 I'm pleased to welcome you all to this IIEA webinar today, and we are delighted to be joined by Kevin Rodd, who is President and Chief Executive Officer of the Asian Society, and Kevin has been very generous and has taken time out of his schedule to speak to us. Mr. Rodd will speak to us for about five or ten minutes, and then he and I will move into a discussion followed by a question and answer with our audience, all of which is on the record. You will be able to join the discussion using the Q&A function on Zoom, which you should see on your screen. Please feel free to send your questions in throughout the session as they occur to you, and we will come to them once we come to the Q&A. And could I ask you to identify yourselves and your affiliations in opposing the questions? Let me also just briefly remind everybody that throughout this month, the IIEA is celebrating 30 years since it was founded, and the inaugural Brendan Halligan Lecture by the Taoiseach, Michal Martin, will take place next Monday, May the 17th. And for more details on the full programme, visit the website IIEA.com. And please also feel free to join the discussion on Twitter using the hashtag IIEA30. I will now briefly introduce Kevin Rod and hand over to him. Kevin became President and CEO of the Asia Society in January 2021, and has been President of the Asia Society Policy Institute since January 2015. He served as Australia's 26th Prime Minister from 2007 to 2010, then as Foreign Minister from 2010 to 2012, before returning as Prime Minister of Australia in 2013. He is a senior fellow at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, a distinguished fellow at Chatham House in London, a distinguished statesman with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, and a distinguished fellow at the Paulson Institute in Chicago. I also want to underline that Kevin Rod has an extraordinary depth and breadth of knowledge about China, its people, its politics and policies, its language, its culture and its history, and I can think of no one better able to present and situate for us today the rise of China as a global geopolitical power. Kevin, could I invite you to take the floor? Well, thank you very much, Declan, and greetings from Australia where it's evening, but good to join you in the Irish Republic where it's morning, and of all of our and my good friends in Dublin and in the Irish Foreign Service abroad. If you can sense from my name being a Kevin, my mother's ancestry is Irish, Balangari, County Tiberary. My father, as you can see from my surname is English, but my mother's family were free settlers, whereas my father's family were all 100% criminal convicts. So the Irish brought, shall we say, a degree of civilization to the Union. Let me talk about the question we've been set for this discussion, which is about the impact of China on global geopolitics. Declan, let me spend five or 10 minutes sketching out the world as seen through the lens of Beijing itself, because so we can go in our discussion between yourself and myself and through the Q&A as to what that means for the rest of us. I've always had a view that the beginning of wisdom in understanding China's actions in the world is to understand China's world viewers in Beijing. And here are a number of core points. People often ask me what's Xi Jinping's core priority. Number one core priority for Xi Jinping you'll be surprised to learn is to stay in power and for the Communist Party to stay in power. And seeing the Communist Party as a transitional political arrangement to some more benign form of democratic governance longer term, but to remain in power. Number two, Xi Jinping's priority is to maintain the unity of what they describe as the motherland. Hence the intensity, the extremity of Chinese policies adopted in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, the absolute almost ideological, some would say religious determination to see the return of Taiwan to Chinese sovereignty. Number three, if you look at these as concentric circles of interest is China's determination through the Communist Party leadership to continue to grow the Chinese economy and aggregate size, as well as to increase Chinese living standards to the point of it becoming a fully developed not just middle income country. And that explained the last 35 years of sustained economic reform under Deng, but a reform policy which has undergone some qualification in the most recent several years under Xi Jinping as the party turns somewhat to the left on politics and the economy. Number four in this concentric set of circles of interest is a new agenda a new priority for the party which is environmental sustainability. Of course the Communist Party in their heart of heart through a bunch of suppressed greenies. It's because sustainability climate change and frankly air pollution have emerged as mainstream political pressures on the party from the Chinese people, particularly in urban China, given the hell for leather approach to industrialization of the previous 35 years. Hence why China is gravitating in a more positive direction on climate change, the interaction between hydrocarbon at home, particular matter pollution, plus more broadly the correlation with that and of course reduction greenhouse gas emissions and carbon in particular. Number five is the modernization of the Chinese military. Xi Jinping's aspiration is for the Chinese forces to become a war winning and war fighting capability, a thoroughly modernized people's Liberation Army, by the specified completion date of the modernization process by 2027. In terms of China's geostrategic circumstances, it wishes to push the United States back from the Western Pacific and East Asia, perhaps as far as Guam. In order to make China's immediate Pacific maritime periphery a more benign zone for China's overall strategic interests. China's geostrategically has a very deep memory, going back to the days of the opium wars in the 1840s, and therefore sees its Pacific approaches as a particular corridor of vulnerability for itself, whether it was from the imperial powers of Europe, more recently Japan and currently the United States. Number seven on this list of priorities is China looking westwards across its continental periphery and seeking through the Belt and Road Initiative and related initiatives to turn that wider expanse into a zone not just of economic opportunity for China, but also a benign foreign policy and political environment for China as well. Initially targeted on Central Asia, now wider Eurasia to Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and in time Western Europe. As China seeks to turn the maritime Silk Road and the terrestrial Silk Road into corridors of economic opportunity, infrastructure development, and the evolution of a new digital commerce environment driven and dominated by China's new technologies, particularly those of 5G, but more broadly those associated with the new Chinese regulated internet regime as well. In the last couple of priorities and I'll conclude on these, looking to other theaters beyond, for example in Latin America and in Africa and the Middle East. China again through its global diplomacy seeks to use the gravitational pull of its of its economy, becoming the largest either investors or trading partners of the countries of the wider developing world in order not just to again expand the Chinese footprint, expand Chinese economic markets, extend trade and investment markets, extend its digital commerce market into the future. But also, in doing so, create a new foreign policy constituency in those countries so that when there are for example resolutions before multilateral institutions which may otherwise be damaging to China's interest. There's an automatic capacity to harvest votes multilaterally in support of China's interests, which brings me to the final point in this. If you like foreign policy equivalent or political equivalent of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, which is starting from the center and moving out. The last one should be seen as China's desire over time to construct an international rules based order which is much more accommodating of Chinese interests and values than the one that was necessarily framed in 1944 and 45 through the San Francisco conference and the Britain Woods conference. It's not to say that China is the business of upending these institutions now. No, what China is seeking to do through a series of personnel appointments, a series of resolutions of the United Nations machinery, and through an increasingly activist role in the security council is in fact to shape a international order, which no longer challenges Chinese interests and values, but is more accommodating them over time, accommodating of them over time. And that is just the beginning of a long term work in progress. That's my way of a set of framing remarks about a Chinese worldview under Xi Jinping. I'm happy to take the conversation where you'd now like to take it on China's behaviors in Europe. In my part of the world in the Indo Pacific, or I normally live and work and preside over an American think tank in New York, whatever takes you fancy. Thank you, Kevin. Thank you for that extremely comprehensive and a powerful introductory presentation. I'd like to just take up something you said you referred to to dates. Now dates are of course important in liturgical calendars and the Chinese Communist calendar is very liturgical. You mentioned the 2027 date for modernization of the military which is also the 100th anniversary. I think of the foundation of the People's Liberation Army, which is a happy coincidence. 2021 this year is the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party of China, and also the target date for, as you said achieving a moderately prosperous all round society. In 2049 we have the centenary of the People's Republic of China itself. You have referred to the 2020s as the decade of living dangerously. You also identified another date the date of 2035 halfway between now and the centenary when there will be a general objective of China essentially being fully arrived and complete. Could you develop that thought both the implications for China and also the implications geopolitically and what it means for those other issues you just referred to. Well, thank you, Declan. You're right in your initial observation that dates and timelines mean a lot in the Chinese system. And in terms of the totalizing ideologies of Chinese Marxist Leninism and the Roman Catholic Church in which I grew up. There are some similarities in terms of the liturgy is both secular and divine. These dates. Let me put it to you in these terms. The centenary of the party which is happens in July of this year is important in terms of the Communist Party's determination to reassert its political legitimacy domestically as not just the party which united the country for 100 years of effective division. From the 1840s to the 1940s. But secondly, then took this shambolic economy in 1949 as war torn shambolic economy. And despite all the twists and turns of the 60s and 70s. By the time we get to the 2020s has grown to be the world's second largest economy. And by the end of this decade, respectively the largest. So dates are fundamental to the question of political legitimacy so far. And in terms of future political legitimacy holding, holding forth in the traditional most of Marxist millennialism. A view that in by 2049 the centenary of the People's Republic of China, but China will have merged as a world great power, we would say it already is. That's perhaps Chinese code language for describing China then as the world great power. And very much, again, legitimacy side line through that is that only the Chinese Communist Party can achieve this, because it simply is being able to hold a country together and to marshal the critical economic decisions necessary to take it from poverty to advanced economy status. I think the final point I'd mentioned is 2035, which again, almost in the overall nature of Chinese political cosmology is about the midpoint between where we are now and 2049. The interesting thing about 2035 is that in the mind's eye of Xi Jinping that also falls within the possibility of him still being an office. We might say that'll be impossible he'll be in his early 80s by then 82 83. Well, so too might the President United States depending if he seeks a second term or not. But why that is important is that Xi Jinping being an absolutely determined political leader, a leader with a defined vision for where he wishes to take the country, and to expand its power and influence in the world is that we are likely to see him in this time, the rest of the 20s through to the mid 30s, seeking to force the pace on where perhaps his predecessor leaders were more prepared to allow history to take its course. And that's where we come into the intersection point with Taiwan. And therefore, in Xi Jinping's worldview, I think very much you would wish to see the return of Taiwan to Chinese sovereignty by the time he concludes his term in political office by 2035. Thanks Kevin on Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Central Committee in 2012 and became President of China 2013 he also took over as President of the Central Military Commission in 2012. That's very important. And how, how would you situate the, the galvanizing effect of the change in Chinese approach with the advent to supreme power of Xi Jinping. Is this where the seeds there already, or is this something that's very much Xi Jinping kind of identified development, also given the sort of the emphasis on Xi Jinping, his new thought for socialism and chairing these characteristics, and all the other new tags that have been attached to him. Could you, could you talk a bit about that thanks. Yeah, I think. These two factors are mutually reinforcing one structural, and the other derivative of individual leadership politics. The structural factor is this Chinese behavior in the world today, the assertion and assertiveness of its interest and values, which, as you and I both know from our earlier diplomatic careers Declan, that was not always the case. In the days of, of Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese aphorism was, you know, Taoguang Yang Wei, Jebo Deng Tou, which is high just ranked by your time never take the lead has now been yielded to a Chinese phrase again which is fun fire way to achieve something substantial. This transition point occurred actually at a meeting at the Central Party work conference on foreign affairs at the end of 2013 November of that year, where China officially changed its foreign policy doctrine from passive to active. Now, the intersecting point there is structurally China's ability to assert itself of course is a product of China's perception and reality of national power. China as a Marxist Leninist state has an acute consciousness of the balance of power between itself and other countries, most particularly the United States, but also Japan. And therefore, as China's own calculus of its relative military power economic power and technological power were measured against the United States, and against Japan has increased to the point where they see the 2020s. What I have referred to earlier is the decade of living dangerously as a crossover point, both in terms of relative military capabilities in East Asia and the West Pacific between the Americans and the Chinese or the Americans and the Japanese and the Chinese. Secondly, economically in terms of GDP measured as market exchange rates. But that is a date expected to occur about the end of this decade and technologically the great race in terms of let's call it superconductors as sorry, supercomputers semiconductors, and the race towards artificial intelligence. The outcome there will be vis-à-vis the United States is more difficult to predict. But because of these, shall we say greater convergence of Chinese power with American power. And in some Chinese and American calculus China now exceeding or prospectively exceeding the United States. That is what shapes the assertiveness we began to see publicly articulated new events of 2013. So the ingredient Declan is the leadership style and personality of Xi Jinping. He's a calculated risk taker, not crazy brave, but calculated risks. His method of power consolidation within the country is not from the consensual textbook of collective leadership. It's more snatch and grab where you can deal with your opponents, eliminate them, purge them remove them from the party, or otherwise marginalize them. And when he's seen an opportunity for example in the second Obama term to test the Americans on island reclamation the South Pacific. He went ahead. He went ahead and did so. There was no substantive American military reaction. And therefore from his perspective, this was in fact a risk worth taking. It's this admixture of a structural change in the balance of power between China and the United States and its principal allies on the one hand, plus the particular leadership style of Xi Jinping, which is lead from the front, take the risks and accelerate the normal timetable of shall we say the evolution of China, as his predecessors would have seen as a global great power. Thanks Kevin just just taking up that specific style of Xi leading from the front reform and opening up has been in existence, I suppose since 1978 and got a boost in 1992. The new notion of dual circulation, the idea that there would be within China, a sufficiency of demand to, if you like, compensate for any measures that the West would take against China. How do you see that is that simply a hedge. Obviously it's national self-reliance which is a very old Chinese principle, but how do you see that meshing with reform and opening up and you think it spells the end of the reform and opening up policy. It's an excellent question which goes to the heart of let's call it the next stage of China's economic model phase one I think we're all familiar with. Going back to the time when I was first secretary in our embassy in Beijing back in the Mesolithic period. And we saw the Chinese model land in the 80s and 90s and into the 90s, as being labor intensive manufacture for export, paired with high levels of state investment in public infrastructure. And by and large, generating the phenomenal growth in tandem that we saw during those decades, average growth 10 11% over 30 year period, and compounding of course taking the economy which when this began, which was a little smaller than the Australian economy in aggregate size, and to becoming the second largest economy in the world. However, back in 2013, just as Xi Jinping came to power. The resolution of the party that year was to change the economic model through what was called a major decision the party center with some 60 separate decisions to accelerate the pace of economic reform further. That is more market based reforms across the entire economic structure. However, that is not how it's turned out. In 2015, there was a major financial crisis within China itself. When equities markets effectively collapsed created crisis massive state intervention, creating much doubt in terms of the wisdom of shall we say unregulated markets particularly in finance having absolute sway. That's basically a Marxist Leninist system. Then secondly, the impact of the US China trade war of 2019 and 20, no 2018 and 2019. And the impact which this had on China's internal conclusion that it could rely on global supply change to service its own needs, as well as the continued robustness of global export markets, particularly in the in the age of Trumpian protectionism. And then you had of course the impact of covert itself covert 19 putting those factors together what I have observed is a significant change in the evolution of the growth model away from the reform direction articulated in 2013. By and think tank, the Asia Policy Institute has tracked this, if any of our participants are interested online through a series of we've called China economic dashboard over the period 2015 to 2020, where it's very difficult to identify a substantive significant program of progress across the 10 major categories of economic reform articulated back then so where are we today to go to your point about the dual circulation economy. I suspect that what is actually meant by the dual circulation economy is a polite phrase, an interesting phrase, a newly minted phrase to in fact camouflage a much more basic reality, which is a trend line pointing in the direction of greater national self reliance silly junction for characters. It's been around, in fact, prior to the reform period of 1978. But and even the period of the reform program is still looked in the background of the Chinese economic discourse, but now gaining a much greater cogency in the debates which have flowed in China since the US China trade war in particular. And secondly, parallel to that a belief that the yet untapped potential of the Chinese domestic consumption market will be capable of offsetting any net contraction in external demand coming from ever rising as it were demand for Chinese goods abroad, put all that together what's it mean. I think the dual circulation economy and practice will mean something like this. Yes, we'll continue to trade with the rest of the world that we China, mirroring the United States will begin adjusting our own global supply chains in directions which are more comfortable to us in terms of long their long term security and not being held hostage by political diplomatic or security factors. And on top of that, we will not wish to become economically dependent on anybody external to China in the future. So we're very happy for the rest of the world to become economically dependent on China. That I think is the substantive meaning of the dual circulation economy model, whatever the people study might say. Thanks, Kevin. I just just one more comment before we go to questions and answers. And it's a very topical point. It's the question of Chinese population the census, which as you know has excited a certain amount of comment in the last few days. Even on Chinese figures 72 million people were added to the population since 2010, but it's quite clear that a decline in population is in the offing. And obviously, this will have implications for age dependency. So the question is that I want to ask is, you know, will to use coin the old phrase will China get old before it gets rich, and more importantly in the context of our discussion today. What effect will an aging China have on those geopolitical objectives that you mentioned before, looking forward 10 2030 years. I long argued Declan that, and again reinforcing my proposition that the 2020s is the decade of living dangerously. Is that if we can navigate our way through to 2035 in the absence of original let alone a global war involving China in the United States. In fact, in the period from the mid 2030s on China's war as it will be increasingly a domestic one between the demands of its national security establishment on the one hand, and the demands of retirement income and the health budget on the other. China has just entered into the realities that we the rest of us all face which is the competing demands of the domestic population requiring more and more government services against the external demands of its security apparatus, given that they will probably come second to the internal demands of its security apparatus as well. China's internal security out of apparatus apparatus has more personnel in it than the People's Liberation Army. So, the full manifestation of China's date the demographic destiny will not be with us probably until the mid 30s. The census data is an indication of where that's headed, but it's been an earlier indication as well in 2017, when the Chinese working age population of the Chinese workforce began to contract in real terms as well, hence increase Chinese labor costs, hence the manufacturing of a number of Chinese manufacturing capabilities to, first of all, proximate Southeast Asia, and over time to a number of BRI countries as well. So, I see therefore this is not being a mainstream major problem in terms of budget resources for the next 10 to 15 years. But by the time we get to as it were that period 2035 to 2050, you simply have to do the mathematics in order to conclude that it becomes a major constraint on the capabilities of the Chinese state at that point. So, empowering of course some marvelous innovations in technology, artificial intelligence and productivity, which offset the, the classical requirements for continued, as it were inherent labor force growth and productivity. Thank you, Kevin. Now I'd like to turn to questions and answers from the audience. We already have a stream of questions in. And could I, again, as I said at the start remind everybody just when you pose the question I'll obviously mediate them to Kevin, your, your identity and your affiliation and everything of course is on the record. Kevin, I have a question from Bill Emmett, who's the former editor of the Economist and chair of the Japan Society of the UK, and of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Bill says that US led Western policy towards Taiwan has since the 1970s been one of strategic ambiguity. Recently, as in the US Japan summit last month, the US has adopted some more overt positions, pulling allies along. How do you evaluate this. And what do you see is the appropriate approach to Taiwan now. My greetings to Bill. And, and I thank him for the question. The debate in the United States which Bill will be familiar with about the wisdom or otherwise have made maintaining strategic ambiguity over Taiwan for the current US administration. Richard Hass on behalf of the Council of Foreign Relations has argued that the time for strategic ambiguity has come and gone. And it's time to harden up in terms of creating a more publicly recognizable red line on the part of the United States. That's my paraphrase the latter point, people should read Richard's original comments. I disagree with Richard on this question. There is a wisdom in strategic ambiguity in the public domain. And that is to cause in part our Taiwanese friends to know that they cannot simply assume that the United States would write in to protect Taiwan irrespective of what the Taiwanese government did to provoke the Chinese at some point in the future. Or for that matter as we've seen in the past. I remember this in particular in the age of country again when he was president of Taiwan 2000 2008 I think from memory. And his predisposition to wake up each morning, pick up his morning newspaper and work out how we could provoke the Chinese that afternoon. And always on the border of of the threshold of of some form of unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan, which the Chinese Communist Party has always said would be a an automatic red line for the initiation of military action against Taiwan. So the virtue of strategic ambiguity has not just been to send a message to Beijing it's been sent a message to Taipei as well. By the way, for those not familiar with this arcane discussion about strategic ambiguity. That means to cause the Chinese to be ambiguous about whether sorry for it to be ambiguous in China's eyes as to whether the United States would or will not intervene in defense of Taiwan, under particular circumstances in the future. So I think the ambiguity holds in terms of its relevance to Taiwan. On the Taiwan question for example, that under President Tsai Ing-wen who has been a responsible leader of that country, that there's no prospect of China doing Taiwan doing anything unilateral. However, her term expires in 2024. And with the Democratic Progress Party, the center left party in Taiwan, the technically the pro independence party of Taiwan, we're never quite sure who's going to succeed her through the party primary process. So taking a long forward view, maintaining a policy a declaratory policy of strategic ambiguity, I think is correct. Final point Declan response to Bill's question is having dispensed if you like with the, the strategic ambiguity argument what constitutes the best approach for the rest of us in support of Taiwan in the future. I think it hangs hangs on three propositions. Number one United States to maintain sufficient military capability itself to be able to effectively deter China from acting. That means that the United States must have a very clear eye view of the needs of Indo Pacific Command, and its ability to deploy out of Guam and out of Yokohama and elsewhere. In order to cause the PLA to conclude that this would be too much a near run thing to paraphrase Wellington about Waterloo to take the risk. Second, it depends on the also Taiwan's capacity and predisposition to have a national deterrent capability within the country itself. Taiwan is kept to a defense outlays of about 10% 11% of budget for many, many years now. There's a strong argument by many others that if Taiwan wishes to be effectively deterrent itself against the risk of a Chinese invasion in the future. It needs to do more to cause Beijing to conclude that any attempted military occupation of the island would be one of the bloodiest things that China has encountered since the Korean War and probably the war with Japan. And finally, for the rest of the international community, including countries like Australia in the Irish Republic to make it very plain to our friends in Beijing, that an a coercive action against Taiwan to achieve Beijing's political aims of reunification would result in causing China to be politically and economically isolated in the world, and that there would be a massive political foreign policy and international economic cost to be paid. They I think are the three essential deterrent elements in terms of Taiwan's future, which we should be mindful of rather than fiddling around with the doctrine of strategic ambiguity. Thanks Kevin, I have a question from Paul Drake Murphy, who's the chair of these institutes foreign policy group and former ambassador of Ireland to Japan. And Paul Drake finds your presentation of China's foreign policies vision is very persuasive but he asked the question. Do you consider and involve a view of China as the predominant power in the center with all others surrounding it more or less as tributaries, depending on their distance from the center. So, that's that's a question from Paul Drake Murphy. Thank you, Paul Drake, you've, you've been reading the history of tributary states. The tributary states history of China, particularly the Ming and Qing dynasties is is a fascinating read, and there are multiple different interpretations as to the intensity of what it actually meant at different times in Chinese domestic history. There is certainly a view that at the minima. It was as follows that so long as neighboring states and proximate states provided annual tribute to the emperor. And, in fact, received reciprocal tribute when they did so. And then were authorized to engage in trade in commerce with the then celestial kingdom that basically Bob's your uncle is not a problem. Secondly, on the adverse side of the coin was a view that if any of the tributary states failed to provide tribute to the emperor, or undertook actions without the ultimate sanction of Beijing, which were regarded as significant to Beijing at the time that under those circumstances that the celestial kingdom reserve the right to then engage militarily against them. And there are several instances of when this occurred, not always successfully by the way in the case of an arm was subsequently became Vietnam. And there is a both a minimalist and a maximalist interpretation of what tributary state says is a meant in dynastic times. The other point I'd make in response to the question is that we should not just assume that all of that is simply being translated into current Chinese foreign policy. I think it would be however, a bit like this. China has a particular priority attached to its neighboring states. That has been historical from imperial times to the present and into the future for the not unreasonable proposition that most of the invasions of China have occurred through its neighboring states almost by definition. Whether it's in the case of the Qing who themselves came from Manchuria, or whether it was the Mongols who came obviously from Mongolia, or various other invasions from various tribes to the north and west, or through their maritime neighbors in the case of Japan Second World War. So therefore, there is a huge priority attached in China's foreign policy framework to what they call job and words are neighboring states it's a separate category in itself. Ideally what China wishes in those neighboring states is to have them as compliant as possible. The China's core national interests and its foreign policy interests, the extent to which it succeeds with all of its neighboring states is a separate question. And I would simply make this as a side point. A huge strategic gain for the Chinese in terms of neighboring state strategy has been the conversion of the Soviet Union and now Russia from being an adversary into being a de facto ally. And given the enormous exposure of China to Russia, the Russian Federation through its contiguous land border, this has been an enormous factor impacting on China's political consciousness. Final point is that in terms of however states beyond the neighboring states. As with any country China sees the world in levels of concentric circles of concern and opportunity, but I think it's immediate strategic concerns with its 14 neighboring states. Of course the United States as seen as materially relevant to that, not because of its allied relationship with at least one of those states namely. Almost one of those states in terms of the American military presence on the Korean Peninsula. And of course it's allied relationship with two maritime neighbors, being the Philippines and of course Japan. Thanks Kevin I have a question from retired Brigadier Brigadier General Jerry Hearn who's a member of the Institute, who has been during his career deployed in Africa, and has witnessed China's Belt and Road Policy quite closely and Chinese success in Africa in using its interests and values for partisan outcomes. He wants to know your view on why China has been so successful in pursuing a strategic interest in Africa. I think, I think the general for his question. There is a long foundation to build on as the general be familiar. Back in the 1960s, even the late 50s following the Bandung Conference. As Africa decolonized, the Chinese being a contender with India for leadership at the third world was already a development as a partner with many newly independent states in in Africa. In other words, there were strong foundations to build upon. But secondly, since the, not just with the Belt and Road Initiative, but prior to the Belt and Road Initiative. Really going back to the time of Jiang Zemin in 2002 when he said to Chinese business people, Zou Chuchu, go out into the world and a bucket load of them did and a bucket load of them ended up in Africa. And this was a good decade or so before Xi Jinping came up with the rubric the Belt and Road Initiative. So it's both the experience of the 60s, the post 2002 experience, and now with the Belt and Road Initiative, as I would call turbo charge on top of it. Why have they succeeded historical continuity to, as you know, Chinese Marxist Leninist state, authoritarian state does not deliver any human rights lectures to any government anywhere about its domestic governance. It simply wishes to be there have influenced to make money. The third reason is many states in which it has prevailed and been relatively successful in Africa have been infrastructure poor private investment alternatives from elsewhere in the West has not been sufficient to meet those infrastructure needs. And many of the projects which have been desired have failed to either meet World Bank or African Development Bank Development Approval status standard, or the balance sheet of both those banks hasn't been sufficient to cover them. So I think it's an aggregation of these factors which is brought about on balance significant Chinese success. It's been controversial. There have been political reactions. Government of Zambia and others. Botswana come to mind as cases in point. But if you were to produce the overall scorecard from Beijing's point of view, the great African initiative of the last 50 years, and particularly the last 10 on balance would be succeed as a relatively strong success. Kevin, I have a question from John Bruton, who's a former Taoiseach former Prime Minister of Ireland, who would be interested to know what approach should the European Union take as between relations with the US and China. Well, I think the former Taoiseach for asking me such a delicate question. And as a former Prime Minister myself, I'm here for me to tell the current Taoiseach how we should balance his relations with the United States and China. Let me just make a couple of broader observations. And I'll reflect here on the Australian context, given there may be some similarity in the principles which are involved, though not all of them. The first is this, in my own dealings as Prime Minister with the Chinese leaders, both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. I'm most plain about the fact in my discussions with him that we are a Western democracy anchored in liberal democratic values which will never change. There's a question of who we are that is our identity. There's a consequence we also believe in universal human rights, angered in the Universal Declaration of 1948, and the UN covenant of civil political rights of the 1960s. China is a signatory to both and a ratification state for the first, if not the second. There's a consequence, I would explain to Chinese leaders, when we engage with you on human rights questions. We will do so within the fabric of the international legal norms you have subscribed to, rather than simply the assertion unilaterally of the norms, which we may have in mind from time to time. I always said to him this will create frictions from time to time. When I gave a speech as Prime Minister at Beijing University, I delivered a speech in Chinese, and at that time said that there are significant human rights abuses in Tibet. This was not popular in Beijing, particularly on a Prime Minister visit. But it was necessary to say the second principle, I think, which is important in the case of Australia, less not in the case of the Irish Republic, which is not a treaty ally of the United States. There's something that's happened I'm unaware of, but maybe you think the Bostonian connection is sufficient for treaty purposes anyway I'm not sure. But in Australia we have this thing called Lanzas, which is a formal security treaty with the Americans going back to 1951. And having been allies with the Americans in both the First World War and the Second World War and throughout the Pacific War. This goes deep in Australia so my response always to the Chinese was and we're an ally of the United States, not least because of our historical experience and that's not going to change either. And therefore that will from time to time produce frictions. Thirdly, we do however as an Australian government wish to maximize our trade investment, education and technology relationship with you. Bilaterally to our mutual advantage and we should embrace all measures and means of policy to do so, including in our case the early negotiation of a free trade agreement. Fourthly, I also said, we're active members of the international community, not just through the United Nations, in our case also through the multilateral institutions of Asia. APEC and the rest but also both members of the G20 said and therefore on questions of global economic governance we wish to work strongly with you. As we did during the global financial crisis, intimately with the Chinese government and designing a package there. And the fifth principle which I didn't quite articulate to my Chinese interlock is at the time was this. If you're going to have a disagreement with Beijing on something which is necessary and fundamental, then do two things. One, bring as many other countries along with you as possible in the articulation of that disagreement. That is come with your own friends, partners and allies. And secondly, be judicious in your public language. Not to say you sense your public language, but you be judicious in it and use public diplomacy when absolutely necessary, but maximize the utility of private diplomacy and securing the objectives which you see. So for me, these have been the overarching principles for how to manage a reasonable relationship with Beijing, given the differences between democracies like Ireland and Australia. Friends of the United States and our case allies and dealing with the Chinese economic and opportunity in the global governance necessity. Thanks Kevin. I just saying that I take your point about allies but many years ago when I was dealing with EU foreign policy and relations with the US. The US used to refer to as an ally but they used to use a small a rather than the big a the capital a so we were quite happy with that we were happy to be to be so described. I have a question from Gabriel Denison, who is the CEO of the Irish Academy of Engineering, who thanks you for your presentation, and also notes of the West seems powerless to influence Chinese policy and human rights, most notably towards the Uighurs. I think that liberal economies can do to pressure or encourage China to moderate its approach in this respect, or is this something on which for a variety of reasons, China will continue simply to pursue its own path. Absent fundamental political change in the Chinese system. That is the fundamental reform of the Communist Party, and or its decision to transition to a different form of governance. There was a debate being held within China back in the 1980s, but not since the 80s. It is difficult to see fundamental change in relation to Chinese approaches to both Xinjiang in one direction, and let's just say Hong Kong and Tibet in other directions. Secondly, the Xinjiang factor is also in China's mind driven by questions of not just national unity but national security as well. There were terrorist acts by various Xinjiang organizations against Chinese, most notably in Kunming when 30 or 40 people were killed at a railway station, were killed at a railway station through a bombing, and also self emulation in front of Tiananmen, the gate of peace in Beijing. So that's the prism through which they view this to bet for different reasons Hong Kong for different reasons, but also do with questions of national unity, and in their view national national security. My own view is consistent with what I just said before about the management of human rights disagreements with China. Is that we as Western democracies and as democracies writ large whether we're from the West or not is to constantly return to the international instruments, the Universal Declaration, the, the International Covenant on Civil Political Rights, and the institution designed for the prosecution of those instruments namely the Human Rights Council in Geneva, and of course the UN itself in New York. These are the instruments of international law and global governance. And I know for a fact that our friends in Beijing are deeply concerned when these instruments are deployed in a manner which challenges the legitimacy of their actions. If you want to have a case study of that in a different domain look at China's reaction to the determination by the tribunal of unclassed the United Nations Convention on the law of the sea in the Philippines case brought against China over the nine dashed line in the U.S. Embassy. And there's a reason why China is uncomfortable with this because it brings into challenge China's global standing and reputation, which in Chinese culture and tradition, quite apart from Communist Party legitimacy terms, mean something means a lot. Can you establish a direct causality however between a concerted set of such actions on the one hand, and any fundamental change in a observable timeframe to human rights practices saying Xinjiang or Hong Kong or Tibet. That would be stretching it in terms of where the evidence stands. But I would simply say, however, that as democracies ourselves who adhere to these international covenants as a matter of international law, that it's incumbent on those of us who committed to these principles to continue to argue them, irrespective of whether we see a material change on the ground or not. We cannot afford for resistance to those principles to those covenants to those conventions as being a recipe to, as it were incrementally abandoned legitimacy of those covenants over time. Because that would be, I think a perilous journey for all of us who see ourselves as supporters of liberal democratic order for the long term. Yes, Kevin, just you gave a very interesting answer there and if I could just just slightly developed Gabriel's question and go back to something you said earlier as well. There is, I suppose at the moment, a kind of tussle for the title deeds of multilateralism going on between what we in Ireland and the European Union and the US and Australia called the rules based international order. And China doesn't like that term rules based international order, which it tends to see as kind of in its language cliques and hegemony. And you also have a kind of strict constructionist view the Chinese set out about the UN Charter, a very conservative view, particularly around the question of non interference. As we struck even last month, Xi Jinping at the Boao Economic Summit invoked, you referred to it earlier yourself, the five principles of peaceful coexistence as a continuing principle of Chinese foreign policy, namely non interference internal affairs, which runs counter to the kind of approach that we have on human rights. Where do you see this struggle for the title deeds going. What role should the Security Council play in this. I asked that because Ireland at the moment is a non permanent member. I'm very pleased to have seen Ireland elected to the Security Council. When I was Prime Minister we ran a successful ballot ourselves to be non permanent members. So being a non permanent member of the Security Council carries with a particular responsibilities. Obligations and opportunities because all the questions, frankly, of global governance, and those facing international community suddenly become directly relevant to the day to day deliberations of the Irish Foreign Ministry. Suddenly we in Australia had to become experts and Sierra the own. And, and therefore I understand the basis of the question coming from your own membership the Security Council. And Declan as you know as a professional diplomat yourself. The United Nations Charter is an interesting beast. And if you read it carefully, that's this. And as it was designed by committee. It was a pretty interesting committee that put it together. I don't I doubt that the charter could ever have been agreed at any time since 1945 by the way, because it was such a complex negotiation then. But you're right it does assert the sovereignty of states, but it also asserts other principles of international governance, which do not provide carte blanche to sovereign states to act against their domestic conditions in any manner that they so choose, particularly with the evolution through the United Nations system, particularly in the period since Srebrenica, and since Rwanda of international humanitarian intervention. In consequence, there are live doctrines around the responsibility to protect, which is still alive in international law, and which have been that way for the last 20 or 25 years. And of course that underpins many of the discussions at present in the UN community about what to do about the situation now in Myanmar. Well, yes, the Chinese are right about mutual non interference that does come out of not just the non aligned movement, but it is an active principle that has its foundations in the UN charter, but it is not unqualified. The implications have been subsequently evolved through international practice experience, the horrors of Srebrenica and Rwanda, and the decisions that we reached as a community of nations since then. On the, on the future in dealing with this complex interplay of sovereignty and human rights. Again, I simply go back to the principle that we cannot under any circumstances act in a manner which undermines the integrity of the of the charter universal declaration of 48 and the international covenant. These provide, as it were the ultimate heads of power for the, not just the ideological legitimacy but the political legitimacy of our demands and international community that all states so obliged. And we cannot under any circumstances incrementally begin to walk away from them, however frustrating it may appear to be in any particular application of these principles to a crisis of the time. The worst thing that can happen is that we end up devoid of such principles, and ultimately are left with only one, which is the invasion of one state against another as being the only matter upon which the community of other states could act in concert to sustain the common peace. Thank you Kevin. I'm afraid the the clock has has caught up with us and you have been extraordinary generous with your time. And this has been a tremendously informative and illuminating session. On the quantum behalf of the IIA and I think everybody who tuned in to thank you for this really superb presentation that you've given. I also let me apologize to some there were many questions I couldn't get to them all. But I think that we heard from Kevin, an extremely authoritative impressive handout of the, the issues around the geopolitical rise of China. So it just falls to me Kevin to thank you very much indeed for your time and for engaging with us on this and to issue all the very best and we hope that we can stay in touch with you. And let me also just I was in Beijing, when you gave that speech to bed in April 2008 in Chinese and it was a tour to force. So let me congratulate you on that now, even after all those years. But once again, thanks. And with that, we've come to the end of our webinar, and thank you all very much for tuning in. Thank you. Thank you very much, Kevin, and greetings to everybody in the Irish Republic.