 section 15 of an essay concerning human understanding book 2 by John Locke this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Chad Horne chapter 21 of par section 1 the mind being every day informed by the senses of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes and things without and taking notice how one comes to an end and ceases to be and another begins to exist which was not before reflecting also on what passes within himself and observing a constant change of its ideas sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the senses and sometimes by the determination of its own choice and concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things by like agents and by the like ways considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed and in another the possibility of making that change and so comes by that idea which we call power thus we say fire has a power to melt gold i.e to destroy the consistency of its insensible parts and consequently its hardness and make it fluid and gold has a power to be melted that the sun has a power to blanch wax and wax a power to be blanched by the sun whereby the illness is destroyed and whiteness needs to exist in its room in which and the like cases the power we consider is in reference to the change of perceivable ideas for we cannot observe any alteration to be made in or operation upon anything but by the observable change of its sensible ideas nor conceive any alteration to be made but by conceiving a change of some of its ideas section two power thus considered is to fold this as able to make or able to receive any change the one we may call active the other passive power whether matter be not fully gesticate of active power as its author god is truly above all passive power and whether the intermediate state of created spirits be not that alone which is capable of both active and passive power may be worth consideration i shall not now enter into that inquiry my present business being not to search into the original of power but how we come by the idea of it but since active powers makes a greater part of our complex ideas of natural substances as we shall see hereafter and i mentioned them as such according to common apprehension yet they being not perhaps so truly active powers as our hasty thoughts are apt to represent them i judge it not amiss by this issue to direct our minds to the consideration of god and spirits for the clearest idea of active powers section three i confess part includes in it some kind of relation our relation to action or change as indeed which of our ideas of what kind so ever when authentically considered is not for our ideas of extension duration and number do they not all contain in them a secret relation of the parts figure and motion have something relative in them much more visibly and sensible qualities as colors and smells etc what are they but the powers of different bodies in relation to our perception etc and if considered in the things themselves do they not depend on the world figure texture and motion of the parts all which include some kind of relation in them our idea therefore of power i think may well have a place amongst other simple ideas and be considered as one of them being one of those that make a principal ingredient in our complex ideas of substances as we shall see hereafter have occasion to observe section four we are abundantly furnished with the idea of passing power by almost all sorts of sensible things in most of them we cannot avoid observing their sensible qualities nay their very substances to be in the continual flux and therefore with reason we live on them as liable still to the same change nor have we of active power which is the more proper signification of the word power fewer instances since whatever change is observed the mind must collect a power somewhere able to make that change as well as a possibility in the thing itself to receive it but yet if we will consider it attentively bodies by our senses do not afford a so clear and distinct an idea of active power as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds for all power relating to action and there being but two sorts of action whereas we have any idea this thinking and motion let us consider whence we have the clearest ideas of the powers which produce these actions one of thinking body affords us no idea at all it is only from reflection that we have that two neither have we from body any idea of the beginning of motion a body at rest affords us no idea of any active power to move and when it is set in motion itself that motion is rather a passion than an action in it for when the ball obeys the motion of a billiard stick it is not any action of the ball but bare passion also by impulse it sets another ball in motion that lay in its way it only communicates the motion it had received from another and loses in itself so much as the other received which gives us but a very obscure idea of an active power moving in body whilst we observe it only to transfer but not produce any motion for it is but a very obscure idea of power which reaches not the production of the action but a continuation of the passion for so is motion in a body impaled by another the continuation of the alteration made in it from rest to motion being little more than an action than the continuation of the alteration of its figure by the same blow is an action the idea of the beginning of motion we have only from affection on what passes in ourselves where we find by experience that barely by willing it barely by a thought of the mind we can move the parts of our bodies which were before at rest so that it seems to me we have from the observation of the operation bodies by our senses but a very imperfect obscure idea of active power since they afford us not any idea in themselves of the power to begin any action either motion or thought but if from the impulse bodies are observed to make one upon another anyone thinks he has a clear idea of power it serves as well to my purpose sensation being one of those ways whereby the mind comes by its ideas only I thought it worthwhile to consider here by the way whether the mind does not receive its idea of active power clear from reflection on its own operations than it does from any external sensation section five this at least I think evident that we find in ourselves a power to begin or for bear continue or end several actions of our minds and motions of our bodies barely by a thought preference of the mind ordering or as it were commanded to doing or not doing such or such a particular action this power which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea or the for bearing to consider it or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest and vice versa in any particular instance is that which we call the will the actual exercise of that power by directing any particular action or its forbearance is that which we call volition or willing the forbearance of that action consequent to such order or command of the mind is called voluntary and whatsoever action is performed without such a thought of the mind is called involuntary the power of perception is that which we call the understanding perception which we made the act of the understanding is of three sorts one the perception of ideas in our mind two the perception of the signification of science three the perception of the connection or repugnant say agreement or disagreement that there is between any of our ideas all these are attributed to the understanding or perceptive power though it be the two latter only that use it allows us to say we understand section six these powers of the mind viz of perceiving and of preferring are usually called by another name and the ordinary way of speaking is that the understanding and will are two faculties of the mind a word properly enough if it be used as all words should be so as not to breed any confusion in men's thoughts by being supposed as I suspect it has been to stand for some real beings in the soul that perform those actions of understanding and volition for when we say the will is the commanding and superior faculty of the soul that it is or is not free that it determines the inferior faculties that it follows the dictates of the understanding etc though these are the like expressions by those that carefully attend to their own ideas a conductor thoughts more by the evidence of things than the sound of words may be understood in a clear and distinct sense yet I suspect I say that this way of speaking of faculties has misled many into a confusion option of so many distinct agents in us which had their several provinces and authorities and did command obey and perform several actions as so many distinct beings which has been no small occasion or wrangling obscurity and uncertainty in questions relating to them section seven everyone I think finds in himself a power to begin a forbear continue or put a name to several actions in himself from the consideration of the extent to this power of the mind over the actions of the man which everyone finds in himself arise the ideas of liberty and necessity section eight all the actions that we have any idea of reducing themselves as has been said to these two this thinking emotion so far as a man has power to think or not to think to move or not to move according to the preference or direction of his own mind so far is a man free wherever any performance of reverence or not equally in a man's power whatever doing or not doing will not equally follow up on the preference of his mind directing it there he is not free though perhaps the action may be voluntary so that the idea of liberty is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action according to the determination or thought of the mind whereby either of them is preferred to the other where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition there he is not at liberty that agent is under necessity so that liberty cannot be where there is no thought no volition no will but there may be thought there may be will there may be volition where there is no liberty a little consideration of an obvious instance or two may make this clear section nine a tennis ball whether a motion by the stroke of a racket or lying still at rest is not by any one taken to be a free agent if we inquire into the reason we shall find it is because we conceive not a tennis ball to think and consequently not you have any volition or preference of motion to rest or vice versa and therefore has not liberty is not a free agent but all is both motion and rest come under our idea of necessary and are so-called likewise a man falling into the water a bridge breaking under him has not herein liberty is not a free agent for though he has volition though he prefers is not falling to falling yet the forbearance of that motion not being in his power the stop or cessation of that motion follows not upon his volition and therefore therein he is not free so a man striking himself or his friend by a convulsive motion of his arm which it is not in his power by volition or the direction of his mind to stop or forbear nobody thinks he has in this liberty everyone pities him as acting by necessity and constraint section 10 again suppose a man be carried whilst fast asleep into a room where as a person he longs to see and speak with and be there locked fast in beyond his power to get out he awakes and is glad to find himself in so desirable company which he stays willingly in i.e prefers to stay to go in the way i asked is not this stay voluntary i think nobody will doubt it and yet being locked fast in it is evident he is not a liberty not to stay he has not freedom to be gone so that liberty is not an idea belonging to volition or preferring but to the person having the power of doing or forbearing to do according as the mind shall choose or direct our idea of liberty reaches as far as that power and no farther for wherever restraint comes to check that power or compulsion takes away that indifferency of ability on either side to act or to forbear acting their liberty and our motion of it presently ceases section 11 we have instances enough and often more than enough in our own bodies a man's heart beats and the blood circulates which it is not in his power by any thought or relation to stop and therefore in respect to these motions where rest depends not on his choice nor would follow the determination of his mind if it should refer it he is not a free agent confulsive motions agitate his legs so that though he wills it ever so much he cannot by any power of his mind stop their motion as in that odd disease called courier sancti theory but he is perpetually dancing he is not at liberty in his action but under as much necessity of moving as a stone that falls or a tennis ball struck with a racket on the other side a policy or the stocks hinder his legs from obeying the determination of his mind if it would thereby transfer his body to another place in all these there is one of freedom though the sitting still even of a paralytic whilst he prefers it to a removal is truly voluntary voluntary then is not opposed to necessary but to involuntary for a man may prefer what he can do to what he cannot do the state he is in to its absence or change though necessity has made it in itself unalterable section 12 as it is in the motions of the body so it is in the thoughts of our minds where anyone is such that we have power to take it up or lay it by according to the preference of the mind there we are at liberty a waking man being under the necessity of having some ideas constantly in his mind is not at liberty to think or not to think no more than he is at liberty whether his body shall touch any other or no but whether he will remove his contemplation from one idea to another is many times in his choice and then he is in respect of his ideas as much at liberty as he is in respect of bodies that he rests on he cannot pleasure remove himself from one to another but yet some ideas to the mind like some motions to the body are such as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid nor obtain their absence by the uttermost effort it can use a man on the rack is not at liberty to lay by the idea of pain and divert himself with other contemplations and sometimes a boisterous passion hurries our thoughts as a hurricane does our bodies without leaving us the liberty of thinking on other things which we would rather choose but as soon as the mind regains the power to stop or continue begin or forbear any of these motions of the body without our thoughts within according as it thinks fit prefer either to the other we then consider the man as a free agent again section 13 wherever thought is wholly wanting or the power to act or forbear according to the direction of thought their necessity takes place this is an agent capable of volition when the beginning or continuation of any action is contrary that preference of his mind is called compulsion when the hindering or stopping any action is contrary to his volition it is called restraint agents that have no thought no volition at all are in everything necessary agents section 14 if this be so as I imagine it is I leave it to be considered whether it may not help to put an end to that long agitated and I think unreasonable because an intelligible question whether man's will be free or no or if I mistake not it follows from what I have said that the question itself is altogether improper as it is as insignificant to ask whether man's will be free as to ask whether his sleep be swift or his virtue square liberty being as little applicable to the will as swiftness of motion is to sleep or squareness to virtue everyone would laugh at the absurdity of such a question as either of these because it is obvious that the modifications of motion belong not to sleep nor to the difference of figure to virtue and when anyone well considers it I think he will as plainly perceive that liberty which is but a power belongs only to agents and cannot be an attribute or modification of the will which is also but a power section 15 such is the difficulty of explaining and giving clear notions of internal actions by sounds that I must hear warn my reader that ordering directing choosing the fairing etc which I have made use of will not distinctly enough express volition unless he will reflect on what he himself does when he wills for example referring which seems perhaps best to express the act of volition does it not precisely for though a man would prefer flying to walking yet who can say he ever wills it volition it is plain is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man by employing in it or withholding it from any particular action and what is the will what the faculty to do this and is that faculty anything more in effect than a power the power of the mind to determine its thought to the producing continue or stopping any action as far as it depends on us or can it be denied that whatever agent has a power to think on its own actions and to prefer their doing or omission either to the other has that faculty called will will then is nothing but such a power liberty on the other side is the power a man has to do offer bear doing any particular action according as it's doing offer burns is the actual preference in the mind which is the same thing as to say according as he himself wills it section 16 it is plain then that the will is nothing but one power or ability and freedom another power or ability so that to ask whether the will has freedom is to ask whether one power has another power one ability another ability a question at first sight to grossly observe to make a dispute or need an answer for who is it that says not that powers belong only to agents and or attributes only of substances and not of powers themselves so that this way of putting the question is whether the will be free is in effect to ask whether the will be a substance an agent or at least to suppose it since freedom can probably be attributed to nothing else if freedom come within a propriety of speech be applied to power or may be attributed to the power that is in the man to produce a for bear producing motion in parts of his body by choice of preference which is that which denominates him free and his freedom itself but if anyone should ask whether freedom were free he would be suspected not to understand well what he said and he would be thought to deserve might as is here to knowing that the rich was a denomination for the possession of riches should demand whether riches themselves were rich section 17 however the name faculty which men have given to this power called the will and thereby they have been led into a way of talking of the will as acting may by an appropriation but disguises its true sense serve a little to palliate the absurdity yet the will in truth signifies nothing but a power or ability to prefer or choice and when the will under the name of a faculty is considered as it is fairly as an ability to do something the absurdity in saying it is free or not free will easily discover itself for if it be reasonable to suppose and talk of faculties as distinct beings that can act as we do when we say the will orders and the will is free it is fit that we should make a speaking faculty and a walking faculty and a dancing faculty by which those actions are produced which are but several modes of motion as well as we make the will and understanding to be faculties by which the actions of choosing and perceiving are produced which are but several modes of thinking and we may as properly say that it is the singing faculty sings and the dancing faculty dances as that the will chooses or that the understanding conceives or as is usual that the will directs the understanding or the understanding obeys or obeys not the will it being altogether as proper and intelligible to say that the power of speaking directs the power of singing or the power of singing obeys or disobeys the power of speaking section 18 this way of talking nevertheless has prevailed and as I guess for just great confusion for these being all different powers in the mind or in the man to do several actions he exerts them as he thinks fit but the power to do one action is not operated on by the power of doing another action for the power of thinking operates not on the power of choosing nor the power of choosing on the power of thinking no more than the power of dancing operates on the power of singing or the power of singing on the power of dancing as anyone who reflects on it will easily perceive, and yet this is it which we say, when we thus speak, that the will operates on the understanding or the understanding on the will. 619 I grant that this or that actual thought may be the occasion of volition or exercising the power a man has to choose, or the actual choice of the mind, the cause of actual thinking, on this or that thing, as the actual singing of such a tune, may be the cause of dancing, such a dance, and the actual dancing of such a dance, the occasion of singing such a tune, but in all these it is not one power that operates on another, but it is the mind that operates and exerts these powers, it is the man that does the action, it is the agent that has the power, or is able to do, for powers are radiations, not agents, and that which has the power, or not the power to operate, is that alone which is, or is not free, and not the power itself. For freedom, or not freedom, come belong to nothing, but what has or has not a power to act? 720 The attributing to faculties that which belong not to them has given occasion to this way of talking, but the introducing into discourses concerning the mind with the name of faculties and notion of their operating, as I suppose as little advanced our knowledge in that part of ourselves as the great use and mention of the like invention of faculties in the operations of the body has helped us in the knowledge of physics, not that I deny there are faculties both in the body and mind, they both of them have their powers of operating, as neither the one nor the other could operate, for nothing can operate that is not able to operate, and that is not able to operate that has no power to operate, nor do I deny that those words and the like are to have their place in the common use of languages that have made them current, it looks like too much affectation only to lay them by, and philosophy itself, though it likes not a body dress, yet when it appears in public must have so much complacency as to be clothed in the ordinary fashion and language of the country, so far as it can consist with truth and perspicuity, but the fault has been that faculties have been spoken of and represented as so many distinct agents, for it being asked what it was that digested the meat in our stomachs, it was a ready and very satisfactory answer to say that it was the digested faculty, what was it that made anything come out of the body, the expulsive faculty, what moved, the motive faculty, and so in the mind the intellectual faculty of the understanding understood, and the elective faculty or the will, willed or commanded, this is in short to say that the ability to digest digested, and the ability to move moved, and the ability to understand understood, for faculty, ability, and power I think are about different names of the same things, which ways of speaking when put into more intelligible words will, I think, amount to thus much, that the digestion is performed by something that is able to digest, motioned by something able to move, and understanding by something able to understand, and in truth it would be very strange if it should be otherwise, as strange as it would be for a man to be free without being able to be free, and of section 15, recording by Chad Horner, in to music, of an essay concerning human understanding, section 16 of an essay concerning human understanding, book two by John Locke, this is a LibriVox recording, all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain, for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org, recording by Chad, chapter 21 of power, section 21 to return then to the inquiry about liberty, I think the question is not proper whether there will be free, but whether a man be free, thus I think one, that so far as anyone can, by the direction or choice of his mind, preferring the existence of any action to the non-existence of that action, and vice versa, make it to exist or not exist, so far he is free, for if I can, by a thought directing the motion of my finger, make it move when it was at rest or vice versa, it is evident that in respect of that I am free, and if I can, by a light thought of mind, preferring one to the other, produce either words or sounds, I am at liberty to speak or hold my peace, and as far as his power reaches of acting or not acting, by the determination of his own thought preferring either, so far as a man free, for how can we think anyone freer than to have the power to do what he will, and so far as anyone can, by preferring any action to its not being or rest to any action, or just that action or rest, so far can he do what he will, for such a preferring of action to its absence is the willing of it, and we can scarce tell how to imagine any being freer than to be able to do what he wills, so that in respect of actions within the reach of such a power in him, a man seems as free as it is possible for freedom to make him. Section 22, but the inquisitive mind of man, willing to shift off from himself as far as he can, all thoughts of guilt, though it be by putting himself into a worse state than that fatal necessity is not contempt with this, freedom unless it reaches farther than this, will not serve the turn, and it passes for a good play that a man is not free at all, if he be not as free to will as he is to act what he wills. Concerning a man's liberty, there yet therefore is raised this further question, whether a man be free to will, which I think is what is meant when it is disputed whether the will be free, and as to that I imagine Section 23, that willing or volition being an action and freedom consisting in a power of acting or not acting, a man in respect of willing or the act of volition, when any action in his power is once proposed to his thoughts as presently to be done, cannot be free. The reason we're off is very manifest, for it being unavoidable that the action depending on his will should exist or not exist, and its existence or not existence following perfectly the determination and preference of his will, he cannot avoid willing the existence or not existence of that action. It is absolutely necessary that he will the one or the other, i.e. prefer the one to the other, since one of them must necessarily follow, and that which does follow, follows by the choice and determination of his mind, that is, by his willing it. For if he did not will it, it would not be, so that in respect of the act of willing, a man in such a case is not free, liberty consisting in a power to act or not to act, which in regard of volition, a man upon such a proposal has not, for it is unavoidably necessary to prefer the doing or forbearance of an action in a man's power, which is once proposed to his thoughts. A man must necessarily will the one or the other of them upon which preference or volition, the action or its forbearance certainly follows and is truly voluntary, but the act of volition or preferring one of the two, being that which he cannot avoid, a man in respect of that act of willing is under a necessity and so cannot be free, unless necessity and freedom can consist together, and a man can be free and bound at once. Section 24, this then is evident that in all proposals of present action, a man is not a liberty to will or not to will because he cannot forbear willing, liberty consisting in a power to act or to forbear acting and in that only, for a man that sits still is said yet to be at liberty because he can walk if he wills it, but if a man sitting still has not a power to remove himself, he is not at liberty, so likewise a man falling down a precipice, though in motion is not at liberty because he cannot stop that motion if he would, this being so it is plain that a man that is walking to whom it is proposed to give off walking is not at liberty whether he will determine himself to walk or give off walking or no, he must necessarily prefer one or the other of them walking or not walking and so it is in regard of all other actions in our power so proposed which are the far greater number for considering the vast number of voluntary actions that succeed one another every moment that we are awake in the course of our lives there are but few of them that are thought on or proposed to the will till the time they are to be done and in all such actions as I have shown the mind in respect of willing has not a power to act or not to act wherein consists liberty the mind in that case has not a power to forbear willing it cannot avoid some determination concerning them let the consideration be assured the thought is quick as it will it either leaves the man in the state he was before thinking or changes it continues to action or puts an end to it whereby it is manifest that it orders and directs on in preference to or with neglect of the other and thereby either the continuation or change becomes unavoidably voluntary section 25 since then it is plain that in most cases a man is not at liberty whether he will or no the next thing demanded is whether a man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases motion or rest this question carries the absurdity of it so manifestly in itself that one might thereby sufficiently be convinced that liberty concerns not the will for to ask whether a man be at liberty to will either motion or rest speaking or silence which he pleases is to ask whether a man can well what he wills or be pleased with what he is pleased with a question which I think needs no answer and they who can make a question of it must suppose one will to determine the acts of another and another to determine that and so on in in finiten section 26 to avoid these and the like absurdities nothing can be of greater guess than to establish in our minds determined ideas of the things under consideration if the ideas of liberty and volition are well fixed in the understandings and carried along with us in our minds I say hot through all the questions that are raised about them I suppose the great part of the difficulties that the plex men solves and entangle their understandings would be much easier resolved and we should perceive where the confused signification of terms or where the nature of the thing caused the obscurity section 27 first then it is carefully to be remembered that freedom consists in the dependence of the existence or not existence of any action upon our abolition of it and not in the dependence of any action or its contrary on our preference a man standing on a cliff is at liberty to leap 20 yards downwards into the sea not because he has a power to do the contrary action which is to leap 20 yards upwards for that he cannot do but he is there for free because he has a power to leap or not to leap but if a greater force than his either holds him fast or tumbles him down he is no longer free in that case because the doing or forbearance of that particular action is no longer in his part he that is a close prisoner in a room 20 feet square being at the north side of his chamber is at liberty to walk 20 feet southward because he can walk or not walk it but is not at the same time at liberty to do the contrary i.e. to walk 20 feet northward in this sense consists freedom this in our being able to act or not to act according as we shall choose or will section 28 secondly we must remember that volition or willing is an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any action and thereby exerting its power to reduce it to avoid multiplying of words i would crave leave here under the word action to comprehend forbearance to any action opposed sitting still or holding one's peace when walking or speaking or proposed though mere forbearances requiring as much the determination of the will and being as often waiting in their consequences as a contrary actions may on that consideration well enough pass for actions too but this i say that i may not be mistaken if for brevity sake i speak thus section 29 thirdly the will being nothing but a power in the mind to direct the operative faculties of the man to motion or rest as far as they depend on such direction to the question what is it determines the will the true and proper answer is the mind for that which determines the general power of directing to this or that particular direction is nothing but the agent itself exercising the power it has that particular way if this answer satisfies not it is playing the meaning of the question what determines the will it is what moves the mind in every particular instance to determine its general power of directing to this or that particular motion or rest and to this i answer the motive for continuing in the same state or action is only the present satisfaction in it the motive to change is always some uneasiness nothing setting us upon the change of state or upon any new action but some uneasiness this is the great motive that works on the mind to put it upon action which for shortness sake we will call determining of the will which i shall more at large explain section 30 but in the way to it it will be necessary to premise that though i have above endeavored to express the act of volition by choosing referring and the like terms that signify desire as well as volition or one of other words to mark that action of the mind whose proper name is willing or volition yet it being a very simple act who so ever desires to understand what it is will better find it by reflecting on his own mind and observing what it does when it wills and by any variety of articulate signs whatsoever this question of being careful not to be misled by expressions that do not enough keep up the difference between the will and several acts of the mind that are quite stent from it i think the more necessary because i find the will often confounded with several of the affections especially desire and one put for the other and that by men who would not willingly we thought not to have had very distinct notions of things and not to have read very clearly avoid them this i imagine has been no small occasion of obscurity and mistake in this matter and therefore is as much as maybe to be avoided for he that shall turn his thoughts onwards upon what passes in his mind when he wills shall see that the will or power of volition is convergent about nothing but that particular determination of the mind whereby barely by a thought the mind endeavors to give rise continuation or stop to any action which it takes to be in its part this well considered mainly shows that the will is perfectly distinguished from desire which in the very same action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our will sets us upon a man who might not deny may oblige me to use persuasions to another which at the same time i am speaking i may wish may not prevail on him in this case it is plain the will and desire run counter i will the action that turns one way whilst my desire turns another about the direct contrary way a man who by a violent fit of the gut in his limbs finds a dosiness in the head or a lump of appetite in his stomach removed desires to be eased to of the pain in his feet or hands for wherever there is pain there is a desire to be rid of it though yet whilst he apprehends that the removal of the pain may translate the noxious humor to a more vital part as well as never determined to any one action that may serve to remove this pain once it is evident that desiring and willing are two distinct acts of mind and consequently that the will which is but the power of volition is much more distinct from desire section 31 to return then to the inquiry what is it that determines the will in regard to our actions and that upon second thoughts i am apt to imagine is not as is generally supposed the greater good in view but some and for the most part the most pressing uneasiness a man is at present under this is that which successfully determines what sets us upon those actions we perform this uneasiness we make all as it is desire which is an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good all pain of the body of what sort so ever and the square of the mind is uneasiness and with this is always joined desire equal to the pain or uneasiness filled and is scarce distinguishable from it for desire being nothing but an uneasiness in the want of an absent good in reference to any pain filled ease is that absolute good until that ease be attained we may call it desire nobody feeling pain that he wishes not to be eased off with a desire equal to that pain and inseparable from it besides this desire of ease from pain there is another of absent positive good and here also the desire and uneasiness are equal as much as we desire any absent good so much are we in pain for it but here all absent good does not according to the greatness it has or is acknowledged to have caused pain equal to that greatness as all pain causes desire equal to itself because the absence of good is not always a pain as the presence of pain is and therefore absent good may be looked on and considered without desire but so much as there is anywhere of desire so much there is of uneasiness section 32 that desire is the state of uneasiness everyone who reflects on himself will quickly find who is there that has not felt a desire what the wise man says of hope which is not much different from it that it being deferred makes the heart sick and that still proportionable to the greatness of the design which sometimes raises the uneasiness to that pitch that it makes people cry out give me children give me the thing desired or I die life itself and all its enjoyments is a burden cannot be borne under the lasting and unremote pressure of such uneasiness section 33 good and evil present and absent it is true work upon the mind but that which immediately determines the will from time to time to every voluntary action is the uneasiness of desire fixed on some absent good either negative as indolence to one in pain or positive as enjoyment of pleasure that it is this uneasiness that determines the will to the success of voluntary actions where all the greatest part of our lives is made up and by which we are conducted through different courses to different ends I shall endeavor to show both from experience and the reason of the thing section 34 when the man is perfectly content with the state he is in which is when he is perfectly without any uneasiness what industry what action what will is there left but to continue in it of this every man's observation will satisfy him and thus we see our always maker suitably to our constitution and frame and knowing what it is that determines the world has put into man the uneasiness of hunger and thirst and other natural desires that return at their seasons to move and determine their will for the preservation of themselves and the continuation of their species for I think we may conclude that if the bare contemplation of these good ends to which we are carried by these several uneasinesses had been sufficient to determine the will and set us on work we should have had none of these natural pains and perhaps in this world little or no pain at all it is better to marry them to burn says Saint Paul where we may see what it is that chiefly drives men into the enjoyment of a conjugal life a little burning felt pushes us more powerfully than greater pleasures in prospect draw or learn section 35 it seems so established and settled a maxim by the general consent of all mankind that good the greater good determines the will that I do not at all wonder that when I first published my thoughts on this subject I took it for granted and I imagine that by a great many I shall be thought more excusable for having then done so than that now I have ventured to recede from so received an opinion but yet upon a stricter inquiry I am forced to conclude that good the greater good though apprehended and acknowledged to be so does not determine the will until our desire raised proportionably to it makes us uneasy in the want of it and wins a man ever so much that that day has an advantage of recovery make him say and own that the handsome conveniences of life are better than nasty penury yet as long as he is content with the ladder he finds no uneasiness in it he moves not his will never is determined to any action that shall bring him out of it let a man be ever so well persuaded of the advantages of virtue that it is as necessary to a man who has any great aims in this world or hopes in the next as food to life yet till he on measure thirsts at the righteousness till he feels an uneasiness in the want of it his will will not be determined to any action in pursuit of this confessed greater good but any other uneasiness he feels in himself shall take this and carry his will to other actions on the other side let a drunkard see that his health decays his estate wastes his credit and reasons and the wonderful things even of his beloved drink attains him in the course he falls yet the returns of uneasiness to miss his companions the habitual thirst after his cups at the usual time drives him to the tavern though he has in his view the loss of health and plenty and perhaps of the joys of another life the least of which is no inconsiderable good but such as he confesses is far greater than the tinkling of his palate with a glass of wine or the idle chat of a souping club it is not one of viewing the greater good for he sees and acknowledges it and in the intervals of his drinking large will take resolution to pursue the greater good but when the uneasiness to miss his accustomed to life returns the greater acknowledged good loses its hold and the present uneasiness determines the will to the accustomed action which thereby gets stronger fitting to prevail against the next occasion though he at the same time makes secret promises to himself that he will do so no more this is the last time he will act against the attainment of those greater goods and thus he is from time to time in the state of the unhappy container video mediora proba aqua deteriora se qua which sentence allowed for true a made good by constant experience may this i'm possibly no other way be easily made intelligible section 36 if we inquire into the reason of what experience makes so evident in fact and examine why it is uneasiness alone operates on the will and determines it in its choice we shall find that we being capable but of one determination of the will to one action at once the present uneasiness that we are under does naturally determine the will in order to the happiness between all the amount in all our actions for as much as was we are under any uneasiness we cannot apprehend ourselves happy or in the way to it pain and uneasiness being by everyone concluded and felt to be inconsistent with having spoiling the relish even of those good things which we have little pain serving tomorrow all the pleasure we rejoiced in therefore that which of course determines the choice of our will to the next action will always be the removing the pain as long as we have any left as the first unnecessary step towards happiness section 37 another reason why it is uneasiness alone determines the will maybe this because that alone is present and it is against the nature of things that what is absent should operate where it is not it may be said that absent good may by contradiction be brought home to the mind and be present the idea of it indeed may be in the mind and viewed as present there but nothing will be in the mind as a present good able to counterbalance the removal of any uneasiness which we are under till it raises our desire and the uneasiness of that has the prevalence in determining the will till then the idea in the mind whatever good is their own like other ideas the object of their unactive speculation but operates not on the will or sets us on work the reason we're off I shall show by and by how many are to be found that have had lively representations set before their minds that the unspeakable joys of heaven which they acknowledge the possible and probable to you yet would be content to take up with their happiness here and so the revealing uneasiness of their desires let this after the enjoyment of this life take their turns in the determining their wills and all that while they take not one step or not one shot move towards the good things of another life considered as ever so great section 38 where the will determined by the views of good as it appears in contemplation greater or less to the understanding which is the state of all as a good and that which in the received opinion the will is supposed to move to and to be moved by I do not see how it could ever get lists from the infinite eternal joys of heaven once proposed and considered as possible for all absolute good by which alone barely proposed and coming in view the will is thought to be determined and so to set us on action being only possible but not invalidly certain it is unavoidable that the infinitely greater possible good should regularly and constantly determine the will in all the successive actions it directs and then we should keep constantly and steadily in our course towards heaven without ever standing still or directing our actions to any other end the eternal addition of a future state infinitely outweighing the expectation of riches or honor or any other worldly pleasure which we can propose to ourselves but we should grant these the more probable to be attained or nothing future is yet in possession and so the expectation even of these may deceive us if it were so that the greater good in view determines the will so great a good once proposed and not but sees the will and hold it fast to the pursuit of this infinitely greatest good without ever letting it go again for the will having a car over directing the thoughts as well as other actions would if it were so hold the contemplation of the mind fixed to that good this would be the state of the mind and regular tendency of the will in all its determinations were it determined by that which is considered and in view the greater good but that it is not so as visible in experience the infinitely greatest confessed good being often neglected to satisfy the success of uneasiness of our desires pursuing tribals but though the greatest allowed even everlasting unspeakable good which sometimes moved and affected the mind does not steadfastly hold will yet we see any very great and fulfilling uneasiness having once let hold on the will let's it not go by which we may be convinced what it is that determines the will thus any vehement pain of the body the ungovernable passion of the man violently in love with the impatient desire of revenge keeps the will steady and intent and the will thus determined never lets the understanding lay by the object but all the thoughts of the mind empowered as a body are uninterruptedly employed that way by the determination of the will influenced by that popping uneasiness as long as it lasts whereby it seems to me evident that the will or power of setting us upon one action in preference to all other is determined in us by uneasiness and other this be not so I desire everyone to observe in himself section 39 I have hitherto chiefly instanced in the uneasiness of desire as that which determines the will because that is the chief and most sensible and the will seldom orders any action nor is there any voluntary action formed without some desire accompanying it which I think is the reason why the will and sire so often can find it we get we are not to look upon the uneasiness which makes up or at least accompanies most of the other passions is wholly excluded in the case our version fear anger envy shame etc of each their uneasiness to thereby influence the will these passions are scarce any of them in life and practice simple and alone and wholly unmixed with others though usually in discourse and contemplation that carries the name which operates strongest and appears most in this present state of the mind nay there is I think scarce any of the passions to be found without desire joined with it I am sure wherever there is uneasiness there is desire for we constantly desire happiness and whatever we feel of uneasiness so much it is certain we want of happiness even in our own opinion that our state and condition otherwise be what it will besides the present moment not being our eternity whatever our enjoyment be we look beyond the present and desire goes with our foresight and that still carries the will with it so that even in joy itself that which keeps up the action where on the enjoyment depends is the desire to continue and fear to lose it and whenever a greater uneasiness than that takes place in the mind the will presently is without determined to some new action on the present delight neglected section four but we being in this world beset with sundry uneasiness distracted with different desires the next inquiry naturally will be which of them has to precedency in determining the will to the next action and to that the answer is that ordinarily which is the most pressing of those that are just capable of being then removed for the will being the power of directing our operative faculties to some action for some end and not at any time be moved towards what is judged at that time unattainable that would be to suppose an intelligent being designed to act for an end only to lose its labor for so it is to act for what is judged not attainable therefore very great uneasiness move not the will when they are judged not capable of a cure they in that case put us not upon endeavors but these set apart the most important and urgent uneasiness we at that time feel is that which ordinarily determines the will successively in that train of voluntary actions which makes up our lives the greatest present uneasiness is a spur to action that is constantly felt and for the most part determines the will in its choice of the next action for this we must carry along with us that the proper and only object of the will is some action of ours nothing else for we producing nothing by our billing it but some action in our power it is there the will terminates and reaches your father section 41 if it be further asked what it is most desire i answer happiness not alone happiness and misery are the names of two extremes the utmost bounds whereof we know not it is what i have not seen here not heard nor have it entered into the heart of man to conceive but of some degrees of both we have very lively impressions made by several instances of delight and joy on the one side and torment and sorrow on the other which for short and sake i shall comprehend under the names of pleasure and pain there being pleasure and pain of the mind as well as the body with him is fullness of joy and pleasure for everyone for to speak truly they are all of the mind though some have their rise in the mind from thought others in the body from certain modifications of motion section 42 happiness then in its full extent is the utmost pleasure we are capable of and misery the utmost pain and the lowest degree of what can be called happiness is so much ease from all pain and so much present pleasure as without which anyone cannot be content now because pleasure and pain are produced in us by the operation of certain objects either on our minds or our bodies and in different degrees therefore what has an aptness to produce pleasure in us is that we call good and what is apt to produce pain in us we call evil for no other reason but for its aptness to produce pleasure and pain in us wherein consists our happiness and misery father though what is apt to produce any degree of pleasure be in itself good and what is apt to produce any degree of pain be evil yet it often happens that we do not call it so when it comes in competition the greater of its sword because when they come in competition the degrees also of pleasure and pain have justly a preference so that if we will rightly estimate what we call good and evil we shall find it lies much in comparison for the cause of every less degree of pain as well as every greater degree of pleasure has the nature of good and vice versa section 43 though this be that which is called good and evil and all good be the proper object of desire in general yet all good even seen and confessed to be so does not necessarily move every particular man's desire but only that part or so much of it as is considered and taken to make a necessary part of this happiness all other good by ever great in reality or appearance excites not a man's desires who looks not on it to make a part of the happiness wherewith he in his present thoughts can satisfy himself happiness under this view everyone constantly pursues and desires what makes any part of it other things acknowledged to be good he can look upon without desire pass by and be contempt without there is nobody I think so senseless as to deny that there is pleasure in knowledge and for the pleasures of sense they have too many followers to let it be questioned whether men are taken with them or no now let one man plays his satisfaction in sensual pleasures another in the delight of knowledge though each of them cannot confess there is great pleasure in what the other pursues yet neither of them making the other's delight a part of his happiness their desires are not moved but each is satisfied without what the other enjoys and so as well as not determined to the pursuit of it but yet as soon as the studious man's hunger and thirst makes him uneasy he whose will was never determined to any pursuit of good cheer poignant sauces delicious wine by the pleasant taste he has found in them is by the uneasiness of hunger and thirst presently determined to eating and drinking though possibly with great indifference what wholesome food comes in his way and on the other side the epicure buckles to study when shame or the desire to recommend himself to his mistress shall make him uneasy in the world of any sort of knowledge thus how much so ever men are in earnest and constant in pursuit of happiness yet they may have a clear view of good greed and confessed good without being concerned for it or moved by it if they think they can make up their happiness without it though as to pain that they are always concerned for they can feel no uneasiness without being moved and therefore being uneasy in the want of whatever is judged necessary to their happiness as soon as any good appears to make a part of their portion of happiness they begin to desire it section 44 this i think anyone may observe in himself and others that the greater visible good does not always raise men's desires in proportion to the greatness that appears and is acknowledged to have though every little trouble moves us and sets us on work to get rid of it the reason we're off is evident from the nature of our happiness and misery itself all present pain whatever it be makes a part of our present misery but all absolute does not at any time make a necessary part of our present happiness nor the absence of it make a part of our misery if it did we should be constantly and infinitely miserable there being infinite degrees of happiness which are not in our possession all uneasiness therefore being removed in whatever portion of good serves a present to contentment and some few degrees of pleasure in the succession of ordinary enjoyments make up a happiness wherein they can be satisfied if this were not so there could be no room for those indifferent and visibly trifling actions to which our wills are so often determined and wherein we voluntarily be so much of our lives which remissness could by no means consist of the constant determination of will or desire to the greatest of our good that this is so I think few people need go far from home to be convinced and indeed in this life there are not many whose happiness reaches so far as to afford them a constant train of moderate mean pleasures with any mixture of uneasiness and yet they could be content to stay here forever though they cannot deny but that it is possible there may be a state of eternal durable joys after this life far surpassing all the good that is to be found here nay they cannot but see that it is more possible than the attainment and continuation of that pittance of honor riches or pleasure which they pursue and for which they neglect that eternal state but yet in full view of this difference satisfied of the possibility of the perfect secure and lasting happiness in a future state and under a clear conviction that is not to be had here whilst they bind their happiness within some little enjoyment or aim of this life and it's good the joys of heaven for making any necessary part of it their desires are not moved by this greater apparent good no their wills determined to any action or endeavor for its attainment end of section 16 recording by chan