 Okay, good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to this session. You saved the last and make it the best, so we hope this is a very good session for in the next 90 minutes or so. Before we begin, the QR code is up on the screen there. If you go ahead and scan that and want to propose any questions to the panelists, would be a good opportunity to do that when you want to. Let me go ahead and get started. This is Rick Session TA, right? It's the Odyssey of an Export for Advanced Reactors. My name is Pete Hadockhorst, the Export Control and Nonproliferation Branch Chief at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and it truly is a great pleasure to chair this panel on an important topic that will help us navigate the nuclear future. As NRC implements the Advanced Reactor Implementation Plan and approaches small modular reactor design and licensing, a very robust and engaging industry develops, designs, and submits applications and establishment and expansion of both domestic and international partnerships. Export Controls, though not as extensive as the domestic programs, enables the spread of technology and the facilities and is integral part of the transformation within the civilian nuclear world. This panel of experts will discuss how nuclear export processes work, focus towards advanced reactor development. They will highlight regulatory, policy, and practical considerations for export control to facilitate civilian nuclear trade while still maintaining high nonproliferation standards. Now I'd like to spend a few minutes to introduce our panel members. The first member I'd like to introduce is Mr. Mark Campbell to my left. Mark is a Chief Operating Officer at Alera Logistics. Mr. Campbell is a Logistics Executive with over 20 years of experience, managing high consequence logistic projects, coordinating international nuclear, radioactive material, and MISCS waste shipments. Our second panel member is Mr. Barry Miller. Barry is a Senior Policy Analyst in the Office of International Programs at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Barry has over 19 years of experience with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a safety inspector, a reactor rulemaking and licensing, and recently Barry has been supporting export policy issues, negotiating agreements of cooperation, and a liaison with the Nuclear Suppliers Group. To Barry's left is Ms. Jessica Norlis, a Foreign Affairs Specialist at the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. Ms. Norlis' responsibilities include nonproliferation policy with a focus on nuclear cooperation agreements and their associated administrative arrangements, nuclear material accountancy issues, export control, and fuel bank initiatives. And finally, on the far left is Mr. Jonathan Simons. Jonathan is the Assistant Director of Teleforensic Center at the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Laboratories and Scientific Services. Mr. Simons has extensive experience supporting federal law enforcement in matters pertaining to import and export of radioactive material and equipment and radiation detection. Each of our panelists will provide approximately a 10-minute overview, at which time we will then open it up for questions to all panel members. So a little bit, again, on questions and answers. This is how you can submit a question virtually, and that's on the screen as we speak for those who are not able to attend in person. And again, I will put up the QR code, so if you are interested in any questions during the presentation, we would be happy to entertain and address those questions as we go forward. So now at this time, I'd like to introduce Mr. Campbell for his opening remarks. Thanks, Peter. Good afternoon, everybody. Lots of friends here, lots of people I have not met yet as well, which is wonderful. That means that this nuclear community is growing and evolving. As Peter said, I think the goal of this session is to have an open forum. I'm going to go quickly through my slides with the hope of having a conversation with all of you if you have questions for us. So if you don't know me, who am I and why am I here? My name is Mark Campbell. Chief Operating Officer at Allar Logistics. As Peter said, we're a high-consequence logistics firm, which means we just move dangerous goods, very complicated materials all over the world. I was asked to be here today because I have direct knowledge and experience with shipping a lot of the complicated products that are going to move in order to export advanced reactor technology. In the coming years, many evolutions are going to be needed to the nuclear logistics cycle in order to meet the growing demands of the advanced reactor community. These first few slides just give you a little bit of a snapshot of experience, which allows me the opportunity to give both commercial entities and regulators some guidance on the challenges that I've seen and the future will bring this community. Defense logistics, I don't know what happened to that picture. Anyway, defense logistics, we support radioactive material shipments for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and occasionally we're asked to support nuclear material shipments on DOD assets. Front end nuclear cycle, this is the start of the beginning for the advanced reactor technology group. Currently, we ship enriched uranium hexafluoride all over the world, enriched DO2 shipments, fresh fuel elements, we get involved in spent fuel projects. I am on the ANSI N14 Standards Committee, and we are active members for the World Nuclear Transport Institute and the World Nuclear Association. LEU, while most people associate LEU with commercial reactor fuel, I'm specifically talking about research and test reactor fuel, because this is the community that already uses higher assay material, in most cases up to 20% U-235, and this directly correlates to what we're looking at for the advanced test reactor community. HEU, HEU is still utilized by some reactors, and while the research reactor community with the support from NNSA is actively working on conversion of these reactors from high enriched uranium to low enriched, this conversion takes time, and it has to be done without harming the reactor's ability to create medical isotopes, which are used millions of times a year all over the world. Exporting SMRs requires obtaining regulatory approval from both the exporting country and importing country. Exporting SMRs can be a complex process that involves meeting safety and security standards for both countries and regulatory agencies. For example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission does not allow a foreign entity to be a licensee for exporting nuclear material. If you're a foreign company, you will need to seek out a U.S. entity who can act as your agent for export licensing purposes. These are a couple of examples where my company took the lead as a licensee for the export of LEU and HEU material. As I said before, we actively support the nuclear fuel cycle, and in order to be ready for the HALU community, almost the entire fuel cycle has to adapt. This starts with commercial enrichment, which now must be licensed and approved to up to 20% U-235. The DOE and the NRC are actively working with companies like Centrus Energy and Urenco to hopefully come up with a commercial feasibility process. Once this UF-6 is produced and enriched, it must be transported. Only two packages for UF-6 are being produced and tested by a Rano group, and they will be capable of shipping an assay up to 10% for one of them and up to 20% for the other. From there, the UF-6 will go to a fuel producer and convert it into fuel. This means that current fuel fabrication facilities and new fuel fabrication facilities being built will need to undergo licensing efforts for higher assay material as well as greater quantities. And finally, the end product must be moved to production or a reactor site, and this requires a fresh fuel package. Several of the current fresh fuel packages in existence are already seeking licensed amendments with the NRC, and new designs are also in the works as well. So it doesn't matter for shipping a reactor vessel, dual use technology items associated to SMR, flammable zirconium powder for cladding, or HALO fuel itself. The entire process for the SMR export is strictly controlled by Department of Commerce, the NNSA, Homeland Security, and the NRC. While the logistics community works hard to catch up to the wishes of the HALO community, it's important for you to research what you're up against and to become involved. Start to seek packages that you think will work for your product. Start to talk about routings and start to talk to regulators and find out what kind of roadblocks you might run into or where you might also need to be speaking. Otherwise, you'll end up talking to someone like me when it's too late, and I have to tell you that everything's delayed because you didn't get the correct permission or license where your routing isn't going to work. Thank you, everybody. Thanks, Mark. And now I'll invite Barry Miller to the podium. Thanks, Pete. Good afternoon. So, yeah, my name is Barry Miller. I work for the NRC. I'm in the Export Controls and Non-Proliferation Branch, and I'll be talking about the NRC's role in the odyssey of an export for advanced reactors. And spoiler alert, our role is as the licensing authority. So we do the licensing for the exports, which really Mark spoiled that already. So one of the concepts I want to address to start out with is, and Pete mentioned up front when he introduced me, I worked at the NRC a long time. I've worked on our domestic side. And export licensing is different, right? In the NRC, our Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation licenses nuclear reactors. Our Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards licenses radioisotopes for medical or industrial use. And a lot of that licensing is focused on safety and security. For export licensing, it's rooted in non-proliferation. And so what does that mean? It's non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. So the idea is, when we export something outside of the United States, we want to make sure that the entity that receives it, in whatever country that might be, does not ultimately divert it or somehow use it to develop a nuclear weapon. That is really the foundational principle behind our export controls. Now certainly we care about safety and security, but much of our licensing criteria are rooted on that principle. So without further ado, I'll touch on what the NRC's licensing jurisdiction is. As Mark mentioned, there are multiple government agencies that get involved with export controls. So for the NRC, we license, under 10 CFR Part 110, export of nuclear material. And that can be natural or enriched uranium. It's also plutonium and thorium. Nuclear facilities, and so that's nuclear reactors themselves, but also fuel cycle facilities, both front end and back end fuel cycle facilities, and the equipment for those facilities. And then other nuclear related materials such as radioisotopes, moderator materials such as deuterium or graphite for nuclear end use and radioactive waste. And so touching quickly on the other US government agencies that do have jurisdiction, and I know my fellow panelists, Jessica, with the Department of Energy, I think she'll touch on the Part 810, which they control exports of nuclear technology and assistance. So that's the intangible things, intangible technology, whereas the NRC is exporting the tangible things you can touch, equipment and materials. And then the Department of Commerce has jurisdiction that doesn't overlap with the NRC, but meets up with the NRC's jurisdiction for equipment and material for so-called dual use commodities. So maybe a pump that could be used in a nuclear power plant, but could also be used in some other kind of industrial facility. Oh, and actually, let me go back, because there's an important concept here, my bottom slide. A few years back, we asked ourselves, if we got an advanced reactor export application tomorrow, whether it's for a reactor itself, a piece of equipment for an advanced reactor or fuel, would we be ready to license it under our existing framework? And one of my colleagues who I believe is here in the audience led that effort. And we ultimately concluded that, yes, the framework is generally in place to license it today. There's potentially some clarifications that we could make, but by and large, we feel like our existing export control framework can handle the export of advanced reactors. So let me see. Yes, so I'll touch a little bit about the NRC's export licensing review a little bit. And really, it's all laid out in Part 110. But when you boil it down, the different, not all exports are created equal. Some have more criteria you have to meet to license it than others. But it's really based, in my view, on four fundamental questions. What is it? What's the commodity you're exporting? How much of it do you have? Where is it going? So what country and what entity in that country? And what will it be used for? What is its end use? And so based on the answers of those questions, and you can kind of navigate your way through Part 110, it defines how, what level of requirements need to be met. And certainly we could go down a rabbit hole on some of those things. And maybe we'll get to that in the Q&A, but I won't touch on it too much here. I'll quickly mention the two types of NRC export licenses. There are general licenses where those are in the regulations, the criteria are set, and there's no additional application or approval from the NRC. If you meet the criteria and the regulations, then you can export under that general license. It's generally small quantities that aren't considered proliferation significant. And then a specific license, which is the more traditional, an applicant submits an application, the NRC reviews it. And if approved, then you get a document that is the license, and I think Mark had some pictures of those. And so quickly, I want to make sure I leave time for Q&A and my fellow panelists. The NRC's export, yeah, the licensing process. So step one, and I'll just walk through the practical aspects, a prospective exporter submits an application in the NRC, and that's it in all its glory. I mean, there's like two or three pages to it, but the bulk of the information is that NRC Form 7. It's not necessarily a lot of information. And so that's one practical aspect I want to any prospective exporters in the audience. If there's additional context or different information that helps us understand your export and the situation better, slap a cover letter on that NRC Form 7 and tell us about it. Give us those details, because it helps us understand it better. And if we send it around for certain levels of review that go to other government departments and agencies, it helps them understand it better, which can facilitate our review. And if there's questions before you even submit it, we welcome pre-application interactions, give us a call, send us an email. We understand some of this can be hard to navigate, and we're happy to talk to you about it. I'll touch quickly in this middle bullet on the different levels of review. And I believe my DOE colleague here will touch a little bit on foreign government non-proliferation assurances. But as part of the process for many exports, we actually go to the foreign government that's going to receive that export and ask for their assurances that they'll apply certain non-proliferation principles. And I think Jessica might touch on those, or we can touch on those in the Q&A. And then in increasing levels of review, there's executive branch review. So that is when certain exports require us to send the application to the Department of State. They'll send it around to other departments and agencies in the government. And they'll review it to determine whether or not that export will be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States and make an inimicality determination. And the highest level of review is commission review. So some exports require the NRC staff, after getting executive branch reviews, to send it up to our commissioners to vote on whether or not to approve that export. And the important note at the bottom of this slide is that our regulations in Part 110, as they're currently written today and have been for many years, actually explicitly say that all exports involving advanced reactors currently require both commission level and executive branch level review. So that is the highest level of review. So just want to make sure everyone keeps that in mind. And that highest level review essentially means that things can take a little bit more time. And I'll touch on this slide quickly. How do civil nuclear cooperation agreements fit in? I believe my DOE colleague may touch on this. But these are what are colloquially known as 123 agreements. They are government-to-government agreements that the United States enters into with another country and they put legal obligations for nonproliferation principles. But for certain exports for the NRC to license it, a 123 agreement is required. And so I list here the types of exports that do require a 123 agreement and then the types of exports that do not. Even if an export does not require a 123 agreement, there's still other requirements that still have to be met. So it's not like it's a general license all of a sudden. But there is a tiered approach within Part 110 to how all these exports apply. And so lastly, I will just, this is just a plug again to reach out to us. If you're not sure, you have questions. You can email us at ip.resource.nrc.gov. Now that IP does not stand for intellectual property, which is more in DOE's wheelhouse for the intangible technology, but it stands for International Programs Resource at nrc.gov. So with that, I will turn it over to my next panelist. Thank you, Peter. Thank you, Barry. And now we'll turn it over to Jessica Norlis. Thank you, Peter. My name is Jessica Norlis, and my name is Jessica Norlis, and I'm coming from the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration. I specifically work in the Office of Nonproliferation Policy in the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Program. And the purpose of our program is where we say that nonproliferation intersects with civil nuclear commerce. So in that, we have two sub-programs, which we call Part 810, and then we have the one-two-three agreements program. So I'm going to touch on the roles that DOE and NSA has with respect to exports of nuclear exports. The first part is the Part 810. So it's presumptuously that if you're a U.S. vendor, it's Part 810 is what allows you to transfer or export U.S. unclassified nuclear technology or assistance to a foreign end-user pursuant to Section 57B of the Atomic Energy Act. And then the other side of what we support is the one-two-three agreements. And on behalf of the Secretary of Energy, it provides for the statutorily mandated technical assistance and concurrence for the negotiation of proposed one-twenty-three agreements that are led by the Department of State. And as a follow-on to those one-two-three agreements, we're responsible for leading the negotiation and implementation of what we call administrative arrangements. So I'm going to just touch a little bit on Part 810. And so that is like the first step. If you're a U.S. vendor, it's the first consideration. If you're getting involved in considering new markets out there, this is where you have your intangible. What Barry had mentioned, the intangibles. We are responsible as the regulators of transferring that technology. You don't need a one-twenty-three in place to make those transfers happen. So those are things you can get going in finding a foreign partner that you, a foreign company or a foreign business partner that you would like to work with. Those are things you can do ahead of time. And that's the part of our office that you'll be, that you interact with. So we have a part of that you're interacting because we're the regulator when it comes to technology, however, to provide transparency when it comes to actually exporting the things and stuff, we're going to show you the transparency of what happens behind the scenes once you submit an application to the NRC. But with the Part 810 authorization, it requires, the U.S. persons are required to gain authorization from the Secretary of Energy just for the unclassified technology. And that's things that include blueprints, consulting services. Those are the things of those nature. And some of these transfers are generally authorized, and some of them require specific authorization. So if you have any questions about Part 810, there's an email address Part 810 at nnsa.doe.gov where you can get more information about Part 810 transfers. So on the other hand, we have Section 123, which is authorized by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. It allows the executive branch to enter into agreements for cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Shorthand we call that 123 agreements. It provides the legal framework for the significant civil nuclear commerce for exports of, generally speaking, nuclear material equipment and major components. Barry in his slide had some specificity of what's authorized by or licensed by the NRC. We'll just say it's the things and stuff of reactors and fuel for those reactors. And what's required by the Atomic Energy Act is that they contain nine nonproliferation requirements such as peaceful use, safeguards, consent rights over enrichment and reprocessing and storage and transfers. So if you wanted to export reactor or fuel for that reactor today, you're allowed to do that for 23. We have 23, 123 agreements enforced. We have the URATOM 123, which covers the 27 member states. And most recently, we brought the Mexico 123 into force last November. So as of today, we have 23 potential, you know, you can potentially send your advanced reactor or fuel to those countries. Oops, sorry. It's jumping around. Okay. So, sorry about this thing is sticking. So once we have the 123 enforced, DOE and NSA is responsible for implementation. So the way we do that is we have a follow on arrangement called administrative arrangement and it describes the procedures that the government authorities that would be, like I said, DOE and NSA and then the counterpart foreign government authority, you know, it describes how we will effectively implement the provisions of the 123 agreement. It includes, and this is the part where it helps, it supports NRC and their licensing. It describes communications, which also includes requesting government insurances. It also has provisions for accounting principles and reporting what we track or obligations or commitments on the material and equipment that have been transferred. And it also has a requirement of annual inventory reporting. So the accountancy of the material and the equipment that has been transferred within that calendar year. Okay. Okay. So this is my last slide. So with regards to communication reporting, like I said, DOE and NSA's role with our counterpart government authority is to get these government assurances. Essentially, these assurances, we have the foreign government counterpart confirm that the nuclear material or item that they're going to receive will be subject to all the terms and conditions of that 123 agreement. And they also confirm that the recipient is authorized for the use and possession of that nuclear material or item. Then we exchange a number of notifications regarding the shipment and confirmation of receipt of things that have been supplied. So if you're also the facility on record from a nuclear accounting purpose, you would provide those details of your shipment to NEMIS, so the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguard System. So you would still follow the reporting regulations for that if you're considered the facility of record, which sometimes is different than what maybe Mark Elara is the applicant on the NRC Form 7. So they're the applicant, but they're not necessarily the facility on record who has the actual, who's actually supplying the material or the equipment. So that's something to note. And then for us to fulfill our international reporting commitments, we rely on NEMIS, which has all the facility reported data, and they help aggregate all that information and help support us in meeting our international reporting commitments. And just to note that, you know, exports for advanced reactors and the nuclear fuels are expected to still follow the same existing communication and reporting procedures that we have now. So that concludes my presentation and look forward to any Q&As that we may have afterwards. Thank you. Thanks, Jessica. And now I'll turn it over to Jonathan for our final presentation. Thanks, Pete. Okay. So I'm Jonathan Simone's. I work with U.S. Customs and Border Protection Laboratories and Scientific Services. We're the technical wing of CBP. And I'm here today to talk to you about CBP's role in the export of a nuclear commodity. So CBP is one of the world's largest law enforcement organizations. We have over 60,000 uniformed officers that work at our 328 ports of entry dealing with varieties of issues. And an export of a commodity like this is just one example of the types of items that they deal with on a regular basis. One of the mission priorities of CBP is to facilitate the lawful trade and travel. And as we're located at the ports of entry on our border, we're the stewards of our nation protecting both what's coming into the country as well as what's going out. And the officers have to become knowledgeable on the regulations of other agencies, whether that's Department of State, Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, and Department of Commerce. Now while CBP enforces these regulations, ultimately if you have specific questions, it's best if you go to those specific agencies on the license requirements. One resource for that is the Department of Energy, sorry, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, BIS. There's a website where you can go and look that up depending on what it is that you're trying to export. You can go to the ports of entry and speak with officers on specific questions related to that. However, most of the time they're going to reach out to subject matter experts, subject matter experts such as the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Excus Command Center or within CBP, an office like myself, Laboratories and Scientific Services. There aren't experts in all types of exports, and especially if this is the first time you're doing an export like this, there's going to be more questions than there otherwise would be. So many first-time exporters work with a customs broker, and the broker, they make shipments with a carrier, transports electronic export information through the automated export system. What is that information? What does that look like? So that's, you know, what is the item that's being exported? Where is it going? What kind of value does it have? What license requirements are there for this commodity, in this case, advanced reactors? And when that's transmitted, it's important that it's transmitted correctly if things are not correct that can cause issues down the line. You can look at the specific filing procedures for that in 15 CFR 30.14. One of the biggest takeaways when I was preparing to give this talk to you today, speaking with our officers at work with the Exus Command Center, is communication. And I think you've heard that today with the others as well. Barry mentioned, you know, have a cover letter already talking about your export ahead of time. So when you're interfacing with the port of entry with the officers, you've got something to give them that tells a story about what, you know, what you've done already, what licenses have been issued, what it is you're exporting, you know, if hazmat is involved, such as for fuel for the reactor, you know, what goes along with that. And you want to do this ahead of time, you know, typically weeks if not months ahead of time. For the officers to work through the system, to go through Exus Command Center and reach back to the respective agencies, whether it's Department of Energy, the NRC, to find out if there's license determinations that need to be made, CBP will verify this independently. Even if you submit license copies, it's not taken at face value. All that is verified with the respective agencies prior to the shipment being exported. So it's important to begin that early. As I mentioned, you know, one good practice would be to have a cover letter along with those materials that you're submitting. Much of that information is going to be submitted electronically, but having it available for the officers to forward on to other subject matter experts. Let's say you've went through this process, there's all the boxes have been checked, and you're moving forward with the export. There are other things that can happen the day of the shipment. There could be issues with the storage of it at the port, concerns with, especially if this is the first time you've been exporting this type of commodity at that port of entry, they may be concerned with officer safety. And so because of this, it's very important that you have points of contact that can be reached 24-7. Maybe this is being exported over the weekend on a Sunday, and you're subject matter expert that usually your go-to person, they work weekdays. They have to be available because otherwise there can be delays in the shipments. Another important consideration, especially over the past year with different executive orders related to exports, is to stay current on changes with regards to sanctions or restrictions for exports. The example I have here is an exporter goes through the license determination process and finds that a license is not required. They think that's great, awesome, we're moving forward. But then the experience delays, and as a result, when the export eventually comes ready to go out, now a license is required, and it can't go anywhere until that condition's met. We have additional questions on exports. The CBP has an excellent website talking about the requirements, and I encourage you to go there as a great starting point, along with the other elements that I talked about, speaking with the export teams at the ports of entry, where you believe you may be exporting it. Thanks. All right, thank you Jonathan, and I want to thank all the panel members for their opening remarks, and at this point in time we do have a lot of questions to go through, and I'd like to start to propose those questions to the panel. So this first question is for all panel members. In anticipation of an increase in advanced reactor exports, can you share information about the challenges that you anticipate in implementing export controls for these exports? So I'll start with you, Mark. I will say that I don't implement export controls, I'm just required to follow them all the way through. But do I anticipate problems? I always do. I always anticipate problems. And I have to reiterate what my fellow panelists here said, especially Jonathan, is talk to them early, talk to them frequently. They're not going to hide anything from you, they're not going to try to send you down the wrong path. You don't want to put your head down and hope things go through, they catch everything. So it's super important that you spend the time to do things right and do your due diligence. There's going to be plenty of problems associated to exporting SMR technology because there's plenty of problems in exporting all nuclear material, all radioactive material. So that's not going to change. We're going to have the same enormity of carrier denials. We're going to have the same problems associated to flyovers or countries of restrictions or anything that we currently have to deal with. The carrier denials are a killer to somebody like me and somebody like you as well because a lot of it is based off public perception or misinformation, unfortunately. That's just my opinion. Thanks, Mark. Let's move to Barry and I'd ask the speakers to get close to the microphone as much as you can. Thanks. Sure. Hopefully that's, can you hear me well enough? Oh no, is that working? So yeah, no, that's an interesting question. I know I said in my presentation, we looked at our framework and we feel that we're prepared by and large for advanced reactor exports from a licensing perspective. I think the potential challenges are maybe two things. There are new, for some of the advanced reactor designs, there are new vendors who maybe didn't traditionally work in the nuclear reactor, nuclear power industry, and so they may not be familiar with the export control requirements. This just goes to the point that Mark just made and Jonathan is like, engage all aspects of the process for an export, whether that's the regulator, your transporter customs early and often and ask questions, especially if you're not familiar with the framework. So that could potentially be a challenge, I guess I would say, for newcomers. And I think the second thing I would say is some of these advanced reactors have interesting potential deployment strategies, right, if there's a transportable reactor. If there's something that's built in a factory, fueled in a factory, but then put on a barge and transported somewhere else, you have to think about safeguards and how that's in. So I didn't get into my presentation exactly about our licensing criteria, but IAEA safeguards will have to be applied to reactors and nuclear material. So how do you ensure safeguards and certainly IAEA is in charge of verifying safeguards in accordance with whatever country's safeguards agreement. But also for nuclear reactors and for nuclear material, another licensing criteria for us is physical protection in accordance with an international standard that's in CIRC 225, revision five. So I think us as a US government having confidence that those licensing criteria can be met for some of these potentially unique deployment strategies could potentially be a challenge in thinking through some of those. So I would definitely encourage vendors to be thinking through those issues now. Thank you. Thanks Barry. Jessica, did you want to weigh in on this question? Yes. Speaking from the Department of Energy, I'm just going to focus on our part 810 regulation. So we've been fortunate to this date that we've been able to adequately control the transfer of advanced reactor technologies without a change to our regulations. But of course, if anything, if anything changes, we would assess and make any modifications. But like I said, we're able to be sufficient where we are now without a change to our regulations. And I also want to give a shout out if you hadn't had a chance to go by the booth, the framework for advanced reactors, the NSG part 810 booth that's out in the foyer. I think it's an opportunity to get some valuable information of the brochures that are out there and the representatives who can probably answer some questions about the framework for advanced reactors from an NSG and a DOE part 810 perspective. So thank you. Thanks Jessica. Jonathan? All right. Thanks. Yeah, I'm probably going to mostly echo what Mark and Barry had to say as well as some of what I talked about in my talk. Mainly as far as what kind of challenges, it goes back to communication and getting ahead of it, communicating with the port ahead of time that way that if there's any concerns about the commodity that can be addressed, the storage of it on site, how it's being transported, any changes they have to make to operations when it's actually exporting the port of entry and those types of things. So the more proactive you are, I think that these challenges will be less, especially the second time, the third time that these activities happen. The first time, there's always growing pains, things that people don't think about. But I think as we move forward, there'll be less of those. Thanks Jonathan. The next question, let's see, yeah, Mark, this is specifically for you and it's, what is the role of the World Nuclear Transport Institute? And as a member of this institute, what are the biggest challenges to the fuel cycle shipments? That's a good question. World Nuclear Transport Institute is, it's a technical working group, that's the oil, I'll frame it, it's, I truly enjoy it because it's, in most industries, you have a lot of, I guess, groups that get together and it always turns into sales. This is not that. This is a community of experts that try to solve problems. We are actively trying to solve the problems that currently face the nuclear industry as well as planning out for future technologies as well. And for the second question was, what are the biggest challenges to fuel cycle shipments? We're having to take a complete new look at basically every package that's in existence. Having to spend an enormous amount of money, have to redo safety analysis reports. We have to vet these with the NRC and we have to vet these with foreign countries and we have to find out what foreign countries will allow and we'll, and like I said before, we already have these problems with the nuclear fuel cycle and to add new technologies and not just new technologies but multiple new technologies which utilize different fuel forms, different elements, require different packagings. All of these are gonna really push us to have to be reactive and hope, and also honestly we'll have to, we'll be pushing the NRC to be reactive too because they're ultimately the ones along with the DOT that have to sign off on these packages and if they don't, if they don't get signed off on, nothing moves, simple as that. Thanks Mark. Let's see, the next question is for really all panelists but I know that Barry and Jonathan provided a lot of good insights but the question is, what would be the good practice from each of your organizations related to the export of advanced reactors? I'll start with you on the end, Jonathan, even though you hit upon it on your presentation, so thanks. Yeah, I'm trying to think if there's anything else that I didn't hit on in my talk. Yeah, I mean nothing's immediately coming to mind but maybe through the answers of the others maybe I'll come to something. Okay, thanks Jonathan. Jessica? I think Jonathan kind of hit on it, it's kind of a communication amongst the applicants and then even for us, DOE, the foreign government about what's happening in civil nuclear cooperation on their end so I think it's just a lot of information sharing about what's happening out there in the world and technologies and just in the civic space. Thanks Jessica. Barry, did you want to add anything? Yeah, no, I think I guess I would just reiterate the same, you know, talk to us early and often. I think, you know, sometimes the jurisdictional line between NRC and commerce can be difficult. We use this concept called especially designed or prepared for use in a nuclear reactor, for example, and that's something the NRC would cover. You know, those words can, they come directly from originally the NPT, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We recognize that some of these things can seem subjective, so if you have questions, just yeah, reach out to us early and often. Thanks. Thanks Barry. Mark, did you want to add anything? Yeah, just a quick comment related to primarily I guess the NRC and NSA and that's to remind them especially for the SMR community who wants to put this technology all over the world. We're talking about what, 193 countries and we have 123 agreements with 27 of them. You know, it's a pretty finite market. It leaves out a lot of the countries that probably need the technology the most and I know that a lot of it is about safety and security and safeguards and transfer of nuclear technology but keep that in mind it's going to be critical and a good practice to be paying attention to that stuff. Thanks Mark. This next question deals with foreign government assurances and the question is what are some challenges or impacts that can occur when obtaining foreign government assurances and I'd like to go to Jessica and then Barry and Mark. Thank you Peter. So as I mentioned earlier we have DOE and NSA has an administrative arrangement that has a procedure that lists our working level contacts date for the day to day implementation so that's how we're able to reach out and get foreign government assurances and so on a good day where we have a working relationship we're able to send an email with a formal request and get a response back in a reasonable time but then we come across some situations where we may be working with a country where we don't have an administrative arrangement with and we may have to go through the local foreign embassy and that person doesn't know much about nuclear and doesn't know where to where for their job to even start to where they need to contact back at their home country so there can be delays on they may not know the process and who to reach out back at their home country to get confirmation from the end user so that has been a challenge sometimes and what may be an impact with the future of advanced reactors is that right now we have pretty routine exports and we know who the end user are and our foreign partner knows who the end user are and they they know exactly who to reach out but it may come some challenges where it might be a new company that no one's familiar with our partner government may not be familiar with and it may be some challenges in reaching out to get an affirmative answer from that end user so I think those could be some possible challenges when you're looking at or looking at some advanced reactors with new companies out there so I think that's what I probably perceived thank you thanks Jessica Barry yeah no and actually I think that's a good tagging on to the last question a good practice is in something to notice yeah yeah sometimes we have difficulty when I say we collectively the US government because do we often leads on requesting the foreign government assurances getting those assurances from the foreign government so to the extent that if you as an exporter have a customer in that foreign country you could suggest to that customer that they engage their own government to respond back to the United States on those assurances and so that can also be something where you can we where you can help your own case and trying to obtain those foreign government assurances and maybe if I can because I don't know if we really touched on what those assurances usually are and so if their assurances so they're non-proliferation assurances basically they're assuring us and if for example if it's if it's an export that requires assurances under the 123 agreement it's that the government is saying when we receive this export we will put it under the legal obligations of this 123 agreement and what are those legal obligations well there's requirements in the atomic energy act for what every 123 agreement has to have and those include things like the foreign government giving us assurances that it will be peaceful use that they will not re-export what they receive without getting our permission first they are they will apply IAEA safeguards in the case of you know if we want to use HALU as an example they will apply a physical protection to that material they will not reprocess that material and so those are the sorts of assurances that they give us that they will put it under the agreement and that agreement is legally binding and that's what helps give us the assurance that we can issue that export and have confidence that it will stand up to those non-proliferation principles. Thank you. Thanks Barry for that explanation and details so Mark did you have anything that you wanted to share from your perspective? I don't tip I'm not the one seeking foreign assurances but I can tell you that you know if we if if you're seeking a license that requires those executive approvals or committee approvals it adds a lot of time it adds a lot of time so prepare for that but it's absolutely important and the NRC is very open about the process and will typically guide you through it very well as they have me. Yeah thanks Mark and thanks panel members. The next question is really for Jessica does a 123 agreement requirements apply to the export of advanced reactor technology? Can you repeat that question please? Sure does a 123 agreement apply to the export of advanced reactor technology? If we're talking about technology and itself the intangible you don't need a 123 agreement to transfer technology you just need a part 810 authorization so I just want to make that clear. You don't need a 123 to begin the process of well you know for U.S. vendors I want to reiterate that part 810 is the first consideration when considering the market so you do not need a 123 for the transfer of nuclear technology. Yeah thanks Jessica. Let's see the next question. Okay for Barry. For a U.S. reactor company that has offices overseas are the requirements for specific licenses applicable when they are deploying in that overseas country? If I understand the question correctly so part 110 export control requirements apply to persons and person is defined within part 110 U.S. persons so if there is a subsidiary company in that foreign country yeah the export control requirements would still apply because you're leaving U.S. borders and going into a foreign country's borders. I hope that answered yeah. Yeah that's exactly right I mean that's exactly where it's coming from correct so let's see the next question all right well it looks like it's a banner day for the NRC. What's the biggest bottleneck at the NRC export control review? Are there areas where procedure ties NRC hands and delays the process? I think the answer is it depends. I might disagree with the premise that there's necessarily a bottleneck sometimes things just take time when you have multiple you know take for example something that's a commission level review right that means it also has executive branch level review so we send that to the Department of State they send it around to a number of other departments and agencies or the Department of Energy Department of Commerce I think even Department of Defense and we have to get the foreign government assurances right and then we get all that information back we have to write a commission paper has to go through our internal process up to the commission right so and then they have to vote on it and so it depends on the case some of those steps may take longer than others but I don't know I would say every case is different right in one case it might take a longer to get assurances from the foreign government another case it might take the executive branch a little bit longer to do that and then the quality review and so and depending on the level of review some export cases just take longer because of additional steps that may be involved. Yeah thanks Barry yeah go ahead Mark. Yeah to that and do you or does the NRC anticipate a significant uptick in license applications with SMR technology packaging approvals all that stuff coming down the line is that being planned for? I think the packaging approvals is not a question for the group that I work in so unfortunately I don't think I can I can really answer that and what was the other piece of that just exporting technology well again we make the distinction if we're saying technology meaning like design information you know blueprints software whatever the intangibles that falls under part 810 which the NRC does not license if we're talking actual equipment and material which we do license. Yeah I mean there's certainly a lot of activity with advanced reactors you know it from what we see it seems like most vendors are looking to well to demonstrate the technology first but potentially in the United States maybe not everyone and then you know really as Jessica mentioned the part 810 technology transfer is almost a leading indicator of part 110 exports of equipment and material which would typically come after right because if a vendor is looking to potentially bid on a contract for a country that may want to build a nuclear reactor they're probably going to need a part 810 to transfer technology to put in a bid on that before they would ever submit a part 110 to actually export equipment or material and so from that perspective I think you know we work with our Department of Energy colleagues and can kind of use that as a little bit of a gauge of like are we going to have a huge wave coming in. Now that said we have seen some smaller scale exports for like fuel qualification where maybe there's some fuel samples that are sent to a foreign research reactor for a radiation testing. We have seen a few of those but to date not a huge uptake at this point but certainly if things continue on the same trajectory I think we can expect in the next 5 to 10 years that we will see a significant increase and we're tracking that closely. Thanks Barry. Let's see the next question it appears it looks like it's addressed to me so I'll take a shot at it and then I'll go ahead and ask each of the panel members if they wanted to weigh in and the question really is is export control training available as applied to nuclear technology. And I'll take a first shot at it at least. We don't have any specific export control training at the NRC I would offer that on our website if you go to nrc.gov and you put in import export you will see a number of frequently asked questions you will see recent U.S. government policy issues that affect exports and imports you will see how to fill out a form 7 that Barry talked about. The second part of that would be we do have internal training that's developed and there has been a request by actually our inspector general to make it publicly available and we're in the process of making that training publicly available and then the last thing I would say is kind of the context of this is that there is very little guidance at least in the NRC world for exports however we haven't been embarking for the last couple years with the industry and with Department of Energy and non-government organizations to develop a standard an export standard that affects both 810s and 110s and that's still work in progress if you will but at some point in time that would be a good reference to those who want to export with guidance for advanced reactors so I'll offer any other panel members any thoughts they may have on their organization's training of export training or anything that they can offer to prospective exporters. I would just add for this part 810 if you go to NNSA's website for part 810 there's information about I believe for training you can reach out again there's a website and an email address and I believe they do individual training as well as they're available for at conferences or any other type of regional events but definitely I would recommend reaching out to the part 810 email address for more information about export control training for U.S. technology and assistance to foreign partners. As an indirect air carrier and ocean carrier as well we do significant export training and a lot of it starts and stops with what Jonathan brought up which is the automated export control system that Customs and Border Protection uses as well as their colleagues over at TSA. A lot of that ties directly into the licenses that are required for export because that stuff all gets inputted into the AES system whether it's a department of commerce whether there's an NRC code associated to it and there's a lot of AES training out there that's available to the public. I guess for me I would just add the site that I referenced at the end of my talk on CBP.gov it's a great resource for this information too. Okay, okay the next one looks like for Barry. Where is the guidance on whether a component that is not nuclear specific would be considered part of a reactor facility under part 110 or a dual use component under the department of commerce. For example a commercial valve that has been tested and qualified to nuclear specific requirements. Yeah so that's where some of that subjectivity can come in in terms of if it's considered especially designed or prepared and maybe I shouldn't use the word subjective because it makes it sound like it's an open or a squishy call but appendix A to part 110 it has a note in there that describes what is considered to essentially fall within the scope of being a nuclear reactor component so you can always you can start there but again if it's something that you feel like kind of on the line like reach out to us and ask us because we talk to our friends over at commerce and sometimes we'll email each other back and forth hey we got a question about this thing we think it's yours do you agree and we will have those conversations with each other we'll get emails from them and say hey someone reached out to us but we think this might be yours do you agree and so reach out to us and we can we can look at it and then you know give you our feedback on whose jurisdiction it falls under. Thanks Barry. Okay let me move this question to Jonathan. If an NRC license is import a licensee is importing materials or technology that fall under NRC's regulatory purview is there any requirement for the licensee or customs and border protection to notify the NRC of the import activity? Yeah for the role that I play I'm not for sure on the answer for that one I can say that you know we regularly work with the NRC with regards to imports and verifying legitimacy of imports and legitimacy of licenses but as far as automatic reporting I'm not very knowledgeable on it. Thanks Jonathan. I mean from NRC's perspective I just weigh in and and Barry mentioned the only report for imports are high risk radioactive sources when they come into this country it's called an advanced notice of shipment that would be the only notification at least to the NRC that I'm aware of for imports. Let's see okay dude okay this question is for Jessica. Who can initiate the 123 agreement process and does NNSA proactively put 123 agreements in place in countries that are likely to be future export markets? So the 123 process how we even start it's a it's it's the National Security Council at the White House they lead the lead an inter agency process on what countries we're going to pursue a 123 agreement so that's how the process starts and of course we always hear feedback from industry of where they're trying to go and what things that they feel that may help them win bids in certain areas but we take account to that feedback and other data that we're getting but it is an NNSA led process with an inter agency on how we prioritize in which countries we're going to pursue a 123 agreement so as far as NNSA's role it's mandated in the section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act where we provide the technical assistance and a concurrence for our Secretary of Energy so these 123 agreements are actually led by the Department of State. Yeah thanks Jessica. Let's see. Okay you're doing such a great job how about one more question. When the U.S. technology has been previously transferred to another country for example South Korea who determines when exports from that country to a third country require U.S. export controls. So I think that's a very good question but unfortunately it's outside of my purview because I actually focus on 123 agreements rather than part 810 so I'm unable to answer that one but I'm happy to take that question back. Thanks Jessica. We'll table that one right now and then let's see here. Okay Jonathan would fuel or mobile reactors returning to the United States require an agricultural inspection? Yeah I'm not familiar with the specific requirements of whether or not a shipment would get an agricultural inspection however there would be other inspection activities that would occur with such shipment. I don't really want to get into the specifics of it however. Okay thanks Jonathan. Let's see here. Alright this question is for Jessica and Barry. How does export control information fit in? NRC is requiring only U.S. citizens or permanent residents for review advanced reactors because export control information may be involved. Will this prevent a foreign regulator from reviewing a U.S. reactor design? Well I mean I think that's a part 810 question. Okay well I mean NRC does get the part 810s to review even though it's DOE's lead so I definitely don't want to go too far outside of my lane but a foreign national from another company or from another country I guess that's what makes them a foreign national. Maybe works for a company that is my understanding is part 810s are required to transfer a technology to individuals is really it's not it can also apply to individuals getting information. I'm not sure if that really answers the question but yeah. Again part 810 is under regulated by DOE but I don't have much to offer in this area as I focus mostly on 123 but again happy to take that question back. Okay thanks Jessica and Barry. Let's see here. Okay actually I think this is a good question for all panel members. How would an entire completed workable microreactor loaded with fissile fuel and placed inside a shipping container complicate the export process? Should we start with you Mark? Enormously. Just off the cusp I mean you have to be able to prove that that reactor is safe and offline you have to be able to prove that that reactor however it is loaded meets the standards for the packaging requirements and yeah that's something that's not I won't say it's never been done but it's certainly not realistic in today's climate to have something that somebody could just take ad hoc and and utilize without some kind of safeguards because if somebody even just were to intercept it which happens all the time or the the container falls off the vessel which also happens all the time you know you have to you have to be able to prove that it's it's not a risk to commerce it's not a risk to to marine life it's not a risk to safeguards and security for the worlds so I would think that in a realistic worlds the fuel will almost always be separated from a reactor and that's just my personal opinion. Thanks Mark Barry. I'll just say it's a great question too you know it's almost one of those hypothetical questions that we ask ourselves sometimes you know how would we approach this and what are the issues that we would have to think about in terms of licensing and ultimately it would come down to can the licensing criteria be met those non-proliferation principles applying IAEA safeguards physical protection in those manner of requirements. Jessica or Jonathan. Yeah just echoing what's been said it's a really great question and something it's you know hypothetical but some of the things that just to add on to what Barry said maybe just even the jurisdiction or territory under what 123 agreement would the reactor fall under because it's it's a movable thing and so those are just things that we we would have to consider so just even the jurisdiction and in territory under what 123 such a reactor the microreactor would follow under. Thanks Jonathan. Yeah kind of echoing some of what Mark had to say I imagine it would limit what ports they could go through as well like further limit it and those sorts of things those impacts at the moment off the cuff that's like that's the main things that I see you know and concerns with officer safety making making sure you know making all that work well. Thanks Jonathan and it looks like I've been through all of the questions okay I don't see any more stars so I guess we have about eight minutes left but I do want to thank each of each of the panel members for not only their presentations but their insights on a myriad of questions that involve a lot of different avenues and approaches to export control I want to thank the audience for your participation in the questions and and certainly the last thing is one of the things we pride ourselves here at the NRC is feedback and so if you have any specific feedback on this session or the Rick in general as we go forward we greatly appreciate that and you can find that on our on our website on the Rick website itself so without any further ado I'll close this panel session so thank you very much