 Ladies and gentlemen, it's a great pleasure for me to chair this session on energy and environment. We've had a lot today with a very insightful session and for me it's a great pleasure to welcome very knowledgeable people in this panel and I will immediately start with Mr. Harper. The floor is yours. Okay, thank you. I will, so you will, would you present, would you put your, my presentation, my slides? Okay, yeah. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is clearly a wake-up call. Geopolitics is a key dimension in the energy sector. I would like to quote André Girot, former minister of industry during the second oil shock in France. You used to say oil is a resource with huge diplomatic and defense dimension with a fiscal content and marginally a calorific value. The same applies also for natural gas. So in my presentation, short presentation, I will first develop the main dimensions of the geopolitics of the energy sector and then I'll come back to the decisive turning point of February 24th and then I will highlight the ongoing tensions on oil and gas sector. Geopolitics has always been a key dimension of the oil sector. This is due to the concern of security of supply. The unequal distribution of oil and gas reserves you can see on this slide is an important concern. And on this map, the size of each country is related to the importance of its oil reserves. And this slide illustrates clearly the geological anomaly of the Middle East. The same applies to natural gas. Two-third of gas reserves are located between the fifth and the seventieth meridians, specifically Russia, Iran or Qatar. However, these slides do not include non-conventional resources. The revolution of non-conventional hydrocarbons is a major game changer for geopolitics. Today, the United States are the first producers of oil and petroleum products in the world. In 2020, they became independent for their energy supply for the first time since 1952. This game changer has a major impact on geopolitics. For example, in 2020, Barack Obama highlighted that the country regains an important latitude in their diplomacy thanks to their energy autonomy. The Ukrainian conflict is a clear example of this return of geopolitics. Thanks to their renewed energy independence, the U.S. were claiming leadership on the world energy market and also on the supply of Europe. Russia, the first gas exporter, is threatening on the other side the energy weapon, which has been made afterwards. The political situation of the Middle East is always unstable. The election of Joe Biden confirmed the disengagement of the U.S. in the Middle East. China and Russia take this opportunity to increase their influence on the region. The wars in Libya, Syria, Yemen are not yet solved and the withdrawal of the U.S. of the GCPOA with Iran is creating further uncertainties. This unstable situation is a real threat for the energy sector due to the importance of the resources of energy in this region. China is a key player in the world economy. This slide shows the share of China in the growth of some industrial and energy indicators since 1978. More than 80 percent of the growth of coal or steel demand worldwide, 60 percent of carbon emissions. As the largest energy consumer and CO2 emitter in the world, China is key with rising geopolitical tensions as a major stomping block. As the energy supply is the Achilles Neal Hill of its economy, China is developing a dynamic diplomacy around the world, Middle East, Russia, Africa. We should not ignore the geopolitical challenges linked with the energy transition and I will be very short due to the excellent discussion during the press session. Renewable energy is requiring growing resource of critical raw material. Access and prices of many resources is a challenge such as cobalt, copper, real airs. And you can see on this slide the main producers of critical raw material. China has a clear leadership on critical raw material as it is shown on this slide. China has also a quasi-monopolistic position on certain technologies such as solar panels and batteries. So the invasion of Ukraine by Russia on the 24th of February is a decisive turning point. This dramatic event has a major impact on the energy scene. I just remind you that Russia is a key player on the energy market. It represents 6.4 percent of oil reserves, 17.3 percent of gas reserves, third producer of oil, and first exporter of natural gas. Europe was heavily relying on Russian energy supplies, 20 percent, 20 percent of European oil imports, 46 percent of gas, and 60 percent of coal. On vice versa, Russian economy was relying on energy export to Europe. Total energy export of Russia represents 25 percent of its gross domestic product and 57 percent of its export. And for the last 20 years, this mutual dependence was a win-win solution. It's over now. Ukrainian invasion impacted immediately the gas market both in Europe and Asia. Volatility and prices increased dramatically. The same happened for oil and extra electricity. Most European countries reacted in order to mitigate the impact to the final consumer. Rapidly, the European Union to embargo measures on coal and oil. We may question the real impact of these measures on Russian economy. Both coal and oil market are deep and Russia has been able to redirect its export. For example, India increased by a factor of 10 its imports of oil from Russia. However, the situation is clearly different for natural gas. So clearly in the near future, we may anticipate geopolitical tension of the oil and gas market. The oil market will be faced by, to a growing tension. It is due to lack of investment in exploration production, which has been reduced by a factor of 2 since 2014. At the same time, the oil demand continues to grow. It will not be possible to compensate the natural depletion of existing field, which is estimated at about 6% per annum without investment. For example, for the next 10 years, the IA estimates that the production of new fields to be developed amounts to 20 to 30 million barits per day for a total market of 100 million barits per day. The oil market will be stretched as we experienced 15 years ago. At the same time, the market has been rebalanced, so at that time, the market has been rebalanced thanks to the dramatic growth of non-conventional oil in the US. However, it will not be surely the case in the future. There are significant uncertainties, both technical and economical, for the development of non-conventional oil in the US. The IA, for example, the American Institute of Energy estimates that the US production will reach a plateau in 2030 and then starts to decline. The situation will clearly increase the power of OPEC Plus on the market. On April 12, 2020, reacting to the COVID crisis, OPEC Plus decided to reduce its production quotas by 9.7 million barits per day for a total market of 100 million barits per day. Afterwards, it decided to increase slowly its production, keeping a clear grasp on the market. On October 5, this year, OPEC Plus decided again to reduce their quota by 2 million barits per day. This renewed control of the market is a major geopolitical game changer and a major threat for the consumers. Natural gas market is tightening. This is a clear challenge for Europe, which is relying heavily on Russian supplies. LNG is a unique alternative. For the last six months, LNG imports junk to 40%. At the same time, the share of Russian gas supplies to Europe dropped from 40% to 10%. But there are many bottlenecks, liquefaction, LNG carriers, regazification plants. For this winter, the gas storage are almost full, but we may question the situation for the next winters. In fact, the liquefaction capacity is stretched all around the world. New liquefaction plants are under construction in Qatar, the U.S. or Australia, but they will not come to the market before 2025-2026. In a nutshell, the geopolitics is an escapable challenge of the energy sector for the next years to come. It is clearly urgent to integrate this dimension on the energy policies to be put in place all around the world. Thank you. Thank you very much, Olivier. I just want to mention that Olivier is the chairman of France Brevet, scientific advisor of the Center for Energy and Climate of Yves-Rey and former president of the French Energy Council. Maybe some questions in the room for Olivier at this stage if you are one. Yes, please. Hello, Nicolas Pure from Tilt Capital, an energy transition investor. Do you see potentially an issue with also the piling up of, I would say, the perfect storm with the financing? Because today, I think in the U.S., 60% of cov-like loans and high-yield bonds are structured against the unconventional oil and gas market, and it's a market that has been structurally deficit in terms of cash flows. Do you see that as a potential additional risk in the oil and gas market for future supplies? Clearly, there is an evolution of the financial industry towards the investment of oil and gas. There is an increasing reluctance of the financial institution and the banks and the lenders to lend to the for exploration and production of the oil and gas. There is a specific dimension in the U.S. with non-conventional hydrocarbons because in the past, I would say five or ten years ago, they just invest. Now they are not investing as it was in the past. They are taking into account the profitability of these investments and there has been in the past a huge failure of many, many companies and now in the U.S. they are very cautious. That's why in the evaluation of the energy information agency of the U.S., they don't anticipate an important increase of non-conventional oil supply. There will be perhaps a peak, it will increase some way, but there will be a plateau. It's not the case specifically for natural gas because for natural gas it's easier and also there is the outcome of LNG of the world market. The world is requiring more and more natural gas. But there is no investment. I would say the international energy industry and oil companies now they are investing mostly, I would say for total 50% of the investment are in oil and gas and 50% in the transition economy. Thank you, Olivier. Another question from the person? Yes, please, Mr Schalmer. You spoke about liquefaction bottleneck. Isn't it a regazification bottleneck in Europe? Clearly it's a regazification bottleneck. You remember on the slide I presented with Putin and Trump at that time. Putin was asking to Germany to invest in regazification. They were strongly opposed to any such investments. They decided recently to buy a new regazification, but it's not sufficient. That's why there is this agreement between France and Germany. France is delivering natural gas from the LNG regazification plant in France. And by this, Germany is bringing the electricity from coal, unfortunately. But there are also bottlenecks in liquefaction because there are some new plants coming on stream in the U.S. In Qatar, there will be a strong increase of production, but it will not come before 2025. That's why in Europe we will be able to pass the winter. But I'm not sure, thanks to all the natural gas liquid which is available on the market, it's no more the case. All the supply which could have been kept, keep have been kept. I'm afraid that the next two winters will be very difficult for Europe. We will come back to the discussion. Thank you.