 Intellectual property is naturally a question of interest to the competition economists because there is clearly an interface in the sense that you know information goods are goods which have a consumption that is not rival. I mean the fact that someone is consuming an information good doesn't prevent someone else from consuming it at the same time. It's also good for which it's difficult to undertake exclusion so I mean this is why we need to have patents. We need to have a legal system in order to exclude people from the use of information good in order to make sure that there is an incentive to produce this information good in the first place but the consequence is of course that there is exclusion and exclusion is something which is naturally of interest to competition economists to worry about the consequence of foreclosure. When we consider a standard essential patent then of course sort of new issues come into play because when sort of patents have been included as part of a standard I mean the concern that one might have about the consequences of exclusion of course are different because it may very well be that when standards are essential that's why then patents are declared to be essential for a standard that I mean the implementers the users have no alternative anymore so they really have to use the patents that are considered to be essential and so the prospect for hold up the prospect for the exercise of market power may be maybe greater. Now at the same time as a key pro quo for being included as part of the standard the holders of the intellectual property the patent holders have typically committed to licensing in the particular conditions I mean they are usually referred to as fair and on discriminatory the so-called front-terms and so I mean there is a specific question that arises with respect to standard essential patent I mean for which there is a French commitment of whether indeed did the pursuit of injunction which is the subject of our research whether the pursuit of injunction is a concern as such in terms of an abuse of dominant position. The research that we undertake tries to understand how injunctions will affect the negotiation on standard essential patent and so we start from the observation that indeed hold up can be a concern and that when patents are standard essential the scope for hold up may be significant. We also recognize the fact that the the front term may impose a significant constraint on the behavior of the patent holder and we also recognize the fact that in the absence of injunctions if there is really no threat of injunction whatsoever there may be possibly another concern which is reverse hold up and reverse hold up is a possibility that the implementers the users of the technology will then propose loyalty rates that are very low below what would be considered to be friend or will delay negotiation for instance and so our research is trying to first see empirically in the European context what happens with respect to the negotiation on royalties with respect to standard essential patent and in particular what happens if the patent holders do seek an injunction in in court and second our research is trying to model what the European court system tend to do to see to try to identify whether there is indeed a concern in terms of rates that may be above the friend rates in equilibrium that is to say whether there is a concern for hold up or the opposite whether there is a concern for reverse hold up that is to say situations in which the royalty rates are below the friend level. There is one way of summarizing the paper in just one sentence which was suggested to me by a colleague which is to say that prospective licenses can play games in negotiations on standard essential patent in the same way as patent holder. I think that the focus of the competition agency so far has been on the ability of the patent holder you know to play games to extract royalties in excess of the friend rate what we show is that you know the prospective licenses in the current institutional environment can also play games and that it's not clear that the current institutional environment does a bad job at balancing the risk of hold up and the risk of reverse hold up. I think that the results of our analysis are fairly robust in terms of the underlying principles. Of course the policy conclusions that we draw may be confined to the European environment to the extent that we have only analyzed the procedures in the European context and we found that the European court system I mean seems to operate in a way that balances the interest of the prospective licensee and the patent holder but I wouldn't want to put forward any judgment on what happens outside the European jurisdictions.