 All righty, well, good afternoon, and thanks for sticking through all these briefs to include the one today. So as you know, the Department of the Navy this morning submitted an FY17 base in OGO budget request to Congress of $165 billion, and in this brief, I will provide an overview of the content of that request. We'll start with a national-level mission guidance that defines the missions that the Navy Marine Corps are going to execute in this budget. We'll talk about the operational context of how that mission guidance has been executed over the course of a decade and a half of wartime op-tempo now, and we'll also talk about the evolving nature of that operational context, the dynamics that are driving changes in both the character of the environment and the nature of the competitors themselves. These operational context elements are foundational to many of the investments that we'll talk about later in this brief in the budget request, ranging from the generation of combat readiness to the modernization of capabilities. I'll also briefly highlight for you the fiscal context that bounds the Department's options in balancing capabilities, capacity, and readiness requirements, and then we'll address the specifics. We'll talk about some of the focused investments, the hard choices, and the innovation and reform elements that resource a global sea-based force. So let's start with the mission guidance. This guidance spans the national security, defense, and military strategies through the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Secretary of the Navy's guidance on people, platforms, power, and partnerships, and the service chief guidance, including the newly released design for maintaining maritime superiority from Sino-Richardson and Commandant Neller's update on advanced to contact guidance. This mission guidance directs the Navy Marine Corps that executes the 10QDR mission shown here, ranging from providing an effective nuclear deterrent and fighting terrorism in order to protect the homeland, to providing a stabilizing presence across the globe in order to build security globally, to protecting power and winning decisively when called upon. This budget reflects the Secretary of the Navy's, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps' implementation of this foundational mission guidance. Today's execution of that guidance is the result of resources provided and hard choices made in prior years to resource today's Navy and Marine Corps in meeting the combatant commander's requirements to execute the QDR mission set. The Navy and Marine Corps today provide forward postured sea-based forces as shown. These include 36,000 sailors and 5,000 Marines deployed on 44 ships, three carrier strike groups, and two amphibious ready groups. There's an additional 33,000 sailors and 31,000 Marines forward ashore, including 41,000 in the East Asia and the Pacific. These are among the forces that over the past year provided immediate response options and assured allies, including the deployments of five carrier strike groups and five amphibious readiness groups to combatant commanders around the globe, the South China Sea operations of Lassen and Curtis Wilbur, and challenging excessive sovereignty claims, demonstrating freedom of navigation as a matter of fundamental principle, and the Truman carrier strike groups combat operations with the French carrier Charles de Gaulle in operations in the fight against ISIL. So overall today, the Navy and Marine Corps have continued to remain deeply engaged at high tempo in harm's way, providing immediate options, assuring allies and deterring adversaries. Meeting those combatant commander requirements over the course of a decade and a half of wartime op tempo, concurrent with funding over fiscal year 13 through 16 that collectively provided $30 billion less than the requested levels, has stressed the force in recent years. This chart shows fleet size in gray. It shows annual deployments in blue, and it shows deployment lengths in green. The chart shows that even while the Navy has progressed since the early 90s of deploying a quarter of the battle force each year to a third of the force in recent years, they continue to be oversubscribed in meeting the combatant commander's demand for naval forces. The operational employment summaries for calendar years 13 and 14 show this sustained consumption above the planned deployment levels depicted by the red line. This oversubscription of the service-generated readiness and constrained funding has resulted in deferred maintenance of ships, accelerated consumption of aircraft service lives, and stressed aircraft readiness in order to meet the requested operational tempo. And it placed heavy demands on sailors and Marines as the average deployment lengths increased by a third, as shown in the upper left quadrant in green. Over this time as well, the Marine Corps deployment to dwell ratio continued at one to two against a sustained goal of one to three. So as you know, last year's budget made specific targeted investments to attack these readiness issues with investments in shipbuilding and shipyard infrastructure and a shipyard and aviation depot hiring. Concurrent with those investments, the calendar year 15 operational execution shown in the lower right quadrant reflected implementation of the optimized fleet response plan and readiness consumption that closely matched planned deployment levels. The FY17 budget request builds on those investments and these trends with additional critical investment in depot infrastructure and personnel and aircraft readiness investments as we continue to recover stressed readiness and reduce ship and aircraft maintenance backlogs. At the same time, this budget also adapts the force to reflect key changes in the security environment. As shown here, we're seeing increased reliance on the maritime system with shipping traffic increasing, new Arctic trade routes opening, and new technologies making undersea resources more accessible. Overall, the maritime system is more heavily used, more stressed, more contested than ever before. Concurrently, growth of the global information system is driving an accelerating rate of change and the rate of technology adoption is surging, spanning new materials to artificial intelligence. Beyond those key trends, it's important to note that the competitors themselves are changing as you've heard a number of times in the brief today. The first time in 25 years, the United States is facing a return to great power competition with both Russia and China advancing high-end military capabilities. Others exploit the key trends as well to include North Korea's focus on nuclear weapons and missile programs, Iran's pursuit of advanced missiles and conventional capabilities, and non-state actors exploiting the maritime and information systems that threaten security around the world. As Comedan Neller has stated, the character of warfare is dynamic. Those who adapt succeed, those who don't die. This budget addresses that imperative by making investments to sustain our ability to fight with decisive capability over the full range of operations, at sea, from the sea, and from expeditionary bases across all domains. The fiscal context for executing the department's missions in that dynamic environment remains challenging. Navy Marine Corps base budget funding is shown in $26 here, constant dollars, in blue. It's $43 billion less over this fit up than the green PB-14 level submitted with the QDR-14 strategy. This includes a 3.9 percent reduction this year in base in OCO from the FY17 funding levels of PB-16. This fiscal context drives tough choices and new thinking in order to provide the best balanced force as we continue current operations, reset our equipment, maintain warfighting readiness, and modernize. In this budget, the Navy Department leadership integrated that mission guidance, that operational context, and the fiscal constraints across a spectrum of focused investments, hard choices, and innovation reform to provide the best balanced force. The next section of slides I'll take you through will provide an overview of that balance by appropriation title, including focused investments that span people initiatives, ships, aircraft, readiness, and weapons. The hard choice is required to achieve that balance, including tradeoffs and force structure, military construction, and facility sustainment, and the strong focus on innovation and reform that sustains our warfighting advantage, including in unmanned systems, rapid prototyping, and cradle to grave tracking of each appropriated dollar through auditability. So let's start with military personnel. Our ability to execute our mission depends completely on the Navy and Marine Corps team, sailors and Marines, active and reserve Navy civilians and their families. Key initiatives such as the 21st Century Sailor Office continue with this budget, leading efforts to improve the physical and mental health of our sailors, and a new Sailor 2025 initiative will propose adjustments to improve how we attract, train, develop, and inspire the best force in the world. In the military personnel accounts, both services align and strength with the force structure required by the mission guidance. The budget funds a 1.6 percent pay raise in 2017 versus 1.3 percent in last year's budget. Additions to Navy personnel include added billets for increased security in our installations to improve depth of manning in our helicopter mine hunting community and to adequately fund officer manning levels. In military personnel decreases, all of which will be achieved through natural attrition. The department will seek the legislative proposal to deactivate the 10th carrier air wing, Air Wing 14 in LaMoure, California. This proposal will allow the Navy to match the number of air wings to the number of deployable aircraft carriers. It reflects the practice of having one carrier in refueling and complex overhaul and one carrier in an extended maintenance availability at any time. The proposal allows reallocation of aircraft to the remaining wings to improve readiness and improves air crew proficiency in combat readiness by reducing the dwell time between air wing deployments, which currently can be up to four years for those wings attached to carriers and extended maintenance phases. Overall, this approach provides the best balance for supporting the long-term carrier force structure and the optimized fleet response plan. The Sailor 2025 Ready Relevant Learning Initiative is piloting a new approach for training sailors through mobile learning, new content, and distributed infrastructure. This is a phase training modernization and redesign concept that will decrease the number of sailors in classrooms over time. On the right-hand side of the slide, the Navy's reserve component continues the PB-16-funded profile, which reflects increases in areas spanning cyber warfare to ship maintenance personnel. Collectively, across the active and reserve components, the highlighted adjustments provide the best alignment of military personnel to mission requirements. The Marine Corps has come down from a peak end strength of 202,000 in FY09 to a sustained level of 182,000. It reaches that level in FY16 a year earlier than planned, given fiscal constraints. This end strength provides overall dwell ratios of one to two for the active force against a sustained goal of one to three and one to four for the reserves. At this force level, the Commandant has testified that the Marine Corps' major combat operations in one theater would entail risk in deterred and deny operations elsewhere, with the force structure insufficient to support the other commitments, including theater security cooperation. In civilian personnel, this budget funds the workforce required to support the program's force structure. It sustains efforts in critical areas, such as nuclear surety, and it continues our focus to unrecovering stressed readiness. To accomplish this, the department's full-time equivalent, or FTE profile, increases slightly in FY17, but decreases by over 2700 through FY21. Ship maintenance backlogs are targeted with additional manning at regional maintenance centers, and public shipyard personnel grow to 33,500 in FY17 to increase nuclear ship maintenance capacity. While overall Navy Working Capital Fund FTE declined from FY16 to 17, this budget grows FTE and Naval Aviation Depots to address aviation maintenance backlogs. The budget also funds an additional 750 Navy and Marine Corps civilian guard FTE under the same initiative highlighted earlier to increase military security personnel. The department continues reductions at our major headquarters activities, from the 20% reduction in FY14, which reduced FTE by over 2000. This budget cuts an additional 5% of funding, primarily for headquarters contracting support. Overall, the civilian personnel numbers highlighted here reflect the vital role our civilian personnel continue to play in making force capability come alive. The department's readiness accounts are tightly focused on supporting through the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, the operational tempo requested by the combatant commanders and executing their mission guidance, on properly sustaining ships, aircraft, and ground equipment to reach their expected service lives, and on properly training our people and preparing them to deploy forward. FY17 base and OCO readiness metrics are funded to the historic level shown here. In ship readiness, as with the FY16 requests, the budget funds ship operations in base and OCO at 58 days underway per quarter when deployed, and 24 days underway per quarter when not deployed. Ship depot maintenance is funded to 100% in base and OCO. This includes funding of the initiatives highlighted earlier to improve ship depot maintenance throughput, as well as additional FY17 shipyard infrastructure investment of $150 million. In aviation readiness, the budget funds Navy and Marine Corps base and OCO flat hours to deploy all units at a 2.0T rating. Flat hour funding increases from the FY16 level, but it continues to reflect the reduced availability of legacy hornets due to depot maintenance backlogs and reduce numbers of ready basic aircraft in a number of other type model series. Aviation depot maintenance is funded to capacity at the Fleet Readiness Centers, 85% of the total requirement in base and OCO, and that's an increase from the 83% level funded in FY16. This funding specifically targets the depot maintenance and ready basic aircraft issues through critical chain initiatives, increased hiring of civilian engineers and artisans, and with program-related engineering and program logistics investment. The Marine Corps O&M budget provides a ready and capable Marine Corps across the range of military operations. However, the FY17 O&M budget is leaner than an FY15, the last full year executed, stretching the Marine Corps to maintain current readiness while modernizing to keep pace with evolving adversaries. The budget prioritizes the readiness of deployed and next-to-deployed units to meet today's operational requirements. Non-deployed units will not have the resources and time to maintain the readiness to require to deploy immediately. The Marine Corps ground equipment readiness, 70% of the equipment has been reset, and 50% return to operating forces. This budget funds 79% of the remaining baseline active force requirements in base and OCO. Ships are the foundation of the Navy and essential to both the geographic and functional combatant commanders. Key ship building efforts that I'll highlight for you today include the Ohio Replacement Program, with advanced procurement starting in FY17, leading to procurement to the first boat in FY21. The Ohio Replacement Program is fully funded in this fit-up at $13.2 billion in SCN and R&D, with FY21 proposed to be the first of three years of incremental full funding for the initial boat. Funding continues in FY17 for the USS John F. Kennedy, CVN 79, which delivers an FY22, and for the second year of advanced procurement for USS Enterprise, CVN 80. Both of these ships are on track to deliver within the respective cost gaps. Two Virginia-class submarines are funded per year over FY17 to 20, and one in FY21 when the first Ohio Replacement Boat is introduced. The second FY19 Virginia and all subsequent boats are funded to be Virginia Payload Module Variants, which provide an increase in payload capacity from 12 to 40 Tomahawks. Continued funding is provided each year for two destroyers across the fit-up. The second FY16 destroyer is projected to be the first Flight 3 variant, incorporating the Advanced Missile Defense Radar required to simultaneously conduct anti-air and ballistic missile defense operations. Two littoral combat ships are funded in FY17, and one in FY18. The frigate version is introduced with one ship in FY19, one in 20, and two ships in FY21. Through the fit-up, we procure a total of 33 LCS in frigates, with seven more frigates forecast outside the fit-up for a total of 40 ships. We continue to procure LCS mission packages through the fit-up. Changes to align the mission package requirements with the revised mix of LCS and frigates occur beyond FY21. In amphibes, LHA-8 is funded in FY17, and the first LXR Replacement for the LSD class is funded in FY20. With a delivery of LPD-27 Portland in FY17, and LHA-7 Tripoli in FY19, the Navy's amphibious ship total grows to 33 ships by FY19. The first TAOX Replacement Oiler was funded in FY16. Following procurement of one oiler per year takes place over FY18 to 21. Total procurement is forecast to be 17 oilers. This budget includes advanced procurement in 17 for a block-by for the next five ships, and acquisition strategy expected to yield savings of $45 million per ship, which is reflected in the budget. The department appreciates the strong support of Congress and the FY16 Navy Shipbuilding appropriation. Changes in this budget from the PB16 plan reflect that FY16 Congressional action. They also reflect the reduction of seven small surface combatants over the FITUP, and they reflect the phasing of a TAGO ship from FY21 to later, while those ships' service lives are studied. Overall, 38 ships are funded over FY17 to 21. In FY17, 13 ships are delivered, six are retired, bringing the FY17 Battle Force count to 287. Over the FITUP, this plan grows the Battle Force to 308 ships by 2021. In cruiser modernization, we currently have two cruisers inducted into modernization availabilities, the Gettysburg and the Cowpens. In FY16, we induct two more, the Vicksburg and the Choson. The balance between current and future capability that fits within our budget compels the Navy in this request to propose to Congress inducting the remaining seven newest cruisers into phase modernization in FY17. This is an approach that leverages savings of $3 billion over the FITUP in operating costs to provide the best overall force balance. It maintains Air Defense Commander capable platforms in the Force into the 2040s, and allows us to reallocate personnel elsewhere on the fleet. This is the best way to update our cruisers relative to the evolving threat within the resources we have available. We're choosing to retain a more capable future cruiser fleet longer into the future over our lesser capacity today. The Department has committed more than $500 million in the FITUP to ensure the return of these cruisers to the fleet to meet our future Air Defense Commander requirements. Aircraft procurement reflects the Department's strong emphasis on fielding forces that fight decisively over the full spectrum of combat. 94 aircraft are procured in FY17, including two OCO F-18 combat loss replacements and 20 F-35s. F-35 FITUP production increases by 13 aircraft from the PB-16 acquisition plan, accelerating the fifth generation fighter transition. In combination with the five additional F-18s in FY16, two in 17, and 14 proposed in FY18, these investments help to mitigate the Department's strike fighter shortage. The P-8 Poseidon profile reflects our plan to accelerate procurement of one additional P-8 in FY16 and maintains the production plan to complete the buy in FY19. On the rotary wing side, FY17 reflects small decreases in AH-1Z and MV-22B aircraft for fiscal balancing. The CH-53K replacement for the 53 Echo helicopter completed its first flight this year in 2015. Low rate initial production of two aircraft begins in 17, leading to an initial operational capability or IOC in FY20. Over FY18 to 21, the request funds the first 24 of 48 Navy V-22s to replace the C-2. Forecast IOC for the Navy variant is FY21. And finally, the procurement quantities for MQ-4 Triton and MQ-8 Fire Scout reflect accelerated buys in FY16. In weapons procurement, FY17 provides a net increase of 63 weapons, while fit up quantities are reduced from the PB-16 level by 900 in order to meet fiscal constraints. The Navy begins procurement in FY17 of two new missiles, the Joint Air-to-Ground Missile or JAGAM and the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile or LORASM. JAGAM is a multi-service air-launched missile initially to be used on the AH-1Z with an IOC of FY19. LORASM procurement responds to an urgent operational need for an offensive anti-surface weapon and is on track for an early operational capability on Super Hornets in FY19. In other aircraft weapons, the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile Extended Range or ARGAM ER requirements have been refined, driving the addition of a technology maturation and risk reduction phase. This missile is now expected to enter developments in FY17 and complete operational testing in early FY24. In shipward weapons, the Navy added 100 Tomahawk missiles in FY17 to sustain the industrial base until the FY19 recertification line funding starts. Block I Evolved Seasparrow Procurement completes in 2017 in order to commence transition to the Block II missile without procurement starting in FY18. And the Navy's initial buy of Longbow Hellfire begins in FY17 for use with the LCS Surface-to-Surface missile module. Overall, while weapons procurement decreases over the fit-up, this budget invests $1.5 billion over that same time frame to develop new weapons that place adversaries at risk, including the next-generation land attack weapon, the offensive anti-surface weapon increment 2, standard missile 2 improvements, Tomahawk upgrades, and enhanced lightweight torpedo capabilities. The FY17 budget request also provides substantial investments to modernized currently-filed systems in order to continue to overmatch adversaries. In the information and electronic warfare domains, the Consolidated Afloat Network and Enterprise Services program, or CANES, and the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program, or CWIP, advance to outpace the threat. CANES replaces and provides critical improvements to all Afloat information networks, including in cybersecurity. CANES has been installed on 25 ships to date. 12 installations are in progress. This budget funds an additional 10 installations. CWIP provides upgrades to our surface ship SLIC-32 electronic warfare systems, which provide detection and protection from anti-ship missiles. This advanced capability is integral to our electromagnetic maneuver warfare dominance. The FY17 budget provides $275 million for procurement and $76 million in research and development. The Marine Corps continues to balance ground equipment procurement and future development to ensure Marines are supported in the current fight while modernizing to dominate future fights. The FY17 procurement Marine Corps budget of $1.4 billion funds major programs, including the ground, air, task-oriented radar, and the joint light-tack vehicle. FY17 procurement of ammunition Navy and Marine Corps funding of $730 million buys vital ammunition for the warfighter, including $66 million of OCO funding that replenishes weapons used in ongoing contingency operations. In the research and development appropriation, science and technology funding remains steady at 1.3% of the total budget across the FIDUP. At the other end of the R&D funding spectrum, we have several programs transitioning out of major R&D investment into procurement, including the Lorazum and Jagam missiles, the advanced missile defense radar, and the CH-53K helicopter. In the areas of shipbuilding, aviation, and unmanned systems, major R&D efforts include the Navy's top programmatic priority, the Ohio Replacement Program, where FIDUP R&D investment of $3.9 billion supports development leading to the first boat construction in FY21. Virginia payload module investment supports design work leading to the first BPM boat construction in FY19. In aviation, the F-35 is funded to maintain the F-35 Charlie IOC of 2018, and the CH-53K is on track for a milestone Charlie production decision in FY19. In unmanned systems, the unmanned carrier-launched airborne surveillance and strike or U-class program will be restructured in FY17 to bring high-demand fixed wing capabilities to the carrier air wing in the mid-20s, including intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting, limited strike, and tanking. This program increases air wing capability by freeing strike aircraft to conduct combat missions, vice-refueling missions, preserving strike fighter fatigue life, while enhancing the long endurance ISRNT capability of the air wing. Analysis of capability growth options for the system will continue in future budget cycles. The FY17 request also includes $150 million for technology maturation in unmanned undersea vehicles, leading to increased endurance, payload hosting, and payload delivery capability. The Marine Corps' major R&D initiative continues to be the amphibious combat vehicle. Engineering, manufacturing, development contracts, two vendors were awarded in the first quarter of FY16. The department continues to prioritize funding of cyber capabilities, including continued emphasis on cyberspace operations, training and equipping cyber mission forces, investments in cyber science and technology, and information assurance activities that strengthen defense of our networks. The Navy stood up in 2015, a Navy cybersecurity division, to provide a strategic approach to the cybersecurity and oversee the cyber resiliency investments. This budget includes an increase of $370 million over the fit-up across a spectrum of cyber programs, leading to significant improvements in the department's cyber posture. To address the imperative to increase agility, the department proposes in this budget a single streamed line department-wide approach to innovation in a rapid prototyping and demonstration program that will field urgent technological advances to the fleet within 24 months. We intend to work closely with the Congress on a framework of governance and congressional oversight that ensures effective and efficient use of the rapid prototyping funds. The budget provides $55 million in FY17 for the rapid prototyping initiative. Finally, the Navy continues strong R&D investment in energy initiatives to provide a more energy-efficient and operationally effective Navy and Marine Corps with investments spanning high-energy laser technologies to alternative fuels. The FY17-based budget request funds facility sustainment at 70% Navy and 74% Marine Corps, taking risk and chore infrastructure in order to meet the fiscal constraints. Down from 85% Navy and 84% Marine Corps and FY16, this sustainment funding will be prioritized to preserve the service life of our mission-critical facilities and key facility components across the services. In depot investment, the FY17 budget exceeds the 6% legislative requirement. 7.1% is provided across the shipyards, the fleet readiness centers, and Marine Corps depots. And finally, the FY17-Milcon program reflects a 35% reduction compared to FY16 funding levels. The department continues to pressurize military construction in order to meet fiscal constraints, limiting project to the department's most critical needs. The FY17 request funds 36 projects, including 33 baseline and three OCO. These include key quality of life initiatives, such as the Barracks and Reconditioning Center at Parris Island and Unaccompanied Housing at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. The request also funds projects supporting new weapons systems, such as the Triton UES Mission Control Facility at NAS Widby Island and an F-35 maintenance hangar and Marine Corps Air Station Buford. New electrical transmission lines in Guam are funded to support the long-term facility build plan there. However, three FY17-Guam projects are deferred to later in the FITM due to fiscal balancing. The IOC of the Marine Forces in Guam remains unchanged in FY22. Six energy resilience projects are funded in FY17, upgrading utilities infrastructure to increase the resiliency of key installations. In family housing, the budget supports operations, maintenance, and leasing of 73,000 units worldwide. So wrapping up the overview, overall this budget provides the investment required for the Navy and Marine Corps to execute the department's mission guidance in a challenging fiscal context that reflects the best balance of investments across people, presence, readiness, and capability. Across the full scope of the request, we emphasized innovation and reform to sustain advantage, accelerate learning, and strengthen our team. In making the hard choices and allocating risk, the request feels a larger fleet, a more sustainable, deployed, and Navy and Marine Corps presence, and improved capability. This completes my overview, and we look forward to your questions. If you have about 10 minutes for questions, please wait. So I call on you to turn your name out with Megan. Hi, Megan Eckstein with US Naval Institute News. I was wondering if you could talk a little bit more about the cruiser modernization plan, whether those ships would be kept in the plan until they were needed as a one-for-one replacement or whether you'd get them out of maintenance sooner, and then also kind of how that decision fits in with this overall effort to both achieve more ships and more lethal ships in the fleet. Sure, so addressing the latter part first, it clearly is one of our hard choices that reflects the fiscal pressure that I talked about in the budget year in particular. But it has a number of compelling elements to it which drive our consideration of resubmitting this to the Congress. The 246 plan, which was the prior plan that was being executed, would have brought in two more cruisers into FY17. This plan basically brings in those two plus an additional five. It provides, by doing that, it provides some flexibility to your question on when within that period, that phase modernization period, they would actually be inducted into availability. And that's advantageous because it helps us level load the industrial base and address, as there's peaks in value, peaks and dips in the repair industrial base, that these ships can be essentially adjusted to come into that period. The long-term plan, in fact, would have them continue to have as a one for one replacement as the oldest 11 cruisers were retired. One of these phase modernization cruisers would then come out. The department leadership has spoken very clearly about the commitment to bringing these cruisers back into the fleet because we have this important requirement for air defense commander capable platforms, one per carrier strike group into the 2040s. So the evidence of that commitment is the $500 million that are invested in this budget to make the FY17 plan work. And it's part of the legislative proposal as well that the department is proposing essentially increased congressional oversight that would be applicable for any changes to the status of these cruisers in terms of inactivation. Was that helpful? And is this funded through the SMOSF funding that you've gotten in the past? Is there a timeline for this? It's a combination. So it continues to use the SMOSF funding that's been enacted before. But in this budget over the FITUP to execute this plan, it funds additional money outside the SMOSF across modernization and sustainment. Thank you, Tony. That's my capacity with Bloomberg. Last week, the secretary announced $40 billion across the FITUP, including $8 billion and $17 billion to beef up underwater capabilities. Can you point to anything that actually benefited from that increase that wasn't already part of the plan? Because if you look at what he said, that was already embedded in your plan. So things that were not embedded in the plan would be the Ohio Replacement funding. So there was additional Ohio Replacement funding provided at the Department of FY21. Virginia Payload Module as well. So if you notice, you look at those numbers compared to the prior year, you'll see that that is incrementally above as well. Unmanned underwater vehicles. So I talked about $150 million in the budget year, but across the FITUP as well, it's a substantial investment to really build on the operational deployment that we had last year of a submarine operating unmanned underwater vehicles there. So those will be a number of the elements reflect increased emphasis on this budget. He also announced $2 billion by 4,000 Tomahawks. I found $100 across the FITUP, and you just showed. What happened there? Yeah, I can't speak to the factoid that you described. Factoid? $2 billion? No, I'm sorry. So this is what is in our budget, so I can talk to what's in our budget. OK. Any? All on VPM and also the C-bars, if I remember the term, quickly. There's more money for VPMs. How many more Virginia-class subs over the history of time actually end up getting VPMs? Or does it just only shift the profile to the left, and if so, how much? And C-bars, did you mention that that would actually have a strike ability? Because I hadn't heard that before. OK. So the Virginia payload module profile is the second FY19 boat, and then every boat thereafter. So that's the change there on the profile in the prior year. And before it was, I believe it was one in the FITUP. So it's an increase from one in the prior FITUP. And your question on C-bars was on whether it had a limited strike. Exactly right. So the real value of this restructure is that it incrementally gets at the manned, unmanned interface and operation on the carrier deck in the air wing by the mid-20s. And it brings these highly required capabilities. Yes, limited strike, ISRNT, and mission tanking. It's a smart acquisition approach to incrementally burn down that risk. And then, as I mentioned, we'll continue to look at developing additional capability. How different is that from what you class was envisioned for at the labor requirements, but some of the preency plan? So you class, I would cite as the main difference, was penetrating strike, non-permissive ISR. So it was a much more aggressive increment of capability just to get that platform at the same time as that was going to be the platform to develop the learning of how to operate unmanned off the carrier big deck. So this is a quicker mid-20s IOC and get experience while we build the capability as well. Chris Cabez. Just to follow on Cindy's C-bars, you have a designation here, RAQ-25. Right. Could you explain that? It's the Q-25. Q is an unmanned aircraft. A is attack, R is reconnaissance. But it's called C-bars, the carrier-based aerial refueling system. So this seems to have a certain identity crisis. And I'd like you to say, what is the primary mission of the first iteration of this aircraft? And also, can you explain? I mean, the R&D funding drops to about a fifth of the previous year's rates, $435 million down to $89 million. So RAQ-25, interestingly enough, is actually the same designation that you class had. So there's no change there essentially has picked up at least in the current iteration as this moves forward with the same designation. Absolutely, the budget documentation refers to the carrier-based aerial refueling system. I would cite all of those requirements, all of those capabilities it brings as critical, and not emphasize one or the other. The mission tanking is going to be critical to make the air wing more effective and in delivering projecting power forward. But the ISR&T long endurance is going to be critical as well. And the limited strike is a function that has value. So it's the total package of those integration required capabilities that essentially is being sought with this. The funding profile simply reflects the change in the restructure from where you class was in last year's fit-up to how this program is going to be executed going forward. You don't need any more money. I mean, what's your anticipation for next year's level? Back up to $400 million? So I won't project or speculate on what next year's budget might be, but I think it's entirely fair to say, as this now accelerates this restructure and additional insights generated, that there will be a higher fidelity fit-up profile based on that work. Sandra? Thank you very much. Sandra Erwin of National Defense. I wanted to ask you an LCS. When the Secretary of the Navy negotiated with the shipyards in 2010 to do a dual-source program, there were some significant savings that he worked out. So as you get ready to down-select two single-source, what are some of the potential cost implications? Have you looked into that? Or do you have some thoughts on that? So I think that's work to be done, but it's a great question. It certainly underpins the long-term Navy's strategy of injecting competition and getting savings to the government through competition shipbuilding. I think the competition, it's fair to say, for the down-select, and particularly if you do a block-by for the first frigate ships, is going to drive some significant savings to the department as well. In terms of how, after that initial block-by of frigates, how that plays out in terms of pricing, I won't speculate. But just to say that, as you know, the Navy's approach to acquisition puts a premium on competition, and it's created tremendous value for the taxpayer. Does single-source automatically mean higher cost? I say the question again. Having a single-source instead of a dual-source, wouldn't that potentially increase the cost? I think there's so many factors that I wouldn't just make a blanket statement like that. I would just say that, again, our acquisition approach, and if you look at shipbuilding overall, if you look at the margin shipbuilding, for example, compared to other defense industries, you'll see the value of the way the Navy buys ships through a competitive approach. We have two minutes left for questions. Justin. Hey, Justin, double-day with Inside the Navy. Not much discussed. LCS and I met a couple months ago. Secretary Carter directed the Navy to either maintain or increase key munitions production, but as you said, there's a modest increase in 17 and a pretty big drop-off across the fit-up. So how did you prioritize within that portfolio and how did it ultimately become a billbearer? So if you look at the details of munitions, and we'll take you through some of the details, perhaps, after this session, you'll see there is focusing increases in specific munitions, some of the aviation missiles and tactical tomahawk. And you also see, not in the WPN slash charge, but in the R&D, what I alluded to, strong investment in future munitions, NG law, OASW increment to SM2, the standard missile six as well, you see has a strong commitment in this profile. Larasm has a strong commitment in this profile. So that's essentially the prioritization, but it clearly reflected some of the hard choices in the fiscal pressure as we allocated risk to get the best overall balance. David, final question. Admiral, the Navy was headed to 330,000 N strength. It's now looking 329, and it seems to be going down from there. What drove the change in direction? And I guess what do sailors need to know about their jobs in the future? That's a great question. Thanks for asking that. Sailors need to know that at the deck plate level on the hangar deck of our squadrons, that we sustain, as I talked about here on the slide, the 92% fit, the 95% fill. So at the deck plate level, we have a strong commitment to sustaining the same good manning we have now. And I also mentioned the fact that the officer manning increases as well. The reductions, the main drivers of the N strength reductions that you saw, number one would be the deactivation of carrier wing 14. That's going to be done through natural attrition. Those sailors and those officers will be strongly focused down in making that an ease of transition as they move elsewhere into other squadrons. The other main driver of the N strength reduction was this innovative approach to ready relevant learning. And so it's important to note that that's not billets in units. Those are savings in what's known as the individuals account. So individuals that are in transit, in school houses through this very focused approach on mobile learning, distributed learning. And it's not the old computer based training. It's not clicking through a PowerPoint. It's new content, it's gaining technology, it's use of avatars. It's a way to accelerate getting our sailors to the chief, to getting them to the fleet and to the chief properly trained. And through that innovative approach, pilot program right now continue to incrementally learn we're able to reduce the N strength in this individuals account. So again, the bottom line at the deck plate level, equal or improved posture in terms of manning and through efficiencies and responsible decisions on the proper and best use of resources, we harvested the other N strength reductions. All the time we have for today. Thank you. Thank you.