 So the question is, how does Locke reject Plato's account? Well, he's definitely rejected in the last condition, right? He doesn't think forms are eternal, transcendent, spooky sort of things floating out there, right? And in fact, Locke is very sympathetic to Aristotle, or sympathetic with Aristotle in this regard. Aristotle couldn't cope or grasp the idea of some kind of separate, the existing transcendent thing floating out there, and that's the source of knowledge. Yeah, he's kind of on board with Aristotle in this one. I think most of us, or at least most of y'all, are too, right? Yeah, that platonic form, that's just crazy. Okay, so it's very definitely rejecting that forms are eternal. Now forms are going to be temporary, they're going to be with the thing. Okay, well, what about the universals? Are forms going to be what particular things have in common? You probably, I mean, Locke still wants to give an account of truth, and it's really hard to do truth without some kind of universals. And when we're talking about couches, I'm talking about what all these particular things that we call couches have in common. So yeah, he's probably still going to try doing universals. I've probably talked about all of these things, right? Not just this thing, this thing, this thing, this thing, and try to prove one truth at a time about them, right? So he's not going to say, well, this square has four sides, but I don't necessarily know that all squares have four sides. I have to look at each individual square and I keep going. No, right? He's probably going to keep at least some notion that these forms are universals. Okay, what about objective knowledge? Yeah, probably. I mean, Locke isn't saying that he knows just his own thoughts. He knows the thing, all right? This might be forecasting a little bit, but he thinks that we know the particular objects, right? We know the particular substances. He still uses the word substance. We know the particular substances because we know the qualities. The qualities are in the thing. There's ideas and there's qualities. The qualities are in the thing and we know the qualities because of what they, because of what they cause with our ideas, right? So he's still saying, you know, I can tell you that this is a couch. I can tell you this is a square. I can tell you it's an apple, whatever. I can tell you that's what that is. And I'm saying something about that thing, not just about what's happening in here, right? If I say all squares have four sides, I'm not just telling you what I believe or what's true according to me, right? He's saying something about squares. Okay, well, then what about the reason? Well, if by reason you mean reflection and what's happening in your head, okay, but if you mean some kind of recollection or whatever, no, right? If you're talking about something non-empirical, if you're talking about something non-experiential, no, he doesn't think form is known through reason. Form is known through perception. You perceive, you have sensations, right? And then you use those sensations through reflection to know the form. So he's rejecting two conditions, that form is known through reason or only through reason, right? Plato's going to say you only know form through reason. Aristotle, Locke is saying no, no, no. We know form through perception, through experiences. Now, these experiences are sensation and reflection. Sure, the reflection happens here, but this is still an experience, not just some kind of recollection of a transcendent thing. So Locke rejects that forms are eternal and that forms are known only through reason.