 My name is Victor Cha. I'm Senior Advisor and Korea Chair here at CSIS, as well as a professor at Georgetown University, and we're very fortunate today to have a topic, a very timely discussion, Korea's interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and we have really an all-star cast to talk about this today. Before I go further, I've been instructed here to do a couple of things. The first thing I wanna do is welcome you all to the new building. For those of you who haven't been here before, this has been long in the making by John Hamry, and I don't know if some of you noticed, but we have a global chandelier out there in the back that was very expensive. But one of the things that it does is, it flashes lights according to geographic themes. And for today, this morning, if you stand under it, you will see that it displays a lighting pattern that is a figure of the Korean Peninsula. Is that right? Yeah, yeah. So, so. Money, well spent. All right, money, well spent. But again, it's a pleasure to have you all here today. Let me properly introduce our three speakers. Ambassador Ahn, Ahn Ho-Yong, is, as you know, the Republic of Korea's ambassador here in the United States. He joined the foreign ministry in 1978 and has held a number of postings throughout his career, most recently as first vice minister of foreign affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Prior to this, Ambassador Ahn served as Korea's ambassador to Belgium and as head of the Korean mission to the European Union. He was appointed deputy minister for trade at the ministry from 2008 to 2011, during which he also was the president's surpa for the G20 and G8 outreach meetings. He has served as director general of the Multilateral Trade Bureau and as director of the International Trade Law Division in the office of the minister of trade. And he was director general of the Economic Cooperation Bureau at the Ministry of Finance and Economy from 2004 to 2006. He's also been a professor and is a graduate of Seoul National University as well as the Edmund A. Wall School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. Wendy Cutler became acting deputy US trade representative in June of 2013. She is responsible for US trade negotiations and enforcement in Asia and Africa. Her specific responsibilities include the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the US-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, US-India Trade Policy Forum and Trade and Investment Framework Agreements. She also directly oversees engagement with Japan in the TPP as well as the bilateral negotiations with Japan parallel to the TPP. Wendy joined USTR in 1988 and over the past 25 years has held a number of positions working on both bilateral and multilateral issues. Most recently, she led the US-Japan TPP consultations. As many of you know, she was chief US negotiator for CORUS and was the lead US official for US trade and investment agenda in APEC. Prior to joining USTR, Wendy worked on trade issues at the Commerce Department. She received her MSFS degree from Georgetown. So there's a slight bias in terms of our presenters today as well as her BA from George Washington University. Scott Miller is a senior advisor and holds the William M. Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS. From 1997 to 2012, he was director for Global Trade Policy at Procter & Gamble. In that position, he was responsible for the full range of international trade, investment and business facilitation issues for the company. He's led many campaigns supporting US free trade agreements and as a member of numerous business associations, he has been a key contributor to international trade and investment policy. He advised the US government as liaison to the US Trade Representative's Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations, as well as the State Department's Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy. Scott was the founding chairman of the Department of Commerce's Industry Trade Advisory Committee, investment working group and earlier in his career, he was manufacturing, marketing and government relations executive for Procter & Gamble in the United States and Canada. This is what we call, this is a joint endeavor by both the Scholl Chair and the Korea Chair. For us, it's part of our Korea Platform Series and we're very grateful to Samsung Electronics America for supporting the Korea Platform. We will begin the discussion first. What I'd like to do is have each of our distinguished panelists to start out with some opening comments and then we'll have a little bit of a discussion. I have a few questions I'd like to ask. Not that I'm a trade expert, but I think there, I can ask questions that don't have to do with North Korea. And then we'll have a discussion with the audience. So Ambassador Ahn, would you like to begin? Right, right. Well, first of all, thank you so much for holding this. Well, Victor, you just called it very timely seminar and I totally agree with you. This is a very timely seminar. In the sense that we have just declared our interest. Korea has just declared our interest in participating in the TPP. And then where else would it be the better place to be holding such a seminar than at the CSIS? So thank you so much. Thank you. And then coming over here, my impression is that, well, Korea, of course, it has declared its interest in TPP. And then are we the new kid on the block? Or are we the old kid on the block? I think we are in hybrid. In the sense that we are new so far as TPP is concerned. But at the same time, we have been dealing with, well, trade and investment issues with almost everybody who is, who are participating in the TPP for the time being. So, well, hybrid candidate would be the expression. I mean, we are new. But at the same time, we have been dealing with almost all of those countries for quite some time. And in a very extensive and intensive manner. So as a hybrid candidate, I should be making about three observations. And then the first observation would be, well, Korea has been a very firm believer in the benefits of trade liberalization. And one example would be this, which is that, well, of course, Victor Chah has been a boring you with many of the things I've been doing before. And one of the things I've been doing before was to coordinate Korea's accession to the OECD. So we joined Korea's, we joined OECD back in 1996. One year after that, 1997, then what I came to find was that the OECD as a group was involved in a major, major study, which was called Benefits of Trade and Investment Liberalization. And I came to find that OECD was spending so much resources on that particular project. And then I couldn't understand why. So I came to talk to Director of International Trade at the time, certain now, Mr. Able. And I told him, well, the major project you're working on that's benefits of trade and investment liberalization, but hasn't that question been answered already more than sufficiently 200 years ago by Mr. Adam Smith? That was my question. And then he looked at me and then he said, well, maybe that has been answered at the time. Maybe there is not a big question in your country, in Korea, because you are a firm believer in the benefits of trade liberalization. But somehow that position is being questioned again and again in other parts of the world. So that was the answer. But anyhow, since then or even before that, Korea has been a firm believer in the benefits of trade liberalization. So that's the first point I wanted to share with you. The second point I want to share with you is, Korea has been not only a firm believer, but also a practitioner of something called competition liberalization. And of course, all of you, many of you, would be familiar with this concept of terminology, competition and liberalization. Wendy would be very familiar with it. I guess the author was Mr. Robert Telly, wasn't he? And then where competition and liberalization, when I first heard the terminology I said to myself, it's like black cat and white cat. That's to say, whether it's black or white, if you catch the mice, then there's a good cat, right? And then what I thought was that what Mr. Robert Telly was trying to say was, whether it is bilateral, unilateral or multilateral, if it is good for liberalization, then that is good. That I thought was what Mr. Telly was trying to say. And then in fact, when I say, Korea has been a practitioner of competition and liberalization, we really have been doing it through all different channels. For example, unilaterally, what Korea tried to do was, back in the mid 1980s, we started something called five year tariff reduction plan. So we tried it for five years, and then we had a second five year tariff reduction plan. So we did it for 10 years. As a result of which, the average tariff of Korea, which used to be around 30%, it came down to 8% by mid 1990s. And then we did it without any further consideration, then the fact that we wanted to reduce our tariffs with a firm belief that at the end of the day, it in fact would be in a sense strengthening Korea's competitiveness. That was the only reason why we did it unilaterally. And I told you, it started by the mid 1980s, and then it was completing by mid 1990s. And then mid 1990s, of course, that was the time when Urga round was wrapped up, when WTO started. So multilaterally speaking, then the fact that we have been reducing our tariffs for about 10 years, it made it rather easy for us to adapt our system, whole system, to the start of the WTO multilateral system. So we have been doing it unilaterally, you have been doing it multilaterally. And then up until 1998, we were up to view that multilateralism is a far better alternative than bilateralism. So that is the reason why we have been intentionally keeping away from bilateral FTAs. And in fact, back in 1996, when we had that WTO ministry meeting in Singapore, one of the major issues on our agenda was to how to keep bilateralism at bay. That in fact was the major issue for Korean trade policy by the time of boss WTO ministerial in Singapore in 1996. But after some time, we came to find that, well, it was not happening. That is to say, even if WTO had started, then somehow there was a proliferation of all those bilateral arrangements. So we had to change our position. So if we cannot beat it, then you join it, right? So we changed our trade policy. And by 1998, we began to negotiate our FTAs with a large number of trade partners. And by now we have bilateral FTA with more than 30 countries. So we have been doing it unilaterally, multilaterally, and bilateral, bilaterally as well. But by now, of course, TPP is a new approach that we should be joining. And then we are approaching it in the same spirit. That is to say competition and liberalization. So that is my second point. My third and last point would be this, which is that in our relationship with the United States, then of course we have a very important partner in every sense of the word for the past 60 years. And then when it comes to international trade, then of course we have chorus FTA behind us, Korea, US, FTA behind us. And so the third point I should be sharing would be we have been a partner in many different areas. And then in the area of international trade, chorus is there, providing a phone basis upon which we can continue to further strengthen this very important economic relations between Korea and then the United States. When you think about bilateral relationship, economic relationship between Korea and then the United States, I think we should be looking at three different areas. First of all, trade in goods, trade in services and investment. And when it comes to trade in goods, several weeks ago I was in California. And then I was speaking to business council in one of the cities in California. And it was a very impressive meeting in the sense that there was an orange girl who said, well, my export of orange to Korea, it increased by 50% last year. And there was another gentleman who said, well, I grow almonds and my export of almonds to Korea, it increased by 70% in the past year, et cetera, et cetera. So in totality, export of agriculture products from Korea to, I'm sorry, from United States to Korea, from the state of California, it increased by 12% last year. And then it is increased by another 12% this year. So in other words, the products covered under the FDA, they in fact are enjoying this improved market access in a very significant way. Then I was very encouraged about that. And then when it comes to trade in services, then of course we have to admit the fact that, well, US service providers, you are the most competitive service providers in the whole world. And then when it comes to investment, back in 2005, 2006, interesting thing began to happen. That is to say, up until that time, there was more investment being made from the United States into Korea. But beginning from 2005 to 2006, the direction changed. In other words, now there is more investment being made from Korea into the United States. So far as the flow of investment is concerned, United States is the net benefit for investment coming from Korea into the United States. And in that context, I should be telling you this, which is that when it comes to trading goods, it is just the goods which cross the border. But when it comes to trading services, or when it comes to investment, you need more than that. In order to promote trading services or investment, what you have to say is movement of character, movement of technology as well as movement of people. And then when it comes to capital or technology, there is very little barrier for the cross border movement of capital or technology. But when it comes to professionals, when it comes to the movement of people, then there are barriers. So that is the reason why for the time being, we are working rather hard in order to have more, say, professional visa for Korea so that we would be able to have more professionals to come from Korea to work in the United States, which I think will help for the promotion of our trading services as investment between our two countries. So let me try to wrap up. We are a hybrid candidate for the TPP, but at the same time, we have all of these behind us. That's to say, we are a firm believer in the benefits of trade liberalization. And then we have been a very active practitioner of competition liberalization. And then, of course, we have been benefiting enormously out of our bilateral trade arrangement between Korea and the United States. And then with all of these background, I'm pretty sure that we can be a very meaningful participant in the TPP negotiation as well. Thank you. Thank you very much. Wendy. Well, thank you very much. First of all, it's an honor to be here in your new headquarters. I have to say this morning, I was heading over to 1800 G Street and then realized that you moved. And it's really great to be in a panel with three colleagues who I work with throughout my whole career. Victor, I love to tell the story when he was in the White House and he was working on North Korea issues. I was working on chorus issues. And periodically, we would look at each other and ask each other, who has a tougher job? Ambassador Ahn and I go way back. We went to Georgetown University together many years ago. And since then, we have worked together both in OECD matters, WTO matters, and bilateral matters. And so it's a real honor, but also a bit of an intimidation to be on the stage with him because I always think that I know a lot about trade, but when I hear Ambassador Ahn, I always realize I have a lot more to learn. And Scott Miller, we go way back through working on various issues, both bilateral, multilateral, and regional. So Korea TPP. Let me make an offer, a few remarks this morning. First of all, I'm just back last night from our meetings in Singapore, where we concluded a very successful TPP meeting at the minister's level. There were four days of intensive discussions among the 12 TPP ministers. They made excellent progress in terms of really identifying what we call in the trade world, landing zones on a number of the key outstanding issues. They reaffirmed the commitment of achieving a high level comprehensive agreement, even if that meant taking a little more time to achieve such an agreement. And they agreed to meet soon after the new year again. So we are very encouraged by the progress made in Singapore. There are clearly some tough issues that still need to be worked out, but even on the tough issues like IPR, environment, and state-owned enterprises, we made a good deal of progress. And coming out of that meeting, we feel that we have a lot of momentum going forward to moving towards concluding a high standard ambitious agreement. Adding to the momentum is Korea's recent announcement of its interest in joining TPP. And since then, Korea has entered into concerted consultations with a number of TPP partners with respect to its interests. We understand that this issue is under extensive debate in Korea, while Koreans are debating the benefits of joining TPP, but also expressing concerns with respect to what more does it have to gain from TPP since it has free trade agreements with a number of the TPP partners. There are a number of concerns being expressed in various sensitive sectors in Korea. And there's also a feeling that maybe there's some FTA fatigue in Korea. But for our part, we believe that Korea's expression of interest is something to be welcomed, that Korea through the chorus agreement has shown that it is prepared to negotiate a high standard and comprehensive agreement. And that Korea's addition would really add to the political and strategic weight of TPP as the vehicle for regional economic integration and a basis for free trade area of the Asia Pacific. That said, and I'll get to this shortly, through the TPP bilateral consultation process, we will have a number of issues to work through with Korea as we consider Korea's interest in joining TPP. The first order of business among the 12 TPP countries now is to complete the negotiations, which are in the final stage. And there is a process for joining TPP once a candidate country announces its interest in joining TPP. First, each country needs to reach its own decision and its own conclusion with Korea or any candidate country with regard to its support for that country joining TPP. For the United States, this means that we undertake bilateral consultations with the country in close consultation with our Congress and with our stakeholders, soliciting input from them and then working through with the candidate country a number of issues. Our consultations with potential TPP partners typically are too tracked. First, we focus on the country's readiness to live up to the high standards of TPP and to indicate that it's prepared for the comprehensive tariff coverage of TPP. In addition, we look at bilateral issues of concern that we develop based on extensive consultations with our stakeholders and with Congress. With respect to the first aspect, as Ambassador Ahn mentioned, chorus is a gold standard agreement and in many respects, what we're negotiating in TPP is very similar to chorus. There are new issues, new chapters like state-owned enterprises, supply chains, small and medium-sized enterprises, issues that were not fully addressed or addressed at all in chorus and those are issues we'll need to consult with Korea on to make sure that it's ready to live up to those high standards in those areas. There are also certain areas that were addressed in chorus but in TPP we're building on the chorus commitments and for example, the issue of the environment comes to mind, that's an area where we had a strong chapter in chorus, there's a strong chapter in environment in chorus but in TPP we're looking to go beyond the chorus commitments in that area. In addition, with respect to the bilateral issues of concern, this is something once again, we'll need to work out in close consultation with our stakeholders and with Congress and that's something that will take a bit of time but that said, I thought I would just mention a few issues that were the subject of my recent trip to Seoul, issues that are many or tied to chorus implementation and issues that are coming up with respect to chorus that will need to be addressed regardless of Korea's interest in the TPP but before I get to these issues, I just wanna underscore something that Ambassador Ahn said that overall in chorus, we've had good implementation of the agreement, we have a huge and growing bilateral trade relationship and it's only natural that we'll have differences and issues to work through with any large trading partner like Korea and through the FTA, we have a lot of committees and structures to deal with emerging issues and emerging issues of concern with respect to chorus and we have been using the committee process I think very effectively to head off a number of issues that could become potential irritants in our trade relationship. When the vice president was in Korea just a few weeks ago, he did underscore the importance of chorus implementation and today I would just like to highlight a few issues that we're working with Korea on where we're looking for progress to be made once again regardless of Korea's interest in TPP. The first issue I'd like to highlight is the issue of with respect to customs origin verification. This is an issue that has really been lingering for a while, we had hoped that there would be a technical solution to this issue but we are concerned with this issue as growing as more and more of US companies are telling us that excessive origin verification requirements by Korea have the potential to undermine a number of the tariff benefits that we negotiated hard for in the agreement. So we look forward to Korea quickly addressing this issue. Second, on the second anniversary of chorus which will be next March 15th, a number of important commitments will come into effect with respect to the financial services chapter dealing with data transfer issues. We've made some progress in that area but we are working with Korea to ensure that upon the second anniversary of chorus that these commitments will be fully implemented. Third, in the automotive sector we continue to experience a number of issues with respect to not only the letter of chorus but also the spirit of chorus. As many of you remember, this administration has placed a high priority on the health and the growth of the US automotive industry and we worked hard with the Koreans to agree on additional commitments in the automotive sector in 2010. Since that time there have been a number of issues have surfaced, we've worked through a number of them but the latest issue of concern to our companies deals with the bonus malice system that Korea is looking to implement in the near future. And finally, an issue that's on our minds but not addressed in chorus is the issue of organics and specifically come January one, Korea is set to implement a new certification program on trade and organics goods which has the potential to disrupt trade from the United States. We are seeking to work with Korea on what we call an equivalence agreement which we would then each mutually recognize each other's certification systems in these areas. We recently concluded such an agreement with Japan and the EU. So we look forward to concluding such an agreement with Korea. And now then if I can just move on to TPP. But if I can just say all those issues are really important and we need to work with Korea to resolve them. As we look to TPP then we look forward to working with Korea closely as we seek to pave the way for their membership in the TPP. We believe that Korea is a natural partner for the TPP. It is a lot to offer to the TPP with respect to being a country that not only agreed to high standards with the United States and our FDA but in fact in its negotiations with other countries around the world both TPP countries and non-TPP countries has been insisting on such high standards with other countries. And so we think that's very important. And so looking ahead we are hopeful and we look forward to working with Korea in our bilateral TPP consultations to pave the way for their membership in the TPP provided that we have the certainty that high level and comprehensive standards can be adhered to and also that we can work through the bilateral issues of concern. Thank you. Thank you Victor. I'll be very brief as I wanna get to your questions and Victor's questions which says he's not a trade guy but he'll ask some good trade questions. My first reaction when I read the news of Korea's interest in joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership was what took so long. It seems a very natural move and I applaud the government of Korea for moving forward but if you look at this you look at the existing 12 parties of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Korea has already concluded free trade agreements with eight of the 12. It's negotiating them with three more Canada, Mexico and New Zealand. And so that leaves only Japan where there's not an existing FDA or an ongoing negotiation. So from that standpoint, Korea is a very natural partner to the TPP. From the standpoint of strategy, I think becoming a member of the Trans-Pacific Partnership is totally consistent with and quite logical fit with the Korea's strategy of FTAs that they've been implementing very diligently since 2002 or 2003. So this fits strategically. In terms of the benefits of the agreement, most obvious ones are the market access in Japan. Japan remains a top five trading partner, both imports and exports for Korea. And with the exception of China, with Korea is already negotiating a free trade agreement with China, it would be the biggest remaining trading partner on which the trade terms were MFN rather than preferential. So there's a win there given the existing trading relationships. In terms of the text itself, in terms of the commitments in the text and the obligations in TPP, in my view, our best effort before TPP was the US-Korea free trade agreement. And those obligations from 2006 will be improved and modernized, but not particularly burdensome to Korea. So my suspicion is this will be a fairly straightforward entry. Now, if this is such a natural fit and if there are already these existing free trade agreements, what's the benefit for Korea? Let me pick up on the ambassador's comments because I think he identified the areas which were most beneficial for Korea's entry with the Trans-Pacific Partnership and that is services and investment. If you look at Korea's position in the world, Korea is a big trader, interestingly, and a growing trader, astonishingly so. Korea's trade, totally important in exports and merchandise trade is a little over a trillion dollars for economy the size of Korea. That's massive trade and a big footprint in trade. And keep in mind that is a thousandfold increase in 50 years. You go back to 1965, Korea had a million dollars worth of merchandise trade. It went from a million to a trillion. Very impressive progress and it has benefited the Korean economy to do so. However, the areas of investment and services are both major opportunities. If you look at Korea's investment profile, the Korean economy and Korean firms are major capital exporters, including to destinations like the United States. But Korea attracts the smallest share of inbound foreign direct investment of any OECD member. So there's an opportunity there, whether it's because of regulation or closed sectors or whatever it might be, there's a major opportunity for Korea to benefit as a recipient of foreign direct investment, not just a capital exporter. A lot of those opportunities will be in services. And I think if I were an armchair economist looking at the Korean economy and how to generate growth, the thing I would focus on the most is efficiencies in services. Korea has a spectacularly efficient manufacturing sector, but services productivity is less than half of manufacturing productivity for Korea. And in fact, total factor productivity in services in Korea are declining. So this is an opportunity both for domestic regulatory reform, but also for engagement with world-class service providers in the economies of the Trans-Civic Partnership. So for those reasons, I think that despite this appearing to be an easy lift, there's some really beneficial work to be done in services and investment. I'm delighted to see Korea sign up for this because I think the Trans-Civic Partnership is the place to do the best work in reform for services and investment. Let me close by asking a question about next steps. I wouldn't speculate to know what the US government has in mind or what the Korean government has in mind, but for me, next steps are a little bit complicated. We probably ought to talk about it today. There are, in some ways, a binary choice. Does Korea join the Trans-Civic Partnership before the agreement is concluded or after? And either choice is a little complicated, but let me lay out the complications and then stop talking. If Korea joins before the TPP is concluded, it will reflect a decision among the Trans-Civic Partnership parties, the current 12 parties, to continue the talks for somewhere between six months and a year. And I'm just basing that on what's happened. Mexico and Canada express interest in joining the Trans-Civic Partnership at Honolulu's APEC meeting in November, 2011. The first time they sat down at the negotiating table full-time was December, 2012. It takes time. Japan was a little faster, but not much, okay? Japan expressed interest in March of 2013 and made its first negotiating round in August, 2013. And based on the comments made by Ambassador Froman and others, there's a lot of remedial work to be done with Japan right at the moment in terms of catching it up to the rest of the negotiations. So with that said, joining now would mean a, probably just speculating a late 2014 completion of TPP, which may or may not be acceptable to the parties given the progress that has been made. The other alternative is for Korea to join after concluding the agreement, in which case the parties that conclude the agreement have to figure out what the Assession Protocol looks like. I can easily imagine an Assession Protocol because TPP, at some level, looks a lot like the WTO where if you want to accede to the WTO, you accept GAT 94, which is the text, and you negotiate schedules on all the products in terms of entry with all the members and that gets consolidated. Now WTO is a different animal. It's been handling Assessions since its creation. It has a secretariat, TPP doesn't. So there are unanswered questions here, but that's what, not only is joining now complicated, joining later is complicated. And with the, I've done my usual of identify a problem and not a solution, but perhaps that's a good place for me to stop. Thank you. Victor? Great, thank you. Thank you, Scott. So thank you all for both concise and very informative presentations. Let me start by quid with Ambassador Ron and sort of picking up where Scott left off. And I guess one of the questions is, if Scott put it so eloquently, why it takes all the time. But I guess the other question is, so how does this pronounced interest in TPP on the left of him? So it's a new building, but we do have it on the left. So I guess one question would be why did it take Korea so long? But then the other is, given this pronounced interest in TPP, how does this effect reflect on the country's interest in the free trade negotiations with China as well as our set? Well, why it took so long? Well, I think when Mr. Miller has just mentioned the fact that out of 12 countries which are participating in the TPP negotiation for the time being, Korea already has an FDA agreement with at least 10 of them. The only two countries with which Korea does not have an FDA for the time being is Japan and Mexico. Maybe there is, well, there are a large number of explanations for at the same time. That may be the single most important explanation about why it took so long for Korea in the sense that when you have FDA already with 10 of them, I think maybe, and then of course it takes a lot of time and efforts in order to implement them as well. And then, well, of course, KOROS FDA, it was such an important FDA for Korea and then certainly it took some time and efforts on our part to digest it to implement it in the correct manner. So that would be the single most important reason why it took so long. But what we have done just now is expressed our interest in participating in the TPP. So this is somewhere in the middle in the sense that we are not participating in the negotiation yet. So we have just expressed our interest. But at the same time, I think we, in fact, are beginning to think about what would be the additional advantages of participating in the TPP other than having had the collection of bilateral FDAs. And then one of them would be, again, Mr. Miller was quite correct when he said that where, when it comes to manufacturing sector, Korean business community, it is already up to certain global standard. But when it comes to services, I think there is still a long way to go. And at the same time, there would be far, far larger number of additional benefits which can accrue from participation in the TPP. Like, for example, rules of origin, Wendy has just mentioned about the rules of origin. And then one big advantage of participating in an arrangement like the TPP would be cumulative rules of origin which would make it far easier for us to benefit from the FDA arrangements. So I think there are many, many, say, economic, as well as non-economic reasons why we should be joining the TPP. But as I have just mentioned, we are not there yet. We are not there to have the negotiation yet. What impact it will have on our bilateral FTO arrangement with China as well as I said. Well, one of the reasons why I, in my opening statement, was mentioning about competition and liberalization, I think it is there in the sense that when there is important activities we are taking in the direction of participating in the TPP, then, of course, it will create no momentum in Korea's efforts in our negotiation with China as well as with the RCEP. So that, I think, would be additional benefits of Korea participating in the TPP. Wendy, thank you again for your presentation both on chorus and on TPP. If I could take you to the 1,000 foot level for a second. And we hosted recently a talk by Susan Rice at Georgetown. And one of the things that struck me in her discussion of TPP, I mean, clearly TPP is a very important part of the pivot. In fact, some would argue it is the pivot and the second term is TPP and TPP is the pivot. But one of the things that I thought was very striking about her presentation was in speaking about TPP, she both invited and seemed to challenge China to look at this seriously in the future. And I wonder if you have any comment. I mean, I guess talk to trade folks. It's always been somewhere in the picture as we think about FTAF and all this, but to me that was a very upfront statement and it struck me. You know, it's interesting for until recently when you read the press reports about how China was viewing TPP, they were quite negative and looked like the US was trying to dominate this group of 10, 11 countries. Containment, ghost of George 10. But that line has changed recently and China's been much more interested in TPP. We have launched talks with them under which we are updating them on TPP and TPP does come up at all levels when we meet with the Chinese. TPP was always conceived as an open platform agreement where all countries of APEC that were prepared to live up to the high standards of the TPP were welcome to express their interest. And so, you know, the door is open for that. Right now once again, and this gets to I think an issue that Scott was raising, our focus now is really concluding this agreement with the 12 countries. We are in the final stages. We think we are in the end game and particularly coming out of Singapore. There's a lot of momentum and a lot of enthusiasm among the 12 towards concluding this agreement very, very soon. So with respect to the timing issue that Scott mentioned, I think it'll be very, very difficult for any country including Korea to join the ongoing negotiations. If you just look at the timetable and the clock, because even if we were to quickly conclude our bilateral consultations with Korea and the other 11 TPP countries could do the same, in the United States we would need to notify our Congress once we were concluded with these negotiations and a quote unquote 90 day clock of consultations with Congress then would commence. So if you just look at a calendar, it's very difficult to see how any new country could join the ongoing negotiations. That said, we look forward to consulting with Korea working through all of these issues and having them join the TPP at the appropriate time. I mentioned that Korea through CORAS has already achieved high standards of liberalization and obligations. And I would also mention that in our tariff schedules with Korea, we have a comprehensive agreement that addresses a lot of sensitive sectors for Korea for the United States with respect to Korea in the agriculture sector. For example, we have a schedule of commitments that address Korea's sensitivities but also provide for comprehensive liberalization sometimes using very long staging periods but also providing meaningful market access in the interim. So I wanted just to add those comments. The other thing just based on one point that Scott made just to make clear from his recollection, I think you were saying that Japan entered the negotiations very quickly from March to July. In reality, Japan also announced its interest in interest towards joining the TPP in Honolulu when Canada and Mexico announced. So those consultations actually took longer than they did for Canada and Mexico. Thank you. Well, I mean, I take your point about momentum. I clearly, Mike Froman's statements yesterday really gave a sense that you guys felt like you were in the final stage, the final push. And again, speaking as a former White House staffer when they've said out that the president's gonna be there in the spring, it's gotta be done by the spring for sure. So, but that actually raises a question that I wanted to ask Scott having to do with what's going on back here at home. And that is the whole question of trade promotion authority, right? We have this strange constitution which we gave the president the power to not negotiate international agreements, but not to regulate commerce. And thus we had FastTrack and TPA. What is your view of where we stand on trade promotion authority? Can the administration reach an agreement on TPP without TPA? What do you think? Sure. Well, for those of you who aren't trade policy wonks in the audience, since 1974, most presidents have relied on an agreement with Congress that creates expedited procedures for the approval of trade agreements and including that they be voted straight up or down without amendment. It used to be called FastTrack since 2001. It's been called trade promotion authority. But it's an agreement between the executive and legislative branches for which the constitutional authority for trade is divided. Congress has authority to regulate foreign commerce. The executive has authority to regulate treaty to negotiate with foreign governments. So it's been a practical solution to a difficult constitutional problem. It doesn't exist now. It expired in about the time that Korea, actually within about 15 minutes of the Korea free trade agreement being presented to the Congress. And somebody was watching the clock, I remember. So it's not in existence now. And TPA is not a foolproof process. Ask anybody from the government of Columbia how it can not work. But it's better than having it, having it than not, because you face renegotiation pretty decisively with an uncooperative Congress absent the authority. In terms of the status, I'll start with yesterday's headlines, which is chairman of the Waste Means Committee, Dave Camp, Michigan, made a very clear statement. He said two things. One is, we're ready to go, meaning there's a bill that's been agreed and it's been a long work process with the Senate Finance Committee, that there's a bill that they think does right and is certainly bipartisan in the bill in the Senate. Mr. Hatch has been working, Senator Hatch has been working very closely with Chairman Baucus. So there's a work product they're ready to introduce. But the second thing he said is, we can do this quickly if the president engages. And I think that's, the recipe is simply, it's just that simple, that the authority is available. This situation reminds me of the year 2000 following the agreement with China to enter the WTO. When President Clinton, Democratic president, with the Republican Congress, faced the need to change US trade law in a pretty controversial matter called a permanent normal trade relations with China. There was no trade promotion authority of fast track at the time, but there was an impressive, extensive legislative initiative by the White House to get it done. And the ultimate success was that it was a bipartisan passage in the House, including over 70 House Democrats voting for Russia, excuse me, China PNTR, and the Senate through some really impressive work with Senate legislative errors and the chairman and ranking member of the Finance Committee, the Senate passed a bill that agreed without amendments. They passed the House bill without amending it, which is really rare. That's essentially practically what you'd get with TPA. I think it's very important for our negotiators to have clear red lines. So I'd like to see TPA in hand now and certainly sooner than later. I do not underestimate the challenge associated with getting it in our, but we've had divided government before we've done it. We've had dysfunctional government before and we've done it. So if our divided dysfunctional government could work again, that'd be good for trade. Okay, and I'm sorry, Ambassador, if I could just ask you one more question before we go to the audience, and that is in the discussions about Korea and TPP, the question came up or the comment came up about how Korea is discussing this domestically. I mean, and there is a degree of FDA fatigue a little bit. I mean, could you comment a little bit on sort of the domestic challenges for your government in terms of, I mean, it's still early on, but selling TPP to a domestic audience? I mean, there's a big picture of arguments about this is good for reform more broadly and regulation and services and industry, but that really doesn't sell domestically. I mean, what are the challenges here? Well, one of the things which I've already mentioned was that Korea already has an FDA with the more than 30 countries. And then in the process of negotiating all those FTAs, bilateral FTAs, then there has been rather clear, say, lineup for domestic actors, in our domestic consultation. And then the clear lineup was, well, business community, they were mostly behind the idea of entering into FTAs, whereas agriculture sector had far more reservation with respect to entering those FTAs. So I think maybe in our domestic consultation about the discussing about the advantages as well as downsides of joining TPP, I think we are going to see the repetition of the same lineup of voices, well, according to that same topography of domestic actors where they stand. But at the same time, I think when it comes to the TPP, as I have already mentioned that there is the case of Japan and then Mexico. And then with respect to Japan, then of course there has been a lot of discussions. And then that lineup has not been as clear as it has been the case with other FTAs. So that's one additional background. But the Orinor, I think there will be broadly speaking, there will be a firm support for Korea's accession to the TPP, participation in the TPP. But we are not there yet. So we are walking for that. And then for us to be there, I think it would be absolutely necessary for us to get good consultation with all the countries participating in the TPP. But first of all, with the United States. We really look forward to doing it. Me too. Right. Korea could actually be, I mean if we're talking about, in terms of timetable, as Scott mentioned, after an agreement is reached, Korea could actually be a model for how, right? Other countries that dock onto TPP after an agreement is reached. So still be blazing a trail in that sense as well. Yeah, well that's the point which has been read by Mr. Miller and which has been partly answered by Mr. Cutler. But the thing is, where we are talking about tier one, or tier two, well maybe there could be a status somewhere in between tier 1.5. But at the same time, I think it is too early. There are so many factors which will be in a sense affecting Korea's status of joining the TPP. So let us just think about the overall general direction where we are going and then let us see how all those related factors play in and then see how it all plays out at the end of the day. Very good. Well tier 1.5. So I think we have time for 1.5 questions. Tammy. Well I think a mic is coming in. Thank you. Thank you. This has just been an outstanding presentation by each of you. I'd direct my question to Ambassador Cutler. Thank you for the update on TPP and particularly on the core of implementation front. I wanted to ask thank you for raising the several issues that you did and alluding that there might be a few more. We recently had a meeting of our US Korea Business Council and we did a stock take on the core of implementation and we have quite a few companies who would like to raise issues and I wanted to ask if you could share anything on the process of how we can get our information and how we can engage with you and Ambassador Anwar, eager and ready to do the same with your government as well. Thank you. And as I mentioned, consultations with both Congress and our stakeholders are a key feature of our domestic consultation process with respect to considering Korea or any new candidates candidacy for the TPP. So we really look forward to consulting with our stakeholders and Congress soon as we develop our agenda for our consultations with Korea. I think most people know where to find me. On the plane. Yeah, right, on the plane. On the plane. In an airport land. Yeah. Claude. Claude Barfield, the American Enterprise Institute. I'd like to go back to a question that, or very interesting question that Victor asked and maybe he's the one to answer because it could be a little difficult for the government people. And that is, how do we explain Korea? He talked about it took too long. How do we explain Korea's sudden change of heart? The last couple of years, if you talk to academics, you talk to government people in Korea, I remember talking with Theo Barker a year ago, there's a very hard nose look at the economics. They said, their point was, we've got all these FTAs, we've got chorus. We don't have to really worry too much about the economic side. What we have to do right now, I remember him saying, publicly as well as privately, we've got to tamp down the China situation. We need that FTA. My own, this is a question as well as statement, my own guess would be that what really has changed this is the deteriorating security and diplomatic situation and that somewhere at the top of the Korean government, there's this decision that we really ought to seek shelter a bit. So it's really beyond the economics. Well, I'll let Ambassador, but let me just say that I had very similar experience. I mean, on the one year anniversary of chorus, I was actually in Korea for a conference and was sitting at a dinner table with some very former high level officials that were quite involved in the chorus negotiations and I said to them, so one year anniversary of chorus, what's next? TPP, right? And their response was no, China, Korea, FTA. And they gave me all the arguments about the economics of this. So there is a shift. I mean, I think if you had to point to one of the reasons, I think was the one that Scott raised and that was before Japan was a part of it. And when I talked to Korean officials now, I mean, TPP, the Korea, Japan, FTA negotiations have long since stalled. And whenever you raised TPP with Korean trade officials, they were very focused on, once Japan was in, they were very focused on how the United States treated Japan in those negotiations on non-tariff barriers, particularly in market access. So I think that could be one reason, but I think certainly the trade negotiation is never just a trade negotiation. The trade strategy is not just a trade strategy, it's a broader geo-strategy. And I think for Korea, they see this probably as the most important thing going right now in the region and something from which they can benefit in not just economic terms, but also what they call geo-strategic. That's Ron, I don't know how you deal with that. What TPP started with four countries, Singapore, Brunei, New Zealand, and Chile. And then I think the status of TPP has drastically changed when United States has decided to be a leading country for that whole process. And I think the status of TPP changed again when Canada and Mexico joined and then when Japan joined. So getting back to your point about why Korea has changed its position, if it is because of the deteriorating security environment. I just wonder if I necessarily agree with your assessment of security environment at a deteriorating. So that I think would not be the definitive answer for the change of what improved or advancement of Korea's position on. I wouldn't call it change, I would call it advancement of Korea's position on the TPP negotiation. But at the same time, the point you have made and then the point which has been echoed by a victim, which is where TPP, of course, economics is important, but it is not necessarily economics. I wholeheartedly agree with that. Thank you. Thank you. So I'm sorry with SPS from Korea. My question is directly to Ambassador Wendy Cutler. And I understand that the United States eased its own restriction on beef trade, the beef import in terms of the progress and transatlantic trade negotiations. Do you believe or does the USTR believe that Korea, South Korea also need to take the measure the US has taken? Does two countries need to work on that issue before? Korea joins the TPP negotiations. I guess that's for me. Yes. Beef trade has been a discussion between the United States and Korea for some time. We have a beef protocol in effect. It's been operating very smoothly. Our trade and our exports of beef to Korea have been increasing. And I'd just like to leave it at that. Great. Well, Wendy, I know you literally- Very nutritious also. You literally just got off the plane. If you want to comment. Do you want to comment on it? No, I don't know. All right. Okay. Sorry. Wendy has been judicious enough. Okay, very good. Okay, well, I know that Wendy's just gotten off a plane literally from Asia. And Ambassador, I want to thank you for taking the time this morning. I'm afraid that's all the time we have. On behalf of Scott Miller, the Shoal Chair and the Korea Chair, thank you for attending. And please give our guests a warm welcome. Thank you.