 Ladies and gentlemen, if you will please take your seats. Good morning and welcome to CSIS. We are delighted that you were here. Many of you canoed or swam here from the terrible flooding and in fact, our apologies for beginning a few minutes late. We had some speakers that were stuck in some traffic so we were waiting for them to arrive. My name is Heather Conley. I'm senior fellow and director here of the Europe Program at CSIS. And we are delighted that you were here and we are looking forward to such a rich discussion about a very dynamic region, the Asia Pacific region. There has been an enormous amount of transatlantic discussion and unity over the past several weeks about the crisis in Ukraine and transatlantic policy towards Russia. But today we have an opportunity to talk about a transatlantic approach and to discuss Asia. Again, I want to congratulate the Center for Transatlantic Relations to Dan Hamilton, Hans Bendedike. They have organized and put together a fantastic program of very senior Obama administration officials, very senior former Bush administration officials, senior Europeans to really bring a very rich dynamic discussion. Of course, we save the best for last and we'll have the Dutch foreign minister, Minister Timmermans here to provide the keynote. So you may be wondering if this is a Center for Transatlantic Relations project, why are we here at CSIS? Well, my friends, this is great think tank cooperation and partnership. And this project fits so perfectly with a CSIS project with a European Union delegation to create an EU-US dialogue on the Asia Pacific region. So we're working in the same area and we're pulling strength from one another. Again, congratulations. We're going to have copies of this book for you at the end of the program. We just wanted you to listen to the speakers and not read this riveting document. But here it is, a transatlantic pivot to Asia towards new trilateral partnerships. Again, we know what an undertaking this is. My congratulations to the authors, again, to Hans and to Dan. One of my very first projects as coming to CSIS was working with Dan on a major book like this on really strengthening USEU cooperation. I know what goes into this and again it is a fantastic opportunity. So I will be back with you in moderating the second panel. But until then, you are most welcome. We look forward to a rich discussion. Sit back, relax and enjoy. And with that, I will welcome the executive director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations, Dan Hamilton, to give you a few more words about this exciting project. Thank you. Thank you, Heather. Thanks, everyone, for coming today. We appreciate it very much. I think we have a very rich agenda and a lot of substance in the meeting. But first, let me thank CSIS, Heather and your team for working with us on this. We appreciate it. You can see another reason why we want to be here. It's very nice. CSIS has become our new neighbor. I can look at our building, one building of Johns Hopkins size right there. And so it's really become really a great dynamic development here. As I think many of you know, so we are what's called the EU Center in Washington working with the other area universities on US-EU relations and do a lot of things on that. So if there are other colleagues from the other universities, Georgetown, George Washington American, George Mason, I want to say hello. And this particular project has been the work of a group of authors. Almost, I think all of them are here. In fact, I want to thank them for all of their work. It's a typical type of think tank product and that we boil this down into, so okay, what does this all mean? What do we got to do? And that sort of cheat sheet, if you will, the sort of quick couple page agenda is out on the table in front of this room if you haven't seen that. So instead of 300 pages, I think three pages. But that's geared to the Washington and European decision maker world. But we have been doing this in collaboration with our colleagues from the Dutch foreign ministry and I want to really take the opportunity to thank them. We'll see the foreign minister later and that's the embodiment of that cooperation. But I've always been struck and really refreshed when I deal with my Dutch colleagues because they have a very big view and this idea of how do we talk about the pivot together? They immediately joined in on that and we've had meetings in The Hague with the authors and here and we'll continue that discussion. So what we've tried to do here is to bring again a collection of experts and what we think is we'll have to be increasingly the norm but it's still an exception. And that is people who really are experts on Asia and the Pacific and experts who are knowledgeable about the US-European relationship. And often what's happening is sort of me sort of seeing what's going on is often when we say let's talk about China or something, we get the China experts from the US and Europe together. But then there's not somebody that actually is talking about how the US and Europe work together. And so sometimes I think there's sort of a mismatch of discussion because people aren't quite sure what the mechanisms are that would allow the US and Europe to work together. And then often the traditional transatlantic crowd, if you will, then say well we have to now talk about China. Does anybody in the room know anything about China? And so clearly there's a missing link in those traditional discussions as well. So I think we've tried to bridge that with this collection. We have a number of people who are really experts on Asia and the Pacific and practitioners. I want to just point out Michael here. Michael Schaefer who was the German ambassador to China for six years, has rich experience there. But he was also the political director of the German Foreign Office. He and I worked on the Balkans together some years ago. And that's the kind of expansive experience that is really I think very, very good to put together. So the premise of this work is if you just take the United States. The United States is an Atlantic and a Pacific power. It has been for a while now. And when the term the pivot came out I think there was some uncertainty or misunderstanding especially in Europe about what that meant. And we will talk about this later. But originally the term emerged more out of the defense world in terms of pivoting away from military engagements in Central Asia and the broader Middle East toward security challenges now rising again in the Asia Pacific region. It was not intended as a pivot away from Europe. In fact I think many in the administration and many will say that they was intended to actually start working with Europe on that. But it was not quite understood that way because at the same time of course we were talking about a post-Cold War type of structure in Europe. And so I think the two conflated in the minds of some Europeans to say well the United States is really moving away from our relationship as well. So we hope to address that with some of this in the work. But I think if you look at Europe, Europe is increasingly intertwined with Asia. Again, but in many, many, many different ways. And that element, the Europe Asia, Europe Asia Pacific dynamic maybe is not as well understood in Washington. It has its own dynamics. And so we're trying to lift that part of the conversation into these discussions as well. So Europe has its own stakes in what's happening in Asia. Very deep linkages in many, many areas. But some are uneven. And when we say, we Americans like to say Europe as if it's one thing. As soon as you go to Europe, you know it's not yet. And despite our colleagues in the EU, each member state of the EU has its own view. So the Europeans bring a whole, another diversity of experience and different values and not different values I think, but different interests to some of the issues of the Asia Pacific. So I think the third piece to this when we say pivot, I've been arguing for some time, but I think this reinforces it, is the transatlantic relationship has had to pivot. Not in just a geographic sense, but in terms of the nature of the relationship itself. Because during the Cold War, really you could say about 80, 90% of our agenda when we said transatlantic relations, we meant stabilizing the European continent. It was about Europe, really. We had other issues, but it was about stabilizing Europe. Today, given the developments, we're still about stabilizing Europe and that's still an important piece of our relationship. But the relationship is broadened so that it's not 90% of our agenda. We have to focus on developments in Ukraine. We have to focus on the security of wider Europe now in a way that maybe we hadn't for some time. And that's really still a core element of the agenda, but it's not the whole agenda. I think the other pivot that we've had to make is to understand the deep integration of our economies in a world of globalization, in a world in which we're facing at least 4 billion other new workers who are also part of the global economy. And so how do you pivot the US-European economic relationship to deal with this very new world rising? Much of it's about opening up opportunity across the Atlantic. That's what the TransLink Trade and Investment Partnership is about. But the T-TIP, as we call it, is not just about that. It's about repositioning the two sides of the Atlantic for the world we're facing in the future, not the world we left behind. And that's an equally important pivot. And then the third pivot, it seems, is in fact to address how Europeans and Americans, how and whether we will work together on a whole range of global and extra regional issues very far from European or American shores, but where if you don't get the Europeans and Americans to work together, you're not gonna get much of a coalition that does work very well together. And if you do get them together, usually at least there's a core there of a much bigger coalition that get things done. I think that's still distinctive about our relationship across Atlantic. But now we're facing really critical challenges, but also huge opportunities presented by the Asia Pacific region. And that is the nature of our book and that's the nature of our discussions here today. So I'm going to welcome Danny Russell, who has joined us now. Danny, we explained everybody was stuck in traffic today. I think so, we appreciate your being here. What we've tried to do in the conference is bring some current decision makers who have to grapple with these issues every day together with our authors. As I said, many of the authors were themselves, has themselves been in those positions and try to tease out what could be a concrete agenda of how US and Europe work with Asia Pacific partners. Hans Benendijk has been our editor and leader on this effort and he will join in soon and has really directed the whole project. And Hans, thank you again for everything you've done. So Danny is here and I want to now just briefly introduce him. You have bios, I think, so I don't need to read everything, but we actually got to work together when he was worked with Tom Pickering and when he was roaming the seventh floor of the State Department, getting everybody else organized, working for the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. But Danny's had this great, also transatlantic, trans-pacific experience, not only based in The Hague, which is great for this project, but also based a number of times, postings in Asia, particularly in Osaka, which seems to be your place of choice in various postings. Also, special assistance to the President for Asian Affairs and now the Assistant Secretary for State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. So it's a great way to start the scene to get a view from Danny on how do we think about this region, what perspectives might there be for the U.S. and Europe to address the region, and how does the U.S. view the dynamics. So please, Danny, rest. Dan, thanks very much. Hans, I apologize for being late. I see some friendly and familiar faces here today. It's great to be at CSIS and it's a privilege to speak at this conference. You have some outstanding speakers in the course of the day, myself not included. My former boss and friend Chris Hill is coming, I know, Derek Chalet, and of course, Minister Timmermans, which is great. I want to tell the Center for Transatlantic Relations that I think this is a terrific review of U.S. and European policy towards the Asia Pacific region. There are some really good ideas in the report about it, how we can work even more closely together. It's no surprise to me that the Dutch government has a role in this project and in today's conference given forward-looking and expansive diplomacy towards the region that's been a hallmark of the Netherlands. As Dan mentioned, I served at the U.S. Embassy in The Hague for three years as the Deputy Chief of Mission as part of the six years that I've worked in Europe in the U.S. Foreign Service. And it's clear to me that the trade ties with Asia will play an increasing role for the Netherlands and for Europe for their future prosperity just as they have in the past in the 17th century. I was back in The Hague last month with President Obama during the Nuclear Security Summit and participated in the President's meetings with President Park of South Korea and Prime Minister Abe of Japan as well as his bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping who went on, I know, to hold a series of visits throughout Western Europe. So along with Europe's increasing engagement in Asia, our U.S.-EU cooperation in the Asia Pacific region is important and is extensive. It's indispensable, it's growing. And frankly, it's a significant feature of our own strategy of rebalance. Let me start by giving you the broader policy context of our strategy in the Asia Pacific region, our rebalance strategy. It's built on a very simple proposition that the U.S. views Asia, the Asia Pacific as hugely consequential to our economic and our security future. Both as a resident Asia Pacific power and as a major trading nation, the U.S. simply depends on a stable and a prosperous Asia. The broader Asia Pacific rim region, including the U.S., constitutes over half of the world's people, half of the world's economic output and the numbers are growing. So the region matters for the United States economy. It's key to creating jobs for us here at home and it matters very much for our long-term security and we simply can't afford not to be there in an active role. So we're working hard to build stronger and closer relationships and ties bilaterally and plural laterally with the region. So given this perspective, when policy makers at the beginning of the Obama administration in 2009 looked at how the U.S. government's resources were distributed, how they were allocated through the region. That means diplomatic development, personnel, funds, other military assets. It also means the time and attention of senior leaders themselves. It was clear that the U.S. was still somewhat out of balance. So over the last five and a half years, the administration worked to rebalance, to achieve the right kind of equilibrium in the allocation of our resources and that meant in the first instance, strengthening America's alliances in Asia. It meant secondly, contributing to the development of regional institutions, of the regional architecture. And thirdly, it meant engaging with the emerging powers in the Asia Pacific region. And I'll give you a little bit more perspective on each of those three areas. The U.S. has five treaty allies in Asia, Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand and the Philippines. And as a matter of deliberate policy, we have significantly enhanced our alliances. We've upgraded our military cooperation and interoperability. But we've also expanded security cooperation with important partners like Singapore, like New Zealand and even increasingly with countries like Vietnam and with Malaysia. At the same time, we've upgraded our economic and trade engagement. We've enacted and ratified the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, CORUS, FTA. We are negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP, which is an ambitious, comprehensive, high stakes, high standards and high stakes agreement that will create jobs and create growth among the 12 members, among the region and globally. And recently in Japan, as the President and Ambassador Froman have indicated, we made significant headway in the bilateral negotiations that are the critical next step in developing the TPP. But we've also increased our diplomatic and our political and our people-to-people ties, particularly with our allies. And President Obama's just concluded trip, I got back two nights ago, is his fifth trip to the region as president. And it included visits to three allied nations and one important partner, Malaysia. There are quite a few cabinet officers who travel on a regular basis to the Asia Pacific region. And we also foster business and cultural, educational, scientific, other direct links among our peoples. On this trip, the President announced a new program to double exchanges between the U.S. and Japan, for example, and he also launched a major young Southeast Asian leaders initiative, a program that will support the region's next generation. We've also, as I mentioned, significantly deepened our military and security cooperation with our allies. You'll hear from Derek Chalet today, I know. But it includes our work with Japan, with the ROK, in order to counter the threat from North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile program. It includes new forms of defense cooperation that allow, not for new bases, but for access, joint operations and interoperability, such as the enhanced defense cooperation agreement that was reached during the President's visit to the Philippines a few days ago. It includes our rotational deployment of Marines to Darwin, Australia. And it includes a broader systematic program of capacity building throughout Southeast Asia. Secondly, we're helping to build up the region's institutions to address the political, security, and economic challenges and opportunities that are presented. We, the United States, were the first non-ASEAN member to dedicate a permanent mission toASEAN in Jakarta. President Obama participates annually in the East Asia Summit, having made the fundamental decision not to wait until the East Asia Summit perfected itself before we joined, but to get in there, roll up his sleeves, participate actively in shaping and developing the region's institutions. He also meets annually with the 10 leaders ofASEAN on innovation in the Obama administration. And in addition to the work on TPP, we are also active within APEC in the effort to liberalize trade and investment rules and to promote sustainable and inclusive growth. So these regional institutions also serve as a platform for fostering dialogue, fostering understanding, and helping the countries in the region to interact in ways that are likely to develop collaborative patterns of operation. We want the countries in the region to operate on the basis of dialogue and diplomacy. So whether it's a code of conduct for claimants in the South China Sea, whether it's managing shared and dwindling resources like fisheries, or whether it's addressing pollution that crosses borders, building up these institutions creates a vehicle for constructive multilateral interaction. The third pillar of the rebalance that I mentioned is our engagement with emerging powers. Now, this traditionally has meant countries like India, Indonesia, and, of course, China. And we have high-level, regular, ongoing, and in-depth discussions with all three, with each of these three countries on a wide range of issues. On a wide range of bilateral and global issues through a variety of bilateral mechanisms. But a broader definition of emerging powers could also include the modernizing countries of the region like Vietnam, like Malaysia, and I certainly harbor the hope someday Burma, Myanmar, where I traveled last month as part of our effort to support that remarkable and important transition to democracy and free markets. So these three pillars support and reinforce each other. Strengthening our alliances provides the foundation for security for the region. It gives countries the confidence and the space to move forward on their collective interests and to strengthen the institutions. And building up these institutions in turn helps the region develop the rules of the road that are so important to stability and to progress. And those rules developed, not imposed on the nations, but developed by the nations of the Asia Pacific themselves, those rules provide the foundation for trade, for prosperity, and for problem-solving. That's a closely held tenant of the president and of the administration. Furthermore, our engagement with these emerging powers shows that we're welcoming of new voices. We are not locked into an immutable status quo. We're committed to building positive some, not zero some, relationships and approaches. And fundamentally it shows that the United States supports the peaceful rise of China that plays a responsible role in regional and in global affairs. So these are all areas where I believe that Europe brings some significant comparative advantages. And with that as the context, I'll talk a little bit about how we coordinate with Europe since our interests in the region are so closely aligned. I myself, in the nine months that I've been in my current position as assistant secretary, have gone twice already to Europe for the purpose of discussing and coordinating on policy towards the Asia Pacific region. I spent some time in Brussels and other European capitals in January this year to consult with the EU and with some of the member states on how we can deepen our coordination. And I'm very encouraged by the European countries engagement with Asia dating back to our joint pledge in 2011 at the US EU summit where we resolved to increase cooperation. And since then we've met numerous times to discuss practical and concrete areas where we can partner in the region. I think that the US and Europe have never been more strategically aligned. We've never been more focused on the opportunities in Asia. And it's also clear to me operating in the region that Asia Pacific welcomes European interest in trade and in international security. And once that engagement to be sustained and expanded both bilaterally and through the European Union. But just as we see opportunities we obviously also face very serious challenges throughout the region. Those include the ongoing threat from North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile program as I mentioned, as well as that country's truly deplorable human rights record. We're seeing significant maritime and territorial disputes in the East and the South China Seas. The historical issues that create tensions between Japan and its neighbors can undermine growth, can undermine regional stability. There are political and social and economic tensions boiling in countries like Cambodia and in Thailand. We have a formidable task in promoting continued political reform in Burma. We have other democratic challenges in the region such as in Fiji. And in addition to our efforts to support individual countries, we have a lot of work to do on transnational and global challenges that have a huge impact on the region by far and away the most consequential being climate change and environmental degradation. Yet for all the challenges we are seeing and we are making important progress. I mentioned TPP and the progress in the negotiations there and with other economic agreements. And as you know well, the high standards being set in TPP will complement the high standards of the TTIP, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership that the US is negotiating with Europe. This inclusive set of trade relationships can have tremendous benefit for the Asia Pacific region by harmonizing consumer product regulations between the US and the EU. Asian manufacturers for example will more efficiently produce goods for both markets. We're also making progress in developing rules, rules that promote security. Last week in Beijing, nearly two dozen nations in the region adopted a new agreement, what is called a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea. And this sort of naval code while voluntary and informal creates a framework that helps prevent potentially dangerous incidents, a huge concern right now in the region. It's modest but it's still a very positive development that can help reduce the risk of misunderstanding and dangerous interaction between ships, naval ships and naval aircraft in the region. And my hope is that it can spur progress in efforts to conclude a code of conduct between ASEAN and China in the South China Sea, as well as spur progress in developing agreements and mechanisms to avoid and prevent incidents between Japan and China in the East China Sea. Secretary Kerry and certainly I put a very high premium on coordinating with Europe in Asia as part of our strong global Atlantic alliance and partnerships. And I should be clear that although my area of responsibility is East Asia and the Pacific, I'm well aware of the extent to which the US and Europe cooperate across the spectrum of South and Central Asia from Afghanistan to Iran to the Middle East. We work together to address not only the challenges that I've mentioned and build on progress there but develop other areas where jointly we can make a difference. In the Asia Pacific region, I think it's absolutely fair to say that America's involvement in the rebalance, America's commitment to the Asia Pacific region doesn't and shouldn't and won't come at the expense of our engagement across the Atlantic. More attention to Asia does not mean less attention to Europe, that's not what the pivot is. We have it and we won't pivot away from the Atlantic to focus on the Pacific. To the contrary, as I've said, we have common interests and I think we can do far more together than we could hope to do independently. A classic example being the collaboration on North Korean human rights where by working together over the past few months, we got an unprecedentedly strong vote in the Human Rights Council and we raised the DPRK human rights issue for the first time at an informal meeting of the UN Security Council resolution. So these kinds of efforts underline the shared values that make us such good partners, make us such uniquely close friends and allies. And with the challenges facing the world, clearly there's a growing demand for our collaboration, our engagement, and our leadership. So in keeping with the very thoughtful recommendations and conclusions in the report, we certainly wanna see deeper coordination, deeper consultation with Europe on a whole range of Asia Pacific opportunities and challenges. So having arrived late, let me stop here and take any questions that the time will allow. Yeah, we are pressed for time, so is Danny, but I think if we just collect it, okay Danny, just a couple of questions, we'll let you just answer those and I think we will probably be good. So yes, right here. We have microphones, I understand. So if you could just say who you are, so Danny has an orientation point that... I'm sorry, I met the woman in front of you, I'm sorry. Thank you. Thank you, Secretary. My name is Jeanine Nguyen with Voice of Vietnamese Americans. First, I'd like to thank you for all the work you've done up until now for the region. And as a Vietnamese American, I thank you very much for all the advancement of the changes in the region. Secondly, I would like to ask specifically about Vietnam and the impact of the recent trip of President Obama to the region, because Vietnam is one of the members who wanted to join the TPP, and we've been working on it for a long time. And Vietnam is also one of the main claimants in the situation in the South China Sea. Vietnam has also had a long, almost a very long history in engagement with the French, European... I have to ask you to ask the question, please, because we're really... So my question is, what impacts do you expect the transatlantic period to Asia have in Vietnam? What role can Vietnam play? And whether you see the impacts of the recent trip of the President Obama regarding the role of Vietnam since he did not visit Vietnam. Okay, thank you. Could you pass the microphone behind you? Just thank you. Natalie Liu with Voice of America. Could the pivot or rebalance to Asia have been done in such a way that it would at least appear to antagonize China a bit less? Thank you. Thank you, Secretary Faso. Bibi Wang with Hong Kong Phoenix TV. I have a more detailed question. When you were in Japan, we saw the joint statement. As you know, the word Senkaku, you put in there, actually surprised many one, even in Washington, D.C. Could you tell us about, have you ever hesitant to put Senkaku in the joint statement because there was reports saying there was a difference between U.S. and Japan. And if so, what made you change your mind? Thank you. Okay, we're gonna stop there. Let, Danny, take whatever you like out of that menu. Thank you. Well, let me answer the collective questions by saying a few words about the President's recent trip because I think that spans the issues raised. I went with the President. We began in Japan, went on to the Republic of Korea from there to Malaysia and ended in the Philippines and just got back about 48 hours ago. The significance of the trip includes the fact that he visited three treaty allies of the United States and one burgeoning security partner, Malaysia. Also the fact that the trip integrated Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. And I think it's important that the United States is looking at the broad Asia Pacific region as a whole and that the trip underscored in economic terms, in security terms, and in people-to-people cultural, political terms how much the region has in common. Both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia face challenges from, as I mentioned, transnational threats, global threats like climate change. They're experiencing challenges in territorial and maritime disputes but both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia are seeing tremendous economic growth and political development and maturity. Those are positive forces that the U.S. wants to foster and wants to participate in. The increasing ties between the United States and ASEAN and each of the 10 ASEAN members, the U.S. strategy of promoting capacity, expanding the wherewithal of the Southeast Asian countries to collaborate in institutional ways to develop their own maritime law enforcement mechanisms to grow their political and economic institutions and to promote a greater and more vigorous civil society were major features of the president's trip. Vietnam plays an important role as a leader in the region and as an active participant in the TPP negotiations. There is, to my eyes, abundant evidence that Vietnam has decided to engage in a path to reform and participation in regional and international affairs that is very, very constructive. I accompanied Secretary Kerry last year when he visited Vietnam and not only went to Hanoi but to Ho Chi Minh City, he met with a broad spectrum of political leaders of civil society and of business leaders and it's clear that there's change, positive change, afoot in Vietnam that matches the growth and the dynamism of the rest of the region. In Japan where we began, the president reaffirmed the fact that the U.S.-Japan defense treaty includes a provision that stipulates that its application extends to areas under the administrative control of Japan and that includes the Senkakus. As he himself made clear, this is not a new policy and surely having the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense affirm this repeatedly and publicly meant that it was both proper and appropriate for the president to do likewise. In doing so, he merely removed any doubt that might exist in anyone's mind, both to the facts and to the strength of America's commitment to the security of our allies. But at the same time, he emphasized in Japan as he did in the Philippines that number one, the U.S. is not a party to any of these disputes. We don't take a position on any of the claims. Number two, that the strong preference of the United States is that differences be managed diplomatically without coercion, without the use or the threat of force, that there are abundant diplomatic channels for peaceful resolution of these differences and certainly pending resolution, they can and must be managed with restraint and with diplomacy. But the third point that he made, which goes to the issue of China is this, that the United States, as the president said, welcomes the peaceful rise of China, that the United States seeks and has a constructive partnership with China and that the United States seeks an active role by China in participating in the rulemaking process in the Asia Pacific region. We want and have facilitated China's voice being heard and help to ensure that China has a seat at the table. And as the president indicated, we harbor the reasonable expectation that like the United States and like others, as a rulemaker, as a participant in regional discussions, that China will consider itself equally bound by the same rules that apply to all of us. There is no anti-China intent or dimension to our Asia policy. To the contrary, President Obama has met, if I'm counting right, something on the order of 19 times with Chinese leaders, with the president or the prime minister of China since he's taken office. The United States, although we accept that there are both areas of cooperation and areas of competition with China, have found important projects, for example, climate change, where cooperation between the US and China has not only been possible, frankly it is indispensable to making headway on a matter of existential importance to the entire world. My name is Hans Benendike and it's a great pleasure for me to be here. We're sort of pressed for time, so I'm gonna set aside the half hours' worth of opening comments that I had planned to make. I do wanna thank the Dutch government and the Dutch Foreign Ministry in particular for supporting this effort. I do wanna make three very brief points. The first point is that one of the purposes of this book was to try to correct a series of misimpressions, myths, if you will, about the pivot. And those included that it's all about defense policy, that it's about containing China, that it's purely rhetorical, that it produces winners and losers and one of the losers is Europe, and that the scope for transatlantic cooperation is limited. Those are all myths. Julie Smith's chapter in the book, which you'll get later today, addresses all of those, but one of the purposes of the book was to correct that narrative. The second purpose was to try to sort of push forward on this agreement that was reached a couple of years ago between the United States and the EU with regard to greater cooperation in the pivot to Asia. That happened, but we felt that it needed a clearer agenda. And so one of the main purposes of the book was to focus on that agenda. And you'll see that most of the chapters in the book focus on that. They focus on a bit on security policy and the role for NATO, but they also focus on some of the things that Danny just mentioned, the importance of institutions, rule of law, reconciliation, norms, and the role that together we can play to develop that in Asia. Another element to this transatlantic pivot is about problem solving. Problem solving with regard to environmental issues, international crime, human rights, et cetera. And then finally there's the economic dimension which Jeff will talk about in a minute. It's about these two sets of trade negotiations who in many ways can underpin this new trilateral relationship that we're talking about. Finally, let me, I'm sure some of you are wondering, is the pivot and this transatlantic notion of pivoting with Europe still valid after what we have seen over the last couple of months the challenges that we have in Ukraine and Crimea from President Putin? The answer in my mind is yes, more than ever. Things have not changed in Asia. The pivot was never intended, as Danny said, to reduce in any way America's commitment to Europe. And in fact one could argue that as the United States focuses a bit more back on Europe to deal with this new challenge that Europe ought to be leaning with us in the other direction as well so that we have sort of a burden sharing relationship and so that we can have the benefit of this strong transatlantic partnership when we deal with Asia. Now, let me turn with those very brief comments to the panel. I got a note last night from Julie Smith saying she has bronchitis and has lost her voice. I suggest that she might speak with sign language but she didn't take me up on that. Patrick Cronin has very graciously written one of the major chapters in our book. He's graciously agreed to stand in. Let me start with Miriam von Den Heuvel though who is the director of the Western Hemisphere Department of the Dutch Foreign Ministry. Let me ask her to start. The bios are all available so I won't spend any time doing it. And if I can ask all the panelists to speak in code, do this quickly. It's five to seven minutes and then we can have some room for discussion. So, Miriam, can you start please? Thank you Hans, thank you. And let me first of all congratulate all the authors and in particular Hans Binnenberg and Dan Hamilton and the Center of Transatlantic Relations on the completion of this very important project and the publication of this very interesting book. Three years ago the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where I work, we started working on some ideas to redefine the transatlantic relationship and in a changing world. And one of the authors, Rem Kortwer sitting here in front of me was part of our team at that time. And at the same time our colleagues in the ministry working in the Asia Department were working on a proposal for a new policy towards Asia. Well, when I met Dan Hamilton in full 2011 and I heard about his ideas to conduct a project on the pivot to Asia, I felt that this coincided so well with the policy questions on transatlantic issues and Asian issues that we were working on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. So, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dutch Embassy here in Washington, we became partners to this very interesting project and I want to thank all the colleagues for that. Today I've been asked to present the Dutch view on the pivot to Asia and I will limit myself to a few remarks as Minister Timmermans will address your audience this afternoon and present his views on transatlantic relations in a changing world. Well, about transatlantic relations, next year we will commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II and the role that the US has played in ending the war and the sacrifice that young soldiers have brought to bring us freedom is at the very, very heart of the transatlantic relationship. But there is much more. I believe that the strong and shared belief in values like individual freedom, open economy, the rule of law and democracy have further strengthened over the years the transatlantic relationship and the cooperation across the Atlantic. And internationally, in my opinion, these very values that have helped build a whole multilateral system promoting free trade, young rights and international law that on the international front and domestically these values have brought our societies, our citizens more freedom, they have brought us more security and more prosperity. Looking at Asia, I believe that it is fair to say that the 21st century will be known as a century of Asia. The last 20 years, the share of China's and India's economy has tripled. Six out of the 10 most populated countries worldwide are in Asia. Asia is to become the largest producer and the largest consumer of goods worldwide. I believe yesterday there was an article in the Financial Times saying that the Chinese economy has become bigger than the US economy. And rapid economic growth goes hand in hand with increased political ambition. Well, given all these facts, it's only normal that the interest of Western countries turns towards Asia. And I must say it's not only Western countries because when you are in Latin America, when you're in the Middle East, when you are in Africa you see that there is more and more interaction between these regions and the countries in Asia. But so the central question I would say is not so much about the pivot to Asia in itself, it's more about how to pivot and with whom. And in this respect, I will share with you three elements I would say perhaps risks or myths as Hans has called them that still exist and that we need to address and that I believe your book is addressing very well and will help us to address and find solution to them. Well, first, there is a risk that economic drivers are the decisive element of defining our relationship with Asia. And I must say that economic and trade motives are extremely important and totally legitimate in an area where we have to overcome a crisis in Europe but focusing on the economy alone entails risk of short-term gain and long-term loss. We need to keep our focus as European countries and as Netherlands in particular on those elements that I mentioned earlier. I believe that these elements that helped us building our post-World War II order need to be central in that approach towards Asia as well. So promoting a rules-based world order, be it on maritime security, free trade or international security, human rights needs to be an essential part of our approach to Asia. And until now we need every time in the Netherlands but I believe in other European countries as well to maintain that focus. It's not only about interesting trading orders or economic opportunities. The second risk that I would like to mention here is that we equal Asia with China. Secretary Russell has already pointed out that all the different countries and the different relationships that we have with the different countries in Asia. Asia is complex in its diversity and so are the relationships with individual countries. And besides being the region with the largest economic growth, it's also the region that where current and latent conflicts exist. And some Asian countries share the same outlook as Europe on certain international affairs and others take a totally opposite stance. So the European countries having certain historic ties with certain Asian countries can be an asset but it can be your burden as well. In that respect, an approach to Asia cannot be one size fits all. It has to take into account the differences between the countries, the interaction among Asian countries themselves and the strategic relationship that we have with each one of them. The third risk is the risk that we consider each other as competitors or as Secretary Russell has said that we focus more on the competition than on the cooperation. And some believe and I believe that it is true that it still exists up to now at least in the Netherlands and other European countries that the pivot to Asia means the pivot away from Europe and I agree with Hans that every time again we should get rid of that myth and explain that it is not a zero sum game. Some believe in Europe that having a joint approach decreases competitiveness and a privileged position of an individual country. But in fact that too is untrue for having a coordinated strategic approach whether within the EU, and I believe that Remcourt has also pointed out that it still lacks a coherent EU approach. So either within the EU or the EU jointly with the US and other partners increases our chances to successfully influence developments. Finally I would like to add one last element which we are faced with in the Netherlands currently with decreasing human resources, decreasing financial instruments due to the economic crisis. We need more than ever to develop a smart diplomacy. And smart diplomacy vis-à-vis Asia or any region in the world requires that we have a proper understanding of international developments, that we are capable of defining our interests and that we cooperate strategically with partners with whom we share interests. And in that respect given the challenges worldwide but also in Asia, I believe that your work and your studies represent a tremendous contribution to administrations, to diplomacy, to our own ministry in The Hague to formulate a better policy and a more strategic approach together, EU and the US. Thank you very much. Very thank you so much for that. Let me turn now to Patrick Cronin who runs the Asia programs at the Center for New American Security and is a former colleague of mine at the National Defense University. Hans, thank you very much. Let me just start with a comment about how 20 years ago working for you at National Defense University, you were one of the few transatlanticists who were constantly focusing on both the trans-Pacific and transatlantic. So the ingredients for a transatlantic pivot have long been, I think, in your veins. They're also in CSIS's veins to some extent in the sense that when I was working with Kurt Campbell and Julie Smith for whom I'm filling in this morning, we had many discussions about being bogged down in Iraq. We had Victor Cha and other great officials working on Asia account, so it wasn't new, but we were thinking very much about how the future of the world looks so different in the 21st century. So the ingredients for the pivot, Kurt Campbell is an architect under Secretary Clinton and Julie Smith very much working on, especially transatlantic policy, coming together. So this really isn't a big stretch to have a transatlantic pivot to Asia. What is the pivot? Let me just make two geo-strategic points. I've already had the good fortune of Assistant Secretary Danny Russell explaining official US policy, so let me explain unofficial geo-strategy. Two points that I will enlarge and sharpen. Asia's rise that Danny talked about is in particular led by China. So that was downplayed in Danny's comments for lots of reasons. The report that was issued this week that China will likely overtake the United States as the world's largest economy in purchasing power parity this year is an indicator of this trend of a rising Indo-Pacific region, of which, again, China is critical India in that survey, by the way, moves ahead of Japan into the number three position. So it isn't just China. It is really this Indo-Pacific rise that we're trying to deal with. And that's raising two sets of questions that, again, Danny hinted at. One of them is the security maintenance with all these challenges that we face. The other one is the order building. And these are the two challenges we're facing. So in security maintenance, let me just put an image in your mind. If you think about the Chinese military order in the Pacific in 1999, very few aircraft and ships that could project power. 2014, vastly many more, but the quality is inferior. But now think out to 15 years ahead or to 2035. And that's the trajectory that many in the region are watching and seeing and they're wondering, well, by what rules will that larger China use its military force? It's a legitimate set of questions and many Chinese are asking the same questions. And you think about the order building. That's everything from the kind of confidence building measures such as the code for the sort of unintended sort of episodes or encounters at sea that Danny Russell talked about, which is non-binding and is even less useful. Then the binding coal regs that exist right now and cover both commercial and military shipping or that the incidents at sea agreement in the Cold War provided for military to military real confidence building measure. So we need to go well beyond that, but to the larger institution building that has to happen in this region. And here's where the rebalancing policy of being a whole of government approach and having to work with others in the region and work with Europe is so important because we can't get to the order building or the security without the world really coming together at least in terms of major powers, major countries coming together to try to work on these issues. The pivot therefore was a really bad term because it suggested such a immediate shift. You've got to think of this like climate change. It's a gradual shift. The world is pivoting, right? Asia is growing. And so we are all trying to adapt and to integrate in this inclusive rules-based system the rise of Asia. And that's really the second point, which is that the liberal world order if we can just use the catchphrase of what an inclusive rules-based system might include is indeed the extension of the system that Europe and the United States in particular helped to build after World War II. So we have an obligation, we have an opportunity to now take this into the next chapter of that project. And in 2014, there are more and more people around the world asking who makes the rules. Yesterday, I heard perhaps the next prime minister of Japan, Ishiba-san, the secretary general of the Liberal Democratic Party say, well, we have to ask ourselves in Japan and in Asia, since we did not, as a world community, stop Assad after chemical weapons were used, did this give the green light to Putin in the Crimea? Now, whatever you think of that question, the fact that it's being asked by a man of that seniority in Asia says that it's a legitimate issue, that people are questioning who makes the rules. Well, that's why you heard, I think, Assistant Secretary Russell talk about Article 5 of the treaty and why he didn't want there to be ambiguity, because this is a time when maybe ambiguity is not helpful. We want people to understand that there are rules, we expect good behavior, we have to come together now to create new rules and adapt this system. Anyway, those are the two points I would make that this is an urgent sort of important thing. It's not just the big rules, it's also little things. And again, Danny mentioned law enforcement, for instance. So when you think about Philippines and Vietnam, countries that are increasingly having to play a critical role in a place like the South China Sea, where there aren't so many claims, understanding the rule of law starts very small with law enforcement and coast guards. And those are very important too. And those are the practical, that's why the trip by the president in many ways sounded somewhat pedestrian. It was workman-like, because this is a long-term effort. It's, most of it is not that exciting, but it has some huge strategic implications if we don't get it right. So thank you, Hans. Excellent. Dr. Craig and Cyson, useful. Let's turn now to Victor Chah, who is a senior fellow and holds the Korea Chair here at CSIS. And he was the Director of Asian Affairs National Security Council some years ago, Victor. Thank you, Hans. Congratulations and to the authors on a great volume and to the organizers of this for a really fantastic conference. I'm gonna offer an analysis of the pivot that will have some, not critical, but maybe pose some of the challenges to the pivot. I don't do that as an unemployed Republican because I did actually go to college with President Obama. We were in the same class at Columbia. His career's gone a little bit better than mine, but so far, right? But I don't know that. 2016? Right, right. And I would, I just wanna reiterate the point about how the, when we talk about the pivot and Europe in Asia, it is not a zero sum game at all. In fact, I think if you go to a lot of countries in Asia, while they appreciate the terminology and the President's visit and everything, I don't think you get this groundswell feeling in Asia that all the attention is on them. On the contrary, they are striving for US attention as much as anybody else. I think one of the most important things when we talk about stability and prosperity in Asia is the whole question of institutions and practices. And these are not necessarily formal, advanced European institutions, but more broadly, simply the level of interaction, the volume of interaction that takes place in Asia. And I think it's fair to say that relatively speaking, Asia is fairly under institutionalized if you use that broad definition. There really aren't any formal institutions in Northeast Asia. Chris and I used to be part of something called the Six Party Talks. Chris Hill and I used to be part of something called the Six Party Talks, but that hasn't met in what, eight years now? So I don't know if it really exists anymore. There are more in Southeast Asia, relatively more, but there are none in South Asia. And the interesting thing to me is that the pivot to Asia is happening at a time, perhaps not without coincidence, where China's rise is causing Beijing to extend its own footprint in all these regions, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. And so what this is creating is a lot more interaction between the United States and China in areas and over issues about which or upon which we have no established patterns of interaction, right? No established institutions, no established patterns of interaction, no established practices. So whether you're talking about instability in North Korea, we don't have an institution or established pattern of interaction or understanding. Whether you're talking about territorial disputes in Asia, including things like the Senkaku Islands, we don't have an established pattern of interaction or institution or understanding with China. Now to the pivot's credit, it has bolstered a lot of the institution building in Asia. As Danny said earlier with regard to the alliances in Asia, whether you're talking about Japan, Korea, Australia, the new access arrangement in the Philippines, to the administration's credit, they have also done a lot with EAS, the East Asia Summit. Again, when Chris and I were in government, there was a lot of debate about whether the United States should or shouldn't join EAS, but this administration made that decision and really has done a lot to define the agenda of EAS, define it as distinct but complementary to the agenda for APEC, so you give them a lot of credit in that respect. But let me just highlight four challenges, and again, I wanna be quick so we can get to discussion and question and answers, and I also wanna hear what Jeff has to say because he really knows what he's talking about. The first, I think, again, when we think about Asia, Asia desires to have an East Asian, they desire for a community. They wanna have a community like Europe has a community. If you poll Asians and you ask them about the notion of an Asian community or East Asian community, overwhelmingly they want it. So one of the challenges for the pivot is, can the pivot be seen by the region as both a hedge against China and something that's good for the alliances, but also not be seen as an impediment to this building of an East Asian community, right? So that's, I think, a big challenge. The second is something that Danny talked about, and this is a whole question of so-called rebalancing the rebalance, right? The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on the rebalance, which I think right now is the best document and print out there on it, is very clear about how the rebalance is too military focused. And if you look at the president's trip to Asia, it was a great trip, but the headline was all about security, right? Article five in Senkaku in Japan, OPCON transition in Korea, right? Defense Access Arrangement in the Philippines. So can the administration be successful in rebalancing the rebalance, bringing out the other elements of this? Link to this, of course, and the third challenge is TPP, right? Trans-Pacific Partnership, if it can be accomplished, will by far be the most important institution in Asia and the most important legacy of the Obama administration's pivot to Asia, unquestionably, right? And whether they can get that, I think, is a big question. And the fourth challenge, of course, is history. Europe has dealt with its history much better than Asia. And the pivot, even the United States has generally tried to stay away from these history issues in Asia, but it's very challenging now because it's one of the most prominent issues in the region, and at the same time, the United States cannot pivot to Asia with this being one of the prime issues and not play a larger role in helping to forge pragmatic cooperation in spite of this history. So these, I think, are the four challenges for the pivot. I think I entirely agree with the concept behind it and with the enthusiasm and passion with which the administration pursues it, but these are some of the challenges we have to think about as we move forward. Victor, thank you very much. Now we're gonna turn to one of the four points that you raised and dig into it a bit more, which is this notion of trade and economics as a basis for a, not just a transatlantic pivot, but actually a new trilateralism, if you will. So Jeffrey Schott is a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute. He has been studying both of these trade agreements and knows more about them than anyone else in town, I think. Jeffrey, over to you. Thank you very much, Hans. And it has been a great pleasure for me to have the opportunity to work with you and to work with Dan and the other authors and putting this book together. And I congratulate you on the hard work and seeing it through to fruition. So congratulations on that. Economists don't speak the same language as political scientists. And many people say economists don't speak English, and that may be true. But one of the words that you don't hear economists say is pivot. And so I've had a little bit of difficulty fitting into, as the odd man in this lineup of authors, in discussing the very important developments, both economic and strategic, that have been underway for quite some time. From a U.S. perspective, the U.S. economic pivot to Asia started more than 15 years ago. And it has been evident in the marketplace for a long, long time. It has been evident in U.S. policy for a long, long time. You can pick any starting date you want, but clearly the U.S. role in getting China into the World Trade Organization was a crucial event for transatlantic relations, for trans-Pacific relations, for the global economy at large. That was followed by a deepening of U.S. economic engagement in the region, foremost led by the negotiation of the Korea-U.S. Retreat Agreement, also agreements with other countries that laid the foundation for the establishment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was first launched at the endpoint of the Bush administration in September of 2008, but other things were happening in 2008 that economists took greater note of. And so it wasn't until the financial crisis had stabilized, the U.S. economy had stabilized, that the Obama administration was able to pick up the baton that had fallen and start the renewed negotiations of a Trans-Pacific Partnership. Europe, at the same time, had been well behind and started emulating the United States only about in the mid-2000s, 2005, 2006, and was very successful in emulating the KORUS FTA and actually implementing it before the KORUS agreement entered into force because of difficulties here in Washington. Europe has had less success, however, with other countries in Asia, and so I think part of the problem looking at this is Europe had been lagging behind, and yet after the financial crisis, both the United States and Europe needed an economic boost, and a boost that didn't come from just saying, well, we're going to increase our joint efforts working together to deal with Asia, but how could we work together to improve our efficiency and productivity of our economies so that we would be more competitive and therefore be able to play a bigger role in the growing Asian economies? And I think that, in a sense, is the economic pivot that I was trying to talk about in the chapter that I wrote. The T-TIP is an important part of that. It was founded on the thoughtful deliberations and recommendations of the high-level working group on jobs and growth that issued its report and led to the launching of the negotiations. The focus of those negotiations are boosting economic growth and jobs in the United States and in Europe with the view that if we have healthier economies, if we have greater productivity in our economies, then we will be able to play a bigger role and have more influence in the global economy. That's crucial. And doing so means that the US and European officials need to look at the restrictions, both traditional trade and broader regulatory policies, that unduly add to transaction costs that impede transatlantic trade and investment. That's what the negotiations are all about. We have already the biggest commercial, bilateral commercial relationship in the world, and yet we can do much, much better and become more competitive and therefore improve our footprint in global markets, including in Asia. That's the challenge that the TIP negotiators have. It depends importantly on the willingness of US and European officials to change existing policies. If we don't agree that we can improve what we're already doing, there's not going to be a great scope for improving the efficiency and productivity of our firms and workers. So there's great opportunity to do much better, but there's also a political challenge because some of those policies have strong vested political interests. If I could have one more minute, Mr. Chairman. I think it's important to note that the economic dimension though, and working together on the economic side in TTIP underscores the importance of having a broader alliance and deepening and reinforcing the already crucial alliance that we have with Europe. And that's been shown very readily with regard to the crisis in Ukraine. We need to work together very closely to address this, both on medium term energy supply and distribution issues, which will have a broad economic benefit for our economies, but also will help rebalance some of the vulnerabilities on the strategic side. But we also have to deal with short term measures to discourage further Russian expansionism. And that's much more difficult because the European economy is much more dependent on trade with Russia has much greater, 10 times greater foreign investment in the Russian economy than the United States and therefore is much more vulnerable to disruptive sanctions that would affect European production and employment. We need to keep that in mind as we build our partnership. We need to find ways of working together to ensure that the transatlantic pivot includes a deepening of the transatlantic comedy. And I think the many chapters in this book will help guide policymakers as they go through these very turbulent times. Thank you very much. Jeff, thank you very much. I'm gonna open it up for questions now, but I just did want to note that as you listened to administration officials, you will hear the word rebalancing. You will also note that when President Obama talks about it, he talks about the pivot. He's a basketball player. The pivot is a basketball term. I play basketball too, and I know that when one pivots, you keep a foot on the ground. That's your pivot foot. And you keep your balance. And you are able in a pivoting situation in basketball to turn quickly and be agile and move in any direction that you need to move in. So in some ways, I think President Obama really understands this policy well. Okay, with that little caveat, let me open it up to some questions. I'll maybe take two or three over here first, then over there. And if you could bring the, just identify yourself, please. Hi, thank you for the panel. My name is Dina Lee. I'm with the Atlantic Council's Brands Co-Crop Center, and I have a question for Mr. Scott. Can you elaborate on the way to coordinate the TTIP negotiation and the TPP negotiation, both of which are really like the two largest trade negotiation in the world? Thank you. So what was the specific question? How to coordinate the TTIP. How to coordinate the two, right? Okay. Okay, over here. Yes, I'm Iris Drows, committee on Eastern Europe and Russian and NATO. All of us are talking the same thing, not to set Pacific against Atlantic. And yet it seems to me the only one up there, the only one today who has given a language that can overcome that is the chair of this session who spoke of trilateral, a single word, instead of two separate words, Europe, Asia, Atlantic, Pacific. It seems to me that's crucially important to come up with a language that will unite these rather than dividing them. There are other words. There's First World. There's OECD. There's Industrial Democracies. But it's extremely important to change the language in this. I think it's very valuable to think of Asia as two places. Third World Asia or China-oriented Asia or Continental Asia as the Japanese call it, or Maritime First World, Western-oriented Asia. Those are two separate things much more different from each other than First World Pacific is from First World Atlantic. And if one looks historically, Australia and New Zealand were always part of the Atlantic grouping. OECD has existed for 30 years now, 40 years, 50 years. It's very sad that we don't have an effective language which unites these and we allow these to be played against each other. The competition should be seen more like the competition between Mediterranean NATO and Nordic NATO. Asia's growth should be seen as an extension wing of the Atlantic rather than a competing wing against it. I hope that people can be invented with language. That's my question. Let me take one or two more and maybe the panelists could take notes and answer the ones if you want to focus. Ma'am, yes. Thank you. My name is Jinning Wang with Voice of Vietnamese Americans. I come back to the point that Dr. Cronin brought up Indo-Pacific. And whether you see the Indo-Pacific placed in with the transatlantic pivot to Asia, whether India played in the TPP potentially, maybe in the long term, but in the current trade, and as a connection between the TTIP and the TPP, do you think from the TTIP point of view, the TPA is important? Because in 2002, we did have the TPA, the Trade Promotion Authority was given to the president at the time, which is helpful in the WTO case. So you think we should somehow ask the US Congress to promote the TPA? Thank you. Okay, maybe one more question if we have one. Over here, please. Yes, Dave, his general retired foreign service. I'd like to pick up on the point that Victor Chao mentioned about a possible US role in dealing with some of the history issues in East Asia. And I'm not quite sure what that role could be, but I was wondering how the European participants here might view a US role in resolving historical issues in Europe. I don't recall that there was such a role that France and Germany took the leads on that. I was wondering whether we would have problems in Europe if we tried to play any role on dealing with historical issues there, given our own experiences with Europe. I think we would have similar problems in Asia given our own involvement in the way that the Second World War ended with atomic bombings and Victor's justice. I'd like to comment on that. Let me perhaps go down the line and see which ones you'd like to take starting with, Merym? Well, perhaps very briefly on the last question. Sure. Yeah. Would European countries be prepared for a US role for historic, to help solving historic issues on the European continent? And whether that would work also in Asia? I think that the, well, but I cannot speak for the US, but I can imagine that the US is perfectly fine when partners can do it for themselves. But if there is an offer to facilitate and the partners are willing to take that on, I see that there would be a possibility for the US to play a role in that respect. I believe that in many cases, we have felt that it was useful, look at European history. I mean, there was, at a certain point, with the building of the European Union and the integration of the European Union, we helped overcome problems between some of the individual member states that brought us stability and security and prosperity. But at the same time, this could not have been done, I believe, was there not a role from outside and the preparedness from outside, notably from the US, to play a constructive role in that part. Okay. Let me pick up on the history question, first of all. I mean, yesterday on The Washington Post, the China Daily insert was, front page headline was all about Nanjing survivors, the Nanjing massacre. Obviously, it didn't just happen. So the fact that they're putting it in the newspaper in The Washington Post today suggests that maybe there's an issue here, as Victor Charles suggested. And I think there is a role for Europe to play, but it's not necessarily for governments to necessarily lead on. It's for universities and the civil society to help raise the standards of understanding and the common understanding. That's where this is vital because of rising nationalism in Asia. Nationalism is different in different places and Chinese nationalism is being driven and sort of is a driver of policy in some ways that could be very negative. But in Japan and Korea, the nationalism there is limiting opportunities. It's an opportunity cost in terms of cooperation. That's why it was so important for the president to put his arm around his two good friends, President Park and Prime Minister Abe, in the Hague, and say, look, let's get together and start making some progress on this relationship. And I think as a result of that right now, quietly, there is a deal being worked out. I hope it's true by the end of this year that Japanese and Korean governments will make some progress on this sex slave comfort women issue, which is one of the thorniest issues. And if that's the case, then it paves the way for a summit meeting, paves the way for defense cooperation, which is needed for dealing with Korean peninsula. I think language, by the way, is very important. Trilateral is an important new opportunity and it's in this book with some great recommendations. But we have to recognize this is the proverbial noodle bowl of many overlapping sets of relations and institutions. And there are lots of ways that European countries, the EU, Europe and North America can play together in this region and must play. The final point would simply be to note that in the Singapore Straits Times, my Oxford classmate Jonathan Isle wrote a very dispeptic piece on the Obama rebalancing policy. This is sort of old European think, as far as I'm concerned, in terms of raising questions about accusing the United States essentially of budget cutting, masquerading as strategy, is the phrase he used. Yes, I would look at it just the opposite, which is to say, because we live with fiscal austerity, we have to be more intelligent about our strategy. And we're thinking about these long-term trends that we talked about, the security maintenance and the order building in the Indo-Pacific. So this is a vision of a strategy, the beginning of it. It didn't come out a whole cloth new, but it is the latest iteration of this US policy. And now we've got an opportunity in this transatlantic pivot to do it together. Victor? In terms of views on Asia, the gap between the US and Europe, whether there's a common language. So I'm not an expert on Europe, but I have always found both in government and outside of government that the gap has not been on economic trade or business issues. The gap has always been on the strategic issues, where the United States fundamentally sees Asia as a region of strategic importance. And for Europe, while some may view that, it just doesn't permeate the policy like it does in the United States. On history, I guess when I said that it's a challenge for the pivot, I think it is a challenge. It's not necessarily advocating that the United States must play a role to resolve all these disputes, because first of all, I don't think they can't play that role. And secondly, these issues are never going to be resolved. I mean, history is never easily resolvable. Having said that, I think the administration does have to deal with the fact that we are so-called pivoting to Asia. And the number one issue right now is the inability of our two allies, two key allies, Japan and Korea, to work together. So there's something that the United States has to do. And I would say, I would argue on these sorts of issues, the status quo is changing in terms of what the Koreans and the Japanese are doing on the history issues. The status quo is changing. And in terms of very slowly, the United States is also moving off the status quo in terms of how it responds to these things. Making statements, critical statements of the Japanese prime minister going to Yasukuni Shrine, or encouraging in the way that they've done active cooperation between the two. I entirely agree with Patrick that often where a lot of this work can be done, or a lot of the ground can be made. Software is through track 1.5, track 2, these sorts of things I think are very important. To me, the primary obstacle in looking at the European example, and here I have done some work, the primary difference between Europe and Asia in terms of history is that in Asia, unlike in Europe, in all countries, it is still not domestically politically legitimate to seek historical reconciliation. That's the big gap that I see. And can the United States help in that role? I don't know. But I think as an analyst, that to me would be the thing that we have to look at and work on. And the United States, the role it can play, I mean, the thing we have to understand is that, and for Asianists, we've heard this all the time, most of the countries in Asia view the United States or trust the United States more than they trust each other. And so in that sense, the United States is in a very central role. And if this is the central problem, it's hard to see how these two things don't have to meet in some fashion. Well, all the questions are very interesting. And I'd like to comment on all of them, but I'll just focus on the specific economically oriented one, otherwise I'll take too much time. The first question was a very astute one about coordination of TTIP and TPP. Actually, those initiatives are inherently coordinated. They have common roots. If you think about the basic structure of those agreements, it starts from the common experience that the United States and Europe have had with constructing a free trade agreement with Korea. That provides a large part of the sort of boilerplate of a TTIP, but it also demarks areas where we each worked with Korea. There were limitations based on a more traditional trade agreement. We could go further because of the richness and complexity of our commercial relationship. And so we can build on that experience. And the coordination occurs almost naturally. Now, that has important implications. And I won't use the word trilateral because trilateral is not the right word. The right word is global or multilateral. Because if you have the TTIP and the TPP with a common agenda for broadening economic interactions, then you're covering and you have more and more countries in Asia who are thinking about joining the TPP because of the incentive that that agreement will have for their own economic reform and productivity growth. And that includes Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, and also possibly China. China's been working very hard looking very closely on how it could use TPP to advance its desire for economic reform at home. And while that's not politically on the radar screen for this year or next year, things happen very fast in Asia. Things change very quickly. And so it's conceivable that even within this decade, one could see Chinese requests to participate in TPP and in willingness to undertake TPP-type reforms. That would have sounded idiotic just two years ago. Maybe some of you still think it is. But it is in the realm of possible policy reform. If you do that, then who is left out of this trilateral relationship while working on a common platform of economic reform? And it's the poorest countries. It's the countries of Africa, some Latin American countries, some countries in South Asia. And so it's almost an imperative to coordinate efforts in the TPP and TTIP and find common ground to bring those mega-regionals and find precedents to restore proper multilateral negotiation in Geneva. That's the challenge that WTO countries are facing this year in trying to build on the mega-regionals and restore a constructive WTO negotiating agenda. And hopefully they will do that and that will bring in India and the others. Jeff, thank you very much. Just my own comment on the notion of trilateralism. I think you're probably right in the economic sphere. The goal is to globalize these sets of free trade agreements. But in the broader sense, we use the word trilateralism in the subtitle of the book because we wanted to get away from this notion of the United States or the United States and Europe together sort of imposing or engaging too heavily in Asia. This and the chapter in the book that we have written by our Asian colleagues about Asian institutions and sensitivities just underlined for me the importance of doing this thing very carefully. That if we're going to engage this way, it's very important that we figure out which Asian institutions, ASEAN, and others we plug into. That requires a great deal of consultation in advance and a great deal of cooperation among our friends and allies in Asia. So hence this notion of trilateralism. It gets you away from this sense of, you know, are coming in and imposing. So with that, and I will also note that we have Michael Schaefer here with us who has just come from a Trilateral Commission meeting. So you may want to address this when you have a chance. All right, is Derek here? All right, so I sort of hesitate to let the group go for a coffee break. Well, why don't we take a sort of a five minute break? I think we probably ought to wrap it up here. Let's take a five minute but no longer break in place and please join me in thanking this panel.