 Wel, mae'r gysyllt hwn yn ymdweud hynny yn ddim o'r eich cymdeithas yng Nghymru, a cydweithio'n unrhyw o'r eich cymdeithas ymdweith yma yng Nghymru yn Oxford, yn y Llyfrgell Ddechrau, yn Ysgol iawn. Mae'r rhaid i gweithio'r ysgol iawn, yma y gallwn ei gweithio, o'r ei cymoedd, o'r eich cymdeithas ymdweith ymdweith, ac mai milywi Fel threads интересus slipped i canol yr hyau roof Bydd moutod subway pan oed hynny Diolch i ddefnyddio chi o fynd yring confusion i ez Gwyrdiwch yn 2012 Mi fyddewchol ni front love yngheadedd i NOR Nghael Ddydd ynghyd G gweld ar y chanol eraill ein hunnw. gyda'r ffaswni'n rhoi gyda. Mae'n meddwl'i cwestiynau a'r byw a'i amser o'r hunain gwahodd ar y diodd gweld a'r myn. Ddodd ddodd yn fawr yn ei ddweud. Mae'n ymddangos i bobl yn gwneud yn cyfleu. Mae'n ddweud yw'r hyn, mae wedi'n meddwl i'r diodd gwneud o'r cyfrannu ffynesol yn euroboedau i'r cyfrannu i'r eistedd o'r cyfrannu i'r digwydd o'r cyfrannu. Ac yn y gwrth gwrs, mae'n mynd i'n ddigonwyr, ac rwyf wedi bod wedi'i gweithio arwag y gwrthgwrs ddwyllgus cyrfaenau yma yn y llwyr hwn. Mae'r bwysig byddai'rudiwyr yma yn ygyrchol yma, ac yn y ddweud, i'r drwsgwr yma, yn llwr ddwyllgus cyrfer y byddai Llyfrgell, yn y gyfyddo i'r bwysig o'r bwysig, yn y gwrthgwrs i'r Llyfrgell, ond mae'r bwysig yn y gyrchol yma, a dyna'r gael hynny'n cyfrannu gyda Brexit. Yn gweithio bydd yn bach y Proses Unedig, sy'n gweithio bydd eisiau sydd wedi'i gwelio iawn i'r exerio. Felly, rydyn ni'n gweithio. Felly, mae'n gweithio'n gweithio y Proses Unedig, yn y ddweud i European. Yn dweud, y cwestiwnio'n gweithio'n meddwl i'r cyfrannu'r cyfrannu, a gweithio, y dyna'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio European. ..ac yn mynd i ddim yn dweud yw'r rhai. Yn fwy ffordd i'r eisiau ochr eich ymdegysig y ffordd yma yn diem ni gynnaeth... ..reall y 10 yma, y bydd angen amser y Llywodraeth a Leithaer mae'r ddefnyddio... ..rhyw brydion, o barod o'r mewn economi ac yn y Dweud.. ..y grwp yw'r adon o syrraedd, y Carad�ji Uniau Unig... ..a'r deishoedd yw Pax Llywodraeth a'r ystod y Cynon. um the state without exaggerations of doom and gloom that's been prevalent in Brussels and elsewhere in Europe in recent years. And then the second part of the talk Try not so much to talk about what can be done to save it But talk about some of the main policy challenges and choices facing us in the months and years ahead Rwy'n amser y gallu ei gweithio'n gweithio'r cyfnodol yma, mae ydych yn bwyd yn gweithio'n gweithio. Ond y gallwn ei gweithio'n gweithio ar gyfer y cyfnodol cyd-gyrru, yn ei ddwyllio'n gweithio'n cyfnodol sydd yn ddyn nhw'n cyfnodol. Mae'r fydd yn unigol yn ddyn nhw. Mae'r unigol yn fawr i'r gweithio'n ddyn nhw'n gweithio'n ddyn nhw'n ddyn nhw'n ddyn nhw'n ddyn nhw. Mae'r awr Casio eich hunain eich gwrthysg dd 열�wsad yma'r unrhyw o'i ffeirthraol iechyd. Mae wedi cael pergylchedd yma ar 50 o ffêl. Ond rwy'n gwneud yn astudio y ffeirthraol iechyd i ffeirthraol er mwyn o'r ymellodau. Mae sy'n bezio i'r ein hanfodol. Ond efallYw drafted o'r ffeirthraol iechyd i'r ffeirthraol er mwyn o'r ymellodau, While the center remains weak and the legitimacy base on which the whole project rests remains weak as well, then you've got a problem. And by the way, parenthesis, think about all those studies about Europeanization. The idea was that with successive enlargements countries would gradually converge in terms of standards, institutions, rules and converge towards the higher benchmark provided by the more developed countries of Western Europe. Now experience suggests that Europeanization moves extremely slowly, if at all, in some cases. That particular long-term underlying trend is specific to Europe. There's something else which is much broader than Europe. And this is that Europe and the European BROP project runs the risk of being a victim of collateral damage. Collateral damage which is related to the latest stage of global capitalism that has two important characteristics. If you think of what has been happening in the last 20-25 years, slow growth on average and widening income inequalities within countries. A combination of two things. Western economies, the European economy in general, has been growing at a much slower pace for the last 20 years. And while inequalities have been rising inside our member countries. If I were to summarize the history of European integration, history of the last 50 or 60 years, this is the way I would summarize it. The European integration has become, or the European project has become ever bigger, more intrusive and less inclusive in a steadily deteriorating economic environment. And that is not good news. But Europe has been faced with multiple crises in recent years. Of course the one that is most obvious and very familiar to you in Ireland is the Eurozone crisis. Interesting question, the first question to ask, and I think the answer is pretty obvious, is how is it that an international financial crisis that originates in the United States turns into an existential crisis of the Eurozone and European integration in general. And of course I think the answer lies with a very poor design. The Euro is for me an extreme example of European over stretch. But more than that, it was a decision to proceed with the creation of a common currency without being willing to accept the consequences in terms of the institutions and common instruments. So it was some Europeans thought that they could have a currency without any form of advanced fiscal or political union. And I believe that in the medium and long term this is an unsustainable proposition. And they paid the price when the crisis came. Europeans were lucky because the first big test for their young currency coincided with the biggest, with the bursting of the biggest international financial bubble since 1929. And that's but luck. So they were both unprepared and they were also unlucky. And then they proceeded with wrong policies. Of course this is a very long story. The way I would summarize it, first of all Europe has been in a state of denial about the banking problem that broke out of the Eurozone crisis for a long time. We still have a banking problem in several European countries. And it also adopted a wrong policy mix insisting on austerity rules. Remember there are more and more rules in the government of the Eurozone. Those rules are increasingly pronounced with a rolling R, like in German. But this emphasis on austerity was largely based on a narrative about the crisis that the crisis was essentially the result of irresponsible fiscal policies and large deficits, which is true of Greece, but it was not true of Ireland, it was not true of Spain, it was not true of many other European countries. You had a private bubble, we increase had a public bubble. Now many things have happened since the outbreak of the crisis, but still we continue with a clash of interests and a clash of different narratives. And a good question to ask to which there's no simple answer is to what extent this incompatibility of views and policies reflects different interests, or is it an ideological dialogue of the deaf, but in many cases interests and ideology overlap. And despite all the changes and the new rules that have been introduced in the management of the Eurozone, the ECB essentially remains the only actor of last resort. And this is the only actor of last resort that keeps the system ticking at the present moment. But of course the Eurozone crisis is not the only crisis that Europe has experienced. In the meantime the neighbourhood or a large part of Europe's neighbourhood has caught fire. And remember if you look at the map I know you in Ireland are much more protected because you only have the British and the sea to cope with. In other parts of Europe it's much more complicated. If you look at the map, Europe is surrounded by a wide arc of instability. Starting from Ukraine down to Moldova and Georgia, Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Algeria, and further to the east Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, not to mention parts of Africa. It is a neighbourhood that is very unstable, is unlikely to stabilize anytime soon, and it's a neighbourhood that is not very easy for Europeans to deal with, and it's a neighbourhood that is exporting instability to Europe. And it is exporting instability through the export of refugees, immigrants, and also terrorists. I'm not suggesting that refugees are terrorists, but there are three different categories. But one thing apart from the export of instability, one thing that we have learned, or rather one illusion that has been shattered as a result of the crisis, is the illusion of Europe's soft power in international politics. Hard power has come back with the vengeance and Europe is extremely weak. And there are two things mainly in the neighbourhood that convinced us that Europe's soft power was an illusion. One was the failure of the Arab Spring and civil wars and all the rest in the Arab world, plus Mr Putin reminded us that Europe's soft power was not exactly a credible proposition. But one other thing that's happened is that because of the crisis, a new balance of power has emerged in Europe, and I'm saying the obvious here. We have the emergence of an undisputed yet unhappy and very reluctant leader in Germany, the progressive weakening of countries such as France and Italy, and an increasing number of free riders, misfits and laggards inside the European Union. So a combination of one reluctant and unhappy leader with many free riders, misfits and laggards leads to the proposition with a question mark whether Europe is governable in the foreseeable future. So are we faced with an ungovernable postmodern European empire? Now, few words about Brexit. I'm sure you know about Brexit more, although I've spent about 25 years of my life in Britain, but you're more directly affected by Brexit than us on the other side of Europe. But perhaps just two or three comments about Brexit. No doubt Brexit is a result of a huge act of political irresponsibility on behalf of Mr Cameron, but not only if you think about it, Mr Farage is the one who almost single-handedly delivered Brexit for the British population, which is extraordinary, but now we have Mr Trump, so nothing to worry about. I believe that the referendum of 23 June reflects English peculiarities together with a much more general European phenomenon. And here I borrow a phrase from a Scottish friend of mine who says that Brexit was won by an unholy alliance of members of English golf clubs, those people who are nostalgic of the British empire and who live in the English countryside, with the succulent, the losers from globalization, and it is a very interesting and a very unholy alliance. To some extent there are interesting comparisons to draw with what happened in the United States with the election of Mr Trump. They elected a billionaire and many of the losers of globalization felt that the billionaire will save them from the effects of globalization. But there's another point I would like to make and this is that it's about free movement of labour, free movement of people. I think it's pretty clear from surveys that the most important determining factor on Brexit was free movement. The British voted against immigration, they voted in favour of restoration of control over borders. And I've been saying that even before the referendum that I think it was a huge mistake on behalf of the rest of us that we did not give more to another wise, if I may say so, irresponsible Mr Cameron on this subject. Free movement of labour, free movement of people is one of the sacred cows of European integration. It's part of the four fundamental freedoms, it's part of the single market. But free movement of people was fine as long as Europe was a fairly homogeneous group in economic terms, growth was healthy and not many people moved. In a new world of huge economic diversity and heterogeneity in Europe, coupled with very slow growth and a much greater willingness of people to move, I believe that we may need thresholds and safety valves even inside the European Union. And I know every time I say that especially in Brussels people shiver with horror because it is really challenging one of the holy things of the European Bible. But my point of view is that if free movement is a sacred cow, this sacred cow will need to become leaner in order to avoid ritual sacrifice in times of crisis. Now looking into the future, just raise a few questions and then we can, I hope, I have provoked you sufficiently to have some discussion although I know that it's never difficult to provoke Irish people to have a discussion. Now looking into the future, if slow growth combined with persisting wide inequalities inside countries persists, this is going to be a ticking bomb for our political systems in Europe. I know you are doing better than the average European country in terms of growth, but for Europe as a whole this is a huge problem. All predictions point to pretty low growth for the foreseeable future. People talk about secular stagnation. Madame Lagarde talks about the new mediocre. If those predictions materialize and we have persistence of slow growth combined with widening income inequalities, the future looks very gloomy to me and dangerous politically. Now question of course is how do you restore growth, but how also do you achieve the objective of inclusive societies? One provocative question that I have to put to you is the following. Are there signs to indicate that on many instances there may be a trade-off between competitiveness and internal cohesion for countries? And if such a trade-off exists between competitiveness and equity inside countries, how will political parties cope with that? Even worse, how will social democratic parties in Europe cope with such a trade-off? I don't have a civil answer, but one reason I believe that social democrats across Europe are doing so badly is precisely because they have no answer to that problem. Now, Eurozone remains dysfunctional despite many changes in European governance. The Eurozone is neither effective nor legitimate. And I believe that the biggest systemic risk for the Eurozone today is Italy, not Greece. Not because it agrees is doing well, but because Greece is small enough and now sufficiently insulated in order not to present a systemic risk to the rest of the Eurozone. Italy is the big systemic risk because Italy is a country that is too big to fail and too big to save. And remember that in Italy today, which is completely unprecedented, virtually all opposition parties are against the Euro, against continued membership of the Euro, and they are turning increasingly Eurosceptic. The fact that Italy is turning increasingly Eurosceptic I think tells us a lot about how Italy has changed, but also how European integration has changed. Next point, I know it's very sensitive when one raises questions of taxation in this country. I believe that an eye will be blunt and perhaps provocative. I believe that a single market and a monetary union is simply incompatible with independent national taxation policies, especially with reference to the most mobile factor, which is capital. And something has to give in. And we know from experience that the combination of the abolition of national borders and the abolition of the exchange risk and independent tax policies on capital have turned tax avoidance and tax evasion for multinationals into cottage industry. And we have more experience of that in recent years. And I believe that this has become and will continue to be one of the big political issues on the agenda of Europe and the pressure to agree not on tax harmonisation, but on minimum rates and common standards will increase because of this experience and also because the British are leaving. And the British have been one of the main obstacles to progress in that respect, although I know that this is not meant to be progress in Ireland. But I believe that the next phase of integration, if any, will require more differentiation within Europe and search for a new place for the UK, but not only the UK because there may be need to find a place for other. Countries in Europe that may not want to be members of the more integrated core, which for the time being is identified with membership of the Eurozone. So the next phase will require much more differentiation than we've had. And then the second, the next question is about security security, both internal and external is reaching again the top of the agenda. Europe operated on two implicit assumptions for years. One was that soft power counted number one and number two that Europe could rely on the cheap on the protection of the United States. I think both of those assumptions are certainly much less valid and this is to put it mildly than they were before. Is Europe ready for adult life in terms of security? I have my doubts. In general, people say that the challenges are huge. Europe will not be able to deal with them. But then my counter question is or counter proposition is if it is true that Europe is not able, will not be able to cope with those challenges, then what is the likely consequence? The likely consequence is of an increasingly weak divided and increasingly irrelevant Europe in a rapidly changing world. And you might argue that relative decline for a prosperous continent is not necessarily a very bad thing. It may not be a very bad thing for people of my age. Declining graciously with grace may not be that bad if you are over 50. But I'm not sure this is a proposition that can be very credible for the younger generations. And I'm not even sure that Europe's neighborhood and Mr Putin will allow us to decline in grace.