 Question 137 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secundae, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of fortitude. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secundae, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of fortitude. By Saint Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 137 of Perseverance in four articles. We must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed to it. Under the head of perseverance there are four points of inquiry. First, whether perseverance is a virtue. Second, whether it is a part of fortitude. Third, of its relation to constancy. Fourth, whether it needs the help of grace. First article, whether perseverance is a virtue. Objection one, it seems that perseverance is not a virtue. For according to the philosopher in Ethics 7.7, Continency is greater than perseverance. But Continency is not a virtue, as stated in Ethics 4.9. Therefore, perseverance is not a virtue. Objection two, further. By virtue man lives a right, according to Augustine in Entree Will 2.19. Now according to the same authority, when Augustine says, in On Perseverance 1, no one can be said to have perseverance while living unless he persevered until death. Therefore, perseverance is not a virtue. Objection three, further. It is requisite of every virtue that one should persist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as stated in Ethics 2.4. But this is what we understand by perseverance, for Tully says, in the Art of Redirect 2, that perseverance is the fixed and continued persistence in a well-considered purpose. Therefore, perseverance is not a special virtue, but a condition of every virtue. On the contrary, Andronicus says that perseverance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to stand and those to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that are indifferent. Now a habit that directs us to do something well or to omit something is a virtue. Therefore, perseverance is a virtue. I answer that according to the philosopher in Ethics 2.3. Virtue is about the difficult and the good. And so where there is any kind of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue. Now a virtuous deed may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts. First, from the acts, a very species, which is considered in respect of the proper object of that act. Secondly, from the length of time, since to persist long in something difficult involves a special difficulty. Since to persist long in something good, until it is accomplished, belongs to a special virtue. Accordingly, just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for the reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch, which is of itself a difficult thing, while the other moderates fear and daring in connection with dangers of death, which is also something difficult in itself. So perseverance is a special virtue, since it consists in enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so far as necessity requires. Reply to Objection 1. The philosopher is taking perseverance there as it is found in one who bears those things which are most difficult to endure long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And evils that involve danger of death, for the most part are not endured for a long time, because often they soon pass away, wherefore it is not on this account that perseverance has its chief title to appraise. Among other evils foremost are those which are opposed to pleasures of touch, because evils of this kind affect the necessities of life, such are the lack of food and the like, which at times call for long endurance. Now it is not difficult to endure these things for a long time for one who grieves not much at them, nor delights much in the contrary goods, as in the case of the temperate man in whom these passions are not violent. But they are most difficult to bear for one who is strongly affected by such things, through lacking the perfect virtue that moderates these passions. For if perseverance be taken in this sense, it is not a perfect virtue, but something imperfect in the genus of virtue. On the other hand, if we take perseverance as denoting long persistence in any kind of difficult good, it is consistent in one who has even perfect virtue, for even if it is less difficult for him to persist, yet he persists in the more perfect good. Wherefore, such like perseverance may be a virtue, because virtue derives perfection from the aspect of good rather than from the aspect of difficulty. Reply to Objection 2. Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the same name. Thus Augustine says in his commentary on John, number 74, faith is to believe without seeing. Yet it is possible to have a habit of virtue without performing the act. Thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence without exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the habit begins to perform the act, yet does not accomplish it. For instance, a builder begins to build a house, but does not complete it. Accordingly, we must reply that the term perseverance is sometimes used to denote the habit whereby one chooses to persevere, sometimes for the act of persevering, and sometimes one who has the habit of perseverance chooses to persevere and begins to carry out his choice by persisting for a time, yet completes not the act, through not persisting to the end. Now the end is twofold. One is the end of the work, the other is the end of human life. Properly speaking, it belongs to perseverance to persevere to the end of the virtuous work, for instance that a soldier persevered to the end of the fight, and the magnificent man until his work be accomplished. There are, however, some virtues whose acts must endure throughout the whole of life, such as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last end of the entire life of man. Therefore, as regards these which are the principal virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished until the end of life. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of perseverance as denoting the consummate act of perseverance. Why to Objection 3 Unchangeable persistence may belong to a virtue in two ways. First, on account of the intended end that is proper to that virtue, and thus to persist in good for a long time until the end, belongs to a special virtue called perseverance, which intends this as its special end. Secondly, by reason of the relation of the habit to its subject, and thus unchangeable persistence is consequent upon every virtue in as much as virtue is a quality difficult to change. Second Article Whether perseverance is a part of fortitude. Objection 1 It seems that perseverance is not a part of fortitude, for according to the philosopher in Ethics 8.7, perseverance is about pains of touch. But these belong to temperance. Therefore, perseverance is a part of temperance rather than of fortitude. Objection 2 Every part of a moral virtue is about certain passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply moderation of the passions. Since the more violent the passions, the more praiseworthy it is to persevere in accordance with reason. Therefore, it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue, but rather of prudence, which perfects the reason. Objection 3 Further Augustine says in On Perseverance 1 that no one can lose perseverance, whereas one can lose the other virtues. Therefore, perseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a principle virtue is greater than its part. Therefore, perseverance is not a part of virtue, but is itself a principle virtue. On the contrary, Tully, in On the Art of Rhetoric II, reckons perseverance as a part of fortitude. I answer that, as stated above in Question 123, Article 2, as well as in the On Parse Prima Secunde, Question 61, Articles 3 and 4. A principle virtue is one to which is principally ascribed something that lays claim to the praise of virtue in as much as it practices it in connection with its own matter, wherein it is most difficult of accomplishment. In accordance with this, it has been stated in Question 123, Article 2 that fortitude is a principle virtue, because it observes firmness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand firm, namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of necessity that every virtue which has a title to praise for the firm endurance of something difficult must be annexed to fortitude as secondary to principle virtue. Now the endurance of difficulty arising from delay in accomplishing a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise, nor is this so difficult as to endure dangers of death. Therefore, perseverance is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principle virtue. Reply to Objection 1. The annexing of secondary to principle virtues depends not only on the matter but also on the mode, because in everything form is of more account than matter. Wherefore, although as to matter, perseverance seems to have much more in common with temperance than with fortitude, yet in mode it has more in common with fortitude in the point of standing firm against the difficulty arising from length of time. Reply to Objection 2. The perseverance of which the philosopher speaks in Ethics 7, 4 and 7, does not moderate any passions, but consists merely in a certain firmness of reason and will. But perseverance, considered as a virtue, moderates certain passions, namely fear of weariness or failure on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like fortitude, is in the Erastable. Reply to Objection 3. Augustine speaks there of perseverance as denoting not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained to the end, according to Matthew 24, 13. He that shall persevere to the end he shall be saved. Hence it is incompatible with such like perseverance for it to be lost, since it would no longer endure to the end. Whether Constancy Pertains to Perseverance Objection 1. It seems that Constancy does not pertain to perseverance. For Constancy pertains to patience, as stated above in Question 137, Article 5, and patience differs from perseverance. Therefore, Constancy does not pertain to perseverance. Virtue is about the difficult and the good. Now it does not seem difficult to be constant in little works, but only in great deeds which pertain to magnificence. Therefore, Constancy pertains to magnificence rather than to perseverance. Objection 3. Further, if Constancy pertained to perseverance, it would seem no wise to differ from it, since both denote a kind of unchangeableness. Yet they differ. From Acrobius, Kant divides Constancy with firmness by which he indicates perseverance, as stated above in Question 128, Article 6. Therefore, Constancy does not pertain to perseverance. On the contrary, one is said to be constant because one stands to a thing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand to certain things, as appears from the definition given by Andronicus. Therefore, Constancy belongs to perseverance. I answer that perseverance and constancy agree as to end, since it belongs to both to persist firmly in some good. But they differ as to those things which make it difficult to persist in good. Because the virtue of perseverance properly makes man persist firmly in good against the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the act. Whereas Constancy makes him persist firmly in good against difficulties arising from any other external hindrances. Hence, perseverance takes precedence of Constancy as a part of fortitude because the difficulty arising from continuance of action is more intrinsic to the act of virtue than that which arises from external obstacles. Reply to Objection 1. External obstacles to persistence in good are especially those which cause sorrow. Now patience is about sorrow, as stated above in Question 136, Article 1. Hence, Constancy agrees with perseverance as to end, while it agrees with patience as to those things which occasion difficulty. Now the end is of most account, wherefore Constancy pertains to perseverance rather than to patience. Reply to Objection 2. It is more difficult to persist in great deeds, yet in little or ordinary deeds it is difficult to persist for any length of time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed which magnificence considers, yet from its very continuance which perseverance regards. Hence Constancy may pertain to both. Reply to Objection 3. Constancy pertains to perseverance insofar as it has something in common with it, but it is not the same thing in the point of their difference, as stated in the article. 4. Article Whether perseverance needs the help of grace? Objection 1. It seems that perseverance does not need the help of grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above in Article 1. Now according to Tully, virtue acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the sole inclination of virtue suffices for perseverance. Therefore this does not need the help of grace. Objection 2 further. The gift of Christ's grace is greater than the harm brought upon us by Adam as appears from Romans 5.15 and following. Now, before sin man was so framed that he could persevere by means of what he had received, as Augustine says in Rebuke and Grace 11. Much more therefore can man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ, persevere without the help of a further grace. Objection 3 further. Sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult than deeds of virtue. Hence it is said in the Person of the Wicked in Wisdom 5.7, We have walked through hard ways. Now some persevere in sinful deeds without the help of another. Therefore man can also persevere in deeds of virtue without the help of grace. On the contrary, Augustine says in Unperseverance 1. We hold that perseverance is a gift of God whereby we persevere unto the end in Christ. I answer that as stated above in Article 1, 2nd reply and in Article 2, 3rd reply. Perseverance has a twofold signification. First, it denotes the habit of perseverance considered as a virtue. In this way, it needs the gift of habitual grace even as the other infused virtues. Secondly, it may be taken to denote the act of perseverance enduring until death. And in this sense, it needs not only habitual grace but also the gratuitous help of God's sustaining man in good until the end of life as stated above in the Paris Prima Secundae, Question 109, Article 10 when we were treating of grace. Because since the free will is changeable by its very nature, which changeableness is not taken away from it by the habitual grace bestowed in the present life, it is not in the power of the free will, albeit repaired by grace, to abide unchangeably in good though it is in its power to choose this, for it is often in our power to choose yet not to accomplish. Reply to Objection 1. The virtue of perseverance so far as it is concerned inclines one to persevere. Yet since it is a habit and a habit is a thing one uses at will, it does not follow that a person who has the habit of virtue uses it unchangeably until death. Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says in Honorabuke and Grace 11, it was given to the first man not to persevere but to be able to persevere of his free will because then no corruption was in human nature to make perseverance difficult. Now, however, by the grace of Christ the predestined receive not only the possibility of persevering but perseverance itself, wherefore the first man whom no man threatened of his own free will, rebelling against a threatening God, forfeited so great a happiness and so great a facility of avoiding sin. Whereas these, although the world rage against their constancy, have persevered in faith. Reply to Objection 3. Man is able by himself to fall into sin but he cannot by himself arise from sin without the help of grace. Hence by falling into sin so far as he is concerned man makes himself to be persevering in sin unless he be delivered by God's grace. On the other hand, by doing good he does not make himself to be persevering in good because he is able by himself to sin wherefore he needs the help of grace for that end. End of Question 137 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC Question 138 Assume a Theologica Secunda Secunde Triities on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Fortitude This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triities on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Fortitude by St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 138 Of the Vices Opposed to Perseverance in two articles We must now consider the Vices Opposed to Perseverance under which head there are two points of inquiry. First of a Feminacy Second of Pertinacity First article Whether a Feminacy is Opposed to Perseverance Translator's Note A Feminacy is here translated from the Latin Militias Literally Softness Objection 1 It seems that a Feminacy is not opposed to Perseverance For a Gloss on 1 Corinthians 6, verses 9 and 10 Nor Adulterers Nor the Affeminate Nor Liars with Mankind Expounds the Text Thus Affeminate That is, Obscene Given to a Natural Vice But this is opposed to Chastity Therefore a Feminacy is not a Vice Opposed to Perseverance Objection 2 Further The Philosopher says in Ethics 7.7 that Delicacy is a kind of a Feminacy But to be Delicate seems akin to Intemperance Therefore a Feminacy is not opposed to Perseverance But to Temperance Objection 3 Further The Philosopher says again in Ethics 7.7 that The man who has fond of Amusement is a Feminate Now a Moderate Fondness of Amusement is opposed to Eutropelia Which is the Virtue about Pleasures of Play As stated in Ethics 4.8 Therefore a Feminacy is not opposed to Perseverance On the contrary, the Philosopher says in Ethics 7.7 that The Persevering Man is opposed to the Affeminate I answer that as stated above in Question 137 Articles 1 and 2 Perseverance is deserving of Praise Because thereby a Man does not forsake a Good on account of long Endurance of Difficulties and Toils And it is directly opposed to this Seemingly for a Man to be ready to forsake a Good on account of Difficulties which he cannot endure This is what we understand by a Feminacy Because the Thing is said to be Soft If it readily yields to the Touch Now a Thing is not declared to be Soft through yielding To a Heavy Blow For even Walls yield to the Battering Ram Wherefore a Man is not said to be Affeminate If he yields to Heavy Blows Hence the Philosopher says in Ethics 7.7 that It is no wonder if a Person is overcome by Strong And Overwhelming Pleasures or Sorrows But he is to be pardoned if he struggles against them Now it is evident that Fear of Danger is more Impelling Than the Desire of Pleasure Wherefore Tully Says under the Heading True Magnanimity Consists of Two Things It is Inconsistent for One who has not Cast Down by Fear To be Defeated by Lust Or who has Proved himself Unbeaten by Toil To Yield to Pleasure Moreover Pleasure itself is a Stronger Motive Of Attraction Than Sorrow For the Lack of Pleasure is a Motive of Withdrawal Since Lack of Pleasure is a Pure Privation Wherefore according to the Philosopher in Ethics 7.7 Properly speaking an Affeminate Man is One who Withdraws From Good on Account of Sorrow Caused by Lack of Pleasure Yielding as it were to a Weak Motion Reply to Objection 1 This Affeminacy is Caused in Two Ways In One by Custom For where a man is accustomed to enjoy Pleasures It is more difficult for him to endure the Lack of them In another Way by Natural Disposition Because to which his Mind is less Persevering Through the Frailty of his Temperament This is how Women are Compared to Men as the Philosopher says In Ethics 7.7 Wherefore those who are passively Sodomitical Are said to be Affeminate Because Womenish Themselves as it were Reply to Objection 2 Toil is Opposed to Bodily Pleasure Wherefore it is only Toil some things That are a Hindrance to Pleasures Now the Delicate are those who cannot endure Toils Nor anything that diminishes Pleasure Hence it is Written in Deuteronomy 28, 56 The Tender and Delicate Woman That Could not go upon the Ground Nor set down her Foot for Softness Thus Delicacy is a Kind of Affeminacy But Properly speaking Affeminacy Regards Lack of Pleasures While Delicacy Regards the Cause that Hinders Pleasure For instance Toil or the Like Reply to Objection 3 In Play two things may be considered In the first place there is the Pleasure And thus in Ordnate fondness of play Is Opposed to Eutropalia Secondly we may consider the Relaxation or Rest Which is Opposed to Toil Accordingly just as it Belongs to Affeminacy Is able to endure Toil some things So too it Belongs there too to Desire play Or any other Relaxation in Ordnately Second Article Whether Pertinacity is Opposed to Perseverance Objection 1 It seems that Pertinacity is not Opposed to Perseverance For Gregory says in his commentary on Job 31 That Pertinacity arises from Vainglory But Vainglory is not Opposed to Perseverance But to Magnanimity as stated above in Question 132 Article 2 Therefore Pertinacity is not Opposed to Perseverance Objection 2 further If it is Opposed to Perseverance This is so either by Excess or by Deficiency Or it is not Opposed by Excess Because the Pertinaceous also Yield to Certain Pleasure and Sorrow Since according to the Philosopher and Ethics 7.9 They Rejoice when they Proveil And Grieve when their Opinions are Adjected And if it be Opposed by Deficiency It will be the same as Feminacy which is Clearly False Therefore Pertinacity is Noise Opposed to Perseverance Objection 3 further Just as the Persevering Man Persists in Good against Sorrow So too do the Continent and the Temporate against Pleasures The Brave against Fear and the Meek against Anger But Pertinacity is Over-Persistence in Something Therefore Pertinacity is Not Opposed to Perseverance More Than to Other Virtues On the Contrary Tully Says that Personacity is to Perseverance as Superstition is to Religion But Superstition is Opposed to Religion As stated above in Question 92 Article 1 Therefore Pertinacity is Opposed to Perseverance I answer that as Isidore Says in his Etymologies 10 A Person is said to be Pertinacious Who Holds on Impudently as Being Utterly Tenacious Pervivacaceous has the same Meaning For it Signifies that a Man Perseveres in his Purpose Until he is Victorious For the Ancients Called Vitya What we call Victory The Philosopher in Ethics 79 Calls Iskiro Gornomones That is Headstrong Or Idiognomenes That is Self-Opinionated Because they Abide by their Opinions More Than They Should Whereas the Affeminate Man Does So Less Than He Ought And the Persevering Man As He Ought Hence it is Clear that Perseverance is Commended For Observing the Mean While Pertinacity is Reproved for Exceeding the Mean And Affeminacy for Falling Short of it Reply to Objection 1 The Reason why a Man is Too Persistent in his Own Opinion Is that he Wishes by this Means To Make a Show of his Own Excellence Wherefore This is the Result of Vainglory as its Cause Now it has been stated above In Question 127 Article 2 First Reply As well as in Question 133 Article 2 That Opposition of Vices to Virtues Depends Not on their Cause, but on their Species Reply to Objection 2 The Pertinacious Man Exceeds By Persisting Inordinately in Something Against Many Difficulties Yet he takes a Certain Pleasure in the End Just as the Brave and the Persevering Man Since, however, this Pleasure is Sinful Seeing that he Desires it Too Much And Shuns the Contrary Pain He is like the Incontinent or Affeminate Man Reply to Objection 3 Although the Other Virtues Persist Against the Onslaught of the Passions They are not Commended for Persisting In the Same Way as Perseverance is As to Continence Its Claim to Praise Seems to Lie Rather In Overcoming Pleasures Hence, Pertinacity is Directly Opposed To Perseverance End of Question 138 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC Question 139 Assume a Theologica Secunda Secunde Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Fortitude This is the LibriVox Recording All LibriVox Recordings are in the Public Domain For more information or to volunteer Please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Fortitude By St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 139 Of the Gift of Fortitude In two Articles We must next consider the Gift Corresponding to Fortitude And this is the Gift of Fortitude Under this Head there are two Points of Inquiry First, Whether Fortitude is a Gift Second, Which among the Beatitudes and Fruits Correspond with it First Article Whether Fortitude is a Gift Objection 1 It seems that Fortitude is not a Gift For the Virtues differ from the Gifts And Fortitude is a Virtue Therefore it should not be Reckoned as a Gift Objection 2 Further The Acts of the Gifts remain in Heaven As stated above in the Parse Prima Secunde Question 68, Article 6 But the Act of Fortitude does not remain in Heaven For Gregory says in his commentary on Job 1 That Fortitude encourages The faint-hearted against hardships Which will be altogether absent from Heaven Therefore Fortitude is not a Gift Objection 3 Further Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine 2 That it is a sign of Fortitude To cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures Of the passing show Now noisome pleasures and delights Are the concern of Temperance rather than of Fortitude Therefore it seems that Fortitude is not the Gift Corresponding to the Virtue of Fortitude On the contrary Fortitude is Reckoned among the other Gifts Of the Holy Ghost in Isaiah 11-2 I answer that Fortitude denotes A certain firmness of mind as stated above In Question 123, Article 2 As well as in the Parse Prima Secunde Question 61, Article 3 And this firmness of mind is required Both in doing good and in enduring evil Especially with regard to goods or evils That are difficult Now man, according to his proper and conatural mode Is able to have this firmness in both these respects So as not to forsake the good on account of difficulties Whether in accomplishing an arduous work Or in enduring grievous evil In this sense, Fortitude denotes A special or general virtue as stated above In Question 123, Article 2 Yet furthermore, man's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost In order that he may attain to the end of each work begun And avoid whatever perils may threaten This surpasses human nature For sometimes it is not in a man's power To attain the end of his work Or to avoid evils or dangers Since these may happen to overwhelm him in death But the Holy Ghost works this in man By bringing him to everlasting life Which is the end of all good deeds And the release from all perils A certain confidence of this Is infused into the mind by the Holy Ghost Who expels any fear of the contrary It is in this sense that Fortitude is reckoned A gift of the Holy Ghost For it has been stated above Question 68, Articles 1 and 2 That the gifts regard the motion of the mind By the Holy Ghost Reply to Objection 1 Fortitude, as a virtue, Perfects the mind in the endurance of all perils whatever But it does not go so far as to give confidence Of overcoming all dangers This belongs to the Fortitude that is a gift Of the Holy Ghost The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on the way For they exercise acts in connection with the enjoyment of the end Hence the act of Fortitude There is to enjoy full security from toil and evil Reply to Objection 3 The gift of Fortitude regards the virtue of Fortitude Not only because it consists in enduring dangers But also in as much as it consists in accomplishing any difficult work Wherefore the gift of Fortitude is directed by the gift of counsel Which seems to be concerned chiefly with the greater goods Second Article Whether the fourth be Attitude Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice Corresponds with the gift of Fortitude Objection 1 It seems that the fourth be Attitude Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice Does not correspond to the gift of Fortitude For the gift of piety and not the gift of Fortitude Corresponds to the virtue of justice Now hungering and thirsting after justice Pertain to the act of justice Therefore this be Attitude corresponds to the gift of piety Rather than to the gift of Fortitude Objection 2 further Hunger and thirst after justice Imply a desire for good Now this belongs properly to charity To which the gift of wisdom and not the gift of Fortitude Corresponds as stated above in Question 45 Therefore this be Attitude corresponds Not to the gift of Fortitude But to the gift of wisdom Objection 3 further The fruits are consequent upon the be Attitudes Since delight is essential to be Attitude According to Ethics 1-8 Now the fruits apparently Include none pertaining to Fortitude Therefore neither does any be Attitude correspond to it On the contrary Augustine says in his commentary on the Sermon on the Mount Fortitude becomes the hungry and thirsty Since those who desire to enjoy true goods And wish to avoid loving earthly and material things Must toil I answer that as stated above in Question 121, Article 2 Augustine makes the be Attitudes correspond to the gifts According to the order in which they are set forth Observing at the same time A certain fittingness between them Wherefore he ascribes the forth be Attitude Concerning the hunger and thirst for justice To the forth gift, namely Fortitude Yet there is a certain congruity between them Because as stated in Article 1 Fortitude is about difficult things Now it is very difficult Not merely to do virtuous deeds Which receive the common designation of works of justice But furthermore to do them with an unsatiable desire Which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice Reply to Objection 1 As Chrysostom says in his 15th homily on the Gospel of Matthew We may understand here not only particular But also universal justice Which is related to all virtuous deeds according to Ethics 5.1 Wherein whatever is hard is the object of that Fortitude Which is a gift Reply to Objection 2 Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts As stated above in Question 23, Article 8, Third Reply As well as in the parts Prima Secunde Question 68, Article 4, Third Reply Hence whatever pertains to Fortitude May also be referred to Charity Reply to Objection 3 There are two of the fruits Which correspond sufficiently to the gift of Fortitude Namely, patience Which regards the enduring of evils And longanimity Which may regard the long delay and accomplishment of goods End of Question 139 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC Question 140 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triaties on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Fortitude This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer Please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triaties on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Fortitude By St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 140 Of the Precepts of Fortitude In two articles We must next consider the Precepts of Fortitude First, the Precepts of Fortitude itself Second, the Precepts of its parts First article Whether the Precepts of Fortitude Are suitably given in the Divine Law Objection 1 It seems that the Precepts of Fortitude Are not suitably given in the Divine Law For the new law is more perfect than the old law Yet the old law contains Precepts of Fortitude As stated in Deuteronomy 20 Therefore, Precepts of Fortitude Should have been given in the new law also Objection 2 further Affirmative Precepts are of greater import Than negative Precepts Since the affirmative include the negative But not vice versa Therefore, it is unsuitable for the Divine Law To contain none but negative Precepts In prohibition of fear Objection 3 further Fortitude is one of the principal virtues As stated above in question 123 article 2 As well as in the Parsprimes Acunde question 61 article 2 Now the Precepts are directed to the virtues As to their end Wherefore, they should be proportionate to them Therefore, the Precepts of Fortitude Should have been placed among the Precepts of the Decalogue Or are the chief Precepts of the Law On the contrary, stands Holy Rhett Which contains these Precepts I answer that Precepts of Law are directed to the end Intended by the Lawgiver Wherefore, Precepts of Law Must needs be framed in various ways According to the various ends intended by Lawgivers So that even in human affairs Because of democracies Others of kingdoms And others again of tyrannical governments Now the end of the Divine Law Is that man may adhere to God Wherefore, the Divine Law contains Precepts Both of Fortitude and of the other virtues With a view to directing the mind to God For this reason it is written In Deuteronomy 20 verses 3 and 4 Fear ye them not Because the Lord your God is in the midst of you And will fight for you against your enemies As to human laws They are directed to certain earthly goods And among them we find Precepts of Fortitude According to the requirements of those goods Reply to Objection 1 The Old Testament contained temporal promises While the promises of the New Testament Were spiritual and eternal According to Augustine in Against Faustus 4 Hence in the Old Law There was need for the people to be taught How to fight even in a bodily contest In order to obtain an earthly possession But in the New Testament Men were taught how to come To the possession of eternal life By fighting spiritually According to Matthew 11-12 The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence And the violent bear it away Hence Peter commands In 1 Peter 5 verses 8 and 9 Your adversary the devil As a roaring lion goeth about Seeking whom he may devour Whom resist ye strong in faith As also James 4-7 And he will fly from you Since, however, men while tending to spiritual goods May be withdrawn from them by corporal dangers Precepts of Fortitude had to be given Even in the New Law That they might bravely endure temporal evils According to Matthew 10-28 Fear ye not them that kill the body Reply to Objection 2 The law gives general directions in its precepts But the things that have to be done In cases of danger are not Like the things to be avoided Reducible to some common thing Hence the precepts of Fortitude are negative Rather than affirmative Reply to Objection 3 As stated above in Question 122 Article 1 The precepts of the Decalogue Are placed in the law as first principles Which need to be known to all from the outset Wherefore the precepts of the Decalogue Had to be chiefly about those acts of justice In which the notion of duty is manifest And not about acts of Fortitude Because it is not so evident That it is a duty for a person Not to fear dangers of death 2nd Article Whether the precepts of the parts of Fortitude Are suitably given in the Divine Law Objection 1 It seems that the precepts of the parts of Fortitude Are unsuitably given in the Divine Law For just as patience and perseverance Are parts of Fortitude So also are magnificence, magnanimity and confidence As stated above in Question 128 Now we find precepts of patience in the Divine Law As also of perseverance Therefore there should also have been precepts Of magnificence and magnanimity Objection 2 further Patience is a very necessary virtue Since it is the guardian of the other virtues As Gregory says in his Homily 35 on the Gospel Now the other virtues are commanded absolutely Therefore patience should not have been commanded merely As Augustine says in his commentary on the Sermon on the Mount As to preparedness of the mind Objection 3 further Patience and perseverance are parts of Fortitude As stated above in Question 128 And Question 136 Article 4 As well as in Question 137 Article 2 Now the precepts of Fortitude are not affirmative But only negative as stated above in Article 1, 2 Reply Therefore the precepts of patience and perseverance Should have been negative and not affirmative The contrary, however, follows from the way In which they are given by Holy writ I answer that The Divine Law instructs man perfectly About such things as are necessary for right living Now in order to live a right Man needs not only the principle virtues But also the secondary and the next virtues Wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts Not only about the acts of the principle virtues But also about the acts of the secondary and the next virtues Reply to Objection 1 Magnificence and magnanimity Do not belong to the genus of Fortitude Except by reason of a certain excellence of greatness Which they regard in their respective matters Now things pertaining to excellence Come under the counsels of perfection Rather than under precepts of obligation Wherefore there was need of counsels Rather than of precepts About magnificence and magnanimity On the other hand, the hardships and toils Of the present life pertain to patience and perseverance Not by reason of any greatness observable in them But on account of the very nature of those virtues Hence the need of precepts of patience and perseverance Reply to Objection 2 As stated above in Question 3, Article 2 Although affirmative precepts are always binding They are not binding for always But according to time and place Wherefore just as the affirmative precepts About the other virtues are to be understood As to the preparedness of the mind In the sense that man be prepared to fulfill them when necessary So too are the precepts of patience to be understood in the same way Reply to Objection 3 Fortitude, as distinct from patience and perseverance Is about the greatest dangers wherein one must proceed with caution Nor is it necessary to determine what is to be done in particular On the other hand, patience and perseverance Are about minor hardships and toils Wherefore there is less danger in determining Especially in general, what is to be done in such cases End of Question 140 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC Question 141 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triates on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Temperance This is the LibriVox Recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triates on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Temperance By St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 141 of Temperance In 8 articles In the next place, we must consider Temperance 1. Temperance itself 2. Its parts 3. Its precepts With regard to Temperance, we must consider 1. Temperance itself 2. The contrary vices Under the first head, there are 8 points of inquiry First, whether Temperance is a Virtue Second, whether it is a Special Virtue Third, whether it is only about desires and pleasures Fourth, whether it is only about pleasures of touch Fifth, whether it is about pleasures of taste as such Or only as a kind of touch Sixth, what is the Rule of Temperance Seventh, whether it is a Cardinal or Principal Virtue Eighth, whether it is the Greatest of Virtues First article, whether Temperance is a Virtue Objection 1 It seems that Temperance is not a Virtue For no Virtue goes against the inclination of nature Since there is in us a natural aptitude for Virtue Estated in Ethics 2.1 Now Temperance withdraws us from pleasures to which nature inclines according to Ethics 2, 3 and 8 Therefore Temperance is not a Virtue Objection 2 Further, Virtues are connected with one another as stated above in Bar's Prima Secunde Question 65, Article 1 But some people have Temperance without having the other Virtues For we find many who are temperate and yet covetous or timid Therefore Temperance is not a Virtue Objection 3 Further, to every Virtue there is a corresponding gift As appears from what we have said above in Bar's Prima Secunde Question 68, Article 4 But seemingly no gift corresponds to Temperance Since all the gifts have already been ascribed to other Virtues As already seen in Questions 8, 9, 19, 45, 52, 71 and 139 Therefore Temperance is not a Virtue On the contrary, Augustine says in Music 615 Temperance is the name of a Virtue I answer that as stated above in Bar's Prima Secunde Question 55, Article 3 It is essential to Virtue to accline man to good Now the good of man is to be in accordance with reason As Dionysius states in On the Divine Names 4 Hence human Virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance with reason Now Temperance evidently inclines man to this Since its very name implies moderation or temperateness Which reason causes Therefore Temperance is a Virtue Reply to Objection 1 Nature inclines everything to whatever is becoming to it Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are becoming to him Since however man as such is a rational being It follows that those pleasures are becoming to man Which are in accordance with reason Such pleasures Temperance does not withdraw him But from those which are contrary to reason Wherefore it is clear that Temperance is not contrary to the inclination of human nature But is in accord with it It is however contrary to the inclination of the animal nature that is not subject to reason Reply to Objection 2 The Temperance which fulfills the conditions of perfect Virtue is not without prudence While this is lacking to all who are in sin Hence those who lack other Virtues through being subject to the opposite vices Have not the Temperance which is a Virtue Though they do acts of Temperance from a certain natural disposition Insofar as certain imperfect Virtues are either natural to man as stated above In Paras Prima Secunde, Question 63, Article 1 Or acquired by habituation Which Virtues through lack of prudence are not perfected by reason as stated above Paras Prima Secunde, Question 65, Article 1 Reply to Objection 3 Temperance also has a corresponding gift Namely Fear Whereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh According to Psalm 118, Verse 120 Pierce thou my flesh with thy fear The gift of fear has for its principal object God Whom it avoids offending And in this respect it corresponds to the Virtue of Hope as stated above Question 19, Article 9, First Reply But it may have for its secondary object whatever a man shuns In order to avoid offending God Now man stands in the greatest need of the fear of God In order to shun those things which are most seductive And these are the matter of Temperance Wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to Temperance also Second Article Whether Temperance is a special Virtue Objection 1 It would seem that Temperance is not a special Virtue For Augustine says on the morals of the Catholic Church And on the morals of the Manichaeans 15 that It belongs to Temperance to preserve one's integrity and freedom from corruption for God's sake But this is common to every Virtue Therefore Temperance is not a special Virtue Objection 2 Further, Ambrose says in On the Duties of the Clergy 142 that What we observe and seek most in Temperance is Tranquility of Soul But this is common to every Virtue Therefore Temperance is not a special Virtue Objection 3 Further, Tali says as referred to in On the Duties of the Clergy 127 that We cannot separate the beautiful from the virtuous And that whatever is just is beautiful Now the beautiful is considered as proper to Temperance according to the same authority Therefore Temperance is not a special Virtue On the contrary, the Philosopher in Ethics 27 and Ethics 310 Reckons it a special Virtue I answer that it is customary in human speech to employ a common term in a restricted sense In order to designate the principal things to which that common term is applicable Thus the word city is used antinomastically to designate Rome Translators note Antinomazia in Greek is the figure of speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term For example, the Philosopher for Aristotle Accordingly, the word Temperance has a twofold Acceptation First, in accordance with its common Signification And thus Temperance is not a special but a general Virtue Because the word Temperance signifies a certain Temperateness or Moderation Which reason appoints to human operations and passions And this is common to every moral Virtue Yet there is a logical difference between Temperance and Fortitude Even if we take them both as general Virtues Since Temperance withdraws man from things which seduce the appetite from obeying reason While Fortitude incites him to endure or withstand those things on account of which he forsakes the good of reason On the other hand, if we take Temperance antinomastically As withholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive to man It is a special Virtue For thus it has, like Fortitude, a special matter Reply to Objection 1 Man's appetite is corrupted chiefly by those things which seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and divine law Wherefore, Integrity, which Augustine ascribes to Temperance Can, like the latter, be taken in two ways First, in a general sense And secondly, in a sense of excellence Reply to Objection 2 The things about which Temperance is concerned Have a most disturbing effect on the soul For the reason that they are natural to man as we shall state further on in Articles 4 and 5 Hence Tranquility of soul is ascribed to Temperance by way of excellence Although it is a common property of all the Virtues Reply to Objection 3 Although Beauty is becoming to every Virtue It is ascribed to Temperance by way of excellence for two reasons First, in respect of the generic notion of Temperance Which consists in a certain moderate and fitting proportion And this is what we understand by Beauty as attested by Dionysius in On the Divine Names 4 Secondly, because the things from which Temperance withholds us hold the lowest place in man And are becoming to him by reason of his animal nature as we shall state further on Articles 4 and 5 as well as Question 142 Article 4 Wherefore it is natural that such things should defile him In consequence, Beauty is a foremost attribute of Temperance Which above all hinders man from being defiled In like manner, Honesty Translators note Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness From the point of view of Decorum Is a special attribute of Temperance For Isidore says in Etymologies 10 An honest man is one who has no defilement For honesty means an honorable state This is most applicable to Temperance Which withstands the vices that bring most dishonour on man As we shall state further on In Question 142 Article 4 Third Article Whether Temperance is only about desires and pleasures Objection 1 It would seem that Temperance is not only about desires and pleasures For Tully says in On the Art of Rhetoric 254 Temperance is reason's firm and moderate mastery of lust And other wanton emotions of the mind Now all passions of the soul are called emotions of the mind Therefore it seems that Temperance is not only about desires and pleasures Objection 2 Further Virtue is about the Difficult and the Good As stated in Ethics 23 Now it seems more difficult to temper fear Especially with regard to dangers of death Than to moderate desires and pleasures Which are despised on account of deadly pains and dangers According to Augustine in his 83 Questions Question 36 Therefore it seems that the virtue of Temperance Is not chiefly about desires and pleasures Objection 3 Further According to Ambrose in On the Duties of the Clergy 143 The Grace of Moderation belongs to Temperance And Tully says that It is the concern of Temperance to calm all disturbances of the mind And to enforce moderation Now moderation is needed Not only in desires and pleasures But also in external acts Temperance pertains to the exterior Therefore Temperance is not only about desires and pleasures On the contrary Isidore says in his Etymologies That it is Temperance whereby lust and desire are kept under control Translators note The words quoted do not occur in the work referred to Confer rather to his On the Supreme Good Chapters 37 and 42 I answer that as stated above In Question 123 Article 12 In Question 136 Article 1 It belongs to moral virtue To safeguard the good of reason Against the passions that rebel against reason Now the movement of the soul's passions is twofold As stated above In Paras Prima-Sakunde Question 23 Article 2 When we were treating of the passions The one whereby the sensitive appetite pursues sensible and bodily goods The other whereby it flies from sensible and bodily evils The first of these movements of the sensitive appetite Rebells against reason Chiefly by lack of moderation Because sensible and bodily goods Considered in their species Are not in opposition to reason But are subject to it as instruments which reason employs In order to attain its proper end And that they are opposed to reason Is owing to the fact that the sensitive appetite Fails to tend towards them in accord with the mode of reason Hence it belongs properly to moral virtue To moderate those passions which denote a pursuit of the good On the other hand The movement of the sensitive appetite In flying from sensible evil Is mostly in opposition to reason Not through being immoderate But chiefly in respect of its flight Because when a man flies from sensible and bodily evils Which sometimes accompany the good of reason The result is that he flies from the good of reason Hence it belongs to moral virtue to make man While flying from evil To remain firm in the good of reason Accordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude Which by its very nature bestows firmness Is chiefly concerned with the passion Notably fear Which regards flight from bodily evils And consequently with daring Which attacks the objects of fear In the hope of attaining some good So to temperance Which denotes a kind of moderation Is chiefly concerned with those passions That tend towards sensible goods Notably desire and pleasure And consequently with the sorrows that arise From the absence of those pleasures For just as daring presupposes objects of fear So to such like sorrow arises From the absence of the aforesaid pleasures Reply to Objection 1 As stated above in Paras Prima Secunde Question 23, Articles 1 and 2 As well as Question 25, Article 1 Of Paras Prima Secunde When we were treating of the passions Those passions which pertain to avoidance of evil Presuppose the passions pertaining to the pursuit of good And the passions of the irascible Presuppose the passions of the concupisable Hence, while temperance directly moderates The passions of the concupisable Which tend towards good As a consequence, it moderates all the other passions Inasmuch as moderation of the passions that precede Results in moderation of the passions that follow Since he that is not immoderate in desire Is moderate in hope And grieves moderately for the absence Of the things he desires Reply to Objection 2 Desire denotes an impulse of the appetite Towards the object of pleasure And this impulse needs control Which belongs to temperance On the other hand, fear denotes a withdrawal Of the mind from certain evils Against which man needs firmness of mind Which fortitude bestows Hence, temperance is properly about desires And fortitude about fears Reply to Objection 3 External acts proceed from the internal passions of the soul Wherefore, their moderation depends on the moderation Of the internal passions Fourth article Whether temperance is only about desires And pleasures of touch Objection 1 You would seem that temperance is not only about desires And pleasures of touch For Augustine says in On the morals of the Catholic Church And on the morals of the Manichaeans 19 that The function of temperance is to control and quell the desires Which draw us to the things which withdraw us from the laws of God And from the fruit of his goodness And a little further on he adds that It is the duty of temperance to spurn all bodily allurements Now, we are withdrawn from God's laws Not only by the desire for pleasures of touch But also by the desire for pleasures of the other senses For these too belong to the bodily allurements And again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory Wherefore it is written in 1 Timothy 6-10 Desire is the root of all evils Translators note Desire is translated from the Latin Cupiditas Which the Dewey version, following the Greek Filargeria Renders desire of money Therefore temperance is not only about desires of pleasures of touch Objection 2 Further, the philosopher says in Ethics 4-3 that One who is worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is temperate But he is not magnificent Now honors, whether small or great, of which he is speaking there Are an object of pleasure, not of touch But in the soul's apprehension Therefore temperance is not only about desires for pleasure of touch Objection 3 Further, things that are of the same genus Would seem to pertain to the matter of a particular virtue Under one same aspect Now all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus Therefore they all equally belong to the matter of temperance Objection 4 Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the pleasures of the body As stated above in Parts Prima Secunde, Question 31, Article 5 In the triates on the passions Now sometimes men forsake God's laws in the state of virtue Through desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance Through curiosity in matters of knowledge Wherefore the devil promised man knowledge saying in Genesis 3-5 Ye shall be as God's, knowing good and evil Therefore temperance is not only about pleasures of touch Objection 5 Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter of temperance You would follow that temperance is about all pleasures of touch But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur in games Therefore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of temperance On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 3-10 that Temperance is properly about desires of pleasures of touch I answer that, as stated above in Article 3 Temperance is about desires and pleasures in the same way as fortitude is about fear and daring Now fortitude is about fear and daring with respect to the greatest evils whereby nature itself is dissolved And such are dangers of death Wherefore, in like manner, temperance must needs be about desires for the greatest pleasures And since pleasure results from a natural operation It is so much the greater according as it results from a more natural operation Now to animals, the most natural operations are those which preserve the nature of the individual by means of meat and drink And the nature of the species by the union of the sexes Hence temperance is properly about pleasures of meat and drink and sexual pleasures Now these pleasures result from the sense of touch Wherefore, it follows that temperance is about pleasures of touch Reply to Objection 1 In the passage quoted, Augustine apparently takes temperance not as a special virtue having a determinate matter But as concerned with the moderation of reason in any matter whatever And this is a general condition of every virtue However, we may also reply that if a man can control the greatest pleasures, much more can he control lesser ones Wherefore, it belongs chiefly and properly to temperance to moderate desires and pleasures of touch and secondarily other pleasures Reply to Objection 2 The philosopher takes temperance as denoting moderation in external things When, to wit, a man tends to that which is proportionate to him But not as denoting moderation in the soul's emotions which pertains to the virtue of temperance Reply to Objection 3 The pleasures of the other senses play a different part in man and in other animals For in other animals, pleasures do not result from the other senses save in relation to sensibles of touch Thus the lion is pleased to see the stag or to hear its voice in relation to his food On the other hand, man derives pleasure from the other senses, not only for this reason But also an account of the becomingness of the sensible object Wherefore temperance is about the pleasures of the other senses in relation to pleasures of touch Not principally, but consequently While insofar as the sensible objects of the other senses are pleasant on account of their becomingness As when a man is pleased at a well-harmonized sound, this pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature Hence these passions are not of such importance that temperance can be referred to them antinomastically Reply to Objection 4 Although spiritual pleasures are by their nature greater than bodily pleasures They are not so perceptible to the senses And consequently, they do not so strongly affect the sensitive appetite Against whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded by moral virtue We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly speaking, are in accordance with reason Wherefore they need no control save accidentally Insofar as one spiritual pleasure is a hindrance to another greater and more binding Reply to Objection 5 Not all pleasures of touch regard the preservation of nature And consequently, it does not follow that temperance is about all pleasures of touch Fifth article Whether temperance is about the pleasures proper to the taste Objection 1 It would seem that temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste For pleasures of the taste result from food and drink Which are more necessary to man's life than sexual pleasures which regard the touch But according to what has been said in article 4 Temperance is about pleasures and things that are necessary to human life Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste Rather than about those proper to the touch Objection 2 Further temperance is about the passions rather than about things themselves Now according to On the Soul 2.3 The touch is the sense of food as regards the very substance of the food Whereas savor which is the proper object of the taste is the pleasing quality of the food Therefore temperance is about the taste rather than about the touch Objection 3 Further according to Ethics 7, 4 and 7 Temperance and intemperance are about the same things And so are continents and incontinence, perseverance and effeminacy To which delicacy pertains Now delicacy seems to regard the delight taken in savers which are the object of the taste Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 3.10 that Seemingly temperance and intemperance have little if anything to do with the taste I answer that as stated above in Article 4 Temperance is about the greatest pleasures Which chiefly regard the preservation of human life either in the species or in the individual In these matters certain things are to be considered as principal and others as secondary The principal thing is the use itself of the necessary means Of the woman who is necessary for the preservation of the species Or of food and drink which are necessary for the preservation of the individual While the very use of these necessary things has a certain essential pleasure annexed there too In regard to either use we consider as secondary whatever makes the use more pleasurable Such as beauty and adornment in woman and a pleasing saver and likewise odor in food Hence temperance is chiefly about the pleasure of touch that results essentially from the use of these necessary things Which use is in all cases attained by the touch Secondarily however temperance and intemperance are about pleasures of the taste, smell or sight Inasmuch as the sensible objects of these senses conduce to the pleasurable use of the necessary things that have relation to the touch But since the taste is more akin to the touch than the other senses are It follows that temperance is more about the taste than about the other senses Reply to objection one The use of food and the pleasure that essentially results therefrom pertain to the touch Hence the philosopher says in On the soul two three that Touch is a sense of food for food is hot or cold, wet or dry To the taste belongs the discernment of savers which makes the food pleasant to eat Insofar as their signs of its being suitable for nourishment Reply to objection two The pleasure resulting from saver is additional so to speak Whereas the pleasure of touch results essentially from the use of food and drink Reply to objection three Delicacy regards principally the substance of the food But secondarily it regards its delicious saver and the way in which it is served Sixth article Whether the rule of temperance depends on the need of the present life Objection one It would seem that the rule of temperance does not depend on the needs of the present life For higher things are not regulated according to lower Now as temperance is a virtue of the soul it is above the needs of the body Therefore the rule of temperance does not depend on the needs of the body Objection two Further Whoever exceeds a rule sins Therefore if the needs of the body were the rule of temperance It would be a sin against temperance to indulge in any other pleasure than those required by nature Which is content with the very little But this would seem unreasonable Objection three Further No one sins in observing a rule Therefore if the need of the body were the rule of temperance There would be no sin in using any pleasure for the needs of the body For instance for the sake of health But this is apparently false Therefore the need of the body is not the rule of temperance On the contrary Augustine says on the morals of the Catholic Church and on the morals of the Manichaeans 21 In both Testaments the temperate man finds confirmation of the rule Forbidding him to love the things of this life Or to deem any of them desirable for its own sake And commanding him to avail himself of those things with the moderation of a user Not the attachment of a lover Insofar as they are requisite for the needs of this life and of his station I answer that as stated above in Article 1 As well in Question 109, Article 2 And Question 123, Article 12 The good of moral virtue Consists chiefly in the order of reason Because man's good is to be in accord with reason As Dionysius asserts in On the Divine Names 4 Now the principle order of reason is that by which it directs certain things towards their end And the good of reason consists chiefly in this order Since good has the aspect of end And the end is the rule of whatever is directed to the end Now all the pleasurable objects that are at man's disposal Are directed to some necessity of this life as to their end Wherefore temperance takes the need of this life As the rule of the pleasurable objects of which it makes use And uses them only for as much as the need of this life requires Reply to Objection 1 As stated above, the need of this life is regarded as a rule Insofar as it is an end Now it must be observed that sometimes the end of the worker differs from the end of the work Thus it is clear that the end of building is a house Whereas sometimes the end of the builder is profit Accordingly, the end and rule of temperance itself is happiness While the end and rule of the thing it makes use of is the need of human life To which whatever is useful for life is subordinate Reply to Objection 2 The need of human life may be taken in two ways First, it may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term necessary To that without which a thing cannot be at all Thus food is necessary to an animal Secondly, it may be taken for something without which a thing cannot be becomingly Now temperance regards not only the former of these needs But also the latter Wherefore the philosopher says in Ethics 311 that As a temperate man desires pleasant things for the sake of health Or for the sake of a sound condition of body Other things that are not necessary for this purpose may be divided into two classes For some are a hindrance to health and a sound condition of body And these temperance makes not use of whatever For this would be a sin against temperance But others are not a hindrance to those things And these temperance uses moderately according to the demands of place and time And in keeping with those among whom one dwells Hence the philosopher in Ethics 311 says that The temperate man also desires other pleasant things Those namely that are not necessary for health or a sound condition of body So long as they are not prejudicial to these things Reply to Objection 3 as stated in the second reply Temperance regards need according to the requirements of life And this depends not only on the requirements of the body But also on the requirements of external things such as riches and station And more still on the requirements of good conduct Hence the philosopher adds in Ethics 311 that The temperate man makes use of pleasant things Provided that not only they be not prejudicial to health and a sound bodily condition But also that they be not inconsistent with good That is good conduct Nor beyond his substance That is his means And Augustine says in On the Morals of the Catholic Church And On the Morals of the Manichaeans 21 That the temperate man considers the need Not only of this life But also of his station Seventh article Whether temperance is a cardinal virtue Objection 1 It would seem that temperance is not a cardinal virtue For the good of moral virtue depends on reason But temperance is about those things that are furthest removed from reason Namely about pleasures common to us and the lower animals As stated in Ethics 310 Therefore temperance seemingly is not a principle virtue Objection 2 Further the greater the impetus the more difficult it is to control Now anger which is controlled by meekness Seems to be more impetuous than desire Which is controlled by temperance For it is written in Proverbs 27 for Anger hath no mercy nor fury when it breaketh forth And who can bear the violence impetuum of one provoked Therefore meekness is a principle virtue rather than temperance Objection 3 Further hope as a movement of the soul takes precedence of desire And concupiscence as stated above in Parse Prima Secunde Question 25 article 4 But humility controls the presumption of immoderate hope Therefore, seemingly, humility is a principle virtue Rather than temperance which controls concupiscence On the contrary, Gregory reckons temperance Among the principle virtues in his commentary on Job 249 I answer that as stated above in question 123 article 11 And in question 61 article 3 A principle or cardinal virtue is so called Because it has a foremost claim to praise On account of one of those things that are requisite For the notion of virtue in general Now moderation, which is requisite in every virtue Deserves praise principally in pleasures of touch With which temperance is concerned Both because these pleasures are most natural to us So that it is more difficult to abstain from them And to control the desire for them And because their objects are more necessary to the present life As stated above in article 4 For this reason temperance is reckoned a principle Or cardinal virtue Reply to objection 1 The longer the range of its operation The greater is the agent's power, virtus Shown to be Wherefore, the very fact that the reason is able To moderate desires and pleasures That are furthest removed from it Proves the greatness of reason's power This is how temperance comes to be a principle virtue Reply to objection 2 The impetuousness of anger is caused by an accident For instance, a painful hurt Wherefore it soon passes Although its impetus be great On the other hand The impetuousness of the desire for pleasures of touch Proceeds from a natural cause Wherefore it is more lasting and more general And consequently its control regards a more principle virtue Reply to objection 3 The object of hope is higher than the object of desire Wherefore hope is accounted the principal passion In the irascible The objects of desire and pleasures of touch Move the appetite with greater force Since they are more natural Therefore temperance, which appoints the mean in such things Is a principle virtue 8th article Whether temperance is the greatest of the virtues Objection 1 It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the virtues For Ambrose says on the duties of the clergy 143 That whatever we observe and seek Most in temperance is the safeguarding of what is honorable And the regard for what is beautiful Now virtue deserves praise For being honorable and beautiful Therefore temperance is the greatest of the virtues Objection 2 Further The more difficult the deed The greater the virtue Now it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of touch Than to regulate external actions The former pertaining to temperance And the latter to justice Therefore temperance is a greater virtue than justice Objection 3 Further Seemingly the more general a thing is The more necessary and the better it is Now fortitude is about dangers of death Which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch For these occur every day So that temperance is in more general use than fortitude Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than fortitude On the contrary, the philosopher says in Rhetoric 1.9 That the greatest virtues are those which are most profitable to others For which reason we give the greatest honour to the brave and the just I answer that as the philosopher declares in Ethics 1.2 The good of the many is more of the godlike than the good of the individual Wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better it is Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the many more than temperance does Since justice regards the relations between one man and another While fortitude regards dangers of battle which are endured for the common wheel Whereas temperance moderates only the desires and pleasures which affect man himself Hence it is evident that justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than temperance While prudence and the theological virtues are more excellent still Reply to Objection 1 Honor and beauty are especially ascribed to temperance Not on account of the excellence of the good proper to temperance But on account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from which it withdraws us By moderating the pleasures common to us and the lower animals Reply to Objection 2 Since virtue is about the difficult and the good The excellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of good wherein justice excels Than under the aspect of difficult wherein temperance excels Reply to Objection 3 That which is general because it regards the many Conduces more to the excellence of goodness than that which is general because it occurs frequently And fortitude excels in the former way temperance in the latter Hence fortitude is greater simply although in some respects temperance may be described as greater Not only than fortitude but also than justice Question 141 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC