 And now it will turn to our good friend in Beijing, Wang Jishi. Thank you very much, doc. Could you hear me? Yes, very good. I found out being able to take the conference in person because of the COVID regulations in Beijing. I actually just returned to Beijing from Berlin and I talked a number of German officials and scholars there so I could even provide a German perspective on this picture. The Europeans continue to be strongly interested in trading with and investing in China. Chancellor Schultz went to Beijing last month and Charles Mechier, the European Council President, was in Beijing in early December. They will be followed probably by President Macron of France. So Beijing is very happy with all these visits. But in Berlin, some business leaders told me that their commercial interests in China have met with public opinion posts and media reports in Germany are increasingly negative about China. Chancellor Schultz went to Beijing on December 21st because of a problem, not because of the pandemic in Germany. He belongs to one party and 40 minutes and some other cabinet members belong to another green party. So there are some problems there. And I also heard in Germany the draft of German's first China strategy report was leaked to the press last month and the German Foreign Ministry and the political pressure from home has to modify it to appear somewhat more hawkish toward China. I hope that is not the case but I'm not sure. Some officials said to me that Germany will increase its military budget to be closer to the United States in geopolitical terms and try to strengthen NATO. And Europeans and Americans hold similar views on China in ideological terms, being critical of China's human rights and some other domestic policies. So on the one hand, Europe will keep its strategic autonomy, especially in the economic and technological dimensions in dealing with China. Climate change is another dimension for China and Europe to work together. On the other hand, the U.N. Britain will lean to the U.S. as far as geopolitics and ideology are concerned. I want to mention the recent visit by Xi Jinping to Saudi Arabia. I think it is not simply a bilateral visit. Xi Jinping joined Arab leaders in the first China-Europe states summit and China-GCC summit. So I think China has more ambitions than simply bilateral relations with Arab countries. It is trying to establish a one-to-multiple platform with Arab countries and the countries in the region as a whole. And the Chinese say that we are more open. We are more inclusive. They are comparing their scheme with some American projects. For instance, Americans have I2U2 mechanism. That is India, Israel, United States and UAE. China says that we should be more inclusive. Our platform can include the United States, European countries, Russia, India, everybody. And we are open to include them in Shanghai Cooperation Organization or BRICS. So probably we'll see a more proactive Chinese approach to the Middle East and to the third world countries at large. Now a few things about Taiwan. I agree with some others that a massive military action or a full-scale military takeover of Taiwan is not likely in any foreseeable future. The reference to Taiwan in the Chinese Party Congress is milder than most observers expected. The report continues to emphasize peaceful invocation and the One Country, Two Systems. Despite the uplaws, we often hear from some more militant and belligerent nationalistic voices in social media. My, I think, China's top priorities at this moment are not Taiwan. They are two-fold. First, Omicron or COVID. Beijing's COVID policy changed dramatically since last week. And people in Beijing, like myself, are flexed to see confusing and conflicting regulations and signals announced by the government. Infection cases are surging alarmingly in my neighborhood and in the whole city of Beijing. Unless and until we successfully deal with this problem, we are not ready to focus on Taiwan. It's hard to imagine that the PLA soldiers landing on Taiwan have to wear masks. Second, the economy. The economic growth is low, record low this year. And unemployment is terribly high. I don't want to expand that because there are more many media reports on China's economy. This is why I think Taiwan is not high on Beijing's political agenda. Recently, Xi Jinping met with Biden in Bali, Indonesia, and their summit went quite well and they achieved the agreement that they don't want to fight with each other, and Biden went back saying that he doesn't see the immediate conflict over Taiwan. That is a good sign. However, we in China are worried about two things on Taiwan. First, US approach to Taiwan is moving from assuring Beijing that Washington will stick to its one China policy to assuring Taipei that it will be given more assistance to the island's defense. We see increased danger that one day Washington would give up its one China policy and instead recognize an independent Taiwan. I'm not thinking this as a reality, but there are fears in China this way. Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan triggered a major military crisis and political crisis. Kevin McCarthy, the perspective of House Speaker in the United States, announced he would lead a large congressional delegation to Taiwan early in 2023. If that happened, Beijing would have no choice but to respond with more decisive military moves which could result in an uncontrollable confrontation. The second hidden danger is Taiwan's internal politics. The opposition party, the KMT won more seats in the last election. But even the KMT would not support reunification with the mainland. I hope Doug Paul will say more about Taiwan's internal politics because he knows a great deal. But that is what I'm going to say. Thank you. Thank you very much, Jesus. You've given us a very concise tour of the horizon on Chinese policy toward Europe, Taiwan and foreign policy generally and domestic politics.