 Welcome to ThinkTech on Spectrum OC16, Hawaii's weekly newscast on things that matter to tech and to Hawaii. I'm Jay Fidel. In our show this time, we'll take you to the 40th annual Paul Chung Memorial Lecture presented at the Waikiki Prince Hotel by PAMI, the Pacific Asian Management Institute at the Shidler College of Business. The event featured remarks by Tom Fargo, retired United States Navy Admiral, about U.S. foreign policy in Asia Pacific. Following a distinguished career in the United States Navy and the Department of Defense, Admiral Fargo transitioned to corporate leadership in 2005. He is presently chairman of Huntington Ingalls Industries, America's largest military shipbuilder. He also serves on the boards of Hawaiian Electric Industries, Matson, the Greenbrier Companies and USAA. Admiral Fargo is active in the Hawaii community, serving on the boards of the Japan America Society of Hawaii, the Friends of Hawaii Charities, the Ilani School Board of Governors, and the Hawaii State Junior Golf Association. Previously, he held leadership positions at Trex Enterprises, Lehman & Company, and Hawaii Superfery. Admiral Fargo completed his military career as the 20th officer to hold the position of commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, PAKOM. As a senior U.S. military commander in East Asia and in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, he led America's largest unified command and directed the operations of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force across 100 million square miles. The Paul Chung Memorial Lecture was well attended by community leaders who wanted to hear what Admiral Fargo had to say about American foreign policy in Asia Pacific, and particularly with respect to North Korea, which is so important and threatening these days. Shirley Daniel of the Pacific Asian Management Institute introduced the 40th Paul Chung Lecture and Admiral Fargo. The Pacific Asian Management Institute was founded 40 years ago in 1977 by Dr. Paul Chung, who was an economics professor at the University of Hawaii, Manoa-Scheider College of Business. Dr. Chung foresaw many changes in global economic conditions and business and realized how important the Asia Pacific region was going to become to Hawaii and to the U.S. Our vital interests are in Asia, and of course, indicating some fashion that Asia deserved all of our time, attention, and resources, at least the bulk of them, if we were going to ensure our economic prosperity. As true as that is and has been, we have gotten distracted by the Middle East in every single administration. Bush 41, it was the first Gulf War. With Clinton, it was the years containing Saddam, southern no-fly zones, northern no-fly zones, protecting the Kurds, 1998 I guess it was, I commanded the Tomahawk cruise missile strike into Iraq for my headquarters in Bahrain. Bush 43, it was 9-11 in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and when the Clinton administration came into power, they articulated the same view with a different emphasis. And that emphasis was that we need to keep our focus on Asia, and the way that we're going to do that is through a pivot to Asia, which was later renamed the Rebalance. Now let me be clear, I think that policy was absolutely directionally correct and still is, but it had some issues. Europeans, of course, didn't like it because they knew that national security resources on the Obama administration were going to be a zero-sum game, and of course, it had implications that would diminish NATO. Chinese didn't like it because they thought this was clearly part of a containment or an encirclement strategy of China, and our allies in Asia and the Pacific were a little confused. Despite the huge commitment of people and resources to Iraq and Afghanistan over this period of time, we've done a pretty good job of continuing to maintain the same level of military engagement and our exercise. And in fact, force levels of permanently stationed forces essentially remain the same during this period of time. We actually increased the submarine levels by moving three submarines to Guam. So in fact, we never left. Whereas the Defense and Prime Minister of Singapore, a good friend, said to me, why didn't you just call it the reaffirmation of our policy to Asia? Despite the name, it was good policy, good initiative, and the Rebalance was much more than military strategy that you normally read about. The military component got the bulk of the attention because we said we would have 60% of our forces in Asia and the Pacific. For you math majors, you'll recognize clearly that 60% of a diminishing force structure is about the same number of ships and people. But we made a commitment to station our most capable forces in the Pacific, and we have done that and it's ongoing. Horses like the F-22s that you have at Hickam, the Virginia class submarines that you have in Pearl Harbor. And we maintain our commitment to a new force posture and footprint throughout Asia that recognized that Southeast Asia was a growing part of our important national security issues and ought to be recognized as such. The diplomatic component was very important in my view and also very well done by the Obama administration. Especially in the first term when Hillary Clinton was the Secretary of State, cabinet members would claim Clinton and Gates early in that part of the administration and later Panetta and Carter, they were all the different regional events, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Shangri-La Dialogue, the East Asian Summit. Presidential visits took place in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Including a very notable one to Indonesia. So they really did walk the talk on the pivot to Asia and that engagement. I think Secretary Clinton spoke twice at the East West Senator in that period of time and addressed major policy issues with respect to Asia. And of course APEC was held here in Hawaii. It was a major difference by that administration. The Middle East Wars had previously absorbed all the time and attention of the cabinet members and probably properly so. But now we were starting to get back to what we knew to be fundamental issues of our national policy. Fell off a little bit under Secretary Kerry because of his focus on the Middle East peace treaty and Russia and of course the Iranian deal. But all in all, the very solid performance was must appreciated by our friends and allies in Asia. Maybe not so much by China because I would tell you Hillary was pretty tough on China during that period of time. The third component was the economic, the economic principles that we were gonna move into this new period of time with. And it was centered on trade. Principal vehicle of that of course was the Trans-Pacific Partnership or TPP. It was in my view hugely important to the rebalance for its credibility, its substance beyond the military and its messaging to all our Asian partners. Trade agreements are hard. I mean we know they're hard. This one was broad and inclusive except of course China. It took a huge amount of work and political sacrifice and political capital among the members to gain agreement. And of course now, the TPP appears to be in the dustbin as result of domestic political politics. From a national security standpoint, it leaves a vacuum that China will certainly fill and matter of fact, they have filled it. They're working on their own trade agreements right now. Along with the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which is their version of the International Monetary Fund. These are all soft power initiatives that have been very effective to bolster their position within the region. It's demise weakens our relationship with our allies and dilutes our message of a long term commitment to the region. From a policy standpoint, it's not yet clear what's gonna replace TPP. New bilateral agreements are a possibility. They won't be easy on either end of the deal. And as we heard this week, we're struggling to rewrite the five-year-old US-Korean free trade agreement. From a standpoint of Hawaii, this is just not helpful. None of the industries that might gain protection reside here. And of course, prices for us will go up. I mean, I don't know how many of you own a Hyundai or a Samsung Galaxy Note 7 or maybe even a Note 8 coming up. But it's not gonna help Hawaii. This is probably an appropriate point in time to talk further about China. I'm certainly not a China basher. Probably probably made six visits to China in the last decade. And I believe it's very important to build our relationship with China, both on a civilian and a military level. I think on the majority of international issues, our interests are gonna intersect in a very positive way. Our economic interests certainly, critical security interests like North Korea. And the fundamental stability within Asia Pacific, which has promoted the prosperity in the region, especially in China. It's always good to remember that despite the tremendous growth of the Chinese economy and the prosperity of many, there are still another one billion Chinese that haven't benefited from the Shanghai Miracle. On the other hand, I don't believe China merits a free pass on behavior. That's outside the norms of international law. Intimidates their neighbors or fails to meet the basic standards of human rights. Next is pretty clear to me that China has a strategy, I mean a clear strategy. And that strategy includes building a navy that comports with their view as the preeminent regional power, some would say hegemony. That navy will help protect their free flow of natural resources, which they are securing throughout the world to fuel their economy. Also, you've seen the infrastructure investment in other countries in the South China Sea, creating trade dependencies, which is something that we're gonna see in greater frequency as we move forward. And here's a key word, using cyber and space for military, intelligence, and especially commercial gains, especially as it relates to intellectual property theft. There isn't enough time to go into the South China Sea and the East China Sea and those situations. But suffice it to say that their behavior makes their neighbors really nervous. Nervous from a standpoint that many believe China is pushing to establish a new order in Asia where they make all the rules and call all the shots. A friend of mine with deep Chinese roots the other day told me, no country wants to be a vassal of China. From a policy standpoint, what our friends and allies need to see from the United States is commitment and consistency. That means commitment to freedom of navigation, free trade, international law that defines the territorial seas and our exclusive economic zones. And they expect our continued presence at at least our current levels and hopefully something that exceeds that with full engagement. Of course, the bedrock is the support of our alliances. Our alliances with Japan, with Korea, with Australia, with Thailand, and the Philippines. Many of you that have been to Taiwan recognize that this is a vibrant two-party democracy, its fundamental institutions and political processes represent much of what we have advocated around the world. It would be a mistake and a terrible signal to back away from Taiwan. It is key to how Xi Jinping sees his legacy. And hopefully a slide provides a feel for the Belt and Road. Its objective is to solidify China's emergence as a great economic and military power as it expands its markets into new territories and especially those markets in Europe. There's other collateral benefits as China moves west, including physical security, as I said earlier, in regions that have been problematic, opportunities to meet energy needs in places like Central Asia and attracting investment and expanding global influence through a soft power approach. By moving west, it also doesn't butt up directly against the United States' interests, but it does provide a different model of development than we have used in the past, including very large infrastructure projects. So I would ask you all to stay tuned and as you can imagine, India is not a big fan of the Belt and the Road Initiative. Time to talk about Korea, since it seems to be in the news today. Henry Kissinger last month in an op-ed piece summed up our current situation, I'll read it. He said, for more than 30 years the world's response to North Korea's nuclear program has combined condemnation with procrastination. Pyongyang's reckless conduct is deplored. Warnings are issued that its evolution toward weaponization will prove unacceptable, yet its nuclear program has only accelerated. Yes, we've been kicking this can to the right, and that doesn't mean good people like our own Jim Kelly here, who's the Assistant Secretary of Asia, have not made valiant efforts. It's an intractable conflict with an extremely difficult leader. Kissinger went on to say, if Kim Jong-un maintains a nuclear program against the opposition of China and the United States and a unanimous Security Council resolution, it will alter the geo-strategic relationship among the principal players. If Pyongyang develops a full-scale nuclear capability, while the world dithers, it will seriously diminish the credibility of the United States nuclear umbrella in Asia, especially from our allies in Tokyo and Seoul. Since those sanctions were approved by the UN, and after the op-ed I just quoted, you're all clear where that North Korea has launched a missile over northern Japan and detonated a much larger nuclear weapon, and has claimed it's a hydrogen bomb. Now, I don't know whether it's actually a hydrogen bomb or not, but the size of the detonation matters, and for the most part, in my experience, Kim Jong-il has said in the past about his nuclear weapons program has proven true. The brief calm from the resolution of the crisis surrounding the rhetoric over a strike on Guam seems long since gone, and reminded that this remains, without a doubt, our most immediate national security threat. As an aside, I thought the current national security team, I did a very good job on Guam, the Guam crisis, and their strong UN resolution with Russia and China signing up clearly breaks new ground. The real challenge remains ahead. Some like Lieutenant General Dan Leif, who you may know, who ran the Asian Pacific Center for the last number of years, have argued in an award-winning essay actually that he wrote for the Oslo Center for Humanitarian Dialogue that it will take the very best minds of all parties to pull together a federated approach on all of the long-standing issues on the Korean Peninsula, as opposed to a single-point solution. Those are clearly the denuclearization, the armistice. We have never signed a peace treaty with North Korea, and by we, I mean the UN and the United States. The reconciliation, territorial claims, just to name a few. I wish I'd sent out the Kissinger article as required reason for this session. That's normally what you do in college, right? Because it's the clearest articulation of not only the threat to the U.S. and our allies, but the geostrategic implications of our current and future policy and position in Asia. So if you want to read it, Wall Street Journal August 7th. If you want to read Dan Lee's article, we'll get you that also. There are some things that you need to know about China. China is absolutely key to the resolution, but not just the terms of applying pressure on sanctions to North Korea. They have to play a much larger role than just squeezing North Korea. They'll have to be a partner with the United States and both a short-term and a long-term outcome on the Korean Peninsula. As much as our objectives are aligned on the demuclearization of North Korea, there are long-term issues related to the future status of the peninsula that are clearly important to China. Other points, obviously Japan and South Korea have a huge stake. Both are under immediate threat from the North, North Korea's ability to reign soul with chemical weapons through artillery that are hardened in sites north of Seoul is a constant factor in all military options. Well, not in anyone's interest, especially China. An unwanted outcome could be a nuclear Japan and a nuclear South Korea, for that matter. And it's difficult in a few words to emphasize how a nuclear Japan would be viewed on the Asian mainland. So I guess it's time for me to vote here, here are my thoughts. It's hard for me to come up with a scenario where Kim gives up his entire nuclear capability. It's just central to his survival and that of the Kim dynasty. Job one, of course, for Kim is staying in power and my sense is that he believes in both an external threat, that's us and our allies, and an internal threat, that's his own people, that maintaining a nuclear capability is absolutely essential. He does recognize that an attack on the U.S. or our allies or our territories will do exactly what secretaries Mattis and Tillerson have made clear. He would suffer a massive military attack and he and his regime would be gone. Because of the dynamic of staying in power and if you believe he is rational, which I do, there's an argument in my belief that he's deterable, both strategically and conventionally. I don't know whether he's weaponized an intercontinental ballistic missile yet, but no doubt he can and he will be able to do so in a relatively short order. I'm in the view and this is not a view that's shared by everybody and including some of my colleagues that sanctions can be put in place and can be effective. I've seen in my time where, especially the financial sanctions that dry up his cash and access to currency from offshore banks and other sources have made him look at an opportunity to come back to the table. And of course, we all know how a sanctions regime is. It's only as good as the back door and that back door is controlled by China. China has its hands on the energy valve and a concerted effort from the UN and the rest of the world I believe he will come to the table. Given what I've said, what are the possible outcomes? Probably some version of three. First, you live with it on the belief that you can deter him in the same manner that we have deterred other nuclear powers like Russia and China. I think that would be a terrible outcome. And as indicated earlier, it changes our geostrategic position in Asia and institutionalizes a nuclear threat. Second, he comes to the negotiating table and a deal is struck. Some very senior defense experts that I've talked to have opined that a deal might be something like this. He rolls back his program substantially, however, not completely eliminates his nuclear capability. However, something, however, that nuclear capability would be something well within our current ability to defend both the United States and our allies with great confidence. In exchange, he gets peace treaty, recognition, and an assurance on regime change. All would require very extensive international oversight. And last, the third potential scenario, he refuses to be a nuclearizer and negotiate, and we can't live with that state, which puts, of course, military options in play. Thanks to Admiral Fargo and PAMI for including ThinkTech in this program. We look forward to the next annual Paul Chung lecture next year. Needless to say, it's important that we all keep current on American foreign policy in Asia Pacific, especially now. This talk was a valuable contribution to the public conversation on that subject, and consistent with the long-standing efforts of PAMI and the Shardler College of Business to raise global awareness in Hawaii. And now let's take a look at our ThinkTech schedule of events going forward. ThinkTech streams its talk shows and remote broadcasts live on the Internet from 11 a.m. to 5 p.m. on weekdays. Then we stream our earlier shows all night long, and some people watch them all night long. If you missed a show or if you want to replay or share any of our shows, they're all archived on demand on thinktecawaii.com and YouTube. For our audio stream, go to thinktecawaii.com slash radio. And we post all our programs as podcasts on iTunes, all for you. Visit thinktecawaii.com for our weekly calendar and live stream and YouTube links. Or better yet, sign up in our email list and get the daily docket of our upcoming shows. ThinkTech has a high-tech green screen studio at Pioneer Plaza. If you want to see it or be part of our live audience or if you want to participate in our programs, contact shows at thinktecawaii.com. Go ahead, give us a thumbs up on YouTube or send us a tweet at thinktechhi. We'd like to know how you feel about the issues and events that affect our lives together in these islands. We want to stay in touch with you. We'd like you to stay in touch with us. Let's think together. Let's go back to wrap up this week's edition of ThinkTech. But first, we want to thank our underwriters. A grateful thanks to our underwriters. The Annie Sinclair Knudsen Memorial Fund. The Atherton Family Foundation. The Bernice and Conrad Bonham Fund. Castle and Cook Hawaii. The Center for Microbial Oceanography Research and Education. Collateral Analytics. The Cook Foundation. The Hawaii Community Foundation. The Hawaii Council of Associations of Apartment Order. Hawaii Energy. The Hawaii Energy Policy Forum. The Hawaii Institute for Geophysics and Planetology. Hawaiian Electric Company. Gaelin Ho of BAE Systems. Hameha Meha Schools. Integrated Security Technologies. Carol Mun Lee and the Friends of ThinkTech. The Omediar Ohana Fund. The Shidler Family Foundation. The Sydney Stern Memorial Trust. Yuriko J. Sugimura. Thanks also to our viewers like you. Okay, that wraps up this week's edition of ThinkTech. Remember, you can watch ThinkTech on Spectrum OC16 several times every week. For additional times, check out OC16.tv. For lots more ThinkTech videos and for underwriting and sponsorship opportunities on ThinkTech, visit ThinkTechHawaii.com. Be a host or a guest, a producer or an intern and help us reach and have an impact on Hawaii. Thanks for being part of our ThinkTech family and for supporting our open discussion of tech, energy, diversification and global awareness in Hawaii. You can watch this show throughout the week and tune in next Sunday evening for our next important weekly episode. I'm Jay Fiedel.