 Good morning and welcome to the Labour Force and your Population Survey Conference. Now move on to the main session in the conference. So I'm very pleased to introduce Nae Komuneti, who will share his screen shortly. So Nae works at the Resolution Foundation as a senior economist. The Resolution Foundation is an independent think tank that focuses really on living standards of low-income households. They do a lot of research and they advocate quite effectively for policy change or policy adaptation. His particular focus is on the labour market and low-paid work, so working on issues such as the minimum wage, the living wage, job quality and insecurity. Along with many of us, I suppose, working in research, more recently the impact of COVID-19 on that group of people who have been in the labour market that he's been interested in. So over to Nae for his presentation. If you have questions, then post them in the Q&A on the website as we go through. Yeah, OK, well, thanks very much. Nigel, let me just quickly show you a fellow across the office. Yeah, thank you very much for inviting me to talk to you this morning. I can see, so I'm joined by what looks like a collection of people from various universities. So hello, it's very nice to talk to you. Nigel invited us to join your conference today. And my plan is to talk a bit about a paper that I recently worked on, which is very much based on the labour force survey as well as some other data. But before I do that, I was going to talk a little bit about who we are as an organisation and also a bit about a programme of work called the Economy 2030 Inquiry, which this work I'm looking at now sits within. So that's sort of the rough plan. It's going to be who are we? What is this programme of work that we're doing? And then I'll show you some. Yeah, then I'll take you through the work that I've been doing recently. So let me share my slides. Hopefully this will work. Share. Can you see that as a full screen or do I need to do anything different? That's full screen now. OK, brilliant. All right, I'll crack on them. So, yes, an introduction to RF highlights from our Economy 2030 programme and then a summary of this paper changing jobs. So first of all, who are Resolution Foundation? I've got no idea when I do these kinds of talks, whether we have enough of a reputation that sort of explaining who we are is irritating because you know, or whether I should go into detail because you've never heard of us. It seems to vary, but I'll assume that you don't really have any sense of who we are. So this is our this is the mission statement that you would find if you went on to our website, which is, I think, a useful place to start. So we're an independent think tank focused on improving the living standards of those on low to middle incomes. And we work across a wide range of economic and social policy areas, combining our core purpose with commitment to rigor. Now, there's a lot of words in there, some of which sound like, well, what do we really mean by those things? So just to quickly dwell on a couple of them. So by independent, that means we're not tied to any political party. So obviously we talk to the Labour Party, we talk to the Conservative Party, but we're not tied to them, which is not quite the case for some other think tanks and the benefit there is that we can talk to both. So whichever party is in power, we would hope to still be able to have some influence. By living standards, we usually mean disposable income. That's sort of our standard way of thinking about that. Obviously, you could probably think about others as well. And the group they were focused on is those on low to middle income. So the reason for that, I think, is when we were set up, which is about 15 years ago now, there were a few research organisations and charities focused on the very lowest earners or those in the very lowest incomes. But I think at the time, it felt like there was a gap in that sort of for that low to middle bracket and that those concepts like squeezed, you know, just about managing sort of came out of some of that thinking. But I think in a sort of day to day sense, it's not like we would sort of throw in the bin anything that didn't relate to deciles two to five or anything like that. So, you know, we don't sort of stick to that completely rigidly. And then, yes, our purpose and our rig are very important to us. So who we are, we're about, I think we still consider ourselves fairly small, but we have been growing recently. There's about 30 of us who work here, of which about 20 are researchers. We're established in 2005. I have no idea if anyone is interested in the money side of things, but I find it interesting when you sort of get a sense of what it costs to run an organisation like us, it would cost about two million pounds a year to run, and the majority of our money comes from a single trust, which is actually a single person who sets up its trust a long time ago. That comes about two thirds of our costs. And then we do commission projects alongside it. That's sort of a very quick sense of who we are. This is London. So if you're interested in geographically where we are, that's where I'm talking to you now. I'm actually in the office. So we're just off Burkage or Bison James Park. This is a picture of our building. And actually, I am literally the other side of that window right there. That window of my shoulder is that one there. So there you go. Nigel, when I spoke to you, I think you were interested in how we achieve our aim. So I suppose it's very well saying you want to improve work and improve the living standards of low income households. And it's very well saying we're going to do some research about how do those things connect with each other? How does one relate to the other? So first of all, you know, rigor I think is very important to us. First of all, obviously, if we want to draw, you know, we want to be correct in the things that we say, we want to come up with correct findings and so on. But I think it's more than that because without reggae, you just don't get anywhere. We often speak to journalists and, you know, and they say to us, you know, the reason that we can regularly get ourselves on the media or the reason that they will come to us, you know, if there's an emerging story relating to living standards or labor market. So often give us a call because there's a certain amount of trust there. And that basically comes from 15 years of building a reputation for caring a lot about rigor. So it's really, really important to us. And without it, you basically don't get anywhere is our view. So that's sort of the bedrock on which everything else is based. But in terms of impact, I think we try and do that in two ways. I think you've probably got in your head this this the short term version of impact, which might be, you know, a minister is trying to make a decision about something. You go from meeting and you provide them with a sort of briefing that sets out a bit of research and your views. And that's definitely a way in which it's possible for a think tank to have impact and we do that. So we'll definitely try to intervene at key moments when there are decisions being taken, most obviously, you know, twice a year there's a budget and we would be putting out reports before the budget saying, you know, these are the key issues facing the groups that we care about. And here's what policy might do and we'll do reactions. But in particular over the last year, there have been many more and during the crisis, I mean, there have been many more moments where there have been these short term moments where clearly the government is in a sort of decision making frame of mind and we've very much tried to influence those moments as well. So during the creation of the furlough scheme, we were sort of quite quick to put out papers. And when I say quick, I mean, within a couple of days, papers saying, here's how we would design this kind of a scheme. And this would be this is what the impact might be. And then similarly at the moment, during what is said to be a positive in crisis this year, driven by the rising energy prices, we are similarly putting out policy proposals, which some of which we hope might get taken out. So there are definitely short term ways in which a think tank like ours can achieve impact, but probably the less obvious way. And but perhaps no less important, maybe more important is this sort of long term effect that we try to have on the policy debate in terms of both which issues have some kind of profile and the way in which they're being discussed. So we sort of think of this as sort of a drumbeat of reports building the intellectual case for caring about living standards and for thinking about policy in the way that we do. And it's sort of hard to see that because, you know, you don't notice it day to day. But I think and I wasn't really, I've only sort of been in this world for the last 10 years, so I wasn't quite around at the full outset of our organization. But we, yeah, but those are where I say that, you know, living standards as an issue just had a much lower profile back then, whereas nowadays it would be impossible for, you know, an event like the budget or a big policy statement to happen without people asking about, you know, what is the impact of living standards? What is the impact on incomes of low earners? Those are just sort of default questions they come that get asked now. And that wasn't necessarily the case when we set out. So that's how we think about impact. I know that Nigel, you're potentially going to invite questions at the end, but I'm very happy to take interruptions at any points, especially because I've got a somewhat of a sort of a three part set of slides here. So if anyone has any questions to talk about that first bit, I'd be very happy to take them. I can't see the other is a chat, so I might briefly look into the chat. I don't think there's any questions for me, but OK, I'll move on. But yeah, please do, please do interrupt and raise your hand. And whatever you feel like, if you have any questions to talk about. So moving on, then, we have we six months ago launched a programme of work called the Economy 2030 Enquirer, which sort of does what it says on the thing. It's about where we think the economy is headed over the coming decade. We are doing this. It's a collaboration. So it's all funded by Nuffield. So does anyone here from Nuffield? Thank you very much. And it's a collaboration between us and the Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics. And so far, I think there's been about 15 researchers there about about that, maybe 10 or 15 that have been involved with this programme of work. And on our side, like I said earlier, there's 20 researchers. So we're covering quite a broad range of topics, which I'll go through in a moment. And what we do is we sort of bring in the different researchers as and when we want to. So why are we doing this inquiry? So our argument is that the 2020s are going to be a very important decade for the UK economy and by extension for living standards for local households, the group that we care about. So it's not just that this is the post pandemic period where we will sort of to some extent see life returning to normal, but will also be faced by the lingering effects of covid. It's also going to be the period where the economy adjusts to Brexit. Obviously, some some of those adjustments have been happening already and are happening now, but we think those are going to continue over the next decade. And it's also the decade where much of the work in terms of transitioning to net zero has to take place. So we think those three things are what we would consider shocks facing the economy. And our argument is that there hasn't been anything of quite that scale happening at the same time in the UK economy for about a generation. And I'll come on to that a bit when I talk about my job report at the end. And on top of those shocks, there are the ongoing, you can either call them shocks or trends in the shape of demographic change and technology and obviously both of those things will continue to try to change in this decade as well. So our argument is this is an absolutely crucial decade and could go badly or well depending on the decisions that are taken. And the reason, therefore, that we're putting all this evidence together is to say, well, how can we best navigate this decade in a way that, you know, doesn't damage prosperity and maybe even promotes prosperity in particular for low income households? Yeah, so there you go. Those are the five drivers of change that I was just talking about, which we think will have a big impact in this decade. Just to show you a couple of images relating to those. I don't think any of this will be news to you, but it's the kind of stuff that we're trying to bring into one place. So this is just the idea. This is the internet sales as a percentage of total retail sales. And you can see it's been growing over time, but it really shot up during the pandemic. And we think that, you know, so to some extent, COVID is going to speed up or put boosters underneath preexisting trends. This could be, you know, the 1980s is the decade we usually point to as the last time there was significant change happening. And I'll talk about this more detail in a second. And the interesting thing about it is I think many people have ideas of, you know, the real difficulties of that created in some areas. And that's certainly true. And that's the next slide. But what is not often remembered is actually it was a period of quite fast rising income. So it's interesting that you can have those two things happening at the same time. But yes, this was the downside of the change that took place in the 1980s. This is the fall in employment as measured in census from 1981 to 1991 in a selection of local authorities. And I think it's just always makes me boggle looking at this chart, this sort of scale of the change in the number of jobs that took place in some of these areas. I mean, a fall of a third is an absolutely incredible change during that decade. So yes, alongside general rising incomes was obviously real pain in some parts of the country. Alongside that, this is a chart just trying to bring home the Brexit point. So obviously, I think you'd have probably seen charts like this in the news. But although trade to non-EU has been recovering, was recovering last year. Trade to EU was much slower to recover. So although it's hard to, you know, pick out Brexit from the impact of COVID, it does, you know, I think this chart makes the point fairly clearly that there definitely is going to be an impact and that will continue. And we've, you know, as I show in a moment, had started trying to think through what the impacts of that will be. Yep. And then finally, like I said, this will be the decade where the big net zero transition should happen or a large part of it. Anyway, obviously, whether or not it does is somewhat of an open question. But this is just trying to bring home the sort of scale of capital and investment costs alongside the savings, which will be required for us to get there. And this is just taken from the Climate Change Committee. And then finally, why does it all matter? Well, the argument in our launch report was that, you know, the country's economic positions can change and quite fast. So you might think it might be tempting to think that all of these things. Well, you know, yes, they're shocked, but, you know, by and large, the economy will just bump along and it will adjust and everything will be fine. But we've used this image, which is just comparing us to three other European countries to show that countries, economic positions can change quite quickly. And we think that, you know, the policy decisions that are taken are obviously a big part of that. And the example that maybe the people talked a lot about when we showed them this graph was Italy and the difference between GDP per capita there just before the financial crisis and now. So Italy went from being at the top of this group to down towards the bottom with Spain and the UK is also obviously holding behind a relative journey in that period as well. OK, so that's that sort of in a nutshell why we decided to launch this programme of work. We started it in the summer. It's a two year programme of work and we have been busy. So this was our launch report, but we've since also now written reports on on what we on on workers experiences of work. We've written a report about the carbon crunch. This was a report about trading regimes and how they and their impact in the economy. This was on the performance of the UK's businesses with this focus on productivity. This was on the impact of the covid crisis, where we focused a lot on the rise in economic inactivity and suggested that that was likely to be a lasting legacy of the crisis. So far, that looks like that is the case in the latest labor market stats. You can see that connectivity was still heading upwards. This was a very long look at trends in the history of welfare in this country. The different groups is favoured, you know, where we showed, for example, the really significant falls in replacement rates of people and losing work and having recourse to social security payments. And this I'm putting this one in here because of just the excellent point in the title. But this was by my colleague Sophie and it was about the this one came out yesterday and it was about the prospects for a trade deal with India and what impact that might have. So those are reports that we've done in the last couple of months. In addition, we've done a few briefing notes. On top of those was this one. So this was a report that came out in January, which I co-authored with colleagues at the LSE. And so that is about the history of economic change in the labor market and workers' experiences of those change. So that is what I was going to talk to you about in the final part of this presentation. But again, I'll just do a quick pause in case anyone has anything they wanted to ask or shout about in those slides I just shared. And absolutely fine if I don't know if you don't know, of course. Moving on then. So again, the premise of of our whole economic economy 2030 inquiry is that this will be a decade where a lot of change happens. And it's important that policy makers take the right decisions and manage that change well. And we will be building a full set of policy proposals around that in the second year of our inquiry. But this first year is more about looking backwards and trying to understand how changes happened in the past and trying to understand what's happening now as well. So this report was focused on how change in the labor market has happened in the past and what workers' experiences of those work. So to do that, we set up a bit of a straw man argument relating to economic change, which is that I think in many people's minds, the pace of change is speeding up. So you might see headlines of, you know, robots taking our jobs or reports of exciting new technologies. And, you know, it might feel like there's a world of work change in the world of work is speeding up. That's maybe an idea that many people have, but you can tell me if that's not the case. And secondly, although I'm sure many would agree that structural change has positives, I think many would think that it mainly involves it happens mainly through people losing their jobs in declining sectors. Obviously relating to that story, I showed you earlier of those parts of the country that really they experience really significant job loss in the 80s. So our report is sort of testing the extent to which these two ideas are true. And there are definitely some aspects of them are true, but I think they also need to be challenged a bit as well so that we can have a sort of a fully rounded understanding of how change has tended to happen in the past. And yeah, our suggestion is that that might give us a better sense of what's going to be coming in this decade. So first of all, first of all, this idea that change has sped up and I should clarify that here. I'm not trying to capture every type of change, you know, every every way in which economic life is changing. But in particular, we're focusing on the extent to which labor is reallocating across different sectors of the economy. So manufacturing services and so on. We will definitely and have done in the past written reports about, you know, changes in job security, contract type, people's experience of work. That's really in no way discounting that. But I just want to clarify that this report is about change in the kinds of jobs that we're doing as described by occupations and sectors. So the brief answers to the question of is change speeding up is perhaps surprisingly no. So this is here presenting you a measure of the rate at which taking a decade on decade view, so looking at the structure of the economy now to 10 years ago and doing that all the way back throughout the century. It's a measure of how different is the sectoral composition at those two points in time? And the reason there are two lines on this chart is that we use two different aggregations of economic sectors. And that's just to do with the data that is available over different time periods. You can get a very long term series of employment by eleven sections that comes from the Bank of England's Millennium of Macro Economic Data. If you want a slightly more detailed that data only goes back to the 1970s. But interestingly, they basically tell exactly the same story. Which is that change has been the rate of change in terms of the the composition of the sectoral composition of work has been basically slowing down since the mid 1980s. It did pick up around the time of the financial crisis, but then the trend of a slowing pace of change continued after that. And I think that's potentially surprising to some people. Like I said, you might have this sense that change is speeding up. But it doesn't look like that is really the case. There's not really enough data yet to plot the impact of covid on this chart. I mean, it looks like it might be in a tiny sense, picking up. It's not really something you'd be able to measure this long, long term view. But yes, aside from the 80s, and I'll focus on that in a second. The other periods where we observe fast rates of change have been around the around the war. So you can see after the Second World War, the composition of work was very different to to to what it was. Ten years before that. So what was it that was happening in the 80s that was leading to such a high rate of change? Well, I think, as you'll probably all know, it was the transformation from manufacturing to a range of services. And basically, that was happening at a much faster rate in that period than it was now. It's still happening. You can see on this this graph here and this is the proportion of jobs in a selection of sectors. So, yeah, the proportion of jobs represented by section of sectors got manufacturing down the bottom there. And you've got a number of services in green there, two of which are public sector or main public sector services or education health, but we also got professional services. You could add to this picture a number of other personal services like hospitality. But the data doesn't go quite as far back as it's not quite as easily manipulable. So that this I think even with these services here, you can tell a fairly clear story of manufacturing employment was actually pretty stable from the 50s to the 70s. And even if you go back to earlier in the century, you know, the proportion of jobs in manufacturing didn't really change for the first half of the 20th century. But then in the 70s and 80s, we just saw this really rapid fall in manufacturing share of employment driven by technological changes, globalization and so on. And in its place came jobs in services. So basically in the 80s, we had this really fast rate of transformation and those forces to a large extent are still happening, but a lot of them have, you know, run out of steam. So although change is still happening, as I showed you in that previous chart, it's just happening at a much slower pace nowadays. So that's the response to point one. And a second yeah, the second idea that I think many people have is the structural change like this mainly happens through individual workers losing their jobs, being made redundant. So, you know, manufacturing facilities somewhere close down and people lose their jobs and then individual workers need to look for, you know, work in another sector or perhaps remain unemployed or inactive, as many did in the 1980s. And I'm certainly not here arguing that that doesn't happen. Clearly it does in any crisis. You can observe rates of redundancy rising. But I first want to just argue that that's not the only way in which these kinds of structural changes happen. So reallocation of labor across sectors can come from a number of sources. Workers can individually move jobs between sectors. And that does happen. But you can also have reallocation from the net effect at the sector level of workers joining and leaving the workforce. And in the report, we split that into a natural entry and exit, which we think about as the difference between younger workers joining the workforce and older workers leaving it. So you might have a stylized picture in your head of younger workers nowadays more like to be joining services and older workers, perhaps in manufacturing leaving. And so that effect, even if no individual work actually makes the move from those sectors can lead to quite significant amounts of sectoral reallocation. And then you can also have that effect going on, but within career. So people to move in and out of the labor market. And I think this is the first time I've seen someone try to pick apart those those different types of reallocation. And we did and we did this using the annual survey of hours and earnings. And it's it's far from a perfect data set to be doing this. We have to rely on the panel component here and we're and I'll explain how we how we did that. And it's not perfect, but I haven't seen, you know, an attempt at measuring this elsewhere. And interestingly, what it shows is that so this is manufacturing, which obviously, as we just looked just seen was falling in employment in this period. But workers directly moving between sectors is in the red bars there. And that does contribute to falling employment in manufacturing. So some workers, you know, leaving manufacturing to other sectors. Actually, it's it's it's the one of the smaller factors driving reallocation. The bigger factor in the 80s and 90s, anyway, was what we call in the natural entry and exit. So as I said, the difference between younger workers joining the labor force and all the work is leaving it, which I think is quite interesting because it suggests you can have really significant rates of change, which doesn't entirely rest on individual workers experiencing that change. So that for me was quite interesting. And another way of showing the same point of this natural entry and exit effect is to look at the changing age profile of the manufacturing workforce. So this is the difference in employment by age over a 25 year period. We can't in this data, this is looking at the LFS. Now, we can't go all the way back to. But you can in some in some annual files being in the data we had really access to. I think it sort of starts here in the early 90s. And so this is a 25 year period. It's just showing that the fall in manufacturing employment has been concentrated among those of among lower age groups. But by contrast, business services, the sector which grew strongly in this period has seen jobs growth across the age range. Yeah. OK, so what should we make of of of economic change? Or here again, just referring back to that straw man, the idea that it's, you know, you know, maybe has some good aspects, but it is really negative for individuals. I think that basically is true, but it misses the fact that it is also positive for some individuals is the key is the key addition we wanted to make to that straw man. And so on that individual level, what we can do in an asset to set is again, using this panel component is look at the typical individual level pay growth of individuals who are moving jobs. And I think you may have seen a series like this, the UNS publishes one going back to I can't remember, I think it's the last 20 years or so, but we've stretched that back to the early 70s. And what you can see is that there basically has always been this move is bonus. So individuals who move jobs in a year on average, this is the story of the median annual pay growth compared to the previous year is is is always higher than the median pay growth of people who stay in their jobs. I don't think that's very surprising, but what I find interesting here is that the difference between those two, so the move is bonus, which is the which I'm showing in the in the yellow area, shaded area there has been a pretty consistent feature of economic life going back to the 70s. And it does rise and fall somewhat. It tends to fall a bit during periods of of economic crisis. You can see in the early 90s, it falls and again in the financial crisis, but it's been sort of it hovers around a trend of about four percentage points throughout that 40 year period, which I thought was quite interesting. So this move is bonus idea that individual individual workers can benefit from from change has been a consistent something we consistently observe. And that is particularly the case if workers don't just change jobs, but change jobs to a different sector or through a different region. And this is the average. This is using the the modern national and this is the average individual level pay growth over the last 15 years for workers who make these different types of moves. Obviously, there's two ways of thinking about this. You could say that, well, you know, it's it's workers or season opportunity of change, or you could say, you know, it requires you know, a more significant pay boost like this for workers to justify the archival that comes with these kind of moves. But I think either way, as the idea that, you know, change is not a wholly bad thing for workers at the individual level. And yeah, this this just just to add to that, we just had this look at this concept of occupational polarization, which I think many would have heard of. And we just argued briefly in the report that economic change over the last 20 years has actually more been characterized by occupational upgrading than it has by polarization. So this is the growth in employment by the death style of occupation at the start of the period. And we're looking at the last 20 years and you can see that so polarization is usually means growth, growth of low paying jobs, growth of high paying jobs and the fall in the middle. And there has been a fall of middle paying jobs and a growth of high paying jobs. We don't really observe much growth in the lower end. So we have described this as more of a story of upgrading rather than one of polarization. And that's particularly true of women, which you can see with the blue dots there, two men. OK, so there are definitely some positives when it comes to economic change, even for individual workers, it's not just an aggregate effect, but we certainly don't report discount the real risks that do come for some workers. And the main risk unsurprisingly is of workers losing their jobs, being made redundant. So here I'm showing you for the two quarter LFS, the proportion of workers who in the last quarter were made redundant. So facing them in voluntary job loss. But we're splitting it up in the other two lines between workers in declining and in expanding expanding sectors. And our argument in the report is that basically those earlier periods were characterized by faster rates of change. And as the rate of change across sectors has slowed down, it looks like and we can't really prove this in it. And we definitely can't. We're definitely not able to prove a causal relationship. But what we suggest anyway, or I suppose speculate, is that the slowing rate of change has meant fewer workers being pushed out of their jobs. And that's interesting because you can particularly see that happening in declining industries. There's just been much slower rates of involuntary job loss in those sectors than there was 20 years ago. And unfortunately, this is far back as we could stretch this series. Why does that matter? Well, as I'm sure won't come as a surprise, involuntary job loss is just a profoundly negative experience. Obviously, it is in the immediate sense. No one likes losing their job, but it also has negative knock on effects. So here I'm showing you in the five quarter LFS, the median pay growth people experience compared to the previous year. So this is only looking at people in work today and who are in work a year ago. And overall, that tends to come out at about 2%, controlling for inflation. But there's a really massive difference between whether a worker in that intervening period experienced some time out of work involuntarily. So in the blue, you can see that if we only look at people who had a period out of work, but for whom that period not working was voluntary, i.e. they quit their job and we in the LFS observed them not working in a particular quarter. By the time they're back in work, their typical pay growth is almost exactly in line with the overall figure on the left-hand side there. But when we look at individuals who had an involuntary period out of work within the past year, they have negative pay growth. So it's not just their workers lose their jobs and then have the pain of some time in unemployment. It's that when they do return to work, they typically earn less than they did in their previous job. So involuntary job losses are bad now and in the future. We also show in the report that involuntary job losses are associated with longer periods out of work. So it takes people slightly longer to return to work than if they quit their job voluntarily. Just looking at the time, I think I've just about got time to do this and I wanted to show you these slides because I think I'm speaking to, well, I know I'm speaking to LFS users. So I thought this might be interesting to you. So in the report, we had a deeper look at job moves and it didn't necessarily make the headlines in the report but I think the work was quite interesting. So first of all, we showed that the rates at which workers move jobs and move sectors. So job moves to a different sector are here shown in the dark blue bars and within sector job moves are shown in the light blue bars and the totality of those bars is any job move. And we showed that the rates at which workers are moving jobs really varies very significantly across different groups of workers. So there's really significant variation by age group which I think probably wouldn't be a surprise by contract types. So again, temporary work is much more likely to move jobs than those in permanent contracts. But there are also big variations in by occupation groups. So those in lower paying occupations move jobs at a much faster rate as do those in certain sectors. So hospitality and retail associated with much higher rates of job moving than those in public administration. So that was quite interesting. And one question you might have is, well, job moves have been slowing. I haven't actually shown you that chart in this presentation for the rate of which when average across the economy workers move jobs has been slowing over the last 20 or 30 years. And we have some measures going back a bit further than that, but it looks like much of that change has been happening over the last 20 or 30 years. So there, you know, and there is some extent to which compositional factors are driving that. So we know that the workforce is aging and I've just showed you that older workers are much less likely than younger workers to move jobs. But interestingly, you know, compositional factors are contributing to slowing mobility but only explain about the quarter of the fall in job mobility that we observed over the last 20 years. So, you know, they're having an effect but it's not really the main story. And this is why we suggest that that structural impact, so the rate at which the economy is changing may be the bigger factor than the changing composition of the workforce. The other thing I wanted to show you, and this was work that was done by my colleagues at LSE, was trying to not just measure whether workers are changing jobs and whether they're changing jobs to different sectors, but being a slightly more nuanced so you're trying to understand the nature of those job moves. So we can measure in this method I'll show you now not just whether someone's moving jobs but the distance of the job move that they've made and some extent also the direction of their move. We do that using the ONS's ONET database which breaks down occupations into a set of tasks which you may have come across this classification before. So it's non-routine, analytical, personal, and physical and routine cognitive and manual. So there's this sort of five task types and every occupation is given an importance waiting for these different sets of tasks. And, oh, a raised hand. I'm very happy to take an intervention. Please do speak up, I couldn't quite see who it was, but. Sorry, and I was trying to open the chat. I could have no one button because I'm a fool. Okay, no worries, no worries. So yes, we can build this classification of task types for different occupations and then we can measure how different two jobs are in terms of the different makeup of their constituent tasks. It's a technique that has been used before but you don't see it used quite so much in the UK because you have to do this mapping of the US's ONET database onto UK occupations which definitely can be done, but I suppose it's an extra step. So you do tend to see it a bit more in the US literature. And so this then allows you to build this typology of the distance between at which workers are moving when they're moving jobs in terms of the task requirements involved in the jobs they're moving between. So this is just trying to show you that distribution. So over on the left, this is all workers changing jobs. And you can see over on the left there about a third of workers when they change jobs move to a job within the same occupation. But over on the right hand side, in the red bars you've got all the workers who moved to a job in a different occupation. And you can see the spread of the distances which are moving. And so interestingly, before I'd seen this chart I would probably have expected to look more like a consistent downward slope. So workers being more likely to move to the jobs that more closely resemble their current job and sort of tailing away as well as jobs get more distant. So, but that's not what we observe. So actually it's more common for workers to move to this sort of medium distance to make this medium distance job move than it is for them to make a really near job move. And the numbers here are a statistical contract that construct their relate to the sort of standard deviation of the difference in this measure of similarity that we construct but just to give you a slightly more concrete meaning of those numbers. So job distance move up two, which is the most common we observe is equivalent to a nurse moving to a job in a factory. And this is not, and we don't mean that in this other positive or negative way but just literally in terms of the distance between those two types of the tasks involved in those jobs, a distance of one would be equivalent to a nurse becoming a care worker or a care worker becoming a nurse. You probably imagine those jobs are much more similar in terms of the tasks they require. And then larger distances, for example, a nurse moving to become a solicitor that would be a job move of three. That's quite interesting to observe that you do still in that quite distant job move to observe a good number of job moves. But yeah, this was interesting to me and I'd be curious to know if you've seen this kind of result for the UK before. So just to bring out a couple of other results that then flow from that. So first of all, just looking at age. So I showed you already that workers who are older are less likely to move jobs. They're also, it's also the case that older workers are less likely to move jobs to a different occupation. And again, that's probably not surprising. Younger workers are still building their careers. They might be moving, they haven't quite figured out yet what job they want to end up in. So I think that's not surprising. So you can see this is the red line there. This is the portion of job moves that are to a different occupation that's higher for younger workers that falls with age. But if you look at the workers who did move occupation, which is the blue bar, the blue line, which then measures the distance that they've moved. There's not a straightforward relationship with age and it might not be the one that you would have expected. So actually the biggest distance that workers are moving is actually highest for the very oldest workers we observed, which was quite an surprising finding. So again, I would probably have expected that blue bar to look more like the blue line to look like the red line, i.e as workers get older, they're less likely to make big job moves in terms of the distance. But that's not what we observed. I thought that was quite interesting. And then the other finding to draw out is that we're not just limited to measuring the distance between jobs, but we can also look at the direction that they're moving in terms of whether they're moving towards or away from these different component tasks. And what we observe is that there's quite a big difference between workers who made an involuntary exit from their previous job to workers whose job move was voluntary. So people making voluntary job moves are likely to move towards non-routine, cognitive, analytical jobs or jobs involving high amounts of that kind of task. And that is associated with high pay. So it looks like people making voluntary moves it's usually a positive thing. But on the other hand, people making involuntary moves, either move jobs or their previous job exit was a redundancy. They're more likely to move towards, sorry, away from non-routine cognitive, analytical jobs and non-routine persons and towards routine jobs which typically are associated with low rates of pay. So again, it's just another way of showing that those previous episodes in our economy of high rates of involuntary job move, it's another way of showing that those things are negative experiences for the works involved. And then finally, just to briefly draw out lessons for the 2020s, I've probably said enough about the understanding of economic change, but just to say that it's recently there hasn't been very much of it. The composition of our economy in terms of sectors now is broadly similar to what it was 10 years back but that definitely wasn't the case in the 70s and 80s. There are winners as well as losers from change and it's not the case that sectoral adjustment mainly relies on workers losing their jobs. Actually, natural change flows in and out can explain quite a large part of sectoral change. And then for policymakers, this really is a sort of a tentative first go at politics we'll be doing more detailed policy reports but we think that they should prepare for more change in the 2020s than we are used to. So that means sort of gearing up our skills, services our employment services to be ready for that. And then we think in terms of mitigating or managing that change is about maximizing the benefits which we think will mean helping workers make pay enhancing moves to growing sectors and worrying about the involuntary job losses which will we think probably pick up as rates of change increase. Okay, I think that was all from me. Thank you very much for bearing with me.