 3, 2, 1, go. Yep, now it says it's live. I guess we'll start with an introduction. I'm Tom Lawrence of Lawrence Systems, and you are? I am Dodie Glenn, and I am from PC Pitstop. I'm the VP of Cybersecurity. Cool, all right. Now we got that done. Where do you want to start? Well, a little bit about myself first. Just to kind of give you the background. I've been in this industry in the security space probably about 13, maybe 14 years. I've done everything from your technical support phone calls, talking to mom and dad, to technical support calls, talking to IT admins, to QA, to development, to managing an entire antivirus lab of about 100 people, to now product management, and now where I'm at as a VP of Cybersecurity for PC Pitstop. So my role and responsibility now is to really oversee the research part, but also to bring together certain partners, certain organizations together with us, and kind of do good to really protect the systems that are out there. One of the partnering companies is Microsoft, right? So in order for us to be in the Windows Security Center, we've got to have a relationship with Microsoft that says we have been validated. We've been certified. Our product meets specific criteria to do what we say we do, and we've got to show that we pass tests, not just one test. There are a couple tests we've got to pass and sign off all their contracts and red tapes that Microsoft loves to do. But yeah, I've been doing this for quite some time. I'm also on the board of directors for a nonprofit organization that their sole mission is to look at building better test scores or test sets rather, sorry, to have scores that are meaningful rather for anti-malware products rather than just having these fly-by-night kind of companies that say I get paid $100,000, $200,000, whatever the money is to give a good test score. These are guys that are actually doing it for the better sake of the community. And I think prior to even joining PC Fit Stop testing has always been something that's very important to me. And I think as a former IT admin in my past life, it's important to know how well your product is stacking up against others because there are times where products do go up and down. There are some times where your product may fall through. And the way I view testing as a guy who's at a software company now is I let this third-party testing really validate not only the work that I'm doing, but also provide feedback. There are a number of bugs that we've found in our own software from testing houses. So it's kind of a two-way relationship. Yeah, no, that's right because this is one of the problems we had as well. And one of our policies as a company where IT services company, but we don't resell any particular antivirus that way we never stay committed, so to speak, to anyone because it's subjective. You go back a few years ago, the product we recommend is not the product we recommend today because the market changes, the product, we see failures in it. So we're always dynamic in that. We want to provide always the best antivirus for our clients, not the one that pays the most commission or the one that was in highlight because some company bought a two-page ad in PC Magazine type thing. You know what I mean? And then I'll admit it's still a challenge finding really good information that's concise and clear for AV. And I think part of it just the nature of virus being really tricky, because if one product blocks A virus, another one blocks another, but the opposite can be true for a different virus where that product blocked and the other one didn't. So we are always looking ourselves in the best interest of our business clients and consumer clients for recommending the best one. And that's always a little tricky. And you've only got, what, 54 or 55 plus to choose from? Yeah. And then I've seen, I'm not as clear on this, maybe you know about some of the insights. I mean, we know the big names in the game, but as I understand, some of these companies are now allow a white label rebranded version of their software. It's really common. Really, really common. That makes it more confusing. So technically it's actually this product, but it's been white labeled as another product so another company can resell it under a different name. And that only makes it that much harder to figure out is this even, the challenge for removing viruses sometimes is what is this on your computer that's popping up? Is this actually a legit program or is this some random program that we need to remove? That's a challenge. We have a retail store. So that's a challenge we face every time retail customers bring in computers or virus mobile, that's the puzzle we have to solve is do we need to remove this? And what actually brings us to this conversation all the way around to PCmatic is malware bytes has become one of our absolute, and me and every other tech, they've become the juggernaut of the market for cleanup software with their malware bytes and their latest version. And of course, it flagged your software. So I think that's what brought us all together today. Yeah, so the little kind of story behind that is last month we had a couple of notifications from our customers and employees as well, noticed that malware bytes was detecting us as what we call this potentially unwanted application. P-U-A, P-U-P, attention wanted program, however you wanna call it. So when we look at that, we're like, okay, well, we're not potentially unwanted. And I think where the sort of painting with the same brush happens is that twofold. Number one, we advertise on TV and that's rare for security companies to do. And what happened in prior years, you had the finally fast.coms and the fix my PC nows and those guys that really were like true potentially unwanted programs. So what we ended up doing is we did do some system optimization and these optimizations are done really as a legacy software. So when you look at our software, the core component of the software is not the optimization. And I think in the video that you had done or you had shown and thank you for doing that really just shows a lot about the optimization stuff. What the customer gets from actually paying for the software, think of the optimization stuff as a freebie. The optimization stuff is for legacy systems. Let's face it, Microsoft did a really good job at optimizing the registry for TCP IP stat for the TCP IP stat. They did a good job handling or now even detecting that you've got an SSC drive and the machine so that you don't do a disc defrag. You don't wanna do that on one of those drives. So those kind of add-ons, if you wanna call them add-ons aren't the reason why our customers are buying their software. In fact, we don't even lead with any of that stuff in any of our marketing material or any of our television heads. We are an endpoint security product. Right. That means that we protect the endpoints from malware from hitting the machine. And we work in a preventative fashion instead of a reactive fashion. Prior company, two, two and a half, three years ago I was pulling in a million new samples every day coming into the networks. One million new, brand new, new MD5s, unique MD5s every single day. The fact is blacklisting technology cannot keep up with that. You can look at Gartner, you can look at Forrester, you can look at all the analysts that are out there and they'll tell you the exact same thing. It cannot keep up with it. Signatures are dead when it comes to detecting files that are blacklisted to put on a black list. Yeah, and it's a big undertaking what you guys are doing with white listing. I mean, white listing is, so to speak, what makes the tablet, phone, Android ecosystem work and where Microsoft's gonna go because you only get applications in there. And I'm a big Linux guy. So, and being Debian based, you only pull from the repositories. You're essentially white listing. That's why it's not that Linux doesn't get virus, but if you're only pulling from repositories, you simply don't have as much to worry about because you're pulling from a single source of executables that have already been certified prior to you downloading them, which is inverted to the way it works in the general Microsoft world. Right, so, and I think really it's important to talk about sort of the past a little bit about why white listing in the past has failed so badly. And we're even guilty of that to a degree. In 2014, you saw we had a lot of false positives on our virus bulletin, some sluggishness with it. Then we were using another third-party antivirus product. You had mentioned the white labeling stuff. Well, we OEM the third-party component. We no longer knew that we're all our own code right now. So our stability has improved significantly. But going back to the white listing stuff, manageability was the biggest problem. And what I mean by that is you would put the file, you'd put your anti-malware white listing application on. And like you said, your machine would stop working effectively. And then what would happen is the IT admin would have to go through his entire network and find out what's good, what's bad, and then white list that. But the honest was on him to do it. It wasn't on the vendor to do it. So my research team, actually what they do is they go out and actually find the good files for the IT admins and for consumers. And rather than having the consumer do it themselves and figure out what's right or wrong, we take that burden. This is what our employees are being paid to do. Now, what happens is, though, is you'll see some files that are based over in the UK, which is where one testing house is, or in Germany or Austria, which is where two other ones are located at. And they're prevalent to that location. They're prevalent to that geographical location. So while you'll see some FPs that are out there, what happens is on our technology, we're no lie about it, the majority of our customer are US based customers. They don't have these issues where when you install the actual component after you've paid, because that's where we do charge for the security component. That's when you really start seeing the power of what this white listing can do. And more so, you see that files aren't being blocked incorrectly. And the other cool thing is, you've probably seen what I call an extinction event with several anti-malware companies that are out there. They blow away Explorer.exe, or they blow away Shell 32. They blow away something, and now you're rebooting and your machine's completely dead. Yeah, those are now never good. So our thing is- You weren't gonna have that problem what, two years ago or three years ago? Yeah, I won't talk about brands just to stay- One of the big guys did it. Yeah, one of those big guys, right? Right, the David Hasselhoff commercial guys, right? If you've seen those. But yeah, so what we do is we don't remove the file off the machine. It's important to know that, because what we'll do is just prevent the execution of it. So two things. One, if the file is a false positive, it's not gonna go away. You can whitelist it manually yourself and then the problem's solved. Or two, four hours, between four to 24 hours later, our team's gonna see the file. We get all the files that we block and we'll see the file and we'll whitelist it globally so that everybody gets that new whitelist update. So that's the cool thing about having an automated cloud system. Yeah. We do it for one customer. There's only one victim who gets the signatures. So the other thing to bring up about, go ahead. No, I said that completely makes sense. I mean, it's a very logical way to do it. It comes down to, I mean, creating that many signatures. It's the inverse problem of trying to create that many signatures for the viruses. It's trying to create that many whitelist signatures. So I said, I don't know. There's so many programs out there. I'm not sure how you guys, maybe it's- Yeah, but that's the cool thing about partnerships. The cool thing about partnerships is we actually have ways where we can, where we talk to companies like Microsoft who expose APIs to us that basically secret sauce stuff that we know that it is from Microsoft. And we can validate that it's a Microsoft house that we know we never detected. And the other thing is we can predict what they're going to do when they release new pieces of software. So will we ever have zero false positives? Never. We'll never. Which brings me to the next point. We'll never pass a virus bulletin test. They test 800 to a million files for clean files. If you detect one file, you fail the test. Doesn't matter if you've got a perfect score on the detection rates. If you've missed one file, it could be a game that they happen to have in their repository that no one cares about. But it's the false positive, you missed it, you fail the test. Our goal isn't to pass that test. Our goal is to block as much malware as we can. And that's what we do at the RAP score. That's why the RAP score. And more specifically, to the points that you had brought up about, I can't find the numbers where they're getting 82% here and 93% here and whatever. Yeah, that's very confusing. Yeah, we're working on that right now. Kudo, appreciate you, the heads up for that. Actually, the marketing team and column team or communications team are actually working on that right now to clear that up. We'll link to each one of those reports. I would appreciate that. That'd be great. I mean, I just, I prefer truth in advertising. It's as simple as, yeah, because I've never been a fan of convoluted marketing speak. I'm a tech guy. Yeah, I'm a techie guy too, right? Marketing's not my forte, right? Right, right. Sorry, let's talk zeros and ones instead of the little- We deal in levels of precision. The data doesn't lie either. So that's the other thing, right? So, but no, so we took some test reports that were actually, you had to scroll to the bottom of the page of the wrap test itself to see that proactively, meaning how the test was done was how well do you block from, you know, point from zero day of no more definition updates up until day five or day 10? How well did you perform at protecting or guessing what the new malware was going to be? That's what our strong point is, is we can block all the new malware. You can make something polymorphic server side. I don't care, it doesn't bother me. It's never gonna appear on my white list. Therefore it's never gonna run. And that's really, you know, just like the iPhone, if you wanna download something, you go to an app store and you download it. We don't have an app store. We have a cloud-based system. But if you go and download Microsoft Office and put it on your machine, it's gonna run. If you download the latest in the video drivers, it's gonna run. We have the common software. Exactly, all the common software, but even some of the uncommon software, right? We have some companies, you know, some of our enterprise companies are law enforcement agencies. Okay, well, that's not common software to have their specific software that can search, you know, the FBI records or whatever it is they're trying to do. Right. But that's software we've got white listed. So even uncommon software is there too. But to kind of bring up the whole malware bytes issues, when we released the test results and the commission test result, as you pointed out, we paid to have that test result done, test done, for a specific reason. But when we released that test result, very soon after was when this malware bytes fiasco started. And we, you know, call it coincidence, call it the planets lined up. We, you know, we feel that, hey, there's something a little bit off when it happens that way. So what did we do? Well, we went to our normal communication channels. We sent an email to pup or pua at malwarebytes.org. Got a reply back with a block of copy paste text. This is why we detected you. Had no truth about what it was that we did. I then said, okay, I happened to know a higher up a VP over there. Used to work with them before too. Reached out to this VP, contacted him and he said, I'll pass the ball to the team that handles it. Okay, cool. This back and forth, back and forth and then dead silence. We actually created the blog post that you had posted to, or in your video. That was actually a response to the detection, not a response to malwarebytes blog post. So there's actually another blog post that talks about the direct response to what malwarebytes is saying. Malwarebytes was on the 12? What's the date? I'm looking at it. December the 12th. Yeah, December 12th was malwarebytes and you guys then posted on the 23rd. Yep, and there's multiple posts that are there as well. But the case in point is we then reached out to malwarebytes and then posted publicly on their blog as a comment to their blog post. Still to this day, they have yet to allow our blog or our reply back to come back publicly. Oh, really? Allowing us to reply. Right, so what did we do? Okay, let's bring it up to a different level. Let's take the CEO of malwarebytes and the CEO of PC Fit Stop. And let's let those two guys work together. And so far it's been successful. But what's been said about the product originally versus what is now being said about the product and what's now being corrected in the product really aren't making sense. They're not, they're two, there's three different things in fact. And truthfully what it boils down to is color coding of the software where we say something is red to become, to look dangerous. We've now changed all of that. There are some changes that we've made also to, you know, instead of it being fixed now, it's just the next button. There's no fix now. That's gone. And basically anything that's red is gonna be something that's either a vulnerability or that's going to be malware itself. No more red color for anything but that. And then the text is also being changed out. We're not gonna offer a 30 day trial like some of the things do. I'm fine with that. I don't understand why that was a criteria in Malwarebytes' past either. That's a business choice. Some people offer demos, some people don't. And that's why, you know, I skipped right over it. I said, Malwarebytes thinks this, but I made no other comment. It's a business decision. It's exactly right. But what we do do. Business owner, I understand that. We don't have a free 30 day trial. We don't fix it. Give me a free hour of your time to fix my computer so I can tell that you're a good technician that I can repair my computer. I didn't understand that in Malwarebytes' for a criteria, but yeah. I did agree with the, and I did see you changed it when I did your blog post was stopping Google Chrome from auto-updating. Cause that's one of the reasons we like Google Chrome as a browser and, you know, Firefox does it now too, is the auto update feature helps keep people safe because reality is no one will update things unless you automate the update. That's, you know that as well as I do when it comes to end users. And I'm glad you brought that point up because there's a reason why we do what we do when it comes to stopping the auto update. And the reason is that we take care of the auto-updating ourselves. You update Chrome? Yes, absolutely. Same with Java as well. And the reason why we do that is because some of these applications, Java, comes down with all the extra bundled crap. Correct. The ask.com, and it doesn't automatically install unless it's been configured that way. By default, it throws the dialog box. What have we taught users in the past? Don't click on anything. So what do they do? They click the X and it goes away. And 24 hours later, it pops back up again. And it's this method of insanity that just happens and they're like, what do we do? And then you guys come along as a service tech and responsibly say, that needs to be updated. Let's go ahead and update Java. So we actually strip out the bad stuff but still behind the scenes allow vulnerability updates to occur. The other thing we do are driver updates which very few companies actually do. Slim drivers is one but they're dedicated to just doing drivers only. They really don't do anything else but we do update our own drivers. Why? Because of the same situation. Not only that, there are vulnerabilities in drivers, right? There's the keyboard mouse issue I think with Logitech that happened at one point. Yeah, but it's also becoming a moot point with Windows 10. It is, that's right. Windows 10 is doing a better job. I don't say they're a hundred percent. But it's their own animal but we've lived with them. We have to, right? Exactly, exactly. But that's what we do, right? This is what we're doing. So when it looks bad like for somebody to say, oh my God, a security company is disabling an update service for a vulnerable product or a product that's potentially vulnerable. How dare you do that? Totally get that. I would do the same thing if my, but what needs to be known or clear is that we do the updating for the customer. It happens when we get the updates. It happens automatically. They don't know about it. It's underneath the covers. It happens behind the scenes. No adware gets installed, no true potentially unwanted software gets installed to worse things like that. And the customer is still remaining protected. So it's a big difference there. So with regards to the fragmentation stuff that had been mentioned though, why would we disable the distifrag? Again, legacy software, Windows 10 supports SSD drives. We have technology in ours that actually will detect an SSD drive. You can see it in the front UI. And we won't do a distifrag when we know that it's on an SSD drive. So it's preventative maintenance in that regard. So don't do something that's gonna be bad for an SSD drive. All I'm gonna do is have them. In my test, because I loaded in VirtualBox, it was my usual test environment. I noticed I wanted to turn off my auto-updater for the VirtualBox drivers. Is that something you guys update as well? I wasn't clear on that. It is one of those where we've known that it can cause performance issues, but I've actually already documented that. And because we're a cloud product, we're gonna remove that detection. Most of our customers aren't on a VirtualBox system anyways. Right? Yeah, probably not. We're using bare metal systems. But again, this is why Benefit of testing helps us. It's something you called out. My dev team is already working on it to remove it. And it's a signature update, right? It's just in the cloud. And the next time you do a scan, it won't show up anymore. So, but to me, detecting that does not make you a PUA PAP product. No. It's just like Microsoft and Google and everybody else we have bugs. It's just a bug that needs to be fixed. Okay, cool. It was just the confusing point because you're clarifying, I have now learned more in this, what are we, 20 minutes into this? I've learned more in 20 minutes than I did spending an hour on your website reading through your marketing. Yeah, and the thing is, is when you've got marketing, how many seconds do you have to engage with a customer? 10, maybe 15, maybe 30 at most. We do a 60 minute commercial sometimes and even those don't always do that well. You know, so just. And these are very different things. Generally, the channels, a lot of antivirus companies go through is educating people in the tech field, such as myself, small businesses. You know, we are the service people because it's not like they call you and ask you for a recommendation. We're doing their IT. So the question they always have us, what antivirus should I use? So as a service provider and other people in my category, we all have the same question. And this is, you know, this is something we need to know. So I would, if you guys had a four texts only, we would read that, we look at that. MillerBytes does that. Because I think, you know, they have a more technical, they're not trying to sell it to the end user. Most of their focus is trying to get a business like mine to recommend it, recommend their product. So they give us a lot of tech details of what's going on. That's, maybe that's something you guys can talk to marketing where, you know, I like blog posts from the tech side. Less, you know what I mean? That's, and that's how I base my judgment on many products that we recommend. Less marketing, more technical, how we're doing things. Yeah, because I would have answered the questions and I don't need to do a video when I have the answer. I can go, oh, look, this blog post tells me that they're, they ought to turn this off because they can do this. And this, they make it very clear and concise and technical details. You're right. It's not for the end user. It's not, you know, I wouldn't waste any time putting a commercial together on that because that's the wrong audience. We're not the ones watching commercials. We're, we're hitting the blog post going, all right, how is this database updated? How does it do this? We're looking for the technical details so we can recommend it as a product to our clients. Yeah, and then I'll throw the offer to you. You know, if you want a lifetime license, I'm glad to throw you one. You know, it's not a problem at all. We can get you a lifetime license. You can actually turn on the real security part of the product instead of just seeing the intro part what we call Super Shield, which is a real-time protection. You can see it actually go to work. And if you want to throw malware on it, if you've got your own repository or whatever, you can throw it. Try to run the malware on it. It's not going to work, right? Because it's not going to execute. That's actually been really tricky. We were doing it the other day. We were trying to find some crypto lockers. And this is actually one of my shocking tarts and this is why I didn't do a video on it. Even crypto locker that was only like two or three days old from one of the sites we were able to pull it from would not execute in, what is that? So the one built in to Windows, the Defender. Yeah, Defender actually found it. And we were shocked because it was like, wow, within 24 hours, even Windows Defender was able to find this malware. We- But imagine that window of opportunity though. How many people were infected where before? Yeah. About the zero hour weren't detected, you know? Oh yeah, yeah, you're right. So that's, yeah, you're right about that. And so it's kind of interesting, malware testing. Like I said, I played around with it out of my own curiosity, but it's very time consuming. And the more I play with it as a thought, I realized the complexities of it and had a more hands-on understanding of malware. We always see everything post-mortem. You know, we deal with infected machines. We're always trying to figure out how can we stop from being infected. But I understand why it's so tricky to find anyone who's doing testing on it because it's so hard to get ahold of these viruses. Samples, yeah. It's a tricky, it's a tricky problem. It is, and that's sort of, that's one of the challenges that the testing houses face is where do I get all my samples from? Because you'll start tainting the test if you take samples from vendors because you know the vendor's only gonna send you stuff that's a hundred percent. Exactly the problem. And that's why we did the commission test. That was one thing that we were like, we're not gonna do this. We want you guys to find the files yourselves. I don't wanna know anything about your files until the test is over. So the other thing that I wanted to point out was you were talking about dates. One was listed as September for the test and the other one was October for the comparative test. What happens is the test is commissioned in September. The results come out in October. Yeah, and that's why I commented. I said maybe that's what it was. That's exactly what it was. But let's put aside those tests in and of themselves. Let's talk about MRGF-ATAS. It was another testing house company. So Q3 2016, they did what they call a 360 in the wild test. And, you know, Maurerbytes had scored on this particular test 58.6% on the detection rate for Maurerbytes. On Microsoft's turn, Microsoft scored 64.9%. So this wasn't even a commission test that we had done. These are just results that somebody had done. And no one commissioned these tests, actually. You know, then another organization called Zamanic commissioned a test with them. And again, it's a common thing to do in this industry when you don't have people, or you don't have vendors rather, you want to participate in public testing. You've got to pay to get them to do the test because it costs money. But they scored second best, right? Instead of scoring 40 out of 40 for the samples, they only detected 23 out of 40 for the samples. So I think what's happening or what you're seeing and your point is exactly true because I've done the same thing. I use Maurerbytes or I've used Maurerbytes to be the kind of cleanup crew. But as for something that's going to stop Maurer 100%, the test results are showing differently. The test results are showing that it's not the best at doing that. But for cleanup, 24 hours later, 48 hours later for a system that's become pretty hung up. Heck, yeah, that's in my arsenal, right? Same, I check this probably AW cleaner, ADW cleaner for as another one, maybe C cleaner would be another one to clean things up. We all have our own tool set, right? Even bootable disks are out there. Hirons bootable disk is one that a lot of techies like to have in their set. Pitman Pro is another one that people use. So yeah, that's great. But our point is, and really where our big success is at, is rather than playing cleanup crew, we want to prevent it from ever getting one. And I think that's the way it has to go. Because with ransomware, right now, 300 bucks, great. What if they start infecting people at $500,000, $600,000, $17,000 that we've seen before creation? We've seen them hit the larger hospitals and seen them in the news for what $17,000 was for the transit authority or something. So yeah, the numbers are going up. And why? Because it's pretty darn lucrative, right? Before they were focusing on Trojans. How can I steal bank account information? How can I do that? Some of those products or malware are now kind of long gone. But the same actors that are behind it or the groups that are behind it, switch gears and move it over to ransomware. So a few years ago, we were talking about it. And it's like, what if ransomware became a worm? Hey, lo and behold, guess what? It now jumps from local machine, network shares, bounces all around. And it's now become worm-like in nature, too. Have you seen the new social engineering tactic? There's a couple. The text message one that they're doing. Yeah, and the one where if you infect two other machines and they pay- Yeah, they credit you. Yeah. Come on. I mean, you know, these, and it's kind of interesting because some of these organizations, these criminal organizations actually have customer support lines, too. Yeah. You can actually call them up and say, hey, Boris, wherever you're located at. Can you help me unlock my machine? Sure, and I'll help you go to bit, you know, go get some Bitcoins and then pay it and things like that. You know, 10, no, probably less than 10 years, maybe six, seven years ago, they were doing the green dot money pack. Yeah. Right? You had to go to Walgreens and go buy one of the little credit card things and prepay it and then give them the pin number and then they pull your money. Why do you think they stopped? Was no longer anonymous. Yeah. Once again. Green dot has tracking capabilities of who it's actually being redeemed by. Hey, look, they know that. What they do, they stopped doing it. So now they switched over to Bitcoin, which is more anonymous. And now what happens? Well, supposedly you can track some Bitcoin transactions. So they do Bitcoin washing. Yeah. Right? So now they wash them. So they pass them out all over to a bunch of different people and or wallets and make it a lot harder to figure out where things are going. So it's the evolution of malware. And I think this is, you know, this is just some of their tactics and one more attack factor thing. Oh, exactly. Exactly. So we want to be able to stop it. And again, it's preventative measures. It's really key with us. Stop it before it can ever hit the disk. And that's where application language comes in. Well, you did a good job of answering all the questions. This was very insightful. I look forward to maybe a blog post with some of the little things. But like I said, you guys said you're doing Chrome. I've seen your response. And like you said, you're going to waitlist the virtual box thing. So anything else we have on the topic list here? No. I think that's about it. Like I said, I just want to thank you for your timing and spend a little bit of time with me. And then doing the review. Those often don't happen. And a lot of times, it's just jump on the bandwagon of whatever anyone else is saying. So back then, you took time. I mean, I think people post. I don't like any time someone just posts a video going, that company sucks, XYZ, blah, blah, blah, yell, yell, yell. And that's it. That's never, as you tell, a much more rational person. I like concise things. I like sharing knowledge. And that's why I want to take time. I would have never called you guys out without ever offering you a rebuttal. I mean, I don't know why mail or vice wouldn't let your blog post be on it. So I'm like, no, I don't want to be on it. Yeah, I want to hear the response. I want to know, what do you guys have saying, what you said was very concise and intelligent? No, I appreciate it. Anytime, anytime. You're more than welcome to reach out to me. I'll pass you my email address offline too. And yeah, anytime you got any questions, by all means, let me know. And if you're stumbling across something or you need another connection to link up to, by all means, let me know. All right. Well, thank you very much. And you have a wonderful evening. You too, take care. Yeah, it's 1.30 here. So it's afternoon. Good afternoon. All right, you take care.