 Good afternoon, everybody. You're all very welcome both in person here in North Gray, Georgia Street and for those of you who are joining us online. My name is John O'Brennan. I'm a Professor of Maneuth University and I'm delighted to chair this afternoon's special event on European Union enlargement and the Western Balkans time to recalibrate question mark. I think most of us agree it is time to recalibrate enlargement policy. We are delighted to welcome back to Dublin and to the Institute, Dr Kurt Assuner. Kurt, I'm sure is known to many of you who follow the Western Balkans and enlargement debates. He is the co founder and a senior research associate of the democratization policy council, which is a Berlin based think tank, which has been around for the last 18 years or so. Kurt received his PhD from St Andrews University in Scotland in 2021. He was based there at the Center for the study of terrorism and political violence, one of the leading such academic units in the world. He is co author and the research director of the diplomats handbook for democracy development support. He lived in Sarajevo for 11 or 12 years, I think. And he has a very, very deep knowledge of the region. He was at one point, an advisor to Patty Ashton, who many of you will remember the Liberal Democrat leader who became the European Union's high representative so called in Bosnia and Herzegovina. So we're delighted to host Kurt, his democratization policy council does extraordinarily important work, publishing policy briefs on the Western Balkans, all of it based on the deep knowledge, experience and engagement with the region of people like Kurt and his colleagues. This is the way this afternoon session will unfold I will shortly invite Kurt to speak he's going to speak for about 20 minutes or so. We're then going to settle into questions and answers a sort of back and forth between us and then we'll open the session to our audience both in person and online. If they have any questions, if you are online, I would say, please use the Q&A function on zoom towards the bottom of your screen. And those questions will be fed through to me and I can feed them through to Kurt. A reminder that today's session is on the record. And that applies equally to our conversation subsequently. So, without further ado, Kurt, it's a great pleasure to welcome you back to the Institute. Thank you. Well thank you very much john it's a pleasure to be back here at the Institute after about a decade. It's a pleasure to meet Kian and Barry and to see Tony Brown again who have not seen since I was last here. And I also want to recognize Valerie Hughes who is tireless efforts, first of all, help make the stars align for this visit but also is active constantly running in the background for human rights and human dignity, not just in the Balkans but in Syria elsewhere. As John noted, I'll try to present you with a frame to discuss for our discussion, a brief statement of the situation in democratization policy Council's view, answering the event title and we can do that up front. Yes, it's time to recalibrate I'm going to tell you why, followed, followed by a chronological enumeration of how we got here and how we could get out of it. We're in a deeply negative and degenerating dynamic in the Western Balkans right now, do in large measure to the policies and actions of the European Union, and it's Western allies toward the region. And that, rather than using the geopolitical shock of Russia's full scale invasion attempt to crush and absorb Ukraine colonial war as a rationale to finally disengage the bureaucratic autopilot that the policy toward the Western Balkans has been on for I would argue 17 years and undertake a course correction. And those policies have simply accelerated on the course that was determined prior to February 24 last year. Self defeating and self corrupting path, I would argue, the aggregate trends line trend lines according to a host of indicated the freedom houses freedom in the world, nations and transit but you could look at transparent international, lead tables committee to protect protect journalists. All of these paint a pretty dire picture of the operating environment for the values that we proclaim we hold dear in in this region where the European Union in particular but the West more broadly has been the dominant geopolitical actor for a quarter of century. So, these indicators include democratic practice, and it's been a protracted period that they've been negative it's not a recent turn accelerating emigration from the region. Also speaks to popular views on the possibility of living with dignity and positive change to actually make that possible where they where they where they live now. The possibility of dissent and to organize violence in the Western Balkans is real. This does not represent some sort of underlying inherent societal malady of these societies but rather they're protracted mal governance and the incentives under which the leaders are able to govern what they've been presented both from without and within. So the essential question for the European Union and its Western allies including the United States Britain and others is this. How could a region in which we, that is the European Union, United States Britain NATO have been dominant external actors, where we have an unparalleled toolbox potential potency and the leverage of our proclaimed democratic human rights rule of law values. How could we be on the back foot, how can the security dynamic be so and political dynamic be so negative after so long. We're in where the geo our geopolitical adversaries are increasingly present as factors, what does that reflect on us. I think that the premises of the European Union's engagement in the Western Balkans need to be recapitulated so we can revisit them. 20 years ago, as the big bang enlargement was approaching and that's a lot of key in 2003 20 years ago. There was transatlantic friction with the United States and Britain over a rock and within the European Union itself. But those transatlantic frictions actually led to a meeting of division of labor with the Western Balkans effectively with the European Union taking the lead. The enlargement will take these these countries the rest of the way in their transitions. And, but that came with what was baked into the source code of the European Union from its very foundation, which is an elite focus, a presumption that the societies are represented through their political elites that their political mechanisms and therefore what the EU is offering these societies and these leaders will allow a self self propelling dynamic toward toward European Union standards and your Atlantic integration as the term of art became at the time. And probably not divorced at all from from the Iraq Frictions became a theological view of how these things should be done for example in Bosnia Herzegovina this is perhaps clearest. You have executive tools to enforce the date and peace agreement, those are the international high representative. And up until the end of 2004 chapter seven authorized military deterrent force that the European Union took on willingly enthusiastically, which is now you for. But these you're not supposed to need enforcement tools in the country with enlargement perspective. That's theologically unsound. And so, while there was resistance in the peace implementation Council to to eliminating them what ended up happening is they were just allowed to wither and rust and become effectively shadows of their former own selves, legally just as valid as they always were practically not as potent as they used to be with the EU institutions, and a large number of member states constantly trying to undercut them. So, the presumptions that attended the the EU's course, starting from about 20 years ago, have never been revisited. So the results, I think it's been, it's quite clear that this this policy these presumptions are self evidently failing in the Western Balkans. And they were self evidently failing before the financial crisis hit. So 15 years running now. So the EU collective policy response to that that disjunct faking it. It's a clear forward movement in the hope in the hope that that will be in the fullness of time realized that you can make it real over time don't want to kill the mood. Momentum, the cult of momentum. So the partners in this in this relationship we're not the societies as a whole, but the leaderships of these individual Western Balkan six countries. And at that point they weren't Western Balkan six it also included Croatia. Well, you declare forward movement and you try to bridge your own cognitive dissonance with that. And this is a way you def the EU defended its self conception as a normative transformational power. You couple that with significant bilateral parochialism, most clearly evident in the in the name dispute between Greece and what's now North Macedonia. But now being played out with Bulgaria and North Macedonia. And there's numerous other examples, even in cases where the EU's own rules allowed for qualified majority voting. Basically that's just not, not done, you don't want to do something by majority vote that's, and so that's for example, one of the reasons why there are no effective sanctions and Bosnia here to Gavina, hungry objected and shot those down and nobody, nobody really raised a peep and made them own their veto on that two years ago. So, over time you've seen a shift to a values neutral approach. And this is particularly manifest in the way the ES is managing the dialogue on Serbia Kosovo. You might, it's worth reminding ourselves how the dialogue began. It began really with Angela Merkel telling the current Serbian presidents predecessor Boris Todic that there's no chance in hell of Serbia ever and entering the European Union until it recognized where it southern border where its constitution said it was. But now it's, it's what we've seen subsequently was both the ES adopt this land swap idea in 2018 five years ago that Trump rapidly jumped on because Merkel was on the other side of it and I think in part it was to needle her. In any case, the EU institutions have been subcontracted to manage while member states let them manage don't really intervene because there's most member states want to consign that to the sidelines while they focus on other issues. And that's become a self perpetuating dynamic where the EU institutions now don't even inform member states of a lot of their policies or declare that everybody's on board when there are a lot of frictions below the surface. There are three chances in the past in about a 13 month period to revisit this dynamic this Clyde path or trajectory, the inauguration of the Biden administration the United States, the entry of the Schultz government in Germany, and February 24 last year. Most of these I think is the most damning in a lot of ways, because there's been greater transatlantic Western unity declaratively behind democratic values human dignity rule of law, and real policies to back that up facing East, a direct support to Ukraine sanctions on Russia, etc. And, but so this is unprecedented since the end of the Cold War, but while these values are correctly deployed eastward, the effective policy and posture in the Western Balkans is effectively unchanged, only the velocity and the vehemence with which they pursued has amplified. So, you, you see in the societies of the Western Balkans. A lot of real loss of credibility for not only the West but the idea that it stands for what it says it stands for. That's the Chinese or the Russians or the Turks to not be self interested geopolitical actors that's a given, and nobody's in an illusion that countries and groups of countries don't pursue their interests as well. But when you say we're better we're different we have these values we have these standards and then you actively undercut them in the eyes of people. It's a friction that's even greater because it creates a, an element of hypocrisy a perception of hypocrisy. So, what's generated the region's susceptibility to geopolitical challenge, our posture and our policies, coupled with an unreconstructed unaccountable extractive political class in these, the governing each of these states. At present, more effort is devoted to countermeasures against particularly Russia but also China, and some of these countermeasures are more declarative than real in actual effect. Then intellectual capital being devoted toward re revisiting from first principles what what we want to achieve and then the strategy and in order to achieve it. To make these countries actually move them toward democratic accountable and resilient self governance that that could be ultimately adopted into the European Union or NATO if they so desire. I believe that this reveals not only a deepening cynical fatalism on the part of the established democracies and in the capacity of Western Balkan societies and countries to ever be liberal democracies, as well as a crisis of self belief on our own part, and I say this as an American in the proclaimed democratic human values are in a minimum the popular residents of those values in in a very contested environment. So who are the beneficiaries of that regional ethnic party leaders, Vucic Vucic first and foremost in Serbia. And, but he's far from alone. At least three, probably for hegemonic agendas that play in the Western Balkans, Serbia's Croatia's Bulgaria via v North Macedonia, as you see playing out within the European Union, and in the sort of only at the Eddie Rama level declaratively in Tirana to a certain extent but it doesn't seem to have popular resonance in my own estimation. The EU enlargement in the Western Balkans is no really no longer really seem as a socially transformative tool. The priority seems to be pacification keep it quiet, but it not be a problem for us. And to prove us potency and leverage to itself, not necessarily to the societies and governments in question. So you see this reflected in the electoral reform process that were pursued was pursued jointly by the US and the European Union in Bosnia. But then was ultimately imposed through the high representative so there you had another theological friction point it wasn't about the substance of the changes, which we pursued together but the application thereof, where you couldn't get political agreement they were imposed that created created friction with the European Union and between the EU and US and Britain. And you also see this this dynamic dynamic reflected in the so called overage agreement between between the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo, which I put in quotation marks I don't even really think you see any evidence that was actually an agreement at all functionally. It's an aim for deliverables to demonstrate progress without actual belief in progress. So fear and patronage of re entered, they were always there, but fear is a far more salient factor than it was when Thessaloniki was proclaimed in 2003 and patronage is a much more potent tool, we engage in patronage ourselves so fears directed outward toward the external Western actors. If you don't give us what we want we could go crazy pay us and and and and treat us treat us with deference. So, what does this portend for the future on the current pathway. It's, it's going to be continued generate degeneration degrading European Union capability among the excuse me credibility among the Western Balkan six citizens who remain there, or those citizens coming to the European Union, and a lot of countries are happy to have them for demographic and other reasons. Those societies more secure for their elites who get more deeply entrenched as well as more susceptible to those with opposing sets of values. And these are represented within the European Union hungry and Orban being chief among the exponent among them but he's emblematic but not alone. But this dynamically is hardly hidden from the West geopolitical adversaries. We're not playing out we're not fooling anybody. It's hardly hidden for this inhabitants of these countries, and to an increasing degree it's not hidden from the us and other democracies own citizens. So this approach in dangers enlargement, including with Ukraine and Moldova in the medium to long term. It is more attached to its current operating system and comfort zone, then its values reflected in democracy rule of law, other standards. So there's a real palpable decline and popular belief, not the values per se, but they're the sense that the EU in the West actually believes in them ourselves. They do move out to where they believe they can't can live with dignity Germany, Sweden, what have you, and much of the EU actively seeks them. And these are not primarily economic drivers they're part of the mix, but the prominent primarily human dignity drivers on 53, there are people my age who are leaving were established, who don't have to leave but they have one humiliation too many and they're like, I'm out. So what is to be done. Some EU member states and there is our increasing communications among like minded who know things are going wrong need to take this to the principles level. Basically heads of government level. That's the only way this is going to turn around so long as it's mired at bureaucratic level or below or we're stuck. We recognize that this policy is not only flawed but deeply damaging and doomed it can't succeed on its own terms, it is not possible, and therefore urgently requires revisiting and resetting. I'll wrap up here. So, you know what's my case for angry optimism I'm not a pessimist I know that might surprise you given the litany I've just, I've just laid out before you. But if I did not if I believe that there wasn't a potential constituency for the values we proclaim as our own in these countries, I believe I'm stubborn but I'm not a masochist. I believe there's real potential for radically different social contracts in these countries far closer to what the EU and its allies proclaimed to hold dear. The environment conducive for those would be both embarrassing at the managerial and bureaucratic level within our governments and structures and dis disruptive. But for the latter issue the expansive toolbox including deterrence mandates afforded in the post war settlements particularly pertaining pertaining to Bosnia and Kosovo. And that's the only disruption that really scares me. That's the only disruption that I think would not potentially be creative disruption. This doesn't assure progress, nothing is guaranteed, but it would at least make it feasible. And it would find it would be a shield against radical regression. So I'm confident real organic progress would follow, and it would be instructive to us in our own societies could a lot of the challenges we're facing divisions in established democracies. So these are, are things that resemble the divisions within within these Western Balkan societies. I'll wrap up with just, I'm more optimistic on the democratic and potential for achieving a social contract in Bosnia where I live, then I am in the United States right now. I know that might sound nuts but I have far more belief that we could find a modus vivendi in Bosnia than we can in the United States amongst ourselves. So that's the challenge and I appreciate your patience and your attention. I look forward to our discussion. Thank you.