 My name is Rory Medcarth. I'm the head of the National Security College here at the Australian National University. I should say here virtually of course and it's a real pleasure to host a really not only distinguished but I think dynamic panel that you're going to listen to and engage with over the next 90 minutes. Our topic of course is India's future. The shape and character of India's future, India as India, India in the world, India in the Indo-Pacific and of course India's relations with Australia and in a moment I'll introduce our panel to you before I begin. As his customary I'll acknowledge the traditional owners of the land that we are recording from here in Canberra today, the Ngunnawal people and pay respects to their elders past present and emerging. So the discussion that we have for you as I said is going to be looking in a very wide-ranging way at India's future and we'll certainly get to some pretty sharp questions I hope on what India's trajectory means for Australia and for Australia's interests. To discuss this topic and really I hope can test ideas we have three speakers who between them I think encompass a breadth of experience and expertise on India. We have two Indian experts too. I won't necessarily say young or emerging because they're already very high-impact voices in India's policy debate. We have Ritika Pasi who is with the Observer Research Foundation arguably India's most influential and effective think tank. Certainly India's largest I think and most established think tank across foreign and security policy and I note that Ritika also has an affiliation this year with the Perth US Asia Center in Western Australia as an Indo-Pacific fellow. We have Dr Konstantino Xavier who and Konstantino is with the Brookings Institution but within India he's with the Center for Social and Economic Progress which I understand has a relationship with the Brookings India or what was the Brookings India initiative but now stands very much on its own feet and Konstantino has had a lot of impact across the debate not only on Indian foreign policy but on the perspectives of new generations of Indian thinkers and we have Harinda Siddhu. I guess it would be traditional in some countries to call Harinda a High Commissioner Siddhu because although she's not serving head of mission at the moment Harinda was the Australian High Commissioner to New Delhi quite recently I think before our current High Commissioner Barry O'Farrell and therefore had a key role I think in the strengthening of the Australia-India relationship. Harinda of course has a distinguished career across the Australian public service and is now Deputy Secretary in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Chief Operating Officer there. So we've got three great speakers for you and what I want to do before I go to discussion among our panel and certainly questions and engagement from the participants is put a couple of framing questions to each of you. Now as I've said we want to range pretty widely so we certainly want to look at India as a foreign policy actor and we want to look at India as a power in the Indo-Pacific and globally. Ritika going to you first if I may it would be great to hear from you and and in due course from Constantino as well what I would call a next generation question or a next generation sense or sensibility about really India's role in its world in the world India's strategic vision its role and its interests as a power in the in the Indo-Pacific and I'd especially be interested in your views on what should India's priorities and ambitions be in this region. Thank you Professor Medcalf. Good morning from Delhi. This is my first interaction with ACLF. Thank you to Richard for the kind invitation and I'm delighted to be participating today in the excellent company of my co-panelists and moderator. I think you'd be hard pressed to find an Indian today that isn't more confident about its promise and potential on the global stage particularly in the context of Indo-Pacific and I'd like to address the opening questions and by by by elaborating on what I see are the roles that India is seeking to play in the mid to short in the short to mid run in the Indo-Pacific. I see it positioning itself in a couple of ways and these are not mutually exclusive in fact they will be and are being played concurrently across different areas of engagement. The first role that I see India playing is based on its status as a middle power and its need to to balance China given growing differences I think last year of course was a watershed moment in India China ties and this points to a greater trend line towards engaging with the West with the US and its allies certainly as it seeks to compensate for its own deficits at present through partnerships and external balancing but I think it's important to point out that presently that the objective of this balancing is towards a multi-polar Indo-Pacific as middle players like India rise and pursue agency. India's bilaterals across the Indo-Pacific whether it is with the Gulf countries UAE for example or with ASEAN or with the major powers or with US or of course the Quad and Quad countries but also its intensifying mini-lateral and plurilateral engagement I think is proof positive of this pursuit for a networked multi-polar space in the in the Indo-Pacific and therefore we have a Jai or an India Australia France but we also have an India Australia Indonesia the Quad of course but also the SEO which assumes greater importance now in the wake of Afghanistan and sub-regional configurations such as the the Colombo security dispensation which brings together India and its Indian ocean neighbors. The key objective call it strategic autonomy but I think a better way to think about it is an opportunity for India to increase its maneuvering space and its foreign policy to ensure a multi-polar Asia a free open and inclusive Indo-Pacific both of which will allow India maximum options for growth development security at home. I think the second role that India is seeking to play is in service of its ambition to be a leading power to be a rule setter and I think we have seen India playing a greater role in terms of providing regional public goods but also as a convener for example it's HADR in the space of HADR whether in terms of India's naval capacities strengthening naval capacities or in terms of it leading the platform the coalition for disaster resilient infrastructure whether it is in the space of connectivity specifically infrastructure diplomacy and I'd argue that even as India does not have a globe span and connectivity vision akin to a China's Belt and Road initiative or now the G7's built back better world proposal that India still has a solid frame for increasing regional infrastructure diplomacy and of course it's steadily increasing a development assistance program and development partnership. I think it's also interesting to note here that it's seeking to actively co-opt a broader range of countries to participate in emerging governance architecture in the Indo-Pacific and here I'd like to call out or bring to attention the Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative. It cuts across seven pillars from maritime security to maritime biodiversity to transport and infrastructure. Japan and Australia have indicated and signed on to the IPOI and it remains to be seen what shape it takes going forward but I think India's intellectual leadership would be hard to dismiss in the space of the Indo-Pacific. I think it's also critical to note however that India is able to play this role as being able to provide regional public goods because of its successes and experiences at home so it is able to with France platform the International Solar Alliance because of its own success in deploying solar energy at home and this I think I'd like to briefly now just end with one obvious I think point that needs to be said here that relates to this exact point of its success and development at home is that there is a concern which I think would which should not be sidelined that as India strives to play a balancing role in the pursuit of a multi-polar Asia and Indo-Pacific that as India pursues its leadership ambitions in this Indo-Pacific and it's immediate Indian Ocean and broader Indo-Pacific region that it runs the risk of also being in absent power in some respects and here I think India's track record with respect to developing trade and investment ties is witness or is testament to this huge gap and therefore the role that it can play in shaping the economic infrastructure of Indo-Pacific which is going to be an increasingly important component of of course realizing the potential of the space that India inhabits and COVID-19 has only brought these challenges to the fore but it has to be stated that these gaps in India's growth and development existed before COVID and therefore it now depends on whether a flurry of Indian initiatives that have been that that we now talk about whether it's Akman Nairkar or the national infrastructure pipeline or now India's India's engagement in trying to achieve many FTAs with a number of countries how well it fairs here in order to build its material human economic military capacity in order to be able to play the two roles that I've mapped out before. There's a lot there thank you and I think that already brings some of our audience perhaps out of a familiar zone where we don't necessarily think of India as a provider of public goods in the region. I would challenge you on one point there to begin with though and that is you know we've seen what a dreadful impact the pandemic had in India this year particularly in those awful months in sort of April, May, June where the Delta variant was really at its height as far as we could see in India and I guess many of us would say well has that thrown India off course with this more ambitious regional agenda how is that going from your perspective? As I've mentioned COVID-19 has definitely brought to the fore glaring gaps whether it's in terms of its the dependence on an informal economy whether it is the gaps in social and digital infrastructure in India but I think that like for many countries in across the world COVID-19 definitely delays India's aspirations but I began with saying that I think that India has a level of confidence that perhaps hasn't been witnessed up till now and I think there is a at least there is a drive to have the inputs in place what those inputs manifest into what outcomes these inputs manifest into whether it's in terms of expressing a desire and wanting to change labor to codify India's various labor laws into force specific to streamline them for example or this recognition of needing to deliver better to deliver faster. While this recognition exists I think now with COVID with the increasing tensions with China this is actually India's window of opportunity to prove to itself but also to its neighborhood and its partners that it can be a reliable partner and power in the in the Indo-Pacific and I would actually turn this around maybe it is because I'm a little bit of an optimist but I would like to say that I believe that this could be a real opportunity if India does get its domestic act together and if it does focus on the long-term consequences of its actions today instead of short-term electoral gains for instance. Thank you that's fantastic really sets the scene and I'm going to build on that with Konstantino a couple of questions for you and feel free to agree or disagree with your co-panelists you know I think one of the one of the joys of policy engagement with India is that argument is built into the conversation so that's what democracy sounds like but I want to ask you Konstantino about democracy actually you know about the character of Indian society, India's political system, Indian democracy and how that plays into the expectations that many of us are now placing on India's greater role in the region and the world and you know it's no surprise or secret that some friends of India watching India over the past few years are asking questions about the character of Indian democracy about whether there's growing liberalism what that means for India as a power in the world so it'd be useful if you could connect some of those threads for us you know how do you see the the landscape of the nature of India's political system changing or not and how does that play into India's role in the Indo-Pacific and I guess just to frame all of that you know a lot of us who look at the China balancing role that India and many countries are playing also ask ourselves is this balancing going to be in terms of shared values or shared interests and if so how do we how do we frame it thank you Rory wonderful to be here at the ACL forum also together with Harinder and Ritika and let's try to disagree let's try to make this as Indian as possible and and and have a good other and a good discussion full of divergent points of view you know Rory let me break this down in three points your question one is India's democracy backsliding is it suffering should partners around the world concern be concerned about that you know I let me let me give it counterintuitive and provocative of this I actually think India is more democratic than ever and that is exactly a challenge and a threat and what I mean is that if you look at India's democracy over the last 10 to 20 years it's actually reaching records level record levels of participation we saw this in Prime Minister Modi's re-election in 2019 it's not easy to get re-elected to be larger mandate which is exactly what his party managed with a record voter turnout a record number of women voting minorities so across the spectrum Indian society is mobilizing is becoming more vocal is joining political institutions this is a very young country with an average age of around 27 or 30s so you have really three revolutions in progress in this country let's not forget this is a country that only opened up its economy in 1991 we're into a year 30 of some very timid economic reforms still so that's a major economic transition where people have ambitions aspirations India's GDP per capita is around $2,000 American dollars that's five times less than China that's 33 zero times less than Singapore you have a variety of social groups that are mobilizing lower caste groups different social economic regional groups all of this is leading to turbulence and therefore why I see that actually is a healthy sign of participation of joining the system it's also leading to stress to challenges to illiberalism to populism to nationalism to a variety of course I think what we call non-democratic let's say illiberal movements that also I think nurturing or it's the feeding of this transition and you know if you look at this it's not so different from the larger movements we've seen happening in the United States in Brazil in Europe I'd say even to some extent in Australia so the challenges are the same but I'd say in India it's just a much larger country it's going much more faster it's a more recent more rapid deeper transformation that this country is going through but I think we should keep in mind that there's a categorical difference between India and dementia China for example India today is a function in democracy it's one of the most formidable experiments in democracy in the developing world 1,400 million people voting joining the systems with an independent rule of law a civilian supremacy of the military which we don't see in all parts of Asia secularism federalism so I think that's that's important and we should keep that in mind in the larger schemes. Number two, will India join a democratic bloc or alliances I think Rory's done a lot of work on this this is an idea that the Quad for example the US Japan India and Australia have somehow now a democratic bloc I see this in the sense that I think values have always been there India's always been a democracy they don't determine India's strategic alignments but they facilitate they make it easier I think for India to work with Australia with Japan with the US with European countries you know India's foreign minister I believe is I think speaking as part of this forum later today had this wonderful expression where someone asked him what alliances that you're going to choose the Americans the Russians you need the Quad Japan and he said comfort is the new commitment now comfort denotes I think a certain ideological tendency that you're comfortable with systems that are similar to you countries that speak the same language the same political language the same values and I'd say that's coming out quite clearly in India's strategic for example on data governance you know how do you develop a new framework new legislation that balances privacy between competing imperatives from the state citizens and the market on this you see India clearly for example having a very strong dialogue with the European Union on data privacy I don't see India discussing data privacy and legislation with the Chinese or the Russians so I think on the Quad for example again Rory you've been doing a lot of work and Australia has been taking the initiative on this on tech technology is not just a neutral fungible element right there's a strong normative element to how you regulate tech how do you use tech how do you apply tech and I think there's a different framework again that India shares with fellow democracies and does not share for example with China let me end on the last point is India really therefore a reliable democratic partner I think Rory you pinged me about this in your in your email prior to the session and let me just bring this up also because I think well here again I'd say yes and no India is reliable in terms of an architecture that tries to balance China in India today you don't hear any more the debate about is China a problem these days you discuss how to deal with problem China that is the great Indian debate but second on the other hand I think in India no one is under the illusion that you can afford to alienate isolate you know completely sort of marginalize China from the international economy international system and that's where I think all countries have the same dilemma how do you sort of deal with China how do you develop coalitions of like-minded partners like the Quad for example that try to shape the incentives for China to change its feeling and there India certainly playing ball with Australia and with fellow democracies to try to change the structure that has been actually quite permissive for China to take on I'd say a more aggressive assertive role in particular in Asia thank you Constantine I'm glad you've you've really opened up the China question there because of course one thing I'd like to come back to is that India-China relationship we all saw I think with you know with some really shock and concern the bloodshed last year in the Golan Valley and we've seen the you know the risk of confrontation worsening there so I'd like to come back to that China factor but I am glad that you've noted a few other things I'm glad that you've reminded us that we do indeed have Indian external affairs minister Jay Shankar as the keynote speaker for the forum in fact giving the Crawl Federation I should say later on this evening Canberra time you've also I think noted a couple of important points about the scale of Indian democracy and just for Australian listeners who perhaps don't fully fully comprehend what we're talking about here it always astounds me that every Indian national election is by definition the largest exercise in democracy in history each time it grows it also I think it is worth noting that India has an electoral commission that is pretty defiantly independent and I know that electoral organizations or institutions around the world look with a certain degree of envy at what India has I suspect the United States does or should in that regard and I like to remind my students that India has more democratically elected politicians than the rest of the world put together if you count local government panchayaks and so forth so there is something on scale there that is very difficult to comprehend and I'm really you know pleased and intrigued as well the way that you've you've really offered that that that that counterpoint to the the narrative that there's an inevitable illiberalism but let's keep that conversation open and instead I might now go to Harinda to Harinda sit who for your views having heard both what you've heard today Harinda but also building on your experience your long observation of India your you know your intensive role there is as high commissioner how do you see the I guess the realistic ambitions for the Australia-India relationship across the full spectrum from economics to security to technology to society in question that's a very big question thank you Rory I have to say just bouncing off Konstantino's last point about democracy I observed you know all around me the Indian election in 2019 and I think as an Australian it's really staggering to be in the midst of that and to see Indian democracy in action in that way and in that scale it truly is a remarkable thing to see and it really stays with me as the bedrock of my optimism about India I am an Indian India optimist I'm not a starry eyed one but I think that when you think about the sorts of things we've been talking about Ritika's point about how you know all Konstantino's about how it's only since 1991 which is not that long ago that India's economic opening happened when you look at the bilateral relationship what you're looking at is a dramatic transformation in what has been a fairly short space of time in just the last few years we've gone from having it's always been a good relationship but to something that has accelerated beyond I think if I think back to when I first took up my role in 2016 in New Delhi I think I would have been amazed to consider where we are now the quad is up and running it was you know in 2016 a really highly contested thing but it's not just up and running it is thriving it is deepening the levels of trust and confidence amongst the the four countries is very strong it has certainly brought Australia and India closer together despite all the naysayers Australia participated in Malabar exercise last year and is likely to do so again this year there's been a level of intensity in the bilateral contact between our ministers and leaders at a level that I think we have not seen at any time in the um in Australia India history and of course the the crowning glory in a way was the virtual summit that took place last year between the two prime ministers and the signing off of the comprehensive strategic partnership so we have aligned strategic interests as as my colleagues co-panelists have mentioned we really very much see the world I to I we come at things in a very similar way between Australia and India because of the fact that we are democracies I do think that the growth in the Indian diaspora in Australia is a it helps the focus I think on India I think you can over egg what a diaspora can deliver but certainly that it does ground the relationship very importantly from the Australian perspective and also from the Indian perspective because Indians now have relatives in Australia they have much more textured sense of what Australia is I think that that all of that gives you great grounds for optimism but there's a couple of things to bear in mind one is that we really do have to guard against um overreach and complacency and I think that those are the things that that carry risks for us and so by that I mean essentially on the complacency front taking India a little bit for granted I and taking each other for granted just assuming that because these fundamentals are in place we don't necessarily need to attend to them and to nurture them we really do need to maintain effort to sustain and develop the relationships and then there's an issue right overreach and and that really goes to a point that I think Peter Varghese made when he wrote his uh India economic strategy he sort of he pointed out that we should not we should take India in its own terms that India is not the next China it is a qualitatively different relationship and I think we should not place more on the India relationship than it can actually deliver this means we need to see the relationship very clearly and we need to work with what we have and what we can realistically achieve in the relationship to ask too much of each other I think runs a real risk of failure and I don't mean that in any sense of dampening ambition but I'm just saying you can achieve a great deal but we should be really clear about where we can where we can get to and finally I just wanted to make the point that relationships are two-way things one thing that happens certainly from my perspective as an Australian diplomat and an Australian former High Commissioner is that you tend to focus very much on what it is Australia can do but actually it also does require India to come to the party as well and so both of us have to move in the same direction both of us need to do the work to understand each other and to build a relationship but I see that happening I see that happening in both directions in a very considered and cooperative way between the two countries and of course we'll all have our bumps and scrape up against each other but the trend line is you know progressing it's forward-looking and it's very very positive so I'll just leave it there. Thank you Harinda I'm going to just come back to you very briefly on the economic relationship if I may because you know one really striking feature of the overall relationship in recent years I think is how substantial and pronounced the security relationship has become and as someone who you know in my original engagement with India 20 years ago working on security issues being posted to Delhi at a time when our relationship was not so great you know and in a security context a nuclear context that I think you know is very much history now I've been really impressed by how closely we found that security convergence and that's great but in the sense it's overtaken the economic complementarities or it's sometimes seems it has so you've mentioned the Peter Varghese report and Peter Varghese's great work in that regard we've noticed Tony Abbott in India recently and we've heard some pretty positive messages about formalising the economic relationship but we also know about I guess the difficulties of anything resembling a true FDA politically in India so I'd love a little bit more specificity about I guess where you see the economic opportunities. Yes thank you isn't it interesting that you're opened up by pointing to the dominance of the strategic relationship and I think that that in its own right illustrates how India is different to the typical relationship that Australia forms in our region which has always been led by the economic and trade relationship and that goes I think to the fact that it is a qualitatively different place there is a qualitatively different set of drivers and I don't think we should fret too much about the fact that the strategic relationship has taken the front running here but I do agree that we're not going to get to an enduring relationship unless we also follow that up with a substantial economic relationship now we can fret about how you know the economic relationship is insubstantial but again that is compared to what we did see some slippage but at the time when I was in India you know India was already our fourth or fifth largest trading partners it was in the top five it's still it's a very significant relationship it slipped last year because of the economics of course and it may slip further again but I have no doubt it will recover what we have to accept is that the size and the shape of our economic relationship with India will be unique and it will be different we're not going to get a replication I don't think with India of what we have with China we're one or two commodities just entirely drive the economic relationship what we will have is a very large trading and investment relationship and this is a point that Peter Varghese made which is the relationship won't only be trade led it will also be investment there'll be a significant investment component to the economic relationship and it will become it'll be across a number of sectors and in sectors that we don't usually consider as you know leading economic sectors such as education which is of course very large part of the relationship I think will continue to be a large part of the relationship so the India economic strategy I think was pitched well it recognized the importance of having a free trade agreement but it also recognized that the entirety of an economic relationship doesn't rest only in a free trade agreement so you can look at all these components that actually build the economic relationship we've got the seeker the free trade agreement work that is now looking like it's moving forward again we've got the India economic strategy that reminds us that there are many other dimensions to the economic relationship and we've also got the specific economic commitments that came out of the comprehensive strategic partnership which actually look at the economic relationship being integral to the strategic relationship so look we will get a large economic relationship we already have a large economic relationship it will just look different from what we might expect thank you and that's a good point which to remind participants to start lining up your questions please either raising your hands or preferably lining up written questions in the q&a with your name we can come back to you I can see that it's a it's a pretty high-powered group observing or participating in this conversation so I want to hear from many of you but I'm going to ask one last question of our other two panelists before we go to the group's questions and that really goes back to the youth factor I guess to the you know the average age in India as we've said is so young and I know I know longer can keep pace with the statistics over you know the precise or the approximate number of Indians under the age of 25 or 27 but it's you know it's in the hundreds of millions larger than most other countries on earth and what young Indians think about the world I think is extraordinarily important and is a question that often hasn't been asked systematically in the past Ritika I know that your think tank or if did an opinion poll recently on this and I'm not going to put you on the spot with any exact statistics from that unless you have them to hand but it would be just interesting to hear from you first and then from Konstantino about whether you think younger Indians on balance have a different worldview than the one that you know many of us you know who imagine the India of the 20th century would have from what I recall and because from what I recall of the youth survey that or brought out one I think it's an excellent step that or undertook such a study in the first place but from what I recall and I think this is also this is also reflected in a lot of my own conversations with my peers which is that there is a greater I think as Tina already made the point that you know today there's no question about whether China is a problematic neighbor the the question is how do we manage this problematic neighbor I think that sea change has actually bled over into the youth population and I and because of this also then there is the importance that the Indian youth today see in for example pursuing ties with the U.S. it ranks high in countries that the Indian youth today being important for India to engage with. Funnily enough I here I want to mention the points that Master Sims raised about education because Australia actually ranks pretty high in terms of I think one of the points about you know which countries do you think are important for India and Australia actually I think was for Indians and I think Australia ranked above Russia and in the EU I think and I strongly believe it was definitely because of the education ties that that India and Australia have between them so I think the sort of old adage you know there's been this foreign minister talks about you know dispensing with the old dogmas of the past and I think that the the the younger population which is going to we're going to peak our working age population is going to peak by about 2045 here's another statistic to add um uh there's a greater recognition that opportunity lies in a range of countries including the west and they're not particularly tied to this sense of wanting to not partner with the U.S. I think those older um uh those hesitations or traditional hesitations will not implicate the younger generation to the same degree as they did um or as they yeah as they did um our policymakers up till now and I think um under for the last five six seven years increasing outreach India's increasing foreign policy outreach has actually opened up a larger vista for India's youth to engage with whether it's in terms of education but also in terms of business opportunities to think that you know India today has instituted a working group um to discuss trade and investment potential between India and Uzbekistan you know at one point you'd be like why is it necessary where is Uzbekistan but I think as India is is is also um trying to form a a networked architecture of partnerships it is also opening it is also exposing um younger the younger generations to more opportunities abroad and so I think it's not going to be as constrained by the traditional dogmas of the past fantastic thank you and I'll um I'll go to uh Tino and then I just want to add a couple of other reflections Tino uh thanks Rory I think uh just to follow up on her interest I think I think extremely important point on the sort of um two-way street between Indian Australia and how the economics and trade investments pillar has been progressing in absolute terms but is relatively weaker compared to the security one I would say more than strategic what we're talking about is the defense and security cooperation between India and Australia which is phenomenal and I think across the board a phenomenal progress in the bilateral relationship but I think in India now what we see is a very state-led openness you hear the noise about uh self-reliance economic protectionism which by the way again is similar across the board worldwide there's nothing exceptional about India but what's happening which is slightly different from the past is that the Indian government I think is trying to securitize and strategize its trade and economics relations with various partners that means pushing back on China which is still India's largest trade partner we saw that last year with a variety of new investment screening mechanisms and trying to reduce India's dependence on China second we see this through this whole business Rory you've been involved and many others in Australia on critical supply chains where really the Indian government is going sector by sector saying here we have to work with the Japanese here we have to work with the Thais here with the Australians here with the Europeans he's a sort of a very strategic government led policy which has its drawbacks obviously especially if into classical economics and believe in a purely traditional free trade strategy and third element is the private sector the government is working very closely with very big private sector plays in India that are tying up with their fellow private sector partners in other countries and pushing through specific agendas of investments and trade and special sort of supply chains there so I think that sets India apart currently from the past on the new generation three quick departures Rory one is the China threat it surprises me whenever I speak to young people anecdotally but whenever I also engage with the younger generation of Indian diplomats Indian administrators Indian military officers there is today a centrality of China threat which was not there despite having fought a war in 1962 and these having been you know enemy states for many decades today that salience is centerpiece in the new generation strategic worldview number two economic opens the younger generations in India today unlike previous generations see economic interdependence connectivity the language of business and transactionalism has been in India's interest unlike the past so they're that openness towards openness is I think again a secondary culture and finally nationalism and this is going to be integrated you have today not so different from the Chinese approach and of course I'm caveatting with this with two different models two different systems but the sense that this is India's moment that India needs to push back that India needs to educate and correct Westerners about India that India needs to push and articulate better its own narrative about its democracy about its right role in the in world institutions in its right place and that is going to be an irritant because there are younger people that's coming particularly from the youth today that is saying this is our moment and we're not going to put up with a variety of biases and perceptions and we need to push back and that is going to affect the India's relations with a variety of partners including Australia. Thanks for that Tina and I'd note again from the opinion polling that I've seen the RF poll and and indeed some polling that I conducted a number of years ago in a different role in India there has been that pretty extraordinary shift you know Pakistan is still there as a source of concern and threat perception and I imagine and I would like to come to this before the end of our conversation at some point that the the calamity in Afghanistan is going to you know reinforce those concerns in India so you know there is a question as to how well can India now balance all of the risks around its periphery but I have seen you know I have seen a lot of evidence of that generational shift we've got a couple of questions I think coming in from some of the audience or some of the participants so I will go to them but I will come back to you all as we go along firstly I might go to a question from High Commissioner Manpreet Vohra so I might read out the High Commissioner's question this is the Indian High Commissioner in Canberra recently arrived and it's really great to have you with us High Commissioner your question if Australia's relations with China were to improve again what would the impact on the way Australia looks sorry what would be the impact on the way Australia looks at the value from India or other new partners now I wonder that's a question for all of you I guess but it goes to a larger question as well and I think it's whether Australia's relations with China somehow stabilise in the near term and I must say from hearing the Australian Treasurer's remarks this morning to this conference I don't anticipate that happening anytime soon for those relationships that relationship to become somewhat more harmonious but it goes to the question of to what extent are Australia and India positing their closer partnership on the fact that we're both having our own sets of problems with China so I will put the High Commissioner's question to the three of you but I'm also interested in the question of you know what if India manages to find its own new equilibrium with China what happens then we'll go in order Ritika first that's actually a great question I think perhaps you know I've mentioned that this is India's sort of window of opportunity right Constino put it another way where he said that you know we recognise the the the sort of potential that shift that we're seeing the generational shift that we're seeing right this window of opportunity critically not only rests on India's own ambitions but also the crisis of what I call credibility and viability of the Chinese development model that it has been exporting to other countries principally through its Belt and Road Initiative and I think this is a moment just as it is for India for other countries as well as COVID has brought glaringly to the fore that dominance on any one actor is not in interests of any of the of the taker and therefore in order to ensure greater equilibrium greater reciprocity I think it it behooves it is in the interest of countries like Australia like India to make note of that talking and I'm going to focus specifically in response to the High Commissioner's question I'm going to focus on for example the India-China relationship and the rhetoric is it cannot be business as usual we have crossed a red line because of the loss of lives because of the increasing skirmishes and the expectations effectively of an active border in the coming years at the same time we've also seen for example trade between India and China not actually having had a significant impact between last year and this year outside of of course the pitfalls the economic implications due to COVID the shortages the blockages etc and I think this points to the to how countries like India have to strategize their engagement in view of key objectives which include increased resilience in their trading and their investment major reactions for example canceling I think India canceled a an order a manufacturing order of uniforms from a Chinese supplier of its Indian Olympic teams uniforms if I if I if I recall correctly I mean such knee jerk reactions do not amount to any change in the in the in the trading relationship I think a deeper rethink is required and suddenly enough now I'm going to also step out or cross over to the point about that was made about Indian-Australian relationship not being like that of India of Australia and China's relationship and here I think there is a huge scope China's rise was predicated on it becoming a manufacturing power India does not hold that mantle and is likely to not hold that mantle in the coming in the near future we've got Vietnam and Bangladesh that are just if not more appetizing for companies as they look at China plus one one model of say is they seek to diversify their risks and relocate and I've lost my train of thought oh no um sorry can you just remind me with a thing look so the well the question is I mean I think I don't think I don't think you actually have lost your train of thought because it's it's a pretty rich answer but look I think and I'll I'll go to Tina in a moment come back to you the question is really um to my mind you know what is it that will change the Australia India relationship if Australia finds itself somehow improving its relations with China or if India does if I could just finish I'm so sorry I just I've got my train of thought um what I wanted to say was that absolutely improve your your the the the trading engagement that you have with China but at the same time there are new spaces such as technology such as connectivity infrastructure such as climate change such as innovative technology low-cost development such as solar panels there are new emerging spaces where countries can balance a still strong relationship with China on trade with other partners that's the point that I was right right now thank you and I think um Tina I'd be interested in hearing your view as well and I think the I just would note in passing that you know one of the perceptions in my view a misperception around there has been that somehow um you know the the reasonably confident relationship Australia did have with China maybe 10 or 15 years ago was an impediment to relations with India I mean is it really all going to be so zero some so I think uh High Commissioner Boris hitting the nail on the head in terms of his addressing a critical issue of trust and reliability between a variety of partners in this case India and Australia I think Harinder is the best person placed to reply to this question but let me attempt one proposition which is Ronnie what you hinted at I get this exact same question from the opposite sense I'm asked repeatedly by Japanese officials Southeast Asian Asian European officials Bangladeshi or Nepali officials is India reliable in terms of really pushing it back to China are you really going to play this out in the wrong term are you here to protect us when you know things heat up again from various perspectives right different countries different interests but all of them suffer from the same concern you know where do we how do we distribute our eggs into different baskets and how reliable is the Indian basket if we put our eggs into that if we do more security cooperation more naval exercises if we enter a particular trade agreement with India that China's not going to be happy about so I would say just to maybe the realist to me will say no one is reliable no one is trustworthy I hope the practitioners in the room will agree with me in the end it really falls to them but and here's the button in terms of what Ritika has been hit I think stressing countries are watching countries expect more from India and Australia and I think in that sense the India-Australia relationship has become much more reliable as an indicator as I think a larger signpost for several countries that are observing this turbulence in Asia strategic rivalry in competition and that beyond strategy and security want developmental alternatives focused often on democratic solutions that's where I think the ideological thing matters the fact that India and Australia will offer different technological developmental digital solutions to these countries multilateral solutions than China or other actors and even the United States has a different approach in many ways so I think every bilateral partnership trilateral quadrilateral biolatership in the Pacific has its own DNA its own usp to equip these countries to navigate this greater turbulence and no one will in the end really rely on one or the other or third or fourth I think the proliferation of institutions the mini-laterals Rory you've again worked on so much that proliferation is a healthy indicator of greater alternatives in the end of the Pacific today. Thanks Tino Harinda how much would you like to say on this question of reliability? I think Australia is very reliable is that the right answer? So I just wanted to just go to this question because I do want to challenge the premise that sits underneath that question which is that there is only one driver for the relationship that seems to be a premise which is a shared concern about China and the second is an assumption that these relationships go forward with the greatest respect to the High Commission I'm just sort of being a little bit sketchy here but that it's transactional and I don't think that that's what the High Commission intends in this question but I can see how some people might read it that way so what I want to be really clear about is that I think we both we all understand that foreign policy is a long-term game I think that you know that there are a number of things that have brought Australia and India closer together in recent times they have to do for example with the with India's growing size of its economy which accelerated quite considerably in the last decade making India a much more attractive economic partner for Australia from Australia's perspective it has to do with India's greater outreach and engagement in the world particularly in recent years the deepening of its relationship with the United States where Australia then naturally feels a greater interest and comfort because we're now all working in similar similar strategic spaces as well so there are multiple things that have brought the relationship together much closer again I don't think these things are zero-sum and certainly the case that all relationships go through their ups and downs and and that there is a space I think for Australia and India which I believe isn't going to be a very enduring relationship out into the long term I think that both sides actually are reliable in that respect because both sides can see that there is a long-term value in investing in this relationship for the long-term future of our regional stability and security and the last thing I want to say is that it's all underpinned by the reframing of our strategic interest as as lying in the Indo-Pacific that's what fundamentally we share that is where the center of gravity I suppose is starting to shift to and both countries in defining that that is our area of primary strategic interest have by by necessity and by by design captured the other country as a key strategic partner in that region thank you Harinda spoken like an analyst and a diplomat I would say I'm going to again push for some questions from the audience who have been surprisingly shy and there are three other participants in this group whose names I have on a little list that I'm going to start prompting in a moment unless they jump in but I note we do have a question in the meantime from Silbo Banerjee so I'll read out Silbo's question if I if I may so Silbo your question an India-Australia relationship that is based on genuine mutual respect needs to be conducted on the basis that both sides of important things to learn from each other it would be great to hear from the panel about some things that Australia should be looking to learn from the contemporary Indian experience so here's your chance colleagues I'll go to Ritika first and then Konstantino and Harinda too I mean what can Australia learn from the Indian experience that's actually a really great question because I think it's often termed into what India can gain in terms of trade or investment from its partners and I think here there is a definitely and I think here one of the the the potentials in terms of India's experience is actually in terms of the youth component right increased engagement with the youth but also in matters of research and development in matters of it low-cost innovation in matters of climate change I think there is a one of India's leadership ambitions when it comes to the global state is to export its developmental solutions around the world and I think here there is some scope for greater engagement to see okay the kind of solutions that Indians are coming up with what kind of climate change problems that they're saying what kind of development experiences India is as to offer to the world and how Australia can partner with India online in this exportation and in this promotion of India's developmental experience particular emphasis on again renewable energy particular emphasis on inclusion digital technology based developmental solutions I think that's an area that is forward looking but also ties together in Australia beyond a conversation of trade and investment in strategic sectors. Thanks Tino what do you think? I think one is a very macro point the other one is the micro one is strategic patience and flexibility but there's one thing that India has consistently brought to the table since the 1950s that is autonomy of its as a territorial integrity of the country economic development the survival and flourishing of the countries we've premised on diversifying its partnerships taking its time keeping flexibility which I think actually the Americans as we see these days have not been very good which is a function of power where you have excess power you're a superpower you can afford to do mistakes absorb the cost pack up your bags and go home which is what the US has done over the last 20 30 years repeatedly. I think India given its very difficult environment threatening in some ways but also unstable diverse in South Asia has learned to be strategically patient flexible not interventionist and working with time and not against time and I think actually current circumstances around the world are forcing all of us to recognize the merits of that patience that flexibility and the limits of power in terms of trying to influence trying to force choices on other countries and I think that that is something Australia could learn from India particularly because Australia obviously came from that I think sort of security line system led by the US the micro point building up on what Ritika was saying is offering developmental solutions to developing countries in the larger Indo-Pacific from the eastern African coast in the ocean region Southeast Asia these are countries that are battling with difficult transitions with competing demands from the Chinese the Americans Indians ASEAN turbulent space I think India has a wonderful track record of equipping institutions training officials in these countries which is really about good governance and sustainable democratic development in the long term so the more I think Australia can work with India doing that the better I think for regional order peace and stability. Thank you Harinda would you like to comment on what we can learn from each other and perhaps what Australia you can learn from the Indian experience. Yes I had a lot of time to think about this because there are many things about India I admired I think when I was then I still do now here's two one is how to deal with plurality goodness me it's a difficult word but if you think about India it's you know 31 states there's a constant negotiation in inside its political system keeping this democracy together keeping the country functioning which you know from observers on the outside you often wonder how it gets done because there are so many actors in the process but Indians are particularly skilled at dealing with that level of diversity and coming up with an outcome if you think about the world we're living in now multi-polar many laterals plural laterals this is the way foreign policy is conducted and I actually think India is very very skilled in doing that they are genuinely able to keep several conversations on the go at the same time and yet arrive at a conclusion understand that you don't need a unitary top-down system in order to achieve outcomes find ways to achieve outcomes and get progress in a very messy environment and I think that that's something I genuinely admire because as Australians I think we have a desire for order but I think Indians have understood how to work in a world that is more complex than that of course we all do but but I think India has a particular skill and the second thing is I think in innovation and Tino just touched on this a minute ago but when I think about it's not both countries are innovative what India is particularly good at is actually delivering innovative solutions in scientific innovation or technology or whatever but at low cost and at scale and you know when you think about the challenges the developing world is going to has now and is going to have in recovering from COVID that I think is a particular thing for the Australian aid program for example that we can genuinely learn and partner with India on. Thank you Harinda I've got two other questions lined up and I should just add Harinda that I reinforced a few of those points from my own observation I think there is a kind of resilience and anti fragility that one encounters in India every day that I think you know we could learn from. We've got some questions from several participants, Brendan Sargent, Natasha Khasam and Cosmo Jones so I'll serve and get to all of you and Brendan I'm going to read out your question first but I'm going to build on your question to bring Afghanistan in as well as I threatened to do earlier. So Brendan Sargent my colleague at ANU former Australian Associate Secretary of Defense asks in Australia we focus on the Indo-Pacific but India has vast interest in Central Asia an area of enormous ferment and change and contest is an Indo-Pacific focus viable in the context of Central Asian challenges does India have enough strategic capability and I think let's put Afghanistan in that question as well Ritika. Exactly my mind went immediately to Afghanistan and this is a challenge not just for India but the broader Asian landscape and indeed a challenge for counter-terrorism at the global level and I think that India necessarily because of its geographies of course implicated and currently does not actually have the necessary leverage to participate in conversations that are happening about Afghanistan that include Russia and China and Turkey and Iran and of course the traditional Western powers but that India is trying to create space for itself and I think it's a very fluid situation I think it's too early to say which direction India is going to go in which direction any of the other powers are going to go in the regional players are going to go in with respect to Afghanistan and that is a challenge that India of course has to address at the same time I do not think it's going to come at the cost of the Indo-Pacific vision. India has made institutional changes for example creating the Indo-Pacific division and its Ministry of External Affairs there is the narrative beyond the rhetoric even its poor lateral engagements increasingly signify an increased attention to and engagement within the ambit of this vision of an open and free and inclusive Indo-Pacific I think that will the two are not going to come at the cost of each other and this goes to the point exactly of what the speaker mentioned about the flexibility and the Indian capacity to deal with multiple issues India is still dealing with COVID and yet the number of foreign policy interactions that India held virtually yes to discuss the response to COVID but also to strengthen existing bilaterals and trilaterals is testament to the fact that India is not going to be hamstrung by in fact in fact one could actually argue that the Afghanistan challenge actually fits or actually becomes a key part of India's drive for a multi-polar Asia in the sense that it wants to be included in these conversations and it's going to create space for itself fingers crossed in a way that it's able to secure its territory and sovereignty. Thanks Tano. Well I think on Central Asia there's only one big debate you see in India which is always is the Indo-Pacific maritime sort of outlook and everything else northwards and eastwards is continental belt and road Shanghai cooperation organization Russia China India so this I think that's one school of thought in India I'm of a different view I think the Indo-Pacific and I think that's the mainstream thinking within the Indian government is not about the territorial dimension of the Indo-Pacific I actually think the Indo-Pacific is really a signaling device between India and its partners about the future order provocatively I sometimes say that even Brazil or Senegal have a stake in the Indo-Pacific just to make the point that the Indo-Pacific may be immediately about the change in order among multi-polar less multi-polar order in Asia Asia Pacific Indo-Pacific in that territorial dimension but the Indo-Pacific and India's long-term orientation towards that idea of the Indo-Pacific is actually how to manage the rise of China the relative decline of the US compared to 20 years ago and a system in transition and I don't think there's a big difference there between what happens at seas and what happens in the hinterland up in the mountains in Afghanistan or Central Asia India is equally concerned about stability and order I think in both those fields thanks Tina and I couldn't personally agree with you that much more I fear and I do think the Indo-Pacific is more than a geographic expression but I would say that wouldn't I it is about multi-polarity and I'd note that of course that the the road in the Belt and Road is in fact a maritime silk road so you know China is not thinking of an either or either Harinda do you want to touch on this question I'm quite happy to go to the other questions we've got three more lined up so I'll let would you like to just address this or not yeah I don't think there's much more I can add I think you know Tina and Ritika have pretty much covered it you know your foreign policy interests are very large they're not confined to the Indo-Pacific or anywhere however you might want to define them and I think India is a sophisticated and mature power so we can certainly manage those so I'll just leave it at that thanks great well we've got three questions left in the Q&A box and we've got about 19 minutes I believe so what I'm going to do is I'm actually going to read all three questions out and I'm going to let each of each panelist choose whether they wish to address any of the questions you must must address at least one but I'm quite happy for you to take this as a bit of a smorgasbord because they're three excellent and quite diverse questions the first one is from Natasha Kasam from the Lowy Institute and Natasha goes back I guess with some more fidelity to those questions about democracy and liberalism and she notes specifically that Australian foreign policy has increasingly been focused on democracy and she notes that recently according to our PM Liberal Democracy but at the same time Freedom House has recently downgraded India from free to partly free that's free and partly free with capital letters is it the idea or is the idea of values based foreign policy from Australia or even from the US or others I would say is that a limitation accordingly on the relationship with India the second question that I'll go to was actually from Gareth Evans from the former Chancellor of the University and of course as former Australian Foreign Minister and much else besides and Gareth still plays a vital role in this dialogue but Gareth's question is really I think quite apposite for those of you who work in think tanks especially and he says what's the value or the value added potential of second track institutions especially the Australia India Institute which is just appointed former Senator Lisa Singh as its new head and that is a great appointment I would say I'd note of course that the ANU is another great second track institution but what is the value of second track institutions in building the relationship and then finally we go to Cosmo Jones who's a student at ANU and Cosmo asks other than engagement for the sake of engagement what does the panel think should be the specific long-term strategic goals of the Quad and he notes especially what's the potential on the economic or geoeconomic side so there's your smorgasbord I'll go to you one at a time for answers to one or more of those questions and perhaps any final observations you'd like to make Ritika um all right these are excellent questions and I'm going to very very briefly just respond to two of them but first on value-based foreign policy I think yes there is a danger of falling into rhetoric more than pragmatic delivery on the ground having said that I think it is an important part of delivery of any foreign policy any country's foreign policy just as the US emphasizes the importance of democracies working together especially you know in the larger context yes of the US China strategic rivalry I think we all understand a little bit of conceit that's embedded within within such proclamations at the same time there can also be a positive value addition particularly in defining what contributions countries are seeking to make in their engagements and I think for India it is showcased exemplarily or an exemplary case in point is effectively India's bid for a consultative collective response to developmental challenges for itself in its region with its neighborhood and its emphasis for example on demand-centric development partnership India is not without its own value-based propositions in its foreign policy delivery and the important thing I think to notice here is that instead of a narrower definition of what comprises a democracy and what doesn't given the domestic tensions we're witnessing not only in India but also in several countries in the European Union also in the US I think the broader what on the debate of values I think the broader the way that I look at it is these can be principles of engagement whether they relate to for example the need for transparent economic engagement respect for sovereignty striving to create free and open global commons free of navigation these necessarily do not translate into the same alignments on specific issues but I think that broader rubric definitely cars out the positive contributions that these that that India and like-minded countries are seeking to play yes this must be accompanied by delivery but there is a value here to basing to describing these these principles of engagement the second question that I wanted to very briefly answer was with respect to the quad and I think here I'm actually going to continue use my previous answer it's a springboard for this the quad has to be a has to have a positive contribution longer term no one can deny that there is a greater bilateral trilateral and of course within the quad format increased military engagement trust and greater drive towards operate towards military operationalized and operationalization among the armed forces of these these these countries but at the same time this should not it would be a very narrow lens through which to view the utility of the quad particularly given the fact that the quad has firmly founded its footing beyond just the security role its engagement the three working groups that is instituted whether it is for high tech whether it is on climate change or whether it is to meet the more immediate need of providing vaccines to south asia and these are positive contributions that the quad can make we're still waiting for steps to be taken on the vaccine manufacturing for example but delays in such positive contributions that are not necessarily always strictly security based but I think in showcasing that engagement can exist under the parameters of ensuring a free and open navigation in the end of Pacific I think that should be the the focus of the quad of down the road thank you very much for that contribution that's um there's a lot there and I think the the broad vision of the quad is something that will all take away from that and I'd note to Tino and Harinda there was a second half to Garrett Evans question there that I left out which was not only what should the role of these tractor institutions be but in particular uh on what agenda which issues whether it's soft security hard security economics technology so any any more um precision you can give to that would be great um but Tino over to you thank you Rory three three points trying to address the whole variety of great questions to Natasha's I think um to build on what Hirinder had shared before I think we would have a very um limited perspective of what's happening around the world and in particular between Indian Australia if we just look at the China factor as a single cause of partnerships and similarly if we look at democracy as a single driver of these relationships it's neither or it's both and there's it's many more things economics too let's not forget India is a growing economy that was not you know half the size 10 20 years ago so this is you know many many factors at play and therefore I would refrain from calling these values based relationships these are values facilitated relationships or values um shaped relationships because if it was really values driven we would have had an India allying with Western Europe with NATO with the US with Australia 40 50 years ago which was not the case when India was pretty much proto-allied with the Soviet Union so and I think that holds for everyone right the imperative strategic rational interests come first but the point I've made in my opening statement today was that values make it easy they're the glue that brings the building blocks together in a more sustainable way and I think Indian Australia show that the breadth of diverse relationships you have today between Indian Australian institutions now going to the second question is phenomenal and I think a lot of credit goes to Harinder to Peter Varghese to you roaring to many others on the Indian side too several Indian High Commissioners in Canberra that over the last I'd say you know five to ten years have really revolutionized this relationship and that's something that does not work today between India and China that's something that it's not featured in the India Russia relationship which is an excellent relationship but does not have that strong civil society dimension which is a reflection of two pluralist democratic societies and governments that recognize that as an asset to the future of the relationship so just as a response to I think many democratic partners that have reasons to be concerned about some things in India in fact any government recognizes there's a lot of challenges in India it's the first I mean one to come out and say yeah there are a lot of problems with facing with institutions with managing 1400 people's expectations ambitions different ideological agendas etc 29 states 30 states I think that that's that's all obvious but it's up to these other democratic partners to choose whether they want to take on this sort of moral mantle of superiority and monitor control and say you know India should be doing better on this you must do better on that or if you want to have a productive engagement agenda what a fellow democracy with an exceptional democracy in the developing world it's not just another western democracy but at the heart of Asia and that offers a very distinct better or not time will tell but a distinct model from the Chinese one just to finalize on the quad Rory I've made this recently in my piece an argument that some people sort of I think may have different views on but I this is something I feel very strongly about is that if you look at the countries in Southeast Asia and South Asia the notion the last thing they want is a joint military exercise from the quad in their waters nearby their waters with them sometimes they may be okay with it it decreases their bargaining power with China but the first thing they want is concrete financial developmental economic solutions to strengthen their modernization paths so that's where the quads agenda I'd say 2.0 agenda of the last year of civilianizing the quad I think the critic has mentioned towards critical supply chains tech vaccine diplomacy capacity building connectivity that is truly free and open that is where the solution for the quad lies in the end if you'd say no last word to you Harinda and I am going to change my instructions and request that you do among other things answer the question about track 2 activity good because I was actually going to answer that question so it's interesting that Gareth asked it because I reckon he's got the answer already no I think it's absolutely essential it has actually is the track 2 activity is actually been what has got us here I think the track 2 activity that certainly you led Rory I know I worked with you Tino on this when I was there and even pre before I got there that's what has opened the conversation and built the trust in the system and both systems about us it has allowed us the scope to explore where we can actually have areas of commonality I think the track 2 dialogues that we establish also were the first to pick up in those areas where there was potential to take the relationship forward most significantly Gareth asked about the Australia India Institute people do forget a little bit but when we were accelerating on the seeker negotiations in 2014 and 2015 the Australia India Institute facilitated a lot of dialogue at the working level to explore areas of common interests and actually did support that process so there there is I don't think there's a specific area where you would actually bring the track 2 in but you if you just had a bilateral relationship that was led entirely at the government the government level it's not really a relationship it really has to happen at multiple levels and in fact it is when you see that flourishing of the alternative forms of dialogue of engagement of working together in multiple areas that's when you know you've really got a relationship going so I'll just leave it there I'm conscious for short on time thanks Harinder and I think I'll there's not a lot of wrapping up for me to do I mean this has been a very energizing conversation and you know I think at a time where the world is a place of such great uncertainty or worse I think disruption you know there is damage to credibility of of institutions there's so much to be anxious about at the same time you know I do like to look at India through a lens of some confidence at times that gets shaken but I think it's conversations like this that remind us of some of those fundamental qualities about what makes India not only special but what makes India I think such an important part of not just the geopolitical story but the human story in this century so I want to thank our three participants and sort of note in passing to the observers to the other participants in the event today that we'll share through the secretariat some readings and documents I especially want to share the opinion polls that we've spoken about today because they really do I think open our eyes as to what young India thinks on that note I'm going to wrap us up a minute or two early so that we can prepare for the next session in this really fast moving feast I also want to again thank not only our participants but also encourage everyone to tune in for the Indian External Affairs Minister for the Crawford Oration this evening it's significant achievement for the university that Choshanka has agreed to do this one he's probably quite a busy man I suspect but it's also I think an important signal about the Australia-India relationship so thank you again and on that note I'm going to say goodbye and ask you all to join me in thanking our panellists