 Good day. I'm Colonel Jerry Moorlach, the Director of the Combat Studies Institute. You're about to use a video series which our instructors have prepared for the sole purpose of improving your presentation of M610, the Evolution of Modern Warfare. We've taken care to make the course that you teach as similar to the one taught at Fort Leavenworth as possible and choose to add these tapes to your libraries in order to give you every advantage as you prepare to teach this new course. These tapes are similar to the weekly train-up sessions which we utilize to prepare our instructors here at Fort Leavenworth. My intent for the tape sessions was to provide you insights and tips on ways to approach the lessons of M610 that were not available in the instructor notes. I've drawn various instructors, military and civilian into the sessions based upon their specific expertise and historical background. They were asked to just talk to the lesson structure and content, giving you some additional information on the historical context and differing views on how to approach the lessons. These tapes will provide you a wealth of knowledge and direction that will significantly improve your readiness to teach our new history course. One word of caution regarding how to use these training tapes, they are not designed to be substituted for your instruction during the individual lessons of the course. As instructor preparation tapes train the training material, if you will, they are inappropriate for direct instruction to students and are not intended for that purpose. Our intent with these tapes is to improve your ability to lead the students' seminars by sharing tips and advice from some highly qualified experts. The Combat Studies Institute stands ready to provide whatever additional expertise or assistance that you may require, and we've included the institute's phone, mail, and email contact information on the tape if you should need it. Good luck with the evolution of modern warfare course. Have a good time. My name is Gary Biorgi. I'm an instructor at CSI and manager of staff college, and this is our lesson on the Korean War, 1950-1953. With me today are Lieutenant Colonel Jim Martin and Dr. Larry Yates, both from the Combat Studies Institute. We're going to be talking about the Korean War and raising some issues that hopefully will help you in your preparation for teaching the course, teaching the lesson. Before we get into the meat of the lesson, I would just like to mention that there are a number of U.S. Army official publications that deal with the Korean War. We have this combat action in Korea by Geigler. We have a number of publications, books printed by the Center of Military History. Here's Ebb and Flow, November 1950, July 1951, Policy and Direction the first year, and then South of the Nactong, North of the Yalu, and also the Medics War. I think Jim, you had another book. There's a brand new book out the Center of Military History just put out called Black Soldier of White Army that deals with the 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea, which is a change from what you'll find in these books and how they've dealt with that regiment. If you want an update, the issue really here is one of race, segregation and prejudice. If you want an update, the new one, Black Soldier of White Army from the Center for Military History, updates what's in the Apple books. A couple here. This book is from the Foreign Relations of the United States series. The series of volumes, there is one volume for Korea 1950, and then another volume for 51, and I believe a third volume for 52 through 54, three volumes that cover the war years. And what they contain are declassified documents, mainly at the policy making level, but they do get into military affairs. So for example, in the 1950 Korea volume, you'll find the Pentagon's orders to General MacArthur in Korea, et cetera. So if you have access to a university, government documents department, or I don't know, public library, whatever, you might see if these are available. One other book just came out, John Lewis Gattis, we now know, Oxford University Press, but it's available commercially. Most bookstores are in or could be ordered, but it deals with documentation we've gotten out of Moscow and Beijing since the end of the Cold War, and I guess some of it was coming out even before the end of the Cold War. But there's chapter three deals with Asia, and it brings us up to date on what we know now from the other side's point of view as to how the war started and various critical points in the war, such as the Chinese intervention. What were their considerations? What was Stalin saying to Mao? What was Mao saying to Kim Il-sung? What was Kim saying to both of them? Gattis gives you an overview of that in this book. Thank you. There are quite a number of books that have been written on the Korean War. The war itself, some people have called it the Forgotten War. Perhaps some of you have had the opportunity to visit the Korean War Monument in Washington, D.C., which is just south of the reflecting pool there in front of the Lincoln Memorial, opposite the Vietnam Memorial. Certainly the number of casualties in the Korean War make it a war that should not be forgotten. Approximately 54,000 Americans died in the war and over a million and a half Korean civilians and about 800,000 Korean soldiers north and south. It was fought by as many as eight U.S. divisions at one time in Korea. It has some very interesting characteristics and if we go back and look at it in terms of its place in the Abuse Room of Modern Warfare, it also has a very special role, a very special place, I think, in terms of it being the first limited war that the U.S. fought after the great victory in World War II. So now, just to start off here talking about the war and what are the lessons that we can draw from the war, I think the first place to start here is to just look at where the war fits into the international environment at that time and the U.S. policies. What was the United States national security position? What were our policies in early 1950? Where did we see the problems in the world? And did we think that there was going to be a war in Korea? I guess certainly that is also a major issue because a lot of people, or very few people, thought that there would be a war in Korea and that we were caught by surprise. I teach an elective on the Korean War and it's a point that surprises my students when we talk about how this really started because you don't think about how this war comes about. What most of us have read about is all of a sudden North Koreans come across the border. But the fact is that as the U.S. is focusing in the post-World War II era, they're not focusing on China, they're not focusing on Korea. I mean, there's the discussion of, you know, they lost China. The revolution has occurred in China and Taiwan is now where the nationalists are. And the Secretary of State gives a speech at the press club in which he draws a line which shows American interests in the Pacific. And that line includes Japan, but it doesn't include Korea. He doesn't put Korea within our sphere. And I think you can argue that that sends a message to North Koreans and their Russian friends, right? That it's acceptable to the United States. And I think that's one of the backgrounds you've got a place when you want to start looking at why this war comes about in the international, you know, the overall international context is that we send a very muddled message to the communist bloc nations that we have no problem with them taking Korea. We think, Larry. We've pretty well written off Korea as being strategically important. And Atchison's speech, although it's aimed at Taiwan, it does reaffirm that by leaving Korea on the other side of the defensive perimeter as well. And as you suggested, there's conflict already in Korea. Both sides want to reunify the peninsula. Kim Il-sung, the communist leader of the North, Sigmund Ri, he's not our puppet by any means we can't manage him, but he's someone we've turned to a nationalist, someone say a rightist, who wins elections, sets up a fairly dictatorial government in the South. Both of them are Kim Il-sung and Sigmund Ri are committed to reunifying the country. The demarcation there across the 38th parallel was an administrative convenience done in 45 when the Soviets came into the northern part in the latter part of the Pacific War and to compensate we go into the southern part of Korea. But Korea, like Vietnam, was not naturally divided. It was an administrative line that became then a political line in the Cold War. And both sides are committed to reunifying the country, but Sigmund Ri can't get the U.S. support to do it because we don't consider it to be that significant. And Kim Il-sung is having a tough time getting Stalin to approve an invasion of the South. So what you have in the peninsula is guerrilla warfare, raids and intrusions across the 38th parallel. You've got guerrilla warfare in the South, which the South manages to deal with fairly well. And so it becomes apparent to Kim Il-sung that if he's going to reunify the country, it better be through an invasion. And the problem is getting Stalin to buy off on it. Well, after Atchison's speech, after China goes communist, then Atchison's speech, Stalin's much more adventurous than he was up to 1950. And he seems to be more willing to take the risk. Again, the archives more recent, or his findings in the Russian archives have indicated. And so what Gaddas argues is then that Stalin, Kim Il-sung and Mao do the one thing that would ensure a U.S. response, and that is open aggression across the 38th parallel. Had they continued with guerrilla warfare, we probably wouldn't have done anything. Had it been raids, whatever, we wouldn't have done anything. But when you committed the open aggression, it was the one thing that was sure to get a response because of the Munich analogy. Going back to how did World War II start, we didn't stop Hitler soon enough. And the appeasement of Munich is the lesson for that. So the Munich analogy Truman uses after the North Koreans attack. He refers to what happened in Munich and we need to respond this time or they will attack us elsewhere, primarily Europe or the Near East, in areas that are vital to our interest. So you've got the Munich analogy. Also, it's a test for the United Nations. Truman cites that as a reason we have to respond. And also, it has an effect on the Japanese. Overt aggression in Korea cannot be ignored by Japan and we're in the process of one, signing a peace treaty with Japan. And two, a defense pact. And if we don't show resolving Korea, the Japanese are going to have serious doubts about aligning themselves with the United States. So for these reasons, the North Korean attack in South Korea precipitate the response that Kim Il-sung promised Stalin would not take place and that is a U.S. military reaction. I think a point you made there is important. While Korea and Formosa were not within the line we drew, Japan certainly is. Japan is a strategic importance to us. And if you've ever been to Korea, you recognize that it points like a dagger right at Japan. I mean, would you an hour away by flying time? During the Korean War, you'll have Air Force fighters coming off of Japan flying strike missions in Korea. It's that close. So if you're going to protect Japan, you can't just give up Korea to the communist forces. So it becomes important to us because of the proximity to Japan. And the issue here of the Japanese psychology, I mean, it's very easy to think while we're not going to get involved on the mainland of Asia and all of that. But once we actually are faced with the fact that here is an invasion of Korea, when we've had the containment strategy, the Truman Doctrine, in fact, years before sending aid degrees in Turkey, and then all of a sudden here's this actual armed invasion that's going to expand the area under communist control. We have to do something. As you said, looking at Korea as a dagger pointing at Japan, this was the strategic mindset within Japan that led Japan to try to gain control over Korea in the late 19th century and eventually annex Korea in 1910. For Japan's security, national security, they wanted control of Korea. Well, if we would have let the communists take over, you know, in June of 1950, you know, the psychological impact in Japan would have been tremendous. That's something that both Larry and Gary said. You know, Gary talked about containment, and Larry talked about how the overt military actions brought our response. And Gary talked about containment. I mean, containment is the dominant theme in our foreign policy in 1950. And when the North Koreans supported by, you know, their T-34 Russian tanks throw it out just right in the world's face, it obviously becomes an issue of containment. I mean, it is communism spilling over. When you see a T-34 tank, it is therefore communism, because that's a Russian tank and you know it's a Russian tank. In line with that, and again, this may be part of the Cold War lesson or you might want to use it now or not at all, but in early 1950, by the spring of 1950, you have a reassessment of containment policy in the form of National Security Council paper 68 or NSC 68. And NSC 68 identifies international communism as the threat, not simply Soviet expansion, which it had been before. It's now international communism. So like you say, when you see Russian tanks and Korean communists coming across the parallel, it's a part of an international movement as we see it. It may not be monolithic. We still hope there are fissures between the Russians and the Chinese, but it appears as though they are, at least in this case, acting in concert as they are. The documents demonstrate that now. And that we cannot ignore the threat. But again, the U.S. response is based upon several points. I think we've touched upon them all, but to summarize, the Munich analogy, if we don't respond, they will hit us elsewhere. They will only encourage them to do more in the Near East or in Europe, or our real interests are in Europe. Also, it will hurt Japan, the psychological effect on Japan. We cannot allow that to happen. It's a test of the U.N. and collective security. And at this point, the U.N. is still seen as, or there's still hope for the U.N. to perform the role that we had envisioned for it as helping to maintain the peace. So in this Cold War context, what was a non-strategic area all of a sudden becomes a major interest. It's not a vital interest. We're not going to fight to the death of Fort. And there are times where we're ready to get out. But it's no longer a peripheral interest over which we have no interest, which it was before June of 1950. It's somewhere in between. One historian has called it a major interest. We'll fight to save the South Korean regime. At least that's the initial objective. We'll get to war objectives later. We'll fight for South Korea to a certain degree. If we get pushed off, well, we'll reassess it then, but there are indications that if we had been pushed out, we probably would have accepted it. But we don't know that speculation. Well, thinking about the motivations then for getting involved in Korea and the decision to intervene has been mentioned. Here are all these reasons to intervene. Then the question is, what are we going to intervene with? What tools do we have to use to serve our national policy objectives here? And the unfortunate reality is that we have an unprepared military. The army is unprepared, the Navy is unprepared, the Air Force is unprepared to fight this war. What does that mean then for the soldier who's sent off to fight the North Koreans? It's going to mean trouble. We have Task Force Smith then, which has been used ever since the Korean War as an example of unpreparedness, the hollow army forcing the army to force the soldiers to get into a dangerous situation because the government did not provide them the training, preparation, equipment, whatever, the numbers that would allow them to go in and win that first battle. This is a spin-off of the last lesson. Larry talks about that, the Cold War lesson. This is a very tightly tied lesson to that one. The reason that we have this hollow army that Gary talks about is because our national military strategy is really wrapped around the bomb. It's wrapped around that huge advantage that we have in nuclear weapons. And so the individual soldier, the tank, does not deliver that weapon. So the money's not put into the army. The money gets put into those portions of the Air Force which can deliver nuclear weapons. Well, so while we have an Air Force with plenty of money, it's not putting that money into close air support that can help on the battlefield, and we'll see that in the initial fight in Korea. The ability to bring close air support down for infantry armor units simply does not exist early on because that's not where our defense dollars are going. So we have an army that still basically has World War II weapons, which are not well maintained and cared for. And you've not had the money to do the training, the units in Japan, the money or the space to do the individual unit training. And while they may be able to fire their rifles, rifle marksmanship's easy. But any of you who've tried to do maneuvers at the company level, the battalion level, the brigade level, or the division level know that those are things you have to practice. They don't just come naturally because you teach a soldier how to shoot. And that's the result, really, of our national military objectives and the way we focus where we're going to spend our money. And adding to that, you've got the issue of the budget. The idea of a balanced budget as a political issue is nothing new. It's in today's news, of course, but Truman was committed to balancing the budget because if you don't have it, you're in a way of inflation, you can ruin the economy and lose the Cold War right there, a theme that Eisenhower will come back to after the Korean War when he's president. But the need to balance a budget, a military strategy based on the bomb and among the services, the preference for the Air Force over the other two, the Air Force, which we haven't discussed, becomes a separate service in 1947. And I assume that's part of the Cold War lesson, the National Security Act of 1947 and all of that. But these considerations are played budgetary as well as strategic. You know, I think this all rolls in because you talked about the decision to intervene and that's where we really got started. And we've talked about how the decision by the North Koreans to come across in a blatant invasion is really what will garner the response. The problem then becomes on the decision to intervene is, okay, what do I intervene with? That becomes the real issue. We have what, just over two divisions? Rather hollow divisions in Japan? We have four there. The whole Army has ten divisions, four are in Japan. And I think in the reading that's assigned for this lesson out of Wigley, Wigley does a good job of talking about the accident of geography that puts 40% of our divisions within, you know, an hour's flying time or two hours flying time of the Korean Peninsula. And you know, what's interesting is though we've got 40% there when the President makes his decision to go ahead and say, okay, yeah, John McCarthy, anybody under your command you can commit. The problem is, well, we send Brad Smith and Task Force Smith, but how many anti-tank rounds do they take with them? They take six. And what is that? Half of what's in the Far East Theater? So while we have 40% of our divisions an hour away, there's no ammunition to stop tanks. You know, one comment I'd like to make here, most students who haven't looked into this war much envision the North Korean forces as being just like the Chinese forces, which will cross the Yalu. Those are infantry heavy, mass wave assaults, and that's not accurate. The columns which will shred Task Force Smith and will run the Americans back into the Pusan perimeter are tank heavy. They are being pushed forward on the roads behind T-34 tanks. I mean, that's what shreds Task Force Smith and their inability to even dent them or slow them down. So there's a misunderstanding there and you need to make sure your students understand that. It's two different types of ground war. The first one is a tank battle where infantry time to take on tanks. Later at the Yalu, yes, it will be wave after wave mass assaults of Chinese infantry. But that's not true when the North Koreans come across. And the thing is, how could that happen? Given the intelligence devices, surveillance devices we have today, you can't imagine an opponent that easily massing armor without us knowing about what we didn't have those things back then. And it was just generally assumed by the Korean military advisory group that we left behind when US occupation troops pulled out in 49. The K-Mag, as it was called, the general that led that, I don't recall his name, but his assumption was that you cannot use T-34s in Korea. The terrain is too rugged for their use. Well, the North Koreans proved him wrong and it proved catastrophic because on the basis of that assumption and others, the United States had not supplied Sigmund Rhee with tanks that could be used against tanks, with aircraft that could be used against tanks, or with artillery, or heavy artillery. The reason being is if we gave him those things, our assumption was he'd go north with them and precipitate his own war. So we withheld the heavy weaponry that he could have used against tanks on the assumption that the other side couldn't use tanks and the assumption was wrong. And here they come and, as Jim said, what is our response? And one thing to keep in mind, it is incremental. We don't immediately commit tasks for a Smith. Truman meets Saturday night Sunday, or excuse me, Sunday at Blair House with his advisers and the initial response is air cover for the South Koreans and our advisers. Then it's air and naval support south of the 38th parallel. Then it's air and naval support north of the 38th parallel. U.S. aircraft and naval vessels in the vicinity taken part. And finally, by the end of that week, with the realization that the air and naval power are unable to stop the North Koreans by themselves the decisions made to sending land troops at Task Force Smith being the first contingent to arrive and its legend lives on. My students are absolutely amazed when we do the piece on Task Force Smith. And I have a copy of a letter that Brad Smith wrote some years ago to a CGSC student and talks about how they did the best they could with what they had. And my students keep going, how could any American commander send a thrown-together battalion Task Force with six anti-tank weapons, a few howitzers, you know, hadn't trained together at all and throw them up against armored columns? It's unconscionable. But I think the fact of the matter is that the guy who saw Brad Smith off the airport basically told him, Brad, just go show the flag. When they see the Americans are there, they'll stop. And, you know, we consistently underestimate I think our enemies in the Far East. We'll see it again in the Vietnam lesson. And we believe that if we showed the American flag Brad Smith stood up there with his helmet on, looked like a GI, they'd go, oh, the Americans are here, let's turn around and go back. And the North Koreans had no intention of slowing down for Americans. I think that's, to me, that's the only answer that makes any sense as to why you send Task Force Smith because you don't think they're really going to have to fight it out. You're not sacrificing American bodies. You're doing a show of force and that's all it's going to take for these guys to go back north again. It's one thing to take on the South Koreans. It's a totally different thing to take on American soldiers. Just so we're clear, we don't see any conflict. Again, Kim Il Sung is not expecting the Americans to intervene. But once they do, he's already started his juggernaut. He's not going to call it to a stop. He's going to, if need be, he'll look to the Chinese and Russians for more support. But that comes down the road. But he does not expect the intervention. But when he sees the flag, he doesn't turn it around. It keeps going. The momentum is there. But again, both sides have misinterpreted the other's intentions. They've misgaged the other and they're both going to pay for it. Well, this issue of what is or is not unconscionable, as we look at what happens to the 24th Infantry Division, basically, I think General Walker was prepared to sacrifice that division to gain time. Because he knew that he had to somehow gain enough time to set up the Pusan perimeter. And the division is pretty well smashed, as it does withdraw from that early July, up there by Osan, down through Tate, was it Tate John and then Tegu and so on. Finally, we're in the Pusan perimeter and that area has been reinforced then. And eventually there are 100,000 troops that are in the Pusan perimeter. And then MacArthur is thinking well. I guess we're not going to fight this out in the Pusan perimeter. I'm going to take a strategic action here and we're going to have an amphibious landing and bring back some flexibility and fluidity to the battlefield. And we have the Incheon landing, which we didn't talk about the command relationships that are set up here when the war begins. And of course MacArthur had been in Japan as supreme commander of Allied powers as the supreme agent of the occupation of Japan. And then also he was a commander of U.S. forces far east. And then once the war starts and Truman decides well, all right, he's going to be my commander in the field and that's added to his other responsibilities. So MacArthur is supreme commander then of the forces that are fighting in Korea with General Walker as the 8th Army commander, but for purposes of his chromite there, chromite operation, which is the landing in Incheon. MacArthur fights with the Joint Chiefs to agree to establish a 10th Corps, which will be made up of a Marine division and an Army division in land in what is really an incredible operation. We'll come back, just maybe to take this chronologically. Let's fill in just a little bit on MacArthur and the command in Incheon. On the Pusan perimeter, I might suggest you, we've got a Leavenworth paper which I think is listed in your syllabus by Glenn Robertson's counterattack on the Macdon which shows just how tenuous that line is. When you look at a map, it looks like a fairly solid line down on the southeastern tip of Korea. It's not. It's a porous line and Walker is constantly having to shift units around to fill that line in and to hold it. Glenn's paper, his Leavenworth paper deals with that. These are available to you free of charge and in a class you might ask one student to read it and do a report or whatever. You might not, but just as a suggestion that paper is available free of charge, it deals with the Pusan perimeter and the actual fighting there and this may be something you want to exploit. On the command front, I think you mentioned it, even my MacArthur is a UN commander as well. This is a UN coalition. We pass the resolutions that make it a UN endeavor. MacArthur is a UN commander, but who's he answering to? Not necessarily the Secretary General of the UN. He's answering to Harry Truman up to a point. But the Americans are running the war, but it is a coalition. There are foreign troops that will fight under MacArthur in Korea and other nations that will apply aid of support. But it's a UN effort, a UN flag, but the U.S. is calling the shots, so we just need to clarify that. You get the Pusan where we finally stabilize the line, reinforce, and then MacArthur has his idea for the end run at Incheon. And something you can bring up with your students which will hit a good note. Today we deal a lot with the idea of force projection. That's a very important thing that all of us have to look at, historians and our friends on the tactical and operational side. And really the decision to buy time by Walton Walker, what he has to do is he has to buy enough time for America's ability to project forces to outweigh what the North Koreans can sense out. I mean, that's the race. The question is, can I get enough into Korea before I'm thrown off the peninsula to keep us there? Because if I can, we'll win. And that's the key. It's a race not of how fast do they get here or there, but how fast can I get ships to put American soldiers, tanks, and equipment into this little tiny perimeter. At point, there are North Koreans within 15 and 16 miles of the port of Pusan. And it's how fast can I get this stuff there to win? And actually they do pretty well, even though going back to the budgetary issues, what the Navy's spending their money on is carriers and not spending it on transports. Force projection of the Army is not something it's seen as important, so it's not where they're spending a lot of money. But by the time that chromite comes off, the soldiers inside the Pusan perimeter are living far better than the North Korean soldiers on the outside of the Pusan perimeter. They're living on a couple rice balls a day because they're at the absolute far length of their logistics line. And our guys are eating fresh vegetables and fruit. They're eating as well as guys in Japan are by the time chromites launched. So it's a great study in force projection. If you want to focus in that direction, and if that's something that you have looked at in repeated lessons, or you want to look at repeated lessons, Korea is a great place to look at the power of force projection. And another thing to look at here with this decision on chromite, if we're talking about a lesson in command decision making, in strategy and risk taking, how do you evaluate things? I mean there are those who are saying these additional troops that are coming from the States to Japan and Korea should go into the Pusan perimeter because as Larry had already said, this was not a solid line. We didn't have complete security, complete assurance that this was going to be able to hold. But MacArthur makes an assessment here that Walker is going to be able to somehow hold it enough and that the two divisions that are coming, instead of being put into the Pusan perimeter, should be used in a strategic stroke that will have a lot of risk, but in one fell swoop then, it can dramatically alter the military situation in the Korean Peninsula. And the JCS are nervous about it. Lots of people are nervous about it. MacArthur argues strongly for it and it works. Well in fact, if you get the idea that MacArthur just kind of figured this out as the perimeter was going on, it's not really true. I mean the records indicate that he starts talking about doing an action like Incheon very, very early. I mean shortly after the invasion occurs, he already, with his staff in Japan, are starting to visualize this bold stroke to do, I mean, let's face what Cromite really does for us. We've talked about the tanks that are being used by the North Koreans. If you've ever been to Korea, you know, the general in the KMAG wasn't too far off. There's only so many places you can use him. And if you follow the battle calendar down, you'll see they follow the highway, the main highway that goes Osan, Pyongyang, then down Tejon, Taegu. I mean that's where the battle, so just following that road down there and he's going to cut that road because if you cut that road up above its soul, and it goes right through soul, and you cut off the fuel supply to the North Korean tanks, they're going to wither up and die. And he starts thinking about that very, very early on. I've read one author who says that when he lands in Osan, oh it's north of Osan, Suwon, when he first lands and he'll take a jeep up to look across the Yalu River or look across the Ahan River, that even then he turns to an aide and starts talking about a bold stroke coming from the ocean in the area of soul. So this is something that pops into Doug MacArthur's mind real early on. When you were talking about this road and you mentioned Osan and then you said Pyongyang, Pyongyang Tech. Sorry, I was going north already. One question you might ask the students regarding Incheon and that is is this an example of MacArthur's brilliance or is it just pure common sense? We've had officers come through here arguing both ways. Here you've got the JCS, they're inclined not to approve it, MacArthur's eloquence wins them over. There's a recent documentation that suggests that Truman's sending some atomic bomb components out in that direction also helped the JCS go for it. But MacArthur talks about the second hand of destiny ticking away and all of this and he convinces them this is the thing to do. But is it that bold a maneuver? Is it that unexceptual? Mao Tse-Tung knew it was coming. He told Kim Il-Sung they'll hit you at Incheon. Kim Il-Sung ignored the advice and paid the price. Is it brilliant or just military common sense? Do the development and cut them off? Well, the aftermath of Incheon, of course, is that the North Korean army that's down in the southeast corner of the Korean Peninsula then has its logistics lines cut and then we know that there's a breakout from the Pusan perimeter link up and by the end of September the UN coalition is faced with the issue of what to do now about the Korea because the Korean army has basically been destroyed North Korean army has been destroyed and there's the question of should we cross the 30th parallel? The issue of war aims changing at this point when it looks as if we can accomplish a lot more we can achieve a lot more than just returning to the pre-war situation and so we have a debate in the UN, in the US and so on and other places in Korea what to do and the decision is made and the good to go for. And I think that debate is meaningless because Seungmin-Ri is going north. I don't care what anybody else says Seungmin-Ri is going north so he's either going by himself or he's going with us and at this point MacArthur argues and Truman agrees that if he's going we better go with him because one way or the other he's going north. Excuse me there are compelling reasons to do it. One point to make and again we see this not only as giving you suggestions but also information you might not have in the readings. As the foreign relations series American policy makers with an interagency actually State Department, Defense Department, CIA the second echelon right below the secretaries they're talking in July of 1950 about when we get to the 38th what are we going to do it's not a question of if we get to the 38th it's always when we get to the 38th they're assuming that Pusan perimeter will hold and ultimately we'll push them back then the question becomes do we cross the 38th as Jim said Sigmund Rees already decided that he's going north he's got the wherewithal to do it now the question is will the UN go with him will the US go with him and one thing you might do is ask your students you know if you're the commander in chief if you were MacArthur what recommendation would you make if you're Truman what decision will you make and on what basis would you go north or not there's really not a heck of a lot of debate all the reasons say go north the only one that causes some caution is if we go north the Chinese and the Soviets might intervene and that causes some real consternation but not enough to override these other concerns and a comment on that issue of Chinese intervention as we look back we know that's what actually occurred and the issue is well how could we have known the fact is that we could have known because Mao Tse-tung does in fact tell that we don't have direct relations diplomatic relations but he in fact tells who's the Indian ambassador that if the Koreans come north that's one thing I have no problem with that but if the Americans come north basically he says that he'll have to take some action and again I take that back to our continuing we continue to underestimate Asian enemies and we didn't believe he'd do it or he couldn't do it without us knowing it was coming right the fact the matter was he was already moving towards the border by the time we hit the 38th he's already got there I mean he's ready to go much earlier than we would start looking for him but I agree there is no other option you go north at that point and you if you believe Mao Tse-tung then you try to bluff him out of coming with nuclear weapons or whatever you try to bluff him with but we did have a semblance of a warning that the Chinese would come across Mao was rather open about that well that's right and also in terms of looking for what's going to happen if we cross the 30th parallel there's concern about Chinese intervention or Soviet intervention is there and in a sense the JCS does give MacArthur some guidance as to what to do if there is a Chinese intervention or Soviet intervention we're supposed to stop you know moving north which in a sense is a tool of engagement then that we're now fighting this war on her and also Truman as he's making his decision and looking towards the end of the war he flies to Wake Island and meets with MacArthur and asks MacArthur about this possibility well what's going to happen if the Chinese come? MacArthur says well don't worry about it we're not going to come I think for some of the reasons that Colonel Martin has mentioned it doesn't make sense they've just had a long bloody civil war they need the time for economic reconstruction we've got overwhelming firepower they don't have the army that we have so why would they want to get in there and lose which is what MacArthur says to Truman that will happen if the Chinese come in we'll beat them so don't worry about it if they come we win and the closest thing you've got to an Asian expert the military is Douglas MacArthur he spent his whole life there he spent the last 17 years there you know at one point I'd like to make because I know we're going to have to wrap this up here shortly but you know we see 50 to 53 for the dates on this thing everything we've talked about here yeah all right this war goes three years in length but most students only study the first year of it you know the drive to the perimeter back to the Yalu back to Seoul that's what is mainly studied there's two more years of virtual trench warfare okay stagnated on a line while they're busy doing their thing at Penman John trying to come up with a treaty all right so I mean you might make that point to your students most of them only see the Korean war if it's what we've talked about through Chinese intervention well that's right and when the Chinese intervene and MacArthur starts and the war offensive 25 November 24 November the Chinese intervene and MacArthur surprised and the 8th Army is defeated launched out of North Korea and you know it's a disaster that's the only way you can describe it and General Walker's killed in an automobile accident north of Seoul we get Ridgway in there the 8th Army is withdrawing south of Seoul when the Chinese launch their New Year's offensive and things look bad MacArthur has gone from the Chinese who feels that the Chinese can't do anything to the pessimist who feels that the Chinese are going to drive the U.N. Army off the Korean Peninsula and he starts talking about all kinds of things that use the A-bomb and what's going to happen if we have to withdraw from Korea and things and the JCS are getting worried about his state of mind, TRUM is worried about his state of mind and then when Ridgway has some success at the end of January and so on and goes back, recaptures Seoul and TRUM and then it's starting to think about well maybe we can make a deal but MacArthur kind of sabotages his effort there and we end up then with the relief from MacArthur which is I mean an awful lot of time talking about this early period of the war which is extremely important extremely interesting and then all of a sudden here you've got the middle of April 1951 the relief of MacArthur which again it's a tremendous topic for discussion. You can do a whole class on dealing with is MacArthur right or is he wrong and that has to do with a basic tentative American military service and that's who's in charge of the civilians of the military. That's a critical point you can debate the merits of the Europe first policy of Truman who at one point tells MacArthur the rest of the divisions were put together they're going to Europe to beef up NATO which is a paper organization you're going to have to fight the war with what you've got which MacArthur doesn't want to hear but to us to the Truman administration Europe was the critical of the Cold War not the Far East MacArthur on the other hand of course is fighting in the Far East and sees everything from that narrower perspective. You can debate who's right or wrong in that but the issue is MacArthur publicly made his views known after he had been told not to and that's in subordination and for that you get relieved but in the time left very quickly there are some implications of all this when you look at the Korean War first of all constraints or containment rather is expanded to Asia secondly the budget the ceiling on the budget is lifted it goes up to 50 billion Eisenhower will put a clamp back on it and that's a story of the 50s the armies hurting once again in the 50s but for a brief moment everybody gets well and each service is getting what it needs to fight and then I think one of the main things to come out of Korea is the theory of limited war which did not exist before and that is what do you do when you have to fight for the reasons we stated earlier but you can't go all the way to a super power confrontation for fear of the Soviets New York they've got enough bombs to do that and the answer is you fight the limited war what is the limited war theory you use enough military force to convince the other side they can't win militarily and they need to negotiate well a lot of people are going to die to get that political negotiation McArthur's view is there is no substitute for victory Harry Truman is essentially saying yes there is a political settlement but one based upon our convincing the other side through the loss of our lives and our sacrifice that they cannot win and this limited war theory which is written after Korea will become the basis for getting us into Vietnam so here we are the limited war, Korea and we hope these points that have been raised here by the three of us will help you as you put your own lesson together as we said preparedness the conduct of operations civil military relations relief from McArthur the conduct of the war strategic surprise why do we underestimate the enemy there are all kinds of issues that are raised here with the a deeper discussion that you're going to have time for