 Question 81 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secundae, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of justice. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secundae, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of justice, by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 81 of Religion in 8 Articles We must now consider each of the foregoing virtues insofar as our present scope demands. We shall consider 1. Religion 2. Piety 3. Observance 4. Gratitude 5. Revenge 6. Truth 7. Friendship 8. Liberality 9. Epi-Echeia Of the other virtues that have been mentioned, we have spoken partly in the triates on charity, notably of concord and the like, and partly in this triates on justice, for instance, of right commutations and of innocence, of legislative justice we spoke in the triates on prudence. Religion offers a threefold consideration. 1. Religion considered in itself. 2. Its acts. 3. The opposite vices. Under the first head, there are eight points of inquiry. First, whether religion regards only a relation to God. Second, whether religion is a virtue. Third, whether religion is one virtue. Fourth, whether religion is a special virtue. Fifth, whether religion is a theological virtue. Sixth, whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues. Seventh, whether religion has any external actions. Eighth, whether religion is the same as holiness. First article, whether religion directs man to God alone. Objection won. You would seem that religion does not direct man to God alone. It is written in James 1, 27. Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is this. To visit the Fatherless and widows in their tribulation, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world. Now, to visit the Fatherless and widows indicates an order between oneself and one's neighbor. And to keep oneself unspotted from this world belongs to the order of a man within himself. Therefore, religion does not imply order to God alone. Objection two further. Augustine says in On the City of God 10.1 that, since in speaking Latin, not only unlettered, but even most cultured persons err want to speak of religion as being exhibited to our human kindred and relations as also to those who are linked with us by any kind of tie, that term does not escape ambiguity when it is a question of divine worship so that we be able to say without hesitation that religion is nothing else but the worship of God. Therefore, religion signifies a relation not only to God, but also to our kindred. Objection three further. Seemingly, Latria pertains to religion. Now, Latria signifies servitude, as Augustine states in On the City of God 10.1, and we are bound to serve not only God, but also our neighbor according to Galatians 5.13, by charity of the spirit serve one another. Therefore, religion includes a relation to one's neighbor also. Objection four further, worship belongs to religion. Now man is said to worship not only God, but also his neighbor according to a saying of Cato, worship thy parents. Therefore, religion directs us also to our neighbor and not only to God. Objection five further, all those who are in the state of grace are subject to God, yet not all who are in a state of grace are called religious, but only those who bind themselves by certain vows and observances and to obedience to certain men. Therefore, religion seemingly does not denote a relation of subjection of man to God. On the contrary, Tully says in his rhetoric 253 that, religion consists in offering service and ceremonial rights to a superior nature that men call divine. I answer that as Isidore says in his etymologies 10. According to Cicero, a man is said to be religious from religio because he often ponders over and as it were reads again, relegit, the things which pertain to the worship of God. So that religion would seem to take its name from reading over those things which belong to divine worship because we ought frequently to ponder over such things in our hearts according to Proverbs 3.6, in all thy ways think on him. According to Augustine on the city of God 10.3, it may also take its name from the fact that we ought to seek God again whom we had lost by our neglect. Translator's note, St. Augustine plays on the words re-eligere that is to choose over again and negligere to neglect or despise. Or again, religion may be derived from re-eligare to bind together where for Augustine says in on true religion 55, may religion bind us to the one almighty God. However, whether religion take its name from frequent reading or from a repeated choice of what has been lost through negligence or from being a bond it denotes properly a relation to God. For it is he to whom we ought to be bound as to our unfailing principle to whom also our choice should be resolutely directed as to our last end and whom we lose when we neglect him by sin and should recover by believing in him and confessing our faith. Reply to Objection 1, Religion has two kinds of acts. Some are its proper and immediate acts which it elicits and by which man is directed to God alone, for instance, sacrifice, adoration and the like. But it has other acts which it produces through the medium of the virtues which it commands directing them to the honor of God because the virtue which is concerned with the end commands the virtues which are concerned with the means. Accordingly, to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation is an act of religion as commanding and an act of mercy as eliciting. And to keep oneself unspotted from this world is an act of religion as commanding but of temperance or of some similar virtue as eliciting. Reply to Objection 2, Religion is referred to those things one exhibits to one's human kindred if we take the term religion in a broad sense but not if we take it in its proper sense. Hence, shortly before the passage quoted, Augustine says, In a stricter sense, religion seems to denote not any kind of worship but the worship of God. Reply to Objection 3, Since servant implies relation to a lord, wherever there is a special kind of lordship there must needs be a special kind of service. Now it is evident that lordship belongs to God in a special and singular way because he made all things and has supreme dominion over all. Consequently, a special kind of service is due to him, which is known as Latria in Greek and therefore it belongs to religion. Reply to Objection 4, We are said to worship those whom we honour and to cultivate a man's memory or presence. Translators note, in the Latin the same word cholerae stands for worship and cultivate. We even speak of cultivating things that are beneath us thus a farmer, agricola, is one who cultivates the land and an inhabit, incola, is one who cultivates the place where he dwells. Since however special honour is due to God as the first principle of all things to him also is due a special kind of worship which in Greek is Osebia or Theosubia Reply to Objection 5, Although the name religious may be given to all in general who worship God yet in a special way religious are those who consecrate their whole life to the divine worship by withdrawing from human affairs. Thus also the term contemplative is applied not to those who contemplate but to those who give up their whole lives to contemplation. Such men subject themselves to man not for man's sake but for God's sake according to the word of the Apostle in Galatians 4, 14 You received me as an angel of God even as Christ Jesus. Second Article Whether Religion is a Virtue Objection 1 It would seem that religion is not a virtue. Seemingly it belongs to religion to pay reverence to God. But reverence is an act of fear which is a gift as stated above in Question 19 Article 9. Therefore religion is not a virtue but a gift. Objection 2 further Every virtue is a free exercise of the will therefore it is described as elective or voluntary habit according to Ethics 2, 6. Now as stated above in Article 1, 3 reply Latria belongs to religion and Latria denotes a kind of servitude. Therefore religion is not a virtue. Objection 3 further According to Ethics 2, 1 aptitude for virtue is in us by nature wherefore things pertaining to virtue belong to the dictate of natural reason. Now it belongs to religion to offer ceremonial worship to the Godhead and ceremonial matters as stated above do not belong to the dictate of natural reason. Therefore religion is not a virtue. On the contrary it is enumerated with the other virtues as appears from what has been said above in Question 80. I answer that as stated above in Question 58 Article 3 as well as in the parts Prima Secunde Question 55 Articles 3 and 4 a virtue is that which makes its possessor good and his act good likewise. Wherefore we must need say that every good act belongs to a virtue. Now it is evident that to render anyone his due has the aspect of good since by rendering a person his due one becomes suitably proportioned to him through being ordered to him in a becoming manner. But order comes under the aspect of good just as mode and species according to Augustine and on the nature of good 3. Since then it belongs to religion to pay due honor to someone namely to God it is evident that religion is a virtue. Reply to Objection 1 to pay reverence to God is an act of the gift of fear. Now it belongs to religion to do certain things through reverence for God. Hence it follows not that religion is the same as the gift of fear but that it is referred there too as to something more excellent. For the gifts are more excellent than the moral virtues as stated above in Question 9 Article 1 Third Reply as well as in the Pars Prima Secunde Question 68 Article 8 Reply to Objection 2 even a slave can voluntarily do his duty by his master and so he makes a virtue of necessity to quote Saint Jerome by doing his duty voluntarily. In like manner to render due service to God may be an act of virtue insofar as man does so voluntarily. Reply to Objection 3 it belongs to the dictate of natural reason that man should do something through reverence for God but that he should do this or that determinant thing does not belong to the dictate of natural reason but is established by divine or human law. Third Article whether religion is one virtue Objection 1 it would seem that religion is not one virtue religion directs us to God as stated above in Article 1. Now in God there are three persons and also many attributes which differ at least logically from one another. Now a logical difference in the object suffices for a difference of virtue as stated above in Question 50 Article 2 Second Reply. Therefore religion is not one virtue. Objection 2 further of one virtue there is seemingly one act since habits are distinguished by their acts. Now there are many acts of religion for instance to worship, to serve, to vow, to pray, to sacrifice and many such like. Therefore religion is not one virtue. Objection 3 further Adoration belongs to religion. Now adoration is paid to images under one aspect and under another aspect to God himself. Since then a difference of aspect distinguishes virtues it would seem that religion is not one virtue. On the contrary it is written in Ephesians 4-5 one God, one faith. Now true religion professes faith in one God. Therefore religion is one virtue. I answer that as stated above in the Parse Prima Secunde Question 54 Article 2 First Reply. Habits are differentiated according to a different aspect of the object. Now it belongs to religion to show reverence to one God under one aspect namely as the first principle of the creation and government of things. Therefore he himself says in Malachi 1-6 If I be a father where is my honour? For it belongs to a father to be get and to govern. Therefore it is evident that religion is one virtue. Reply to Objection 1 The three divine persons are the one principle of the creation and government of things where they are served by one religion. The different aspects of the attributes concur under the aspect of first principle because God produces all things and governs them by the wisdom will and power of His goodness. Therefore religion is one virtue. Reply to Objection 2 By the one same act man both serves and worships God for worship regards the excellence of God to whom while service regards the subjection of man who by his condition is under an obligation of showing reverence to God. To these two belong all acts ascribed to religion because by them all man bears witness to the divine excellence and to his own subjection to God either by offering something to God or by assuming something divine. Reply to Objection 3 The worship of religion is paid to images not as considered in themselves nor as things but as images leading us to God incarnate. Now movement to an image as image does not stop at the image but goes on to the thing it represents. Hence neither Latria nor the virtue of religion is differentiated by the fact that religious worship is paid to images of Christ. Fourth Article Whether religion is a special virtue distinct from the others Objection 1 It would seem that religion is not a special virtue distinct from the others. Augustine says in On the City of God 10.6 Any action whereby we are united to God in holy fellowship is a true sacrifice but sacrifice belongs to religion. Therefore every virtuous deed belongs to religion and consequently religion is not a special virtue. Objection 2 The Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 10.31 Do all to the glory of God. Now it belongs to religion to do anything in reverence of God as stated above in the 1 second reply as well as in Article 2. Therefore religion is not a special virtue. Objection 3 further The charity whereby we love God is not distinct from the charity whereby we love our neighbor but according to Ethics 8.8 to be honored is almost to be loved. Therefore the religion whereby we honor God is not a special virtue distinct from observance or doulia or piety whereby we honor our neighbor. Therefore religion is not a special virtue. On the contrary it is reckoned a part of justice distinct from the other parts. I answer that since virtue is directed to the good wherever there is a special virtue. Now the good to which religion is directed is to give due honor to God. Again honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence and to God a singular excellence is competent since he infinitely surpasses all things and exceeds them in every way. Wherefore to him is special honor due even as in human affairs we see that different honor is due to different personal excellences one kind of honor to a father another to the king and so on. Hence it is evident that religion is a special virtue. Reply to Objection 1 Every virtuous deed is said to be a sacrifice insofar as it is done out of reverence to God. Hence this does not prove that religion is a general virtue but that it commands all other virtues as stated above in article 1 first reply. Reply to Objection 2 Every deed insofar as it is done in God's honor belongs to religion not as eliciting but as commanding. Those belong to religion as eliciting which pertain to the reverence of God by reason of their specific character. Reply to Objection 3 The object of love is the good but the object of honor and reverence is something excellent. Now God's goodness is communicated to the preacher but the excellence of his goodness is not. Hence the charity whereby God is loved is not distinct from the charity whereby our neighbor is loved whereas the religion whereby God is honored is distinct from the virtues whereby we honor our neighbor. 5th article Whether religion is a theological virtue Objection 1 It would seem that religion is a theological virtue. Augustine says in the Incaridian 3 that God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity. Which are theological virtues? Now it belongs to religion to pay worship to God. Therefore religion is a theological virtue. Objection 2 further A theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now religion has God for its object since it directs us to God alone as stated above in article 1. Therefore religion is a theological virtue. Objection 3 further Every virtue is either theological or intellectual or moral as is clear from what has been said in the Paras Primesa Cunde question 57, 58 and 62. Now it is evident that religion is not an intellectual virtue because its perfection does not depend on the consideration of truth. Nor is it a moral virtue which consists properly in observing the mean between too much and too little for one cannot worship God too much according to Ecclesiasticist 4333 Blessing the Lord exalt him as much as you can for he is above all praise. Therefore it remains that it is a theological virtue. On the contrary it is reckoned a part of justice which is a moral virtue. I answer that as stated above in article 4. Religion pays due worship to God. Hence two things are to be considered in religion. First that which it offers to God notably worship and this is by way of matter and object in religion. Secondly that to which something is offered notably God to whom worship is paid. And yet the acts whereby God is worshiped do not reach out to God himself as when we believe God we reach out to him by believing for which reason it was stated in question 1 articles 1, 2 and 4 that God is the object of faith not only because we believe in the God but because we believe God. Now due worship is paid to God insofar as certain acts whereby God is worshiped such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth are done out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is related to religion not as matter or object but as end and consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the last end but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred to the end. Reply to Objection 1 the power or virtue whose action deals with an end moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues faith, hope and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper object wherefor by their command they cause the act of religion which performs certain deeds directed to God and so Augustine says that God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity. Reply to Objection 2 religion directs man to God not as its object but as its end. Reply to Objection 3 Religion is neither a theological nor an intellectual but a moral virtue since it is a part of justice and observes a mean not in the passions but in actions directed to God by establishing a kind of equality in them and when I say equality I do not mean absolute equality because it is not possible to pay God as much as we owe him but equality in consideration of man's ability and God's acceptance and it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the divine worship not as regards the circumstance of quantity but as regards other circumstances as when divine worship is paid to whom it is not due or when it is not due or unduly in respect of some other circumstance 6th article whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues Objection 1 it would seem that religion should not be preferred to the other moral virtues the perfection of a moral virtue consists in its observing the mean as stated in Ethics 2.6 but religion fails to mean of justice since it does not render an absolute equal to God therefore religion is not more excellent than the other moral virtues Objection 2 further what is offered by one man to another is the more praiseworthy according as the person it is offered to is in greater need wherefore it is written in Isaiah 57.7 deal thy bread to the hungry but God needs nothing that we can offer him according to Psalm 15.2 I have said thou art my God for thou hast no need of my goods therefore religion would seem less praiseworthy than the other virtues whereby man's needs are relieved Objection 3 further the greater the obligation to do a thing the less praise does it deserve according to 1 Corinthians 9.16 if I preach the gospel it is no glory to me a necessity lieth upon me now the more a thing is due the greater the obligation of paying it since then what is paid to God by man is in the highest degree due to him it would seem that religion is less praiseworthy than the other human virtues on the contrary the precepts pertaining to religion are given precedence in Exodus 20 as being of greatest importance now the order of precepts is proportionate to the order of virtues since the precepts of the law prescribe acts of virtue therefore religion is the chief of the moral virtues I answer that whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness from being ordered to that end so that the nearer it is to the end the better it is now moral virtues as stated above in article 5 as well as in question 4 article 7 are about matters that are ordered to God as their end and religion approaches the nearer to God than the other moral virtues insofar as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor of God hence religion excels among the moral virtues replied to objection 1 virtue is praised because of the will not because of the ability and therefore if a man fall short of equality which is the mean of justice through lack of ability his virtue deserves no less praise provided there be no failing on the part of his will replied to objection 2 in offering a thing to a man on account of its usefulness to him the more needy the man the more praise worthy the offering because it is more useful whereas we offer a thing to God not on account of its usefulness to him but for the sake of his glory and on account of its usefulness to us replied to objection 3 where there is an obligation to do a thing it loses the luster of super-arrogation but not the merit of virtue provided it be done voluntarily hence the argument proves nothing 7th article whether religion has an external act objection 1 it would seem that religion has not an external act it is written in John 4.24 God is a spirit and they that adore him must adore him in spirit and in truth now external acts pertain not to the spirit but to the body or religion to which adoration belongs has acts that are not external but internal objection 2 further the end of religion is to pay God reverence and honour now it would savor of irreverence towards the superior if one were to offer him that which properly belongs to his inferior since then whatever man is by bodily actions seems to be directed properly to the relief of human needs or to the reverence of inferior creatures it would seem unbecoming to employ them in showing reverence to God objection 3 further Augustine in on the city of God 6.10 commends Seneca for finding fault with those who offer to idols those things that are want to be offered to men because to it that which befits mortals is unbecoming to immortals but such things are much less becoming to the true God who is exalted above all gods according to Psalm 94.3 therefore it would seem wrong to worship God with bodily actions therefore religion has no bodily actions on the contrary it is written in Psalm 83.3 my heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God now just as internal actions belong to the heart so do external actions belong to the members of the flesh therefore it seems that God ought to be worshiped not only by internal but also by external actions I answer that we pay God honor and reverence not for his sake because he is of himself full of glory to which no creature can add anything but for our own sake because by the very fact that we revere and honor God our mind is subjected to him wherein its perfection consists since a thing is perfected by being subjected to its superior for instance the body is perfected by being quickened by the soul and the air by being enlightened by the sun now the human mind in order to be united to God needs to be guided by the sensible world since invisible things are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made as the apostle says in Romans 120 wherefor in the divine worship it is necessary to make use of corporeal things that man's mind may be aroused thereby as by signs to the spiritual acts by means of which he is united to God therefore the internal acts of religion take precedence of the others and belong to religion while its external acts are secondary and subordinate to the internal acts reply to objection one our lord is speaking of that which is most important and directly intended in the worship of God reply to objection two these external things are offered to God not as though he stood in need of them according to Psalm 49 verse 13 shall I eat the flesh of bullocks or shall I drink the blood of goats but as signs of the internal and spiritual works which are of themselves acceptable to God hence Augustine says on the city of God 10.5 the visible sacrifice is the sacrament or sacred sign of the invisible sacrifice reply to objection three idolaters are ridiculed for offering to idols things pertaining to men not as signs arousing them to certain spiritual things but as though they were of themselves acceptable to the idols and still more because they were foolish and wicked eighth article whether religion is the same as sanctity objection one you would seem that religion is not the same as sanctity religion is a special virtue as stated above in article 4 whereas sanctity is a general virtue because it makes us faithful and fulfill our just obligations to God according to Andronicus therefore sanctity is not the same as religion objection two further sanctity seems to denote a kind of purity for Dionysius says in On the Divine Names 12 that sanctity is free from all uncleanness and is perfect and altogether unspotted purity now purity would seem above all to pertain to temperance which repels bodily uncleanness since then religion belongs to justice you would seem that sanctity is not the same as religion objection three further things that are opposite members of a division are not identified with one another but in an enumeration given above in question eighty fourth reply of the parts of justice sanctity is reckoned as distinct from religion therefore sanctity is not the same as religion on the contrary it is written in Luke one verses seventy four and seventy five that we may serve him in holiness and justice now to serve God belongs to religion is stated above in article one third reply and article three second reply therefore religion is the same as sanctity I answer that the word sanctity seems to have two significations in one way it denotes purity and this signification fits in with the Greek for hagos means unsoiled in another way it denotes firmness where for in olden times the term sancta was applied to such things as were upheld by law and were not to be violated hence a thing is said to be sacred sanctitum when it is ratified by law again in latin this word sanctus may be connected with purity if it be resolved into sanguine tinctus since in olden times those who wished to be purified were sprinkled with the victims blood according to isidor in etymology's ten in either case the signification requires sanctity to be ascribed to those things that are applied to divine worship so that not only men but also the temple vessels and such like things are said to be sanctified through being applied to the worship of God for purity is necessary in order that the mind be applied to God since the human mind is soiled by contact with inferior things even as all things depreciate by admixture with baser things for instance silver by being mixed with lead now in order for the mind to be united to the supreme being it must be withdrawn from inferior things and hence it is without purity the mind cannot be applied to God wherefore it is written in Hebrews 12 14 follow peace with all men and holiness without which no man shall see God again firmness is required for the mind to be applied to God for it is applied to him as its last end and first beginning and such things must needs be most immovable hence the apostles said in Romans 8 verses 38 and 39 I am sure that neither death nor life shall separate me from the love of God accordingly it is by sanctity that the human mind applies itself and its acts to God so that it differs from religion not essentially but only logically for it takes the name of religion according as it gives God due service in matters pertaining specially to the divine worship such as sacrifices, oblations and so forth while it is called sanctity according as man refers to God not only these things but also the works of the other virtues or according as man by means of certain good works disposes himself to the worship of God replied to objection one sanctity is a special virtue according to its essence and in this respect it is in a way identified with religion but it has a certain generality insofar as by its command it directs the acts of all the virtues to the divine good even as legal justice is said to be a general virtue insofar as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good replied to objection two temperance practices purity yet not so as to have the character of sanctity unless it be referred to God hence of virginity itself Augustine says in on virginity eight that it is honored not for what it is but for being consecrated to God replied to objection three sanctity differs from religion as explained above not really but logically end of question 81 read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert LC question 82 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde triities on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings from the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde triities on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 82 of devotion in four articles we must now consider the acts of religion first we shall consider the interior acts which are stated above are its principal acts secondly we shall consider its exterior acts which are secondary the interior acts of religion are seemingly devotion and prayer accordingly we shall treat first of devotion and afterwards of prayer under the first head there are four points of inquiry first whether devotion is a special act second whether it is an act of religion third of the cause of devotion fourth of its effect first article whether devotion is a special act objection one it would seem that devotion is not a special act that which qualifies other acts is seemingly not a special act now devotion seems to qualify other acts for it is written in 2nd Chronicles 2931 all the multitude offered victims and praises and holocausts with a devout mind therefore devotion is not a special act objection two further no special kind of act is common to various genera of acts but devotion is common to various genera of acts namely corporal and spiritual acts for a person is said to meditate devoutly and to genuflect devoutly therefore devotion is not a special act objection three further every special act belongs either to an appetitive or to a cognitive virtue or power but devotion belongs to neither as may be seen by going through the various species of acts of either faculty as enumerated above in the Parse Prima question 78 and following therefore devotion is not a special act on the contrary merits are acquired by acts as stated above in the Parse Prima Secunde question 21 article 3 and 4 but devotion has a special reason for merit therefore devotion is a special act I answer that devotion is derived from devote translators note the Latin devotee means to vow therefore those persons are said to be devout who in a way devote themselves to God so as to subject themselves wholly to him hence in olden times among the heathens a devotee was one who vowed to his idols to suffer death for the safety of his army as Livy relates of the two Decii hence devotion is apparently nothing else but the will of oneself readily to things concerning the service of God where for it is written in Exodus 35 verses 20 and 21 that the multitude of the children of Israel offered first fruits to the Lord with a most ready and devout mind now it is evident that the will to do readily what concerns the service of God is a special kind of act therefore devotion is a special act of the will reply to objection one the mover prescribes the mode of the movement of the thing moved now the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts and the will in so far as it regards the end moves both itself and whatever is directed to the end as stated above in the Bar's Prima Secunde question 9 article 3 where for since devotion is an act of the will whereby a man offers himself for the service of God who is the last end it follows that devotion prescribes the mode to human acts whether they be acts of the will itself about things directed to the end or acts of the other powers that are moved by the will reply to objection two devotion is to be found in various genera of acts not as a species of those genera but as the motion of the mover is found virtually in the movements of the things moved reply to objection three devotion is an act of the appetitive part of the soul and is a movement of the will as stated above second article whether devotion is an act of religion objection one seems that devotion is not an act of religion devotion as stated above in article one consists in giving oneself up to God but this is done chiefly by charity since according to Dionysius in On the Divine Names Four the divine love produces ecstasy for it takes the lover away from himself and gives him to the beloved therefore devotion is an act of charity rather than of religion objection two further charity precedes religion and devotion seems to proceed charity since in the scriptures charity is represented by fire while devotion is signified by fatness which is the material of fire confer Canticles eight six and Psalm fifty two six therefore devotion is not an act of religion objection three further by religion man is directed to God alone as stated above in question eighty one article one but devotion is directed also to men for we speak of people being devout to certain holy men and subjects are said to be devoted to their masters thus Pope Leo says in his sermon eight on the Lord's passion that the Jews out of devotion to the Roman laws said we have no king but Caesar therefore devotion is not an act of religion on the contrary devotion is derived from devover a stated above in article one but a vow is an act of religion therefore devotion is also an act of religion I answer that it belongs to the same virtue to will to do something and to have the will ready to do it because both acts have the same object for this reason the philosopher says in ethics five one it is justice whereby men both will and do just actions now it is evident that to do what pertains to the worship or service of God belongs properly to religion as stated above in question 81 where for it belongs to that virtue to have the will ready to do such things and this is to be devout hence it is evident that devotion is an act of religion reply to objection one it belongs immediately to charity that man should give himself to God adhering to him by a union of the spirit but it belongs immediately to religion and through the medium of religion to charity which is the principle of religion that man should give himself to God for certain works of divine worship reply to objection two bodily fatness is produced by the natural heat in the process of digestion and at the same time the natural heat thrives as it were on this fatness in like manner charity both causes devotion in as much as love makes one ready to serve one's friend and feeds on devotion even so all friendship is safeguarded and increased by the practice and consideration of friendly deeds reply to objection three devotion to God's holy ones dead or living does not terminate in them but passes on to God in so far as we honor God in his servants but the devotion of subjects to their temporal masters is of another kind just as service of a temporal master differs from the service of God third article whether contemplation or meditation is the cause of devotion objection one you would seem that contemplation or meditation is not the cause of devotion no cause hinders its effect but subtle considerations about abstract matters are often a hindrance to devotion therefore contemplation or meditation is not the cause of devotion objection two further if contemplation were the proper and essential cause of devotion the higher objects of contemplation would arouse greater devotion but the contrary is the case since frequently we are urged to greater devotion by considering Christ's passion and other mysteries of his humanity then by considering the greatness of his Godhead therefore contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion objection three further if contemplation were the proper cause of devotion it would follow that those who are most apt for contemplation are also most apt for devotion yet the contrary is to be noticed for devotion is frequently found in men of simplicity and members of the female sex were defective in contemplation therefore contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion on the contrary it is written in Psalm 38 verse 4 in my meditation a fire shall flame out but spiritual fire causes devotion therefore meditation is the cause of devotion I answer that the extrinsic and chief cause of devotion is God of whom Ambrose commenting on Luke 9.55 says that God calls whom he deigns to call and whom he wills he makes religious the profane Samaritans had he so willed he would have made devout but the intrinsic cause on our part must needs be meditation or contemplation for it was stated above in article 1 that devotion is an act of the will to the effect that man surrenders himself readily to the service of God now every act of the will proceeds from some consideration since the object of the will is a good understood where for Augustine says in on the trinity 9.12 and 25.23 that the will arises from the intelligence consequently meditation must needs be the cause of devotion in so far as through meditation man conceives the thought of surrendering himself to God's service indeed a two fold consideration leads him there too the one is the consideration of God's goodness and loving kindness according to Psalm 72 verse 28 it is good for me to adhere to my God to put my hope in the Lord God and this consideration awakens love translators note delects you the interior act of charity confer question 27 which is the proximate cause of devotion the other consideration is that of man's own shortcomings on account of which he needs to lean on God according to Psalm 120 verses 1 and 2 I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains from whence help shall come to me my help is from the Lord who made heaven and earth and this consideration shuts out presumption whereby man is hindered from submitting to God because he leans on his strength reply to objection one the consideration of God the consideration of such things as are of a nature to awaken our love of God causes devotion whereas the consideration of foreign matters that distract the mind from such things is a hindrance to devotion reply to objection two matters concerning the Godhead are in themselves the strongest incentive to love and consequently to devotion because God is supremely loveable yet such is the weakness of the human mind that it needs a guiding hand not only to the knowledge but also to the love of divine things by means of certain sensible objects known to us chief among these is the humanity of Christ according to the words of the preface of Christmas Tide that through knowing God visibly we may be caught of things invisible where for matters relating to Christ's humanity are the chief incentive to devotion leading us thither as a guiding hand although devotion itself has for its object matters concerning the Godhead reply to objection three science and anything else conducive to greatness is to man an occasion of self-confidence so that he does not wholly surrender himself to God the result is that such like things sometimes occasion a hindrance to devotion while in simple souls and women devotion abounds by repressing pride if however a man perfectly submits to God his science or any other perfection by this very fact his devotion is increased fourth article whether joy is an effective devotion objection one you would seem that joy is not an effective devotion as stated above in article three second reply Christ's passion is the chief incentive to devotion but the consideration thereof causes an affliction of the soul according to lamentations three nineteen remember my poverty the wormwood and the gall refers to the passion and afterwards in lamentations three twenty it is said I will be mindful and remember and my soul shall languish within me therefore delight or joy is not the effect of devotion objection two further devotion consists chiefly in an interior sacrifice of the spirit but it is written in psalm fifty verse nineteen a sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit therefore affliction is the effect of devotion rather than gladness or joy objection three further Gregory of Nyssa says that justice laughter proceeds from joy so tears and groans are signs of sorrow but devotion makes some people shed tears therefore gladness or joy is not the effect of devotion on the contrary we say in the collect for Thursday after the fourth Sunday of Lent that we who are punished by fasting may be comforted by a holy devotion I answer that the direct and principal effect of devotion is the spiritual joy of the mind though sorrow is its secondary and indirect effect for it has been stated in article three that devotion is caused by a twofold consideration chiefly by the consideration of God's goodness because this consideration belongs to the term as it were of the movement of the will in surrendering itself to God and the direct result of this consideration is joy according to Psalm seventy six verse four I remembered God and was delighted but accidentally this consideration causes a certain sorrow in those who do not yet enjoy God fully according to Psalm forty one verse three my soul hath thirsted after the strong living God and afterwards it is said in Psalm forty one verse four my tears have been my bread etc secondarily devotion is caused as stated in article three by the consideration of one's own failings for this consideration regards the term from which man withdraws by the movement of his devout will in that he trusts not in himself but subjects himself to God this consideration has an opposite tendency to the first for it is of a nature to cause sorrow directly when one thinks over one's own failings and joy accidentally namely through hope of the divine assistance it is accordingly evident that the first and direct effect of devotion is joy while the secondary and accidental effect is that sorrow which is according to God according to second Corinthians seven ten reply to objection one in the consideration of Christ's passion there is something that causes sorrow namely the human defect the removal of which made it necessary for Christ to suffer confer Luke 24 verse 25 and there is something that causes joy namely God's loving kindness to us in giving us such a deliverance reply to objection two the spirit which on one hand is afflicted on account of the defects of the present life on the other hand is rejoiced by the consideration of God's goodness and by the hope of the divine help reply to objection three tears are caused not only through sorrow but also through a certain tenderness of the affections especially when one considers something that gives joy mixed with pain thus men are want read tears through a sentiment of piety when they recover their children or dear friends whom they thought to have lost in this way tears arise from devotion end of question 82 read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert LC question 83 part one of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde triities on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice this is the LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde triities on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice by Saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 83 of prayer in 17 articles part one articles one through six we must now consider prayer under which head there are 17 points of inquiry first whether prayer is an act of the appetitive or of the cognitive power second whether it is fitting to pray to God third whether prayer is an act of religion fourth whether we ought to pray to God alone fifth whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray sixth whether we ought to ask for temporal things when we pray seventh whether we ought to pray for others eighth whether we ought to pray for our enemies ninth of the seven petitions of the Lord's prayer tenth whether prayer is proper to the rational creature eleventh whether the saints in heaven pray for us twelfth whether prayer should be vocal thirteenth whether attention is requisite in prayer fourteenth whether prayer should last a long time fifteenth whether prayer is meritorious sixteenth whether sinners impotrate anything from God by praying seventeenth of the different kinds of prayer first article whether prayer is an act of the appetitive power objection one you would seem that prayer is an act of the appetitive power it belongs to prayer to be heard it is the desire that is heard by God according to Psalm 9 verse 38 the Lord hath heard the desire of the poor therefore prayer is desire but desire is an act of the appetitive power and therefore prayer is also objection two further Dionysius says in on the divine names three it is useful to begin everything with prayer because thereby we surrender ourselves to God and unite ourselves to him now union with God is affected by love which belongs to the appetitive power therefore prayer belongs to the appetitive power objection three further the philosopher states in on the soul three six that there are two operations of the intellect of part of these the first is the understanding of indivisibles by which operation we apprehend what a thing is while the second is synthesis and analysis whereby we apprehend that a thing is or is not to these a third may be added namely reasoning whereby we proceed from the known to the unknown now prayer is not reducible to any of these operations therefore it is an operation not of the intellect of but of the appetitive power on the contrary is it or says in his etymologies ten that to pray is to speak now speech belongs to the intellect therefore prayer is an act not of the appetitive but of the intellect of power I answer that according to casio doris in his commentary on some thirty six prayer or ratio is spoken reason or is ratio now the speculative and practical reason differ in this that the speculative merely apprehends its object whereas the practical reason not only apprehends but causes now one thing is the cause of another in two ways first perfectly when it necessitates its effect and this happens when the effect is wholly subject to the power of the cause secondly imperfectly by merely disposing to the effect for the reason that the effect is not wholly subject to the power of the cause accordingly in this way the reason is cause of certain things in two ways first by imposing necessity and in this way it belongs to reason to command not only the lower powers and members of the body but also human subjects which indeed is done by commanding secondly by leading up to the effect and in a way disposing to it and in this sense the reason asks for something to be done by things not subject to it whether they be its equals or its superiors now both of these namely to command and to ask or beseech imply a certain ordering seeing that man proposes something to be affected by something else wherefore they pertain to the reason to which it belongs to set in order for this reason the philosopher says in Ethics 113 that the reason exhorts us to do what is best now in the present instance we are speaking of prayer as signifying a beseeching or petition in which sense Augustine says that prayer is a petition and Damascene states in On the True Faith 324 that to prayer is to ask becoming things of God accordingly it is evident that prayer as we speak of it now is an act of the reason reply to Objection 1 the Lord is said to hear the desire of the poor either because desire is the cause of their petition since a petition is like the interpreter of a desire or in order to show how speedily they are heard since no sooner do the poor desire something than God hears them before they put up a prayer according to the saying of Isaiah 65 24 and it shall come to pass that before they call I will hear reply to Objection 2 as stated above in the Parse Prima question 82 4 as well as in the Parse Prima Secunde question 9 Article 1 third reply the will moves the reason to its end where for nothing hinders the act of reason under the motion of the will from tending to an end such as charity which is union with God now prayer tends to God through being moved by the will of charity as it were and this in two ways first on the part of the object of our petition because when we pray we ought principally to ask to be united to God according to Psalm 26 verse 4 one thing I have asked of the Lord this will I seek after that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life secondly on the part of the petitioner who ought to approach the person whom he petitions either locally as when he petitions a man or mentally as when he petitions God hence Dionysius says in on the divine names three that when we call upon God in our prayers we unveil our mind in his presence and in the same sense damasin says in on the true faith 324 that prayer is the raising up of the mind to God reply to Psalm 23 these three acts belong to the speculative reason but to the practical reason it belongs in addition to cause something by way of command or of petition as stated above second article whether it is becoming to pray objection one you would seem that it is unbecoming to pray prayer seems to be necessary in the needs known to the person to whom we pray but according to Matthew 632 your father knoweth that you have need of all these things therefore it is not becoming to pray to God objection to further by prayer we bend the mind of the person to whom we pray so that he may do what is asked of him but God's mind is unchangeable and inflexible according to first kings 1529 but the triumphor in Israel will not spare and will not be moved to repentance therefore it is not fitting that we should pray to God objection three further it is more liberal to give to one that asks not than to one who asks because according to Seneca nothing is bought more dearly than what is bought with prayers but God is supremely liberal therefore it would seem unbecoming to pray to God on the contrary it is written in Luke 181 we ought always to pray and not to faint I answer that among the ancients there was a threefold error concerning prayer some held that human affairs are not ruled by divine providence whence it would follow that it is useless to pray and to worship God at all of these it is written in Malachi 314 you have said he laboreth in vain that serveth God another opinion held that all things even in human affairs happen of necessity whether by reason of the unchangeableness of providence or through the compelling influence of the stars or on account of the connection of causes and this opinion also excluded the utility of prayer there was a third opinion of those who held that human affairs are indeed ruled by divine providence and that they do not happen of necessity yet they deemed the disposition of divine providence to be changeable yet it is changed by prayers and other things pertaining to the worship of God all these opinions were disproved in the first part question 19 article 7 and 8 question 22 articles 2 and 4 question 115 article 6 and question 116 wherefore it behooves us so to account for the utility of prayer as neither to impose necessity on the subject to divine providence nor to imply changeableness on the part of the divine disposition in order to throw light on this question we must consider that divine providence disposes not only what effects shall take place but also from what causes and in what order these effects shall proceed now among other causes human acts are the causes wherefore it must be that men do certain actions not that they thereby may change the divine disposition but that by those actions they may achieve certain effects according to the order of the divine disposition and the same is to be said of natural causes and so it is with regard to prayer for we pray not that we may change the divine disposition but that we may impotrate that which God has disposed to be fulfilled by our prayers in other words that by asking men may deserve to receive what Almighty God from eternity has disposed to give as Gregory says in his dialogues 18 reply to Objection 1 we need to pray to God not in order to make known to him our needs or desires but that we ourselves may be reminded of the necessity of having recourse to God's help in these matters reply to Objection 2 as stated above our motive in praying is not that we may change the divine dispositions but that by our prayers we may obtain what God has appointed reply to Objection 3 God bestows many things on us out of his liberality even without our asking for them but that he wishes to bestow certain things on us at our asking is for the sake of our good namely that we may acquire confidence in having recourse to God and that we may recognize in him the author of our goods hence Chrysostom says think what happiness is granted thee what honor bestowed on thee when thou conversest with God when thou talkest with Christ when thou askest what thou wilt whatever thou desirest third article whether prayer is an act of religion Objection 1 it would seem that prayer is not an act of religion since religion is a part of justice it resides in the will as in its subject but prayer belongs to intellect of part as stated above in article 1 therefore prayer seems to be an act not of religion but of the gift of understanding whereby the mind ascends to God Objection 2 further the act of Latria falls under a necessity of precept but prayer does not seem to come under a necessity of precept but to come from the mere will since it is nothing else than a petition for what we will therefore prayer seemingly is not an act of religion Objection 3 further it seems to belong to religion that one offers worship and ceremonial rights to the Godhead according to Cicero in his rhetoric but prayer seems not to offer anything to God but to ask to obtain something from him therefore prayer is not an act of religion on the contrary it is written in Psalm 140 verse 2 and a gloss on the passage says that it was to signify this that under the old law incense was said to be offered for a sweet smell to the Lord now this belongs to religion therefore prayer is an act of religion I answer that as stated above in question 81 articles 2 and 4 it belongs properly to religion to show honor to God where for all those things through which reverence is shown to God belong to religion now man shows reverence to God by means of prayer insofar as he subjects himself to him and by praying confesses that he needs him as the author of his goods hence it is evident that prayer is properly an act of religion reply to objection 1 the will moves the other powers of the soul to its end as stated above in question 82 article 1 first reply and therefore religion directs in the will directs the acts of the other powers to the reverence of God now among the other powers of the soul the intellect is the highest and the nearest to the will and consequently after devotion which belongs to the will prayer which belongs to the intellect of part is the chief of the acts of religion since by it religion directs intellect to God reply to objection 2 it is a matter of precept not only that we should ask for what we desire but also that we should desire a right but to desire comes under a precept of charity whereas to ask comes under a precept of religion which precept is expressed in Matthew 7.7 where it is said ask and ye shall receive reply to objection 3 by praying man surrenders his mind to God since he subjects it to him with reverence and so to speak presents it to him as appears from the words of Dionysius quoted above in article 1 objection 2 wherefore just as the human mind excels exterior things whether bodily members those external things that are employed for God's service so to prayer surpasses other acts of religion 4th article whether we ought to pray to God alone objection 1 you would seem that we ought to pray to God alone prayer is an act of religion as stated above in article 3 but God alone is to be worshiped by religion therefore we should pray to God alone objection 2 further it is useless to pray to one who is ignorant of the prayer but it belongs to God alone to know one's prayer both because frequently prayer is uttered by an interior act which God alone knows rather than by words according to the saying of the apostle in 1 Corinthians 14 15 I will pray with the spirit I will pray also with the understanding and again because as Augustine says in Death Burial and the hereafter 13 the dead even the saints know not what the living even their own children are doing therefore we ought to pray to God alone objection 3 further if we pray to any of the saints this is only because they are united to God now some yet living in this world or even some who are in purgatory are closely united to God by grace and yet we do not pray to them therefore neither should we pray to the saints who are in paradise on the contrary it is written in Job 5 1 call if there be any that will answer the and turn to some of the saints I answer that prayer is offered to a person in two ways first as to be fulfilled by him secondly as to be obtained through him in the first way we offer prayer to God alone since all our prayers ought to be directed to the acquisition of grace and glory which God alone gives according to Psalm 83 verse 12 the Lord will give grace and glory but in the second way we pray to the saints whether angels or men not that God may through them know our petitions but that our prayers may be effective through their prayers and merits hence it is written in Apocalypse 8 4 that the smoke of the incense namely prayers of the saints ascended up before God this is also clear from the very style employed by the church in praying since we beseech the blessed Trinity to have mercy on us while we ask any of the saints to pray for us reply to Objection 1 to him alone do we offer religious worship when praying from whom we seek to obtain what we pray for because by so doing we confess that he is the author of our goods but not to those whom we call upon as our advocates in God's presence reply to Objection 2 the dead if we consider their natural condition do not know what takes place in this world especially the interior movements of the heart nevertheless according to Gregory in his commentary on Job 1221 whatever it is fitting the blessed should know about what happens to us even as regards the interior movements of the heart is made known to them in the word and it is most becoming to their exalted position that they should know the petitions we make to them by word or thought and consequently the petitions which we raise to them are known to them through divine manifestation Objection 3 those who are in this world or in purgatory do not yet enjoy the vision of the word so as to be able to know what we think or say wherefore we do not seek their assistance by praying to them but ask it of the living by speaking to them 5th article whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray Objection 1 we ought not to ask for anything definite when we pray to God according to Damascene in On the True Faith 324 to pray is to ask becoming things of God wherefore it is useless to pray for what is inexpedient according to James 4 3 you ask and receive not because you ask amiss now according to Romans 826 we know not what we should pray for as we ought therefore we ought not to ask for anything definite when we pray Objection 2 further those who ask another person for something definite strive to incline his will to do what they wish themselves but we ought not to endeavor to make God will what we will on the contrary we ought to strive to will what he wills according to a gloss on Psalm 32 1 rejoice in the Lord, O ye just therefore we ought not to ask God for anything definite when we pray Objection 3 further evil things are not to be sought from God and as to good things God himself invites us to take them now it is useless to ask a person to give you what he invites you to take therefore we ought not to ask God for anything definite in our prayers on the contrary our Lord in Matthew 6 and Luke 11 taught his disciples to ask definitely for those things which are contained in the petitions of the Lord's prayer I answer that according to Valerius Maximus Socrates deemed that we should ask the immortal gods for nothing else but that they should grant us good things because they at any rate know what is good for each one whereas when we pray we frequently ask for what it had been better for us not to obtain this opinion is true to a certain extent as to those things which may have an evil result and which man may use ill or well such as riches by which as stated by the same authority may have come to an evil end honors which have ruined many power of which we frequently witness the unhappy results splendid marriages which sometimes bring about the total wreck of a family nevertheless there are certain goods which man cannot ill use because they cannot have an evil result such are those which are the object of beatitude and whereby we merit it and these the saints seek absolutely when we pray as in Psalm 79 verse 4 show us thy face and we shall be saved and again in Psalm 118 verse 35 lead me into the path of thy commandments reply to objection one although man cannot by himself know what he ought to pray for the spirit as stated in the same passage helpeth our infirmity since by inspiring us with holy desires he makes us ask for what is right hence our lord said in John 4 24 that true adores must adore in spirit and in truth reply to objection two when in our prayers for things concerning our salvation we can form our will to gods of whom it is written in 1st Timothy 24 that you will have all men to be saved reply to objection three God so invites us to take good things that we may approach to them not by the steps of the body but by pious desires and devout prayers 6th article man ought to ask God for temporal things when he prays objection one it would seem that man ought not to ask God for temporal things when he prays we seek what we ask for in prayer but we should not seek for temporal things for it is written in Matthew 633 seek ye first the kingdom of God and his justice and all these things shall be added to the temporal things which he says we are not to seek but they will be added to what we seek therefore temporal things are not to be asked of God in prayer objection two further no one asks save for that which he is solicitous about now we ought not to have solicitude for temporal things according to the saying of Matthew 625 be not solicitous for your life what you shall eat therefore we ought not to ask for temporal things when we pray objection three further by prayer our mind should be raised up to God but by asking for temporal things it descends to things beneath it against the saying of the apostle in 2 Corinthians 418 while we look not at the things which are seen but at the things which are not seen for the things which are seen are temporal but the things which are not seen are eternal therefore man ought not to ask God for temporal things when he prays objection four further man ought not to ask of God other than good temporal things but sometimes temporal things when we have them are harmful not only in a spiritual sense but also in a material sense therefore we should not ask God for them in our prayers on the contrary it is written in Proverbs 30 verse 8 give me only the necessaries of life I answer that as Augustine says in his letter it is lawful to pray for what it is lawful to desire now it is lawful to desire temporal things not indeed principally by placing our end therein but as helps whereby we are assisted intending towards beatitude in so far to wit as they are the means of supporting the life of the body and are of service to us as instruments in performing acts of virtue as also the philosopher states in ethics 1.8 Augustine too says the same to Proba when he states that it is not unbecoming for anyone to desire enough for a livelihood and no more for this sufficiency is desired not for its own sake but for the welfare of the body or that we should desire to be clothed in a way befitting one station so as not to be put out of keeping with those among whom we have to live accordingly we ought to pray that we may keep these things if we have them and if we have them not that we may gain possession of them reply to objection 1 we should seek temporal things not in the first but in the second place as Augustine says in his commentary on the sermon 1.16 when he says that this that is the kingdom of God is to be sought first he implies that the other that is temporal goods is to be sought afterwards not in time but in importance this as being our good the other as our need reply to objection 2 not all solicitude about temporal things is forbidden but that which is superfluous and inordinate as stated above in question 55 article 6 reply to objection 3 when our mind is intent on temporal things in order that it may rest in them it remains immersed therein but when it is intent on them in relation to the acquisition of beatitude it is not lowered by them it raises them to a higher level reply to objection 4 from the very fact that we ask for temporal things not as the principal object of our petition but as subordinate to something else we ask God for them in the sense that they may be granted to us so far as they are expedient for salvation end of question 83 part 1 read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert thank you