 to receive Alevea Chesobal who was a PhD student here but now is flying on our home wings and it will be she will give a talk entitled is fairly the same boat as Galileo or century and don't actually you have to thank you very much yes like Alexander for organizing this and you all for being present but it serves for technical things so we will start because today I just hope that it works and it does okay so yes so in my title there are two parts so there is a small specific question I'm sorry I will be looking there because I don't see anything on my laptop so there is first specific question about just two symmetries about this further sketch and as it's going to be she presents much more to your question and I will use all the letter and then also the former so the letter question is about symmetry and textuality so symmetry is usually defined as invariance under transformation or transformation usually something like so usually you have two components invariance plus transformation so the easiest case is symmetry of a geometric figure so you take a square and if you flip it then the shape does not change the orientation does not change or if you rotate it around the center then also it looks as if you did nothing so you have a transformation like flipping rotation and you have invariance of the shape so this is a geometry very easy but in physics so I'm doing philosophy of physics in physics you have different things which are invariance which are no longer mathematical objects these can be in particular equations for models some models can be defined differently but usually one more definition is a solution of equation is a model so equation tells you about how things evolve and what particular way to evolve would be a particular solution of equations seems to be a model but you can also tell about like state at a particular moment of time so yesterday for the integration of the mechanics using one another translations which change so you have variables like position and wave functions so if you change position by a transformation which is called translation the form of the equation will change or if you change the wave function here into another which is very shifted with respect to the first then you still have the same form of equations so you can say the equation is invariant and also solutions can be invariant and this is kind of transformations so in others plus transformation against you can have a symmetry so but more precisely so this is not usually done but I'm doing this I'm assuming not only in variance and transformation but also differences so if you take a symmetry to be constituted by two states so here one state another then there will be an invariant part which post states share but then there is also transformation which sends one state to another and more precisely it changes something into something else so there are also these differences like the one position and another position one wave function another wave function and this will be the form of equation for this equation here's an order so so now symmetry can be you're going to encounter it in the world in a theory so suppose we're interested in theoretical symmetry solve physics so this will be now more particularly statistical symmetry so physics that I said and the analogy is what associates associate theoretical items to worldly items which are counterparts of that so this is a theoretical symmetry we would like to find something in the world which would be a counterpart to this symmetry and the question is what it would look like so one option is here this kind of result is called symmetry into reality it's inference and it was discussed by the sculptor you have not discussed much this is Alexander so this is always in you a bit so in this inference what is said is that the environmental part of your theoretical symmetry has a counterpart in the world so if you have a question and you have here a corresponding dynamics in the world this is an ontological claim but you can understand it in different ways because as you know the other components in your symmetry so you can ask what about them okay and one way to understand would be the strong way it would say that the statistical symmetry is superfluous in the sense that the other components besides the transformation do not have counterparts only the environmental part has counterparts this will be the superfluous interpretation of your statistical symmetry the fact that it has it does not have counterparts for this differences and transformation but then we also can have a recreating which says that the statistical symmetry is not superfluous because now not only the environmental part has a counterpart but also the different parts and the transformation also have counterparts in the world this is important to for my talk okay remember superfluous means just the environmental part has counterparts and non-superfluous means also the differences and the transformation have counterparts in the world now one way of being non-superfluous or actually there is a single direct empirical status but then if you put it into this small chain of context which I have just introduced and I can say that the direct empirical status is one way of being non-superfluous so it's one way of for a statistical symmetry to be interpretive in such a way that not only the environmental part but also the differences and the transformation have counterparts in the world and how how is this achieved so you take it so it's simply to be matched much is it which what is called an empirical symmetry empirical because usually you can see and here is now an example symmetry which is a boost so boost is an addition of velocity it goes from zero velocity to some of zero velocity and it applies on the subsystem not the whole universe but just some part of it okay so you take this so it's called symmetry but you can match it with what is called Karelia shape and be equal symmetry and as a matching of so it's called symmetry with an empirical symmetry is called direct empirical status okay so what's Karelia shape and be equal symmetry it's you take a ship which is at rest you boost it physically in the world okay you really like activate your engine and as the ship is now moving with the uniform speed with respect to the shore which plays the role of your entrance so your transformer from the rest to moving it is an observable transformation you can observe where the ship moves a lot but you have a phenomenon inside the ship and if you are also inside the ship then you will not notice the differences unless you look outside you will not notice like if this room is boosted there's also inside will not feel it okay so this is only a vehicle symmetry the environments of phenomena within the ship under the boost of the ship with respect to the shore so so as I said the symmetrical subsystem was symmetry has directly be equal status in other worlds is not super first because as much as the relationship in vehicle symmetry in the world and now as you remember the question in my title was is is Faraday is the same boat as Karelia so actually the question is is this sink the Karelia shape in vehicle symmetry is kind of sink does it is it analogous for the case of case of Faraday or not okay because Faraday also has observed another symmetry which is called a Faraday's case of vehicle symmetry so here you have a cage you can enter it's a huge cage okay you can enter inside to the experiments so first the case is uncharged then you charge it and you see the sparkles appearing at the outer boundaries of the cage so it's observable change okay but if you do experiments within the cage you will not notice the difference so it's again an empirical symmetry because you made an empirical change but it also yielded you some environment and so the question is is the same boat as Karelia also is is there a direct empirical status for corresponding straight score symmetries is the same way as we just saw this with straight score boost and he says no okay so he does much this empirical symmetry with sub-cellatical symmetries but he says it doesn't lead to direct empirical status it doesn't lead to non-superfluous interpretation okay so we will return to this but just to give you an example so one representation of Faraday's cage would be if you send if you describe the original cage by assigning to it zero zero electrostatic potential and then it transforms this into some non-zero but uniform electrostatic potential then you can predict this Faraday's cage in particular symmetry but he says it's not sufficient to have direct empirical status in this case so here he says there's a disanalogy between the relationship of Faraday's cage as to the appearance versus not the appearance of direct empirical status and so this was like a particular case a couple of particular cases but these make part of a more general query okay so if boosts have direct empirical status and if electrostatic potential transformations which we have just seen they don't have because they don't have direct empirical status so we can ask which transformations have direct empirical status and which don't which symmetries and we can ask more generally because direct empirical status is a way of being non-superfluous we can ask more generally which so it's not simple symmetries are non-superfluous and which are superfluous so we just generalize this query which Achille had about his symmetries we're generalizing these two also other cases okay and we are supposed that as we can distinguish between these symmetries we are not supposing that the same interpretation the different interpretations are by the same symmetries we are supposing that different interpretations are by the different symmetries okay and we want to distinguish between them and so the reason why at least as far as direct empirical status is concerned was that global symmetries are non-superfluous and local symmetries are superfluous and what does it mean global local uh specified by parameters means global specified by functions means local and roughly this means global are uniform and the local are uniform so global is when you add for instance you add the quantity and you add it at each point of your domain okay the same quantity and local would be you add different quantities at different places so within your ship or cage you would add different quantities this depends on which place was the ship or was against your eye okay so roughly global are uniform non-uniform okay uh and uh yeah and boosts and this would explain well at least a part of hilly's disanalogy because uh boosts are global you boost you apply the same velocity to each part of the ship but electromagnetic potential transformation so hilly discusses electrostatic and electromagnetic electrostatic also global but electromagnetic are local okay so this is when you add the same potential or different potentials at different places of your cage uh for this cage okay so you can say yeah uh hilly is right that there is a disanalogy between the leadership and for this cage because the leadership uses global symmetries this has anything bigger things and then uh for this cage kind of in particular use local symmetries and so it doesn't have that kind of ecosystem so you have a good explanation of why hilly would be right about his disanalogy but but we have this truth is uh and we haven't disproved the classification so we updated uh boosts are global and the electromagnetic potential transformation are local but we have disproved this part okay not not the classification about this part so uh global does not uh necessary but i i mean no surface it doesn't necessarily by global surface does not necessarily by uh it was disproved by gizmos uh in 2014 and uh separately in another in a different way okay it was disproved by myself and this was precisely what i was doing with xander except uh sorry i defended the hdc this is the center a few years ago and it was precisely was this topic and one of the main uh perhaps the main result was uh no local symmetries unopened surface because they also can't have directed bigger status uh and uh xander i did not appreciate this but i suppose it's suppose it's it can work because anyway if you don't want to suppose suppose it gives them all a spark they do the same but in a different way okay so um yeah so what to do i mean if if this explanation doesn't work so first thing we can ask is uh is this is that still the analogy if if now it's not true that um the local symmetry is always superfluous well if local symmetries are not always superfluous it means sometimes there are no superfluous super simple simple symmetries can have direct and bigger states and in particular they can have direct and bigger status in as a case of faraday's case okay so why he really would be rocked because uh he said that uh in faraday's case there is no direct and bigger states and normally i said no there is direct and bigger status even if i did uh is for local symmetries okay so is there still this analogy between faraday's case and the little ship if if both uh lead to direct and bigger status and uh first i will say yes so i still this analogy but it is not about direct and bigger states but they won't do it it's about uh the environment so what's uh the environment uh so actually uh remember we were speaking about the uh ship or the cage uh more generally we can say this is the subsystem okay subsystem is a part of the universe but then we also have the rest of the universe and this is called the environment so if you want the whole thing is the universe and then you separate the ship or the cage the subsystem and the rest is the environment okay so uh Gleason wants to say that this analogy between faraday ship and faraday's case is that they exemplify different kind of subsystem symmetries okay so in Gleason ship what we have as i say is a boundary preservativeness so uh your transformation on the subsystem is preserving the boundary and the boundary here means the set of environment states which can be matched with the subsystem states so uh more simply stated okay your subsystem transformation does not induce a transformation of the environment transformation the environment can stay the same okay so uh you just form the ship you boost it it starts to move but as the shore is unchanged okay the shore is staying still but then in faraday's case this analogy would be that when you transform the cage the environment also changes because now you first purpose okay or whatever so uh outside the cage there is also a change same as it was but outside the ship there is no change even if you change the ship okay so this is the analogy and uh and i'm you can keep this in your mind because now i'm going to another topic okay now i will be in the instead of this analogy i will be discussing this part the correspondence is between this purpose and our distinctions and but at the end i so i will be resolved with another part more general which in my title was symmetry and contextuality and then at the end i will it it will turn out that i will also resolve this kind about this analogy and i will agree that there is not this analogy okay i mean you can still find this analogy but it will be not uh not of this kind so uh let's keep this just in our mind until the end of the talk more and uh let's let's concentrate for the moment on another part of this question okay so the question was about uh correspondence uh so originally so the original claim was no superfluous because it was the global superfluous to local and then as i was myself this was this okay so now we need another kind of correspondence uh so here are some examples of what uh we hope we can proceed so the group that was saying uh take so so remember i started when i was introducing the superfluous superfluous i started by the sculptor's result which is called symmetry to reality inference so it associates a series called symmetry with something in the world especially both and right apart okay so this was called symmetry to reality inference and this is a nondological result because it associates something so it's equal to something in the world okay and here he was concerned by the question how to make it right how to make it work and for this he considered different definitions of symmetry because it was a symmetry to reality inference okay it was about symmetries so he considered different definitions uh formal on the logical and he uh said i hope logical definitions are better for me because uh my inference is ontological and if i take it ontological definition of symmetry my inference works easily easily okay but if i take a formal definition i am not sure how it works okay but i wanted to make it work sorry i take uh the definition which is of the same kind of symmetry which is of the same kind as my inference and then it works well okay but woz as woz has uh which drafts were 2019 and then they were published in 2022 and in between here you made a talk in 2021 so i'm speaking about this uh period from 1920 2019 to 2022 and last week there was my symmetry workshop and here also made a similar kind of talk okay so it's 2019 for the 2023 so he says uh he criticized the scope he says yeah it's too it's easy but it's too easy okay it's too easy you you take an ontological thing you define it as you you derive another ontological thing from it it's too easy okay you should derive ontological not from ontological but from formal because it's difficult but more interesting because like you start you start with something which is easily definable okay because ontology it's so clear you are not you don't know what corresponds to which symmetry is the world okay but formal things are usually clear you you it's not difficult to say but the symmetry is global okay so start from something formal and then you derive something ontological and you gain uh knowledge okay and this way and uh and i i i use his uh idea i i mean uh it's interesting to explore but i i just perform it in in my way which i prefer okay so yeah i want to derive formal from ontological but uh so so first okay so i derive formal from ontological but uh in between okay i put substantial so i derive actually formal from formal for substantial then from substantial ontological okay so i have an intermediary stage okay then uh i have refuted this link between formal and ontological between uh particular formal distinction which is global local okay i'm saying yeah i will be deriving from from ontological but not from the global local distinction it's formal but it does not suit because i have this process yeah uh and uh and what will be the the relationship between formal and ontological six i will call it uh correctional dynamics yeah i will introduce a particular relationship okay so again we want to derive something formal from something formal something ontological formal and ontological in my case is filled with distinctions and so we need uh different distinct different uh relationships between distinctions and one of them will be uh this is the relationship i will be using okay so i'm just firstly introducing this relationship so here is a distinction for instance substantial uh so superfluous not superfluous uh or haven't i uh not directly because they describe it directly because there is and here you will have formal distinctions or substantial distinctions like global local or external internal or something else okay this is a binary distinction so one way in which they can um correspond to each other will be orthogonality so orthogonality is where in within each term of your distinction you have both terms of the other distinction okay so for example within uh heavy vertical status you have both global and local or within global you have both uh with the activity because they are all mixed okay and this uh on my account this happens with the global local distinction okay it's orthogonal to uh to some superfluous no superfluous it's orthogonal to global do having versus not having the activity of status okay and then there is the opposite case expressionizing is just anything in between okay so the opposite case is well to your the first term of the distinction corresponds to just one term of the distinction okay so instead of in within the same term having both terms of the distinction you have just correspondence per term okay so for instance if the original uh view was right then uh directly bigger status was could not correspond to global and not directly bigger status was correspond to local and they would not mix okay so just this this will be a question about uh co-stationality and i want this relationship uh but it will be not mystical local distinction but with something else if you repeat just um just these distinctions please so uh new or maybe example is it yeah so traditional view says directly bigger status corresponds to global not directly bigger status corresponds to local this would be co-stationality when the terms of the two distinctions do not mix okay you have correspondence like this and like this parallelism okay and of superlality is my view of this and wall assist so you take for instance global and within you have with directly bigger status and result directly bigger status or you take uh directly bigger steps and within you have global and local so within the same term one distinction you have both terms of this distinction i present this episode mostly is it clear or not okay i will basically again i see co-stationality okay because then if you have global if it was right you derive from it uh ontological okay if you local uh if it was right the original view from local you would derive no not directly bigger status i want to derive uh from formal ontological just as well as that okay so here are now three distinctions peripherals are superfluous is it is the ontological distinction which i have introduced in the beginning okay so again those superfluous means uh all the elements of ourselves seem to be counterparts superfluous means just the environment part has has called about the world okay the typical status is just a particular case of being on superfluous and so uh if you're if you if it's superfluous and in particular it doesn't have these are ontological distinctions in general in particular ontological distinctions they are about the relationship between symmetry of your syria and symmetry as well now please this is the shell distinction and here's the formal distinction and as i said i will not be linking ontological directly with formal i will be linking with the intermediary of substantial distinctions substantial is not formal but it's not yet ontological okay and now i will show just briefly because actually so far i'm sorry but i was mostly some mostly i was summarizing my talk of last link okay except for this here here is this analogy because because i need this to get to to new results okay so now i finish with summarizing and then we'll get to something even newer okay so i'm showing how to use my co-extensionality between distinctions how to dive okay something from one distinction to another first we go in this direction first we just we concentrate on the on this part on on super um ontological and substantial okay uh so what is the usefulness of the substantial distinction so the distinction observationally complete versus observationally incomplete uh observationally complete means it preserves all predictions okay so in the environment part of your symmetry are contained all predictions observationally incomplete means your symmetry does not preserve all predictions so it predicts some change okay this is my distinction and why what is useful about it it explains actually some assignments of ontological distinction to simplest okay so the role of my substantial distinction is that it explains uh why some series are interpreted ontologically as superfluous or as non-superfluous namely because so they interpret it as superfluous but they are observationally complete and that is uh a debate with Clark was precisely about that he was taking uh observationally complete symmetries for instance boosting the whole universe okay and that is what's saying that they should be superfluous and Clark was saying no they should be non-superfluous and as i explained the quantum is why uh let me tell you it's preferable to Clark's view why we should say that observationally complete symmetries are superfluous as i mean why we should say that the universal boosts are superfluous as in non-superfluous and explanation is that because they are observationally complete observational completeness for a pair of superfluous because there is a co-extrationality between these two so i'm using co-extrationality and the substantial distinction to explain some facts about ontological assignment okay and Clark was directing vehicle status we can also get an explanation there why is it convincing that uh that uh services could be here okay why is it convincing that there can be a status far worse than non-superfluous interpretation well because it was observationally complete symmetries and with that they predict some change and you can go into the world and you can see this change and if it's right if it's right then you simply see the vehicle and you see that it cannot be no it cannot be superfluous because it predicts the change so it means uh the uh the differences which i use by the transformations they should have counterparts in the world which you have observed as these are the predicted changes okay as they favor the non-superfluous interpretation so again i'm using observational completeness in completeness which is a part of my substantial distinction to this to explain why i'm directing vehicle status favors the non-superfluous interpretation which is an ontological fact so here's the formal distinction i will interpret but roughly it says the distinction between symmetry subsystem symmetry which are real as a boundary of subsystem versus not real as a boundary of the subsystem so it's a distinction about what happens at the subsystem side of your boundary so so what about substantial distinction i would think was interesting a lot about formal distinction i would think is that it clarifies the knowledge of the show office so the show offices are uh cinders of general activity and they have usually been interpreted as only superfluous only superfluous but the whole argument okay so the whole argument says you transform more something inside the hole but it does not like this if it's really a non-superfluous transformation in determinism but then you better avoid determinism and so you should not count this as a real transformation in short you should interpret the show office as superfluous okay so differences would be only superfluous and what my distinction says no it's only some of the different superfluous only those which are boundary trivial but boundary not real are not superfluous they have direct typical status okay so here this is where we go in the one direction or last because uh this part is already known about different office so i first just check it with the whole agreement i go in this direction i check that uh the whole different offices are boundary trivial and then i go in the other direction i say and then if different offices are boundary non-trivial then you should have a conversely uh direct typical status and i close this okay so now you see my talk of last week if you need because it should be online or hopefully uh in some time uh as a same upset as this talk okay and and you discover that as a film office are no longer just non-superfluous they are also now non-superfluous okay so here i finished finished this previous results uh and finally of last week uh but uh let's advance a bit okay so uh i'm supposed to have proven by now that we can use substantial informal distinctions to derive something about ontological distinctions uh if they are correct if all the distinctions are correct and now the problem is however that the duration from formal to ontological passes by substantial but there is a discrepancy between how i have defined the formal and substantial distinctions and those i have chosen because actually my formal distinction is about the subsystem as my substantial distinction is about the universe so i remember we have distinguished subsystem environment and the whole of the universe okay so this means i uh my formal side i told only about the subsystem side but i haven't talked about the environment side i haven't standardized it formally and so actually i cannot go from uh from formal to substantial okay because uh on the formal side i have just made uh one half of the task okay specifying just the subsystem side but not the environment side but i need both uh i need the whole universe to uh at this for now to get to the substantial side and therefore to the ontological side from the formal side okay so now i'm managing this discrepancy and uh this will also result uh uh this debate about whether there is a disanalogy between uh fairly sketch and uh fellowship okay so i'm solving this uh so here are my distinctions both distinctions uh sources of national and the formal and we want to solve this discrepancy so that we can go from here to there and then to ontological things okay uh it uh describes some property to to the subsystem plus the environment to the whole universe and the property is either either observational completeness so the reservation of following of all predictions or the incompleteness so the changing predictions and now on the subsystem side uh unfortunately you don't see much here okay but actually there is a good idea okay so it goes from right to to white okay so right here right here and here it goes from right to blue okay so white means there is no transformation here and blue means there is a transformation and gray means unspecified okay so in my formal distinction what it says about the ideal symmetries and the boundaries of the subsystem uh they don't change anything they are identity here okay and if they are all doing materials they are they change something here it's about the subsystem and that our task is to specify formally the environment so that the whole thing gets uh okay yields either observational completeness or observational incompleteness and uh and here we return to this distinction which uh gives an all single reduced to account for the technology between the relationship and the sketch so remember that they said uh no both both cases if they have legal status but uh but one is about the preserving so the boosts are about the preserving and the net potential suspensions among all the preserve okay so the distinction it was about subsystems in this case but it was characterizing the effect of them on the environment okay so in case of boosts when you boost the ship as you remember the effect was the environment does not change and then when you transform the cage the effect was that the environment changes but more precisely there is an reduced transformation which is quite strong near the cage but then when you go away it disappears so it's it fades away okay uh and so as i said i always have my decision about formal decision about subsystem and so the proposal would be uh how about adding to it uh this another decision which is about the environment and then i will get the both yeah i have something about subsystem something about the environment okay they take unbind uh this on the formal side and i should get something about both sides it's a social level that would be a proposal yeah thank you uh so so i'm my decision was going to be involved okay and so yeah i said uh let's let's combine the decision about uh uh but we should modify the decision before it can be combined because the decision has a drawback okay it is a distinction about the environment but it still concerns the subsystem it's a distinction about how the subsystem transformation influences the environment transformation it's not a distinction about uh environment transformation per se okay it's about the influence of subsystem on the environment but i want a decision which would be just about the environment right uh because uh when you're speaking about subsystem environment it looks like subsystem is primary environment is secondary okay but actually this is just two parts of the universe and they are alike you can even switch the levels so what you were calling the subsystem you could call it the environment advice versa so actually there is no reason to say that the environment is always subordinate to the subsystem and that nothing happens they are accepted the subsystem represents the environment this is not a this is not a true okay we should treat the environment just as if it was another subsystem which means in particular you can transform it independently of the the environment even on derivative transform okay so i'm taking this but i'm imagining it okay i'm admitting uh independent transformation to the environment okay and now uh uh let's see what is this use so first we consider boundary preserving transformations these are transformations when you transform one subdomain it does it has no influence on what happens on the other subdomain but you can still transform the other subdomain just independently or you can do it on the other side okay so you can consider uh sink of boosts again so we we are adding a velocity on some subdomain as a subsystem as a environmental boost okay so most in his uh so it's one of the purpose which is called the observability or something else for dynamical similar transformations okay so it's between 2019 and 2022 and presented plastic again so here he distinguishes between subsystem gravity and subsystem gravity subsystem gravity is when when not trivial transformation on the subsystem plus the same transformation of the environment amount to the symmetry of the whole system and subsystem locality is when identity uh well it has specified transformation which is actually density uh or subsystem combined to identity of the environment is a symmetry of the form so these are notions which uh and his views is a formal notion okay they have nothing to do with my substantial decision about observational completeness and observational completeness but his claim is that from these formal evolutions you can derive uh something about as a as a substantial ontological about what he calls observability and observability okay so if your symmetry is subsystem global so you again think of a material boost on the ship you add to the material boost on the environment the whole of the symmetry of the universe then well it says it has observability in the sense that when you transform just a ship and keep the environment and transform you get a ship and vehicle symmetry well he doesn't say that but i imagine that okay he says you you get observability and he says if your symmetry is on the boundary subsystem local so when you couple it to your subsystem symmetry to uh add it to the environment and you get the symmetry full okay uh this is called subsystem locality and then you get the observability so he's trying to derive some from something formal something observational ontological but i just informed that this is my throw up and then it happens that this is already not formal and this is already observational okay uh so this is the case as i said you boost this is the ship you put the shore the whole thing is the symmetry of the universe and it sounds symmetry it has uh it doesn't predict any changes in the environment therefore it doesn't have to have a vehicle status the same is in both sides uh identity uh not a vehicle status and this is a vehicle status you boost as a ship you keep an eye on the shore and you get a symmetry which corresponds to Galileo ship and vehicle symmetry i hear you feel that we are getting to our question of this analogy between Galileo ship and fire this cage uh yeah and it looks like uh uh so first as i said i replaced world assist notion uh i said as i look forward they are observation just like this and then you see there's something missing here isn't it uh yeah so let's just add it uh there's a form of scale actually okay which is just like the previous except that now it's not really those folders the environment except uh besides instead of the subsystem so you don't boost the ship but you boost the shore and the whole is again the ship and vehicle symmetry because you're still observe the relative displacement of the ship uh respect to the shore which appears after this transformation and the reason why Wallace uh missed this transformation is because he did not consider the environment as being transformable independently of the subsystem he was thinking the other environment as identity or at best you induce some transformation from the subsystem but there's a novelty uh my notes which enables this extra case is that i admit uh independent transformations on the environment just what uh this was just the amendment which i have just proposed and as the knowledge as i said uh actually these four cases are all uh non-formal and uh yeah and so yeah you hold the cases are not formal then we get to our previous question which was uh how to uh from which formal thing should we derive these non-formal things and i have this formal thing from which uh these four cases can be derived so here's my proposal uh here's the formal property from which i claim uh this uh uh substantial and ontological properties can be derived the the four properties called boundary state preservatives or boundary state non-preservatives so what is this so you have a boundary between the subsystem and the environment and on my account what explains whether you have uh observational and completeness or completeness whether you have directly because that is not directly because that is what happens with this boundary is it changed or is it preserved if it's preserved so here it was for most things so you don't change the relationship between them the boundary is preserved therefore you have observational completeness and not directly because the same here you don't change the boundary the relationship is the same as before and therefore uh you have this uh side of distinctions but if you change just one of them just set subsystem or just the environment you have changed the relationship between them uh and the boundary and this implies on my view observational completeness and dynamic of state so yeah here's the here's the formal decision here is a substantial ontological state which we shall substantial uh in the sense defined and well yeah so we are getting uh uh well time to to the question how to resolve our beauty this analogy between the leadership and for this case so what i have just explained uh so this okay this was uh a paradigmatic example were boosts which correspond to galeo shape and now we get to electomanticism which corresponds to faraday sketch so the previous simplest uh the previous symmetry is a boundary preserved so when you transform one of the subdomains it does not influence the other uh if there are these transformed it because it transformed it independently okay but now we get instead of boundary completeness we get to boundary uh normal boundaries so this means uh that when you transform one of the subdomains it influences influences the other okay well if we actually examine a here is sorry it's called symmetries we say that not all of them are boundary are boundary preserved are non-boundary preserved okay so uh like at first value it would see that boosts are all boundary preserved and the electromagnetic transmissions are all non-boundary preserved actually no within electromagnetic transformations you also have boundary preserved so it's the same which looks just like boosts which means you transform one thing and the other does not change that does not change uh so these are here is uh these are sort for symmetries okay so uh second and third symmetries which here they associate with faraday sketch are boundary preserved okay boundary preserved you transform one side the other side does not change these symmetries are explainable in the same way as just uh beforehand okay they are actually the same as my fourth case fourth case we transform the environment we don't do it transform the subsystem you change the boundary therefore you get observation on completeness and then directly because the same observation is the same analysis carries over to these two symmetries okay yeah but there is also the third symmetry and here is finally the non-boundary preserved symmetry of classical if the one which describes a faraday sketch but these two also describe okay but we also have a new case okay so it's non-boundary preserving which means when you transform the subsystem you also transform the environment but the environment transformation it fades away okay so here it's still uh near the subsystem is still uh like you transform a lot but when you go away uh uh finally it becomes sadist okay and the question how do we explain this in my terms because if you remember the explanation was that uh directly because status arises when you have changed the relationship between the two but here it doesn't seem like okay well at best you have changed somewhere away from the subsystem but at the subsystem environment boundary and the relations more or less the same uh both sides okay have you really changed something so it's like it seems to be a problem for my account and uh yeah i uh i'm not sure how to resolve this okay but i have at least a few options so one option is uh so the first representation these two are actually in terms of uh potentials but this one it is also stressed in terms of potentials but is actually uh what did express since our uh field strengths okay and the usual uh the usual way of understanding the classical analysis is to say that uh predictions are governed by field strengths they're not governed by potentials but by field strengths okay so the explanation would be yeah perhaps you don't have any change at the boundary here but uh this is just one representation in terms of potential but the main representation is in terms of field strengths and there you do have a change that would be one option to explain why we have directly being those status here uh even if the boundary seems to have to be unchanged okay another another explanation is now we instead of looking like comparing these two we will compare these two um the other two representations we can say okay yeah perhaps here is no change in the boundary so we would think that there is no directly being of status part that this um representation is uh linked by an initial transformation uh which has a specific form okay to another representation also in terms of potential where we do have a discrepancy at the boundary because we have changed the environment but not the subsystem okay and so the another solution would be yeah we don't have the discrepancy here but uh if this is the this representation is linked to another where we do have a discrepancy and then again uh that's why we have directly being of status here and therefore also in the linked representation and the third a third option would be to say yeah because we don't have really a discrepancy at this particular place but when if we see a bit uh a bit more relations around there is a here we have uniform transformation and here we have a non-uniform transformation and so here there's broadly still a discrepancy because we are passing from uniform to non-uniform so these are three explanations of how to account of uh uh technical status for non-uniform transformation even if the appearance of discrepancy is not obvious as a boundary and yeah so so finally uh resolving the data analogy okay so what I was doing so far was to mostly uh so from my title there was a question about the analogy but then there was a symmetry and contextuality so I was I was uh discussing this uh general question about how to make distinctions and then uh I know I will show how to resolve this analogy using it in the story so concentrate on this last representation okay so uh remember it was uh I was operating in terms of just two subdomains of the universe it was there was a subsystem and there was a department and it was supposed to be all okay actually it's not all okay actually so what what we will see is now I will add a third uh thing here okay okay so now this will be not just the same environment okay it will be approximate environment and then there will be another thing which I have added and this will be called distant environment okay so uh where symmetry is near the subsystem and then the distant which is away from the subsystem okay so now uh I I have uh I have added more environment into the picture okay so the previous picture was not complete actually this is uh I want and uh now we can say that uh symmetry is is is non-boundary it affects the environment but it affects just the approximate environment it doesn't affect the distant environment because at some point you remember as this influence of the subsystem transformation fades away and by now we have here identity okay so uh symmetry is non-boundary preserved at this boundary but not at the distant boundary and this is I I have not included this but Alexander knows there's Simon Friedrich which was in my committee actually in my PhD committee and he uh he was saying that this this was an objection to uh saying that the symmetry has directed because that's because he was saying something like but if you if you continue your environment transformation it will fade away and then you will not have a bigger status and so this is I can also resolve this in my approach but uh since I was promised to resolve this this analogy okay so I'm doing this now I I'm eliminating okay I've just eliminated the uh distant as approximate environment okay so first I at the distant one and now I eliminated the approximate okay now we compare just the subsystem as a distant environment and what we see is that actually uh at this boundary with respect to distant environment this true representation they would uh like tell you that there is no like the bigger status yeah because actually when I was editing and you see in these presentations the transformation is only the approximate environment it's not in the subsystem nor the environment someone you meet the approximate environment is not like the bigger status at all because there's no changing relationship okay and now this uh this final representation which on the contrary helps to scan more directly because that is because this representation you have a real difference between the subsystem which is changed and the distant environment which is not changed so you have a discrepancy at this distant boundary and it leads to directly bigger status and uh now the crucial thing is that I've changed nothing yeah I've changed nothing so this was the previous slide about here is um for this case and now uh just the same slide but you see I changed just the name okay now exactly the same thing applies to actually to boost yeah because you remember boosts were uh went where you change the subsystem you don't change the environment that you have directly bigger status now uh what was the game uh the game is ankle I mean that uh the usual uh analysis of boosts it's red but the environment it's speaking about is the distant environment yeah remember it speaks about was forming the ship with respect to the shore so my claim is the shore is the distant environment okay uh this time is compatible with uh say that in this case uh because status arises but it is the question what was the approximate environment the shore is the distant environment what is about the approximate and in the approximate environment what I'm blaming is that the situation is precisely the same as if it's fire day sketch namely as the subsystem symmetry is non boundary preserved on this environment so remember boosts are usually called boundary preserved because they don't transform the environment but if they only if the environment which they don't transform is a distant one then it's still possible that they transform the approximate environment and I'm saying that they do to decide this and you can ask what what is this approximate environment in case of the kind of ship okay so the distant one is the shore but what is the approximate environment well the approximate is just the water and the air okay because uh uh ship is not in some uh uh flying away okay it's it's uh um surrounded by some media okay like water and air and it transforms them because if you go through the air through the water you have friction and it affects the ship but also it's uh this media is itself affected to the ship you have an exchange of heat and so okay so this is um this is uh non boundary preserved this is for the influence of the subsystem of the environment subsystem transformation of the environment transformation which is omitted in in the usual analysis of boosts because they concentrate on the because the environment they concentrate on are actually is actually just a distant environment so uh yeah so um so actually so what this means as I said keep in mind this picture okay I go a few slides back and you can just a picture but the last picture was about the ship but here's the picture about uh about uh fire this cage so the resolution of the disanalogy is that uh this analogy is simply because we concentrate on different parts of the environment and on different violence but if uh anyway because the pictures are incomplete in the analysis of condition and in the analysis of fire this cage so the the disanalogy disappears when we consider um the whole picture uh for both symmetries okay so in in the usual fire this case you concentrate on just the proximal side on the usual fire kind of ship you concentrate on just the distant side but combine both for each case and you will see that they are the same and there's not this analogy but you can still generate it if you by switching your attention to different environments and on different boundaries and there's a feather is I didn't put it here but I have it in my text okay so the feather is problem about right the bigger status which which arises uh which seems to arise for subsystem simply but then it's supposed to disappear because the the environment transformation can be um continued to identity it's also is all by saying that um right the bigger status is relative to a boundary since since I have derived right the bigger status forms discrepancy in the boundary there are different boundaries can have different states of discrepancy and some of them yield the right to bigger status and others uh don't so the fact for Friedrich uh when Friedrich says that uh right to bigger status disappears nor it does not disappear that just means that it arises at the boundary it doesn't arise at another boundary but the fact that it does not arise at another boundary does not imply that it disappears at the first boundary it's just relative to boundaries and uh yeah here we are so uh yeah what was uh well uh the scope to start it by saying that you can uh options and Wallace says uh but extremal you should derive frontological formal formal and they say yeah it's possible yeah we can derive frontological formal uh by the intermediaries of substantial in my case and uh uh the distinctions are more precisely so ontological was the purpose most purpose in particular uh uh norm versus sunday equal status substantial was observationally um um hope it versus observationally and that uh formal is what I have transformed so firstly it was boundary trivial versus boundary neutral subsystem synthesis and then I extended this to synthesis of the universe but actually then uh it was not the universal which was important but just the boundary between subsystem and environment so my formal distinction is finally about the state deserve about the state changes so changing uh whether you have this capacity at a particular boundary I was changed or not and uh yeah so I have resolved the disanalogy between I mean I had like uh dissolved the disanalogy between uh relationship and further discussion and in my in my title there was similar in contextuality so the wire saying that in general we have contextuality here because as I said observational completeness I calculated it on the universe but actually I go uh in light of my formal distinction which is ultimately about boundaries this one is also about boundaries but anyway it's about uh not just the subsystem uh like uh gives an velocity distinction it's not very well the environment it's about both it's about the boundary that is there okay so it's relative to it's contextual because it depends on which uh because the same subsystem transformation can have uh or not have data because that was dependent depending on which environment transformation you couple it with and vice versa and uh so data because that was observational completeness and so on this is a contextual properties because they're not properties of one of the sides but of which of them which which of those which of the things that's coupled with on the other side or more more precisely the property of both sides together and not each of them separate okay and each depends on the choice of boundaries so for for different I was synced in subsystem and uh disted environment and proximal environment but you could also combine proximal environment and the subsystem and call the whole thing the subsystem and then you can call the disted environment just the environment okay so it doesn't matter how you call them but the what matters is that they can put boundaries at different places and therefore uh since uh my forward distinction is about the boundaries uh is determined as it seems you will also have uh substantial and observational claims which are dependent on uh the boundaries and therefore contextual uh that's all thank you and I will do a very short general comment do you want to come here with me you can turn the camera it's okay it gets the whole room yeah and after that I will do a little a very small yeah the very small question about about the specific case Faraday versus so for people outside the field there's something important you have to understand is the way the debate is framed now about this ontology of symmetry if you read like this and Clark they are discussing about the world and they use symmetry as a probe okay discuss now if we move all the universe from one meter is it the same universe lineman says I don't see any sufficient reason but it's not and Clark says I don't care about the principle of sufficient reason so it's not and he has another reason there must be a specific frame that exists in which God wrote the laws of nature in one single valid formulation so the debate was not about the kind of transformation it was about the world but once physicists discovered group theory group theory is a very it's the is the standard way physics physics I say physics because of course in mathematics symmetry is not limited to to is the way to frame symmetry and of course if you frame symmetry with group you you're talking about transformation and you qualify transformation and all this debate between Haley Wallace before is all about kinds of transformation what can I deduce from the world from the kind of transformation my theory has and only very recently and with people like you they began to say oh maybe we should talk about the world a little bit maybe there's an empirical consideration but it's extremely weird because it's really debate if you read papers of Wallace in particular it's it's debate about kind of transformation mathematical blah blah blah and it's not it's very general very abstract that kind of symmetry that kind of an ontological consideration formal to ontology and depending on what you're talking so I'm ashamed to say that I did not read again Wallace and Haley to prepare for this comment and I'm very ashamed because because I think I should have to comment better because based on my fuzzy memory of when I read this paper it told me the last time you were here so it's four years ago my impression is that you answer well to Wallace but it's less obvious that your arguments is against you maybe it's complementary okay let me elaborate a little that would be my question so the paper of Haley is extremely strange it's perfect symmetry it's a very bizarre paper there's a completely impossible to understand appendix at the end there's consideration about intrinsic extrinsic property in David Lewis which no philosopher of physics ever consider because it's metaphysics but it's metaphysics and philosopher physics but I think it's important to to understand what what was the goal of the goal of Haley at least the goal as I see it is what is their way to differentiate identical situation from equivalent dynamically equivalent situations all the discussion the disanalogy between Galileo and and Faraday which is very close and very pretty symmetry there they are formally almost the same but he says they are not the same because in the case of Faraday you have identical situation before and after inside inside not in the world but inside so he's talking about intrinsic properties the same intrinsic properties inside and outside and he's claiming I don't know if he's right that in the case of Galileo you don't have an interesting situation in the ship on the the ship moving the ship not moving even if they are dynamically in distinguishing I don't know if he's right I don't know about the metaphysics of intrinsic properties but I think that is claiming how do you know that they are the same but you take cage zero potential cage at a certain fixed potential and you put the bulk cage near the same and you take guy on the floor sure guy in the ship and you do okay well not the same it's it's cruel but I think intrinsically he's saying that movement is relational so in case so so it's different when you're not moving compared to your reference I don't know he's right about that I think it's what's streaming and you have different statics potential but fixed static potential so without without the the differential is zero it's metaphysically the same but of course this debate between metaphysically the same and equivalent physically equivalent but not the same by discussion about transformation because they are the same except if you went you entered this very weird external environment I don't know maybe something outside the universe so so people the argument after that will take but let's make a transformation on ed and we will have to have an external to the external so you you see how the empiricist technique will be limited if the claim is about metaphysical and intrinsic properties maybe is right maybe is wrong maybe we should not do that but I think his argument is is about that instead waters is an argument but it's an argument about about empirically frontier and non-frontiers and environment and where where you can argue more efficiency against against against waters but that's it and sir and after that the floor yes thank you yes as I said three things okay so the last one was shouldn't you do something else here again that's what yeah that's what Wallace says in his new articles so he says the cosmological assumption is that also the reason Wallace's article is that the physics is essentially about the universe and as he proposes to deny his own assumption and that's so many other persons so this assumption he says no physics is essentially about subsystems which means that he says his article is about how to extend the same to further subsystems but so yes he is there he says we can start with small one and another and we can consider what happens with the whole and so on and so on and this is called subsystemic or civility and in the name of the course you see that it can be well he means that you can go back and forth and interpret the game but in the course you see there's also this extra sense that you can apply it again and again and yeah you can go into various subsystems so yeah this was just not the core for lexander's comment but I just clarified this and then the which situations are similar and which are identical so there are again two things here but there's one thing about he actually thinks that we don't know what is identical what is not or which situations are duplicates which are not interesting duplicates but it's a series which tells us okay so there's this new dimension that he's not presupposing any claims about what is the same and what is different but he's saying that let's associate our series or what happens in the world with some statistical representations let's make this presentation as maximally symmetric so they should be symmetric performing the predictions but also on the underlying levels for example the little absolute quantities because this introduces the unnecessary symmetries and then we get the result and then he said that now we will be using this result as a guidance and principle so it will tell us which situations are interesting duplicates okay these are those which can be represented as such and then now I'm going to your final the third one no no no you avoid my question because then he lay it's not what he said in he lay of course he's saying theory we need the theory to to to describe the world so he's a philosopher of physics I mean sometimes a physician but he's saying the the difference is between I describe the situation on the shore I describe the situation on the ship and I have also a model where I had a ship and the guy on the shore doing both experiments so he says people like Wallace they describe model one model two symmetrical and they never take some model one some model two inside a bigger model which is in the field also which will show you or not if it's identical or not it's it's the end we're the next it's about that yeah so yeah I'm coming to this point which was the first yeah so now is there this analogy between the ship with her discussions the sense that one is about three secret identical situations one is about just similar situations and second question can be kind of participations of the discussion because you know the way of both cages are inside yeah this is what is I think it's both sides yeah so firstly this question so suppose this this was about like the ones but that was just you have me just using the sides okay so suppose this is about this is about the ship okay suppose this is about the ship yeah yeah so this this will be about the ship now okay so forget this personal environment and then when so he is is saying that when you boost the ship you transform it from a stationary to moving state this is a different state okay when you boost the ship from stationary to moving this you make the difference and the environment doesn't change but when you transform the cage you can transform it in such you can represent the transformed state of the cage in such a way that the cage will be untransformed and these are these representations okay so this is the final state of your cage this is the final state of your ship but it is transformed okay so what Alexander said that this analogy was that when he transforms the ship you go forward from stationary to moving but when you go when you transform the cage you actually don't transform it because you will go from uncharged to uncharged and this was this could be a disanalogy okay but then at least for me but how did he get this analogy actually he was obliged to transform the environment because he transformed us in a pose and he would not be able to represent and he is a the sparks so it's all the wilderness of the cage so yes he he exhibited some representations of the video ship of Friday's cage where the cage is not transformed but it was at the price of transform is environment it's possible that for the ship there are also such representations if you use local synopsis so what I force for my account is that you have you're still talking that the ontology is given by the transformation and this is not what you are saying it's exactly you but you just show how the debate is done now okay it's done let's discuss the type of transformation if it's if I can show you the transformation is formally the same it's the same ontology my impression but maybe it's me my my vague memory of healing is that healing is about the fact that it's not just the transformation outside that is important because we could say okay let's change an atom on the moon doesn't change anything here symmetrical did we discover something ontological about the world we would say no so it's not it's not the fact that the environment change that is important is the fact that inside the cage nothing change whatever you do and my impression is that he believes right wrong or right that it's not the same for the ship maybe maybe you should not understand movements like that and you you could say okay maybe it's not the right way to understand the thing as far as I remember he he makes a claim about the presentations about the series okay he says in particular the two cases are the same the difference is theoretical which is what does the difference when you represent a little ship by a series cosimetry you must transform the subsystem but when you represent for the sketch by a big by a series cosimetry you need not transform the subsystem because you can represent it as unchanged and but on the price of transformers environment that's the difference in a perfect and a perfect symmetry if my memories go perfect symmetry no no does not change in dread sick properties the difference between perfect and imperfect symmetry is we can take the quite as an example of velocities so imperfect seem both changes of relative and well and absolute velocities likewise preserve phenomena but if you change relative velocities and sorry we transform the universe okay relative velocities are preserved absolute velocities are changed predictions are preserved so perfect imperfect typical symmetry is the one with absolute velocities it preserves predictions but under at the underlying level changes velocities absolute velocities this is imperfect the perfect symmetry it preserves predictions and it preserves everything on the line so it abandons absolute velocities now we have just a little bit less than it preserves symmetry in yours preserves predictions and preserves relative velocities it's perfect because it has no underlying symmetry yeah because it preserves the intrinsic properties the same it's the difference between identical metaphysically identical or dynamically it's a yes so it can enter something else if you want or you can give the floor no so yes so here he is only interested in changes of intrinsic properties yes but he distinguishes observable in this example so strong symmetry only please yes stronger it's called strong the strong symmetry only preserves observable basic purposes and the perfect symmetry also preserves unobservable basic purposes and then he says but we don't know which properties are intrinsic and he says oh see what symmetry preserves and this will be your guide to what is intrinsic I just wanted to just to tell you sorry yes so um when I was saying that he said argues that faraday sketch does not yield direct empirical status okay and but then I said with his bruises as well so I was addressing just one aspect but of course he has other arguments we were saying that I have not completely arrested but it was not important for my talk but my talk but of course he has other arguments why why why there is no direct empirical status in the case of faraday sketch but as these arguments also do not work so he says that um electrostatic potential transformations they would have direct empirical status if electrostatic electrostatics was right about our world but it's not right because actually systems are moving and electrostatics is only about stationary systems and that's why this direct empirical status is not really realized but this this argument does not work because especially relativity which has boosted the symmetry is it's also not not like really right about our world because you have general relativity and so so so if he if this argument was working then he would not have a direct empirical status even for boost okay and the second argument was precisely this analogy that when you have electrostatic potential transformation they don't have a direct empirical status because they can represent the subsystem has not changed on the basis of changing the environment but I think this is just they are able to solve because they are local and that's why I mean it's not a good argument to say some symmetry doesn't have a direct empirical status purely because it's local but I mean it's just it's just the fact that it's local but how do you link this with um with ontology you can blame a symmetry on just formal grounds when I derive ontological claims from formal claims I'm I'm adding something I'm claiming that there is a correspondence between formal and ontological but then you cannot say merely because a symmetry has some formal feature it does not imply anything about ontology you you need to specify the connection and understand it will work so so saying that a symmetry has it doesn't have a direct empirical status on the pure grounds that represents the symmetry as it does form but why why I'm sure that since it includes a direct empirical status what is your justification okay you haven't postulated a link which would justifies this so it's it's it's a segment that's a proposal Kevin, can I have a question? Sure, thanks for the talk. Let me start with a question. I'm not sure of the suit how you make the difference in what is the oxymere of the environment and the distant environment but have a physical feature that allows you to discriminate and participate. Just the existence of the system? No but the interest in the sense is I mean you can claim that water is sufficiently uniform within the water anything is sufficiently uniform and within the shore anything is sufficiently uniform but in between them you have a clear defense which you can describe in terms of physical purposes like what is the liquid shore is not and so on so you you can have a clear kind of display. Okay, as we've been speaking that I would see how this relates to the equation of symmetries of the system and the combined distribution of the system and the symmetries of the environment and if you visualize that the more you have to finish the distinction between both of them then you can question the negativity of the soil system. I'm not sure I'm assuming how it relates to the question of symmetries. Yes, sorry, I didn't understand what is the question, it's not, it's a symmetry of the environment that's going to subsist, no? I don't understand how the distinction, how the distinction between the distant environment and the cause of the environment matters here. For the analysis? Yeah because it seems that except if you're making some high cutoff of when our forces are the vertebrates involved then you would have to take it for a problem that they found out because then you would be forced to take all of them and say it's because of the transmission, right? You have to take it for the more obvious part of the whole cause of the obvious in the same environment, right? It says that's easy to, you mean that the effect Yeah I'm not convinced but maybe you mean that the effect of subsystem transformation will be felt very, very far away or? Yeah, or you have a particular reason to take the cutoff because you feel that you're looking at the force here, it's an order of energy or something like that and then you make a cutoff because it's a way to make the force become invisible or something like that. Okay, so you have a question, yeah, so you can say that this fade in the way should stop not here but actually very far away. Yeah, well in your theory you can postulate the action so whatever, yeah but actually it's for observational purposes after some point your measurement apparatus will not be sensitive enough to get this so it will depend on if you have values one, two, three, yeah and then okay you can cut, it's not one, it's two but I can still say it's one half, yeah but then you divide and you get to a practical possibility to discriminate between very small viruses and the same here so yeah but it's for some things like if you touch the case when it's charged you will feel something you can be even like some persons can be dead because yes if it's to charge too much and you touch it but if you don't touch you will not see so it's this kind of approximate effects. So for some effects there will not even fade away, there will be a lot of results here and for others there is a cause of horizon and special activity so for some events they are too far away, I get any cause of influence from there, there is observational limit like you are in front of the ocean and you see until the horizon but then at some point that if the ship is far away you will not see it and if it's closer you will see, so practically there are always grounds to distinguish between whereas effect is still felt but whereas it's not even within your sea radio kind of thing, it's for more than with us, it's unnervified and very uncompleted. So it's an unethical definition of what is far away, so it's not unethical but it's still objective in the sense that it's a world which says us or that when you touch you feel an effect or when you are too much of a way you don't feel an effect, it's the world of the day you were to catch and it was as far as it's close, technically if you show you a kind of theory for it to assume that more or less the amplitude of the interaction is at least something of inferior, but it's close to zero or arbitrary close to zero but also that you still have some kind of that. As a world says when you have an effect and when you don't feel it but it does not tell you how far away you should say that it's zero rather than very small. You say it's pragmatic in the sense it depends on what you can ensure. It depends on what you want. It depends on how it works. But we're interested. Yeah, so which is I think the general metaphysics of medicine but let's kind of be sure, because if it's a general rotation, that's an interesting point because if you include that such distinction between you know what you want to measure or what you can measure or that goes a little bit against the Wallace paper where it was you know always full metaphors and we were discussing he was arguing against most of the debate on symmetry saying oh these guys did not work on all the manifolds with frontier condition but if you say no that's not how physics work physics work about subsystem like you said and we have maybe two kind of beyond the system beyond the system where you can see something beyond the system where we cannot see something who cares about the complete manifold. Yeah, but as I said Wallace denies his own assumption, yeah. So he was saying he was, well it was Green's and Wallace, they were analysing in 2014 in terms of the whole universe yeah and then he says no, instead of the whole environment we can consider just a small part of it, yeah. So he's denied, yeah. He said I was making an error, many persons were making an error, no, let's stop making it a consultative subsystem because physics is an essential subsystem. So this is what physics is about the universe is called cosmological assumption and in his new papers he says as well as denies this assumption. Nobody was confused between a global symmetry applied to one system in global symmetry applied to the universe. That's because nobody was confused about that except theoretician and philosopher of physics because they work with the complete manifold all the time so they cannot make the distinction under n. But nobody empirically was confused about that except us, you know, philosopher of physics asked the pages of my dissertation about this distinction that makes absolutely no sense outside theoretical physics that is really nobody empirically would say oh okay a boost nobody has used that in theoretical physics. In theoretical physics it's very difficult to make the difference. Yeah but then you just know from what he said because theoretical physics is essential. But what I'm saying is that even if he tries to be not in that direction maybe the fact that he works with manifolds it's already you know he cannot he cannot make this distinction. Now he can. Now he can okay maybe I'm up to date. But he is not yeah so I was discussing his articles as I said the the draft tomorrow in the south of 19 a bit after my PhD and publication is to solve the way to do it he was able to do it again. So but he is not so he still considered one or two but I made it the second that makes some difference. But he his system is such that you can add the smashers you want so in principle and still and still not reach the whole universe. So now you are tonight and you're still speaking all sorts of stuff. It's just great to ask. If there are any questions come on Kevin that's what to follow. So then he just started to get romantic with this distinction of why do you care about theories or symmetries or do you look at the symmetries of because as I said it's unsaid like she comes from moving into theories and then you try to make them adult. You should stop taking our mental consideration of how you define the the system that you're speaking or what you're speaking. Nobody uses theories of what is close to our model for its value. It seems between us it's a defect that what you're showing is that there is a defect in the original interpretation of theories and symmetries. But the defect it's not in the theories it was in the interpretation so his claim was that we are theories are final but just we were interpreting them wrongly. Yeah but I mean it's not it was not for human reason to abandon the theories. He was saying just let's interpret them in the right way but we're not abandoning or we he was not opposing us to switch to different models. He was saying the models are right but he was just misinterpreting them. I would say to switch the models we're saying to switch from analysis of the developed theory and how the theories work to analyze it from more general models to how theories work. Nobody is using these theories as full stuff from the different gas settings. There was something to do that. Lady man when he discussed about the friction on the boat. So you know that the boat moved because you had an eating effect. That's the empirical models and we see a difference. So that and if I remember maybe there's a passage of the paper but there's two pages to each other so in the in the high one. No but I'm saying that they try sometimes to have a more applied model to the kind of models that wouldn't be tested. Yeah but we're still the models as I mean we're still in physics. We're not abandoning physics. We're just adding more physics because the friction is modeled with a suitable physical theory again as I find this just like you're serious just about the boost or you want more theory which also explains friction. So yeah so I haven't told that this example of what happens with ship and water is from that man's manuscript but but he is not using it in this way so he's using this to say that water is a water affects the ship and I'm doing this layout because they want to influence all the environments. I'm saying the ship all affects water. They both they get the changes in temperature and so on. Yes but I still say with staying with the physics we just stayed in more physics but I'm not saying that the original interpretation was bad. I mean not about the universal system but about the one which Abadu spoke about in my own way. It's just that they also have less information but it's still correct that we it's correctly said that predicts that the ship changes with its visible behavior with respect to the shore and predictions inside are changed. Yeah but Alexander yes so I did it differently. So he lives in Appendix B where this is from so he has the same thing but this is the final state of the subsystem and this for him is the original state of the subsystem. So he uses the same thing but to represent the like special change in between two cages one of them is in the original state and the in the last home stage but I'm interpreting the original cage as the environment so instead of but it's essentially the same because he was saying he just like in his case the difference is special and in my case it's temporal so in between original state the final state he'll have time which has and here is special so but the analysis will be the same so this could be the right one was the original cage you must still have something to say about what happens in the deep. Could be an eighth question or absolutely eighth question. There's Americans I don't pretend like that. The kind of question they're keeping an eye on Chad I think so. They have many naive questions but they are not doing justice to the work they did so they're embarrassed to ask them. So a naive question would be like you talk about coexistent co-expansionality right while all of these notions seem modelled in nature so are we really interested in whether something has the same extension if we are talking about intrinsic properties and so on like whether it's intrinsic or not may not be an extension of the physical thing but that's super naive and very physical but also like another model consideration my head was like if you're talking about boosting is there like is it important that there is sort of intervention of the boost and so they're really a physical process or is it like the first situation of the boat and then in a possible world another possible world as you imagine a situation where the boat is moving or must there really be some sort of an intervention and what does that say about intervention isn't and so on I mean super naive questions that if you don't have anything to say about that that's no of course I do have thank you very much yeah of course there is a model dimension to this depot but it's mostly not what you were saying but I will say what is usually model but at the end you said what is really model in Hill's way of understanding the depot yeah so he says that for him the situations so here transform the states yeah so if I'm original state of the ship and transform state of the ship on the cage so for him it does not matter whether the states are actual or possible he fine okay if it's possible then you just have direct to bigger status with respect to possible worlds and if it's actual then it's with respect to actual world so the difference so why he was saying that there is no direct to bigger status for electrostatic potential transformations he was he manages in our world because because electrostatics is not right about our world so he says electrostatic potential ships have direct to bigger status in the world where electrostatic is true which is not our world but in some possible world it has yeah and the difference was for him that but boosts have direct to bigger status in our world because and I would I would complete his argument because the speciality whatever is true of our world but then I say no it's wrong speciality is no less no more true of our world than electrostatics is because there's an objection to our statistics is that the models on the static systems those which don't move and we have moving systems which are also which also exhibit the next phenomenon that's why we need it instead of statistics and so okay but this speciality is also more than just an immediate kind of phenomenon than if I'm generally serious which is more general which which involves phenomena which speciality does not matter so actually the boss have like a bigger status in a possible world if he is this kind of environment that works but of course in fact that it's not it's not a good argument because you cannot have anything bigger status respect to whatever we want in a possible world but what's we're interested in is ontology is mostly about actual it's not always saying that ontology or physics is about what would the possible world look like where Syria is true but it's not actually the questions we are solving because the important question is whether our Syria predicts what happens in our world whether it's true about the actual world yeah because the whole world give you experiments I mean manipulate things to to to see which model properties yeah but you you're linking this with intervention so it looks like what's important is intervention but for for this topic it doesn't matter whether it's we who intervene or whether it's like some natural process and we discover that one planet has supposed one planet is stationary but another is moving we can just discover it without doing anything but we can still ask where's the phenomenon within that planet or the movement that the station of what it was as I said that that would still be the case it's not important for the discussion it's not the world like agent it or something like approach to this boosting or whether you just look at planets yeah exactly exactly so it doesn't matter whether we can intervene or whether it's just a natural phenomenon what matters is where the both states are actually not because if they are possible then how do you know what really obtains well we just rely on your theory we suppose that it's true but it's not the question we answer we answer whether it's true of our world and not what the world will be like or where the theory is true so what matters is that both states should be actual at least sometimes and but it does not matter whether we bring them about or whether they are just naturally happen to be but it's more than that because if you look at the symmetry as a kind of transformation among models okay it's possible world and no care maybe one is that could be actual or not but you forget your own dissertation you know there's a big part of your description about how can we say there's an empirical status associated to one of this theoretical symmetry of models and if my memory is correct you claim maybe I could be wrong you claim in your dissertation that to empirically sustain that it is a real empirical symmetry you have to be able to differentiate a natural possible transformation from something that looks like a transformation maybe it's identical but it looks different because so at one point there's there's there's something substantial if you want to to claim a direct empirical yes yes direct empirical symmetry that you have to be able to know this is a real transformation yeah but this is identifiability this is what I call the observational incompleteness here so this is the idea that two states should be in vehicly distinguishable there should be some difference which you can observe between the answer in the ship case one is moving with respect to the shore and this makes observational difference and this tells you that the two states are indeed different perhaps they are different in the way which you have not seen but then you don't know perhaps they are the same and that's why I was saying yeah you need this observational incompleteness for identifiability of the transformation yeah but there is another thing which is about two ways to realize empirical symmetry so one is when you really transform one state to another you boost the same ship but another is when they compare two ships and this was already proposed one one stationary as opposed to two planets and this was always composed by Brazill and Braal and I was claiming that these two ways like we wouldn't so in my account it's not important we are not obliged to transform one thing into another we can just compare two different things which exhibit this observational different purposes but also some advice and this will still be in the vehicle so there is a chance we don't need to transform how how else modality is involved so there is so Wallace in his paper it is called observability modality and redundancy for dynamical and so on so he wants I was explaining how from formal you derive observational and ontological but he also wants from formal to derive model okay and in principle we can also do this with my approach but as to my material where model seems intervening was in this part which I will not much tell about so you have built an article of 2018 that I was on our conference in 2017 was given he was presenting that out so he here's an article which is called like 50 million Elvis fans can't be wrong because the physicists and the famous that the Elvis fans are right I mean if they like Elvis then there's no question what the Elvis is not because yeah and as a claim the best thing is physicists attribute they take states related by a symmetry of the universe to represent different possibilities this is the model thing yeah and as a since physicists do this philosophers should follow them so so physicists are Elvis fans they can be wrong and so philosophers they should if physicists represent take symmetry related states symmetry of the whole universe to represent this in possibilities and philosophers should also do this so this is not okay and and what I'm doing in this material about the film of this was because symmetries belt is interested in a different are even a boundary not the film of this but I need them to be subsistence in this we get the right thing was up and he never said this was the whole universe and I'm saying no you should actually start by the subsystems that he goes into the universe and I said no you should revert to the subsystem because because of Wallace's denial of the cosmological assumption for instance which has the physics is essentially both subsystems and so I revert from from a universal subsystem but they keep all the ideal symmetries and I'm saying that they have therefore they have right in the and I explain what is and explained in Bellot's article why do physicists think that symmetry related states represent different possibilities he just says they think so and philosophers should also think I'm saying no because and this is as serious and I'm saying no they are simply subsystems and this explains why they why they represent why they take symmetry related states to represent different different possibilities because they this is a theoretical symmetry because they correspond to different states of empirical symmetry which can be actually possible that's why they interpret okay symmetry related states corresponded to distant possibilities because they don't correspond to this but this happens when you have right because when you have a correspondence with the vehicle simply in the world or in his way where one or both states can also be possible so this okay so time up time up time for continued discussion