 to the US Institute of Peace virtual event on the impact of COVID-19 on North Korea. This is USIP's first webcast event during this shelter at home period. So if we run into any hiccups or difficulties during this webcast, I ask for your patience and understanding. This being said, we have an excellent audio visual team and I think we're in pretty good hands. For those of you who aren't familiar with USIP, we're a national independent and non-partisan institute that's fully funded by Congress and dedicated to the goal of mitigating, preventing and resolving violent conflict. Today's event will examine the impact of the novel coronavirus on North Korea and what this means for security in the region. So much of crisis response depends on having timely and accurate information, but that's precisely the problem with North Korea. Due to the North Korean government's lack of transparency and accurate reporting, our information is oftentimes limited to organizations on the ground, particularly South Korean organizations that have sources in North Korea, as well as what we can piece together from those who have experience with epidemics, experience with North Korea's healthcare system and North Korea's responses to past crises like Ebola and SARS. We do know that North Korea has responded quickly to COVID-19, including a ban on all foreign tourists starting on January 21st of this year, which is around the same time that the United States and South Korea have announced their first infections. In addition, North Korea has been implementing very robust quarantines, social distancing and public education efforts, but still given North Korea's proximity to virus hotspots like China and the under-resourced state of its healthcare infrastructure, the potential for a significant crisis remains. So to gain further insight into this topic, we have assembled a fantastic group of five speakers who will address a range of issues related to COVID-19 in North Korea. And let me introduce each of them very briefly and what they'll be covering. So first we have Keith Luce, who's the executive director of the National Committee on North Korea. NCNK has done an excellent job tracking the COVID situation in North Korea and Keith will provide a broad overview of the situation. Next, we have Dr. Keith Park, who's a lecturer on global health and social medicine at Harvard Medical School. He's also the director of the North Korea program for the Korean American Medical Association. He's been to North Korea numerous times on medical and humanitarian visits and he'll provide greater insights into North Korea's healthcare system and its ability to address the coronavirus. Then we have Scott Snyder, who's senior fellow for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He'll provide his thoughts on how COVID has reinforced North Korea's isolation and what this might mean in relation to the broader pressure campaign against North Korea. Next is Dave Maxwell, who's senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, as well as a 30 year veteran of the US Army. He'll share his thinking on the potential for COVID related instability in North Korea and the need to maintain vigilance regarding the instability indicators. And then last, we have Jessica Lee, who is a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. She'll address the potential for providing sanctions relief to North Korea to aid in the COVID response efforts and perhaps even deferred diplomacy. Each panelist will have about five minutes to speak and then we'll shift to a Q&A session. For those of you who are watching online, I wanted to note that we'll be taking questions throughout the webcast. So if you have a question, please log on to YouTube and type in your question in the chat box and make sure that you identify your name as well as your affiliation. And then when the panelists have finished speaking, which should be around the half hour mark, we'll start addressing the questions then. So with that being said, let me turn it over to Keith to provide an overview of the COVID situation in North Korea. Thank you, Frank. And thanks to the US Institute of Peace for hosting this event. Frank, as you noted last January, as the COVID-19 situation intensified in China, North Korea began implementing a series of steps throughout January into February, steps that include today, that extended today, including border closure, including quarantine measures, quarantine measures on visitors coming into the country, quarantine measures related to Pyongyang, related to the expat community, a very serious series of actions in terms of making certain that people, that the virus was prevented from coming into North Korea, and if it were to enter, that would not spread throughout the population. North Korea also announced a state of emergency, activating anti-epidemic measures and it reported in January that it was working closely with the World Health Organization, related to the potential for pandemic in the country. But as Frank alluded, there are many questions that we have today regarding COVID-19 and North Korea. We really don't know the status of the situation in the country. We do know there are humanitarian consequences resulting from the border closure, resulting from internal restrictions on travel and movement. For example, the spring planting season is being impacted. Seeds being held up at the border in Dandong and with the internal travel restrictions, it's difficult for workers, farmers and so on to move around to proceed with planting as they would normally. Also international NGO representatives need to be able to re-enter the country in a timely way to implement their programming and to ensure monitoring. Despite the pandemic, at least outside of North Korea, North Korean officials continue to maintain a business as usual posture. One notable example being the construction of a major new hospital, a project that will not allow for social distancing and this reflects an air of confidence on the part of the leadership that they have a situation under control. At the same time, as we witnessed over the weekend, there was a frank acknowledgement of the COVID-19 threat by the Politburo meeting and the need for additional action. But at this juncture, as we review COVID-19 in North Korea, there are four points of particular interest that come to mind for me. Number one, perhaps as another example of confidence, North Korea will not accept offers of assistance from US NGOs related to COVID-19. However, the North does continue to work with those same NGOs to receive assistance in those areas where previous collaboration existed, such as tuberculosis, malaria, digging wells and so on. Point two, it's my understanding that President Trump's offer of assistance to North Korea still stands. Point three, meetings are now underway between officials of the UN and the ministries of public health and foreign affairs in Pyongyang on a range of topics. For example, the timely entry of humanitarian supplies into North Korea, the establishment of protocols that would allow for seed for other supplies to move into the country more timely. And then there's the issue of personnel. Presently, the United Nations in Pyongyang is operating at about 25% of capacity. I think that there are 12 people or so on the ground there. This is one of those areas where the UN is quite concerned, not only in terms of getting their people in and out, but also to discuss the entry into North Korea of other international workers. Point four, some aid shipments from the international community are making their way into North Korea by boat and by way of the Dan-dong point of entry. Reportedly about 10% of normal ship traffic has resumed as has about 10% of cargo traffic by land. And remember that all cargo going into the country is subject to quarantine upon arrival. In conclusion, the international community has some information about COVID-19 in North Korea, but not a lot. The battle with this virus, as we all know, it's not a sprint with a predetermined route and known finish line, it's a journey. So we in the international community, I think, must be careful about drawing conclusions today regarding the situation in North Korea based upon our present knowledge and assumptions. Thank you. Thank you very much, Keith, for that succinct summary. Now we'll go to Dr. Park to provide some finer details on the health system in North Korea. Thank you, Frank, and the USIP for inviting me. So the real question right now is, do they or do they not have COVID-19 in North Korea? Right, that's the question. Well, just about every news article on COVID-19 in North Korea, they temper North Korea's claims that there are no COVID-19 cases within their borders with something like, quote, contrary to what experts believe. Or they'll actually include direct quotes, for example, General Robert Abrams, the top US general in South Korea. He's been quoted as saying, quote, this is an impossible claim based on all of our intel, unquote. Well, my research team, we've been looking at this a little bit more closely and I can tell you that the naysayers, and that includes me, by the way, should not be so confident. So here's what we know. North Korea canceled all their flights to and from China, closed its borders with China, and quarantined foreigners, and also North Korean nationals who were returning from overseas trips. And the key is when they did this national lockdown, they did this in late January, about the same time, the Chinese lockdown Wuhan and the Hubei province. In fact, some of the measures actually preceded the Hubei lockdown. They didn't wait until they were starting to see actual deaths from COVID cases inside North Korea. The next country outside of North Korea to actually impose a nationwide lockdown is actually Italy. And they did that in March 9th, and this was actually full six weeks after North Korea locked down their borders. And the Italians did it after thousands of people have already died inside Italy. So we also need to remember how aggressive China was in containing the epidemic. The two provinces that bordered North Korea actually had very few cases to begin with, and they were quickly identified and contained. Leonien had 145 total cases with two total deaths, and Jilin province had 100 cases total and had one death, and they were rapidly contained as I mentioned. I think the mitigation measures that the Chinese have applied which are very aggressive, they were very successful. And we know that because of the curve, right? They're well behind the peak. And now they're relaxing some of their lockdown measures in Hubei province after two months. So in my assessment, the risk of the novel coronavirus entering through the 880 miles of shared border between China and North Korea, I think the risk is not as high as we thought they were. I think the North Koreans succeeded in flattening the curve and I would say that maybe completely squashed it. The North Koreans also value their economy just like any other country, right? So they want to open up their business as soon as they can. And we're dealing with that in the US now. But they will not take any unnecessary risks and let their guard down too soon. Remember, they stop all tourism and the Chinese border which they depend on for most of their trade completely. This was an expensive decision. The fact that they're now allowing foreigners to roam around streets of Pyongyang, allowing them to meet with the interlocutors and reopen the port of Nampo for shipping lanes. And we just heard that the 14th people's Supreme People's Assembly was held. These are indications that the country feels confident enough that to start to relax some of their mitigation measures. So I believe it's possible and perhaps probable that North Korea was successful in preventing the COVID-19 virus from entering its borders. So at this point it would be logical to ask, does North Korea actually have the capacity to test for COVID-19? Maybe they have it, but they just been able to not be able to detect it or confirm it. The answer is they do. They do have the capacity. They have the machines to run the tests and they've been provided with the diagnostic test kits from both China and Russia. So they have it and they're actually doing the diagnostic testing. Now that's the good news, but the story is not over yet, right? So I'm sure they're relieved to see the Chinese contain the COVID-19 epidemic very quickly which they share a border. But the fact is we have a raging pandemic at the moment and I think this has re-heightened their fears of the virus threat that you can continue still enter their borders. The pilot bureau, which just met last weekend like Keith mentioned, here's what they put out as a statement in the resolution. Quote, they're calling for consistently taking strict national countermeasures to thoroughly check the inroads of the virus in the light of the steady spread of the worldwide epidemic disease, unquote. So I think we can expect to see continued vigorous screening and mandatory quarantine for visitors for some time to come. Now let's talk a little bit about what would happen if an outbreak were actually to occur inside North Korea? The health system, as most of you know, is fragile and weak and they're only able to treat only a handful of critically ill patients. So according to some of these estimates, we've been collecting these numbers, the total number of hospital beds in North Korea, it's a big range, is between 31,000 and 330,000. In low-income countries where North Korea is one of them, the proportion of ICU beds, the critical care unit beds, the total number of beds about 1.6%. So this translates to about 500 to 5,000 maximum ICU beds in North Korea. And I can tell you, having worked in some of these top hospitals over the last 13 years in North Korea, my guess is towards the small estimate. And I'll be very surprised if the total number of ventilators in the country exceeds 50. This is just a my personal guess. So in a worst case scenario, there was a modeling study done by the Imperial College people. They do all the pandemic modeling and they actually included North Korea in their analysis. So assuming each infected person with COVID-19 infects three more people. And if there was no mitigation measures applied, which is not realistic, but if the worst case scenario, the total number of deaths in North Korea could exceed 150,000 people. And they would need at somewhere between 800,000 hospital beds and 200,000 ICU beds. It would totally exceed their capacity, right? However, more realistically is that they will apply aggressive mitigation measures. And assuming their mitigation measures are able to reduce transmission by 75% and they apply these measures aggressively early on when there's less than 50 total deaths from COVID-19, the number of deaths as a result of an outbreak inside North Korea could be reduced to about 7,000 deaths. And then as for the demands for beds, about 13,000 hospital beds and about 2,500 ICU beds, which is within the capacity of North Korean health system. So based on these predictions, I think you'll still be worthwhile for North Korea to increase their treatment capacity by building out more ICU beds and procuring crucial pieces of equipment like oxygen concentrators and ventilators, et cetera. But more critical and effective is for North Korea to continue to apply the comprehensive preventive measures until treatment and vaccine becomes available. Thank you. Dr. Park, thank you so much for your perspective. I think that was very insightful on basically your estimation of what is actually happening on the ground. Let's turn to Scott Snyder now. Thanks to USIP for putting this on and inviting me. And the question I really wanna dig into is what is the impact of quarantine on North Korea as opposed to sanctions? Because North Korea's typical response to public health pandemic crises in the past has been to pursue a quarantine, to shut down borders to prevent the infiltration of negative global influences. And yet we also have the sanctions regime in place. And I think that there is one critical difference between sanctions and quarantine and that is sanctions is externally imposed while the quarantine by North Korea, its initial response to the COVID-19 crisis was self-imposed. And in many respects, this decision highlights, I think the fundamental political challenge that North Korea has been dealing with now for some years. And that is how do you pursue political isolation in a context where you're becoming more economically interdependent in particular with the Chinese economy? And so the challenge related to quarantine is that it cuts off flows that have become increasingly important to North Korea's economy despite the imposition of sanctions. And I think the critical questions in terms of political impacts of quarantine on North Korea are gonna be duration and the ability of North Korea to manage the flow of goods while continuing to restrict the flow of people. Now, what are the impacts in terms of North Korea's internal economy of a decision to quarantine? Well, one is it increases scarcity of goods and scarcity of goods in North Korea increases internal dependency on the leadership and on entities that are close to the leadership. It's a distortion of the regular market activities that are going on in North Korea that help to provide needs. But scarcity, I think also indirectly serves the state's desire to reassert centralized economic control over distribution and availability of goods by winnowing those who are successful independent of regime permission. But quarantine also can't last forever. North Korea needs goods to come in and out. A second impact I think has been the financial impact on North Korea that is occurring as a result of the cutoff of Chinese tourism into North Korea which has been a big revenue earner for North Korea through 2019. And so that's something to watch the possibility that quarantine could have an outsized financial impact on North Korea disproportionate to any impact that sanctions may have had because it deprives North Korea of a release valve that had been operating with China as a means post to reduce the impact of sanctions. In terms of North Korea's ability to defend itself from the public health impact of COVID-19, we all know that North Korea's public health system is vulnerable, but we also have to ask the question, well, what is the likely impact of COVID-19 transmission into North Korea? And we really don't know whether, I think it's pretty clear that lower classes within North Korea are gonna be more vulnerable because of the impact of poverty and also because of the likelihood they already have underlying health conditions, but it can also have an impact on elites. And I think that one area to watch is whether or not we see evidence of impact on elites in North Korea from COVID-19. And so far, it's hard to say that there have been major impacts. The fact that the SPA has gone on over the weekend, apparently without social distancing, sends a signal that North Korea is going on as normal. But I think that it also raises an interesting question that we'll have to wait a few weeks to see as to whether or not even that decision might have impacts on elites. And then the last question I wanted to address is really the issue of sanctions relaxation on North Korea. And we already, as Keith has mentioned, the US has already made offers for humanitarian assistance. North Korea is working to some extent with the WHO, but I think it's pretty clear. Maybe the big lesson from the famine of the 1990s for North Korea is that decisions to allow in international assistance also come with perceptions of vulnerability. And at this moment, I think that what North Korea does not want to do is to reveal any sense of vulnerability internally or externally. And so as a result, I think that it's likely that only in the event that the North Korean system is completely overwhelmed that we'll actually see North Korea responding actively to and positively to offers of international assistance. And I'll stop there. Scott, thank you so much for that political perspective. I wanna give a reminder for those of you joining online that we are taking questions throughout the webcast and we've already received several so far. If you wanna ask a question, make sure you're logged into YouTube and you can type a question in the chat box, make sure you identify your name as well as your affiliation. Let's move on to Dave Maxwell, who will provide some thoughts on the military readiness perspective. Good morning and thank you to USIP and Frank and the team for having us and to my fellow panel members. Dr. Park painted a very optimistic view, which I hope is what comes true, but I think it illustrates the paradox of North Korea and if his view comes true, it's likely the draconian population of resources control measures and the inhumane security system that exists in North Korea will probably have made the biggest contribution to preventing and mitigating an outbreak. But as a military planner, I'm a worst case kind of guy. And so my fear is that a Corona virus outbreak in North Korea could have devastating effects on the Korean people, on the military and on the regime elite, which can lead to internal instability for the regime, which of course will have dangerous consequences for the Rock US Alliance. I was gonna touch on three points, conditions in the North, the impact on regime decision-making and why we need to prepare for contingencies and of course, hope they don't happen. I think that the conditions could surpass the arduous March and the great famine of 94 to 96. Again, worst case that we've got to consider that. And of course, the North was saved 97 to 2007 with the sunshine policy, the transfer of billions of dollars into North Korea and of course, the growth of the markets. And I think that there's a lot of stifling of market activity now, which has been one of the safety valves. So I think it could be worse, but a widespread outbreak is gonna influence the decision-making of Kim Jong-un. And everybody's kind of touched on this. They're trying to, you know, they're not transparent with information. They're presenting a stiff upper lip to the outside world. You know, the use of provocations as we've seen today is really probably designed to send the signal of their strength and ability. But we just don't know what is happening. But if there is an outbreak, particularly within the military, and of course we've seen unconfirmed reports of 200 soldiers dying this weekend, we saw reports of four military doctors supposedly perishing because of coronavirus-like symptoms. Even though these are unconfirmed reports, we need to assess them and we need to take them seriously. So how should the U.S. Alliance respond? First, I think that Kim and Trump are both gonna try to protect President Trump's unconventional experimental top-down and pen-pal diplomacy. I think they both want to do that. But the problem is the unknown and whether the coronavirus will create those conditions for instability and the worst case regime collapse. Now, during contingency planning in the 1990s, when we were really looking at this problem, we defined instability regime collapse arising out of two conditions. One, the inability of the Korean Workers' Party to govern the entire territory within the North, centrally from Pyongyang, combined with the loss of coherency of the North Korean People's Army and of course then support of the Army for the regime. When those two conditions occur, that is really what can lead to regime instability and of course ultimately collapse. And as I said, in the 90s, it didn't occur and it didn't occur because of outside aid and because of the growth of market activities. And of course, we never predicted when North Korea would become unstable and collapse, but if it does, I think it's gonna be catastrophic and we're gonna see a humanitarian disaster inside North Korea that will far surpass the arduous march. You know, we can see refugees, we can see refugees going to China to South Korea, even Japan by sea. And of course, the other factor within all this is the massive amounts of weapons of mass destruction inside North Korea, which poses a real threat to the South and to the region. And so in the midst of instability and collapse, we face a very complex situation and one which we must be prepared for. It really demands that policymakers and strategists and military planners be on guard to look at these indicators. Hope for the best, like Dr. Park is saying, but we must plan for the worst, the worst case. And hopefully we never have to execute that. You know, Sun Tzu said, do not assume the enemy will not attack, make yourself invincible. As we've done planning for instability and collapse over the years, our corollary was do not assume the Kim family regime will not become unstable and not collapse, but prepare your contingency plans. And I think that that's what we really have to do is prepare for the contingencies, because as everybody has said, we really don't know what's going on inside North Korea. We hope for the best case, but if the worst case happens, we need to be prepared. And so that's why I think we need to dust off the contingency plans and keep a close watch on what's happening. Thank you, Frank. David, thank you so much. It was very helpful to take a look at what could be a worst case scenario. And let's wrap it up now, turning to Jessica to focus on how we can cooperate on anti-COVID efforts. Great, thank you, Frank, for organizing this and for having me on. So I wanna take a look at what I think is important for all of us here in Washington, which is the context of U.S. national security interests. And COVID-19 and how that fits together. So I think much more can be done to ensure that our policies, U.S. policies are effective in achieving our strategic interests in the region, which include preventing COVID-19 from spreading inside North Korea. So the ongoing diplomatic stalemate, as everyone alluded to just now between the United States and North Korea, is a major challenge. And I think something that we here in Washington have to assess very carefully in the context of the global pandemic. COVID-19 shows that it's quite dangerous, where we are right now in terms of the status quo because of the overwhelming number of lives that are at stake, particularly below the 30th parallel, where U.S. troops and obviously our allies South Korea reside. As David mentioned earlier today, North Korea tested another missile test, which is its fifth this month. And it was likely timed in order to sort of provoke a reaction from South Korea, whose legislative election is today and comes the day before the birthday of the country's founding president, Kim Il-sung. And so as the United States continues to sanction Pyongyang, North Korea is advancing its nuclear and missile technology, which is incidentally opposite of what our sanctions are supposed to achieve and greatly adding to an already volatile situation with the pandemic. So there are a couple of things that we know. One, more ballistic missile tests by Pyongyang means that it's improving its technical capabilities, right? Number two, we know that inter-Korea cooperation could potentially be lifesaving if there is adequate monitoring of distribution of aid and sustained access to various high-risk parts of North Korea. Inter-Korea cooperation is also the key toward a more stable Korean Peninsula over the long run. Fortunately, South Korean government seems interested in aiding North Korea if they were asked. Its Prime Minister, Jeong Jae-yeon, has stated that if North Korea requested help in countering COVID-19, that South Korea will quote positively review it, which is a good sign. So I think President Trump should welcome South Korea's assistance, willingness to assist by calling for an exemption of certain UN sanctions that have prevented inter-Korea cooperation to date. It's really not clear yet which specific UN sanctions would need to be lifted for a better flow of medical aid to accurately diagnose and contain the likely spread of the pandemic inside North Korea, but they could include sanctions related to transportation or scientific cooperation. What is clear to me is that US Congress has a vital role to play. It should hold public hearings on the impact of the US and UN sanctions on North Korea's ability to respond to COVID-19. It should ask officials from State Department, Treasury Department, Defense Departments, as well as Center for Disease Control and the World Health Organization to assess the risks of COVID-19 in the Korean Peninsula and its implication for regional stability. Finally, I think it's really clear to us that the longer the United States pursues a policy of maximum isolation on North Korea, the more Pyongyang will have no choice but to rely on China, which has been its long-term trading partner as well as the biggest source of energy and food aid. And a more security independent North Korea would likely be less hostile to the United States seeking to contribute to greater balance and stability in the region. So I think the global pandemic is showing that the world is becoming smaller and more interconnected. And it's forcing countries to coordinate and share data in real time, whether it is among allies, competitors, or adversaries. There's an old Korean proverb, 등장 미치 어둡다, which means it's often difficult to see what's right in front of your face. And South Korea has become a droid in addressing the COVID crisis. And it's become a model nation by which other countries are drawing lessons. North Korea should let South Korea and the international community in in order to assess its public health. And the US should take this opportunity to pursue more aggressive diplomacy with North Korea in partnership with South Korea, which ultimately serves the United States interests. I think finally, everyone needs to think outside of the box in order to find our way out of the global pandemic. It's clear that COVID-19 has raised a series of questions here in Washington about the sustainability and durability of our military spending and many aspects of our federal budget that has created uncertainty in terms of addressing the crisis here at home. And so I hope this crisis will present an opportunity as we think about ways to restart diplomacy with North Korea. Jessica, thank you so much for the reminder that there's a lot more that can be done in the COVID response efforts, and particularly in terms of how the US could be providing assistance. So at this point, we'll now turn over to the Q&A session, a reminder to those online that you can ask questions by logging on to YouTube and type your question into the chat box. We've already received several questions so far. Please make sure you identify your name and affiliation. And I'll ask the speakers, when I ask a question, I'll direct it initially to an individual and then please make sure to keep your responses brief so that we can try to get through as many questions as possible. So the first question is kind of asked by several people, but I'll attribute this one to Eunjung Cho from The Voice of America. Different speakers, Dr. Park, you talked about how effective North Korea has been in terms of its quarantine and social distancing measures at the travel bans. And then the other side of the equation, Dave, you talked about the potential for a worst case scenario. So the question from Eunjung Cho really is, how can we anticipate whether there is an actual crisis in North Korea and what are some of the instability or other factors that would let us know that it's getting out of hand in North Korea? So let me first turn to Dr. Park. Yeah, so North Korea, when things get bad, they do ask for help. In fact, they did ask for help middle of February officially to all of their international partners to at least for diagnostic kits, PPEs and things like that. So if there's an outbreak and there's a true crisis, I would think that the North Koreans will reach out for help and that's how we'll know. Okay, let's turn to Dave. Yeah, I think there's already signs of problems within the military. And I think it was just announced that Kim Jong-un has created a new military guidance department, I think a fourth chain of control for the military. And I think that what we're seeing is that there's fears that there could be a breakdown of military control. And so this fourth line of control, in addition to the traditional chain of command, the political officer chain, the security officer chain, and now this new military guidance department at Radio Free Asia, reported on this weekend, is an indication that they fear a breakdown. So we wanna be alert to unusual military movements. We wanna be alert to deprioritizing military units if there's an outbreak within a specific core, they might be isolated. And of course that could lead to activity by those military personnel that could be destabilizing. And we need to of course be alert towards military defections, and which will be a strong indicator of a breakdown of these chains of control. So those are the kind of things I'll be looking for within the military to indicate that there is growing instability. But I think the key is, I think Kim fears that and he's taken aggressive action to try to prevent it. Over to you Frank. Thank you. So this next question, I will turn to both Keith and Scott, and it has to do with the impact of the quarantine and social distancing measures on different aspects of North Korean society, but particularly the black markets and the Changmadams. And this question is both from, again, from Hoon Jong-chul and Voice of America, but also from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea. So again, what would be the impact of social distancing, especially if it's prolonged over many months on different aspects of North Korean life, but particularly the Changmadams, the markets, and also since Scott, you mentioned that the COVID has increased the scarcity of goods. How do we know that this is true, especially since it looks like the commodity prices have stayed the same, although there was an increase in February and the prices, but it looks like it's kind of gotten back to normal. So let me first turn to Keith to address this question. Well, depending on how long the COVID-19 situation continues inside North Korea, obviously there would be an impact on life as a whole. Look at the United States. It's impossible, though, to predict what might or might not become the reality. I imagine that those involved in trading in North Korea would find themselves very creative and continue trading, albeit in a different form. And Scott. To Changmadam, we really don't know exactly what the impact is. It's highly unlikely that there's been an ordered stay-at-home shutdown that has had an impact on those markets, but instead you can imagine that the effect of the quarantine would be essentially shut down availability of goods in those markets. And that is gonna decrease the likelihood of transmission. And then I think the other aspect is that the two characteristics of North Korean leadership that are most valuable in this context of dealing with COVID-19, one is the ability to quarantine and the other is the ability to evade sanctions. And so my guess is that where there is scarcity, there will also be for a price and ability to find ways to open up avenues to get the goods that are most necessary from China, despite the reports of quarantine. Great, thank you so much. Next question is from Benjamin Madnick at the Virginia Commonwealth University. It's a fairly broad question, so you can take it for however you wanna interpret it, but basically what effects will COVID-19 have on regional security, particularly in regards to the Korean Peninsula? Here I'll turn again to Scott and then maybe I'll also have Jessica Chyman. So let's first turn to Scott. Yeah, well, thanks Frank. I think that it's really way too early to be able to definitively assess what the impact of COVID-19 is gonna be. It's a dynamic situation. We've already seen over the course of the past two to three months, a situation where there were concerns about China being overwhelmed and preoccupied, and now there are more concerns with the US. There's a moment where South Korea seemed overwhelmed and preoccupied, but now it looks a little bit better. And so I think that we're gonna have to wait and see how this kind of plays out. But it also provides a certain moment of potential opportunity or risk for unexpected developments to occur. And I think that's probably the most troubling aspect of it is that in the context of a pandemic situation, it just further erodes some of the institutional and structural factors that might otherwise be counted on to inhibit the risk or unintended consequences of potential conflict. Thank you so much, Scott. And I apologize for turning right back to you after you were previously speaking. I know it's hard to prepare for back-to-back questions, but I know you're a veteran of this process, so that's why I know you can handle that. Jessica, let's turn to you. Sure. Well, I think it's not that the most difficult part of analyzing this situation is all the unknowns and the what-ifs and things that we don't necessarily anticipate or have the capacity to rapidly respond to. I think it's also interesting that this pandemic has raised questions here in Washington about, what we can do to make it a little bit easier for humanitarian workers, who are really the frontline workers that are being dispatched to assist all over the world, even in North Korea, if there's more relaxation of entry and greater trust. And of course, inspection, which I think is a vital part of any medical assistance that the international community can provide. But I just wanna point out that I was heartened to see that Senator Markey and Congressman Levin plans to introduce a bill as they announced yesterday called Enhancing North Korea Humanitarian Assistance Act that would help the delivery of life-saving aid by NGOs to the people of North Korea. And this is in direct response to COVID-19 as well as other challenges that I think NGO community has faced in the context of the sanctions regime. So, I hope that the COVID-19 crisis is an opportunity for all of us to reflect on the state of US-North Korea relations that frankly is very volatile. And as David mentioned, there's been high level diplomacy between the president Trump and Kim Jong-un, but not a lot else going on in the meantime. So there's a lot of uncertainty in the process right now. And this could be a moment in which there are some more direct communications and less of sort of the hardwired animosity and hostility that is ingrained in the relationship to make room for some practical steps. Thank you, Jessica. Dave, you wanted to chime in on the security impacts question. Yes, I think this is very, very important. I think COVID-19 is, the coronavirus is having an impact on readiness of military units. And I think it's important to look at the different ways that the regional actors have reacted to this. We've had reports that North Korea did lock down their military for 30 days, but they've obviously resumed operations. They completed their winter training cycle and up to today they're conducting missile cruise missile tests and the like. The US and South Korea pretty much shut down to try to defend against it. South Korean military's had a good number of infected, but very small number relatively. And I think USFK has about 22 military civilians and contract workers have been affected, but we've stopped exercises and the like. China has continued operations, but from a US perspective, we are looking at this as a force protection issue, protect the force, but we now have four aircraft carriers that have outbreaks on it. We've steamed one into port and have had a lot of controversy about the relief for the captain. I think we have to, from a military perspective, this has to be a rehearsal for biological warfare. I know that's very provocative, but we have to learn to fight through these pandemics. Stopping all military operations while we wanna protect the force, it does, of course, decline readiness, but it makes us vulnerable. And I think that we have a high level of desire to protect our force, South Korea, the US, Japan, but North Korea and China are much less risk averse when it comes to military operations. And so I think we need to consider that in terms of regional security. And I'll stop there. Thank you, Dave. So we have a lot of questions teed up, but I wanna take the moderator's prerogative to ask one of my own. And this will be addressed to Key and Jessica. And it has to do with the question of sanctions relief. So on one hand, we know that the UN Security Council has been providing sanctions exemptions to international NGOs to provide assistance related to COVID response efforts. On the other hand, there have also been calls most prominently from Michelle Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights on the need for providing sanctions relief to North Korea, particularly in this pandemic period. So do we need additional sanctions relief, even broader sanctions relief, despite the fact that there are sanctions exemptions to these international NGOs related to COVID? So I'll turn to Dr. Park first and then Jessica as well. Yeah, great question, Frank. Yes, these sanctions in theory exempt humanitarian assistance. They're all written that way. But in practice, it's anything but that. The evidence is the bill that the Senator Markey and Levin introduced specifically addressed the hurdles that humanitarian organizations have to go through. It's a complex issue. So there's already an underlying disgruntlement and criticism of the mechanism for humanitarian exemptions under current sanctions regime. You add the international public health emergency aspect of COVID-19, then the exemptions process makes no sense at all. And if we fail to act on trying to broaden the humanitarian corridor and roll back some of the sanctions, I think you'll see what's happening now, which is countries like Russia and China basically not seeking exemptions and providing assistance directly. Yeah, I mean, I think there are, there's a lot of existing literature and studies that show that there are impact beyond sort of the immediate ones that Keith just laid out. It's taboo to conduct any financial transactions with any North Korean entities. No bank wants to be scrutinized or penalized or misunderstood for any kind of transaction. So I think on the most practical level, even if it's say the laptop that recently has been announced as exempt, that medical professional, you mentioned workers can bring that into North Korea for the purpose of giving aid. The fact that groups have to be ultra cautious and deal with wary banks that really don't wanna have any connection or be traced back to any transactions that connect to North Korea, I think is deeply troubling. I think, I welcome everyone to read the Congressional Research Services reports on the complexities of the US and UN sanctions. It's a very thick report, one that's publicly available that Diane Renwick has written on over the years. And that just, I think, shows that these sanctions are enormously complex. They are interwoven and very difficult to navigate. And NGO would have to have, I think, a lot of staff resources and lawyers to help navigate that complex system. So it seems to me like even though as Keith mentioned, sanctions are not supposed to harm or impede humanitarian aid. The practical effect of these sanctions are anything but I would just add that this is, I think also, beyond the strategic and other considerations, it's a moral issue, right? The Pope has recently come out and said, we should not be sanctioning countries in this time of global pandemic. So we have to ask ourselves, during this time of global crisis, what is the appropriate response? How can we save lives and not resort to sort of, well, let's just do the bare minimum and see what happens and figure things out when it might be too late. So I think that's why these questions about what sort of sanctions are getting in the way and how to practically respond to some of these hurdles is important. Okay, I saw Dave, you had your finger up, so you want to chime in very quickly. Yes, I just want to respond to that. I agree, saving lives is important, but we put a lot of blame on ourselves for the sanctions, the UN and US sanctions. But I think we have to remember that all of this is a result of policy decisions that Kim Jong-un is making, has made and the Kim family regime has made through the years. I think he bears much responsibility for the situation in North Korea. He could change his behavior. He could accept humanitarian assistance. He could stop his nuclear program, his missile program, his illicit activities around the world, the cyber attacks, and of course, the human rights violations outlined in the 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry that are really crimes against humanity, as they call them. So I think, I agree that I certainly want to save lives, but Kim Jong-un, we shouldn't forget how much responsibility Kim Jong-un bears for this problem. And I think we need to keep that in mind. Thank you. Thank you. So we have maybe say seven minutes left. And so I want to try to go to these questions as much as we can. We have next one from Mark Manion of the Congressional Research Service. He's asking about testing kits. We've heard reports about Russia providing testing kits. But are there any other signs that the North Korean government is proactively acquiring medical supplies, personal protective equipment, ventilators that they may need into future? So let me turn to Keith and then Dr. Park. In terms of the future and what North Korea is doing now in a proactive sense, I really don't know. As has been mentioned, North Korea has reached out to a number of other countries related to the present situation, Southeast Asia, Russia, China, and so on. But Frank, for just a moment, I want to go back to sanctions. Key and Jessica provided a great outline of the situation as it has been. I think it's also important though to give additional perspective in that in recent weeks and months, the Treasury Department, the State Department have shown sensitivity to the COVID-19 situation inside North Korea. We've seen the OFAC take a look at offering the changing regs so that laptops can get into North Korea, which is important for NGO workers. We look at the exemptions process at the 1718 Committee at the United Nations. In this particular situation, there is now a three-day turnaround possibility. Once exemption requests are applied for. So everything that has been shared is accurate, I believe in terms of sanctions overall, but I did want to point out that there is sensitivity presently to North Korea by the United States related to the COVID-19 situation. Thank you, let's turn to Dr. Park. So yeah, I want to echo what Frank, I'm sorry, Keith said, the US government, the COVID-19 situation, their position is one of cooperation, international cooperation in the global health security. So they have follow through on their statements, which is they are expeditiously facilitating sanctions exemptions in two days, sometimes as fast as one day. So they are, I think, doing what they can within the structure of the sanctions regime. As far as what's happening and getting equipment and supplies to North Korea, North Korea is actively trying to get those supplies and the entire effort is being coordinated through the UN resident coordinator. So yeah, and Keith knows a lot more about this than I do, but yeah, they are asking and they are acquiring. Okay, next question, I'm sort of combining questions at this point because there's still a lot of questions teed up, but this one has been asked several times in multiple different ways. I'll ask it to Keith and Keith, but this addresses the question and this one of the questioners is from Sandra Fahey. She's asking about the differential risks within the North Korean population from the COVID. So you have the military, you have those in the remote populations, you have the elites, the most vulnerable populations. How does COVID impact different sectors of the North Korean population? So let me turn to Dr. Park first. Yeah, so we saw in the US, the COVID-19 disproportionately affects the minorities, the African Americans, right? And I would expect the same thing to happen in other countries, including North Korea, which is the marginalized and the most vulnerable population will bear the brunt of it, not just because of the medical aspects, the public health aspects, but the treatment of the cure is worse than the disease because remember, they're shutting down the border for these trade with China, smuggling operations and things like that. These things have a way of directly impacting the livelihood of the lower part of the socioeconomic class in North Korea. So we have to be mindful, the vulnerable population are going to bear the brunt of this. Yes, I agree with what Keith just said. Sandra, this is an important question obviously when you consider North Korea, so much of the news coverage, so much of what has been said about COVID-19 probably relates to Pyongyang, probably relates to the elites, the immediate situation around the capital. What about the countryside? What about the people in the rural areas? What about those who are in the prisons? How will they be impacted by this disease? So your question is important, but it raises many more questions and the reality that this disease does not discriminate. All right, next question. And this next question has been received several times, but I'll attribute it to Connie Lee from Voice of America. And this has to do with the meaning of the recent missile tests, the cruise missile tests that North Korea conducted, I think just last night, especially during this timeframe where we have the South Korean elections coming up as well as the COVID crisis. And I'll turn to Dave first and then Scott. Well, I think there are numbers of interpretations of these. Obviously, we look to the messaging aspect of this. Some could interpret this as the old Northern wind, although I don't think that the North really wants the conservatives to win the election. So it could be interpreted as a provocation to demonstrate strength both internally and externally. It could be, and what I think is most likely is the continued development of their military capabilities. Their priority remains on building their military capabilities and these are enhanced warfighting capabilities that will both support warfighting, but also support blackmail diplomacy, the use of provocations and increased tensions to gain political and economic concessions. And then, of course, lastly, they're probably not gonna have a big military celebration for Kim Il-sung's birthday. So this also could be an attempt to show off its military, again, internally and externally in support of any celebration for Kim Il-sung's birthday. Thank you, let's turn to Scott. Let's turn to Scott. My own view is that the template was set by the December party plenum and that the focus is on securing the capacity to focus on security first, show that North Korea is a strong state, resist any perceptions of vulnerability and suggest that it's business as usual in North Korea. If I could just go back on the issue of differential impact of the health situation in North Korea, I think that we know that outside of Pyongyang, there simply will not be equipment available to any individual who potentially has this virus. And so I just wanna emphasize that that is a situation of extreme risk, especially for people outside of Pyongyang. Thank you very much, Scott. So unfortunately, we are running out of time. So I will ask one more question. There are many more questions that were asked. We just don't have time to get to them. So my apologies, but the last question will go to Scott and Jessica and this is broad question about diplomacy. This comes from Annika Bettencourt at Brookings. Are U.S. DPRK talks dead and does the COVID situation have any potential for spurring diplomacy again? So let me first turn to Scott on this question. Well, I believe that the North Korean default position from the beginning of the year is that they're not really looking to engage in negotiations unless the U.S. makes a major concession. And I think that what we are looking to see is whether or not the situation inside North Korea, the impact of COVID-19 might actually lead the leadership to change its own calculation under those circumstances and possibly use the humanitarian situation as a pretext or as a way of reaching out to negotiate with the U.S. while hiding its own vulnerability. Great, let's turn to Jessica. Well, I think there are some critical factors that could impede progress and talks at this point, including the upcoming presidential election here in the United States, as well as just the amount of energy that it is taking to address COVID-19 throughout the world. And so there are reasons to be pessimistic in direct bilateral talks resuming between Washington and Pyongyang. But as I alluded to in a piece that I wrote for the Quincy Institute, I do see this as an opportunity as well. And I think we need to always be measured and cautious, but also show policymakers a realm of possibility of steps that they can take to really break the stalemate and this deadlock that has persisted for months. And so I hope that this pandemic will create some sense of urgency that the status quo isn't working and that we need to try something new. Jessica, thank you so much. Unfortunately, that's all the time that we have. I wanna thank all the speakers for sharing their time and their insights. I also wanna thank my colleagues, Paul Lee, Matt Lilich from the AV team and Blaine Theodores from the Events team for helping put this webcast together. And thank you to all for joining us for this webcast. I hope we will address most of your questions and stay tuned for additional events from USIP. Thank you for joining us.