 All right. Good morning to those joining us from the United States and good evening to our friends in Asia. Welcome to the United States Institute of Peace and thank you so much for joining us today for this event. My name is Jennifer Statz and I'm the director for East and Southeast Asia programs at USIP. As many of you know, the United States Institute of Peace was founded by Congress in 1984 as a national independent nonpartisan institute dedicated to preventing, mitigating, and resolving violent conflict. We do that through our headquarters in Washington DC but also through our field offices around the world. Of course, one of those field offices is in Yangon and you'll hear more about the terrific work our Myanmar team is doing there in just a few minutes. Today we are excited to publicly launch two recent USIP publications. The first is entitled Why Burma's Peace Everts Have Failed to End Its Internal Wars by Bertol Lindner and the second is called the Arakhan Army in Myanmar. Deadly Conflict Rises in Rakhine State by David Matheson. Both of these reports are available on the USIP website so if you haven't read them yet, I encourage you to download them at usip.org. The authors of those reports are with us here this morning along with two leading peace practitioners, Ying Lao and Mei-U Mutra, to talk about how Myanmar might potentially reset its efforts to address violence within its borders. And with that, let me say thank you again for joining us and I will pass things over to USIP's Country Director and Myanmar, Jason Tower. Thank you, Jennifer, and welcome to all of the participants as well as to our panelists to a really exciting launch event that we have planned here for this morning. As Jennifer said, my name is Jason Tower and I'm the Country Director for USIP's program based in Yangon. The Myanmar program of the Institute has worked on peace and conflict issues in Myanmar since 2012. It works both through our research on what is really Asia's most complex and longest standing conflict as well as through supporting peacebuilding initiatives on the ground. The current programming includes a range of different areas. We have programs that support peace education initiatives that are working both with civil society practitioners on the grounds to offer trainings to teachers in peace education as well as more recent work with the state schools in our country where we're providing trainings to teachers in those schools as well as working on avenues for trying to bring peace education into the national curriculum. There's other aspects of the programming that look at the relationship between investment and conflict. So again, insofar as cross-border investment is a key factor that drives conflict in country. We're trying to better understand how investment plays a role with respect to conflict dynamics and we've published actually quite a few reports on these topics over the past couple of years. A very recent report in July looks at actually illicit investments and the way in which illicit investments particularly in casino cities and in other forms of investments that are set up to host criminal activities are undermining efforts to address peace particularly in Korean state. We have other aspects of our programming that work on security sector particularly around community security and that programming has been quite active around the recent elections that were held in November where we supported dialogue as well as training for security sector stakeholders around election security with an eye towards trying to take steps to help prevent election violence around the 2020 elections that were just held. And then of course we're also sponsoring and commissioning and doing a lot of our own internal research on really a lot of the dynamics that are driving the very complex conflict that you'll be hearing a lot more about here today. And really excited to be able to launch what I think are two really phenomenal studies here this morning. Jennifer's already given a brief introduction to each of the two studies. Just wanting to say a couple of words about both why these two studies as well as about the format for our panel here today. I think the two studies actually complement one another very well. The first of the studies by Bertel Lytner looks at really why the country's peace process has failed to make progress over the past few years at least the current iteration of the peace process. And then it looks deep into history to understand what lessons might be learned by looking at some of the previous failed efforts to try to make peace in countries. So this first paper looks for new paths forward for the country's peace process by deeply exploring its history and I think also identifying in course of doing so a lot of the reasons why the peace process hasn't been able to achieve peace. And then of course the second paper by David Matheson focuses in on the most deadly of the current conflicts in our Rakhine state between the Arakhan army and the Myanmar military which also is I think one of the least understood of Myanmar's current conflicts. Of course the reasons why the conflict has become so intense in Rakhine state a lot of that relates to I think some of the issues that were raised in the first of these papers around the failures of the peace process. But I think really together the two papers do a fantastic job of both explaining where some of the shortfalls are as well as explaining some of the important conflict dynamics that are there which I think are really critical as we think about the post-election period and the the new government that will be coming in to follow. So with that just a few words about our our format here this morning each of the authors will take roughly six to seven minutes to introduce some of the main points and arguments in their respective works touching also on other issues around both Rakhine state and around aspects of ways in which Myanmar might find new approaches to building peace looking forward and then we have also two very well known practitioners who will be offering some additional insights into the two studies and into the themes that are explored in the two studies. So with that I have the honor first of introducing the first of our speakers here this morning. The first speaker will be David Scott Matheson who is a Myanmar based analyst working on conflict peace humanitarian and human rights issues. He was previously a senior researcher at Human Rights Watch based in both Thailand and in Myanmar and he contributes regular articles to publications like the New York Times, Wall Street Journal and many other publications. This is actually the the second report that David has authored for for USIP so it was wonderful to have a second opportunity for the institute to to work with David in the production of this report. So David over to you thank you. Great thank you very much Jason and thank you everyone for joining and to the team at USIP for great support over the past several months in completing this report. I just want to offer three very specific observations both about the report but about the general peace process and ways forward for peace and stability in in Rakhine state. The first one is the rise of the Arakhan army is probably one of the most deadly insurgencies that Myanmar has seen for for quite some time. Being formed 11 years ago in Kachin state up in the north the Arakhan army has drawn on a very deep well I think of of long standing grievances by the ethnic Arakhanese Rakhine community in in in Rakhine state and has slowly pursued a very classical but very also very innovative form of insurgent mobilization by training up in the north and then slowly moving troops down and really engaging the the Myanmar military the Tamador in the central townships the central plains of of Rakhine state over the especially over the past three years and what we've seen over the past three years is is really a sustained level of conflict that has deeply impacted on the civilian population something like 220 000 or so mostly ethnic Arakhanese Rakhine people have been displaced due to that conflict. There have been a reported more than 300 civilian casualties mostly by the Tamador using heavy air power heavy artillery using arson using the kind of tactics that we've seen in many other places around Myanmar over the past 70 years against many other ethnic minorities it says you know standard really quite brutal toolkit of pacification and counterinsurgency that the the the Tamador pursues and I think that that has helped to kind of bridge both long-standing historical grievances on the part of the the Rakhine community that has driven support for the Arakhan army but also driven new avenues of support through these abuses against the civilian population. Secondly why has this insurgency been so sustained and so damaging just at a time you know coincided with the the the growth of the nationwide peace process and the signing of the not exactly nationwide ceasefire agreement in 2005 and I think the AA insurgency and the violence that we've seen over the past five years in Rakhine state first against the Rohingya population of course in 2016 and 2017 but then a war basically against the Rakhine population as well. I think really stands as a rebuke to the to the efficacy of the nationwide ceasefire process and the fact that you have a very long-standing older Rakhine armed group the the Arakhan Liberation Party Arakhan Liberation Army who are one of the signatories to the NCA and sit around the the the peace table talking about peace while a younger more aggressive insurgency has raged over the over the past few years I think really points to deep failings in the way that the government the military and also international support has been directed at that seeking peace in Myanmar and and I think that you know one of the major points is that when you ignore these long-standing grievances from ethnic nationalities around the country you get insurgencies like this when you ignore genuine concerns and the lack of political and social and economic results I think you get insurgencies like the AA and I think that there are broader lessons to be taken from that and looking around the the rest of the country. I mean I'll leave it to other colleagues to talk directly about the NCA and and and other peace processes but to me the Arakhan army really is and in this conflict in Rakhine really is one of the the the main stumbling blocks to to a sustainable nationwide peace that and many other groups that are excluded from the process and then the third point I want to make is that I know that in in Washington and many other capitals around the world the plight of the Rohingya Muslim population has has learned quite rightly they've bloomed very large in in people's perceptions of what's going on in Rakhine state and unfortunately I don't see any positive resolution of the Rohingya crisis in the return of nearly a million refugees from Bangladesh unless you start looking at connecting the the the Arakhan army insurgency and and broader peace and and the rights of the Rohingya and I think that's something that policy makers around the world need to start understanding better and start connecting nationwide ceasefire processes with regional conflicts such as the the AI and then connecting it also with the rights of the Rohingya and kind of seeing all of the these complex connections and seeing that you know many communities are actually suffering in in places like Rakhine and partly due to this lack of understanding of how complex things are and so hopefully more understanding of the AI insurgency and the grievances of many different communities in in Rakhine state will start hopefully kind of signposting directions for a reorientation of the nationwide ceasefire process and and the peace process were large so I'll conclude there and hand it over to other colleagues. Thank you for that David that both got into a lot of the key points in the report as well as offering some of the key suggestions for the international community and for those who are working around the peace process and around issues in Rakhine more broadly. Next, I would like to introduce Mayu Mutraw who will be giving some remarks related to both the paper and to David's presentation here this morning. Mayu co-founded the Going Home Where We Belong program back in 2007 and has worked with Korean and Korean refugees for for many years. She has experiences as an educator working in conflict zones particularly in Korean states as also design programming as well as courses on governance public policy related issues democracy and and human rights and has provided a lot of technical support and guidance especially to the Korean National Union around both the the peace process as well as around some of those other governance related issues. So with that I'd like to hand the floor over to Mayu for some brief remarks. Thanks. Thank you. A few observations from the two reports. First of all, both are excellent reports. I'm sure many of the newcomers and learners of the process and the situation will appreciate the reports very much. First on the arrogant David's report. I think it's important to look at important to to to analyze the Burmese the conflicts in Myanmar taking the holistic holistic approach because if we look at only Rakhine it looks it looks deadly but it is deadly but it is not the only deadly conflict in the country. So I think to if we are going to link that conflict in Rakhine and with the the peace process we would have to look take the holistic approach the overall the country other conflicts complex in other area and I also think that it's there is a danger in not taking holistic approach to analyzing the conflict because we might and intentionally be marginalizing other stakeholders even within that state particular state that we are talking about because it's not I think it's a little bit of over simplification to say that the conflict is between AA and Dhammadal because it's more than that right. And I also think that AA is the only the latest newcomer to the conflict in the state in that state although probably it is the the strongest force to reckon with by far but singling out AA also plays Andrew Burden on the group I think if and it's not also inclusive and if we are going to find solution we would have to find a solution that all inhabitants in the in the state can accept so I think we would like to avoid it be not inclusive. I think also characterizing conflict and it's important the the conflict analysis I think conflict analysis is important to characterize conflict either conflict in Rakhine or elsewhere in the country for the reason that peace process exist. I think to to say that it's grievances it implies something negative I think I think we might also want to say look into look at the the the cause and then the effect is the grievance. So if we look at the cause and effect if we look at it from that perspective then I we might be able to appreciate why we are stuck for example in the peace process right the ongoing peace process now not getting anywhere or not producing any meaningful outcome. So those are a few observations otherwise I think there are some very valuable informations that many of us can appreciate. So with that view I can come to agree with Mr. Lidner's the the conclusion that the holistic view is important and also responding to responding to Rakhine we would have to to to bring Rakhine AA or any anyone in anyone any party to involved in Rakhine state to bring them into peace process we would probably have to refresh start from the fresh to looking at the conflict as a whole the country as a whole. I think it's vital for peace that the ethnic and religious diversity because the diversity is not only in the country as a whole but within the Rakhine state there we can appreciate the diversity in the Rakhine state as well. So those holistic approach to the peace process must also involve the unarmed which I agree with Mr. Lidner that ethnic groups such as ethnic political parties religious institutions women's groups youth groups and other civil societies. So I think if we can foster that we might find some hope for the the the the current the ongoing process to be able to produce meaningful outcome otherwise we have witnessed a process that is not taking us to anywhere that we we originally intended to or at least we anticipated to to get or to see. Last but I think most important we must keep demanding the political will from all actors and particularly from the two powers the the two power groups the the government and the Dhammadal I think pretty much it's in their hands to if they are politically very committed if they really like to move forward in the peace process they can it's this is not rocket science so I think we have to keep demanding the the political will especially from the power groups. So for now that's my observation thank you Jason. Thank you Amio and I think that's also a very good segue into the second report that we're launching here this morning. Just before I introduce Bertel Lidner I just wanted to let all participants know that if you have questions that you'd like to raise to any of the members of the panel or to the whole of the panel you have two ways of doing so. One is you're able to use the hashtag at USIP Rakhine and go ahead and submit your questions through Twitter or you could go to the USIP event webpage and there's a place there to submit your questions. So with that I'd like to go ahead and introduce the author of the second study being watched here this morning Bertel Lidner has covered Burma civil wars and related issues such as Burmese politics and the Golden Triangle the drug trade for nearly 40 years. He was previously a correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review from 1982 to 2004 and he now writes regularly for the Asia Times as well as being the author of many books about Burma civil war and ethnic strife. So Bertel the floor is yours. Thank you very much indeed yes. Well you know when President Thane Stain or then President Thane Stain launched his peace process in 2012 they realized this was eight years ago right? I was often asked by non Burmese that what do you think about the peace process? My answer or my country question was always what do you think makes this peace process different from previous ones? And I thought to my surprise that neither all of them or I would say all of them were unaware of the fact this was not the first time any attempts had been made to end decades of civil war. In fact it was the sixth time in modern Burmese history. The only difference I could see this time was that the involvement of foreign actors and foreign money this is something completely new. And that was why I decided to write this report. I wanted to describe and analyze what happened in the 1950s with the peace parlor in 1963 talks in the 1970s with the MNC in 1980 and then a series of ceasefire agreements which were agreed upon but not signed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Let's see what kind of lessons could possibly be learned from those failed attempts to establish peace. And my report is also a critical look at the present peace process and the so-called nationwide ceasefire agreement that the ethnic armed organizations are supposed to sign before an meaningful political discussion or dialogue can be held. This I always argued it's like putting in the cart before the horse and it's not going to work. The other problem with the NCA, the MNC's ceasefire agreement is the signatories themselves. To date about 10 groups or to be precise 10 groups have signed what they call an NCA but most of them are very small they're tiny of little relevance. Actually Burmese friend of mine once said that if anyone would like to dissolve those groups someone would have to give them some guns first. It's not entirely a joke because it's actually what has happened. Some groups which were absolutely nothing, had nothing before they signed the NCA, now have camps sold as uniforms and even guns. In fact if you look at those 10 groups it's only two that actually have any armor and armor of any significance. There's the current National Union and the Restoration Council of Charles State. Maybe to some extent the new monster party as well. But the other groups are basically irrelevant. And EEO's actually prefer to call them NGAs, I mean non-governmental armies. Representing more than 80% of all non-governmental combatants in Myanmar have not signed the NCA and are likely to do so. So how can this state might be broken and that is what I want to try to address in my report. And my recommendation is to scrap the so-called NCA which only serves to divide the ethnic organizations into so-called signatories and so-called non-signatories. The LPs process anywhere in the world. Normally the government or the central authorities would announce a ceasefire, a non-condition of ceasefire. The armed resistance groups or group would respond, talks would be held, the consensus may be reached and then a political agreement could be signed to end a certain conflict. That is not the case in Myanmar. If we look at the nature of the NCA and especially the way the tomato is interpreting, the meaning of the NCA is actually nothing short of surrender. That makes the present peace process not that different at all of what happened in the past. But that is always being the main problem, the lack of will to compromise, the lack of will to listen to the causes and the grievances of the various armed actors, if you want to call on that. Why they took up arms in the first place and what they're fighting for and how we can find a solution that would satisfy everybody concerned if there is such a solution at all. And my recommendation is also that all these foreign entities which invest millions of dollars into the peace process really have to rethink the strategies to look at the situation more realistically. We cannot go on pretending that there is a process involving 10 armed groups and what is it? Eight groups have not signed. That is not the way forward. It is not helping us find the end solution. So and by all this money that is being poured into the so-called signatories, I would also argue that they're corrupting the whole process. It's becoming industry and that is not good at all. That is very dangerous and it's destructive. And then of course what we have to do is to try to encourage and get everybody involved to engage in a real and genuine dialogue about the future of the country. What kind of country should Myanmar be? That has been the problem since the independence in 1948. Should it be a central controlled state with a very strong government, limited powers to the outlying areas? Or should it be a federal union of basically not quite autonomous but self-governing states and other entities? That is the issue that has to be addressed. That has to be addressed now, not after signing some kind of NCA. But I see this, it may sound very unrealistic, it may not happen, but nevertheless as I see it, it's the only viable way forward if you're ever going to bring the case of civil war to an end. Thank you. That's what I would say. Thank you very much for that, Bertel. In interest of time, I'll go ahead and introduce the fourth of our speakers, certainly not the least. Yinglao will be our final speaker on the panel. Yinglao serves as the deputy director at the Salawian Institute. She was born and raised in Shan State and has extensive experience working around civic engagement as well as on human rights campaigns. She was a member of the federal constitution drafting and coordinating committee and has also been a representative of the Shan Women's Action Network and Women's League of Burma. Yinglao, over to you. You have around five to six minutes. Thank you, Jason. Thanks, USIP for organizing the event and thank you for inviting me and it is an honor to be speaking to all of you together with you, Bertel and David. Please allow me to address the elephant in the room. I'd like to acknowledge that none of us speaking at this event here are from Rakhine State and there's no way for any of us to truly know and understand the suffering and hardship that the people of Rakhine State face every single day over there and it would have been really nice to have some of our Rakhine brothers and sisters to be here with us. I will talk about two issues. I would say they are extremely important issues but with the least power. They are political parties and CBO CSO. We cannot talk about political parties without talking about the recent elections. They are forming concerns that I have regarding to the recent 2020 general elections. The first one is elections irregularities. There have been reports on irregularities during the elections, particularly in Chin State and in Shan State. Many of them have not been resolved. And in addition to that, one month after the election we still don't know how many people were eligible to vote. 36 million or 37 million, it's still not clear. The lack of transparency in voter lists and all of this thing. Then in addition to that, when we look at the media coverage, all the media coverage has undermined the role of non-vermah dominant party. They only report NLD versus USDP. All the results, everything, all the bar, all the graph, all the charge represent NLD and USDP and never really about ethnic political parties or any other non-vermah dominant parties. Similar patents can be found with reports and coverage from INGOs and observers as well. And all of these are paving the way for a central light party, one party system in the country. And in the interest of party democracy, it is very important that we do not undermine the role of opposition parties. None or very few, if any, of these are being reported. And if the role were reversed, would we be silenced about all of this? Made me wonder if we really stand for democracy or we stand for NLD. And it may have been one and the same, but it is no longer the case. The next issue is about the CBO CSO. We know that the oppressed tends to become oppressors. And we shouldn't be surprised. And instead we should be expecting it. And because power corrupt and absolute power corrupt, absolutely. And we should prepare for it. CBO CSO are what will keep governments in check and our pillar for strong democracy. However, we are seeing a lot of growing numbers of arrests of student activists. Just this morning, three Rakhine youth were arrested for organizing a motorbike campaign to raise awareness about international human rights day. During the elections, thousands campaigned for political parties, violated all sorts of guidelines from the Ministry of Health, but no arrests were made. But students who were protesting to end war in Rakhine state and got arrested for endangering the public, narrowing space for media as well as CBO CSO. Also, there are lots of examples of those and incidents of those. Before I run out of time, I'd like to head back to the peace process itself. The purpose of peace-building is not to end civil, not just simply end the civil war, but to also build sustainable peace. The current peace design is so flawed and miscalculated that not only that it would not bring sustainable peace, it has not even been able to end the war anymore. Just today, more than 200 villages in Lampdutangchip in northern Shan State were forced to live their home due to increased fighting and military activities in the area, close to 5,000 IDPs leading toward the elections in Lampdutangchip. The role of political parties has been very limited in the peace process. Most of the negotiations are between the military or the government and the EOs. And parties have very little say. Every time they try to propose anything alternative to whatever the group are saying, they always get the response that, oh, the other two already agree on this issue. We are not open for discussion anymore. It is disappointing to see international institutions that take pride in its value for democracy and peace to embrace the process that undermined the rule of democratic institutions like political parties and CSO. Under the current process, I have a better chance of making my voice heard as an armed force than being a political party or CBO or CSO. Not that being heard would bring anything meaningful. To build peace, to make peace possible, we must address the root cause of the problem. That is the failure of the state to ensure equality among all people and the right of sub-determination for all member states that form this country. Judging from the 60 or so agreements that they have reached in the union report, part one, two, and three, the essence of federalism, equality, and the actual rights to sub-determination is nowhere to be seen. I consulted with some of my mentors on what I plan to say this evening. They warned me to tone down a little bit because I could be considered a peace spoiler for saying all I have just said. I told them that it is the risk I'm willing to take because this is my country. And all my family and relatives live here. Possibility of sustainable peace and stability through the establishment of the federal democratic union isn't just a job for me. It isn't just a subject to learn and to become an expert in. It is the life and death issues and I have the duty to people of this country to speak the truth, to speak my truth. And thank you for your attention. I probably have been a little bit over time. Thank you. Thank you. Very inspiring remarks from Yinglao. I appreciate that. Would like to transition now into the discussion part of the panel. Just a reminder to participants, you can send questions in. We've received quite a few questions already, but you can send questions in either through the events page or via Twitter. I'd like to kind of kick off the discussion really pulling a couple of the threads together both around some of the disappointments with respect to elections outcomes that Yinglao mentioned as well as the point that Mayo mentioned around political will. And I guess the question to put out to the panel for each of the panelists maybe to consider briefly is do we see anything changing in the post elections period when it comes to either political will of the parties to the conflict to trying to find a new way to address some of these issues? And do we also see there being any possibility particularly in the places where elections were canceled for the different stakeholders to come together and to make elections now happen in the time remaining before the new government is seated? Yeah. Can I ask you a question? I think it's very easy. No. Perhaps it does be more of the same. I haven't seen any initiatives worth even considering or thinking about. The time it always changes attitude. The government has not changed its attitude. It talks about a national unity government, but still is a very early status. What is that going to mean in the end anyway? We also have to remember that we're talking about the government and the power that the government detects over sometime next year. It's not really to be in power because real power, actual power remains with the military through the control of the three most important ministries, defense, the home industry, which is internal security and then border affairs that leads very little to the elected government, whoever is there. Then of course an attempt to change this arrangement is impossible because more than 75 percent of all the MPs have to vote in favor of such a change and then build the control of 25 percent. So I think we're basically stuck here. And the way forward is probably what Jingleau is saying here, that the real opposition now from now on will not be in the parliament. He will not be the political parties. He will be the CSOs who organize in people on a grassroots level. And they have a very important role to play. And they I think will become the real opposition in the years to come. I have to see if there were any comments from other members of the panel on those questions. Okay. So I'm going to shift now to some of the questions from the audience. Some of them will be directed to specific members of the panel. And I see that we have a question here in particular for David. David, do you see or how do you see the specific impacts of counterterrorism laws, as mentioned in your report, are these laws having any impact on humanitarian support that's coming into the country? In other words, do you see the civilian population being unable to receive aid because of that terrorism designation? Just quickly on that, I think that the limitations on humanitarian assistance in Rakhine and many other places in Qichin and northern China and lots of other places has been long standing before the counterterrorism law was passed in 2014 and before two armed groups, the Arakhan and Ninja Salvation Army and the Arakhan Army were designated formally. I think the abuses of the CT law are really against perceived supporters of the Arakhan Army and picking up civilians and charging them under provisions of the of the counterterrorism law and that's really worrying. But I think repression of civil society throughout the country, there's a huge legal toolbag that authorities use all the time, as Yinglao mentioned just this morning against three student activists. So they can pick and choose whatever law that they want to actually go after people. And I think that there's a concern that perhaps that CT law could potentially be expanded around to other parts of the country. But I think a lot of long standing activists and supporters in civil society, political parties and many others are just as worried about the Unlawful Associations Act and many others. And I think the real way forward is for the government to actually repeal or amend all of these laws, there was high expectations they would do so five years ago and they've made very little progress on that. And that's something that I think as Yinglao was saying and Bertle supported that. That civil society really should be the ones to push this. But I also think that international donors should be pushing the government to do the same thing and actually showing far more support for civil society. And definitely speaking out against the misuse of counterterrorism laws and pushing hard on diminishing humanitarian space for not just internationals. And there's a kind of a conversation about this in Rakhine and many others that it's about limitations on foreigners having access. The most important thing is actually local aid workers and local people getting access because they're the ones doing a lot of the really hard work and a lot of conflict there is. Thank you, David. There's a question here for Yinglao and Mayo that I'll raise next. So I think both of you had talked to some extent about civil society exclusion from the peace process. And as the participant raises, how can the international community best support civil society to advocate for a more sustainable peace process? Are there suggestions you would have for members of the international community? I think I go first. I think I would just say really, really shortly, just don't be a hypocrite, basically. Democracy and NMB are no longer the same thing. That is really clear. You can look at every single indicator in the country. The arrest of the journalists, the arrest of all the activists, every single thing, you can look at it. So basically a V for an OD or a V for democracy. If we are for democracy, then I'm going to have to step up our game. That would be the first thing. But I also like to add a few things on the limitations on CBO CSO. It's not just counterterrorism issues. For example, anti-money laundry law and very financial and banking regulations, all of these things are making it a lot harder for CBO CSO to access their fund. CBO CSO are not required to register. However, in order to have a bank account, you need to be a registered organization. Without that, you cannot accept a certain amount of money from foreign countries or things like that. And then even if you actually try to comply with it, after you register and you have all the documents necessary, all the bank account, it is still extremely difficult for CSO CBOs to access funding. It took my organization six months to access a small amount of funding. And my organizations, we know a lot of regulations and we know four languages. I myself know four languages. But many small CSO, they have very limited understanding of knowledge and all of these things on regulations or laws. They have very little dealing with banking, language issue, barriers, all sorts of barriers. And with this kind of some time in order to limit CSO, you don't really have to attack them correctly. If you attack a source of funding, that's how you stop them. And it is really difficult to see and to identify. And that is what is happening in the country right now. It has been going on for the past two, three years. Thank you, Yinglao. Meo, did you want to add anything? No, I think Yinglao said it all. Great. We have another question. So given that the formal peace process has not made any progress, as has been discussed, would looking at more specific issues such as how to move forward with economic reforms be a possible way to start addressing some of the grievances and if so, how potentially could different stakeholders begin to do that? And that's a general question to the panel. Go ahead, Bartel. Well, I think I would just like to emphasize what Yinglao said, that we're not just talking about establishing peace in the sense that fighting will stop. What we're looking for is sustainable peace. And sustainable peace, it means a political solution to the problems that have been troubling the country since independence. And that has to do with what I mentioned earlier, what kind of country it should be. But then if you come into economic development, well, it doesn't mean that much, as long as everything is central to control. But there's very little power to the outlying states and the regions, that's what I'm calling now. So I don't think economic development alone can solve the problem. On the contrary, it can even make things worse. But look, what's happening in Kachin State, for instance, there's been a lot of economic development in the Paka Jain mines. It had to make a power development and so on. One outcome of that is of course that the Kachins, the ethnic Kachins have been reduced to minority in their own state because of influx of outside workers of outside capital and outside experts. It's only one of these problems which comes with economic development. So I think what we have to start is really to get down and talk about the political solution. Without that, I consider it can go forward economically, politically and socially. Thank you Bertrand. I wonder if any of the other panelists would like to raise any points on that question. I will say briefly, I think to gain the sustainable peace, generally and probably, but then most importantly, it's the political will of all people who are engaging in these negotiations and who have yet to engage in the negotiations. But for the international community, one thing recently happened, for example, the somebody from a Korean community has been awarded the Goldman Environmental Award. I think this is something that international organizations, international community can look critically into and acknowledge, recognize that and this kind of activities, the Goldman Award has been awarded to an individual, the leader of the organization who has been working on preserving the environment, protecting the cultures and the forest. And I think this kind of activities in particular for speaking for the Korean people, this is, if you look at it from the peace building perspective, this is very much about trust building on one hand. On the other hand, this is the exercise of right to self-determination that people can manage their own affairs. I think this kind of recognition, more recognition should come and then we will see. It makes sense, these people are demanding for right to self-determination because they can do that. And this recognition, this confidence will actually encourage all partners in the dialogue to see, to acknowledge each other, to recognize each other. And I think that's how we can probably move forward. As long as we fail to recognize, we will help you. We will help you manage, we will do this for you as if all other people are incapable of or do not have the capacity. I think that's counterproductive. So we need to look into activities that have been going on, that are already in place and acknowledge that, recognize that and perhaps if these activities in our understanding are strengthening trust building of any kind in this peace building process, then we might also want to contribute more into that to encourage that. Thank you, Emil. I want to go ahead and take another question here. So this question I think is directed to Bertel, but I think that the whole panel may also want to add additional points to it. But the question is, how do you see the relationship between the illicit economy and the peace process? And do you see the involvement of militias in the illicit economy as being an obstacle to addressing conflict? That's a very good question because it's one actor we haven't talked about at all here, the Petersen, the local militias. And there are hundreds of them all over the country. These are people with guns. They're not necessarily fighting for any ideal or the political agenda or anything like that. They are involved in business. And they are dealing in all sorts of things, including drugs. And they're doing so with the blessing of authority because they're supposed to be maintaining law and order in the respective areas. But because there's no money in the center of the coffee to pay for them, they have to find their own ways out of it. So yes, there is definitely a thing between people involved in armed groups and the illicit economy. And actually, something happened today which I found actually amazing that a well-known gangster from Macau, his nickname was Bagnacoy. It means the broken tooth boy because he had a broken tooth. He was the leader of the 14k tribe in Macau, spent many years in prison. He was released in 2012. And now he's back in business in investing in Tuikoku, this new very strange economic zone in the current state. He had a person with a criminal record and with a criminal collection. It's not all inside the country, but it goes to Hong Kong, to Macau, even to the Republic of Belau in the Pacific Ocean. The U.S. Justice Department has blacklisted him today and designated him as a target. So these are the kind of people who are also involved in making things more difficult. They're much harder to find a political solution to Myanmar's problems because these people are not interested in a political solution because they don't have to go away and look at the businesses. Thank you, Bertel. Any other points from the panel on that question? Or shall I go to another question? I think we have time for one more before we have to start wrapping up here. I think we can take one more question here for David. David, you have a question here about Burmaar control over the economy in Rakhine state and how much Burmaar control over the economy in Rakhine state is a driver of conflict there? How potentially could that sort of issue be addressed? That's a great question. It's very complicated. I think that the Tamil Nadu operates in Rakhine state the way it operates in almost every other part of the country. Massive land grabs, big military bases that don't have many soldiers on them because they're basically seizing land. And I think we've got a balance and it's very similar to lots of other parts of the country where you've got low, cool economic interests on the part of the Tamil Nadu, but then you've got big corporate interests in either through the holding companies, Ume and others, and then private business. Basically, the Tamil Nadu operates on two logics and one is pacification and the other is commerce. And so I think Rakhine is no different from that, but actually unpacking all the details of that would take a very long time. So a great question, but you've kind of opened Pandora's box there. But one thing just to add to some of the previous questions and what the other panelists were saying. And Nome, at this point, is really good to talk about Paul Centoir and winning this award. I think this new NLD government is going to be even more emboldened than the previous administration to pursue a very heavy development approach and using the World Bank and the U.N. Development Program, Chinese investment coming in, and anyone who's using development as some kind of peacebuilding tool, I think will just drive further instability and will make the resolution of the conflict even more difficult. So as Yinglao was saying, this very liberal NLD government wants to build big roads and big industrial parks. And that's not necessarily what the people want. I think the Salwin Peace Park is one major kind of pushback against that. And so making a development project moving forward that's integrated into the peace process in some way. A lot of international interlocutors love to use this term conflict sensitivity. Well, there's no sensitivity to it. And in fact, a lot of the approaches that they're pushing, looking at current state and this proposed World Bank project of something like $250 million called Peaceful and Prosperous Communities, will probably result in the exact opposite. And so I think that's really something to watch, that anyone that looks for economic solutions as opposed to political solutions to the peace process is just going to drive further conflict in my view. Thank you for that, David. We are running up on the hour here. I wanted to give each of the other three participants a chance to just pull out any other threads or to respond to anything else that has been raised either through some of the questions or through some of the comments that were given to the two reports. So Bertil, why don't you go first, Yinglao, and then Mayo? But you need to unmute, Bertil, sorry. Sorry. I've got nothing more to add than that we have to look for a political solution to the conflict, not just that people start shooting each other. There's not a solution. And we have to recognize that this is a country with an immense ethnic and religious diversity. We cannot say that 135 national races and everybody's in Myanmar. It doesn't work that way. And nobody would accept that. And these decisions have to be discussed. And they should be discussed now, not after finding a better meaning that's so-called nationwide situation. So I'd like to come back to the questions about how what should international community do to help with all this thing. Recent experience with elections and irregularities and how international community have been very hesitate to point out all of this thing that really frustrates me. Because if the rule were reversed, they may not be silenced. That's really back the questions of whether the international community really, really want to promote democracy or just something imaginary that may have represented democracy. So this is why I said something about don't be a hypocrite, but on the constructive notes. I wanted to see international community ideally should be working itself out of work, out of job. International community shouldn't be too proud to be claiming that we are in this country for 20 years, for 30 years, for 50 years. Do your job. If international community really did their job and there would be no need for international community in this country, that would be the ideal situation. In reality, how would that work? How would that work is we really need to invest in CBO CSO. We really, really need to be investing in international institutions, policy institute, policy, you know, all the national institutions, local institution, promoting all of the national experts, the native of, you know, who are international experts. And even the terms that we use are extremely, extremely discriminatory international expert, national expert. So the foreigner are considered as international expert, the expert in every country. And then national expert, even though they have international degree and have all this education, but still considered as national expert, how are they different? It's not clear. All of this thing really, really perpetuate the problem, really, really undermine the role of CBO CSO and national organization. And we really need to change all of this practices to help maintain and strengthen all these international, all these, you know, national organizations. In addition to that, at the same time for international communities, it is really also important that we use the terms instead of thing empowering and capacity building. How about saying enabling? Enable the national organization. They do not get empowering. They know what the problem is. They know what the solution are. You just need to enable them. You don't need to empower them. That whole fun idea of empowering and capacity building and providing technical support and all of this thing is also very patronizing concept. And that's really, really put CBO CSO and national organization in a dependent role. And, you know, I am becoming really, really negative. I'm going to conclude my points. So it was supposed to be a constructive point. But these are some of the things that I really hope you see from the international organizations. And then another point, another issue is to really how to say conduct some sort of review or some sort of funding audit within the international organization. How much funding they have provided to international international organization versus national organizations. Because we have a number of organizations who claim to have funded, you know, like how do you say 80% 85% of their partners are national organizations. So that's mean 15% of them are international. I wonder what the budget amount is. Those kind of practices really, really need to be addressed. These are what were made in CBO CSO in the country strong. And this is how we strengthen democracy in the country. And this is how we promote the universal human rights and and equality and all of this that we hold near and dear to ourselves. Thank you. Thank you. Wow. And Mayo, any final comments? Thank you. One specific comment I would like to make regarding the David's, especially on David's report. I think David suggests that we bring into the national peace process because exclusion does not help solve the problem. Generally, it's true, but particularly on this point, I think we we must win AA's heart to desire to be a part of the national process. For that, there are a couple of demands that he has made for now. One is regarding the by elections for the townships that elections were cancelled, recent elections were cancelled. And the other one is the bilateral deal that they are engaging. And as we know yesterday, they had a meeting, AA had a meeting with the Dhammadur representative. There was no government representative and Dhammadur representative also was not the ones that Dhammadur designated to lead the negotiations with the organizations. So we really do not know what's going on, but I think it's important we pay it as observer of the peace process in Yama. We need to pay attention to AA's demand in part because it shows that AA, like other EAOs, are not confining themselves to military solution only. They are looking for a political solution as well and they make political demands. And I think if we are to solve the political problems in this country, if we are to help solve the problems, if we are to help bring about peace, I think we need to listen to those demands. And last, I would like to reiterate, we have to honestly question the political will of the people who hold the power to make a change. The war, to end the war, to bring peace. To end the war for the rest of the country, we get poorer and poorer. But because of the war, we know a handful of people and institutions getting stronger, a handful of people getting richer. Do we really want to end the war? I think that political will has to be constantly questioned if we are to make a change in the process that is not being productive. And we have to constantly raise that political question so that for us to be able to probably expect or anticipate a change in the process that we are engaging or we are, many of us are observing. Thank you. Thank you. And I would just like to close by thanking all four of our panelists and particularly the two authors of the new studies for our participants. Thank you also for joining this morning and do note that both of the reports are now available on our websites. There are Burmese versions of the reports available. So if you would like to get access to a Burmese version, please do reach out and we can make sure that you are able to get access to that. So again, thanks to all of our panelists and everyone for joining and look also for many more US IP events, both more broadly on peace and conflict related issues as well as specific to Myanmar. Thank you.