 Good afternoon, everybody, we'll go straight to questions. So if there are any questions, there's a plus one. Hi, DG. Hello, Murphy from Royches. I have a few questions. I hope you don't mind if we do them one after the other. Just want to get to exactly what has been agreed between you and Iran. It seems to me that we have three issues here, really. So one is FORDOT, one is the monitoring equipment in general in Iran, and the other is the safeguards investigation. So I'm just going to go through those quickly. On FORDOT, was anything agreed during your trip on verification and monitoring that wasn't already agreed at Maxaparo's meeting in Tehran on February the 23rd, which was mentioned in your JCPOA report? You know, the report says Iran confirmed that it would facilitate the notified further increase of the frequency and intensity of agency verification activities at FORDOT. That's my first question. OK, thank you very much. Good to see you all. Yeah, I think you are spot on on the three main areas. And in fact, that corresponds to what I had said before coming. These were the issues I wanted to discuss. So regarding the first issue which has to do with the implementation of the comprehensive safeguards agreement that you identified as FORDOT, I would say that, yes, during the technical trip that preceded my visit, there were a number of things that were agreed, but they needed some consolidation and confirmation. So it was a continuation of what DDGE had started. And we consolidated all of that. There had been some exchanges that we were not seeing Finally, it was possible for Iran to understand what we needed, what was the technical evaluation, justifying the increase, which is quite a marked increase in the verification or inspection intensity at that place. So that was done. Then on the monitoring, well, yes, we agreed on the opportunity. Yes, please go ahead. So on the monitoring, which you were just getting to forgive me for interrupting. But so to be clear, Iran has Iran sorry, given you a firm commitment that it will allow the reinstallation of all the monitoring equipment that was installed under the JCPOA, including online enrichment monitoring, and will Iran hand over the monitoring equipment data that has stayed in general terms? Yes, but you may have noted that in the joint statement there is a reference to certain modalities that need to be and this is an important point because we were never expecting the process or this monitoring capacities to be interrupted in the way they were. So we will have to discuss about this, how do we do it? We have our ideas and this will be part of the technical discussions that are going to be undertaken as a follow up to my visit and to the joint statement. And a technical team will be traveling to Iran very soon to do that. OK, so then in a similar vein, so then on the safeguards investigation, there's slightly more specific wording there in a way. You say Iran expressed its readiness to provide further information, but so how firm is that commitment? And you mentioned some things in your airport press conference, but are you sure it's going to include access to all the places, information, and people that you want? You did specifically mention persons of interest. Or is this just an agreement to hold a meeting about it? As you said on the monitoring equipment, there's reference to another meeting. But on this issue as well, is there some kind of firm commitment or is this just an agreement to hold a meeting about it? No, it's not an agreement to discuss this issue. We have been discussing this issue for three years. So we don't need an agreement to continue discussing. We continue discussing. The idea is to move on to, as I said before, to concrete results, which will include all of these things. If you ask me, is there a list of places, people, et cetera, that first of all, this might be confidential, as you know, as part of the normal, not only Iran related, normal safeguards implementation between a country and the agency. And secondly, apart from this principle, there are many things that we still ignore. Because when the interaction starts and we visit something, or if we take environmental samples of material or equipment, this will prompt yet another set of meetings, places, et cetera. So it is virtually impossible to have a list of detailed list of places or dates related to this process. I understand. It's very hard to distinguish between what you have received, what has really been, you know, what Iran has committed to, what is told you it will give you, and the fact that a lot of this seems to depend on future meetings. Is there any more clarity you can give us in terms of where the distinction between these two things lies? Why don't you let us do our job, unless you want to join us as an inspector, which could be interesting. Who knows? We know how to do these things. There are going to be places, lists. Some may be useful. Some may be less. So what the agency does is that at certain moments in the process, we come up with evaluations. And as we have done, when we are not getting anything or we are not going anywhere with this process, then we report it. We say it. We complain, if you want. So bear with me a little bit when we say we cannot give you, at this stage, full lists of dates, places, people. It would be impossible. It has never happened. Not only here, but in any other safeguards, inquiry of such a sensitive nature. But what you can be sure about is that the agency will be informing regularly that you will get as much density as it is possible. What I can also say is that I sense that there is an understanding that we need certain concrete answers from them on certain things. They have been given us some, as you know. And we, after evaluation, consider that they were not technically credible. And we were in this vicious circle, if you wish. So my impression is that there is a chance now that we can be moving away from this thing. Whether I'm sure or not, Francois, what can I tell you? We are trying to do our job in the best possible way. And I'm sure the conversation will continue. I think if I could just follow up on that. What we're trying to understand is what was different about this visit. We've had frequently the case that just before a board meeting, we've gone to Tehran. What is the difference now? Well, I think there are many differences. But first of all, it was the first time I could have a serious conversation with the president of Iran about these things. This has enormous importance because, of course, he's the president. And I had an opportunity to explain my vision, the way in which we want to work with them. We also had a very substantive discussion with the foreign minister, Amir Abdulahiyan, one of the most substantive discussions I've had with him about these things. And, of course, Mohammed Eslami has been my more, I would say, regular interlocutor. But with him, there was also. But apart from that, which you may say, well, OK, these are conversations, although in international politics and in politics in general, talking to the decision makers makes a big difference irrespective of the results you may get in the end. But apart from it, when you look at the statement and following the logic of Francois in the three areas that we have, we see real substance in all of these areas. We see real substance when it comes to Fardo, where the agency will be inspecting almost every other day. We see substance and important commitments and agreements when it comes to additional verification and monitoring mechanisms. And a technical team of the agency will be traveling very soon to start working on these modalities. So I believe that there is a good opportunity. I cannot guarantee. Of course, when people say these were promises. Well, first, it's not promises. We do have certain agreements which are concrete. And at the same time, I need to do my job and never give up and continue and continue. And I may have been as frustrated as many other people, perhaps the most frustrated when there is lack of results, could have been me. But we continue. And I think this was a step in the right direction. Let's put it like that. Hi, DG. Jonathan Tyrone with Bloomberg. Two very brief questions. Israel's prime minister addressed you directly in a statement yesterday. Under what circumstances would it be permissible for Israel or any other country to attack Iranian enrichment facilities? You're asking me? Good. Well, yes, I saw that. I would say I would like to precise something. I wouldn't comment, of course, on what the prime minister of Israel had to say about me or my statement. But let me precise on the issue. On the issue, I think there is nothing new, really, on what I said. What I said is I reiterated international law. International law from the Geneva Protocols in 1949. And thereafter, several resolutions of the General Conference of the IEA, border governors, have reiterated that attacks on nuclear facilities are illegal, are a violation of the UN Charter, the statute of the IEA. So I did not say anything which should be considered as departing from what is in the public domain. So then maybe that caught the attention of the prime minister. That's fine. And I just want to follow up on that. So what are the risks that the IAEA unwittingly helps to advance a military intervention in Iran by not immediately addressing all the potential causes of the episode of 84% particle sample? Because speculation was allowed to linger for a couple of weeks now. Yes. Well, maybe, first of all, on the 84%, I think this is a matter that perhaps warrants a separate discussion. But in general terms, I would say this, when people tries to establish links between my reports or what the agency does or does not do and possibilities of military action. I think what is clear is that at every turn, on every opportunity, since I have been in charge of this IEA from my election in 2019, I have been always, always opening doors, looking for possibilities, trying to confirm that diplomatic technical solutions are possible. This is my job. Maybe military people think otherwise. But my job as a diplomat, 40 years of work in this area, I will always try to do this. So I think it is obvious that what the agency has been doing is exactly the opposite. What we have been doing is trying to find spaces, looking into ways in which what we do, the agreements we have, the promises we receive, I don't know, can help continue in this way and diffuse and deter any possibilities of the use of force, which of course as a diplomat, as I say, I tend to dislike. Hi, Rakhida Bahnam from Al-Arabiya. On the investigation that the IEA is doing in Iran, you said that this trip, you found something different, you agreed on something more specific. And I know you don't like to put deadlines, but there must be some framework you have agreed to work on. Do we expect to have this investigation solved before the next June meeting, for example, or when do you expect to have tangible results? Thank you for the question, because this is something that I think we always try to learn from past experiences. And one of the lessons that I learned is that perhaps having roadmaps, dates, calendars might not necessarily respond to the realities that we are confronted with. So now we are focusing on the problems that we have in front of us. And of course, we do operate against the background of political realities. And we know that this cannot be a process that continues dragging on in this way. So if you ask me, I would like to have it solved by next week. But of course, it will take time. As I was saying, responding to previous questions, here we have three different locations, with three completely different characteristics historically and in terms of what we want to ascertain. So the process is going to be a serious one, a systematic one. And you can have as well as the international community my assurance that we want to move promptly with this. Whether it coincides with the calendar of the Board of Governors, I don't know. I hope it will, but perhaps much earlier. We have a question on the back. Of this optimism with which you have come, could it open the door to a new round of negotiations between Iran and Qatar Plus 1? Thank you. Thank you. For those who concern with resolutions, as you know, it is something that is in the field of member states. So it is to them to judge and to see if, in front of the elements that are there, the reports that I made, the results of my mission, the joint declaration, etc., they want to react or not. It's not me who will say, do I need a resolution or not. That's a speculation and the question is asked. And frequently, but I still have the same answer. You say, I am optimistic. I would say I am not neither optimistic nor pessimistic. I believe that we are in a constructive way and as we always say, we have confidence but we check everything here at the agency. So it's kind of the spirit with which I came from the land. For those who are in a possible link between what we did, what we obtained and the possibility of a reliance in the negotiating process, etc., and once again, I would say it's not me who decides to take back these negotiations. But I am aware of the fact and the question was actually mentioned during my discussions in the land. I am aware of the fact that with good results in the agency space, it would be much easier to move forward in these other areas, in particular when it comes to establishing the information bases on the activities that we had access to through the cameras, etc., that we had lost in June. I think that with these arrangements, with the idea of re-establishing the capacity of the agency, we will be able to facilitate and create a more positive pH for a negotiation in these areas. Yes. I just wondered whether you feel dismayed by what has been said in Iran since the end of your visit. In fact, a few hours after you came to Vienna and you had the press conference at the airport, the Iranian authorities seem to have walked back on some of these promises that they made to you. For example, access to individuals, they say there won't be any access to individuals. In terms of the three undeclared places, they are saying that they basically promising that they will cooperate as before, as we've been there before, kind of thing. It's been going on for four years, the kind of promises or the promising that you will have more opportunities for monitoring or verification. Are you dismayed or, if not, are you over-optimistic with what you have achieved? Neither nor. I'm not dismayed. I read, I see what is being said, and in this process, if I was to be guided by press comments or press statements, I wouldn't get too far. Disastatement, yes, I talk to them, I don't talk through the press. I hear, I listen, there are contexts, political contexts in which things are being said, but when they tell me that they are not going to be doing something, I will look into it with the seriousness. I'm not dismayed, I'm not dismayed. I think we are at the beginning of a new phase. It's not a new process, it's a new phase after certain agreements that we have come to get. Over-optimistic, no, I'm not even optimistic, as I was saying. I try to be realistic. I know that these things were important. I was trying to obtain these results, so in a certain sense I'm satisfied that we seem to be moving into more firm ground and that certain things are going to be done. But of course we walk with caution and point by point issue by issue. Albert Otti, DPA, German Press Agency. I have two questions, if I may. Yes, please. One, it's something that François asked, but I'm still not quite sure. Have you agreed with the Iranians that the IA will be allowed to access the previously recorded surveillance data and the future surveillance data of these cameras that are supposed to be switched on again? Or is that something that you have still to agree with the Iranians? It's my first question. And my second question is, if for whatever reason there were another spike of enrichment in Iran at 84 or above, under the new more frequent inspections at Fordot, how quickly would your inspectors, how many days would your inspectors find out? Okay, well on the first one, I think in my reply to François, I think I addressed that. There are certain things that we need to clarify because you must remember, maybe this is getting into too much detail and I don't know if for the general public it is clear, but in the previous agreement we had had about this kind of information, there was a specific mechanism that they would keep the information but it would be under the seals of the IAEA. So this is something we will have to sit down and discuss if we continue with the same logic or if there are any modifications to that logic. But this is a technical point, number one. On the spikes, well, first of all, I would say we were able to determine and spot this issue without an increased regime. I would say in general, the IAEA would be able to identify any type of level spike, non-spike at any time. This is important. It was judged by my inspectors as important given the modality of operation of the cascades, the modifications that were introduced to that particular area of the facility, the functionalities it allows. So they felt it would be important to have a more regular presence, but it is not as if without it, we would not be able to get it. I think even without it, we would be able to get any type of reading which would be relevant and pretty confident as it was the case before. Hello, Satsuko Inaki with Nippon Television. I have also a follow-up question on Iran. At the airport, you mentioned about the new baseline for the JCPOA, which construction of the activities of the IAEA. And the wording of the new, I kind of sense that, as you also mentioned right now, that the data missing data may not be available immediately. Therefore, that you perhaps have to make shift and to create the new baseline. And then later on, when it's back again, then you would be able to easily, a little bit more easily reconstruct. Is that what you envision? And is that why you, what do you mean exactly by the new baseline? That's the question number one? No, no, I don't know about the exact, thank you for the question, about the exact wording of that, new or not new. What's important is that, and my answer is quite hypothetical, because your question is also a bit of a speculation, because we don't know first of all, whether JCPOA will be revived or not, et cetera. But in any case, what I had been saying and also in my reports was that, given that the information had been lost, I mean not lost, but the flow of information for the agency had been lost, we would not be able to provide this kind of, call it baseline or however you may wish to call it, to provide approximate numbers, ideas of how much has been produced, et cetera. So clearly we were having a deficit, I referred to applying a tourniquet on the bleeding because things were happening constantly without us being able to get any information. So now this will hopefully stop. It will be a very, I would say, painstaking work because my inspectors will have not only to interpret, to read all this mass of information, but there will be some gaps, actual gaps, because what was not recorded or taped, we cannot re-enact, all right? So there will be a need for us to sit down with our Iranian counterparts, look into records, agree on certain specific measures in order to try to reconstruct the JCPOA. This is what I was meaning. Sorry, the second question. The second question was that, I mean, for us, the Japanese, you know, the near weapon degree protocol is a really a huge deal and we're still a little bit not clear of how and why it happened or actually, well, Iranians are saying that this was a mistake and is IAEA taking that as their world as it is? Or would you be probing a little bit more on that? And also, like, if a facility, even by accident, is capable of having a peak of such a high level, shouldn't IAEA for though or any facilities in Iran with 60% or more be monitored like Rokasho, which means on-site inspection, real-time flow measurement? Well, thank you very much. So many, many, many issues in your question, but I try to simplify. First of all, yes, we continue to look into this. My report says that, and of course, if it's made public, you may see it, but if not, what I can tell you is that we continue discussing with our Iranian counterparts because it is true that certain oscillations are possible in this type of cascades. So you may have readings higher than the expected levels from the operator, but the inspectors are able by looking at the information and at the way, the flows and the way in which the cascade is operated, they would be able to determine whether this is one shot or a one time occurrence or whether there was a more dedicated activity there. So we agreed that we will continuing the discussion. And regarding the second part of your question, which is even more complex, you cannot compare too much Rokasho in terms of volumes, technical characteristics and photo, but in any case, I can tell you that as we were discussing just now, with the frequency of inspection, which is going to be very, very intense, I think we will have a very good coverage of the functioning of these cascades. Hello, DJ Gurusi. This is Ahmad Samadi from Iran International TV. Hello. I hear your response to my colleague about what Iranian said in contradiction of your remarks, but I want to know about this point of your remarks about the access to persons, materials and also facilities. Iranian side told there was no discussion about access to persons and there was no text about it. Mr. Kamal Vandy told also Iran would definitely reject such request if they were made by IAEA. I want to know what is your precious response to this point? Well, again, I would not comment or enter into a polemic with the deputy director of the AOI. He said that to the press. We are discussing all these things with Iran. It is correct that we did not put things on paper. We are discussing. These are sensitive matters, as you can imagine. The agency has an idea of what he would like to be, where he would like to be, or with whom he would like to talk, or the places he would like to visit. But of course, we need the agreement of Iran to be able to move on that. So here there is no imposition whatsoever on our part. We are undertaking a professional technical conversation with them about this. Yes, you can, of course. You seem listening to you today during this press conference and also yesterday, the day before. I get the impression that you're not overly concerned about finding uranium enriched to 83%. I would have thought everyone else is, but you seem to have taken it in your stride that this kind of thing might happen and we will look into it. No, no, no, no, no, let me, so immediate or urgent as far as you're concerned. It's not, you know, it is serious development and this is why I erased it with the government and we have acted on it. What we do not do as an international inspectorate is to react emotionally or making political statements which are not fitting our role and our mission. We identified something which is, of course, serious, but we need to go to the bottom of the issue before we can reach a conclusion. When we say spikes occur, it's because they do occur. I have to say it, otherwise I would be jumping immediately to the conclusion that this was part of a deliberate campaign of enrichment at almost 90%. So that would have very serious consequences. So this is why we have to take it in a way that it is technical and very transparent. So we are trying to explain to you and to the international community that of course this is worthy of our serious consideration and this is what we are doing. We are not saying, we are not dismissing anything. We are saying this is a serious matter. We are looking into it. And how long are you giving yourself time to get to the bottom of this? Well, we are looking into this. I guess that this one should not take a very long time because what we are looking is at a very, if you want, the snapshot is quite clear, it's precise around the time where this reading was or through the samples we took happened. And let me also say that the agency has also informed that there has not been production. This is also very important. There has not been any accumulation. You are saying or they say? I am saying. If I say it is because my inspectors have verified that when they say something, we listen respectfully, but then we verify. Thank you very much.