 actually quite influential in covering negotiations for both the 94-greed framework and the Six-Party Talks. David Sanger from the New York Times. So at this point I'm going to thank Paul Towns for coming and turn it over to David. Well thank you Victor and thank all of you for coming here and thanks to CSIS. But as Victor has suggested we actually do have an all-star panel here and pleased to say that they are all good friends and I'll stipulate the beginning. None of you have ever talked to the New York Times for a newspaper story. So we'll have that straight up. So let me just do a very quick introduction because for this crowd you all know each of them but Yang Wuchun who's down at the at the other end of the stage for me here is the chairman and founder of the Korean Peninsula Future Forum and he of course was the national security advisor under President Lee from 2010 to 2013 a particularly active time in all of this. Sitting next to him Steve Bosworth who's now a senior fellow at the Belford Center of Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School and as chairman of the US Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins Nitsay School and of course was dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy but because that job wasn't a busy enough one he decided that he would take on a part-time gig at the time as the Obama administration's main envoy for dealing with the North Koreans something that made wanting Fletcher look easy right Steve. Bob Galucci is a distinguished professor in practice of diplomacy at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown he of course was the dean of the school for 13 years and was the president of the MacArthur Foundation in Chicago and he was the special envoy who dealt with the North Koreans during the 1994 crisis was I think the time when we first met and did a lot of business together and then of course immediately to my left is Chris Hill who's the dean of the Corbell School of International Studies at the University of Denver and prior to that he was an ambassador of course to Iraq to Korea and also ran the talks with North Korea that took place in the second half of the Bush administration about which he has written a lot. I've written a fair bit about his time there anybody who wanted to see interesting interchanges you should go read up on the interchanges between Chris Hill and Vice President Cheney they're some of the most entertaining dialogues back and forth in recent American governmental history. So let me start first with you Ambassador Chun so we heard Rich Armitage at the last session say you know I'm not sure the North Koreans really want to go deal with us very much and by us I think he meant with the United States directly or at least don't want to deal with them as much as as perhaps Kim Jong-un's father did and grandfather did that they're on a different agenda and that they are pursuing more of a campaign of terror that would suggest perhaps a at least an internal concern about how well the regime can hold together a way that we haven't seen before so my opening question is do you agree with with Mr. Armitage's analysis and what can you tell us about what you think is different but the way Kim Jong-un is is handling both the country and the nuclear issue well I wouldn't say that Kim Jong-un is not interested in talks I think the problem is that the talks that he envisages would not be acceptable to to the rest of the six body partners so I think the talks that the terms of the talks that he has in mind are not acceptable to us I think he wants talks on the premise that he doesn't have to deal with crimes he may be interested in capping North Korea's nuclear capabilities in exchange for political economic rewards so I don't think we can resume that kind of talks with North Korea North Korean terms so it's about the terms and conditions of resumption of the talks not about talks themselves so if it is talks you know on the assumption that North Korea doesn't have to deal with crimes that would end up legitimizing North Korea's nuclear armament that's I think not better than no talks at all in my view and what does I tell you about the stability of the regime well we have we have been hearing you have you have more to say no I was well we have been hearing some horror stories about executions of the latest executions about former Defense Minister and senior officials in North Korea so that would give us impression that the regime is unstable I think we have to guard against the quick judgment about that what that means to me is that Kim Jong-un doesn't have much tolerance for dissenting views of his colleagues in the political bureau and he may not like the unsolicited advice about how he should conduct business in the country but I wouldn't conclude that the regime itself is shaky because of the some sexy headlines that we have read but I think if he continues to execute those who he would deem as disloyal or disrespectful about his leadership then he would push the senior power elites into a coalition against him that would be very dangerous thing he he's taking chance but I wouldn't underestimate that he's in in firm control of the key veins of power but if he but in the long run I wouldn't believe that the regime will be stable but I think the most important game he's playing is with with a Bing Jin policy it's a to track policy of economic development and nuclear armament and what concerns me is he's making progress I think we we don't have to dismiss him I think he may be making progress because of weak sanctions in place the sanctions which do not really bite North Korea so he's not really paying much price in for nuclear armament and he's moving full speed ahead without impediments to building operational nuclear arsenal and with a more sophisticated means of delivery so this is something that we have to watch out and I think we shouldn't lose sight of the bigger picture because of the the persecutions the purses executions that we hear from North Korea so Steve you're no longer paid to defend the administration's policy on all of this but I'll I'll press in that direction anyway so we hear from Ambassador Chun that North Korea is not really paying much of a price for its nuclear development the last set of sanctions we saw put on the North were in early January in response to the Sony attack wasn't really nuclear related but it was an effort to try to trim their sales on another form of possible aggression of the United States and allies and yet when you compare the sanctions regime for North Korea to say what the administration has done so publicly and so aggressively with Iran it would lead you to a conclusion that the administration's significantly more serious about the Iranian problem than they are about actually changing behavior in North Korea is that a is that an unfair assessment no what I've always loved about Steve is he's a man of few words out here tell us why well I was sitting in living in New York in 1994 minding my own business and the gentleman on my right and his co-conspirator in the front row Bob and Tom came to me and persuaded me and I don't quite know how even now to leave that comfortable existence running a small foundation and take on the task of organizing the Korean Energy Development Organization and running it the lesson from which was tested has never returned the luci's phone call exactly yeah right too late and that's 20 years ago 21 years now and I think charitably one could argue there were two brief periods of success in US strategy toward North Korea in that long period of time first was in the immediate aftermath of the agreed framework and the Kato implementation process I think there were opportunities there that for various reasons we were unable to take advantage of North Korea was not trying to take full advantage of them but there there there was a potential second period was when Chris was engaged in the in the six-party talks 2005 and for a brief period after that when I think there were opportunities and to give Chris full credit I think he managed to implement or take advantage of most of those opportunities other than that including my own period of service as special representative I think the history of American policy toward North Korea has been one of pretty much unrelenting failure that's a harsh judgment to make and I don't ascribe all of the blame for that to by any means to the United States the principal villain on the Korean Peninsula is after all North Korea and that's a basic reality but none of us walk away from this 20 years of engagement with with metals of commendation for what as national policies we've managed to achieve and to the initial question of what what is it that makes the Obama administration from your discussions with them in the first term feel as it seems to me that this is a problem that they have to sort of look at in the rearview mirror that certainly the the test that took place the nuclear test that took place shortly after the president was inaugurated seemed to turn many people who might have been interested in engagement in the White House into sort of North Korea Hawks but tell us why they seem to be stuck between not wanting to engage that much but also not wanting to do the kind of organized sanctions regime we've seen in the Iran case well first of all I don't think North Korea is nearly as vulnerable to that kind of sanctions regime as Iran was Iran had a significant although not huge middle class which was actively engaged with the outside world Iran was in many ways similar to South South Africa in the 80s North Korea did not have that now some of our sanctions have hurt them without question but it is not the kind of measure that you can apply as we did in the case of Iran and cause within a relatively brief period of time desire for change in the underlying circumstances Bob as you think back to the 94 period went forward to that which I think a Steve's point now was was one of the hopeful moments when we had the framework together and you then compare it you speed forward 20 years to today tell us what lessons that emerge from the framework agreement you think we might be able to apply if any to the current circumstance do you have another question I I do but you're gonna forget it from Chris and be worse of mine I think we worked on an assumption in 1993 94 that there might be could be an intersection in our interests the North Korean interest we had a model we applied to North Korea to answer the question why did they want to have a nuclear weapons program and it was a simple model they wanted to have a nuclear weapons program probably in order to prevent regime change from being imposed upon them by the United States as to sole remaining superpower at that point in the early 90s and in order to preserve their own survival and possibly also they wanted to have nuclear weapons so that they might eventually use them to still the United States and prove and essentially break the alliance so that they could unify the peninsula under force of arms so it was a simple model and it was that the nuclear weapons had to do with either an offensive or a defensive posture and the idea was if we could we have a negotiation with North Korea that met its objectives not the offensive one but the defensive one could we have a relationship with that for them political relationship that removed the threat they might or we presume they perceived from the United States and the Republic of Korea that's what we were thinking we didn't know that's what we were thinking that by the way in terms of lessons is still what I think we're thinking because we actually don't know what the North Koreans were thinking then or are thinking now the proposition that the North Koreans will not give up their nuclear weapons program and therefore as Ambassador said I think quite precisely we should not negotiate with them unless the nuclear weapons program is on the table to be given up is in my view correct for the reason that were we to do otherwise we would be legitimizing that program as you said so I share that view it's a view we had in 94 I think it's still a correct view I I don't know it of any conclusions that we have reached through the crisis period but he can talk about that that revises the basic structure of what we were trying to do and what assumptions we were making while we're doing it the assumptions didn't mean then in the 2000s or now that we absolutely know what motivates the North Koreans but the idea is let's explore and see if we can find that point that still seems to me that's a lesson it's it's worth doing I think another lesson is that once you succeed at that to whatever degree you cannot walk away I thought that was a very kind way that my colleague to my left characterized what didn't happen after the agreed framework in 1994 much greater attention should have been paid I think in retrospect to curating that that arrangement that's another lesson the implementation of it making sure Congress delivered what they said they would what the US if David if they really if we were right about what the North Koreans expected from the framework namely that it would create a political relationship with the United States which would leave them in no longer in need of nuclear weapons as a method of dealing with the possible threat in the United States we did not do that certain things happened and both on the side of a new Republican Congress and on the side of a administration that had other things on its mind so that's another lesson from this and maybe I should stop there well Chris you just heard Bob he left the situation perfectly well organized for you when you when you came in I can't imagine how it is that you had so much trouble dealing with these guys at that time but I'm wondering if you take us up through the Bush administration's time you had a first term in which as Bob just described in the Bush administration they essentially walked away from a program that the North Koreans were as we now know cheating on with the uranium enrichment program by the second term by the second part of president Bush's term you came in with that group of people who believe that the first rule of holes is stop digging one and you started up a negotiation that ultimately resulted in what turned out to be some dismantlement but reversible dismantlement as we as we've seen tell us a little bit about what you think the lessons from that period are that we should be drawing for right now well I think any administration wants to look at the activities of a previous administration and I can certainly you know respect the idea that you know they didn't want to continue with the framework agreement whatever the problem was they didn't replace it with anything so we went for arguably four years without anything in its in its place and you know the frame framework agreement became a sort of term you couldn't use you know within meetings in the Bush administration but frankly it was a process whereby we got a handle on North Korea's nuclear program it was absolutely in my opinion the right thing to do and if you're going to change it you better replace it with something else and that wasn't done so first rule is if you're going to if you're going to discontinue something you better think in terms of what you're going to put in its place so then along came the six-party talks and I think it was the right approach after all it's not just an American problem it's a it's a problem for the entire region and coming as I came from Republic of Korea where I've been ambassador and you know Steve talks about being happy in New York I was happy in Seoul I mean and so being asked to do this I came with the context and the timing that this North Korean issue was creating big problems in the US South Korean relationship big problems that I found very worrisome because I feel I feel our most important relationship there is not North Korea it's it's obviously the Republic of Korea and so I thought it was very important to re-engage and re-engage in a partnership with other parties especially South Korea Steve said some nice comments about my role in these six parties but you know I worked with others especially Chun Yong-woo together I mean we we you know nailed a few issues and basically the strategy was as you suggest when you see a hole stop digging but when you when you see something you know that requires immediate attention do something about it and so the first thing we did was the idea to shut down the plutonium program plutonium was after all the material in which they're making bombs it did not mean that we didn't believe that there might well be a uranium enrichment program in fact there was a lot of evidence which was consistent with the idea there was a uranium enrichment program so quite simply we wanted to shut down the plutonium program and keep the door open to further explanation on the uranium enrichment program so every time I talked about plutonium people would say well why aren't we doing anything on the uranium enrichment sort of like you know when I wear a yellow tie my wife says what's wrong with the red tie I mean you know you've got to do something and it doesn't mean you can do everything at the same time but we certainly were not prepared to just forget about the uranium enrichment program we knew that was an issue so what we hoped was to stop the bomb making material and then secondly by a series of small steps get the North Koreans to follow along in this in the process this idea that they were to fall out of bed one morning and make a sort of strategic decision to do away with all their nuclear weapons I just didn't see that happening strategic decisions are fairly rare in the world so mostly what you do is you kind of edge people in the right direction and they feel that you know world hasn't you know collapsed because I've moved a few inches this way so I'll continue to do that so that was kind of the day-to-day strategy and it was especially important to get the US government behind this as your opening comment suggested I'm not sure we ever got the vice president behind the president's program I'll lead that up to the vice president or the former vice president the former president to sort out he was pretty clear in there in his memoirs on that issue yes he certainly contained his enthusiasm for just about everything we were doing but we certainly we got a national security staff and Victor Cha was very instrumental in convincing others within the National Security Council to test this these assumptions that maybe we can make progress but Victor also understood that losing or losing this relationship of South Korea or seeing this relationship diverge was also very deleterious to our regional interests so we worked very hard on that at the end of the day the issue ended the negotiations ended not because we didn't want to continue but rather North Korea never gave us the verification that we required so when they gave us a declaration frankly I didn't care what they were going to say in their declaration what was important was whether we could verify things that we were concerned about and they essentially gave us a verification regime that allowed us to verify things that we already knew so we had to stop going forward on the basis of the fact that we did not have a verification process now maybe with a normal country and I do not put North Korea into that category you could sort of begin with a verification process and then kind of widen the scope of it and eventually have the verification needed but it was pretty clear the North Koreans had no intention of allowing us to verify suspected sites they used to the stuff about Iraq at the time they said you know you would you just wanted to look at Saddam Hussein's palaces but then they denied having any palaces of their own so and certainly we're not prepared to to allow us to verify and that's where it all ended so was it right to get into a negotiation on an incremental basis and try to push it as far as you could absolutely because I think today the ROK US relationship is in pretty good shape and I think overall the US did well in the region for having tried just a brief note to history what happened 2009 2010 why was the Obama administration not able to engage which was I would say in the opening several months was the overwhelming sentiment within the administration we really wanted to try to restore the momentum that that Chris and the Bush administration had gained in the period 2005 on why not why didn't it happen it wasn't because of our lack of sincerity if you will it was largely because I think in retrospect because of the internal situation in North Korea even then they were going through a transition of leadership Kim Jong-il had been ill since visibly ill since 2008 they were clearly preparing the ground for succession on the part of Kim Jong-un and I think in retrospect it clearer to me than it was certainly at the time there was a predisposition on the part of North Korea to make sure everybody understood that the United States was the enemy that there was no possibility for compromise hence President Obama greeted him greeted them in effect with his open hand and as I've cited before they basically extended their middle finger and they then had a missile test they had a nuclear test they did all sorts of stuff I think in retrospect designed to buttress the regime as it went through this very difficult transition which as far as we know may still be underway Ambassador Chun when you were in office as national security advisor during this time you were famously engaged in some conversations as the US had been previously with the Chinese on how you go handle the North Koreans and we read probably more about that than you would care for us to have all read thanks to the WikiLeaks revelations but in the course of those discussions it certainly seemed as if it was South Korea's view that China could be peeled away to some degree from the North Koreans and if you look at what's happened since Kim Jong-un came in I would say that the relationship with the Chinese and the North Koreans has turned from frosty to frostier I mean he has still not he's been in office for over two years now he's still not made a trip to China and the Chinese don't seem to be extraordinarily eager to go deal with him a few years ago we would have thought this was great news but it doesn't seem to have made that big a difference so give us your analysis of what's going on well we never have enough information about North Korea to make an informed judgment that's we are we are all trying to make an educated guess on North Korea-China relations actually I have been continuing my discussions with Chinese even after I retire and and I think there has been a lot of a change in China's rhetoric attitude toward North Korea but I I see no basis to no ground to conclude that China's fundamental policy toward North Korea is changing or is likely to change anytime soon they are they are more they are tougher for North Korea and they are trying to be more emphatic in pushing North Korea into denuclearization but I don't think they are willing to use any of the leverage they have to push North Korea into denuclearization so they I think they are giving more effusive leaf service to the virtues of denuclearization that would be how I would describe China's position now but I'm not seeing their harsh language translating into real action to you know change North Korea's behavior change North Korea's policy so I don't think that will change anytime soon with North Korea hmm anybody here on that point yeah I just like to comment I agree with that I think China has not made fundamental to see or strategic decisions on on North Korea at the same time there is a difference in the way Chinese talk about North Korea it is very clear that if you took a snapshot today of Chinese attitudes to North Korea and a snapshot 10 years ago 20 years ago big difference I think more importantly there's a big difference between the way China considers the Republic of Korea today and 10 years ago and I think China is gradually coming around to the view that the Republic of Korea is a good neighbor can be a good neighbor for China and I think the quality of the summits they've had the quality of the dialogue between the Republic of Korea and South and China has been very important so I guess my point is I agree that China isn't there yet but I think what we collectively are doing to develop this ROK China relationship needs to continue this needs to be a major focus of addressing the North Korean problem that is the making sure the quality and even quantity of South Korea and Chinese dialogue is enhanced. I feel that China is beginning to reassess the strategic value of North Korea to China and I think they are very much they are more concerned than before about the collateral damage that North Korea is inflicting on China's security and their vital national security interests all they want from North Korea is not to do harm to China's interests and I don't think there's any positive thing that North Korea is and is able to do for China I think that kind of subtle change in strategic thinking is occurring within the I think power elite and among the strategic thinkers in China and they begin to attach greater strategic value to the ROK to the relationship with ROK because for China the strategic value of ROK is increasing while North Korea's value is decreasing so this is I think I don't know how this new assessment of the relative strategic values between South and North to China is going to lead to their future policy toward Korean Peninsula I don't know how how how that will lead up to but I think there is there is a subtle change going on in their thinking and but I don't think we can expect anything any of an important vital role from China in denuclearizing North Korea they will they still want to mutually contradictory contradictory contradictory things they want both stability of region they they have a very narrow comfort zone with regard to North Korea they don't they don't want they don't want to see any disruptions in their social stability in the border region no massive outflow of refugees to destabilize the the bordering regions so at the same time they want to deal crisis I don't think these two goals can go together I don't think they are going to make a choice although the administration's rhetoric would suggest they still want to make a choice to view it well yes I fundamentally agree with that but there are I think two or three major myths that trouble the policymaking process from the US point of view and substitute for an actual policy toward North Korea one is that North Korea is about to collapse well that's been around for the last 25 years and at some point probably they will but I don't know when and I don't know what circumstances and that may not be by that time a good thing so we have to deal with it as it is the second myth that's I think all too pervasive is that if China really wanted to they could solve this problem and my own view is that China's fundamental dilemma regarding its interest is at least as profound as ours probably more so I wouldn't want to have to address North China's long-term interest on the Korean Peninsula from a policy point of view and remember China has at least 3,000 years of history in dealing with the Korean Peninsula they know what they really would like to see there it's a question of how you bring it about and I would prediction that will never have to be verified one way or another I think is that when the time comes that China think seriously about the future of North Korea they're gonna want to think seriously about the future of the Korean Peninsula and that puts in the question the nature of the US relationship with South Korea and lots of other things but to expect us to expect that China is going to make a discreet to set of decisions affecting their relations with North Korea I think it's just not going to happen Bob if you know it's June which is usually when major league baseball brings out sort of old-timers day and you come out and you get to see everybody show up at the plate one more time so if you were popped back in your old job 21 years later don't flee from the stage right don't accept that premise tell me what kind of strategy you think you would work out both on the China side of this if we take Steve's statement to think is right that that the Chinese have to think of a total Korean Peninsula strategy and if you think about the sanctions element of it and if you think about what incentives if any we want to go offer which the Obama administration is basically offered none following the Gates rule that they didn't want to sell the same course again so if we can proceed from some other premise other than old-timers but I to speak to some of that one it has struck me and I will look to my colleagues on left and right here that it's very difficult to proceed with negotiations with the DPRK if the stars are not aligned in terms of domestic politics and there I say it in the Republic of Korea North Korea and the United States if if for whatever passes for domestic politics in North Korea if they're whatever the regime thinks it needs to do is inconsistent with negotiations with the United States of America they're not going to happen it's very hard for the United States to proceed if the Republic of Korea the domestic politics there are not supportive I have some experience with that in the days of Kim Yong-Sung and and they were not didn't preclude negotiations but let's say there was an edge and certainly in this country if an administration believes it takes great moral courage to engage North Korea because of all the the the comments that come charging submitting to blackmail and naivete etc. in other words if you cannot get these these the domestic support for discussions to proceed it's very hard to believe that you can engage so that's the and I think sometimes that's been the problem certainly for the United States of America a second point is I I think you very much need to understand and be persuasive about why we need to engage the North because it's so unpleasant to do so in other words you've got to be persuasive on the point that to put it in a negative that Secretary Powell many years ago had it wrong when when when Secretary Powell was was asked on a more Sunday morning show about what he was going to do about North Korea he said nothing why do we care what are they going to do with their nuclear weapons are they going to eat them how does how does this said you can't eat plutonium right a month among other things and indeed he's right you really shouldn't be but but the point is that this the North Korean program is not benign as it sits there it's at least a political provocation the non-nuclear weapons status of both South Korea and Japan it is a pop there is the possibility of transfer and it turned out that in fact the North Koreans did transfer important nuclear technology to a country that was once a country called Syria and that that transfer was a very bad precedent it also happens that the ballistic missile program is a cause of anxiety in Japan and and elsewhere so and we add to that North Korean behavior which can be provocative and in fact escalate into a conventional conflict if not more than that so you have to be persuasive it seems to me that there is a reason for engaging the North that to bring them down and you also have to have the North Koreans engage in a way that as we said before more than one of us suggest that they'd be prepared to give up this nuclear weapons program or else it doesn't seem to me to make a lot of sense that's a lot of ifs to get by and it's also an argument that has to be made that this problem does not get better as they used to say like like fine wine by leaving it alone you know it's getting worse and the projections of nuclear weapons capability by 2020 are those projections are maybe 20 weapons maybe more 20 to a hundred low high right it does not yet look like the Pakistani program but it's beginning to look like a serious nuclear weapons program rather than what you might call a demonstration capability and that will be troubling to a strategic vision of the region the I completely agree with my colleagues about China and the X certainly to the extent that we have put it in the United States has put this weight in arguing that this is should be China's problem and I I can't believe that's the right answer the Chinese have a view of this which there is consistency between our outcomes and outcomes they want but they're not congruent the Chinese are huge concerns about instability on the Korean Peninsula and what would happen in a collapse and I don't whether they have the capability to cause the collapse they don't have the will to do that because they see outcomes that should be very difficult to manage so I think we can look to the Chinese for help in these matters of critical points but we can't outsource the problem okay we have a little bit of time for some questions from the audience so why don't we start right back here with this gentleman and he's got a microphone coming and if you can keep the question short tell us who you are Scott Faulkner with the one career coalition a couple months ago Wired magazine talked about the smuggling of thumb drives into the north and so what is your view of is there a undercurrent of domestic turbulence reform questioning of the regime the same way we saw in the 1980s in Eastern Europe is there and is there any anything that can be done to maybe stir that pot wants to take that one up well I used to live in Eastern Europe in the 1980s I like Eastern Europe as even then I liked it like a lot more now but North Korea really has very little to do with Eastern Europe Eastern Europe is no North Korea that said there are some things happening in terms of information getting in we know that from refugee reporting that more information gets in and you think I think one key issue would be if you saw you know radios coming into North Korea must be fixed within a certain amount of time so that they only get a North Korean state signal so if we could start seeing that system break down that would indicate that they're kind of losing control but we're not seeing that system break down at this point the system of five families and this goes way back into the regional culture five families one of whom has to kind of keep track of the others that system is not breaking down so so far we're not seeing the sort of breakdowns that we saw in in Eastern Europe we are seeing much more cell phone use along the Chinese border that has had some time where they pick up the Chinese net right and it's clearly coming from relatives who give a relative a cell phone so right there's some of that but not very much of it but the I guess the overall question is should people continue to pass thumb drives should there be you know balloons full of information and things like that I've never opposed I've never been opposed to it I don't think the US government should put itself from being opposed to it I think so to some extent the ROK has issues you know people in villages don't like to have their villages used as sort of propaganda or to send propaganda those are issues the Koreans need to take care of but as far as I'm concerned we should keep doing things where we can and see what the what is going on let me flip that question in reverse direction and ask it to Ambassador Chun so the most notable thing we've seen North Korea do in the American context in recent times is the Sony hack if you believe that they were behind and that suggests that the North Korean government is seeing in cyber a weapon that they can actually use which they can't do in the case of nuclear and it also suggests that they've gotten significantly better at it than we had thought they were even though if you read what you what's published in the New York Times both South Korea and the United States were pretty deeply up inside the North Korean computer systems as early as 2010 so tell us a little bit about what you think that North Korean strategy is for the use of cyber is a weapon well we have seen you know how good they are in using their cyber capability to to attack even American Sony pictures but you know most people don't understand why North Korea is so good at that I think the best scientific engineering talent in North Korea goes to either nuclear technology or cyber technology so these these are the most popular areas where North Korea's best talent best scientific talent is employed and you don't have many private companies in North Korea no no private company that can employ these best scientists engineers in cyber technology and all they can do is to be employed by the state and all they can do the best thing they can do is to for cyber attack so but in other countries in the Republic Korea elsewhere the best experts in cyber technology they will go to private sector they are better paid there and there are many other areas where they can you know get a better jobs but in North Korea the best place for them is the is the military cyber attack industry so that's that's why even though cyber technology in general is far more backward in than in any other countries you know once if they can get the best talent in one area they can do better in that area than many other countries so that's one explanation I can I can't get off so we shouldn't underestimate their capability but in the end in the end in the future if internet connection spread in North Korea they will be more vulnerable than any country to cyber attack from other countries so they can cut both ways in the future right back here thank you professor Wayne glass from the University of Southern California here with a group of fighting young Trojans I hope you get a chance to meet our young students during maybe after the session great session thank you very much Bob you talked about the domestic political stars lining up I was in the Senate in those days in the wake of the agreed framework and it was my observation that the Congress was working as hard as they could to in effect undo many elements of the agreed framework the Congress is in the business now of engaging the issue of this potential deal with Iran I see the Congress as a key variable in this question of domestic political stars lining up lessons learned that's one of them I hate to be the skunk at the picnic but is there any hope in this regard Wayne if first thing that occurs to me is that while there was with the you know it happens when there's a change in both houses all the committee chairmanship change and all those nice friendly committee sessions you had are not so friendly anymore as the party that was not in control of a White House is now in control of Congress but there it wasn't let's undo the framework it was because they could actually have done some things that would have made it very difficult they kept funding those transfers that we needed to make to implement the framework they wanted to in fact those I don't remember those were transfers of oil heavy fuel oil principally and support support keto some things that that needed to be done so that there was and to go back to Chris's comment there was an awareness among the Republicans and Senate in the house that they didn't have anything to replace the agreed framework with as much as they really didn't like the agreed framework but I think philosophically and because it was administering the other parties administration so they didn't do as as badly towards it as they might however when you look you fast forward enough people have noticed that the political atmosphere which wasn't terrific in in the middle 90s has gone from not being terrific to being horrendous and that if if a leader in the Senate can say our objective is to bring down the president and oppose everything the president wants to do you know your days are going to be pretty long and it makes this the proposition I put on a table before that you need domestic support makes it really a lot harder the Iranian case is going to be interesting I'm sure and instructive to the administration as it plausibly continues to explore the possibility of doing something more with with North Korea if there's a if you will a fair shake here and just a tough look at the deal with Iran as it emerges this month that's one thing if it is no because it has been negotiated by the administration then it makes it very much more difficult seems to me okay time is running a little bit tight we'll take the end lady right here my name is Kayla Orta in 2013 Bosworth and Gucci you wrote an article in the New York Times the International New York Times it was taught it's titled reasons to talk to North Korea and the article you talk about how we shouldn't have no talks for toxic and you talk about how we should engage North Korea it's been two years now and I'm curious to see do you think our current policy stance has changed are we addressing North Korea better or a lot of things you still talked about in that article still true today quickly no no I don't think that our current approach has changed very much at all I think we continue to be enamored with the concept of strategic patience whatever that means and I and I understand these problems are extremely difficult they're politically contentious the administration only has two years left its agenda is very full particularly with regard to Iran and should we be expecting that they're going to pick up and do something forward-looking on North Korea I don't think so how about the flip side of that could they be forced into a crisis with a missile long-range missile launch that actually worked clear evidence that they could shrink a nuclear weapon that could fit on top of these may I sure that that's not a in my view it's not a strategic approach by any means no it's not a hook for negotiations it's a hook for sanctions and literally what works in this country is not to go into negotiation because you were pressured to do it right you it's much in matter of fact after something like that happens what someone will say the administration don't know who someone will say well that means we have to postpone our initiative another six months to a little sort of let the juices that have run out run out a little bit so I mean I agree entirely with what Steve just said an answer to your question but I think you this structure is exactly the opposite we don't respond to the pressure of others by deciding it's a good time to go into negotiation it's a bad time but of course the North Koreans based on some previous experiences might think that those tests actually would force the US into doing or not I mean I don't think so you don't believe I don't think I agree with the beginning of this panel that I don't see political will in North Korea to pursue negotiations and so until they give some private sign that they would like negotiations that they are prepared to deal with negotiations with as Bob said with the nuclear program on the table I think it's very hard to get into negotiations but I can't seem to want it more than they do yeah I mean just just you know you can't buy a rug that way I mean you certainly can't get a nuclear deal that way so I think we need to think not just of negotiations but as a broader strategy that includes negotiations that includes thickening up of missile defense in the region that includes an effort to work with six parties not necessarily on the negotiations but on various other sharing mechanisms I mean as Chun Yang said we you know everything we say about North Korea is an educated guess so let's see what can be done to improve that educated guessing to some partial knowledge and I think that can be done with more sharing so I think the six parties offer a framework for this but I think we need to look at negotiations as an element in the broader strategy we have time for one more and we'll take the only right here my phone's coming to you hi my name is Jackie Kim I'm a research intern for the Human Rights Committee for North Korea and I'm also from University of Southern California I'll go and know with that group thank you so much for for your conversation I had a really good time listening to it so I just want to direct like everyone's attention to what Dr. Campbell said in the first panel he talked about how the issue of human rights in North Korea is always like sidestapped and I think that's very true we hear stories about defectors or POWs and we sympathize with them for like five minutes you know when they're talking or reading their story but after that we just kind of forget about them and when the world looks in North Korea now we look at the nuclear weapons they're using or the regime of Kim Jong-un and we don't really we fail to notice the people that are actually suffering under him and the reason why the world looks at North Korea and views it as not as a country but as like the enemy of the world and like a very inhuman state I guess it's because of the nuclear weapons because of Kim Jong-un I agree but however I think North Korea should be viewed as an inhuman state because of the people who are suffering so what are your views on how to put human rights as a you know first priority and all the new issues that are happening around the world and how do you make North Korea become human again like how do you make the world view North Korea as a human country well let's try that in a slightly different way which is even should human rights be the first item as she's suggesting why not let me just say that during my time we had a six-party process aimed at nuclear disarmament we put everything on the table we're prepared to normalize relations we're prepared to do everything in the context of normalizing relations let's say we got a commitment from the North Koreans not only to to disable but also to dismantle and ultimately abandon all their nuclear programs and then we moved on with our effort which what which are our requirement which was to normalize in the context of any normalization with any dictatorship out of the cold we would have a track dealing with human rights no question we'd have that track but the idea to say well we've got this problem of nuclear weapons so let's just add human rights to it since we can't seem to solve nuclear weapons I doubt we'll solve human rights but it'll sound better if we put it all together I don't think that's serious strategy I think the strategy should be get the nuclear problem under control that is living up to the September agreement of abandoning it create the the process for moving forward with normalization and in the context normalization as we've done with many other countries we have a human rights track so that I think that was the right approach the problem is not us the problem is North Koreans anybody else in that since we are running out of time I would like to go back to the question of how to what to do with North Korean nuclear program only a question and I and there was a question about whether we should re-engage North Korea I I believe that diplomacy still remains the best way to denuclearize and but if we are going to give a chance to diplomacy I don't think we can just the back North Korea to come back to the sixth party that will not work unless we structure restructure the interest for North Korea in a way that can induce them into denuclearization I don't think we diplomacy will work we have to create political energy to make diplomacy work and to strengthen the hand of diplomacy I think we cannot just do that with the current sanctions in place and the sportsworth said earlier that North Korea is less valuable to sanctions that's one of the reasons why sanctions don't work I think another reason is that US doesn't have the same kind of political will to really impose a sanctions that work for North Korea because sanctions are not the current sanctions are not structured to change North Korea's strategic calculations so under the current sanctions that favors North Korea's nuclear armament that would encourage North Korea's nuclear armament with impunity that with if we are going to retain those kind of sanctions which will not really you know bite North Korea I don't think diplomacy will work so could economic sanctions do that or do you need to actually start cutting off shipments in and out of the country physically cut them off if you're really going to make I think there are still many other ways that unexplored ways we can further pressure North Korea into changing their strategic calculus without that happening I think begging North Korea back to the six-party talks alone that and we can re-engage them but without tougher sanctions that can change North Korea's decision strategic decision and their behavior I don't think this even if we resume the six-party talks they will go anywhere that's I think Sid Sellers job to do in the future but Steven Bob West thoughts on a couple of things very quickly one I agree entirely with with Chris about how to the only approach I think is feasible with regard to the question human rights I am appalled by the situation North Korea any thinking human being has to be appalled by that but you're not going to deal with it by focusing everything on that saying we're going to get rid of that problem then we'll move on to other problems it's not the key secondly I think looking ahead we have to go back to the principles of the September 2005 joint statement which clearly establish an agenda beyond denuclearization I think one of our principal difficulties has been that we have focused very heavily almost exclusively on denuclearization that costs questions of support on the questions of human right but it also is not a very attractive agenda to the North Koreans they want to demonstrate asked to demonstrate what else we're prepared to do in the joint statement with its four goals I think sets that forth very clearly whether it's best done within a six-party framework or not I don't really care the issue is not the nature of the framework the question is how do we approach what should be comprehensive negotiations the North Korean threat is most manifestly a nuclear weapons threat but no North Korea is for me North Korea's real threat is its pronounced weakness it's a failed state right at the heart of the most dynamic political economic region of the world and that gives them an importance that the rest of us simply cannot deny and I don't think you deal with that just by focusing on the manifestation of that threat which at the moment tends to be the nuclear program five you got the last word to two quick points as the last word one I could get enthusiastic about more effective sanctions but I wouldn't want to get too enthusiastic unless I were also prepared to deal with consequences that might go kinetic as they say these days so that understand that you don't do this as a freebie you can't just turn the screws and be certain that there will not be an escalation that'll follow from that I'm not saying don't do it but you'd better be prepared in every sense and that means with your ally South Korea and your other ally Japan with with the Chinese understanding this and certainly having a domestic support that's all I'll say on the question of escalating sanctions on the human rights question first of all 1994 was then and this is now in 1994 with with all respect to the human rights community I avoided them because then it was plausible to have an agreement with North Korea which ignored the atrocities of human rights in North Korea and my goal my objective given to me by a president was to do something about the nuclear weapons program not incidentally the conventional weapons program not anything else other than a nuclear weapons program but that was then now I think if I can extract from from what my two colleagues on either side of me said if there's going to be an agreement with North Korea it is not going to be just a nuclear agreement it's going to be a comprehensive agreement and if there's a comprehensive agreement that includes a treaty of peace that includes all kinds of other things things that's entirely impossible to impossible to envision without addressing the human rights issue so I would say don't worry we're not going to do what we did in 1994 we can't we shouldn't we are that will be part of this it will also if you remember in the previous panel human rights was a was a vector of attack with North Korea that may or may not be a wise thing to do but I'm pretty confident that if we do have a comprehensive agreement human rights will be a serious part of it well I thank you very much this is a great panel I enjoyed talking with all of you Victor do you have some last words for us no I too want to reiterate David's thanks I think it was a fantastic panel the whole morning has been great thank you all for coming thank you to especially our green guests from coming from so far and we look forward to seeing you at the next event here at CSIS so this meeting is adjourned thank you