 In February of 1861, Lincoln finally left Springfield, Illinois to head to Washington, D.C., to be inaugurated on March 4th. On the way, the president-elect planned to make several speaking stops. One of his stops would bring him to Baltimore, which was scheduled to pull in at the Calvert Street station on the morning of February 23rd. People gathered at the station, including Baltimore's Mayor George Brown, but they were disappointed to find that the train only carried Miss Lincoln and her three children. Secretly, President-elect Lincoln had traveled ahead of his family and boarded a train at 3.30 a.m. hours earlier. He was already well past the city by the time Miss Lincoln arrived. This was done on the advice of his security guards, who believed that there was an assassination plot planned in Baltimore. When he reached Harrisburg before traveling to Baltimore, he was also advised to replace his iconic stovetop hat with something less conspicuous. When he reached Philadelphia, his last transfer before Baltimore, he was escorted to a car reserved for invalids, and all telegraph communications were temporarily suspended. Instead, Lincoln took the advice of the private Pinkerton National Detective Agency from Chicago. Lincoln had hired them to serve as bodyguards since the government did not provide bodyguards for presidents at this time. The Pinkertons, as they were known, believed they discovered an assassination plot and convinced Lincoln to move secretly through Baltimore. One of the men implicated in the alleged plot was Police Chief Cain, since he was a vocal advocate of secession. Lincoln later came to regret his decision to follow the Pinkerton advice. One member of Lincoln's party, Colonel Charles Sumner, not the same Charles Sumner who was caned by Preston Brooks, referred to Lincoln's secret transfer as a quote unquote, damned piece of cowardice. He wanted the president to travel openly, but with a regiment of cavalry guarding him. Some newspaper cartoons depicted Lincoln as being disguised in women's clothing, peeking cowardly through cracked doorways. The supposed assassination plot has always been an interesting question of history. Speculation about the plot has pointed to a Corsican immigrant named Kipriana Farandini, if I'm pronouncing that correctly, who managed a barber shop in the basement of Barnum's Hotel, which was a popular meeting place for Southern sympathizers, including John Wilkes Booth. Some people have even speculated that Farandini and Booth may have even met there and planned the conspiracy, and the speculation was the inspiration for an opera written by Hollis Thoms entitled The Mustache. Farandini was even summoned before a congressional committee that was investigating any possible plans to interrupt Lincoln's inauguration. Farandini was happy to admit that he favored the South, but he denied any plot to assassinate Lincoln. The Pinkerton agents said that they met with Farandini at the hotel, where he informed them quote, Lincoln surely must die, end quote. Many historians doubt that any assassination plot was actually concocted. All we have are rumors and unproven allegations. Since Lincoln decided to pass secretly through the city, we will probably never know what might have happened, if anything at all. But news of the alleged assassination attempt spread through the city and gave Baltimore a bad image, deserving of its nickname, Mob Town. It's unlikely that we'll ever find any source that can confirm such a plot if one actually did exist, but even if Baltimore did not deserve the reputation it earned from the assassination rumors, it would earn its nickname, Mob Town, on April 19th during the Pratt Street riot. I'm Chris Calton, and this is the Mises Institute podcast, Historical Controversies. We've recently covered the bombardment of Fort Sumter and Lincoln's subsequent call for 75,000 volunteers to suppress the rebellion, as he called it. But the status of every upper South state, aside from Delaware, was in question in the weeks after the bombardment of Fort Sumter, and Maryland was among the most important states to keep in the Union. Lincoln is a famous, though apocryphal quote about Kentucky supposedly saying that he hoped to have God on his side, but he must have Kentucky. Nobody's been able to substantiate this quote, but it remains popular. But Maryland was probably even more vital to keeping the Union, because it was the only state other than Virginia that shared a border with Washington, DC. So if it joined the Confederacy, the Union capital would be completely surrounded. Thus, Lincoln and his generals made harsh and controversial decisions to make sure that Maryland would be kept in the Union, if not by choice, then by force. The first passenger train in the United States was the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the same B&O railroad we know from the monopoly board game. But in 1831, the Baltimore City Council approved an ordinance prohibiting any trains from passing through the city. For anybody taking a train through Baltimore, they would have to take a horse-drawn carriage along Pratt Street from one terminal to another to complete their journey. The ordinance unwittingly created the stage for the Pratt Street riot. That would take place in the city of Baltimore on April 19th, 30 years after the ordinance was passed. After Lincoln's call for volunteers on April 15th, 1861, he needed to get some of the earliest volunteers to Washington, DC to protect the nation's capital, and this meant that the troops would have to march on foot through the city of Baltimore. In many ways, this makes me think of Germany's Schleifen Plan in World War One, in which the German strategy to invade France was to march through the neutral country of Belgium. They assumed that since Belgium was neutral, they would be able to move through the country without interference, but the Belgians saw it as an invasion and they resisted. Likewise, many people in Baltimore did not support Lincoln's actions against the South. Many of them wanted Maryland to join the Confederacy, and the idea of union troops passing through their city in order to force submission from the seceding states did not sit well with a large number of Baltimoreians. Baltimore's chief of police, George Cain, was an outspoken advocate of secession, and he learned that the union troops from New York would be passing through his city. He sent a telegram to the Baltimore agent of the Philadelphia Wilmington in Baltimore Railroad asking for confirmation of the news. His message on April 16th, red quote, Is it true, has stated that an attempt will be made to pass the volunteers from New York intended to war upon the South over your road today? It is important that we have explicit understanding on that subject. End quote. The next day, Baltimore's mayor, George Brown, issued a proclamation of his own. He urged the citizens of Baltimore to stay calm and avoid harsh speech. Only the day after this, now April 18th, Secretary of War Simon Cameron sent a message to the governor of Maryland, Thomas Hicks, a message warning him not to try to stop the union troops from passing through Baltimore. Nobody in any position of authority it seemed was unaware that having the troops pass through Baltimore would likely cause trouble. But the news spread that two artillery companies and four companies of Pennsylvania militia would be passing through the city, arriving at the Bolton Street station and would pass through the city to Camden Station. The artillerists were part of the regular army and they had military uniforms. But the Pennsylvania volunteers had only their civilian clothing and many of them did not even have weapons. There were too many of them to use horse-drawn carriages so they would be marching on foot. Police chief Cain made sure his police officers were at Bolton Street to prevent the mob from breaking out into violence. And for the most part, this was successful. Most of the abuse levied at the volunteers was verbal. Though some did throw stones and the black servant of one of the officers, a man named Nicholas Biddle, was struck in the head making him the first casualty of the Civil War by some counts, though he wasn't killed. But it was the sixth Regiment of Massachusetts volunteers who would receive greater resistance. They came the next day, on April 19th. The men of the sixth Massachusetts had uniforms unlike their Pennsylvania counterparts. They were also full of pride at being the first volunteers to answer Lincoln's call for troops, thinking they were upholding the legacy of their forefathers who served as the first Minutemen to resist Britain in the Revolutionary War. Knowing that these volunteers would be arriving on the 19th, a group of Baltimore's more well-respected citizens gathered on the 18th in what they called the State's Rights Convention. They resolved that they would not allow any more Union troops to pass through their city. Word of the coming Massachusetts Regiment spread quickly throughout the city. At 11 a.m. on the morning of the 19th, the 850 volunteers in the sixth Massachusetts arrived in Baltimore. Colonel Edward Jones, their commander, received a telegram warning him of the dangers of marching his men through the hostile city. Jones was surprised. The previous day, while the Philadelphia volunteers were being booed by Baltimoreans, the sixth Massachusetts was being received as heroes as they passed through New York and New Jersey. He was surprised to learn that Baltimore would not view them the same way. So Jones made a change of plans on how his men would pass through the city. Instead of marching on foot, the men would remain in the railway cars. The cars would be detached from the train and each car would be hooked to a team of four horses, which would then pull them through the city along Pratt Street's rails. Before the men arrived in Baltimore, Jones visited each car to inform his men of the change of plans and see that every soldier received 10 rounds of ammunition. In addition to the Massachusetts volunteers, the train also carried another regiment from Pennsylvania. The 850 men of the sixth Massachusetts were armed, but the 1200 Pennsylvania volunteers under the command of Colonel William Small were not armed. So there was just over 2,000 men total that would have to pass through the city and less than half of them had weapons. Before their 11 a.m. arrival, a mob had emerged on Pratt Street as the horses were being brought to the station. The men of the sixth Massachusetts were loaded up first and Governor Hicks actually advised the unarmed Pennsylvania volunteers to return home to avoid danger from the mob. Meanwhile, the sixth Massachusetts were making their way along Pratt Street with each car carrying maybe four companies at a time. The 10th and last car carried company C, D, I, and L, and the car was led by Captain Albert Follensby, who was in charge of company C. By this time, the mob had blocked their car with rocks and anchors laying on the track and according to one soldier's testimony, given 20 years later, the men were ordered out of the car. According to this testimony, Captain Follensby ordered his men to exit the car and retreat but to only fire on the citizens if they were compelled to do so. When this was going on, Captain Jones was on the other side of Pratt Street and the first car of soldiers. When he learned that Follensby had turned back, he issued an order telling him to march his men on foot to Camden Station following the railroad track. Follensby instead had his men wait at President Street until he could receive further orders. The other nine cars carrying troops to Camden Station received both insults and stones from the Baltimore mob. By the time they arrived, some of the cars had broken windows and some members of the mob pressed up against the cars, threatening the soldiers with knives and revolvers. Just as the day before, the police were forming a protective barrier between the mob and the soldiers as best they could. When the soldiers changed cars, they cocked their muskets to be ready for violence but no shots were fired and all nine cars made it successfully through the city. But it was Captain Follensby's car of about 350 men that saw the worst of it. There was now a mob of about 20,000 secessionists separating them from the other 500 men in the 6th of Massachusetts. Finally, Follensby decided that they would have to fight through the mob. As soon as they started to move, they were charged by a group of Baltimoreans, one of whom, a man named George Koenig, was carrying a Confederate flag in one hand and an iron chain in the other. Koenig was one of the leaders of the riot and he would be the only rioter to be convicted for his participation. But the soldiers broke through this group only to find themselves completely surrounded by the Baltimore mob. The mob started hurling rocks at them. Two of the soldiers went down and nearby members of the mob pounced on them until nearby police officers rescued the injured soldiers and found them shelter in a nearby drug store where their injuries could be treated. The rest of the troops started to scatter, abandoning military discipline as each soldier tried to get away from the mob. If it hadn't been for the efforts of Mayor Brown, Marshall Kane and the city police, the soldiers probably never would have made it through the mob and this is noteworthy, especially on the part of Kane, who was himself an avowed secessionist and would find himself in legal trouble for it in the coming weeks, despite his efforts to keep the Union soldiers safe from fellow secessionists. The police formed a barricade behind the soldiers to protect them from the mob at their rear as they pushed forward. But once they reached a gay street, Baltimoreans were able to get behind the soldiers between them and the police. This is finally enough that the soldiers turned around and fired their muskets at the mob behind them. The secessionists returned fire. Four Baltimore civilians and two Union soldiers went down. Major Watson had been in the ninth car of troops, being the one just ahead of Fulensby. His car had been derailed by the mob and Watson tried to commandeer a loose team of horses led by a nearby conductor to help get his car moving again. The conductor refused to help. So Watson pulled out his pistol and threatened to shoot the conductor in the head if he didn't help get the car moving again. One of Watson's soldiers said he was hit by a bullet and Watson ordered his men to return fire. Fulensby's men caught up to Watson's car enough to be in view of each other. Watson's men were still inside their car, giving them some protection from the mob, even though it had smashed windows and at least one soldier had taken a bullet. But this was more than Fulensby's men had as they were completely exposed and on foot. One of the rioters left a description of the violence. He wrote, quote, a soldier struck by a stone fell almost at my feet. And as he fell, dropped his musket, which was immediately seized by Edward W. Beatty, a port customs officer who raised it to his shoulder and fired into the column. As he fired, he turned into the crowd and asked if anyone had a cartridge. I gave him one or two and showed him how to reload and then but took myself to the protection of the first doorway, thus escaping the bullets that were sweeping the street. The rear files faced about and delivered a volley into the crowd who responded with pistol shots, stones, clubs and other missiles. A perfect fuselage for the next few blocks was kept up by the troops and outrage mob, end quote. This testimony and others like it illustrates something important. The Pratt Street riot was not just a mob of young hotheads. Many of the active participants were well-respected citizens of Baltimore, officials and merchants and other well-to-do citizens. Some of the participants, such as Francis Scott Key's grandson, McHenry Howard, was an attorney and his father, Charles Howard, was the president of the board of the police commissioners. But when he learned of the Pratt Street riot, Howard asked if he had time to put on his uniform as a member of the 53rd Infantry of the Maryland Militia before joining the resistance. This picture of the riot is important because regardless of whether we see the rioters as justified in their actions, it was not just driven by violent hotheads. The mob consisted, at least in part, of many people who believed that as citizens of Baltimore and Maryland, it was their duty to protect their city from Northern invasion. And foreign invasion was exactly how these people saw the troops from Massachusetts. But the soldiers continued to push forward. Mayor Brown emerged from the crowd and ran up to Captain Folensby and shook his hand, saying, quote, I am the mayor of Baltimore, for God's sake, don't shoot. He then took his place beside the captain and marched with the soldiers, trying to calm the mob. He urged Folensby to slow down the pace of their march because it only encouraged the rioters and made the soldiers appear panicked. It was of little effect, and the mob only grew angrier. Captain Folensby, to contrast to the explanation, I just gave about the respectable citizens participating in the riot and their view of the troops as an invading army, said to the mayor, quote, we are attacked without provocation, end quote. This was probably his genuine view. His men were citizens of the same country as the Baltimoreians, so they were only trying to peacefully pass through the city on the way to the nation's capital. So here we have two contrasting views. The rioters legitimately saw the union troops as foreign invaders who had no right to pass through their city to bring violence against the seceding states, even if they were only meant to defend Washington, D.C. So this apparent invasion was certainly a provocation in the minds of the rioters, but in the minds of the soldiers, their presence was not a provocation, so both sides legitimately believed they were acting defensively. But the rioters certainly behaved as rioters, regardless of whether or not they might have had the right to defend the city, and much of the mob activities do them discredit. They looted local businesses for weapons to use against the troops, effectively turning against their own city as well. And as soldiers fell to the ground, injured by the rioters, it was other Baltimore citizens who helped carry them out of harm's way to treat their wounds. The day after the riot, the Baltimore Sun gave this account of the violence, quote, as one of the soldiers fired, he was struck with a stone and knocked down. And as he attempted to arise, another stone struck him in the face. When he crawled into a store and prostrating himself on the floor, clasped his hands and begged piteously for his life, end quote. Rioters tore down telegraph poles and laid them across the railroad tracks to obstruct the movement of the troops. And the city's police did everything they could to clear away the obstructions. But the mob was able to put another telegraph pole down as soon as the police removed the previous one. Some of the city's merchants found a cart of sand that they dumped on the tracks, according to Mayor Brown's account of the riot. Other rioters simply tore up the railroad tracks, which made it impossible for Major Watson and the men in the ninth car to be pulled to the last two blocks to Camden Station, forcing them to exit the car and join Colonel Jones on foot. But Fulensby's men were still behind them and the mob was at its worst as they passed Light Street. Four soldiers were killed here. And as one of the soldiers died, he yelled out, all hell to the stars and stripes. Fulensby ordered his men to go back to marching double time. And the men ran on, dragging their muskets with them as they struggled to reload and fire on the rioters as quickly as they could. The troops in the rear took the worst of the riot. As they tried to move forward, they were constantly being pelted with rocks from the mob behind them. And they would have to turn around, fire their muskets, and then try to catch up with the soldiers in the front. When the regimen arrived at Washington Station, they let off another volley of musket fire. And in return, the mob with guns fired back. And those without guns hurled bricks and stones at them. Finally, Fulensby and his men rejoined the rest of the soldiers at Camden Station and were loaded up in the train car waiting for them. They were no longer under attack, but one soldier fired his musket out the window of the train and killed Robert Davis, a highly respected Baltimore businessman. One final slap in the face to the Baltimoreans who participated in the riot. The train took off for Washington, D.C. with the soldiers who made it at 1.30 p.m. I've read accounts of the riots that conflict in their tally of the deaths which were exaggerated in reports, but as far as I've seen, there were 12 civilians and four Union soldiers killed. One of the civilians killed was a young boy named William Reed who worked on an oyster sloop and was not a rioter, but was hit in the abdomen by a mini-ball as he watched the riot on the dock connected to Pratt Street and he died later that evening. The soldiers were gone, but the leaders in Baltimore knew that the trouble for their city was only beginning. With a handful of Union soldiers killed in the riots, they understood that their citizens had effectively declared war against the Union. They immediately took steps to defend themselves against the anticipated response. Mayor Brown had won the respect of the Union soldiers by marching with them through the city and he was no secessionist, but he was an anti-war Democrat. With the soldiers gone, he decided that he couldn't allow any more Union troops to pass through his city. Police Marshal Kane agreed. Kane was tough and he was awarded his position after Baltimore suffered mob violence from the city's know-nothings during the 1859 elections. So the state legislature responded by passing a law removing all authority over police in the city of Baltimore and handing it entirely to Marshal Kane. It was really the ultimate authority in the city, even more so than Mayor Brown. And even though he had done his job in having the police protect the soldiers from the rioters, he was a secessionist and he would end up leading much of the secessionist activities in the city. With 12 of their citizens dead, at least one of whom wasn't even a participant in the riot, the secessionists effectively owned the city of Baltimore. A few hours after the Union soldiers left Camden Station, a meeting was held at Monument Square. A leading secessionist and doctor started to address the attendees, but he was interrupted by Mayor Brown. Brown told the crowd that both he and the governor of Maryland had requested that no more Union troops be transported through the city. He denied the right of secession, but Mayor Brown said he did believe the oppressed people of the South had a right to revolution. I don't really understand what distinction he was making here. He also said that he and Governor Hicks did not agree with the Lincoln administration's decision to use one section of the nation to subjugate another. Then one of the most prominent lawyers in the city, S. T. Walis, gave a short speech to the crowd in which he said, quote, I have not come to speak. If the blood of citizens on the stones in the streets do not speak, it is useless for man to speak. I assure you my heart is with the South and I am ready to defend Baltimore. I hope that the blood of the citizens shed by an invading foe will obliterate all past differences and seal the covenant of brotherhood among the people. End quote. Again, we see this perception that the Union troops were an invading force. This is a mindset that is hard to comprehend in modern minds, but in the years in which a standing army was nearly non-existent and almost entirely stationed in the Western territories, having the militia from another state pass through your city without permission was genuinely similar in the minds of Baltimoreans to the 20th century invasion of Belgium by a German army who thought it would simply be passing through without incident. But Governor Hicks was not popular among the secessionists and he was called on to address the crowd at Monument Square as well. They wanted to see which side their governor would take. As he was brought to Monument Square, the crowd was in an uproar. Finally, Governor Hicks spoke quote, I coincide with what your worthy mayor has said. I bow in submission to the people. I am a Marylander and I love my state and I love the Union, but I will suffer my right arm to be torn from my body before I will raise it to strike a sister state. End quote. With this, the city of Baltimore had effectively seceded from the Union. The city was fully in the hands of secessionists and quick action was taken to prepare the city for further invasion from the North. No telegraph could be sent without permission from Marshall Kane. Mayor Brown was permitted to send a message to President Lincoln informing him that no more Union troops would be allowed to pass through Baltimore. Governor Hicks added to the message that he fully agreed with the decision. They also sent word to the railroads to not attempt to transport any more troops to Baltimore. The city's militia was ordered to begin drills. Marshall Kane sent a message of his own to the militia leader in Frederick, Maryland, Bradley Johnson. The message read, quote, streets red with Maryland blood. Sint expresses over the mountains and valleys of Maryland and Virginia for the riflemen to come down without delay. Fresh hordes will be down on us tomorrow. We will fight them and whip them or die. End quote. This was two days after Virginia had made the decision to secede. And when the telegram reached Frederick, their militia was sent to Baltimore to help repel any invaders. The mob activities weren't done either. The rioters took to the streets that night and demolished the office of a pro-Republican newspaper and its editors were expelled from the city. Even worse, word reached the city that evening that more troops from Philadelphia were on their way to Baltimore by train. Then at midnight, another telegram came informing Marshall Kane that another regiment was on its way from Harrisburg. Kane went to speak with Mayor Brown and Governor Hicks and proposed the destruction of the railroad tracks and bridges. Brown and Hicks agreed. And at 2 a.m., the city's police and a group of Maryland guardsmen set fire to the Gunpowder River Bridge and then moved on to do the same to the Black River Bridge. Another group of guardsmen and city police took to destroying the railroad leading to Harrisburg. They destroyed five miles of track and then set fire to the Melville Bridge before dispatching some more men to the nearby relay house where a fourth bridge was destroyed. The men also cut the telegraph wires that ran alongside the railroad. Baltimore was now completely cut off from northern railroads and telegrams. With rumors spreading throughout Baltimore, citizens filled the streets the next day expecting hordes of Northerners to descend upon them. Their fears weren't ridiculous either. One New York newspaper published an editorial calling for Baltimore to be attacked, quote, through breaches in the walls, by sappers and miners with crowbars, with sludge hammers, with picks, with gunpowders and small bags armed with hand grenades, revolvers and cutlasses or other weapons that should be best adapted to the storming party and hand-to-hand conflict, end quote. Both pro-union and process session newspapers ran headlines touting the quote, unquote, Civil War in Baltimore. New companies of militia were organized. Horses were procured from the city's stables and military drills were conducted throughout the city. Rifles were donated by citizens of both Maryland and Virginia and Mayor Brown called for donations of ammunition as well. The city council authorized Mayor Brown to raise half a million dollars for the defense of the city and some bankers met the call by offering to advance him the money, which Mayor Brown accepted and called it an act of, quote, great patriotism, end quote. More volunteers began to arrive from outside the city to help defend Baltimore, the first being the Frederick Rifles and then the Patapsco Light Dragoons. On the morning of April 21st, a steamer named the pioneer brought 60 armed men and two hours after this, 35 more dragoons from Howard County arrived. Baltimore was ready for war. At about 10 a.m. on Sunday the 21st, a man on horseback raced to city hall and informed Marshall Kane that somewhere between five and 10,000 Union soldiers were only a few miles north of the city and they were marching toward Baltimore. Word spread and church bells started to ring out warning for the city to prepare. Since it was Sunday morning, many Baltimoreans were in church at the time but the congregations were immediately dismissed so the city could prepare to defend itself and those who couldn't fight could find refuge. The troops in question were actually a regiment of 2,500 Pennsylvania volunteers under the command of General Wincoup from Harrisburg. These men were untrained and many of them were unarmed and wearing their civilian clothing. They had no tents and no food. General Wincoup didn't really know what to do in regards to Baltimore either so he halted his troops in a wheat field in nearby Cockiesville. This was a good decision by Wincoup because the Baltimoreans would have certainly slaughtered his predominantly unarmed men. Almost a certain was that had he attacked, Maryland would have been pushed even further into the hands of the secessionists. But while Wincoup's men in the Baltimore militia were waiting for somebody to start a battle, Mayor Brown, Senator Anthony Kennedy and a handful of other prominent Baltimoreans met with President Lincoln, Secretary of War Simon Cameron and General Winfield Scott. They spent much of Sunday in discussion with each other and Lincoln was finally convinced to find an alternative route to bring Wincoup's volunteers to Washington. However, when Mayor Brown asked for assurance that no other troops would be marched to the city, Lincoln responded, quote, if I grant you this concession and no troops shall move through the city, you will be back here tomorrow demanding that none shall be marched around it. End quote. At 4 p.m., word of the decision reached Baltimore. After six tense hours of wondering if the Union soldiers were going to attack, the city relaxed, but they didn't let down their guard completely just yet. The Pennsylvania troops were kept under guard by Lieutenant John Merriman and his Baltimore County horse guards. When the orders to take the alternate route reached the Pennsylvanians, they began circulating their own rumors that they would soon be attacked by 6,000 troops from Baltimore. When they heard the galloping of horses in the distance, they panicked. One private from Easton, Pennsylvania, suffered a burst blood vessel, presumably from the stress, and he fell dead. When the sun finally came up on the morning of the 22nd, the soldiers had not been attacked and they were able to board their train safely and leave. John Merriman and his horse guards followed the train and they stopped 10 miles south of Pennsylvania to burn one more bridge just for good measure. Washington was now fully cut off from the North by Baltimore's de facto secession. Merriman's actions on this day would help place him in legal trouble with the Lincoln administration and the Union military as he would be arrested and held in prison and the right to habeas corpus would be suspended. Even though Lincoln and General Scott appeared to have conceded to the wishes of Mayor Brown and Governor Hicks, what they did not know was that Lincoln had already resolved to bring war to Baltimore. The city was too strategically important and it would have to be forced to submit. Six days after the meeting with Brown and Hicks on April 27th, Lincoln issued General Order 100. With this, the president had just declared martial law in the city of Baltimore and other parts of Maryland, suspending both civil law and habeas corpus and giving soldiers the power to arrest and jail civilians without any charges being brought against them. This will be where we pick up the story in the next episode. Historical controversies is a production of the Ludwig von Mises Institute. 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