 Good evening and welcome to the Center for Strategic International Studies. My name is Andrew Schwartz. I'm our Senior Vice President for External Relations and I want to welcome all of you to CSIS on behalf of both the Center and Texas Christian University. I'd like to acknowledge Larry Lauer, the Dean of the Vice Chancellor for Government Relations here from TCU. So we have some horned frogs in the house and as many of you follow the football team they had a great game on Saturday night. And Bob's got his spirit here because he's got a socks on. This is an absolutely fascinating topic and there's nobody better here to do it than this panel and I'll leave it with that. Bob, please enjoy. Well thank you all very much on behalf of TCU and the Chief of School of Journalism and CSIS, one of the great partnerships of this century. Tom Friedman was there when the naming took place and we really do have a great panel. There's one more polluter than anybody in Washington. How many? You're up to three now. Three pollutes. He's written five bestselling books in a row and not many people have done that. More to Brahmawits, Ambassador to Turkey, Ambassador to Thailand, once President of the Carnegie Endowment, held all kind of activities. Written no bestsellers. And Scholastic Positions and Bullit Alizrah, Lariza. And he is the founder of the Turkey Project here. He's seen often on television, on the op-ed pages writing about Turkey and a true expert on it. I thought, before we get down to Turkey per se, that I would just get Tom to give us kind of a little overview of what's going on in the region out there. Tom? Well thanks, Bob. It's great to be here. You know, I would just say generally speaking, when it comes to the Arab awakening, which is really the regional context within which Turkey is both emerging and acting today. I think there's one prediction I would feel safe in making and that is that as far as the Arab world is concerned, stability has left the building. And when we're thinking about whether it's Tunisia or Egypt or Yemen or Syria or Bahrain, the only question I have in my mind is which kind of instability are we going to see over the coming decade. And I think this is going to take a long time to play out. That is, will it be instability that has a positive slope and bring these individual countries toward a kind of Indonesia-South Africa transition to democracy, or will it have a negative slope and lead to a kind of Somalia-Pakistan outcome with some kind of military group taking over. I think that's still just very, very much in play. I think that as much instability as we've seen in the region and change, and Lord knows I'm a big supporter of all these democracy movements, but we have seen nothing until it hits Syria because basically my own rule of thumb is Tunisia implodes, Egypt implodes, Yemen implodes, Bahrain implodes, Syria explodes. If the regime there collapses or is brought down by military force, that will pull in necessarily every key power in the region. That will be Iran via Hezbollah and Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq. And we will really see a mini version of the great game there. And so I think that's really the most important thing right now. I think that's probably number one, Wilent can tell us on the, or that probably, and the fate of Iran's nuclear program, probably number one and two on the Turkish foreign policy agenda because of course if Syria collapses, there is the real potential there for a Kurdish safe haven in Syria and particularly of the PKK variety which poses in the Turkish view is certainly a threat to their future. And we're off to the races. So I think as much as we've seen an unstable Middle East up to now as a result of the Arab awakening, an instability that was necessary, and I think hope will be positive in the long run, we have seen nothing until you've seen Syria blow. That will be a volcano. So Wilent, how does that impact Turkey and how will Turkey do that and what will Turkey do? Well, Tom mentioned Syria. And Syria was really the crown jewel of Turkey's opening to the Arab Middle East. For a very long time, Turkey looked primarily to the West naturally because it was an ally of the U.S. It was a member of NATO and it ignored the lands to itself for a very long time. Even before the current government came into office in 2002, there was a lot more interest in the Arab world but it accelerated during the past nine years of the current government and the zero problems policy that was enunciated by this government really focused more on Syria than any other. It has a long border with Syria. It's one of the two Arab countries that Turkey borders, the other being Iraq. And the fact that Turkey has been able to achieve an rapprochement with Syria was really a matter of great pride for Prime Minister Erdogan. Now what we've in fact seen is great tension between Turkey and Syria following on the events in Tunisia, Egypt, and of course there was also Bahrain and Yemen. When it came to Syria is when the Arab Spring, the convulsions that Tom talked about in the Arab world really began to affect Turkey. One, a lot of refugees came into Turkey as the crisis unfolded in Syria. There was a great deal of disaffection between Prime Minister Erdogan and Assad of Syria because Assad simply would not undertake the reforms that he promised Minister Erdogan. And third of course is the Kurdish issue. There is now a lot of suspicion in Turkey that Syria had re-assumed the role that it played in the past, which is that of a sponsor of PKK terrorism against Turkey. Now the PKK is based in northern Iraq, but as I said there's suspicion that not only Syria but now Iran may also be using the PKK card against Turkey in order to ease the pressure by Turkey on Syria and also because Iran is unhappy with the fact that Turkey's agreed to base the radars associated with the missiles on its territory. So the great game that Tom talked about is really on the way and there's a great deal of coordination between Ankara and Washington as the Arab Spring has been unfolding, but ultimately it's Turkey sitting where it sits, bordering Iran and Syria and the possible instability that may still await us in Iraq as we proceed into the future. How does Turkey see itself now in Prime Minister Erdogan? Let me just say if Tom's scenario comes to pass, Turkey's going to be scared as hell. That's what's going to happen. They're going to be scared of an influx. They've got a relatively small influx the first time, 15,000, 20,000 people and this one will be much bigger. They'll be worried about what happens with the Kurds, but I'm less concerned about that because I think there are going to be so many other bigger issues than the Kurds so that Turkey will always be worried about the Kurdish situation in Iran, Syria and Iraq. But on this score, there are so many other bigger issues involved than just the Kurds. So what Turkey will do in the circumstances with the United States, what anybody will do, you'll also mention, you didn't forget to mention Saudi Arabia is going to be deeply interested in this and we'll start playing around. So you have a wild card going on with the impact on Turkey being extremely worried and there's going to be great criticism, I believe in this case of Erdogan, Prime Minister, because one, he started out dealing with an authoritarian government and praising authoritarian government. He quickly switched to supporting democracy and now the whole thing is falling apart. Turkey's going to have a difficult problem knowing how to deal with them and he's going to come under, I think, serious criticism. I may be wrong on that score, but it opens up a totally different world. Now what was your question? That's you answering it. I forgot. Because I'm just going to happen pretty soon, Tom. U.S. troops are going to be out of Iraq by the end of this year. Is Turkey, will they seek a larger role as the U.S. departs and how does the United States feel about it? My suspicion is the United States wants them to seek a larger role. Yeah, I think the United States looks at Turkey as a stabilizing force in Iraq on several grounds. One is they can provide assurance to the Sunni community there and be a friend in court for Sunnis as they try to hold their way against the Shiite majority. That's number one. Number two, the Turks and the Kurds of Iraq, not the PKK, but the two Kurdish parties in Iraq that rule the Kurdistan there, have really developed intimate economic links and really overcome their problems. And they've been, I think, both quite smart about it. The Kurds have invited Turkish contracting companies to do a good deal of the building of Kurdistan and the enormous trade now. And so Turkey will definitely be playing a role there as well. And Turkey, you know, if you just, you know, took the names and dates off here, we could be right back in the, you know, in the 1500s here because basically the Ottoman Turks will balance off the Iranian Persians. And once we are out, there will be a huge struggle between Turkey, Ottoman Turkey and Persia for influence in Iraq. And if we are smart, that is a competition we can play to our advantage without having troops on the ground. I'm also a big believer that once we're out of Iraq, we've deflected, been a lightning rod for an enormous amount of Iraqi anxiety about being occupied by a foreign power and the like. And once we are out, I think a lot of that anxiety will focus naturally on Iran. And I have a thousand years of history that says, you know, Arab Shiites and Iranian Shiites don't play well together. And so I think that Iran will have a much more complicated problem in trying to influence Iraqi politics once America is gone. It will be seen as the regional hegemon and Iraqi politicians that are seen as too close to Iran or its cat's paw, I think will have in time problems within Iraqi politics. Do you see the Iraqis being able to maintain a unified state? I think that's an open question more, but if there's one thing, and I would make no prediction about it, but if there's one thing we've seen about Iraq, you know, since 2003, they've gone to the brink so many times, you know, it's hard to count them anymore. And every time they pull back, at the end of the day, there's turned out to be enough Iraqiness, as it were, for the parties to pull back. Now we played an important role in that, but at the end of the day, they did it. And so I would make no predictions about that. I mean, you have to say the place is held together. I think the larger point that is sort of sobering is when you think about, if you think about all these Arab countries that are now in the process of awakening and the transition to democracy, they all want to and need to make. And we have to root for them to make. And then think about Iraq. I mean, what did it take in Iraq? It took 4,900 American dead, 20,000 wounded, a trillion dollars, seven years, a civil war, where all the parties tested each other's power, what you've got, baby, what you've got, OK? Then we pull them together to write a social contract, stir, bake for two years, and pray that it rises. So that was all done, basically, with the help of an American midwife. Now you're going to have a half a dozen other countries trying to make the same transition from autocracy to democracy with no midwife. And that's, I think, going to be a huge challenge. And that's where maybe Turkey could play a role in our absence. One of the things here is that the US, despite Turkey's severe differences with Israel, the US has very significantly compartmentalized its relations with Turkey and with Israel. It puts, and Obama himself, personally, from everything I've heard, puts great store in Turkey's role in the Middle East in this extremely uncertain period. And in Iraq, I think we're looking to Turkey to sort of remarkably make sure the Kurdish state survives as an entity. And we're looking for Turkey to try to limit Iranian influence in Iraq. So the United States has got a different relationship with Turkey than it's had for a long time. Turkey's ability to confront Iranian influence or to limit Iranian influence in Iraq is limited. Its primary influence is in the north. The moment that you cross from Turkey into Iraq, you're in the Kurdish regional government. Turkey does not officially recognize the Kurdish regional government as such, but deals with it. And the problem there is that the more the PKK attacks Turkey, the more Turkey feels compelled to put pressure on the Kurdish regional government to do something about the PKK. Now, the US, when it was occupying power in Iraq, did not do anything about the PKK. It's right out of the corner, northern corner, northwestern, eastern corner of Iraq, right where it abuts Iran and its difficult terrain. The Central Government of Iraq, obviously, did not have the power to do anything about it. And the KRG, the Kurdish regional government, has not done anything about it. Recently, the Turks have hosted the President of the Kurdish regional government, Mr. Barzani, the Foreign Minister of Iraq, who's actually occurred, Hoshar Zabari, and he put in pressure on them to do something about this. Tom is right. There's a great deal of trade and economic, strong economic relationship between Turkey and northern Iraq. But that could be endangered by the PKK violence and the inability of the KRG to do something about it. So if Turkey is going to play a role in Iraq in maintaining Iraqi stability, we have to look at the possibility that that could really be endangered by the PKK violence. The relationship between the President and Erdogan has been described as a model partnership. Do you think it is? Well, actually, Tom Dulland, the National Security Advisor, described it as an intense relationship, which is an unusual way to describe a relationship between two leaders. The model partnership that President Obama mentioned when he made his first visit to Turkey in April 2009, and by the way, it was his first overseas bilateral visit. So obviously, as Mort says, he regards Turkey as a very important component of his foreign policy. He obviously wanted Turkey to play the role, as he described it in the model partnership, of being a bridge between the two worlds it belongs to. It's linked to the West, but it's also linked to the Middle East and the wider Islamic world. Now, Turkey obviously wants to play that role, because Erdogan is being keen to play that role. For a long time, Tom, you've been following this, Turkey was able to do what the U.S. was not willing to or was unable to do, which is to talk to Tehran and Damascus. Now, we have a situation in which both Syria and Iran are not exactly comfortable with Turkish closeness to the U.S., and we're getting to a situation in which the bridge is coming under pressure from both sides. The U.S. wants Turkey to play an increasing role as a stabilizing force in the Middle East, and there's pushback from these two countries, as well as some of the groups associated with them, for example, like Hezbollah in Lebanon. We're not comfortable with the role that Turkey is playing. So we're really going into a very interesting period in which we will see a test of Turkey's influence in the Middle East. Well, if Iran is a little uncertain about it, what about Russia, for example? How would they feel about Turkey, assuming a larger role? Well, it's interesting that Turkey has developed good relations with both Russia and Iran. In fact, we're doing a study at CSIS, all the triangular relationship between Russia, Turkey and Iran. Turkey's obviously part of NATO. NATO was created to confront the Soviet Union, which dissolved and left Russia and the other 14 former Soviet republics behind. The Turkish-Russian economic relationship is very strong. It's based on energy, primarily guests that Russia is supplying. There's a similar situation with Iran. Iran supplies guests into Turkey. Both Russia and Iran have a trade advantage, a trade balance advantage in the dealings with Turkey. So their limits to what Turkey can do in confronting Russia and the Caucasus or Iran elsewhere because of this strong economic relationship. Now, Russia was unhappy with the missile deal, the missile project, and Turkey's willingness to host the radars. But it hasn't gone beyond a certain limit because if Turkey controls itself as it deals with Russia, the Russians also control themselves as they react to what Turkey is doing. Let's talk about Iran and Turkey's approach to that. Is Turkey's approach different or about the same as the United States' approach? No, I think Turkey does have a different approach still. Turkey is very reluctant to get into a huge hassle with Iraq. Iran? Iran rather, I'm sorry. Very reluctant, very dismayed being caught in the middle here between the United States and the West and increasing pressures to do something about stopping an Iranian nuclear weapon. And on the other hand, the Turkish-Iranian relationship has really weakened. Syria has been a big, a big acerbating factor in limiting or loosening the Iranian-Turkish connection. There are problems also whether Iran is screwing around with the PKK and possibly affecting Turkey's own internal situation. So I think over time the Turkish-Iranian relationship has loosened. It has not loosened to the extent that Turkey is yet willing, it's certainly not willing to support any military action against Iran. And I don't know to the extent to which it would cooperate in severe sanctions against Iran. I personally don't think Turkey's a major factor on what we do about Iran. I think it's a minor factor. That's my own view. Well, the differences were underlined last year when the U.S. put forward a new set of sanctions at the U.N. Turkey was only Security Council at the time. And despite a 45-minute phone call from President Obama to Prime Minister Erdogan, Turkey voted against it. Turkey then, together with Brazil, tried to come up with a separate deal which the U.S. was not willing to support. The trade mode is right. There has been a weakening of the relationship, and yet Turkey's about to open a new border post, a border crossing for Iranian-Turkish trade. Because Turkey's Iran's opening to the West. At a time when it's isolated, increasing the isolated, there's a limit beyond which Turkey's not willing to go. And even if the relationship worsens, I'm not sure that Turkey will be wholehearted and supportive of new sanctions. I don't think we're going to be limited in what we do by Turkey on Iran. I simply don't believe they are a major influence on American policy toward Iran. So if President Romney decides to bomb Iran, Turkey won't be for that, or will we don't? Even if they're not for it, what are they going to do about it? I'd say a couple of things. I think the United States and Turkey are doomed to be friends here for the near future, and Obama and Erdogan. Because I think that given the kind of instability we're going to see in the Arab world, particularly with our traditional allies, Turkey remains a hard power. It is a NATO member. It's got a vibrant economy. We have a long relationship with it, and we are going to be depending on Turkey a lot. And so I think we're going to have to get along, and we will get along, and that's why the administration has been very smart in separating the U.S.-Israel relationship and the U.S.-Turkey relationship, and just keeping them on separate tracks. And as far as Iran is concerned, I think that the one thing that I think, I agree with Wilent, there's enormous commercial ties between the two countries. The Turks, evidently, are resigned to the fact of Iran getting a nuclear weapon. They've lived next to a nuclear Russia all these years. At the same time, though, given where the Sunni Arab Muslim world is on the Iran question, if Turkey wants to continue to have influence in the Arab world, it will have to balance that relationship with Iran with the ties and aspirations and interests of the Sunni Arab world as well. And Erdogan will not be able to dance at both those weddings. Not indefinitely. Does Turkey still want to be part of the European Union, or where is all that? Well, I think we got to the point that one could say that the process is stalled. Recently, I was talking about this, and I said the Russians used to, during the Soviet days, used to have a saying, they pretend to pass, so we pretend to work. The European Commission pretends that there is an ongoing process, and the Turks pretend to believe it. Turkey will not give up the EU process because the massive, domestic transformation has been done with reference to the EU accession process. But I'm convinced more and more that Turkey just does not want to be just another EU country. It prefers to focus on its relationship with Washington than with Brussels. There was great tension in the relationship between Turkey and Germany and Turkey and France because of these two countries' opposition to Turkish entry and those two are the dynamos of the EU, and the EU has massive problems. So Turkey at this moment is still proceeding as if it wants to be a member, but frankly that seems more and more unlikely than ever before. And what about Turkish-Israeli relations? Where is that and what does it mean to the rest of the world? I don't see any short-term improvement in Turkish-Israeli relations unless there comes into play because of sort of the type of factors Tom has raised which would change that. I think Erdogan has a deep animosity toward Israel, but he's also a practical politician and he also wants a very close relationship with the US. So I think that right now that is mostly frozen. And one of the things that interested me in this regard has been that despite the virulence of the Turkish-Israeli relations at the time that Mr. Erdogan came to the United States, that note that the US Congress did nothing, that the Armenians did nothing, that arms supplies continued on to Turkey, and we just sold them three very important helicopters. And I believe that's largely a function of the Israeli government not wanting to exacerbate any further the Israeli-Turkish relationship and they all laid off trying to undermine Erdogan. I can't prove that, but I think that's a factor. And I think any way that Israel can restore the relationship is deeply in Israeli interest. You know, I would say that there are 22 members of the Arab League. I love every one of them. But we don't need a 23rd. And if Turkey decides that it wants to go so far as to in effect become the 23rd member of the Arab League, it would be a huge strategic mistake for Turkey because Turkey's influence and its relevance in the region and vis-a-vis the United States was as a bridge between and Erdogan was an active mediator between Syria and Israel in the old American government. I think it's too bad that the United States painstakingly with lawyers from the Israeli government worked out a deal to overcome the whole, you know, flotilla, Gaza flotilla incident. It didn't even involve really an apology so much as Israel expressing regret. And Prime Minister Netanyahu turned it down because he was afraid that he went against his own legal team, not to mention our Secretary of State, because he was afraid that it would leave him exposed politically to his arch-rival, the foreign minister, Lieberman. And so, you know, this is going to grind on for a while. I'm a big believer that geography is destiny. Turkey and Israel are, again, doomed to be friends given the geography of the Middle East, these two non-era powers. And we'll find a way to get back to it at some point. I'm more pessimistic about this You talked about President Romney ordering an attack on Iran. You know, during the past two weeks we've seen speculation that Israel might attack Iran. If that happens, then you're going to get a reaction certainly from the Turkish public and certainly from the Turkish government, even if, you know, privately the possible elimination of Iran's nuclear capability might be welcomed. And also, with respect to what Mort was saying, now, since the arms embargo on Turkey imposed by Congress in 1974 because of Cyprus, Turkey relied on the Friends of Israel in Washington to help protect it against the Armenian genocide resolution and on all sorts of issues. Now, that relationship is certainly not what it was. And if we were to get another test, let's say with another Armenian genocide resolution in Congress, maybe the Turkey will not find that support from the Friends of Israel. And that's a fact that any president will have to take into account. We want to take some questions from the audience. But while you're thinking of a question, I want to circle back to where we started in Tom and talking about Syria. You're talking about what could happen if Syria falls. What are the chances Syria will fall? I mean, what do you all see happening there? You know, this is a regime that not only is ready to kill as many people, it's already proven that as it needs to stay in power. The Alawites have nowhere to go. This is not like the Ben Ali family in Tunisia. This is 10% of the population that would feel very exposed should it lose its primary place in power there. I don't know what's going to happen. It's very complicated. I think the tipping point will come when you see the Sunni bourgeoisie of Damascus and Aleppo basically abandon the regime. And so far they haven't done that, I think, because they're terrified of instability as well. So this could grind on for a long time, and it could not. I mean, it's hard to see how this ends in a kind of clean, stable way. I'm befuddled by it. So either of you have anything to add on that? Let me ask you, what happens if Assad does survive, which is a real possibility that this does peter out? Unlikely perhaps, but a real possibility. What are we left with if we have Assad in power? So it would have been definitely. I don't really know. More grinding. He's got the Iranians buttressing him. He's got his Bala buttressing him. He's got the Alawites buttressing him. And so he has resources that are keeping him clearly in power. And again, I think where the Sunni merchant class is, is critical and they have yet to clearly abandon him. So he's got the Iraqis, again, supporting him. We have this weird situation where the elected government, Iraq, is supporting basically the dictatorship in Syria now. And that is for purely Shiite reasons, because they're worried about the Sunnis taking over. And underlying this whole story is the oldest civil war in the world between Sunnis and Shiites. It's the unspoken, it's the elephant in the room, and it really is driving so many things and so many behaviors. And it's very, very unpredictable. I would not hazard a guess. I don't know how it's going to play out. My gut tells me he's dead man walking and that this can't go on indefinitely. And that if for no other reason, the Alawites may decide to throw him under the bus in order to save themselves with what is sure to be the future Sunni majority in Syria. That seems like a real possibility, but again, I would make no predictions. Alright, questions? Right here. I wonder if Tom Friedman could amplify and perhaps clarify something you said right at the very beginning, because it scared me. Maybe it was intentional. As I understood it, you said that unlike the other elements of the Arab Spring, which were implosions, something in Syria would be an explosion bringing in, you ticked off a number of countries, but they included both Iran and Israel. Now, I have my doubts that Israel could resist a full court military press by Iran. So if you disagree with that, I wonder if you could explain why. But if you agree, are you projecting the first use of nuclear weapons since 1945? I personally don't think that Israel would use nuclear weapons to block the development of nuclear weapons in Iran, but certainly if there were military plans. Your way off from what I was saying, I wasn't suggesting nuclear anything. The simple point I was making is that Syria is the keystone, the geopolitical keystone balancing all of these Turkey, Syria, Iran, Israel, Iraq, Turkey. And if that keystone collapses, each of those states is going to look to secure its interests in Syria in a way that will look for allies, that will look for partners there to protect its, if nothing else, its border. I think of how many countries Syria borders on, but it has nothing to do with Israel using a nuclear weapon in any way. I wouldn't even contemplate that in the Syrian context. Next one, right here. Hi, Daniel Lakin from the Korea Economic Institute. Thank you for the wonderful discussions so far. What are you doing here? Could you not confuse what room this is? Also very interested in, I'm only an intern, but also very interested in the Middle East, so just under my own power. So someone early, I believe it was Mr. Friedman mentioned the Arab Awakening and the fact that these countries have no midwife to democracy like Iraq did through American presence and occupation. I was wondering if Turkey might have any role to play in that. No, there hasn't been any professed Turkish desire to play a democracy promotion role or exporting its own system of government. But at the same time, there's been a lot of buzz about Turkey's unique Islamist form of, at least the AKP and its mix, its style of governing and Turkish style democracy. Now, do any of you see... I think given the history of Ottoman Arab relations, the idea of Turkey playing any kind of active midwife role would be highly unlikely. I think Turkey's role would be as a model of blending Islam and democracy, but any kind of active role I think the Arab world would require that. I'm not sure you're right on that, Tom. I think the AKP party is very active in helping Islamic parties throughout the area. I agree with Tom that the model is very important, and I think Turkey is a genuine model. Turkey's been a model for 30 years once it was a model for military rule, and it still could be a model for Egypt. But I think, though, that on this score, I don't believe Mr. Erdogan is averse to trying to sort of move the equation a little in terms... Now, that doesn't mean it's necessarily bad. He still brings a secular perspective to Islamic parties. I'm just saying I'm not sure they're going to stand aloof from involvement in the domestic politics of some Arab countries. We're going to see how influential Turkey is as the process unfolds. I mean, I agree with Tom that ultimately it's going to be the Arabs themselves and the individual Arab countries within the Arab world that will determine their future. But if Turkey is a model, to follow on from what Mort is saying, it is a model for the Islamists who were previously shut out of the system. We've seen Rashid Ganoushi, the head of the Anachta party, which just won the elections in Tunisia, referring to the Turkish example. We've seen similar statements from Egyptian Islamists, and the model that the AKP party, which has its roots in political Islam in Turkey, albeit willing to operate within a secular system, brings to the Arab world is that of a root to power through the ballot box. Now, that raises, or should raise, questions in Washington as to whether Mr. Obama's dialogue with Mr. Erdogan about bringing these parties in is ultimately in the US interest. Remember what happened in Gaza when Hamas won? Essentially, Washington cut off contact with Hamas. Now, has the US decided that it's willing to deal with Islamist parties once they gain power? And particularly if they begin to behave in a manner that is deemed unacceptable in Washington? Yeah, I think there's another point we have to really keep in mind when we talk about the Turkish model. And it's unspoken, and to me, underappreciated. Turkey had no natural resources. It had no oil. And because of that, it developed a very vibrant free market, merchant class, really, really impressive, I would say, export model and a real active business elite. And so when you talk about the EKP and their success, it isn't just that they somehow miraculously blend the Islam and democracy, okay? Underlying it is that they create an incredibly powerful economic engine. And that's really what's allowed and enabled a lot of, not only their success, but their influence to spread. And it's not just a question of copying the religious democracy balance, but you also have to copy the free market thing. And that's going to be a real challenge. I mean, in the Arab world, you have all these rent seeking parties, very little authentic entrepreneurship. And don't underestimate that as something holding them back and that it's not just about balancing religion and state. You also have to have the economic engine. It's like everyone wants to be Hong Kong. But you've got to be able to balance Chinese entrepreneurship and British rule of law. That's what makes Hong Kong Hong Kong. So I think you've got to keep that in mind with Turkey. Over here. Yes, sir? Yes, sir. How much of a role is Turkey playing on Afghanistan? I think Turkey's been playing a very important accessory role in Afghanistan for a long time. It has been actively involved. It doesn't have a combat role. But it has had a command role. It has command role today. It has been very close to Afghanistan for many years. Well, proceeding the last 10 years, it has good relations with that country. And by and large, I think in a very limited way has been trying to nudge Afghanistan in a as good a posture as might be expected at this time, which is not very good. But Turkey has an important constructive role there. And the United States certainly has welcomed that for a long time. It's a player. Next. Over here. Thank you. Eric Paloma from CSIS. My question is for Dr. Aleriza. In the last couple of weeks, there have been some major developments in regards to relations between Damascus and Ankara. Primarily kind of the recognition of the Free Syrian Army, which has a de facto forward operating base in Antakya now. Also reports that there have been arms trafficking across the border of Hatay. What is the likelihood that a more aggressive or we'll say defensive posture from Damascus could provoke Turkish response? Thank you. Now the reference to the Turkish backing for the armed group such as it is headed by Colonel Assad. Relation, I presume. It was from the New York Times report that we all read a couple of weeks ago. Now Turkey has not officially confirmed that it's backing such groups. What it's doing is it's allowing the Syrian opposition, the civilian opposition to meet in Turkey. And in fact, last night the foreign minister had a meeting with that group pointedly a few hours after the attack on the Turkish embassy in Damascus and the two Turkish consulates in Latakya and Aleppo, I believe. Now, once you get involved in this kind of thing, what I mean is if you give open support to a group that's trying to overthrow another government, no matter how despicable it is, then you've certainly crossed a line in international relations. Now I'm not sure that Turkey's at that point yet. Turkey's very unhappy with what's going on over there. From the prime minister down, they've expressed great unhappiness. That great unhappiness has been expressed at that level. But whether it will actually cross the line and give open support to a group that wants to overthrow Damascus is something that I'm not sure the Turkish government is willing to do. Because think of the government in Damascus doing the same with the PKK. It hosted the PKK for a long time. The leader of the PKK, who's now in a Turkish jail at Öcalad, was based in Damascus for a long time. Then you've entered the kind of uncharted territory in international relations that you worry about. Now, the U.S. is looking to Turkey to play a more important role. Europeans who met today are looking to Turkey to play a more important role. That unfortunate phrase that was used, leading from behind, when it is applied to Syria, may have Turkey being upfront in a way that other countries were upfront on Libya. But I'm not sure that Turkey is at that point where it's willing to do some of the things that you refer to. Is there a hand back here? Rich Koslerich from George Mason University. A couple of years ago, we were hoping that there would be an opening between Turkey and Armenia. And due to perhaps some miscalculation about Azerbaijan, that did not happen. With 2015 approaching and the 100th anniversary of the tragedy against the Armenians in Turkey, how do you see Turkish Armenian relations evolving over the next couple of years? I'm very pessimistic. The opening was very much encouraged by the U.S. President Gül had taken the lead. And in fact, President Obama, not last year but the year before, explained his unwillingness to use the word genocide in referring to the events of 1915, had referred to the process of normalization. Clearly, the reaction from Azerbaijan, which may not have been taken into account, was a factor in the decision by Prime Minister Erdogan to apply the brakes on this issue. The U.S. still wants something to happen to avoid unpleasant developments in Congress in 2015. But the process is completely stuck. Now, as you know, Turkey recognized Armenia as one of the successful states to the Soviet Union. And that border was actually open until 1993. And it was closed because of the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. So the first step that one would think of in a step-by-step approach to rapprochement, the opening of the border, it stuck because of the Turkish insistence on the withdrawal of the Armenians, or at least the beginning of withdrawal from the Armenian occupied territory that the Armenians currently have. I'm totally pessimistic that anything is going to happen. In fact, one of the reasons for my pessimism is that it's not even being discussed seriously. And Turkey is now busy with what's going on south of its border rather than what's going on on the other side of the globe. Go ahead. Rich, you've got four years still. A lot can happen in four years. And I would not preclude changes in Turkey, Turkey's attitudes on how to deal with this, and I would not preclude a very active diplomacy perhaps changing this. Well, it is right to be pessimistic. It's like on Cyprus. You can't be optimistic about Cyprus. It's just impossible. But on this one, I think there's a possibility of some sort of movement. Maybe I'm a smoky pot, but I do. I take a less negative perspective. Right here. Good evening. Major Howard Beasley, Headquarters, Marine Corps, International Affairs. With the upper hand seemingly gone to the AKP and the long-standing rivalry between the military counterbalance. What do you make of that first? And does that free up Turkey to exercise a more hard power? Foreign policy, now that they have sort of the military underfoot? I don't see the connection. Why would Turkey be more able to play exercise hard power because of the changes in the civilian military balance in Turkey? But what you're referring to, leaving that to one side, what you're referring to is a very important development. It happened because of the EU process. What was previously thought unthinkable in Turkey has happened because there was pressure from the EU. The Copenhagen political criteria demanded that the civilians exercise control over the military. And the military has lost a great deal of its power. Nonetheless, if you're sitting in the Prime Minister's office and you want to fight the PKK, and you want to be able to project power into a force into Northern Iraq, you still look to the Turkish Armed Forces. It's still a very powerful instrument. But it is not as influential as it used to be. And broadening the discussion just a little bit more. Now we're sitting in the middle of Washington talking about this. The core of the US-Turkish relationship in the alliance that was constructed in the Cold War was the relationship between the Pentagon and the Turkish General Staff. Now the TGS is not as influential as it used to be. The Cold War is, of course, no more. And the US is looking to Turkey to exercise not soft power, not hard power, but much more soft power in the lands to the south, and heal some of the divisions between the US and the Islamic world that had been revealed during and after the Iraq war. Now there the Turkey under AK can and has played a role. Whether it will be able to maintain that kind of influence, either in conjunction with the US or on its own, once it begins to try and use hard power is much more debatable. Right here. We've got time for about two more questions. Peter Sharfman. All of you have spoken of the driving force of geography on Turkish... driving force that geography imposes on Turkey. But are there other factors? Are there considerations of Turkish aspirations for what they want to be 20 years from now or so that also play a role in Turkish policy? Good luck, Detective. I think there are some major unresolved issues here in Turkey. First of all is Turkish democracy and what happens and how they handle the increasingly difficult Kurdish issue. That is to me a major uncertainty. The second still is what is the role of religion in Turkish political life? A lot of people rightly or wrongly have deeply concerned about what they think is happening. The third is whether there is an increasing authoritarian trend in Turkey leading to a further AKP control. All those, these are practical issues being debated and discussed in Turkey. I'm not trying to lend a negative notion that somehow or other Turkey is going to fail to meet these. I'm just saying these are the present preoccupations of Turkish domestic political life. And they have to be, and rather how Mr. Erdogan deals with them is coming very much to the fore over this coming year. Final question. I'm Rick Andrew Perth at CSIS. I just wanted to add something to the question about Turkey and Afghanistan, the question that was asked. There's something else that Turkey is doing. It has its hands full with a lot of issues. One of which is to be a convener for a regional conference last week in Istanbul. It's the first time that all of the neighbors and near neighbors in Afghanistan have gotten together. Turkey was able to pull off something that they couldn't pull off a year ago, which was to get India and Pakistan together for the first time in a regional setting to discuss what's going to happen with the future of Afghanistan. So Turkey is playing a key role there, and that's going to be sort of a setup to the bond conference in December. But the regional diplomacy push that Turkey is doing is enormously hopeful if there's going to be any kind of regional settlement for Afghanistan. So Turkey's got an important role to play. What was the result of that conference, Rick? I'm sorry? What was the result of that conference? It was a eight-page declaration. Oh, wait a minute. Well, they're having previous declarations. But the fact that they got everybody together for the first time and the fact that everyone is looking over at shoulder that the U.S. is withdrawing, maybe that will be an impetus for the regional people to find some way to keep their hands out of meddling in Afghanistan in the future. It's a long shot, but at least Turkey is being proactive in trying to bring all the players together. So that's why I applaud what they've done. Won't give them a great odds of success, but it's necessary, and it's something actually that the U.S. government has been pursuing through the regional initiative and the so-called New Silk Road approach. So I give Turkey a hand for that. All right. Well, thank you very much, Rick. And thank you all for coming on behalf of CSIS and CCU.