 everyone. This is Steve Zercher. You're looking to the east on Think Tech, our show that we have twice a month looking at various issues from an Asian perspective. Today we have a very special guest, someone who I've been interacting with now for a number of years. His name is Robert Eldridge and he's quite an esteemed individual, many, many accomplishments, many books as he's published on a wide variety of subjects having to do with Japan and Asia. Just very briefly, Robert, I can't do justice to your accomplishments but I do want to mention you were formerly a professor at Osaka University, one of the finest schools in Japan and you also were involved in the military service with the Marine Corps base in Okinawa for a number of years. Currently you're a consultant and you run your own Think Tank, which is called Robert Eldridge Think Tank, so you're the president of that. So I know I'm missing many other accomplishments for you. You probably published a book or two in the last few months that I'm not aware of and I know you're just so prolific in that area. So thank you so much for being on the show. Thank you very much for having me. Yeah, great. So Robert mentioned he'd been on Think Tech before a number of years ago, so this is not his first engagement with us, so it's good to have welcome you back. Thank you. Aloha. Aloha. Yeah, so Think Tech has been featuring the war in Ukraine. Of course, it's a number one issue worldwide. It's consumed the attention of countries like Japan all over the world. This show's purpose is to take a look at this from the Asian perspective and Robert is an expert in that area. So Robert, just looking at what's going on in the last couple of weeks, are you beginning to see that there are ramifications or impacts? Let's start specifically with Japan. And maybe you can start with just briefly describing the pre-war relationship between Japan and Russia. Great. Well, thank you again for having me and it's good to see everyone. In addition to my time in Okinawa, I also spent one year at Camp Smith in Hawaii with Marine Forces Pacific and that wasn't my introduction to Hawaii, but it was my time to fall in love with the with the with the state and I longed to get back there in the future. So I hope an opportunity comes up for that. But I've been based in Japan for the past 32 years. And so your question about Japan's relations with Russia really get at the heart of Japan's foreign relations. And you know, as you know, and probably most listeners and viewers know, Japan's had a very, very difficult relationship with its northern neighbor and has actually been at war with Russia on a number of occasions. The most famous one being 16, 17 years ago with the Russo-Japanese war in which Japan won barely, but but it did win. And then more recently at the very, very end of World War Two. And as a result of World War Two, or the Soviet Union's entry into World War Two, a couple of major things happened. First of all, the former Soviet Union violated a neutrality pact that it had with, you know, with Japan. And so Japanese really, really came to distrust Russia, the Soviet Union in many ways because of that. Secondly, the former Soviet Union, Russia today, occupied four islands in off of Hokkaido, which were historically Japanese territories, Japanese islands, and quickly populated the islands with Soviet citizens. And so I think there's some parallels with Russian activities in Eastern Europe, too, in that regard. And unfortunately, essentially the war had ended at that point, but the Soviet Union invaded those territories and have not given them back over the past 77 years, although it had multiple opportunities to do so. I'm very critical of Soviet Union Russian foreign policy in that regard, that they had many opportunities to restore, you know, good relations with Japan if they had returned those islands, which are very little strategic benefit to Russia. And a third issue that emerged from the Soviet Union's entry into World War Two was the the inhumane treatment of Japanese citizens that were in North Eastern Asia. For example, the Korean Peninsula, Manchuria, and so the immense human rights violations, plus the treatment of the Japanese prisoners of war, the Japanese soldiers, many of whom weren't allowed to return until essentially the mid 1950s, and many of whom were indoctrinated with communist ideology when they were returned. So they were basically like a, you know, a fifth column inserted into Japan at that point. And then post World War Two, you know, Russian activities or Soviet activities with involvement in domestic politics here in Japan, you know, particularly with the Communist Party and to some extent with the Socialist Party, as well as spying activities, espionage activities within Japan. So the two countries don't have a particularly good relationship. And then I just saw in the news a few minutes ago that Russia designated Japan an unfriendly country. And so it's only going to get, you know, get worse, I think. Is that as a result of Japan sending supplies to Ukraine? I read that a few days ago that Japan has taken the initiative to provide, I don't think it was necessarily guns, but it was more support materials like uniforms and some, I can't remember now, Robert, what it was. You really understand that article. Yeah, helmets and flag gear. Yeah. Yeah. And also participating, you know, quickly, rapidly in the sanctions and sanctions. Yeah, or having a huge impact, I think, on Russia. And so I think, you know, when we step back now, after a couple weeks, a few weeks to see what's going on, I think the biggest thing that has emerged, it may be an unintended consequence and is potentially, you know, extremely dangerous. And I personally think it's going to change the global order permanently, or at least for, you know, our lifetimes, is that the international community's response to Russian aggression, as well as Russian aggression in and of itself, has bound Russia to China in a way that is just, it's unprecedented. And I'm not necessarily saying that the, you know, the so-called West is at fault for doing that, but Russia is now going to be entirely beholden to the People's Republic of China. And so if they were somewhat equal prior to this, the relationship has greatly changed where the PRC will now eventually be calling the shots, I think, over Russia, certainly over its economy. And then once it has control of its economy, you know, in particular as a result of the sanctions, then Russia is going to be a client state of China. Very interesting point, Robert. And that's actually the next subject that I wanted to address. It's ironic in the sense that Russia, by invading Ukraine, wanted to create a client state of its own, or I understand actually absorbed Ukraine back into Russia. And as a result of doing that, they are now going to become a de facto economic client state of China, potentially. You know, I was looking at the economics of Russia and it's an oil state. It really doesn't have anything beyond those natural resources. So in a sense, it's like Nigeria in a way and it's corrupted at the same level. So they don't have a diversified economy. They are dependent on the one resource that they have. And China, of course, is one of their major trading partners and probably a major consumer of their oil resources. So just before we go on to China, because that is something that I wanted to talk about, given what you've just described about Japan's rocky relationship with Russia, not very positive. Looking forward, it doesn't seem like it's going to get any better with potentially Japan. For example, there are thoughts now that Russia's only lifeline is its oil exports and maybe the US and EU would even though it would hurt their economies begin to ban Russian oil from coming in. Would Japan be able to do that as well at this point, do you think? I think Japan, for the most part, is going to follow the G7 and the international community wants to do. And there's a strong push within Japan to restart nuclear reactors and rely more and more on nuclear energy. And so this will give strength to those arguments for that as well. So as we both know, Japan's weathered oil crises in the past before and it'll find a way to get through this. There are voices in Japan that are somewhat sympathetic to Russia for Russia's reasons for its actions. Not so much from an ideological point of view, just from a like a realist point of view. And those people may have exercised some sway in public opinion, but I don't think they'll have a big influence on the Japanese government. Okay, so let's turn then to the the issue that you raised about China. The relationship between Japan and China is a complicated one. Of course, the United States relationship with Japan is influential in terms of how this all works among these three countries. But at a high level, what do you see the incursion by the Russians in Ukraine? What that impact would be on the Japan-China relationship? And then I guess, at least from I'm an American, maybe this is, I'm overemphasizing this, but maybe not, Robert. Maybe you will agree that the U.S. relationship with Japan is very important in terms of how Japan looks at China. Yeah, I think a lot of people in Japan look at the parallels between the Russian aggression in the Ukraine and the potential for Chinese aggression in the Taiwan Strait and potentially against Japan in the future. Japan's become more and more aware of PRC-led political warfare against other countries such as those in the Belt and Road Initiative or against Japan itself. When the elites of society are captured through bribery or other means, and so then the political world gets influenced and dependent on China. The economic community gets dependent on China. China practices something called lawfare, where it unilaterally declares a law and expects other countries to abide by it. And it's particularly true in maritime matters and information operations, all sorts of things that China's doing. And they see that a potential Ukraine situation may happen in East Asia. And so I think one of the big lessons for Taiwan, for example, as well as Japan, is the importance of civil defense, being able to resist any military aggression. And in the Taiwan context, that's called the porcupine strategy. Yeah, and basically to make it so painful to attack Taiwan. And what's happening in Ukraine right now, right? Exactly. The citizen soldiers are fighting back at a level that's surprising in the entire world. Right. And then the international community rallies alongside Ukraine. And that makes me a little bit concerned, though, in this region, because Taiwan's not essentially internationally recognized as an independent nation, which I believe it is. And I firmly support Taiwan's role in the international community. And whereas Ukraine, even though Russia denies, Russia or Putin denies Ukraine's existence, it does have international recognition. Whereas Taiwan, for the most part, roughly a dozen countries and most of them in a very small island nations, only those few do. So whether the international community... And that, of course, is because, sorry, the interrupt you wrote. That's of course the influence of the PRC. Exactly. Using economic bribery or threats or other forces of coercion to say, there's only one China and you need to recognize and therefore you cannot recognize Taiwan. Exactly. And the most recent example, the most recent example of that was in Lithuania. And so China put immense pressure on Lithuania for having open diplomatic relations with Taiwan. And because a lot of Lithuanian exports go to the European Union or vice versa, the European Union felt the pressure from China as well because of Lithuania's activities and diplomatic support. And so you may think, well, that's small country. Of course, it's going to be vulnerable to it. But the same thing happens, unfortunately, in the United States, where China's able to put pressure on all sorts of entities, Apple being one example or the NBA or Hollywood. And so unfortunately, unlike Russia, China is, I think, and some may disagree, is less vulnerable to international economic sanctions than Russia is. And so, for example, the U.S. imports half a trillion dollars of goods from China. Seven of the 10 largest shipping ports are in China. Most of the international shipping that the U.S. depends on relies on countries other than the United States and in particular China. So at the end of World War II mentioned World War II earlier, the U.S. had something like more than 60% of the world's merchant marine. And now it's minimal. Most of the other countries have it. So China, unfortunately, is going to be increasingly less vulnerable to economic sanctions. And then once you get this energy angle to it with the connection with Russia, then it's even more and more independent in that regard. So a couple of things, Robert, I was thinking as you were speaking. Obviously, depending on how this turns out, that would, I think, either increase or decrease the likelihood of tensions increasing between China and Thailand. For example, let's say Russia loses. You know, I'm not, I don't think that that's highly likely, but there's a possibility that they actually lose this. And Putin falls as a result of this. I think that would be an object less than for China. However, let's say Putin succeeds and Ukraine is absorbed. And the world, you know, after this occurs, moves on as is always the case, you know, to other issues and so forth. So those are two different scenarios that I think would highly influence China in terms of their strategy. Because it seems to me from what I've been able to pick up, China is really dancing a very fine line now about what to do with Russia. The economic issues that you raised earlier are incredibly important, but also China pretends to be a world leader economically and would like to see themselves in terms of politics. And very clearly, the world is aligning itself against Russia on this, and China's not doing that. So do you agree with me that how this actually plays out will influence China's strategy going forward? I think very much and I see both sides, both arguments to it. You know, some commentators I respect that are back in the States, for example, will say this has slowed down China's efforts to take Taiwan. And there's always been an argument, I think, outside of China as well as within China about, you know, the timing for that and whether, you know, and then the timing dictates whether it'll be by force or peacefully. I think that the peaceful option is basically off the table because of Taiwanese national identity. The longer it continues in its current state, the more the Taiwanese people identify as Taiwanese and not as Chinese. It's just a generational shift away from that. I worked in Korea for a number of years as a GAM, and South Koreans say the same thing. The North Korean people, even though they're still family relations, the divergence is so wide now that they consider it to be two separate states. Right, right. So, you know, you could argue that that's going to put even more pressure on China to make a move while the, you know, the Nationalist Party still has some extent of influence within, you know, within Taiwan. There's also another window that's not really talked about too much. And a year ago, actually today, here in Japan, March 8th, a year ago, in Hawaii, the Indo-Pacific Command commander at the time, Admiral Davidson, was back in Washington, and he gave a presentation before the Senate Armed Services Committee, and he mentioned that China will likely make a move on Taiwan within 10 years, maybe within six years. And nobody was able to explain the six-year concept or why six years. My own research, I think it has to do with the fact that China has essentially a huge advantage in a space war right now. And, you know, as we know, in a modern war, we're very dependent on satellites and, you know, for GPS communications and whatnot. And China has the ability to take out allied or U.S. satellites very easily. And, you know, you've heard about, you know, the launching of equipment into space, the space arms that can, you know, help remove space garbage and whatnot. But it also has another function to knock out enemy satellites. So in this case, from a PRC perspective, U.S., Japanese, other allies, allies. And so China has the potential to make the U.S. blind in a Taiwan Strait's contingency. And the U.S., and this is public knowledge, the U.S. won't be able to deploy essentially a satellite, you know, defense system, protection system in this regard for about six years. So that's probably where Admiral Davidson got the six years thing. In other words, China's had an advantage during this time. And then going back to Japan, the U.S.-Japan-Taiwan relationship is called like a shared destiny. And that's very, very true, except that triangular relationship is at its weakest point between Taiwan and Japan. In other words, there's no legal, diplomatic, political, or defense relationship between Taiwan and Japan. So the United States and Japan has the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty that has been in existence for 70 years this year. And the U.S. and Taiwan have the Taiwan Relations Act for 43 years. But between Japan and Taiwan, there's no similar agreement. And Japan is a very legalistic country, as you know. It won't do anything unless there's a legal basis to it. And I've been encouraging Japan for the past four years that it needs to create a Taiwan Relations Act. That would then allow Japan from its interpretation to have more formal relations with Taiwan, to do, you know, mil-to-mil interactions, to help welcome Taiwan to, for example, the naval exercises called RIMPAC, or to do other sorts of, you know, activities. So yeah, this is really changing up the global order, as well as the regional order. Yeah, I noticed, maybe because of your influence, Robert, that some Japanese politicians are beginning to publicly state that the relationship between Japan and Taiwan needs to strengthen. But just as you pointed out with Lithuania, China is Japan's largest trading partner. And if Japan was to move in that direction, China would respond with economic threats, I'm sure. So this is the balance that all countries who are doing business with China, which is the majority of the world, they have their economic interests, and then they may have their political interests that could be misaligned. Even if you think about Japan's relationship to the U.S. and China, too, they're kind of a copy between economic interests and political interests as well. But that's an entirely other show. And you've probably written a book on that subject, Robert, to our many articles. Yeah, thank you. I would like to mention, though, that there is a conscious effort in Japan led by the Prime Minister's office to shift Japan away from the dependency on China. And as we saw during the COVID crisis, the supply chain issue became very prominent. And as a result, they created a position for economic security minister in the form of Minister Kobayashi. And so there's a clear effort by Japan to shift the supply chains. So if anyone listening to this in Hawaii or Kones is interested in that, yeah, definitely get in touch with the show and give you more information. Okay. Robert, we have run out of time. This has just flown by. So thank you so much for your informed opinions and your explanation of these relationships that are ongoing in Asia. I'm sure our viewers are coming away with this having a much better understanding of this dynamic part of the world, the Asian part of the world. And I look forward to having you back on the show in the future to talk about this issue or many other issues as well. Thank you very much. Thank you. Aloha. All right. Thank you. That's a wrap for us. Next show, we're going to be moving in a slightly less controversial area. We're going to be talking about Japanese baseball since there's no baseball in America right now. I thought I created a show for you baseball fans to be able to learn about Japanese baseball. We'll have a former player on the show and a friend of mine who is kind of a historian, a chronicle of current Japanese baseball activity. So that'll be in a couple of weeks. Tune in for that again. Robert, thank you so much. And thank you everyone for tuning in. Bye-bye everyone. Aloha.