 So the password, like it's very easily protected. In this case, when you do measurement, the sensitive information, it's fairly tricky to protect it. It's not by no means, the criteria are extremely strict. And you have to really show that no information will come out about the web. For example, there was some authentication process, which revealed something about you that you don't want to find out, because of privacy problem. So then people have to come up with ways to modify the protocol so that those elements of privacy are to not leak through. That is more analogous to what we're faced with. Yes? Is this a DOD project? This is. So most of this work in the past has been funded by Department of Energy, not Defense. In the United States, the agency which takes care of the nuclear weapons and does the research in nuclear weapons break up the secrecy of all that stuff in the Department of Energy. And then where is the implementation? Is this happening or is this just academic papers? So there has been a significant one. So remember I talked about information barriers. There was actual significant work done in collaboration with the Russians, which was extremely good, in the 90s and about 10 years ago. But nobody was satisfied by it, because both sides concluded that information barriers are just not good enough. That essentially pushed people to look for different techniques, completely different approaches towards this problem. That's essentially what we're doing. Yeah, but I mean, right now, the SALT II treaty, they just had a disagreement. Or there was like a disagreement right now. The most recent treaty was a new start. No, but there was a disagreement just a few months ago about continuing the relationship between both parties. They were blaming each other. Right, but it does nothing to do with this problem. But if they're having problems with that, this is like a little bit more intimate directly to the weapons themselves. That's right. So then like, what is the likelihood of seeing this happening? With pleasure. So in the next five years, I don't think it's very likely it will happen. In the next 10, 15 years, when both sides will become more normal, I think there hopefully will be some. My hope is the following, that when the blessed day comes when both sides regain their normalcy and are ready to actually do something politically, they don't run into the barrier that, unfortunately, there is no technological way through this, which is what happened in the 90s. In the 90s, there were lots of attempts to do this. According to what I was told, they did not succeed because there were no technologies. So yes, I don't think this will get implemented in the next five years. In the next 10, 20 years, maybe. But I think this is so important that if it happens in the 20, 30 years, I'm still willing to work with it. Have you been able to simulate a collision? A collision? Yeah, between the two different complex simulations of a warhead and when you get the hash there and same. Ah, good question. Yeah, so basically what the checks that we're doing, essentially we're looking if we will on essential collision between the two, two, two hashes. The thing is that I use the checksums, it's not entirely active because checksum have this avalanche property, right? You change one bit, it changes the, in this case. But for instance, where you say hash, do you mean this cryptographic hash function here? I'm talking with the output of the checksum. So you write MD5 sum on the file, you get the hash. Okay, this is the cryptographic hash function. That's right. But it has a typical, it has an avalanche property. In this case, it does not have an avalanche property. And in this, but the checks that we did, what we are checking, right? So we're showing this thing, right? But basically we're asking, if you take two different weapons, will it have the same output or will it have different outputs? Basically if their outputs are the same, you have a collision. In this case, we showed that we don't have a collision. Within a statistical test that we applied, there is no collision. For this particular scenario. Yeah. So if you take one weapon and modify it by 1,000. So we don't think that, we don't think that there is that. So you're an animal? Or actually, more extent nothing to that. There may be, but they are not valuable folks in this marriage. Someone can come up with something extremely complicated, but it's so complicated that they might as well just make a brand new one. In which case it's not a useful folks in this marriage. So your enemies are basically just statistical statistics. The final test is a statistical test between the two spectra. You take two spectra, which essentially contain themselves the information. You compare them with each other and you ask the other ourselves, how similar are they? How different are they? Right, that's the very last part. Okay. Are the neutrons there working? Each activity may hold that it's each kind of energy. Is that when the neutrons are checkable? Checkable. Right? Yes. The picture is, the picture is, that's how I like to myself. Okay. This kind of activity, we don't have any information on it, but to resonate, we don't have anything to help us. Check it. So the neutrons have no information on it. The neutrons have no information. You just look at it, I don't know. This is what I believe that the animals in this marriage have to have the knowledge that we have to get to know each other. Gamma resource. Gamma resource, what is it? Frangstrom. So electron. In this case, it's a little bit. You put it under an accelerator. So you take an accelerator. Three, six, nine, then you need the accelerator. And you run the beam into copper. In this experiment, when you use copper target, you can use tungsten or anything like that. It will be allowed to bring the accelerator. So the idea would be you would build, I mean, notions that you would build like a facility. There will be a facility in the United States, there will be a facility in Russia. And you know, they'll build like put an accelerator over there. This accelerator are available. They're not very big. Explorators are, I don't know, the... But you know, I'm not talking about a four-meter diameter of commercial, like, Argoyshchnerka. They're about $20,000 or something. I said, yeah, yeah. Put some on. I'd be equal, but they're not part of it. The cushion is related to the game four. So the four is something like this. Yes, it's messing up the photo, in essence, not photo, but extra in essence, you know, in the photo, in essence, the spectrum, the levels. Approximately, yes. So, it's a certain variation. It gets more different. It gets different with that. No, not very much, different in terms of... The way it stays the same, intensely changing. The United States is just a filter. It is, you can think of it as a filter of unknown thickness. And every energy has a different filtering, you know, factor. A known filtering factor. We can think of it as a filter. Look at this. Yes, yes, yes. It's approximately good enough. Yes. I'll give you just one, people who don't ask questions. The verification, I'm not familiar to you. But we are not there yet. This is the hope of that to use this in the future. But, of course, I think when it comes to the day when there is verification, they have to agree on one subject. Well, okay, maybe, I mean, depending how much each one is worried about their situation, there's like, it might be more complicated than that. You know, I think a big part of what will be agreed upon is maybe not so much, not only technological barriers, but also political realities. Or realities that have to do with sensitivity about the formation of the future centers. Yes. Are there completely alternative approaches underway that are kind of running in parallel in literature now that may supplant this as an approach or vice versa? There is a group in Christen who is working on another idea where they use fast controls for doing fast control radiography. And they came up with an idea that sort of will allow actual real zero knowledge proof of this thing. So it's extremely information-secure. But we see a scientist student to come up with ways to focus that system, and he found like 20 different ways to focus on it. So we have that, yeah. What if there was like a nuclear protocol so that you could just say for the devices themselves they expose like a USB-N port or something, and we just like plug it in and find out all of this information instead of carrying around all these things? So I mean they call it secret information? Like it's the size of the material? No, there's like a protocol, and the protocol has to admit all of this information that you would have to get yourself. And then, you know, if there's like, say, from the actual manufacturer of the weapon it must expose this port or something. Okay, but here's the problem. You can still verify it. Yes, but what is the port going to give you? Is it going to use some information? The same information you're trying to get by doing it. No, no, no, no, because that information has to be somehow filtered in a way so that secret information does not come out. Well, let's just say the protocol says these are the things that you're expecting. But in that case they'll build something which will always produce the same thing? No, but that's why I said they still have that way to just verify it still. But I'm saying as a matter of policy that's the kind of agreement that says make this kind of verification be baked in from the beginning of the manufacture rather than bolting it on as an afterthought. The thing is that there's no way of verifying that whoever makes it in will do. That's a political thing though. That's a political question then. Yeah, but it will disable the political agreement. If the Americans say, you know, if the agreement is that the Russians will build a weapon and the Russians will build in this thing inside the weapon that will do the verification, Russians will put in something that will say, yes, it's a real weapon. How do you verify that they have not built something in it? It comes back to the problem of information barriers that if you rely on electronics, especially if the electronics is built by the side which has interest in cheating, then it's self-defeating. It has to be something is something that both sides can trust. Otherwise the audience never can find it. Is there a trusted party here? What's that? Because in photography the major problem which nobody likes is a trusted party. Trusted party. Trusted party. So there's difference. Because if there is a trusted party you cannot make signatures, for example. So there has been lots of discussion about how this is all very abstract. There are some governments of both sides trust so he can make a deal. So for example it could be the IEA, or the atomic energy. But even there... No, I think it can be. If both sides trust in something... No, no, no. Both sides trust their knowledge as physics. Both sides trust their physics. But this is not... Here the cryptography is done entirely through the physics of the process. You don't have to trust on the side. You have to trust your own understanding and you have to do... The idea is that the Russians, their physicists will go home. You'll tell them here's how we're going to do it. They're going to go home. They're going to analyze it. They're going to say yes. With this physics process it's impossible to release any information.