 Good morning, and I'm sorry I'm a couple of minutes late. I know your time is very valuable, and I appreciate you standing by. It's always great to have an opportunity and sit down to talk with you and about what's going on in the Pacific, or in the Indo-Asia Pacific, my particular air of responsibility. It's been a while since I've been here in Washington, and a lot has happened during that time. We assisted the Philippine government as they dealt with the aftermath of a super typhoon. The Operation Damian and the Joint Task Force that was led by Lieutenant General Whistler, they did an excellent job. It was a multinational operation, and there was a quick transition in that operation to the Armed Forces of the Philippine, and ultimately to the government of the Philippines to be able to continue that recovery. But the effort was, I think, quite successful, and it demonstrates the overall value of working together on HADR-related training and initiatives so that we can respond more quickly and more effectively in these types of things and types of events. And I think it paid big dividends to the things we've been doing in this AOR. As you know, about 80%, I'm told, of all natural disasters happen within that area of responsibility that I look at every day. So being able to respond in that way was a good sign, I think, of our alliances, of our partnerships, and the multilateral training that we're doing together. I also traveled to Thailand, to the Vietnam. We've all been seeing the political unrest in Thailand. But it's important, I think, to highlight that the Thai military has responded favorably in support of their government, a democracy that's working through these challenges. My time talking with both the government and the military leadership highlighted their efforts to maintain peaceful democratic processes, and we hope them all the best. The trip to Vietnam marked the first time that a PAKOM commander has visited there since both of our nations, the president, signed the Comprehensive Partnership here in DC in July of 2012. And we're working closely with the Vietnamese military, and we're looking for opportunities to expand and grow our partnerships and work together, especially when it comes to humanitarian and disaster relief operations. It was clear to me that despite our histories as two countries that we share together, that we today and today will always share many common interests. Maintaining peace and security in the region is foremost in their minds as well as in ours. In fact, the second PAKOM sponsored disaster management center opened Vietnam while I was traveling in country, which is indicative of the type of things that we're doing together. And finally, before I take your questions, I'd like to mention my remarks to the Navy's surface warrior convention, the SNA convention that I spoke at last week. As you may or may not know, I'm a surface warrior as well. I have many years of experience in almost every location around the globe. So it's important to me that at forums such as that, that I address the Navy's future surface warrior leaders, hear them and understand what their concerns are, as well as industry that supports them. Because they will ultimately have to buy, man, train, and equip not only the current force we have, but the force of the future. And they have to be ready to address the growing challenges that they will likely face across the entire Indo-Asia Pacific and the world. The comments I made were not about America's rebalance to the Asia Pacific because that is well on track. We're making the progress from the PAKOM commander's perspective. We are doing the things that we have committed and said we would do to the rebalance. But my comments were about the growing sophistication and the capabilities of today's weapons systems and our changing relative dominance with those systems. The rapid technological advancement of warfare capabilities and the proliferation of these capabilities across the globe will challenge us in the future. And we have to continue to address that. We must also ensure that we invest in the proper mix of defensive and offensive capabilities for our ships. And that's who I was talking to were people that man and equip ships. And that the capabilities that they have are both lethal and dominant when required. And they must continue to strive for that. So with that, I'll stop and take your questions. Associate President, Bill, you want to start us off? Sure. I'm getting to that last point that you made. So you do not think that the U.S. is losing seeding ground or losing ground in its dominance in the Pacific to China? And can you speak a bit about your comments on weapons systems? What weapons systems do you think that China is developing more quickly in the United States at this point? Well, China is only one weapon developer in the world. There's many weapons developers. In fact, I've said over time that the end of Asia Pacific is the most militarized region in the world and where there are, because of growth of economies, because of they have money to invest, because of growing defense requirements by countries, they are all in many ways pursuing the militarization. I mean, they're buying weapons and they're buying 21st century weapons. They are not the same weapons systems that we dealt with 30 years ago. They're in this age. And so when we talk about U.S. relative dominance, maybe the right way to look at this would be after World War II, throughout most of the world, we built a U.S. military that was unequaled in technology. And over time, we've contributed our own selves to the development of militaries and development of defense capabilities for peaceful purposes. And we have moved those technologies to other partners and to allies. And so it only stands to reason that our relative dominance in those technologies and those weapons systems will have diminished over time. That's not something to be afraid of. It's just to be pragmatic about it. And so as we look forward to a world that will continue to have defense challenges and we continue to buy, build and procure systems, we have to think carefully about the types of systems and where we make the most investments so that we maintain the type of edge that military leadership in this country have endured for the last few decades. So it's not just about any one particular country. Admiral, I wonder if you can take us back to that incident between the calipans and the Chinese ship, how long ago it was, weeks ago. Tell us exactly what happened there. How dangerous was that situation? Now, we're likely to see more situations like that, as tensions increase in the East China, South China Sea, between China and the U.S. and also Japan. Yes, well, the incident was widely reported. And I think that it was commented on by the leadership here in the Pentagon as well as by me. And in fact, there was a demars that was sent, that we sent formally to, and the demarses are, those are not, those are fairly routine globally when we want to communicate to someone that we've been really concerned about something that has happened. So in this case, there was an interaction in the international waters, in international airspace that we routinely operate in, and that the Chinese were conducting what they claimed to be carrier operations that they believe had been properly notified. Those notification procedures were a question. And I don't think that the people that were on the calipans, in fact, I'm sure were not aware of any notification of that. At any point in time was the situation dangerous. I wasn't on the bridge of the ship, so I can't tell you how the CEO felt about it. I would probably characterize it as more as unnecessary and probably more and unprofessional. But we have to understand, I think, as we look at this part of the world and we look at the growing number of navies that are operating and the growing number of security concerns that are in this region, we have to expect that militaries are going to have to encounter and operate around each other. And in this case, we have to expect that the U.S. and the Chinese navies are going to interact with each other. So this just highlights to both of us, to both the PLA and to the U.S. military, that we have to do better at being able to communicate with each other in a way that allows us to not lead to miscalculation that won't be productive in the security environment. And so we will continue to talk about this. In fact, we're having, we've had defense officials in Beijing the last two days and I'm sure that they have talked about this. We have a mechanism in place with the Chinese where we meet routinely to talk about maritime incidents is how we interact with each other. So will we see more of these in the future? We will interact more with each other in the future. My hope is that we will learn to interact, continue to learn and to progress in the professionalism that we exhibit towards each other. This is the best way forward. Unprofessional, do you mean unprofessional in the part of that Chinese skipper or just a general sense of unprofessionalness on the part of the Chinese Navy? Well, I don't know if it's unprofessional or whether it was a lack of experience. I mean, one of the things that I were, that I've told my leadership and my sea captains is that when we're operating this area, I mean, first we talk to each other on bridge to bridge telephone, right? Radio telephones to work this out. And we speak in English and other countries don't. They speak, they're speaking, or they speak in English, but they're not speaking in their native language. And so there's an extra calculation you have to figure into what someone's trying to tell you when they're speaking the second or third language that they speak and you're speaking in your primary language. And so we have to take this into consideration to make sure that we have looked at all aspects of this. In the end, the US military, my forces in the Pacific AOR will operate freely in international waters, international airspace. That's the bottom line. We'll operate there. We'll operate professionally and we'll operate peacefully for the purpose of peace. And that's the message to all the militaries that are operating in that region. Thank you. India is going for a massive modernization effort for our forces. One of the complaints which I hear from the Indian defense expert is that the US is not willing to share one of the latest technologies equipment which India wants for defending its country, defending its borders. Do you have to say anything on it? And where do you see India's role in your Asia Pacific Rebalance Strategy? Well, if you go back to the defense guidance or the strategy that was signed out by President Obama, one of the things that I'm directed to do is, as the US government is and the military side is to develop a long-term strategic relationship with India. And we're moving in that direction. And one of the cornerstones of that long-term key relationship is to learn how we go forward or to go figure out how we go forward in many of our procurement areas where we share a similar interest and we share similar capabilities. How do we partner together in those? The systems are different and the Indian government and military recognize that their procurement system is different than our procurement system and that we're working through how to streamline those differences or to make those differences not so apparent so that we can move forward with some of the key technologies and key capabilities that we want to develop. And so I think the road ahead is a good road. I don't think we have a plan, but it will take time. And the second part, what role do you see for India's Rebalance Strategy? Well, I think in the long run, certainly the Indian Ocean and India's role in security and the peaceful Indian Ocean is critical. And we welcome that role. And so to the degree that India chooses to take on that role and to participate with us and with other partners in global security with a central focus on the Indian Ocean, this is a good thing. Admiral, I have a question with regard to those sailors who participated in the disaster relief operation off the coast of Japan three years ago. The Congress directed DOD to conduct research about possible, you know, radiation dose for those sailors. Do you have any specific plan how to conduct these research yet? I'm gonna have to refer you to the Department of the Navy for that. Even though I'm sitting here as an Admiral and these forces were in the command of Paycom at that time that we're looking at this issue, I would refer you to the Department of the Navy. I think they have an ongoing investigation to look at what are the things that need to be looked at with a timeline of how you get to resolution. But my guess is that they'll give you an answer that tells you they have a plan and that they're in execution to look at it. Let's go to Paul. Admiral, possibly from the US News and World Report, going back to China for a second, about a year ago in the wake of China testing their new aircraft carrier, you had said that you didn't fault the Chinese Navy for expanding that it was their responsibility to fit into the global security environment. With all that's happened in China this past year, I wonder if you can give us an update on how you feel about their behavior and whether they're on a path to actually fit into that. Well, certainly as I look globally at China, I think there are some positive aspects of how they're using their military forces in a productive way. They participated in Operation Damian in the Philippines. They provided disaster relief. They're operating, I think, more frequently in multilateral exercises that are being done throughout the region. And as we've talked about, they're planning to come to a rampact, so that's still well on track. If you go into the Gulf of Aden, they're operating further away from home and participating in the security in those particular regions. So I think in that context, and by the way, our relationship, I think our bilateral relationship has been, I would give it a passing grade for the last year. And I would say that because we have been able to continue our mill-to-mill dialogue, our mill-to-mill relationships, and our mill-to-mill exercises together, even though there has been churn in the region, particularly in the local region that's close to China. Now, in regard to their activities in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, I think it's yet to be determined about how that will play out. Ultimately, China needs to be a regional leader. Their military needs to be a regional leader. It needs to coexist in that part of the world with our allies and with our militaries. And we need to work together for the mutual security. But I think they're going to have to work hard to get through some of the issues that territorial disputes they're having with their neighbors. And we don't take sides on the territorial disputes, but we do expect them to be done peacefully. And I think they have to think carefully about the introduction of things like aid diseases like they did in the past and how they go forward with that in the future. And to be open and have a dialogue with people before they do it. Thank you very much. I have two questions. In next month, in the United States and South Korea, we'll take a drill for the key reserve military exercises. North Korea has been asked for this exercise to stop. What is the United States position about that? Well, we don't plan to stop the exercises. The exercises are part of the alliance, a cornerstone of how we train and maintain the alliance. So as long as the people and the government of South Korea and the people and the government of the United States of America want this alliance and there's a threat that appears to continue in North Korea, then this exercises will go on. It shouldn't be alarming. It's not a change. We do these every year. And we're going to continue to do them as long as the risk on the Korea Peninsula persists. One question. Do sudden change in North Korea, South Korea and the United States have any specific plan to do that? I didn't understand the question. Sudden change in North Korea in case of a sudden change in North Korea. In case of a sudden change? You know, we've been doing, as you know, when the officials in South Korea will tell you the same is that we do, as a alliance, have done for years, detail planning for many different types of scenarios of what might unfold on the Korea Peninsula. And one of those would be a rapidly changing situation that would require a stabilization of the Peninsula. So that planning is ongoing. We'll continue to be refined this year and next year and as long as the possibility for provocation or possibility for war on the Peninsula exists. Louis. Sir, on the rebalance to Asia, do you foresee any new deployments that would underwrite that strategy? What we seem to have seen really is the replacement or the rotation of assets with the same capabilities as far. Anything new in mind? Yes, well, I mean, I think if you kind of start from the top of the Asia, northeast Asia, first this year, the Japanese and the U.S. will look at the defense review, which hasn't been done since the 90s. And we will look at what that means for the alliance of the future and what the laydown of forces should be. So that's one thing. The second thing is that we appear to be moving in a positive direction on the Fatima replacement facility in Okinawa, where the landfill was signed and we very much appreciate the support of the Japanese government in moving that forward. And once that happens and that facility is built, that will allow us then the realignment of the marine forces throughout the Asia Pacific in accordance with what you refer to as a DPRI plan that has been briefed to y'all, I think, widely. It will allow them some to relocate to Guam and ultimately some to relocate to Hawaii. And then there's the initiative with the Marines and the Air Force that we are pursuing with our Australian partners as well. So that's kind of on the land domain. We're also looking at the infrastructure that we have together with our allies over in each of our alliance countries to ensure that our shared infrastructure or the infrastructure that they have and that we would partner with them to use is set for the 21st century. So on top of that, we have the additional deployment of LCSs, the first one that we sent, I think kind of on an early timeline, has finished and that deployment has been, I think, overall successful. And that will follow in the number of months once the LCSs are in place into deployments of up to three or four out of Singapore at any particular time. So these are just kind of on the periphery. We're also, I've also asked each of the services to go look at each of my components, service components, to look at how do you maximize the force that we have in being today as it rebalances to the Asia Pacific. So we have initiatives in the Marine Corps. We have initiatives in the Navy, which means LCSs and additional submarines. And I think that long-term we would be looking at the possibility of foreign deploying more maritime assets throughout the theater. Well, the Army, which is kind of new to the Asia Pacific in the last couple of decades, is looking at opportunities of how do you take an Army that is coming after out of Afghanistan and has been in coin operations for the last, basically two decades, and to put them in the Asia Pacific in a meaningful way that allows them to partner with our allies and with our partners and our growing strategic partners in a meaningful way and have them available for crisis-responsive necessary. So there's concepts like Pacific Pathways are being talked about. They're concepts at this point in time, but overall I'm supportive of these initiatives. So we have a lot going on. We've also looked around the edges of things that we do that maybe don't get quite so much splash, but we've looked at maybe re-inlining some resources to the Asia Pacific Center, which is a great venue for us to bring in our partners and our allies, military and civilian leadership to talk about our shared security interests. So that's kind of a nutshell, a few things we're doing, but the plan is on course. Yeah, just on two fronts. On the Korean peninsula, what was behind the decision to increase the number of forces there with that armored unit? And then I have a question about you trying to see it. Yeah, well, the decision to do the rotational armor unit there was not prompted by any particular change in the tactical or strategic environment on the peninsula. It was looked at from a army component perspective is how do you best maintain the capability on the peninsula in the century we're in with the resources that we have in a way that would be most effective support for General Skapperadi and his CFC team there. So it got played out like it was a big strategic move, but in reality, it was just part of the pre-planned decision we'd made in the alliance to make sure we had the most capable forces on the peninsula in the way that we're reflective of the way we rotate, we're increasingly rotating and using forces in this century. And then on these trying to see how would you assess the current state of tensions between Japan and China? How much of a risk is there that a miscalculation of some kind of incident could trigger a conflict? Well, I am concerned. I would say that I think there's any time you have two large powers, two large economic powers, two large military powers that have a disagreement that they're not talking to each other about that has no clear diplomatic end state in sight, that the risk calculation can grow because you will have, in this case, you have primarily maritime security forces that are in and around those contested islands. But those are, in many cases, those are young naval officers or young civilian mariners who are out there gonna making those decisions. So we have to continue to encourage restraint. We have to continue to encourage professionalism. And we have to continue to hope that there will be diplomatic dialogue and a solution to this because it's not productive for the region and it needs to be ultimately resolved. Yes, sir. Thank you very much. For a question about the East China Sea, have you talked to your Chinese counterpart about the ADIZ? How did they respond? Did you send another round of military flights to this area? Thank you. Yeah, the question of where we have, we talked to the Chinese about the ADIZ, the answer to that is yes. The question is, did we know about it before they established it? We're not directly notified. And we certainly were not, the fact that they established an ADIZ, I think is less concerned to me than the way that it was done. It would have been better if it had been announced and had been discussed with the neighbors and with the partners in the region. And it had some caveats inside of the way they established that we fundamentally don't agree with and will not acknowledge. So our operations have not changed. And we will continue to operate in international airspace and do our operations just as we do around anywhere else in the world, not just in this part of the world. Admiral Collin-Clarke, Breaking Defense. Did the Chinese test a hypersonic vehicle and how would you assess the strategic impact of such a test? Well, I didn't see the test, but I'm told that they tested it and you all reported it pretty widely. So I believe there's credibility in your reporting. The Chinese, as other nations, are pursuing hyperglide, hypersonic technologies. And so the fact that they are testing, I think this is just one of many, as I talked about earlier in my remarks, this is just one of many highly technical militarized systems that, whether the Chinese are developing or we're developing them or Europeans are developing, that will continue to complicate the security environment with high technology systems. And we will have to figure them into the calculation of how we're going to maintain a peaceful security environment in the future. I think we have time for one more question, sir. Hi, Bagan Moranian from Defense News. Good to see you again, sir. Two-part question. First, are you convinced that the Chinese, in the event of an incident, whether it's an incident between Japan and China, for example, or between us in the future, Calvin's incident that ends up somewhat more sporty, that they're actually going to answer the phone and they have the crisis response mechanisms in place because one of your predecessors, going back about 12 years ago, found nobody was really answering the telephone when something really bad happened? And I have one follow-up question after that. Well, I think you'd have to ask the Chinese on the PRC if they're going to answer the phone or not. What do you call, do they answer the phone now? Yeah, I would say that both in the region and in our mill-to-mill relationship that we need to move forward to allow that type of direct dialogue in crisis situations. We've said this on many occasions. I know that Chairman Densey, Secretary Hagel, and at that level that there are an occasional attempt and opportunities to have dialogue at that level. And would that work at the time of a crisis? We would hope it would work. But internal to the PAKOM AOR, I don't have the ability to pick up the phone and talk directly to a PLA or PLA Navy admiral or general at the time of a crisis. And we need to work on that. So we've talked about it, but things take time. The other question is, it seems as though we repeatedly are surprised when things like the aid has happened. Are we, on our part and with our allies, doing enough to imagine what next is coming out of Beijing and figure where we need to be collectively so that it's a little bit more of a joined up response because there has been a little bit of criticism in how the response was? Are we doing enough to think ahead as to what, frankly, if you look out there, Beijing is fairly logically and consistently trying to achieve over the long term? Well, I guess if we keep you surprised, we're probably not doing enough. But we're working at it. I don't think we were necessarily surprised by the aid is, as you I think that's a mischaracterization. I think we anticipated that there could have been. I mean, that there were some signals, at least in some open press, that there might have been an opportunity for an aid is to be established. I think we were a little bit surprised by the way it was announced and the manner it was, how fast it was sprung on the region. And the fact that it was an aid is that it just kind of was directed at one central issue, not just the general defense of someone's territorial airspace. Sir, I think we reached our time. I don't know if you want to make one more. I'll take one more. Since I was late, that's a. Yes, sir. Thank you. You were so worried about the North Korea and their unexpected behavior. So how do you evaluate their WM, the capability, and their young leader? Well, I think that the young leader is, for me, is very difficult to determine. In fact, unpredictable, I believe, is the best way I would say. I think that his behavior, at least the way it's reported and the way we see it in senses, makes you would make me wonder whether or not he is always in the rational decision-making mode or not. And this is a problem. It is a problem because of the continued nuclearization of the country, the continued pursuit of missile technologies, which threaten not only the peninsula but threaten the region, and eventually now will threaten the globe if it's not constrained. So in the end, we must demand the total denuclearization of North Korea. It's in the interest of not only South Korea and the United States, but of all the people in the region, and now in the best interest of everybody in the world. So the way ahead with the new leader there is not clear to me. But I think that it is a potentially very dangerous place. Thank you very much.