 very much Kunal for inviting me to come and discuss Professor Tante Ogalevi's lecture. And I have to say I really enjoyed your lecture. It's a very powerful argument that you make, taking into consideration the contributory social insurance and the non-contributory social insurance system. And I cannot but agree with the kind of analysis and the kind of conclusion that you come up with regard to the universalism. But I think where I'd probably differ or have differences is probably in the process of reaching that goal of universalism, as you very rightly pointed out in one of your last slides that one of the basic or the fundamental issues that we'll be facing is the fiscal space. How are we actually going to generate resources to reach that kind of universalism? Having said that, I think the way I'm going to structure my comments are based on two major points actually. I'll basically argue saying that we don't need to look at such a narrow definition of contributory social insurance and non-contributory social insurance and need to go beyond that. And here I will bring in the ICSC definitions that we have developed as part of the ILO. And then go on to build saying that today what exists is actually a much more innovative and broader dimension of strategies to actually have a social protection. But before I do that, I think one of the points I do want to raise which was there in Professor Levy's lecture was he referred to Kanbur. And I think Professor Ravi Kanbur also has, ends up with a similar problem with this kind, with a similar dichotomy that you see here of CSI and NCI, is that Professor Kanbur is looking in his argumentation on the Indian legal system and that Indian legal system is actually confined to that of the manufacturing sector with regard to who falls within the formal and who falls within the informal. And that's all actually defined by the Indian factories act. That is, if you're less than 10 workers, then you're part of the organized sector. If you're more than 10 workers and if you have electric city, then you are part of the formal sector. Now what firms do is exactly very similar to what was presented here. Firms will try to see that they do not exceed the number of 10. And then you stay within the limits. And it doesn't matter whether you're paying taxes, whether it's indirect or a direct tax, it doesn't matter whether you have employees for whom you pay social contributions. Again, it doesn't matter whether you're paying any value added tax or not, you just fall within the informal sector. And as a result, what you see very clearly within the Indian case is also that formal sector employment never increases. It stays stable or reduces, but informal sector is actually increasing. So I do feel that this is very important to point out and contextualize it. Because actually, Bismarck is a bad guy, surely, I agree. I cannot but agree. Actually, we have moved beyond Bismarck as far as the entire social protection debate is concerned. And also the way we look at a number of these schemes. So if you look at the informal employment, the way we define it as part of the ICSE is it comprises of total number of jobs and the definition of informal jobs actually relies on employers, own account workers, member of producer, cooperators, contributing family workers, employees, and others not classified. This is just to put it down so that you very clearly see. And then we go about saying these are own account workers and the way it's defined is in the informal nature of the jobs, which is on the production unit and they're not registered or do not have complete set of accounts. And then we basically classify them as being part of the formal sector, informal sector, and households. And what you have is formal jobs in formal sectors. And then you have informal jobs within the household and the informal sector. And finally, you have contributing family workers who are considered to be informal jobs by definition. And the final one is employees. Now this needs additional criteria. And what we have as part of the additional criteria is the 2003 ICSE status, which goes about looking at national labor legislation's income taxation, whether you're registered as part of it, social protection and entitlement to certain benefits or not. And there are also certain operational definitions that are there within the national context, which have very clear strong preferences based on the countries that you're talking about, where you have employers contribution, access to paid annual leave, and access to paid sick leave. Now one of the arguments that I do have here to put forth is that, why do we take a very narrow definition when we want to get into the discussion about informality, formality? You could have a much broader definition. These are the different criteria that I used. Why does one pick on something as narrow as social protection? Because if you do pick on one particular aspect of this definition, you're going to find this kind of a shift that is happening between the formal and the informal sector. Like the registration in India, being part of the Indian Factory Act, is one minute component of this entire thing. So I think what I'd like to say is that, let's try to broaden it. And probably the broadening would solve certain problems for us with regard to how we look at many of these schemes and how do we reach actually the universalism. Having said that, this is a report that came out of the ILO last year, which was done in collaboration with Vigo. And what it basically goes about showing that is informal employment, the way informality happens, is not just one driver, that of social protection or lack of social protection. I think there are a number of drivers. I think one of the major drivers is economic growth. Whether you have economic growth, which actually has the potential to create a number of formal jobs and so that you sort of reduce informality. The second is what is the kind of productivity that you are able to generate? The minute you have much more high productive segments within it, there's a larger potential for many of these enterprises to register, to pay out social contributions and to do a number of other things. The third is the kind of a regulatory framework that is there. I think one of the fundamental problems that you see country after country. I think this is not just in Latin America, you can see it in Africa, you can see it in Asia. It's the kind of sort of regulatory framework that exists. You have a number of laws which are not applicable for many of the workers. So you have within the legal mechanisms, problems which actually brings out this kind of a dichotomy that comes in and then firms surely use this kind of a loophole to actually go formal or informal. The fourth issue is the enforcement system. I think the issue of compliance has been talked about for more than a number of decades and I think that's where we haven't fixed. And what you see increasingly probably Latin America's only one part of the world where it's slightly better than in Asia and Africa, where compliance system and enforcement systems have actually been improved. And labor and spectrates have been improved, but in other parts of the world they are further quite weak. So I think that's one issue that needs to be tackled. And then you have the lack of transparency and accountability of public institutions and lack of work awards and representation. Like you have a lot of alternative forms of organizations that have come in today which try to fight for the rights of the informal workers. But still they are minuscule compared to the kind of problems that the sector is actually facing. And I think where we have workers' voice, we have seen that workers do get their rights. They have rights with regard to whether it is minimum wages, whether it's social protection, or getting any other kind of benefits. There's some very good examples that actually exist. Now, what I tried to do, I think Professor Sallavi does show some of the figures. But I also tried looking at what is the kind of picture that exists in Latin America with regard to informal employment. And what we see very clearly is probably Mexico is in our plier here, where you see informal employment reduced by only 1.1%. In almost all other countries during the period 2005 to 2015, you find informal employment declining. Now, part of the reason why informal employment actually declines during this period is economic growth. Because this is a period of international boom. You have improvement in the terms of trade. You have remittances. You have a lot of foreign cash flows coming into the economy. So you very clearly see that it all has an impact on the informal employment. But I think apart from that, growth itself cannot actually reduce informal employment. I think you need multiple interventions there. And I think what many of the economies in Latin America have done during this period is basically they have simplified a number of systems for accountability for tax declarations and for payments. So I think that has in some sense helped in improving the formalization process within the country, within the countries in the Latin American region. And reducing formality. The second thing that they have done is they have tried to link tax to, tax incentives to social contributions. This is something Professor Levy did touch upon. But what I would like to say is that you have very clearly countries like Uruguay and Argentina there, which have actually brought in single tax regimes, which is the monocontributo, where you again go about providing certain incentives to certain groups of small holders, which can actually get benefit to the system and get the registration process. I think what is very fundamental here is to try to see how do you actually get many of these workers within the formal system and then get them within the social contribution system. At the same time, many of these countries also have tried to extend social protection to a number of workers who are actually often excluded, something that was referred to. And these are the own account workers, workers in micro entrepreneurs, rural workers, and domestic workers. So I think there have been a number of efforts that have been taking place with regard to how the formalization process actually goes on. Now, we at the ILO very clearly see this extension of social protection as a two-way process. We do have a very clear social protection floor that we sort of been pushing. And what we've been trying to do is we need to extend formal employment to all workers within the economy. At the same time, we have been trying to say that let's try to push for a social protection floor. And this is where our concept of universalism actually seems end. And our entire argument is built on a two-way thing, saying that we have to build a nationally sustainable and defined social protection floor. But we also have to ensure that there are high levels of protection, which is in line with the Convention 102. And we have much more advanced social security standards. So what we try to basically argue is that you need universalism, but how do you go about reaching that? And for us, it's the formalization process. And at the same time, bringing in the social protection floor. Here, what we have is basically, again, a two-track approach. We have two recommendations, recommendation 202 on the social protection floor and the recommendation 202 on social protection floor and recommendation 204 on facilitating the formalization of the informal economy. Now, when we talk about formalizing the informal economy, what we are basically trying to say is that you need to have different kinds of mechanisms so that workers can actually register. Now, this registration process, number one, it's been simplified, but what it also means is that any firm irrespective of where you are needs to be registered. You need to have tax registration and tax accounts. And we also go about saying that you should register with the social insurance system. Now, the second way of formalizing the entire process is through the independent status, which is to extend social protection coverage to all workers irrespective of what your status is. Now, when you do something like that, you don't fall into this kind of a dichotomous distinction or segmentation that exists saying that which part of the K-value is. And there's no problem then as to the problem doesn't arise whether you need to push from the formal to the informal sector. And I think the facilitation process would only help not only to improve the economic performance and economic growth, but you could also very clearly see that you can then generate finances to have this fiscal space so that you can have a basic social protection floor being set up. One of the problems of removing all the social insurance systems that are there and moving towards a kind of a universalism like either the universal basic income or a universal social protection is that the lack of space leads to the question of what is the level at which you want to define it. And it also gets into the question saying that you're actually trying to see that all the responsibilities falling onto the state and not to the employer. And our idea is to see how can we build different mechanisms within this so that each one of the different stakeholders and different actors in the economy can actually get benefit. Now as a result of it you very clearly see that in many countries over the past decade you have health and pension coverage that actually has been improved. And finally I want to just end with this particular slide which basically shows that actually I have been working on this issue for a very long time and it has been very systematically trying to build going beyond the contributory non-contributory social system and trying to see how different groups of workers can be built within could be brought in. So what we try to basically argue is that you can adapt how contributions are determined. You can have either a flat or a broad contribution basis. You can have certain kind of a mandatory systems that can be built in. You can also simplify the entire system. You can also facilitate contributions through various mechanisms. Technology can be used in a very significant way with regard to it. And finally what is very important and this is a question that gets raised saying that many of the informal firms cannot pay the minimum wages or cannot make the social contribution. So you know how are you gonna force them or do you want them to get out of the entire market? I think we have mechanisms here. A number of countries have implemented is that you have subsidized schemes which allow, which basically the government comes in to support some of these firms so that they can make these payments and over a period of time many of these firms actually become productive and they can actually join class of formal economy. So I think I can go on talking about this but I think I'll stop here in the interest of time and the discussion. Thank you very much. Thank you, Uma. That was very nice and very succinct comments. I wanted to start off by saying that two takeaways I got from the lecture and also what Uma's comments were. The first takeaway is that if I look at Latin America from where I am in South Asia or Southern Africa and I think I'm an informal worker in Southern Africa, South Asia, I don't have any kind of non-contribute social insurance. I sort of look at Latin America and say, wow, that's pretty impressive. If I were in Latin America, the same informal worker I would be better off. What you're showing is well-intentioned programs like what you see Latin America or non-contribute social insurance have this purpose outcome where actually the workers are no better in the sense of being in informality for large parts of their working life and that's a very important argument because you might say that those sort of non-contribute social insurance programs are what we need for the workers that we see in Southern Africa and South Asia where they have nothing practically. But if that whole thing leads to a situation where they are in formality for quite a bit of their working life even though they make the transitions as we see Latin America, that's not a very good outcome. So that's a very important point. I think it's worth thinking about that a bit more in the Q&A. The second takeaway I feel is that when you think of informality, often we hear and this is particularly from the randomized, our city revolution is that give workers a bit more training, more education and that's the big problem, the supply side of informality. But what you're only showing is that the demand side is equally important. I mean the amazing here, the amazing story of Mexico with Progresor, the huge increase that happened in the poor and the human capital and yet the perversiveness of informality tells us that demand side is a very important thing that we need to worry about. So that's something I think it's important for us to think a bit more on the demand side and how we should think about general criminal effects of certain policies which might lead to a situation where increasing human capital per se among the poor is not going to take us away from a world of informality. So I think those are two important takeaways from my point of view. So what I wanna do is now I wanna have four, three to four questions. I wanted to say, I told this to Santiago at the beginning that I wanna take the question from students first because I know there are quite a few of you here. So let's start with a few questions from students and I'm pretty sure that I will get some and then we'll have questions from everybody else here. So shall we have three to four short questions which Santiago can respond to and if you have any also comments to them or that also would be very nice too. So let's try and I'm gonna try and spot you because it's not that easy with the lights on me but I'll try and spot you. So there's one there and there's one more here. Can I see any more and there's one here. So let's go in that order. Okay, thank you very much. Professor Levy for your presentation. It was interesting. So correct me if I'm wrong. Your point is that some social programs are actually increasing precarious jobs under the form of increased informal employment. We have workers shifting from supposedly productive formal jobs to non-productive informal jobs. So my question would be, are these formal jobs really productive? I would be interested to know the characteristics of the jobs in which for example, after the introduction of the social programs, workers shift from these formal jobs to informal jobs and the characteristics of the jobs in which workers stay of the formal jobs in which workers stays even after the introduction of the social programs. So maybe the main issue here is about the type of formal jobs that are not really productive or that do not pay really well the employees and that gives them an incentive to shift toward informal jobs. Okay, thank you very much for that very nice question. There's one more thing somewhere in the middle there, yeah. Thank you very much. The lecture was really, really interesting. I'm a PhD student at the University of Geneva and I had a question. So you really nicely outlined this cycle of how we get to this problem that you're describing. But I thought that within that cycle, to me it seemed like the biggest problem was that the social protection, the social insurance systems they have at the moment don't work. They don't provide what people pay for and that's why they go to informality. So my big issue with this was if we're talking about going to universality, if the protection we currently have doesn't even work for the people that it applies to now, why talk about kind of making a system in theory universal when in practice it doesn't really provide anything. And then to piggyback kind of onto what the first question was saying, I saw this then as an issue where people that could be in the formal economy decide to do the same job that they would do formally, informally because informally they don't have to pay things, they otherwise have to pay and wouldn't get anything for. So I wouldn't then see how this informality would make the job worse because it's the same job. They just decide not to be registered. Thank you. And there was a question and I think it's here, right? Yeah, go ahead. So it's a short question. So could you share us one takeaway and how could we transition from these dual models into one single universal model? Because I think that the problem here that we're discussing is political implications and the social on grays that might arise if we try to do it with the people that have already gone into one specific system. And especially when that system is extremely unequal, which is the case of Mexico. Thank you. Great, three very good questions, Santiago. So first, thank you to Uma for her comments and perhaps we'll come back to the comments but and thank you for the three questions. They're all extremely difficult and first a comment on Kunal, which I think is related to your question. My understanding is that the notion that people are informal because they don't have sufficient human capital doesn't square with the empirical evidence. It just doesn't square with the empirical evidence. What you have seen is that the people can increase their years of schooling, continue in informal employment or shift back between formal and informal employment. And I didn't show it here, but you can show the rates of informal employment for people with high school degrees, with people with university degrees, with people with senior high, and the same patterns also occur. So it has more to do, not so much with the human capital of the people, but with incentives, the overall environment, not only the taxes and subsidies that come from the implicit social insurance system, but also things that I didn't touch on that Uma did touch on that have to do with registration cost and enforcement and the way the authorities work. The whole environment is what in the general equilibrium of the economy finally decides whether firms decide to have salaried contracts or non-salaried contracts, and whether firms decide to break the law or not break the law. If enforcement is very strict, the likelihood that firms are gonna break the law is less. If enforcement is loose, the likelihood that firms are gonna break the law. But it's also not independent on the quality of the benefits. If the benefits are high relative to the cost of the benefits, the incentives to break the law are not so strong. But if the benefits are really low compared to the costs of the benefits, the incentives to break the law are very high. So it's extremely difficult to generalize because it's very much context-specific and country-specific. Costa Rica and Mexico have exactly, almost exactly the same years of schooling, the population of Costa Rica and the population of Mexico. But the informality rate of Costa Rica is about 30% lower than the informality rate of Mexico. And so it's very difficult to explain otherwise. So how can you then promote the formalization process? I don't like to think about that way because it's a bit of a circular reasoning because it depends exactly what is it that we're using to define informality. So I would separate the problem into two separate problems. What is it that we want people to have? Do we want people to have health insurance? Yes or no? Yes. Do we want people to have health insurance depending on the type of job that they have? Hard to make that argument. I always make the analogy with education. You fund the education from general revenues irrespective of what people's job is. Why don't we do the same with health? If we then have health treated exactly the same way as education, from the point of view of health, formality and informality are irrelevant. They're not useful categories of analysis. Whenever we discuss education, we never think about formality and informality when we discuss education. But we discuss it when we think about health because it has to do with this dichotomy. Now your question. Yes, the benefits are low and this is the beta that I had in the presentation there which says that workers don't value the benefits of this and the example is people are contributing to the pension, they're not gonna get a pension. So I don't think very highly of the pension system if I contribute but I'm not gonna get a pension at the end and I don't think very highly of the health system if I go to the clinic and they tell me that there are no medicines and they cannot treat me for my illness. So the quality is a serious issue. What makes me think that going to a universal system would improve the quality? The answer is nothing. What you need to do is at the same time that you are doing the changes to go to say universal health insurance, you have to do a lot of additional and complimentary work to ensure that the providers of health services have the right incentives to improve the quality. And one of the big problems in Latin America is that the quality of the services that are provided by the public institutions is fairly low and it has to do with corruption, it has to do with the wrong incentives, it has to do with the fact that the systems are not designed to produce quality. So I went very, very, very quickly here through something that is a much more difficult and time intensive and complex process which is changing the incentives of the public sector to provide quality services. We have the same indication, the quality of education in Latin America is also not that good. So this is a systemic problem in the public sector and just changing the taxes and the subsidies would not fix that problem. You have to do something much more than that. You have to do things on accountability, things on corruption, things in other dimensions that I did not discuss. And so that ties up a little bit with your question. My view is that Latin America is caught up in a very bad equilibrium. In which people are no willing to pay taxes because they think that the services that they get in return are not worth the taxes that they're paying. But because the taxes with the exception of Brazil and Argentina are in general are so very low, there's not enough money to provide services. So you're caught in a low equilibrium trap of low taxation, low quality of services. And the question is how could you move to a high equilibrium trap of high quality of services, high taxation? And the political economy of that transition is very difficult because it's a question of trust, it's a question of how do you break the vicious circle in which the citizen says, all right, okay, I'm willing to pay a little bit more, but you government show me that you're not gonna cheat. And the government says, look, I cannot provide you more services because there's not enough money to deliver the services. I didn't discuss at all the political economy of breaking away from this because I'm one step before. I'm at the conceptual stage in which I'm trying to argue the current equilibrium is very bad. If we agree on that, then the next step, okay, what is the transition path out of that? And just one word on the transition path. I think we have to tackle it bit by bit. We talk about social protection and it's kind of a very big thing. Where would I begin? With what matters most to most people in the immediate way, their health. So move gradually to universal health insurance. What does that mean? It means don't make health insurance something that has to be provided and financed by the employer. Through a wage tax, but have health insurance, something provided and financed by the government through general revenues in the same way that education has done. Then you have a different path for daycare, a different path for pensions, a different path for unemployment insurance. Break the problem in pieces and do a transition path for each of the pieces. Begin with probably what's most important to most people, again, which I think is health. Thank you. Let's take three more questions now to, and again, short questions as you had in the first round. That'll be very nice. So who's gonna go next? And this time I'm welcoming a question to anybody actually, not just the students, yeah. Sorry, let's just take two more questions. So you have one question there. There's one, I think, at the back. Yep, and then one more question. Tony, yes. So let's go again in that disorder. So please go ahead. So Santiago, if you were delivering this lecture to the Trump administration, instead of this convert, what would they say? Because universal health insurance in the States, it's not there either. So what do you expect their reaction to be? So we're moving from one, that's the same continent, really. Okay, so one question, I think that's current, right? Yeah, go ahead. Yes, thank you very much for the very interesting lecture. I was wondering what your view is on the abolishment of the Prospera program. Recently in Mexico, and how this fits into what you have been supporting to get to more universal health insurance and general universal social protection. Okay, nice question. Thanks, Tony. Tony Addison from WIDA. One question is fiscal resilience, which you've raised. If we move towards a more ambitious program, we know that Latin America is subject to a roller coaster of macro crises. So how can we embed this in a macroeconomic framework that sustains it? Secondly, there's some powerful forces operating on formal employment, including automation, which may, some economists argue, reduce the formal job opportunities. What does this imply for the scheme that you've put forward? And thirdly, we have a lot of bright young people in the audience who are all thirsting for research topics. So what would you advise the up and coming generation of development economists to work on? Sorry, I threw in three questions there. Okay, but they were pretty quiet, quite a brief question. So we could do a fourth question, actually. If there is a fourth question, anybody? Yeah, all right, there's one there. Hello. Thanks, both presenters. It was really interesting. What I wanted to ask you is something that has been mentioned about the demand side. How important it is, the economic structure of the Latin American countries when it comes to creating formal jobs. For sure, social protection systems are important and this trade-off between informality when it comes to contributions. But what's the capacity during the last 15 years? Umashou that growth actually led to formalization. For sure, specific policies are needed, but I think I was expecting a little bit more about demand side and how to create actual former jobs. Thank you. Oops, sorry. Joe Kudson from the Health Financing Team in WHO. One question on the generalizability of the approach or the thinking on this that occurred to me as you were talking is in Latin America, I think while the informal sector may be larger, or the size of the informal workforce may be larger in the aggregate than the formal, it's still probably, I don't know, in the 30s or 40s percent. I don't know exactly what it is. But what might be the implications, and maybe this is just one of the research questions, where that formal sector is not much larger than civil servants, which might be the case in some African countries, but even there in many, I think in many Francophone countries, they have made what I think we see as the unfortunate choice to set up a separate health scheme for just them, which is a way to really magnify the inequalities in the distribution of public spending. But what might be the implications in terms of thinking of this schema and how to move from informal to formal when that formal sector is really very small? In a sense, does scale matter in thinking about these issues? Do you have quite a bit? No, very interesting questions. I mean, the first one is hard for me to tell what people in the administration that President Trump would respond to this. I mean, there's a view, the underlying, paradigm that guides all the discussion what Uma was saying, what I was saying, is a view in which the intervention of the state is needed to assure the provision of some social services, among which are health insurance, some version of a pension, and perhaps some other social services, like daycare or something else. If the paradigm view, the underlying view, is one in which unabated individualism is what should prevail, and the state should do no more than collect taxes for the military, the police, and perhaps infrastructure, then this whole discussion is basically relevant, because it basically says social protection is not an area in which the state should intervene. My view is that it should, and that what we should be debating about is how to do it best, not whether we should or we should not do it, particularly in the context of Latin America that are such unequal societies, and in which social cohesion is central for these, and unless you have a broad and effective social protection, that not gonna be there. But if your philosophical viewpoint is that that's not something that the state should mingle, then they would say, look, this is only relevant, I forget it, you know, don't even go to slide two, stop. Stop in slide one. So the question back there, perhaps just to put it in context, the program Progresa, that I've been involved for the last 20 years or so, that Kunal mentioned at the beginning, this new administration has actually decided to stop the program. So it is difficult for me to give an interpretation, except to try to cast it in a perception that the program was pursuing objectives different from what it was actually pursuing. If you think, ah, the objective of Progresa was to diminish poverty, and two decades later, poverty is still there, therefore the program failed. You say, yeah, time to abolish the program. If you think, no, the objective of Progresa was not, quote, unquote, to abolish poverty. The objective of Progresa was to invest in the human capital of the poor, and it is in those terms that the program should be judged, but that in fact to abolish poverty, you have to do more things than just a single program, you think, which is my argument at the end, you have to think about the general equilibrium of the economy. My interpretation might be flawed, is that the first viewpoint was a viewpoint taken by the government in this decision to stop the program, and it flows from the lack of precision in separating the objectives of individual programs and looking at the general equilibrium of all the programs and the way they interact and judging the outcomes from the general equilibrium of all the programs. So it brings the point that I was making painfully to the forefront in a very immediate way. Tony's question on fiscal resilience. So you put your finger where the real issue is. Behind this discussion of asymmetric and segmented social protection is a fiscal issue. Is the inability of Latin American states to generate sufficient revenue through taxation to fund a broad social protection scheme that is universal in its scope? And its over-reliance on taxes on wages that can be easily enforced that then is behind this particular problem. It's not everything but it's an important part of the conversation. So without tackling the underlying political economy which comes back to your question of taxation in the region, you're not gonna have this official fiscal fortitude to embark on this. What you certainly don't want to do is fund the universal system of social insurance from revenues from commodities. We've learned that lesson. And what you certainly don't wanna do is to fund it from oil that goes up and down or copper that goes up and down or silver or soybeans or bananas or whatever that goes up and down. If you wanna have a permanent solid social protection universal network, you have to have permanent solid taxes that collect substantial more revenue than it is today. And it goes back to the political economy question which in my view, if there was a second lecture maybe for somebody of number 24, they should talk about the taxation side of all this. I didn't tell it because there was no time but that's kind of the complimentary part. Automation. Automation just makes more urgent the call for universality because indeed, the notion that salary jobs are gonna be continuing is actually questionable in the face in which the logical change is actually making the boss worker relationship more fluid. And it's not obvious who's a salaried worker and who's not. There's gonna be a gray line in the middle more graduations in there. And therefore all the more reason to delink access to health insurance and to some basic pension and acre from your status in the labor market because automation is gonna erode the basis of the wage relationship. So it just brings more urgency to the issue here. And research questions for the, think about the watch. Think about the general equilibrium of the social protection systems. Huge amount of research over the last two decades on impact evaluation of individual programs. Lots of progress, lots of learning. We understand a lot better how these individual programs work. We need to think about the various pieces of the program modeling them in a mixed, technically difficult, but simulation models. I think in a way we're a little bit trapped by the rigorous impact evaluation. I'm all for it, but it should not be just a, Nakamisa, the force that you know, that straps you into not going into other areas of research and other techniques that can bring some light to some issues that require a kind of a different technique. And Joe's question on, if you start from economies that have a small formal sector, in a way it's easier. Think of an economy that has 50% of the labor force in the formal sector and 50% of the informal sector. So the health benefits of 50% of the workers are paid with the wage tax, and the health benefits of 50% of the workers are paid from general taxation. You want to move to universal system from general taxation, you've got to replace the health benefits that are being paid with the wage tax of 50% of the labor force. If that's only 10% of the labor force, that's easier than if it is 50% of the labor force. That's easier than if it is 50% of the labor force. So I always say in economies in which the formal sector is very, very small, they should go immediately to universal systems. And then if we really think about it, the word formal in that economy would no longer be relevant. There might be illegal behavior with regard to taxation, illegal behavior with regards to registration, but nothing to do with people's access to health insurance or people's access to a basic pension, some basic benefits. If you're close, San Diego's been fascinating to listen to your lecture and Ooma's comments and also the question and answer, the question was really, really nice. And I'm going to ask Professor Lou John-Reed, our con to make the closing remarks. Before I do that, I want to say three quick things. First is that I know that San Diego's lecture is so rich, so immensely insightful that you might want to think, okay, how can I actually listen to it again? We are going to make the lecture perhaps in the next few days or weeks. It will be available on our website on the YouTube, our YouTube channel, so you can listen to it again because a lot of things that you might want to listen to in this lecture. Secondly, we have this brief, a policy brief that we have from San Diego's provided to us. You should take it with you if you haven't done that already, it's got a summary of this lecture. And the final thing is we're going to publish the paper that is the basis of the lecture fairly soon because we have San Diego's asked wonderfully what is the final version which is pretty much ready to go and we will have the working paper version fairly soon. And so you can check our website, hopefully it'll be there very, very shortly.