 Rwyf yn fwy o'r gweithio ar y cymhwytoedd y cymhwytoedd yn 2018. Rwyf yn fwy o'r cymhwytoedd, ac rwyf yn fwy o'r cymhwytoedd, mae'r ffóinol yn gwybod gyda eu cyfnodau, a'r cymhwytoedd hynny yn ddigonwch ei fod yn gweithio i ddweud, ac mae'n ddigonwch ei hwn i ddweud. Rwyf yn fwy o'r cymhwytoedd, Sandra White, a ddim yn bwynt i gyd, Sandra White. Gallwch yn ei bwysig o ddigonwch? Mae'r ddweud o'r gweithfyrdd. Ibu ddaisgyn nhw, Mark Myles. Videos hwnnw dim yn sefydlu rhywbeth o hwnnw i'n ddweud o'i ddatblygu. Er이 amgylgr ystyrw strategy, rwy'n ddystrygu ei wneud o ran ardedigiorTham 3 yn 4 yn prifyd. Rwy'n ddweud. Rydyn ni'n bwysig i ddweud o ddiynau rhan o'r ddysgu yn Adequство Ffair. is focused on the management and custodianship of the Macintosh building and its collections. Our committee is also examining the future of both the building and the collections. This is our second evidence session on the art school. Our next session will take place on the 19th of November with Glasgow School of Art Board members. Before we begin, I want to remind members and witnesses that we have a limited amount of time today. As you can see, we've got quite a number of members wishing to ask questions, so if the questions and answers could be kept as succinct as possible, that would be extremely useful. I'd like to welcome our witnesses today to the committee. They are Brian McWade, the managing director of Cure Scotland, and from Pagin Park Architects, we have David Page, the director and David Peyton, the head of design review. I thank you all for coming, and I thank you for your written evidence, which was helpful. Mr McWade, I understand that you wish to make a short opening statement. Yes, that's okay. Yes, it can be as short as possible. That will be very brief. First of all, good morning, and thanks, convener, for the invitation to appear before you today. I appreciate the opportunity to make some brief opening remarks before we start answering the questions this morning. We really just wanted to speak on behalf of everyone at Cure Construction and express in how saddened we were and are by the fire which took hold at the Glasgow School of Art in June with the devastating consequences. As you know, we were appointed by the School of Art to lead the reconstruction works of the Macintosh building back in June 16, following the fire that occurred in May 14. It was a commission which your team was extremely proud of, securing. We recognised the importance of the Mac to the students, to Glasgow and to Scotland, and that world as a whole. For the last two years, our people have been working painstakingly and putting all their efforts into the restoration work, and then those within sight, we could say, ten months away we would be handing the building back over. Everyone at Cure as well as the team of skilled crafts people in the supply chain cared deeply for what we were doing at the Mac. We were looking very much forward to completing the major restoration work, which we hoped would instill pride in the work that was done for Glasgow and indeed all of Scotland. Like everyone else, we await the outcome of the investigation that is on going. I would like to assure the committee that, through the proceedings that we continue to do, we can to assist the fire service and other investigating bodies. I hope that you will understand that there is a live regulatory investigation underway. I do not want to say today that might interfere or prejudice with that investigation. You will be aware that there is a joint names insurance policy taken out by Glasgow School of Art for damage to the renovation works and the existing structure and that covered liability for legal liability for third party property damage. I have got to be mindful not to say anything which could compromise those insurance provisions today. Given both those factors, I might not be able to answer all the questions that you may want to put today, but speaking for Cure, I cannot tell you when the inquiry will come to an end and when we will know, and I appreciate that that is recognised. I hope that we can assist you in the session today, and we will make every endeavour to do that and give you as much information as we can, but thanks for that. I understand that Mr Page wants to make a statement. It is a short statement. Thank you for giving us the opportunity to answer your questions today. Just like this committee and everyone who cares deeply about the Glasgow School of Art, we have been completely devastated by the catastrophic fire in June. Page Park is an employee-owned company based in Glasgow close to the Glasgow School of Art. We have 40 employees and at least a third of them were involved at any one time on the work of the Glasgow School of Art. A number of our team were educated at the GSA and our chair was one of those. It was an incredibly important contract for us to one, and we have always been and remain extremely proud and humbled to have been working on one of the world's most important historic buildings. We, like everyone else in this committee in Glasgow and across Scotland beyond, want to know what happened and we await the outcome of the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service investigation. We look forward to assisting you in your deliberations. Thank you very much for that. Can I open by? We know from the fire report of the 2014 fire that the fire escalated because of the ventilation ducts in the building. Reading through your very helpful timeline that you have submitted, you have been associated as architects with the art school for 25 years. Reading through your timeline, it was clear that there had been a major project work done back in 2008 that was heritage lottery funded. That would have been the opportunity to deal with that problem with the ducts. This came up in evidence from our previous witness session as well. In your timeline, you said that you seemed to indicate that you had an engineer in to look at the fire stopping in the building. That was identified back then, but it was basically... you say that it was not possible because of the extent of fire stopping needed, that you decided not to go down the route of doing that, instead the focus was in a sprinkler system, which of course was not installed by the 2014 fire. Why did you agree to that engineer's report that suggested that the extent of the stopping was so great that it was not possible to do it? We understand the question. In 2008, as we have said, the GSA commissioned the report out of concerns and Fire Engineer Fedra worked with ourselves on that. What they did was they looked at the building very closely and what they said was that the usual risk reduction measures were not possible for three reasons. One, the use of the building couldn't be changed. The construction, the particular construction of the building couldn't be changed and there was remaining the possibility of a fire. In particular on fire stopping, what they said was they concluded that it was virtually impossible, given the current structure and amount of fire stopping and compartmentation required to achieve that. So their conclusion after looking at all the possible remedies and solutions was that there was only one conclusion and that was miss suppression. That's the only viable option that they identified. That obviously left the voids in place, which accelerated the fire. I think the intention was that once the miss suppression went in, it would deal with all of these. If the only fire measure was the suppression and sprinkler system, why did it take from 2008 to 2014 to get it in place and it still wasn't in place at the time of the fire? The miss suppression system was a completely new system to put into an operational historic building. The problem with inserting such a system is that it's incredibly complicated and you're wanting to conserve the fabric but you're having to pass pipes through the spaces that you value. So that was a major challenge for everyone, including the statutory authorities. I think we mentioned on our timeline a workshop was arranged when the statutory authorities were supportive of what was essentially a pioneering installation into an incredibly important world historic building. The journey to get there took time because it's very complicated. There was two insurers involved, one for the building and one for the collections that sat within the building. There were 150 different rooms and every single room was different in size and shape. So the process took time. The money had been expended on the conservation and access project so that funding had to be raised and at the same time the programme to make it, to install it while the building was in operation had to be created. There was a huge amount of challenges that the art school faced in terms of that installation. Was clearly an issue then in terms of not installing it right away? Well the funding is always in, we've found in arts and culture and conservation projects is always an issue. Just to go back to like you're talking about the fire stopping and compartmentation which decided was not possible in 2008. After the 2014 fire, did that change, did your view on fire stopping and compartmentation change after the 2014 fire? Absolutely because what we were then into was a completely different situation. Up until then work had been going on as all the universities do during summer periods and then in the case of the fire suppression system that was one continuous project. But what we had then was a chance to properly consider the events of the fire and put into place a comprehensive system for the building in use in the future. And there were five key targets that were identified as we worked together with our fire consultants. That was, as you can imagine, improved the compartmentation of the building. Install fire stopping, yes, within all the ducts and risers. Install a state-of-the-art detection system through the building. Install a mis-suppression system, which had been commenced previously. And install a smoke extract system. So it was not a single measure, it was a whole range of measures to protect this most important building. Right. And you've listed these in the compartmentation and the fire stopping. Was that written into the contract, the tender? Absolutely. The tender, the documentation that the team prepared required the contractor to put all of these into installation. Okay. And of course we had the situation where the sprinkler system, we had exactly the same situation with the sprinkler system as we had in 2014. It wasn't in place at the time of the fire. Sprinkler systems are, as David has already alluded to, our complex processes. It was in installation and by the end of the contract, of course, would have been commissioned and in place. Right. I think it's important to distinguish to help the committee the difference between the two fires. One was the fire in use for which those five fire prevention measures were put forward. The other one was a fire on a construction site for which there are different processes and procedures that are followed. They are different. Yeah. And there are particular risks during construction. There are risks which are, which there are processes and procedures put in place to mitigate those risks. Yeah. An average person looking at it would see it as extremely unfortunate that, in both fires, he was just about to put in a fire sprinkler system. Yeah. I can't disagree. It's a repetition of the previous mistake. I know that other members are keen to come in, so I'm going to move on to Claire Baker. Thank you, convener. I'm interested in the role of Glasgow's School of Art. The board of Governors' Estates Committee had the role of overseeing the restoration project. And in evidence that we've had from Paging Parks, you've said that, at the commencement of the works, care construction prepared and issued a fire and emergency plan. That was extensively consulted on at the time. So can I ask what the, from the issuing of the tenders and the acceptance of that and Cure's involvement from 2016 up until the recent fire, what kind of discussion did you have with Glasgow? What would you say the extent of Glasgow's School of Arts oversight of the project was? Were they quite intimately involved in the project going forward? Or was it a fairly hands-off and keyed in yourselves when you were responsible for the project? Can I just answer the first point in terms of involvement? The Glasgow's School of Art appointed both internal specialist project managers and external project managers, and they acted as the interface with the board. So in day-to-day, we were in constant dialogue. As you can imagine, this project was in high visibility. And so the level of the discussion was constant. It's also a conservation project. You move a few feet along a wall and there's another issue. So there's a constant dialogue that takes place. So there was no way that that took place in isolation, that took place in constant dialogue with those project manager representatives of the art school. If I might address the other part of your question, which I think was about the consultation and involvement of the GSA in the contractor fire plan, what I would say is that what we required of the contractor and what they did was they were asked to carry out a risk assessment of the building. This is not any other building. This is a very distinct and special building with its own construction and constraints and materials. So what they were asked to do was make an assessment, carry out a risk assessment of that, and once they'd done that, to prepare their fire safety plan. And that's what they did. They then issued that to the team and to the client for comment. And that document was revised three times in the following months. It was revised firstly after consultation with the GSA and that was entirely reasonable because they were operating properties all around that, all around the building. So they entered into discussion about escape from other buildings, et cetera, and neighbours. So it was revised after that discussion. There was then further discussions with the design team and the project managers, and it was revised again. And then finally it was revised after discussion with building control and the fire services. A meeting was arranged on site and a walk round was carried out of the whole building together with these. And after that, there was an agreed list of changes to the fire safety plan which was then adopted. All of these were adopted and the final version was issued by Cure Construction. I'd agree with that in terms of our interface with the school. We had the normal operating procedures with the design team and the rest of the project team. There was nothing unusual for this kind of job. And indeed, probably the school had gone a step beyond that in that they had a couple of their own project managers who came to all the meetings, came to all the project reviews, project sessions that we had. We don't always see that in other projects, but in this project they had two very experienced project managers with heritage background work. So I would say that that was an extra step that was taken that certainly we appreciated to touch on the issues in the fire plan and the site safety measures. We all have a duty. There's obligations upon us all and those obligations overlap. So under the regulations, the client has a duty. We have a duty to put the fire plan together and the construction fees plan and the architects and other consultants have a duty to carry out checks on that as well. And all of that was done as you hear the detail. There was a lot of detailed work, detailed reviews and assessments carried out before the plans were signed off and activities started. Can I just ask? So the emergency, the fire plan that you have described, once that went through the consultation phases with the various partners and it was agreed was that then a fixed document, it wasn't a dynamic document so you described it as being a complex project. The plan didn't change and another question linked to that is do you think what you have to prepare in the plan which is regulatory is adequate to deal with the type of project that the Macintosh was? It seems that in my correct sense that the fire plan is focused around health and safety, around protection of population, around excess, those kinds of issues, and not so much around how you deal with protection of a building. It prioritises people over buildings, is that correct? That's fair to say because that's what the code of practice sets out, that the priority is always people. So for example you have to test, there are requirements to test, the procedures they're tested has to be no more than three months of periods, as we're tested more regularly than that because of the kind of building we're in. We, in the last test that happened I think in May 14, sorry May 18, the building was emptied in something like four minutes. So those tests give you that first priority which is preserving life and then the second priority is obviously the asset protection and the building itself and that's what the fire plan is geared to do and all the measures that are put in place. One thing I would say is not a static document and it can't be because on complex jobs like the Macintosh things have to change by nature of the construction project so it gets revisited over time and it gets updated. So if we move the scaffolding for example or close an area it gets updated and it has to be communicated to the people on site. We have a board on site at standard practice so that people who walk into that site can see that. It's interesting in closing. It's interesting you talk about the project managers that came through the art college because the impression I feel after the fire, the recent fire, was that Glasgow art college didn't really have a responsibility in terms of the project. They seemed to, the comments that came out seemed not recognised, the extent that they seemed, you're suggesting this morning that they were intimately involved in the construction project and how that all developed. In terms of the day-to-day operations and control of work on site but I think probably the distinction to be made is that when a contractor takes possession of a site we all have our own responsibilities but ultimately the contractor has responsibility for securing and protecting the site. There's no debate on that but there can only be one party who has full responsibility. Can I just give you a supplementary to that? We've taken expert evidence from conservation architects who point out exactly the point that Mr McQuade's just made that the statutory requirements of the fire plan are about getting people out and that that's a failing in the statutory requirements for historic buildings. So what did the architects and Glasgow School of Art do to come in and say we want to enhance that fire plan to protect this incredibly precious asset which is the Macintosh building? What we were working to there is a standard code, a joint code of practice which the contractor referred to earlier that sets out the standards for work for fire prevention on construction projects and that's effectively the industry Bible for the work that should be done on site to protect against. That was written into the tender documents and the contractor took that into account in preparing his fire emergency plan. To incorporate it in that code is a major focus on the asset on prevention of hot works, permits for hot works, fire works to steel work. There's a whole series of issues incorporated in it. Life safety must come first but the building is protected within that code is described within that code. That's still a priority. The piece of advice that we've been given by the experts is that compartmentation is quite difficult to build in during the restoration works but you must do it, you must spend money to build in compartmentation during the construction phase. Did you do that in the fire plan? Did you insist on that? While we identified that the contractor has the responsibility of the site there has to be a single point of contact. The project managers, the design team, our health and safety adviser and the CLARCA works monitor throughout the project what is actually happening on site. That's the role that the design team has in response to the works that are going on. A supplementary from... Specifically on compartmentation the building plan divides itself into three parts and at these two third points if I might describe it as that there were fire doors, temporary fire doors put in place throughout the height of the building and they stayed in place throughout the course of the works. Eventually they would have been replaced with new fire screens but throughout the course of the works every time we went down one of the corridors we were going through fire doors. A supplementary from Sandra White. Thank you, chair. It was to follow up on the risk assessment and in your proposals 2015-2016 you mentioned about areas of insulation being put in the roofs. So when you looked at the risk assessment what material was used in the insulation of the roofs? Do you have the name of it? The material that was used? I can't give you the specific manufacturer here and now but I understand why you might ask the question. In the context of Grenfell there's been lots of discussion held about in the media and within... Sorry for interrupting but would you know what it was? Surely you must have known what it was to be in the contract so can you tell the committee what it was? What I would do is explain to you where the insulation was used in this building. At the beginning of our career? Sorry, I know what was used and I'm taking up time others want to come in on. It was used in the roof space but there is point in that certain insulation cannot be used in certain cavities unless it's with concrete. I just want to know what the insulation was and then I suppose we can look at it further. Of course I can tell you the context afterwards but to answer your particular question it was a type of PIR insulation and the manufacturer states on that that the product will not contribute to the development stages of a fire or present smoke or toxic hazard if it is built in in the way that we did which was to encapsulate it. Without an air gap, there was no air gap. It does mention certain ones that were used not just in Grenfell but obviously not far from that school and the harbour development in my constituency it has to be in a duct with concrete so that it isn't flammable. It depends on what it was used. It was a PIR one, I can certainly check that out and I don't want to take up the whole of the committee's time on this but it would be interesting to know what it was exactly what type it was. I'm unable to give you that right now but we can give you that. I think what's important if you will allow me to say a little bit more about it I think it's absolutely important to distinguish in the uses of insulation at Grenfell because everything becomes conflated in media discussion. Grenfell was a concrete tower which was having an overcladding applied to that so it was a composite panel was being applied behind that panel was insulation and behind that was an air gap and as we understand it fire started within the building got into that air gap and was able to travel up by igniting. Now what we have here at the School of Art is completely different it's more akin to the insulation that you might expect to have in your house what we have is an existing envelope which is stone and then internal linings normally we look to add insulation to external walls here we could not add any to external walls the internal fabric was of such quality so we couldn't disturb that where we were able to add to approximately 50% of the roof and there we were replacing the asphalt build-up and the asphalt build-up system that we used included some insulation but as I say that was encapsulated and therefore according to the manufacturer would not cause a risk. So therefore when you did the fire safety it was handed over to the contractor to be a risk that you were putting this type of insulation into the building. We're going to have to move on. Annabelle Ewing. Good morning gentlemen. Going back to the issue of the site and who's in charge and all the rest of it after the fire number two Glasgow School of Art reportedly said that at the time of that fire the Macintosh was not part of the railway state and was in the management and control of care construction limited. Perhaps initially Mr McQuade could say to the committee what he thinks that statement means because we find it a wee bit perplexing. It's probably Glasgow School of Art would have to explain what the meant since they wrote this statement. What we took from it as the building contractor was exactly as I said earlier on the procession of the site which is completely standard practice in any building contract. This was a traditional contract so it was used for very many types of contracts similar to the Macintosh project. So us having procession of the site was absolutely how we understood that when the site wasn't part of their operational estate they were still the owner of the project they were still the owner of the building and they still had their duties under the regulations as client, as we did as principal contractor and as page park and as principal designer. So that's what we took. We were in possession of the site. That's what we took from the school's statement. Anything to add? Simply all that was meant by that because it wasn't an operating school at that point. You take it to mean that it wasn't a functioning part of the day-to-day life of the school as the educational establishment rather than issues of ownership and having a beneficial interest in ensuring that things that happen in your own property are proceeding in a reasonable way. If that then is the position as beneficial owner which of course they continued to be reference has been made to the fact that they attended regular meetings. Could we have a bit more information? Was there a generic name for these meetings as a grouping who attended these meetings? How regularly were these meetings held and were minutes taken of each meeting? Yes, I'm happy to explain that. It's a very rigorous process once you start on-site with a contractor in terms of reporting and monitoring of the work that's going on. On a complex job like this there are many and various meetings. The principal meeting is a monthly progress meeting at which the client and their project manager representatives the external project managers the whole design team and the contractor are present. The contractor prepares a report and presents that to the meeting and then there's a set agenda that will go through on that. Minutes are always taken? Absolutely crucial. Are these minutes now in the public domain? I don't know if they're in the public domain but they are available. When was the last meeting before or far number 2? Do you recall? I can't give you the date. Again, that should be information. Absolutely. What I was going to go on and say is that that's just one of the types of meetings that are held. On a weekly basis there were technical meetings. Did GSE, through their project manager or assistant project manager or their Theobald and Gardner? Gardner and Theobald. Those would be at these. So there were many technical meetings. There were services meetings and then there were a whole host of specific trades meetings where we were talking about say stonework or we were talking about windows or fire suppression so there were very intensive meetings and these were minute. I'm sorry to come back to you in a minute but if the phrasiology operation we state and being part or not part of that was intended to have another meeting on the part of others as far as the actual reality of the situation was concerned, GSE, through its various representatives were actively participating it seems even on a weekly basis in a daily basis in all aspects of the operational nature of the construction process. This was their special building. They weren't going to just hand it over and say, come back later and show us it. Okay. I was going to agree with what David said there. It was a daily in fact up until a few months ago the project managers from Glasgow School of Art had an office on site. Things were moving around them by nature of that they moved to a building just not far away from the site. So there was with our team, with the technical team very often daily meetings because you'd have the site daily things that had to happen and then you'd have the regular sessions with the subcontractors because they had to happen to allow us to progress things and then we had the regular weekly and monthly meetings that are all programmed and scheduled and the reasons for those is so that we know we've got the information to progress things and decisions are getting taken. Okay, one last question. There's a set of other people here, players here, so you've got GSA, its project team, its gardener and theobald, you have care, you have subcontractors reporting to care but you have another set of people who were directly appointed. It appears by GSA being specialist at conservators and craftsmen. How did they fit into this process in terms of what they were doing? Who was dealing with the oversight of what they were doing on-site? There were very few of these on-site. For those who were on-site in terms of the work that they were doing, how did they fit into this daily, monthly process? There was very few on-site. A lot of these would be things that were getting perhaps manufactured off-site directly There were a few on-site, so who was in charge of the oversight? How that works is because the place they ordered direct with them, and it was very minor things. There weren't, to my knowledge, many major issues that they did direct. Where they are done direct, there is a requirement because we are transport contractors when they are on-site, they have to come through our processes and procedures. They cannot come on-site unless we have agreed to do that. There is a rigorous process that they have to go through for anything that they do on-site. They have to be inducted first of all, but they have to go through point of work risk assessments and method statements. All of that has to be submitted and signed off by us principally, but we do take the technical advice of others. There weren't many instances of those direct on-site. It was just another piece of information that we haven't been aware of, so I thank my hon. Friend. Thank you, convener. Can I just clarify then? The contract was signed and Keir became the Yw tuw ownership of the building. The contractor, when we signed the contract, yes. And the GSA. They obviously had, well, daily meetings, they had someone there. So notwithstanding what has just been discussed, can you provide The group is also dealing with additional details regarding any formal structures that are in place between yourselves and the GSC to have that rigorous analysis of what is taking place on a daily basis or regular basis. mor lle gyda'r cyfnod o'r prosesydych. Rydw i'r rai iechydig sydd wedi'u gweld credu'r cyхytleddau gan ymlaen y cefnodol. Rydw i'n digwydd i'r cyfnod, ac mae'n gefnod i gydag cael gronfod. Mae'n tynnu'n gweithio i'r gweithio mewn oedd mae'n gyfarwydd o'n gweithio mewn i'r gweithio i'r gweithio of the progress meetings, or, if we need them in between, we could have them in between the one that we call the progress meeting. That is a regular session that happens, where we need other meetings away from that. They also are scheduled and happen, because when we are procuring the works, and there is a rigorous procurement process, it has to be gone through. It may be just diverse for a moment, if you don't mind, because while this was a traditional contract, the way it was being procured, there were two parts to it. The first part was a fixed part to allow the job to get started, which was a reasonably small sum in the overall. The rest of it was then done on a two-stage basis where we would take the information from the designers and tender that in the open market. The reason for that was to allow an open book process so that they could see the costs coming back. When you go beyond that and choose the subcontractors that are going to work on the site, they then fall into a procurement schedule. The subcontractors are placed in agreement with the client team, so we would agree with the architect engineer any orders to be placed. There was a process that went through, and that happened on almost an ongoing basis. Those reporting processes, the monthly report would capture all of it, and then there would be an ongoing process if something was falling behind. We would have a mechanism to go back and say we need some information or this has gone behind, we would like to adjust how we are doing something. There is nothing unusual about that on a contract, it is good practice, and I think that is what we did. We followed good practice. Can I just add a slight overlay? The arts school also appointed a clerk of works, and that clerk of works gave a report every week with images and text to describe the works on site and the procedures being followed. That was appointed directly to the art school as another layer of inspection. Notwithstanding what you just said, we heard from Malcolm Fraser, when he gave evidence to the committee, and he indicated that the GSA should have put in place structures around the contract that required a make and track deal of themselves to look after the construction and design management, health and safety, proper procurement for the contract, employment practice and other such things. Those structures are in place, but I want to talk about the adequacy of those structures. What was missing? I do not believe that there was anything missing in the process that was adopted. It was a traditional contract and it followed good practice in terms of the meetings. I cannot properly answer that, because I do not know what he is referring to there. I think that if we are talking about the fire, I think that I would take you back to the process that the contractor went through and the consultation process that occurred with all of the best authorities. We consulted with building control and fire services, so I think that that process was absolutely crucial to setting the fire plan at the beginning and then running it. Thereafter, it was a question of monitoring that the fire plan was being adjusted and progressing. I just want to ask one further question that is in a separate area. That is regarding the response on the evening. There were accusations that no fire alarm was heard by local residents and concerns about the level of staff that were on site. What would you like to say to the concerns that have been raised by residents in the area? I was not there on the evening, unfortunately, so I cannot comment whether I heard the fire alarm or not. What I can say is that the systems were all in place and tested. I cannot comment on what was heard or not heard that evening, I am afraid. I have heard speculation in a number of things. I do not wish to be unhelpful, but the systems have been tested and we are working. I have no reason to believe that they were not. When was the last time they were tested before the fire? They were generally tested on a weekly basis. I know that there was certainly a fire alarm procedure on 14 May, I think that it was, which was a few weeks before. Everybody was taken out through the whole process and evacuated from the building. You just said a moment ago that they were tested on a weekly basis, but if that was on 14 May, it was also a number of weeks before the fire? Yes, that is something. The full one, though, where you evacuate the building, happened that day, so I know that that was one that was recorded. The systems are tested on a weekly basis and reported as such. The panels themselves show if there is any faults and they are visible. The team can see that on the panel if there is anything wrong, so that would have thrown up if there was a fault. What I could add is what the procedure that was set out in the contractor's fire and emergency plan was that there was a guard on site overnight. There was a 24-hour security monitoring. There was a fire watch patrol every hour, and records were to be kept of that. If a fire occurred, then the guard was to immediately advise the fire services, then advise the management and then advise the GSA. If a fire tender arrived, he was to meet them in the street, tell them where the fire was, where the panel was, and the quickest route to the fire. That is what was set out as a procedure. What I cannot say is what happened that night, but that is what the procedure was. Thank you, convener. After the first fire at Glasgow School of Art met with Windsor Castle and York Minister to see what lessons had been learned from their fires, so what was learned and how it was applied to the McIntosh building? The learning that came out of those considerations was the five measures that I mentioned earlier. I do not want to go back through them unnecessarily, but these were the key protections that were going to protect this building in the future. Again, I clarify that I am talking about the completed building. Once all of these were in place, these five measures were the ones that were going to protect this building. Clearly, the five measures were not in place at the time of the fire. I think that is probably why we are here just now. Can I ask what role Historic Environment Scotland actually played in the management and restoration of the management site, if any? Historic Scotland and the City Planning Department have been intimately involved throughout our 25 years of involvement with and commitment to the Mac. When we started in the 1990s, I think the view very much was, you replace as is, so we replace the roofs, so you do not enhance systems. What emerged in the 2000s was because of the Federal Fire Report, it was clearly seen that enhancement systems were required. It was innovative at the time. You just do not go and put fire sprinkler systems through buildings. Historic Scotland was adaptable and flexible together with the City Planning to say, we think we understand the risks, and therefore in this particular instance we need to look at those improvements. In that respect, they were flexible to adapting the Macintosh building to improve it. Subsequent to the post 2014 fire, the City Planning were part of the process in terms of all the detail. Again, another overview of what we were doing in terms of building a set of drawings in the form of a digital model that showed the building in immense detail. I would like to tease out a little bit more on the fire safety plan. Perhaps Mr Cwyd would be best to answer that. You have explained how there was quite extensive consultation. Every key stakeholder was involved, including site visits and the lead-up to it. When it came to the ultimate sign-off of the fire safety plan, is it ultimately for Kier to decide whether or not the plan is agreed and goes forward, or is there a collective agreement before the document is considered to be alive? It has to be a collective agreement because each party has duties under the regulations, so we cannot just say that this is what we are doing. That is useful. I believe that there was a press statement from yourself, relatively shortly after the second fire, but it appeared as if that statement was prompted by the two previous ones that came from the School of Art themselves, which appeared to distance them from management of the site, going back to the phraseology around operational control of the estate that Annabelle Ewing brought up. It would not be fair or accurate for the School of Art to attempt to distance themselves from site management or project management during that process. I think that the School of Art would have to respond to that. I do not think that it is appropriate for me to respond to that. I think that we worked with the school, we worked with the team that set out the one and a collaborative approach, and I think that that is very much what happened in the two years that we were involved in it. The reason why we issued a statement after the two statements by the Glasgow School of Art was not in reaction to their statement, it was in reaction to—as you can appreciate at that time, there was a huge amount of interest in people trying to get information, and we were asked for information, and we felt that the simplest thing to do was issue the factual statement, which is what we tried to do because the fire strategy was in place, the systems were in place, we had agreed well in advance on the steps that had to be taken, and we looked at what was appropriate for the job because it is a special job. To take that point wider and perhaps looking at before both fires or the future of the building, the future of the site, is there tension between having a functioning art school and a building that is also essentially a major public attraction, where you are trying to wrestle with two quite different purposes. One is as a working art school with everything that comes with that, and the other is the quite substantial foothold that you get from being a major public attraction. Is there tension between those two that can make fire safety and other safety challenges perhaps more compounded than the other or would have been? From our side, from the construction side, no, we put all the measures in place. I can't really say about the point that David will probably address. The art school as a physical building is one of the most amazing buildings for an artist to have an education. Anyone who speaks to who has been educated there can't help but say that they have been incredibly stimulated by that environment. That brings with it the challenges that people want to go in to see it as well. The art school has created a management system, and part of the process of the development of the proposals in the last four years before the second fire were about how that should be managed. As part of the conservation and access statement, what they did was they took out the reception area into the new adjacent reed building. That's where you gather people. In an orderly fashion, you process through the building at certain times. That allowed the school to operate at the same time. You mentioned about the 24-hour security and monitoring and hourly, etc. I don't know if that was just by camera or people on foot. All of those things reported because we did hear that people here today who say that they didn't hear the fire alarm at all. Therefore, when you had your weekly or daily of our meetings, are those things reported so-and-so went round, fire alarm was working, etc. Would the committee be able to get access to those reports? I mentioned earlier that there was a regular progress meeting at which the contractor prepared a progress report. He submitted that beforehand. At the very first point on that report, he dealt with fire and health and safety. He reported on that every month, giving a statement of how that was going. It was uppermost in people's minds throughout. I'm sorry to interrupt you again, but are those minited? Yes, they are minited. I would say that every one of those minutes, all the way through, records that the system is working and records that the system is being checked. In fact, there was only one occasion where it mentioned anything else. It said that the alarm had gone off. It was found to be a false alarm. Other than that, it was reported every month as working. On the night of the fire, we should be able to see, as the security bit round, the checked x, y and the z. That should be reported to the meeting. I believe that the fire service will have that information. The only thing that I could caution there is that that is something that we would have to defer to the committee and the convener if they want that information. On the fire alarm, a new fire alarm was part of the contract, installing it. At the time of the fire in 2018, were you operating with a new fire alarm or was it still the old one? We were operating with the one that was for the temporary arrangements because we were 10 months away. Similar to the sprinkler installation, it was still part of the building process. There were a lot of pipes and wires being put into the building as there was with a lot of the other finishing works, plaster work, ceilings that were on-going at the time. Arm system, so it wasn't the old one or the new one? It was a temporary one? Yes. What happens on projects when we do this fire assessment and when we do the fire safety plan and the construction phase health and safety plan? We then bring certain things to the project. The project had a temporary fire alarm, so it's not temporary, it's a full blown system, but it's for the period of the project works, and that's a standard process. Members have told us that the fire alarm went off regularly and it was regular false alarms, but in the last month, before the fire, it didn't go off at all. Can you comment on that? Suggestion being that it may have been shut off? No, I can't comment on the last part about not having that at all. There were occasions when, on sites, the systems were triggered because the dust triggers the detector, so there are instances when that will happen. They're recorded. Right. Can you tell us now, as sure as that, that the fire alarm system was not turned off because of those false alarms? The fire alarm system, there's an operational process every day. The panel is just as you go in the door so you can see the lights are on. What I'm saying is that you didn't disable the fire alarm because of those false alarms, did you? Can you categorically assure us that you didn't do that? There are times on the site that there are different detectors. You have CO2 detectors, beam detectors and heat detectors. There are times when operations are getting carried out and there is a method statement put in where they'll be switched off for that period. So that does happen. It does happen. Did it happen at the time of the fire? Well, it happened at different stages. I couldn't say today that that particular day there would have been off. Right. So it may have been off? I can't imagine it would have been because there's an operational process that has it on. Surely you must have asked your people on site. You previously said in the answer to Sandra White's question that you didn't really mail much about the night of the fire, did you ask if the alarm had been disabled on the day of the fire? Have you asked your people that? We have asked our staff that. And what did they tell you? That it was operational as it was every day. Right. And how can you check that? Well, I think that's part of the investigation that the fire service is going through at the moment. Okay. Thanks very much. Alexander Stewart. Thank you, convener. You've talked about the risk assessments. You've talked about the policies and the procedures. That everything was in place that would ensure that if a situation occurred that there was policies to happen. But it's quite apparent that that didn't happen if they had been fit for purpose and everything had been working accordingly and properly, then we wouldn't have had such a devastating fire in the situation. You've also talked about individuals who were on site at the time, and they were given training, support mechanisms, all of that. So why then did we have such a catastrophic situation that the community and the school believed that there were possibly failings taking place in the process? Well, I can't really comment on what the failings are. There's an investigation going on, and what I can say is that we are as keen as everybody else to know, because all the processes and procedures that were appropriate and the extra steps that were taken were all in place and had all been operating for two years. So we are as keen to understand as everyone else as to what's happened. And the oversight of the management of health and safety on the site, you've indicated who had roles and responsibilities for that, and you're all clear that all of that was taking place and all of that was measured and all of that was in place? Yes, we had all the checks in place where the construction health and safety plan was in place, the fire risk assessments were in place, the fire plan was in place, it had been updated to take account of the changes in the site that were all in place. Did the other panel as much as have commented on that? Absolutely, nothing to say to the contrary. That's our understanding, and that's what we saw day in, day out on site. Thank you very much, Jamie Greene. Thank you, convener. Good morning, gentlemen. I have just a couple of quick questions. Can you just educate me in terms of protocol on a construction site? Who is responsible for the site at any given time? Is it an individual? Is it an organisation? And does it change depending on the time of day or what activity is taking place on site? 100 per cent is from the day that the contractor takes possession right through to completion. The contractor has sole responsibility for those measures on site. Okay, when you say that the contractor means the limited company that shows the contract. And within that then, obviously, if free in the afternoon there may be a number of organisations or people on site, contractors, subcontractors, GSA, care, project managers, architects, is it still the contract holder who is fully responsible for the site at that time? The principal contractor holds responsibility for the contract. Okay. So just two weeks after the fire in 2018, there was a statement that went out that that relationship had ended, that contract had ended. Could you just give us a little bit more detail as to why that decision was made so quickly and the circumstances around that joint statement with GSA and if that was an amicable decision? Working in reverse, it was an amicable decision. We got to that point over those two weeks when there was, as you can appreciate, we'd just been through one of the most devastating things. We're dealing with a whole host of things, including people who were devastated by what happened and the impact on the city and the community. There's a whole host of things and we were involved in that. We'd met with Glasgow School and the design team just shortly afterwards to see what steps could be taken. We'd met with the fire service. We continued to do that to make sure we can give whatever information they need for the investigation. The view was, after a 10-day period, that it was unlikely that we could ever actually fulfil the original contract. So the view was it would be better just to bring that contract to an end and that would allow then the school to work round how they could go forward from there. Part of that was because possession of the site would have to be given to others and that seemed to us a sensible thing to do and it was an amicable agreement. There was no exchanges other than professional exchanges to arrange the paperwork. Thank you for that response and can I ask in a previous panel session on this there's a lot of conversation around what should happen next and I know the discussion day is very much round retrospective look at the circumstances of the fires etc but having been so close to the project for such a long time can ask if anyone on the panel today has any personal views or corporate views on what should happen to the site and the skill next. I think we don't feel we can have a kind of corporate view on it because it's something that the school in the art world really need to decide and it's not that we're stepping back from it but we think it's probably more appropriate that the school in the art world decide how it goes forward and committee. I just wonder it will be for others to determine what happens in relation to the art school but there were two questions that we would have had at the back of our mind when we started on the project a number of suggestions were made to me that we didn't have the skills in Scotland to do the reconstruction. I think the team that Kier pulled together and the subcontractors commitment showed we do have those skills and they were doing a beautiful job. Something happened but they were doing a very beautiful job. The other question is do we have the information to rebuild it? Post 2014 we were not sure but we were overwhelmed with photographs from former members of staff, historic photographs, documentation, archives were found. We even found someone who'd taken a sneaky plaster cast of one of the details of the library which we used for the reconstruction. He didn't want his name to be known because he wasn't meant to do that. As a result of that we were able to build a digital model to find a way to do it in a three-dimensional way of all that information. I think we have probably the most advanced information on an existing building anywhere in the world in terms of that documentation. In answer to if the decision was taken now to reconstruct we think we have that information. Part of that was that we had an exchange for four years within Erasmus School at a university in Poland. Half their time was spent measuring all the rooms that weren't damaged in the first fire. We didn't have that before. We had to go back to old drawings. We have the information to reconstruct if that is the decision. A supplementary question from Annabelle Ewing. A supplementary question, in the sense that you are talking about potential reconstruction. I suppose that, on a timely basis, it brings us to the issue of the insurance policy, which was in the joint names of GSA and Kear, I understand. I wish to clarify something. It was mentioned earlier in this evidence session that there was this five point plan, which included missed suppression. How was that five point plan reflected in any conditions in the insurance policy? I can't comment on the insurance policy. I think that it's Glasgow's... But it's enjoyed me in the names of Kear and GSA. There's some joint names. We don't make a claim on it. No, but if it's in policies and joint names, you both had to be signatories to the policies. Presumably somebody read the policy before Kear signed it. Pardon me? Yes, we will join the names on it. How, then, does the five point plan, including the missed suppression condition, how does that get reflected in the insurance policy? Was it reflected? Was it not reflected? Was it about to be reflected? I think that we would have to... I mean, I would have thought it would be very important to ensure that you feel confident that the insurance policy will cover this catastrophic event. Yes, sorry. I'm going to hesitate because there's two different things. The insurance policy was for the period of the construction. The missed suppression system was for the finished product. Okay, and in the period of construction, what kind of conditions were imposed? Were they the statutory minimum or were they add-on conditions? Notwithstanding that, of course, there had already been A5. Can you comment on that? I can't comment on detail. I'm afraid I don't have the detail and I would need to go back and ask someone with the detail of the policy of that. Is that something in terms of parking pages kind of knowledge generally that you would know whether they were kind of add-on conditions? Because, obviously, you're looking at an insurance policy that was taken out, not just a sort of average run of the mill insurance policy. It was taken out after there had already been a catastrophic fire. So it begs the question, would there have been any add-on conditions imposed on insurance? We were not partied to the details of the insurance, but I'm not aware that there were any specific requirements that came from the insurance policy that had to be applied on site. What we were being asked to do was to go through that process of full risk assessment and prepare an appropriate fire and emergency plan. That's all I can say, and that's what was done. So it remains to be seen whether both the plan and the insurance policy reflected any requirements beyond the minimum statutory requirements. That remains to be clarified. I think that we would have known about that. I think that the policy is there. I can't answer the detail of the policy today. I'm afraid I don't have the detailed knowledge of the insurance aspects. I know the headlines of it, but I think that it would be wrong. But the information should be able to be provided. Glasswood School, I'm sure, would be able to provide that when they come. What I would say is that when I referred earlier to the joint code of practice that governs the actions, the fire prevention actions, the joint code refers to the association of British insurers. They are joint authors of that document. In this instance, we would say that if we are working to that, we are normally covering all the issues that an insurance company would require. If there were over and beyond requirements, we would have known about that. That would have been an obligation placed upon the contractor to respond. It's reflected in the detail of the contract at the time you signed it. It's just a lot of detail, and it was something that I just wanted to ask the GEC, as you say, when they come. We've already heard that the fire safety plan that you have to put in place, the statutory regulations, are not adequate for any historic building. I think that what we're asking is what extra that you put in given the precious nature of this building, because the fire safety regulations are about evacuating people, not about preserving precious assets. The joint code of practice is the minimum standard that's used for the insurance one as well. We're talking about a unique cultural treasure here. Can I just... The site then became a crucial part of what the arts go into and the project matters ourselves and what we were seeing on site, whether we were there regularly. Just in terms of what you did to protect the building, can I just go back to my first question? We know about these ducts, how dangerous they were. Some of them were just still being in place because not all the whole building was destroyed in 2014. Did you take immediate measures to ensure that that issue with the ducts was dealt with at an early stage in the construction project? It wasn't done at that stage because these ducts were going to be used for the routing for all the services and then at the end of that process they were going to be fire-stopped. So that was absolutely part of that five-point plan. So during the whole construction phase, the thing that accelerated the fire in the first place, that problem was kept in place and we know that during construction works of historic buildings they're very, very vulnerable, but you kept the ducts in place, you didn't deal with the fire stopping immediately. It still remained a conservation project so that we were unable to build new ducts or new distribution systems, we had to use the systems, the circulation that was there. Did anyone from the art school raise that with you as an issue? We've already heard that the art school had a project manager and all sorts of people were supervising it. Did anybody step in and ask the question that I'm asking now? Why didn't you stop the fire in those ducts? What can we do to ensure that the building is safe during the reconstruction? What was done, you must remember that throughout the course of the works the contractor put in a full detection system. There was a significant process put in place to protect the building at that point and the inspections etc. At the time of the fire… I'm sorry to interrupt and I don't want to be rude but we don't have much time left. Did anyone from the art school, the client, step in at any point and say that we need to deal with these ducts that caused the previous fire to accelerate now? We need to deal with them at an early stage. Did anyone from the art school step in and tell you to find a way to do that? I don't recall that. They were very much part of understanding what the build process is and those ducts were being used for pipe work and cables and at the time of the fire all of that installation was on-going. There was a myriad of cables and pipes going up through those spaces which would be closed off in due course. I still left the building at risk. Which is not unusual in the construction phase for those areas to be open? It may not be unusual but it obviously is resulted in this building possibly being completely destroyed. It's part of the construction process that had to be open. We could not actually put the wires for the final system and the steel work pipes for the final system and without them being open. My final question is in April 2018 Professor John Cole brought out a report into Cure's Work in DG1, a leisure centre in Dumfries. He's obviously a very respected expert and he was extremely critical of Cure's Work on that building and he was extremely critical of the fire stopping in that building. It was a pretty devastating report and I understand that you made a settlement with Dumfries and Galloway Council because of the inadequacy of your work on that building. It was widely publicised not just in the specialist press but also in the Scottish press. What you did as a result of the publication of Professor Cole's report did you go back to Cure to make sure that they were installing the adequate fire stopping and measures in Glasgow School of Art? Were you alarmed at all by Professor Cole's report? What I would take you back to is the whole procurement process for this project. It was a very rigorous process to select a contractor in the first place. That was led by the GASA and its project managers. A shortlist was drawn up and there was rigorous questioning and scoring on that. Out of that came a decision to appoint Cure who showed themselves to be appropriate. You've written submission, we've read all that, as I say, the clock's ticking here. I want to know what you did in 2018, in April 2018, in response to this devastating report about Cure, which mentioned fire stopping as an inadequate measure. What I said earlier is that we were on site on a daily basis. We were monitoring and watching the work that was going on and we had no concerns. So you didn't raise Professor Cole's report? Did the art school raise Professor Cole's report? As far as I'm concerned, that was irrelevant to this contract. We were focused on the work that we were doing and making sure that what Cure were doing on site was correct. All the reporting that was coming from the CLACA works and our overview was that work was being done properly. I thank all our witnesses today for coming to give evidence and we are now going to close and move into private session. Thank you very much.