 Yes. It's identifiers. Yeah. Hello. Hello. Hello. This is Albert Otti, DPHM and Press Agency. I have a question about what you said about North Korea today in the board regarding the observations of the opening of a tunnel at the nuclear test site. First question, when did you observe that in the opening? And what makes you think that the opening of the tunnel might be a preparation to a test? Well, on the observation, I think we've been having regular updates of the imagery, which seem to indicate and to confirm the activity around this adit where the activity is taking place. And the fact that the assessment of the expert is that, is because this is consistent with similar activity and images previous to other tests taken place in the DPRK on past occasions. Of course, this is an assessment and prognosis we cannot say for sure, but it's pretty consistent. Hi. Raqida Bahnam from Al-Arabiya TV. Hello. I wanted to ask you on Iran, we all know that there's a resolution that will be voted on within this week. And you expressed worry that Iran is not cooperating with you. But Iran, on the other hand, said that they will respond in case there was such a resolution. Do you not worry that such resolution might have a counter-effect on your work? And Iran might maybe cut all ties and not allow you any access anymore? Well, of course, there's a bit of speculation in your question. The resolution, as you know, is a matter of member states. I'm not behind or in favor or against. Resolutions are things that countries decide to do when they feel that the board needs to express its voice on something. On the possible actions that might be taken, well, we will see when that happens. I believe that it's in no one's interest that the cooperation between the agency and Iran diminishes even further. So I hope that this will not be the case. And on the contrary, as I said, this will be a reminder for Iran and for us and for everybody that we really need to get down to work and clarify these issues that have been outstanding for too long. I did you, François Murphy from Royce. Hello. We've become used to seeing you going to Tehran shortly before board meetings like this one. But you didn't do that this time. You went to Israel instead. So how are we to interpret that? What's the message that you were sending there, given that Israel has carried out a tax against or appears to have carried out a tax against Iran's nuclear facilities? Yes, et cetera, et cetera. Well, no message, absolutely no message. I am doing what I need to do. It is true, like you are recalling, on previous occasions near or close to the sessions of board of governors, there were invitations from Iran for me to come and try to have some 11th hour agreement on this and that. On this occasion, I don't know about their motivations, but what I could say from the strictly processed point of view, there was very little we could add, since we had, in fact, implemented what we had decided in one of the streets back in February, March, where we had this joint statement with Mr. Salami and then we decided how we were going to work. And the results are what they are and what you have seen in my report. So it is not that I decided not to go. First of all, I was not invited and I believed I could have manifested my intention to go, but I thought that at this stage, we have completed a process. I think we have to sit down urgently, if possible, and see how we continue with this. So, as I said, there is no travel agenda, messaging here whatsoever, no. Since you mentioned the process, so are you essentially saying that this discussion that you've created for three months, these three months, so essentially that's come to an end and now you're hoping to provide something else? We have to recognize that we have not been able to get the results we were expecting and I think my reports are quite clear, quite graphic. I've been trying to put clarity in the reports, so it's very, very obvious what was done and why we believe that what has been said to us is technically not credible or the information is simply not there. So at the end of this line, we say, okay, well, this is where we are. The issues are outstanding. You may have also noted that I have a refrain for getting into definitive language or assessments to the effect that there is nothing more to do. Of course, we have to always, always continue until we can clarify this. I don't see any other way to be honest. So let's see. I think the deliberations of member states now are due. Countries are going to express their views on the matter, including Iran and starting maybe from Iran. And then we will have to, these issues will not go away. They are not solved. They are not clarified. I know you don't take a view on whether there should be a resolution, but do you think a resolution could change anything in this dialogue you're trying to have with Iran? I think we need to continue working with Iran and with a sense of finality. What we got from them is clearly not sufficient or it's inadequate. So with this, we cannot move forward. And the problem here is that Iran needs to continue working with us. They have a very important, very ambitious nuclear program, as you know. And now their declarations are in question because there are loopholes, there are doubts, which are relatively important. So I think it's in their own interest to clear this in order to continue. There is no other way, to be honest. There is no other way. Thanks, DG. Hello. Hi, I have a couple of questions that are non-Iran related. One on al-Qus and one on nuclear safety. I'll take the one at a time if I can. Please. You mentioned ABAC and the consultations going on relation to the withdrawal of special fissionable material to power a Brazilian nuclear submarine. Can you give us a little bit more detail on the kind of interfaces ABAC is having with the agency right now? And how is it that two countries that are outside of the additional protocol are going to be informing best practices about exercising InfoCirc 153 paragraph 14? I mean, this is an unusual circumstance, is it not? No, it's not unusual starting by the last one because the naval propulsion is covered by the Quotipartite agreement. So they are strictly within the normative structure if you wish, if you want, sorry. So I don't see that. The other parts of your question are more of a value judgment sort of nature, which I hope every country signs an additional protocol and subscribes to an additional protocol. But in this particular case, there is article 14 of the Quotipartite agreement, which is more or less a copy of 13 of the normal CSA. And Brazil, in this particular case, has invoked that. So we are at the beginning of the process. We are just at the beginning. They have formally, which is very important, they have formally invoked the provisions of this article that says that they are intending to exclude some material at some point in the future for this purpose. So now we start the process of working on the special agreements or arrangements that are necessary for them to be able to do that. Right, just to follow briefly. But I mean, this could be something that is important for informing a broader international discussion over AUKUS as well. Yes. Well, it's very interesting, because frankly speaking, and if I can use a maritime analogy, these are uncharted waters. It has never been done before. So I think here you will have a very interesting convergence of legal matters, how they apply, and also technical, because many things that we will be doing will depend on the technical paths that they take to get to the reactors that they want. And as you know, there are different options. Existing options and future ones that can apply. And the two projects have similarities, but also have profound differences. So I think it's like we are going to be building our own road as we move forward. OK, and then just on the nuclear safety side, obviously you've been highlighting the very novel safety situation in Ukraine where reactors are operating in the theater of conflict. But yet we've known since at least 2020 that the Pentagon and Westinghouse are developing project Pele, which explicitly is designing an SMR for battlefield use. So my question is, since 2020, that reactors are being developed for theaters of conflict, why hasn't the IAEA already begun the process of developing a safety standard to help inform the best practices of safely operating a reactor in a theater of conflict? What kind of contact groups with military officials, for example, would be needed? And what's the status of that thought process here? Well, I can tell you, setting aside the specific war theater adaptable reactor issue, which is a very, very unique case, there are a number of groups, including within the agency of regulatory nature dealing with standards for SMRs. So that is already underway. And I have very recently launched yet another initiative, which is called NESI for Nuclear Harmonization Standardization, blah, blah initiative, where we are bringing together for the first time, I would say this is interesting, industry, this private sector we are going to start in a couple of weeks, and the regulators from all over the world to see how we can work in a more, I would say, dedicated way and looking into the concrete problems dealing with regulatory licensing, pre-licensing approaches. And on the other side, on the industry, what can be standardized or not, et cetera. So I think there is a reasonable amount of work which is ongoing. I wouldn't say there is a vacuum there. Hold on. That was an artful dodge. But you answered my question with the response about SMR regulation, which is fine. But I was asking specifically about operating reactors intentionally inside of the theater of conflict and whether or not there needs to be safety standards about how best to do that. I mean, do you operate reactors at full capacity? Do you need to inform military commanders? Well, as you know, the issue of the protection of nuclear installations in general, be it small, medium size, or big size, has been dealt with in international law in general. So given that fact, I don't see a movement in industry to prepare reactors that would be fit for battlefield. This is not a trend that I see. There could be one or the other, like you are mentioning, idea here. But frankly, I don't see countries, economies, looking into their energy infrastructure bearing in mind or factoring in war as an element. And actually, another important element, which is relevant in this case, it is not as a result of war, but as you know very well, the physical integrity of reactors as a result of terrorism, not duress terrorism in the early 2000s, was very, very much strengthened, not thinking about conventional type war. But then we have the physical protection that exists now, which is pretty adequate even for situations like this. I don't want to imply that this is ideal. It's a very terrible, dangerous situation about which I am bringing the alarm bell constantly in particular when it regards to sub-region. But yeah, I hope that is. So there's no safety standard in progress. There are safety standards that may apply to conflict situations, but there are no safety standards under a title war. There's no new safety standards that have been started since the Ukraine war. OK. No. Hi, it's Stephanie Liechtenstein, freelance journalist. Hello. I would have one question on your trip to Israel and another specific question on Iran also. Given the large amount of highly enriched uranium that Iran has accumulated according to your reports, some experts say that there's now a risk that basically Iran could dash to enough material for one bomb in between inspections, also given the fact that your inspections are quite limited at the moment, how concerned are you about this? And is this, according to your view, a real possibility? And the second question on your trip to Israel, we all, probably all of us, have read reports in Wall Street Journal about internal documents that Iran obtained two decades ago, allegedly to evade inspections and to maybe deceive the agency. I was wondering if you discussed the matter, if you gained any further insights on this. Yeah, thank you. No. Very simple. We did not discuss. On the second question. We did not discuss this. As you know, this is an old story. These things happened, I believe, around 15 years ago or something like that. So no, the matter was not discussed. And of course, that was a regrettable episode, if it happened and how it happened. There were some investigations, but none to identify clearly how this could have happened. Since then, the protection of confidential information has increased dramatically in general, and in particular at the agency as well. Regarding the amounts of material, I would say there is no need for things between inspections. This is going to happen because they continue to enrich in a quite sustained way. And so it's a matter of time where they get to one or more so-called significant quantities, as you know, which is the quantity for which the terminology indicates for which the development of a nuclear weapon cannot be excluded. And that depends on the levels of enrichment. That depends on whether you're talking about plutonium or enriched uranium. So this is going to happen. Of course, having an SQ, as we call them, does not mean having a bomb. That's a very important, of course. It's not a banality. It's a very, very important thing. And of course, we expect this to be an important development in the process in general. But again, that emphasizes and stresses the importance for us to continue to have as much access for the inspectors as we can have, which is already problematic. And we will see what happens with that. So it's not if it's just a matter of time. There are people who say that already now they have a significant or two different people have different calculations. And it's very close. Let's put it like that. But this idea that you are about to cross a line, which is going to create a dramatically different situation, I wouldn't say so, because it's going to happen. Anyway, they're very close. Anyway, they're very, very close. So for all we can say and see, the development of new centrifuges continue in Iran, which means that they want to have technology to produce more and faster. So it cannot be avoided anymore? Do you see any way how this can be avoided? What can be avoided? The fact that Iran can reach this however you want to qualify that threshold level, can this be avoided? Well, Iran can stop doing what they are doing. And they can stop doing that through different means. One can be by an agreement, for example, like the JCPOA, or by they themselves deciding to slow down. Hello, DJ Guruji. Hello. I am Samayedi from Iran International TV. Hello. Tehran has threatened any resolution in the Board of Governors even today. Yes. We'll have consequences for who push the resolution. My question is, how much can this treat affect IAEA's decisions, the activities, and cooperation with Iran? And second question is about your reports. In your report, you told there is no transparency in Iran's answers. Could you tell more detail about the Iran's answers to your questions? Thank you. Well, the answers, we have received some answers, but they tend to be, as we said, technically not credible. They are telling us, I wouldn't get into technical details, but to give you a flare of what this could be. They explain the presence of certain particles in a way which our assessment indicates that cannot be the answer. So when that happens, we try to go back, as you would do, in a normal dialogue or process, let's say. And we are, you know, sometimes the story changes a little bit, or sometimes they tell us that it's because of a sabotage by a third party, which again is not technically possible because of the nature, the spread, the different varieties of isotopic particles that have been found. So we have told them. This is not, it doesn't explain. What we found cannot be explained in this way. So this is a bit where we are in a sort of impasse, or I don't know, circle, from which we have to go out. We need to bring the conversation to a different level where we will have real, the engagement is there, but there's no result. So under cooperation, going back to your question, I would say the cooperation can always be better, can always be deeper, but at the same time, let's not forget that there is a minimum of cooperation that must exist for as long as Iran continues to be a signatory of the NPT and has a comprehensive safeguards agreement in place. So it's a matter of graduation. It's a matter of intensity and effectiveness of the verification process. Going to the issue again of the threat or the consequences of the colleague was asking before. For me, I don't think I should be speculating what's going to happen. I hope that all that is going to happen is that as a result of the deliberations of the board this week, we will come out of this with a sense of commitment to solve this thing once and for all. Because as I said, this is not going to disappear. This is always going to be there, and it's in the interest of Iran in the first place to clarify it. Anna Saubrei for the German decide. I would like to follow up on what Frau Lichtenstein asked. You said Iran is very, very close to building a bomb or a clue. Having a significant quantity of material. Having a bomb is a different thing. I know, yes. But could you put a figure to that? So you said different experts have different. The matter of weeks, maybe. The matter of weeks or maybe a short month or two months, it depends. I don't like, here at the agency, we are very meticulous in our calculations. And sometimes we see some analysts, NGOs, and analysts that come up with calculations, basically based on what they are assessing without being there. We are there, so we have the very, I would say, heavy responsibility to try to be very precise. And this may vary, because sometimes there are technical problems as well with the cascades. And so there is a deceleration, or there is a slowdown, or there is an acceleration. But to give you the idea that it is something that will happen, they will reach a significant quantity. In general, if you take all the material that they have, if you were to put it together, to bundle it together, there is already a significant quantity. Give and take a little bit, because you may lose a bit of material in the process, but more or less. So and since they are continuing with the process, well, then it's a matter of just a few weeks, let's say. Let's put it like that. Thank you. Hello. Sayena Abdurrahman. I would like to ask about your visit to Israel. Yes. Come back to the visit. If you can walk us through the details, what have you talked to them about, that they haven't signed the MPT, that this makes it not, they don't have the right to talk or to make such big noise since they are not really part of this agreement. Yes. This is one thing. The second thing is a technical question about, is members obliged to, not to enrich uranium, since they are doing it under the supervision of the agency and the inspectors are there? If it is not a secrecy, the activities is not a secret. You mean in Iran, the enrichment? No, it's not a secret. It's not a secret. Iran, of course, is in my mind. Yeah. Thank you. No, that's not a secret. First to start, if I understood correctly what you wanted to know, the enrichment activities that are taking place in Iran, we are aware of. We are following them. We are inspecting them. This is how we can say how much material and for the different isotopic concentrations is. OK, so that is one thing. On the issue of Israel, it's very important. As the director general of the IEA, I talk to everybody. I must. I must. So I cannot talk to some and not to others. It's the same thing that I'm doing with Ukraine and it's the same thing that I'm doing here. On the contrary, one would say that it's very, very important that the head of an international organization has an opportunity to talk to those that have a special interest or that are saying important things about it and could influence one way or the other. So this is why I was there to say, let the IEA work. The inspection work can yield good results if we have the access that we need from Iran. And this, for me, has a tremendous value, a positive value in the sense that what I am protecting here is the ability to continue my work, to continue my work without any external factors that could affect it. So I feel it is really my responsibility to do that. To them about Iran, but what about them themselves, about that Israel to allow inspecting inspections in its lands and these things? As you know, I would, and I think I said it in my public communications about this. I believe that every country should sign the NPT, including Israel, including Israel, and have all the nuclear facilities and installations under the safeguards of the IEAEA, all right? So I don't have the power to force a country to do something. Israel is one of the few countries in the world, as you know, but it's not the only one. There are other important countries that have chosen not to sign the NPT, all right? So they are part of that, they are there in that group. Still, I think it was important that my message would be clear in this sense, that for me it would be very, very important. And I don't think I can add anything else, frankly. It is important that the voice of the agency is heard everywhere. Yes, thank you. I have a question about the report regarding the open questions with Iran in the report and also in previous reports. It was spelled out that one of the open questions regards a neutron detector and the possible presence of neutrons at one of the sites. Why did you mention this or how does this fit into your investigation? I'm asking because in the very few years ago in the report, the IEAEAEAEAEAEA said that basically their conclusion or assessment was that Iran had worked on elements of a nuclear weapons program. So how does a neutron detector fit into that? Well, it is related to that. We have information and subsequent to getting that information, which was not present at the time where the agency had that assessment, uranium particles were found at the place. So everything is part of a mosaic, if you want, that lead us to put certain questions. And the fact of the matter is that when you look at it, it is obvious that when the agency normally has an impression that there is something to be asked, then the facts prove that we were aiming more or less right because we found these particles in this particular place. And something else, which is also a recurrent issue, we have assessments that correspond to the information we have at a certain moment. The agency never closes anything forever. If there is more information arriving and we look at it and we see that is relevant, for example, in this case, which applies to Marivan, then we ask more questions on the basis of this information we have. Well, as you know, these systems are relevant for non-peoples purposes. Hi, DG, Nifon Telefon Network. Actually, I want to ask two questions. Yes. Can I do that? Yes, you can. Okay. When it's about the Ukraine, you mentioned about the appeal from the president of the Ukraine that he's appealing to UN and to you to do that. Now, does that sort of change the character or the members' constellation of the mission? Because now it's more like a multinational, yeah. So can you clarify if that changes? And question number two is the first treaty conference of the Nuclear Ban Treaty is taking place at the end of this month. Is AEEA going to have anybody representing? Thank you. Well, on the first question or the second, sorry, this conference is a conference on a treaty which deals with something different than what is in my mandate, right? So we all recognize the importance of global nuclear disarmament, which I think is a goal that the international community as such has embraced and it is present in the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. So most probably we will have a representative there as an observer to follow that, but we don't have a formal role in that process. And the first part was, sorry. Ah, yeah, yeah, sorry, excuse me for that. Yeah, it's an interesting point. Of course, I must say that whatever we would do at Zaporizhia is something that the agency alone is going to be doing when it comes to safeguards or safety or security activities. This is part of our legal relationship with Ukraine. So we cannot invite others, third parties to. But there has been some discussion. I cannot reveal everything because I'm still in the process of consulting with Ukraine and also Russia that there could be some international presence to add on to the team going there. I would kindly ask you to excuse me because we are in the middle of a negotiation about that. But what I want to assure you is that whatever we are going to be doing there would be exclusively carried out by our inspectors and there is a lot that would need to be done. Now, what we are trying to do is we are looking at what we call the modalities. What are the modalities? Who comes? Who is there? How we do it? There is, of course, as you know, this facility is in a relatively unstable, not to say directly dangerous territory because it's quite close to the theater of operations at the moment. So in order for me and for my technical experts to reach the place, we need the UN involvement and Secretary General Guterres has been following that. I'm very grateful to him because we are in regular contact and he is providing support with armored vehicles and other things. So I hope to be able to report positive news in the next few days about that. Thank you. One final question. Sorry, just to follow up on Israel. Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz recently talked about facilities being built underground and abutting Natanz. I'm just wondering if you could tell us what... Well, I don't know about what Minister Gantz said but this is no secret. As you know, the then president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Dr. Salehi, himself informed that Iran was going to build more underground facilities to install some centrifuges basically or some other things. So we know that this work is ongoing. So it's nothing new. Okay, so this is the tunneling sort of in the hills near Natanz that had been reported. So abutting is a bit of an exaggeration. So it's like... I don't want to comment on what he's had to say but the reality is that yes, there is work and there's that. Thank you very much. It was a pleasure. Thank you.