 I'll start on the left-hand side. I've noted three questions. One, two, three, okay. Can you start there? Alright, my name is Joseph Tufour from Ghana. My first question goes to Yannick on the energy issues. You give the German experience and then that of France, which seems to be fine for Germany in terms of how the individuals are able to collaborate and then set up, for example, a wind turbine to generate electricity. How is the German experience, for example, being able to be applied in a developing country given the context of the institution, the markets that should be existed for such an arrangement to be made possible in a developing country context? It's nice hearing the part of Nguyen, the Vietnamese experience in terms of the forest condition where you need to protect the forest and all that. You talked about the fact that there's a shift from a Greek to industry and then at the point I noticed that there were so many issues raised about the environmental pollution and all that. Why was the neglect of the policy and the implementation as there was a shift from a Greek to industry? It looks as if after the move, initially when it showed the rate of contribution from a Greek and industry, there's a gradual move to industry or industry is contributing much to development. Why was that neglect of taking into consideration the fact that as you industrialize, you are likely to pollute the environment more, for example, for example, polythene bars, robber takes a long time to degenerate and all that. Why was that neglect? The second point is that once you have forests, people may be living in the forest or close to it and there's a temptation for them to depend on the forest, maybe firewood, charcoal in the forest setting. In this case, how has that been managed in terms of the communities that are living in the forest or close to the forest and they are dependent on the forest resources? Thank you. Hong from CIM. I have two questions, two other comments. First, the two questions you would like to ask with the Yannick presentation on the kind of the financing institutions in France, in Germany. You describe very rightly that there should be kind of the right incentives to give to the projects, particularly green projects to be particularly with the investor to be able to invest in green projects. My question is what kind of incentives, policies the governments of France and Germany provide the investors in promoting the green projects in those two countries. And the second question is how can you ensure that the investor could be willing to come up with your kind of the facility, the fund to borrow or to ask for the grant? Because from our experience, sometimes the investor disencouraged to go to such kind of facilities because the opportunity costs are very high. My comments to Nguyen's presentation is I think that in addition to the institutional reforms you just described, I think very important, very important reform recently, Vietnam has introduced is kind of the environmental protection fund, which is the kind of the tool to provide the incentives to the projects to invest in IND on environmental protection and also to promote the kind of the environmental projects. And also I think that it could be very interesting. You could elaborate more in kind of the 1% of the environmental protection expenditure from the budget. That's very important but I don't think maybe other countries, we have such kind of the institution or the regulation providing 1% of the public expenditure to environmental protections. My last comment is to Channing. I think that I learned very much from your presentation and your kind of the exercise on the impact of the climate change emission and also the requirement of the investment to the green options in energy sector development. Our country is very much also similar to the case you applied to the Africa. So that's why my suggestion that maybe you could come to CIM and to make a kind of the joint research and to do the same methodology to analyse how the Vietnam can go with the green path and analyse the impact of the kind of the options. Thank you. Okay, thank you very much. My name is Wisdom Akbalu, I work with the UNU wider. And my question goes to the second presenter Ngoyen. The first question is about the environmental police. I'll be very happy if you can throw some light on that because one very critical challenge that we face in Africa, I mean, sub-Saharan Africa and specifically Ghana is about compliance with environmental regulations. For example, in fisheries we have laws that define the minimum mesh size that fishermen are supposed to use but you will find out that in most communities a very large percentage of fishermen don't obey these laws. We also have fishermen using light attraction equipment so they can attract the fish when the moon is out. So compliance is a big problem. So I would like to know how successful, what the role of this police is and how successful they have been in trying to ensure that people comply with regulations. The second question is about the payment for forest environmental services. As you indicated, only about 45% of this proceed generated goes to the communities. First of all, I would like to know how this value is determined or what determines the pricing of these services and whether the opportunity calls to communities who live around the forest for not cutting down the forest are actually compensated by the 45% that they receive. And if not, what incentive do they have to comply with the regulation of not destroying the forest? You also mentioned that one of the policies is about reducing the use of natural capital. What do you mean exactly by reducing the use of natural capital? Do you mean following an optimal path of extraction of this capital or you just simply reduce the use? What is the economic reasons for this? Thank you very much. And then we'll return for questions. It's the gentleman in front. The one next to you. Yes. And then we'll return for another round. Thank you. I have three questions. One for Yanik about the problem of guarantees which has been nightmare for energy efficiency and renewables and even in emerging economies like Brazil where the National Development Bank is quite capitalized. There's a lot of credit lines that remain idle and with no businessman interested in investing and the problem of requirement of physical guarantees is always mentioned. There have been some attempts to create guarantee funds and things of the sort. But this is really a problem. You mentioned renewables, wind projects, but in energy efficiency it's still worse for trying to foster ESCOS energy service companies. It has not been as good a success on the contrary. Even when the financial community comes, they get into ESCOS and actually reproduce a conservative behavior again. So the ESCOS divert from their original purpose. So it's been quite tough. And I wonder if after all the Jeff market transformation strategy and by that time there were standard contracts that were trying to be designed what is the latest status of the art in that kind? How can we overcome these difficulties? On the Vietnamese case for tank, my question is about the environmental policy tools, environmental impact assessment and the strategic environmental assessment. What's your experience? How many studies? Who is doing that? What's the cost? And particularly, is it mandatory for strategic environmental assessment as well or just for environmental impact statement? And what kind of projects, some examples of the experience, the conclusions, the recommendations are being taken into account in the decision making process. That means if they are done ex ante prior to the decision or just after the decision was already made about investment and they have no conditions to influence the decision making process. And a second question to you would be about the payment for service, for environmental service. I understand that 45% of the money has been flown to the communities and what is this money being used for? Are there plans, how the destination of this payment, this income is being used by the communities if there is an evaluation of the performance and the improvement in regional development or conservation, environmental conservation in the region? And the third question for Channing is about this carbon tax being regressive in South Africa. And my question is if you have already made an experiment with different ways of recycling the carbon tax income. For instance, probably if you reduce social charts on employment generation instead of reducing indirect taxes to make the carbon tax neutral, probably this would improve the social impact of the tax. So if you have got the right results on that, I would be curious to learn. Thank you. Okay, I think the panelists can respond. It seems that we will follow the same order than the presentations. The first regarding the relevance of the German model for a developing country. I haven't used the terminology German model. I don't think it would be relevant to any country right now but Germany. And because one of my point is that if you take the German model and you try to apply it to France where the differences are minute, because of these minute differences you end up with a totally different result. So you can imagine trying to use this model for a developing country where you do not have any of the basic institutional preconditions needed. It's simply not to work. And so the German model is not a model for France and even less a model for developing countries. But what is interesting is to see that in each country you can actually come with a very specific financial ecosystem for a task at hand. The lesson from the German model is the importance of the coherence and the consistency in your approach. You must have a very coherent institutional and policy framework. In a developing country, for example, I wouldn't go for cooperative right now because simply for even a question of income, the average investment in Germany is about 3,200 euros per person. So more than $4,000. So you are definitely speaking about a different level of money. But in a developing country you could, for example, rely on the local government. And results in the cooperative, you bring the local government in the middle and you try to provide access to domestic, to long-term affordable domestic finance to local government through a number of different policy and financial measures. Actually, in each country it could be interesting to prepare the same financial landscape that I did, the general one. So for example, for Vietnam, what are the different institutions? What are the different sources of finance that these institutions can capture right now? I know what are the different types of instruments and in function of what you want to achieve, what kind of institutional coalitions you will need to create? But I would think first local government and second ESCOs, Rural Energy Service Company. And I will come back to that one. Regarding the issue of incentives, what kind of incentives is being provided by the German and the French government to individual citizens? That's the same incentives. It's a fading tariff. What is a fading tariff? It's basically you provide a guarantee price over a period of 20 years, let's say. In Germany and France it's 20 years. And so if you are an investor, if you have a guarantee price for a long-term period, you can use basic investment appraisal tools to calculate what is to be your return. It's very, very simple financial mathematics. So people can very easily understand if it makes sense for them or not to go for it. I personally am a very strong proponent of a fading tariff. I would be very surprised if China was one because there is a real Atlantic divide between the US and Europe in terms of mechanism. But a fading tariff is only one mechanism. The International Energy Agency lists more than 4,000 different clean energy instruments, policy instruments. And so a key challenge for decision makers is to identify the right set of instrument in function of their objective and in function of their national financial infrastructure. There is no model, basically. There are tools that have to be configured to meet the unique requirement of each country. And often when you try to understand why something did work in a country, you realize that it's not so much because you came up with that policy, but because that policy removed another policy which was bad. So the root causes of a success are often quite interesting to investigate. But in general, whenever you are in the business of policy making, one should keep in mind that the most likely impact of any policy is the opposite impact of the one you were looking for. And it's a fairly solid rule. How to incentivize investors to go for a phone? Investors, normally, if you give them money with attractive terms, they will come. But unfortunately, having money is not enough. The quality of the management of your phone is extraordinarily important. And if, for example, in order for me as an investor to get $1 from your phone, I have to spend 50 cents in transaction costs, it's not worth my time. And it's quite amazing the amount of transaction costs can be associated with some individual phones. And in general, the smaller the phone, the bigger the tendency of the phone manager to micromanage to give tiny little amount and therefore the higher the transaction cost. If you want to incentivize investors to come to your phones, keep your management costs as low as possible and basically develop financial products that meets the demand. Managing a phone is a business. It meets the needs of your clients. Regarding the guarantees, Einstein used to say that to every complex problem, there is a simple and false answer. And it's exactly that with guarantees. It's very complex to transform a market. And so there is a high tendency to come with a simple answer. Guarantees. Banks do not want to lend money, provide a guarantee. But most of the time, the reason why an investment does not see the light of the day is because you have a number of institutional, technical, political, financial barriers. And a guarantee can only remove some of those barriers and not obligatory the most complex barriers. So as a rule, if you have 10 barriers, you might need 10 policies. Don't bet on all your hopes on one policy. It's very unlikely to work. There is a huge body of literature on this issue. I would recommend to one recent publication from UNEP on the partial loan guarantees for clean energy because it's relatively simple and the statistics are quite compelling. I understand that I'm running out of time, so I'm not to address the issue of this course. We can maybe have a discussion separately on that one. And that's it because I have... Okay, so we are now running into lunchtime. So if you still want more questions, I'll allow the panelists. It's up to you how much longer you want us to go on. But I'll allow the panelists to respond for the remaining questions. And maybe I'll take three more questions if you'll allow me. Yeah. Thank you for your question. The first question is about the industrialization in Vietnam. Why we choose the industrialization and as its cause of lots of pollution. Well, Vietnam accepted renovation policy in 1986. Almost 30 years ago. And we were on a kind of agricultural country and you know that poor country. So to get our poverty and to reduce the poverty, our direction is to push up the industrialization. But the economic growth and the industrialization is based on the low technology level sectors. And technology in our industry are almost outdated backwards and so it causes pollution. And that's why our new direction is to try to move to the green... modern green growth and green industry. Second, many of you are interested in the payment for forest environment service. The mechanism is that the government promotes the voluntary contracting between the buyer and the seller of the service, meaning between the hydro power plants, clean water companies. And the provider of service is the household that protects the forest in the upstream area. But because there is no such kind of voluntary contracting, so the government regulates certain level of payment of fee as I mentioned in my presentation. And this collected revenue will go through the forest fund, forest protection fund, either in the national level or either in the provincial level. And from that fund, the money collected will go directly to the household. So there is only until now 45% of this collected, around $140 million, dispersed, meaning paid to the household. That is because in the mechanism how to pay to the household protected of the forest is, it depends on the area, how much forest you keep, you protect, and the type of forest also. But in Vietnam, in provinces, the inventory of the forest, how much the area and the type of forest, identification of the type of forest, and also it needs also monitoring. Okay, the government gave you the money, but do you protect the forest as required? So the monitoring and evaluation also might get a complicated issue. So the forest protection fund also keeps 10% of this revenue to implement monitoring, inventory, and management things here between the buyer and the provider of the service. About the environment and police. Yes, in Vietnam, usually we used to have, and now we still have, that is environment and inspectors. Environment and inspectors goes to the enterprises, to the factories, and inspect the environment and protection of the companies. But it seems that it does not work well. Pollution continues. And also in our law system, when you come to inspect a company, you need to inform them in advance. So that's why when the inspector comes, then the company almost prepares for the inspection, like they will operate the treatment system or something like that. We reduce the production activity or something like that. But when we introduced, we established the environment and police. This means that they will investigate the cases where there is some kind of like environment and crimes. And they can go into the companies, into the factory anytime that they found out they had a violation of the environment legislation. They do not have to inform in advance. And through until now almost nearly 10 years, the environment and police show effectiveness of their activities. They have found out the case, the Vedan case, Taiwanese companies in Vietnam, in southern near to Ho Chi Minh City, where in 14 years they continuously discharged and treated wastewater. But they do it intentionally hide under the ground. And discharged into the rivers. And in 14 years they almost killed that river. And environment and police play a very important role to find out that and to find out the underground tunnel and the pipe of discharging this wastewater. After having this kind of environment and police, I think that enterprises and factories in Vietnam must have to pay more attention on the environment and protection, especially the waste management. About the EIA and SEA process, EIA in Vietnam is compulsory. SEA, the strategic environment and assessment are so compulsory for some kind of strategy, master plan and plan. And about the SEA, it should be implemented parallel with the development of the strategy or master plan or plan. And it needs to be conducted by the agency that develop the strategy or master plan. The SEA will have to be appraised by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment. And it is a base, a legal base for approval of the strategy and master plan and plan. And the SEA students try to incorporate, integrate the environmental concerns into the process of development of the strategy master plan and plan. EIA, it is more specific to the investment project. So every investment project, prior to getting the investment license, they need to conduct the EIA process and to come up with the EIA report. And in that report, they have to forecast environmental impacts of the project and then propose and provide measures how to deal with these environmental impacts. And to get the license, the investment license, they need to have the EIA report appraised by either by Moon Ray, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment or by the Provincial Department of Natural Resources and Environment. It depends on the level and the scale of the project. It's big or it's high. It's small. Well, so I think that is... And another question about sustainable use of natural resources in Vietnam. Actually, until now, Vietnam economic growth is relying on the natural resources very much. We export coal, oil, and in the past two decades. And to get our poverty, our economic growth more than is based on the natural resources. And now we're trying to shift to more sustainable use exploitation of the natural resources. For example, for mineral, we ban now the government ban to export the crude minerals without any processing. In terms of water, our water Vietnam is depending a lot on the outside. 60% of surface water comes from the outside country. In many reasons, we lack... We have deficit of water by reason, by reason, and also by season. Our production is the intensity of the water use is very high, so we will try to reduce the water intensity. And also in terms of land use, we're trying to use the land more efficiently. For example, we have 70 million pieces of land in our country because Vietnam is now 90 million, but our farming is at a small and household scale, so we divided the land into small pieces. And this is not used efficiently. So our direction now is to try to push up this and to merge the pieces of land and to make the farming more higher scale. Jenny, it's up to you. I mean, we now are 13 minutes in deficit. I'm not sure we'll be able to get more questions. Okay, yeah, no, I was going to say. I can be very quick. Regressive tax, absolutely. And perhaps I should have done that, but it's simple to do. There are some trade-offs that are involved, but we just haven't taken the time to work through the actual, all the mechanisms we just put in place, something that was simple, and that's what shows up. I want to respond to Yannick on feed-in tariffs that I'm not against feed-in tariffs. In fact, I just bought some solar panels on the basis of feed-in tariffs in my hometown on a little farm. And more generally, I don't think that we necessarily take anything off of the table in this kind of discussion. What's important is effective and efficient. We cannot have inefficient, and we are very often going to be in a second-best kind of situation, so we have to look, okay, what, given the situation, is the best way to proceed. We do not want to proceed in inefficient ways because that's going to give us a backlash, and that'll be a problem. And Tu Hong, we'll see you on Tuesday. Okay, so South Africa's just gone through a renewable energy procurement phase. The way that it worked there was that we had feed-in tariffs, and then we had guaranteed offtake agreements from government for 20 years. And the experience there, because we've got fairly deep financial markets, is once the rules were clear and the guarantees were clear, basically it was fairly easy for renewable energy providers to find the cash. Okay, anyone else who's eager will find the gentleman, I think, after the discussion, if that's okay, so that we can release the people who want to go. Sir, we'll indulge you, but I think anyone who needs to leave can leave the session. If you want to ask your question, you may do, sir. First of all, thank you for your very interesting presentation. And to set time, I'm going to go directly to the question. My question, first to go to Yannick, was how do you balance between the negative tax and positive tax? I mean, positive tax for fossil fuel and negative tax for renewable energy? Or put differently, what is the approach or method to identify the right level of feed-in tariff? And the second thing, you give the example of Germany and as well as the friends and the difference between the two is you would see that, I would see that, for example, in France you have only eight energy cooperatives and for in Germany you have eight hundreds. So I also found that in your presentation there is a limited equity finance from the French government. Is it compared to German government? I understand correctly. And so what is the reason behind that? Why the French government haven't supported that financial instrument? Thank you. Okay, we'll have the last question from the ARC. Yes. So I'm Samuel Mokubo from ARC. I just want to ask Channing the question that if say we rely on hydropower, do you think that it is very, very risky? Like in Kenya, about 50% of our power comes from hydropower and many times we have a lot of fluctuations. Do you think it's good to always go for a mix? Thank you. On the risk issue, there's sort of, depending on the size of the reservoir and so forth, short and long wave power fluctuations. This is a question I posed yesterday. We find that especially on the Congo and in the Nile that the power outputs are really remarkably constant. The Congo River Basin is enormous. And so there's a sort of portfolio. We worry a lot about climate change. We're going to invest a lot of money in a big dam and then it stops raining in the Congo River Basin. That would be a disappointment. But that seems also to be very, very unlikely. So it is something to worry about. What we tend to find is that that mixing hydropower systems with other renewable systems can actually give you quite a lot of stability and really leverage the renewable systems in that. The hydropower kind of serves as a short-term battery because it's relatively easy to move more water through more turbines or less as you're adjusting to either meet demand or deal with fluctuations in supply. So the evidence at this point is that it can be done and it can be quite reliable. I'm very impressed by your questions because you clearly paid attention to the presentation because I went very, very quickly on purpose through the slide on de-risking instruments because that was the topic of my presentation last year and I did not want to repeat that presentation. But in a nutshell, you have thousands of different policy instruments to reduce risk. But if possible, it's better to treat risk, notably all the policy-related risk, the administrative risk. It's better to get rid of them because, for example, in France, you need 29 agencies approval in order to set your project. If you can come with a one-stop shop where investors go to only one guichet, you dramatically reduce the risk of delays in the start-up of your projects and this has a financial cost. So as much as possible, it's better to treat risk and to treat it through policy measures. If you cannot treat them, you can transfer them and through insurance guarantees. And you should move toward fiscal instruments, negative or positive fiscal instruments, only as a last recourse. Because it has normally, when you compensate for risk, it has a high cost. So if you move toward fiscal instruments, it's much better to go toward basically taxing than giving a subsidy. So it's better to come with a carbon tax than providing a subsidy for something. And it's even better, actually, to remove subsidies, fossil fuel subsidies. So in the taxation instruments, first remove your subsidies, you will remove your subsidies on fossil fuels, after tax fossil fuels, and only after provide subsidies for renewable energy. So you have a gradiation, a yard key in the different type of instruments. But here again, we have done quite a lot of modeling in terms of cost, not only for South Africa, what kind of policy mix could work for South Africa. And I will need a presentation of 20 minutes to work you through. But I can give you the references in terms of literature on that one, what we have published on this issue. Your second point regarding the equity in France. It's linked to the regulatory framework for cooperative. You have different types of regulatory framework, but one of them prevents local government from providing more than 20% equity to a project. And the reason is because this, the regulatory framework for cooperative was designed quite a long time ago, and not with energy, not with decentralized energy in mind. So it's obsolete. It was designed to protect consumers. It was designed to protect the independence of the cooperative, et cetera. It was designed with other concerns in mind, and therefore it's need to be updated. You will find this for any kind of decentralized renewable energy. Most of our policies, most of our financing instruments have been designed for centralized, large-scale asset financing. As soon as you move toward decentralized asset financing, you end up with a lot of obsolete regulations that needs to be updated. Well, thank you presenters. It was great. And thank you to you for the robust discussion. Thank you.