 CHAPTER 1 OF HOMENIMS, CINNANIMS, CINNANIMS, PARANIMS. Things are termed homonymous, of which the name alone is common, but the definition bracket of substance according to the name close bracket is different. Thus quotes man, and quote the picture of a man, close quote, are each termed quotes animal. Since of these, the name alone is common, but the definition bracket of the substance according to the name close bracket is different. As if anyone were to assign what was in either to constitute it, quotes animal, he would allege the peculiar definition of each. But those are called synonyms, of which both the name is common, and the definition bracket of the substance according to the name close bracket is the same. As both quote a man, close quote, and quote an ox, close quote, are quotes animal. For each of these is predicated of as quotes animal by a common name, and the definition of the substance is the same, since if a man gave the reason of each as to what was in either to constitute it, quotes animal, he would assign the same reason. Again, things are called paranims, which, though differing in case, have their appellation bracket according to name close bracket from something as quote agramarian, close quote, is called so from quotes grammar, and quote a courageous man, close quote, from quotes courage. Chapter 2 of the logical division of things and their attributes. Of things discourse upon, some are enunciated after a complex, others after an incomplex manner. The complex as quote a man runs, close quote, quote a man conquers, close quote, but the incomplex as quotes man, quotes ox, quotes runs, quotes conquers. Likewise, also, some things are predicated of a certain subject, yet are in no subject as quote the man, close quote, is predicated of a subject, i.e. of quote some certain man, close quote, yet is in no subject. Others again are in a subject, yet are not predicated of any subject. Bracket, I mean by a thing, being in a subject, that which is in anything, not as a part, but which cannot subsist, without that in which it is, close bracket, as quote a certain grammatical art, close quote, is in a subject, quote the soul, close quote, but is not predicated of any, and quote this white thing, close quote, is in a subject, quote the body, close quote. Bracket, for all quotes color is in quotes body, close bracket, but is predicated of no subject, but some things are both predicated of and are in a subject, as quotes science, is in a subject, quote the soul, close quote, but is predicated of a subject, namely quotes grammar. Lastly, some are neither in nor are predicated of any subject, as quote a certain man, close quote, and quote a certain horse, close quote. For nothing of this sort is either in or predicated of a certain subject. In short, individuals and whatever is one in number are predicated of no subject, but nothing prevents some of them from being in a subject, for quote a certain grammatical art, close quote, is amongst those things which are in a subject, but is not predicated of any subject. Chapter 3 of the connection between predicate and subject. When one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, whatever things are said of the predicate, may be also said of the subject as quote the man, close quote, is predicated of quote some certain man, close quote, but quote the animal, close quote, is predicated of quote the man, close quote, wherefore, quote the animal, close quote, will be predicated of quote some certain man, close quote, since quote quote, the certain man, close quote, is both quote's man and quote's animal. The differences of different genera and of things not arranged under each other are diverse also in species as of quote's animal and quote's science. Or the differences of quote's animal are quote's quadruped, quote's biped, quote's winged, quote's aquatic. But none of these forms the difference of quote's science. Since quote's science does not differ from quote's science in being quote's biped. But as to subaltern genera there is nothing to prevent the differences being the same as the superior are predicated of the genera under them so that as many differences as there are of the predicate so many will there also be of the subject. Chapter 4 Enumeration of the Categories Some things in complex enunciated each signifies either substance or quantity or quality or relation or where or when or position or position or action or passion. But substance is bracket to speak generally close bracket as quote's man quote's horse quantity as quote's two or quote three cubits close quote quality as quote's white a quote grammatical thing close quote relation as quote a double close quote quote a half close quote quote's greater where as quote in the form close quote quote in the lyceum close quote when as quote's yesterday quote last year close quote position as quote he reclines close quote quote he sits close quote possession as quote he is shod close quote quote he is armed close quote action as quote he cuts close quote quote he burns close quote passion as quote he is cut close quote quote he is burnt close quote. Now each of the above considered by itself is predicated neither affirmatively nor negatively but from the connection of these with each other affirmation or negation arises. For every affirmation or negation appears to be either true or false but of things enunciated without any connection none is either true or false as quotes man quotes white quotes runs quotes conquers chapter five of substance. Substance in its strictest first and chief sense is that which is neither predicated of any subject nor is in any as quote a certain man close quote or quote a certain horse close quote but secondary substances are they in which as species those primarily named substances are inherent that is to say both these and the genera of these species as quote a certain man close quote exists in quotes man as in a species but the genus of this species is quotes animal these therefore are termed secondary substances as both quotes man and quotes animal but it is evident from what has been said that of those things which are predicated of a subject both the name and the definition must be predicated of the subject as quotes man is predicated of quote some certain man close quote as of a subject and the name at least is predicated for you will predicate quotes man of quote some certain man close quote and the definition of man will be predicated of quote some certain man close quote for quote a certain man close quote is both quotes man and quotes animal where for both the name and the definition will be predicated of a subject but of things which are in a subject for the most part either the name nor the definition is predicated of the subject yet with some there is nothing to prevent the name from being sometimes predicated of the subject though the definition cannot be so as quotes whiteness being in a body as in a subject is predicated of the subject bracket for the body is termed quotes white close bracket but the definition of quotes whiteness can never be predicated of body all other things however are either predicated of primary substances as of subjects or are inherent in them as in subjects this indeed is evident from several obvious instances thus quotes animal is predicated of quotes man and therefore is also predicated of some quote certain man close quote for if it were predicated of no quotes man particularly neither could it be of quotes man universally again quotes color is in quotes body therefore also is it in quote some certain body close quote for if it were not in quote someone close quote of body singularly it could not be in quotes body universally so that all other things are either predicated of primary substances as a subjects or are inherent in them as in subjects if therefore the primal substances do not exist it is impossible that any one of the rest should exist but of secondary substances species is more substance than genus for it is nearer to the primary substance and if anyone explains what the primary substance is he will explain it more clearly and appropriately by giving the species rather than the genus as a person defining quote a certain man close quote would do so more clearly by giving quotes man then quotes animal for the former is more the peculiarity of quote a certain man close quote but the latter is more common in like manner whoever explains what quote a certain tree close quote is will define it in a more known and appropriate manner by introducing quotes tree then quotes plant besides the primary substances because of their subjection to all other things and these last being either predicated of them or being in them are for this reason especially termed substances yet the same relation as the primary substances bear to all other things does species bear to genus for species is subjected to genus since genera are predicated of species but species are not reciprocally predicated of genera whence the species is rather substance than the genus of species themselves however as many as are not genera are not more substance one than another for he will not give a more appropriate definition of quote a certain man close quote who introduces quotes man then he who introduces quotes horse into the definition of quote a certain horse close quote in like manner of primary substances one is not more substance than another for quote a certain man close quote is not more substance than a quote certain ox close quote with reason therefore after the first substances of the rest species and genera alone are termed secondary substances since they alone declare the primary substances of the predicates thus if anyone were to define what quote a certain man close quote is he would by giving the species or the genus define it appropriately and will do so more clearly by introducing quotes man then quotes animal but whatever else he may introduce he will be introducing in a manner foreign to the purpose as if he were to introduce quotes white or quotes runs or anything else of the kind so that with propriety of the others these alone are termed substances moreover the primary substances because they are subject to all the rest and all the others are predicated of or exist in these are most properly termed substances but the same relation which the primary substances bear to all other things to the species and genera of the first substances bear to all the rest since of these are all the rest predicated for you will say that quote a certain man close quote is quote agramarian close quote and therefore you will call both quotes man and quotes animal quote agramarian close quote and in like manner of the rest it is common however to every substance not to be in a subject for neither is the primal substance in a subject nor is it predicated of any but of the secondary substances that none of them is in a subject is evident from this quotes man is predicated of quote some certain close quote subject quotes man but is not in a subject for quotes man is not in quote a certain man close quote so also quotes animal is predicated of quote some certain close quote subject quotes man but quotes animal is not in quote a certain man close quote moreover of those which are in the subject nothing prevents the name from being sometimes predicated of the subject but that the definition should be predicated of it is impossible of secondary substances however the definition and the name are both predicated of the subject for you will predicate the definition of quote a man close quote concerning quote a certain man close quote and likewise the definition of quotes animal so that substance may not be amongst the number of those things which are in a subject this however is not the peculiarity of substance but difference also is of the number of those things not in a subject for quotes pedestrian and quotes biped are indeed predicated of quote a man close quote as of a subject but are not in a subject for neither quotes biped nor quotes pedestrian man the definition also of difference is predicated of that concerning which difference is predicated so that if quotes pedestrian be predicated of quotes man the definition of quotes pedestrian will be predicated of man for quotes man is quotes pedestrian nor let the parts of substances being in holes as in subjects perplex us so that we should at any time be compelled to say that they are not substances for in this manner things would not be said to be in a subject which are in any as parts it happens indeed both to substances and to differences alike that all things should be predicated of them univocally for all the categories from them are predicated either in respect of individuals or of species since from the primary substance there is no category for it is predicated in respect of no subject but of secondary substances species indeed is predicated in respect of the individual but genus in respect to species and two individuals so also differences are predicated as the species and as the individuals again the primary substances take the definition of species and of genera and the species the definition of the genus for as many things as are said of the predicate so many also will be said of the subject likewise both the species and the individuals accept the definition of the differences those things at least were univocal of which the name is common and the definition the same so that all which arise from substances and differences are predicated univocally nevertheless every substance appears to signify this particular thing as regards then the primary substances it is unquestionably true that they signify a particular thing for what is signified is individual and one in number but as regards the secondary substances it appears in like manner that they signify this particular thing by the figure of appellation when anyone says quotes man or quotes animal yet it is not truly so but rather they signify a certain quality for the subject is not one as the primary substance but quotes man and quotes animal are predicated in respect of many neither did they signify simply a certain quality as quotes white for quotes white signifies nothing else but a thing of a certain quality but the species and the genus determine the quality about the substance for they signify what quality a certain substance possesses still a wider limit is made by genus than by species for whoever speaks of quotes animal comprehends more than he who speaks of quotes man it belongs also to substances that there is no contrary to them since what can be contrary to the primary substance as to a certain quotes man or to a certain quotes animal for there is nothing contrary either at least two quotes man or two quotes animal now this is not the peculiarity of substance but of many other things as for instance of quantity for there is no contrary to quotes to cubits nor to quotes three cubits nor to quotes ten nor to anything of the kind unless someone should say that quotes much is contrary to quotes little or quote the great close quote to quote the small close quote but of definite quantities none is contrary to the other substance also appears not to receive greater or less i mean not that one substance is not more or less substance than another for it has been already said that it is but that every substance is not said to be more or less that very thing that it is as if the same substance be quotes man he will not be more or less quotes man neither himself than himself nor another quotes man than another for one quotes man is not more quotes man than another as one quote white thing close quote is more and less quotes white than another and one quotes beautiful thing more and less quotes beautiful than another and quote the same thing close quote more or less than quotes itself so a body being quotes white is said to be more quotes white now than it was before and if quotes warm it is said to be more or less quotes warm substance at least is not termed more or less substance since quotes man is not said to be more quotes man now than before nor anyone of such other things as our substances hence substance is not capable of receiving the greater and the less it appears however to be especially the peculiarity of substance that being one and the same in number it can receive contraries which no one can affirm of the rest which are not substances as that being one in number they are capable of contraries thus quotes color which is one and the same in number is not quotes white and quotes black neither the same action also one in number both bad and good in like manner of other things as many as are not substances but substance being one and the same in number can receive contraries as quote a certain man close quote being one and the same is at one time white and at another black and warm and cold and bad and good in respect of none of the rest does such a thing appear except someone should object by saying that a sentence and opinion are capable of receiving contraries for the same sentence appears to be true and false thus if the statement be true that quote someone sits close quote when he stands up this very statement will be false and in a similar manner in the matter of opinion for if anyone should truly opine that a certain person sits when he rises up he will opine falsely if he still holds the same opinion about him still if anyone should even admit this yet there is a difference in the mode for some things in substances being themselves changed are capable of contraries since cold being made so from hot has changed for it is changed in quality and black from white and good from bad in like manner as to other things each one of them receiving change is capable of contraries the sentence indeed and the opinion remain themselves altogether immovable but the thing being moved a contrary is produced about them the sentence indeed remains the same that quote someone sits close quote but the thing being moved it becomes at one time true and at another false likewise as to opinion so that in this way it will be the peculiarity of substance to receive contraries according to the change in itself but if anyone admitted this that a sentence and opinion can receive contraries this would not be true for the sentence and the opinion are not said to be capable of contraries in that they have received anything but in that about something else a passive quality has been produced for in that a thing is or is not in this is the sentence said to be true or false not in that itself is capable of contraries in short neither is a sentence nor an opinion moved by anything once they cannot be capable of contraries no passive quality being in them substance at least from the fact of itself receiving contraries is said in this to be capable of contraries for it receives disease and health whiteness and blackness and so long as it receives each of these it is said to be capable of receiving contraries where for it will be the peculiarity of substance that being the same and one in number according to change in itself it is capable of receiving contraries and concerning substance this may suffice chapter six of quantity of quantity one kind is discreet and another continuous the one consists of parts holding position with respect to each other but the other of parts which have not that position discreet quantity is as number and sentence but continuous as line superficies body besides place and time for of the parts of number there is no common term by which it's parts can join as if five be a part of 10 five and five can join at no common boundary but are separated three and seven also can join at no common boundary nor can you at all take a common limit of parts in number but they are always separated whence number is of those things which are discreet in like manner a sentence for that a sentence is quantity is evident since it is measured by a short and long syllable but I mean a sentence produced by the voice as its parts concur at no common limit for there is no common limit at which the syllables concur but each is distinct by itself a line on the contrary is continuous for you may take a common term at which its parts meet namely a point and of a superficie's a line for the parts of a superficie's coalesce in a certain common term so also you can take a common term in respect of body namely a line or a superficie's by which the parts of body are joined of the same sort our time and place for the present time is joined both to the past and to the future again place is of the number of continuous things for the parts of a body occupy a certain place which parts join at a certain common boundary where for also the parts of place which each part of the body occupies join at the same boundary as the parts of the body so that place will also be continuous since its parts join at one common boundary moreover some things consist of parts having position with respect to each other but others of parts not having such position thus the parts of a line have relative position for each of them lies somewhere and you can distinguish and set out where each lies in a superficie's and to which part of the rest it is joined so also the parts of a superficie's have a certain position for it may be in like manner pointed out where each lies and what have relation to each other and the parts of a solid and of a place in like manner on the contrary in respect of number it is impossible for anyone to show that its parts have any relative position or that they are situated anywhere or which of the parts are joined to each other nor as regards parts of time for not one of the parts of time endures but that which does not endure how can it have any position you would rather say that they have a certain order in as much as one part of time is former but another latter in the same manner it is with number because one is reckoned before two and two before three and so it may have a certain order but you can by no means assume that it has position a speech likewise for none of its parts endures but it has been spoken and it is no longer possible to bring back what is spoken so that there can be no position of its parts since not one endures some things therefore consist of parts having position but others of those which have not position what we have enumerated are alone properly termed quantities all the rest being so denominated by accident for looking to these we call other things quantities as whiteness is said to be much because the superficie is great and in action long because of its time being long and motion also is termed much yet each of these is not called a quantity by itself for if a man should explain the quantity of an action he will define it by time describing it as yearly or something of the sort and if he were to explain the quantity of whiteness he will define it by the superficies for as the quantity of the superficies so he would say is the quantity of the whiteness whence the particulars we have mentioned are alone properly of themselves termed quantities none of the rest being so of itself but according to accident again nothing is contrary to quantity for in the definite it is clear there is nothing contrary as to quote two cubits close quote or two quotes three or two quotes superficies or to anything of this kind for there is no contrary to them except indeed a man should allege that quotes much was contrary to quotes little or the quotes great to the quotes small of these however none is a quantity but rather belongs to relatives since nothing itself by itself is described as great or small but from its being referred to something else a mountain for instance is called quotes little but a millet seed quotes large from the fact of the one being greater but the other less in respect of things of the same nature whence the relation is to something else since if each were called quotes small or quotes great of itself the mounted would never have been called quotes small nor the seed quotes large we say also that there are quotes many men in a village but quotes few at Athens although these last are more numerous and quotes many in a house but quotes few in a theater although there is a much larger number in the latter besides quote two cubits close quote quotes three and everything of the kind signify quantity but quotes great or quotes small does not signify quantity but rather relation for the quotes great and quotes small are viewed in reference to something else so as evidently to appear relatives whether however anyone does or does not admit such things to be quantities still there is no contrary to them for to that which cannot of itself be assumed but is referred to another how can there be a contrary yet more if quotes great and quotes small be contrary it will happen that the same thing at the same time receives countries and that the same things are contrary to themselves for it happens that the same thing at the same time is both quotes great and quotes small something in respect of this thing is quotes small but the same in reference to another is quotes large so that the same thing happens at the same time to be both quotes great and quotes small by which at the same moment it receives contraries nothing however appears to receive contrary simultaneously as in the case of substance for this indeed seems capable of contraries yet no one is at the same time quotes sick and quotes healthy nor a thing quotes white and quotes black together neither does anything else receive contraries at one and the same time it happens also that the same things are contrary to themselves since if the quotes great be opposed to the quotes small but the same thing at the same time be great and small the same thing would be contrary to itself but it is amongst the number of impossibilities that the same thing should be contrary to itself where for the great is not contrary to the small nor the many to the few so that even if someone should say that these do not belong to relatives but to quantity still they will have no contrary the contrary however of quantity seems especially to subsist about place since men admit quotes upward to be contrary to quotes downward calling the place toward the middle quotes downward because there is the greatest distance from the middle to the extremities of the world they appear also to deduce the definition of the other contraries from these for they define contraries to be those things which being of the same genus are most distant from each other nevertheless quantity does not appear capable of the greater and the less as for instance quote two cubits close quote for one thing is not more quote two cubits close quote than another neither in the case of number since quotes three or quotes five are not said to be more than quotes three or quotes five neither quotes five more quotes five then quotes three quotes three one time also is not said to be more quotes time than another in short of none that I have mentioned is there said to be a greater or a less where for quantity is not capable of the greater and less still it is the special peculiarity of quantity to be called quotes equal and quotes unequal for each of the above mentioned quantities is said to be quotes equal and quotes unequal less body is called quotes equal and quotes unequal and number and time are predicated of as quotes equal and quotes unequal likewise in the case of the rest enumerated each one is denominated quotes equal and quotes unequal of the remainder on the contrary such as are not quantities do not altogether appear to be called quotes equal and quotes unequal as for instance disposition is not termed entirely quotes equal and quotes unequal but rather quotes similar and quotes dissimilar and whiteness is not altogether quotes equal and quotes unequal but rather quotes similar and quotes dissimilar. Hence, the peculiarity of quantity will especially consist in its being termed quotes equal and quotes unequal. Chapter 7 of relatives Such things are termed quotes relatives, which are said to be what they are, from belonging to other things, or in whatever other way they may be referred to something else. Thus, the greater is said to be what it is in reference to another thing, for it is called greater than something, and the double is called what it is in reference to something else, for it is said to be double a certain thing, and similarly, as to other things of this kind. Such as these are of the number of relatives, as habit, disposition, knowledge, position. For all these specified are said to be what they are, from belonging to others, or however else they are referable to another, and they are nothing else, for habit is said to be the habit of someone, knowledge the knowledge of something, position the position of somewhat, and so the rest. Relatives therefore are such things as are said to be what they are, from belonging to others, or which may somehow be referred to another, as a mountain is called quotes great, in comparison with another, for the mountain is called quotes great in relation to something, and quotes like is said to be like somewhat, and other things of this sort are similarly spoken of in relation to something, reclining, station, sitting, are nevertheless certain positions, and position is a relative, but to recline, to stand, or to sit, are not themselves positions, but are peronymously denominated from the above named positions. Yet there is contrariety in relatives, as virtue is contrary to vice, each of them being relative, and knowledge to ignorance, but contrariety is not inherent in all relatives, since there is nothing contrary to double, nor to triple, nor to anything of the sort. Relatives appear notwithstanding to receive the more and the less, for the like and the unlike are said to be so more and less, and the equal and the unequal are so called more and less, each of them being a relative, for the similar is said to be similar to something, and the unequal unequal to something. Not that all relatives admit of the more and less, for double is not called more and less double, nor any such thing, but all relatives are styled so by reciprocity, as the servant is said to be servant of the master, and the master master of the servant, and the double double of the half, also the half, half of the double, and the greater greater than the less, and the less less than the greater. In like manner it happens as to other things, except that sometimes they differ in diction by case, as knowledge is said to be the knowledge of something knowable, and what is knowable is knowable by knowledge. Sense also is the sense of the sensible, and the sensible is sensible by sense. Sometimes indeed they appear not to reciprocate, if that be not appropriately attributed to which relation is made, but here he who attributes heirs, for instance a wing of a bird, if it be attributed to the bird does not reciprocate, for the first is not appropriately attributed, namely quotes wing to quotes bird, since quotes wing is not predicated of it so far as it is quotes bird, but so far as it is quotes winged, as there are wings of many other things which are not birds, so that if it were appropriately attributed it would also reciprocate, as quotes wing is the wing of quote a winged creature close quote, and quote the winged creature close quote is quotes winged by the quotes wing. It is sometimes necessary perhaps even to invent a name, if there be none at hand, for that to which it may be appropriately applied, e.g. if a rudder be attributed to a ship, it is not properly so attributed, for a rudder is not predicated of a ship, so far as it is quotes ship, since there are ships without rudders, hence they do not reciprocate in as much as a ship is not said to be the ship of a rudder, the attribution will perhaps be more appropriate if it were attributed thus, a rudder is the rudder of something ruddered, or in some other way, since a name is not assigned a reciprocity also occurs, if it is appropriately attributed, for what is ruddered is ruddered by a rudder, so also in other things, the head for example will be more appropriately attributed to something headed, then to animal, for a thing has not a head, so far as it is an animal, since there are many animals which have not a head, thus anyone may easily assume those things to which names are not given, if from those which are first he assigns names to those others also, with which they reciprocate, as in the cases adduced, quotes winged, from quotes winged, and quotes ruddered, from quotes rudder, all relatives therefore, if they be properly attributed, are referred to reciprocals, since if they are referred to something casual, and not to that to which they relate, they will not reciprocate, I mean that neither will any one of those things which are admitted to be referable to reciprocals reciprocate, even though names be assigned to them, if the thing be attributed to something accidental, and not to that to which it has relation, for example a servant, if he be not attributed as the servant of a master, but of a man, of a biped, or anything else of the kind, will not reciprocate, for the attribution is not appropriate, if however, that to which something is referred, be appropriately attributed, everything else accidental being taken away, and this thing alone being left, to which it is appropriately attributed, it may always be referred to it as quote a servant, close quote, if he is referred to quote a master, close quote, everything else accidental to the master being left out of the question, bracket as the being quote a biped, close quote, and quote capable of knowledge, close quote, and that he is quote a man, close quote, close bracket, and his being quote a master, close quote alone, left, here the quotes servant will always be referred to him, for a quotes servant is said to be the servant of a quotes master, if again on the other hand, that to which it is at any time referred is not appropriately attributed, other things being taken away, and that alone left, to which it is attributed, in this case it will not be referred to it, for let a quotes servant be referred to quotes man, and quotes wing, to quotes bird, and let the being quote a master, close quote, be taken away from quotes man, the servant will no longer refer to man, since quotes master, not existing, neither does quotes servant exist, so also let quote being winged, close quote, be taken away from quotes bird, and quotes wing, will no longer be amongst relatives, for what is quotes winged, not existing, neither will quotes wing, be the wing of anything, hence it is necessary to attribute that, to which a thing is appropriately referred, and if indeed a name be already given to it, the application is easy, but if no name be assigned, it is perhaps necessary to invent one, but being thus attributed, it is clear that all relatives are referred to reciprocals, naturally relatives appear simultaneous, and this is true of the generality of them, for quotes double, and quotes half are simultaneous, and quotes half existing, quotes double exists, and quote a master, close quote existing, the quotes servant is, and the quotes servant existing, the quotes master is, and other things are also like these, these also are mutually subversive, for if there is no quotes double, there is no quotes half, and no quotes half, there is no quotes double, likewise as to other things of the same kind, it does not however appear to be true of all relatives, that they are by nature simultaneous, for the object of quote science may appear to be prior to quotes science, since for the most part we derive science from things pre-existing, as in few things, if even any, do we see science and the object originating together, moreover the object of science being subverted co-subverts the science, but science being subverted does not co-subvert the object of science, for there being no object of science, science itself becomes non-existent, bracket, since there will be no longer a science of anything, close bracket, but on the contrary, though science does not exist, there is nothing to prevent the object of science existing, thus the quadrature of the circle, if it be an object of scientific knowledge, the science of it does not yet exist, though it is itself an object of science, again quotes animal being taken away, there will not be quotes science, but still it is possible for many objects of science to be, likewise also do things pertaining to sense subsist, since the sensible seems to be prior to the sense, as the sensible being subverted co-subvert sense, but sense does not co-subvert the sensible, for the senses are conversant with body and are in body, but the sensible being subverted, body also is subverted, bracket, since body is of the number of sensibles, close bracket, and body not existing, sense also is subverted, so that the sensible co-subverts sense, sense on the other hand does not co-subvert the sensible, since if animal were subverted, sense indeed would be subverted, but yet the sensible will remain, such for instance as quotes body, quotes warm, quotes sweet, quotes bitter, and everything else which is sensible, besides quotes sense is produced simultaneously with what is quotes sensitive, for at one and the same time quotes animal, and quotes sense are produced, but the quotes sensible is prior in existence to quotes animal or quotes sense, for fire and water, and such things as animal consists of, are altogether prior to the existence of animal or sense, so that the sensible will appear to be antecedent to sense. It is doubtful however whether no substance is among the number of relatives, as seems to be the case, or whether this happens in certain second substances, for it is true in first substances, since neither the holes nor the parts of first substances are relative. Quote, a certain man, close quote, is not said to be a certain man of something, nor, quote, a certain ox, close quote, said to be a certain ox of something, and so also with respect to the parts, for a, quote, certain hand, close quote, is not said to be a certain hand of someone, but the hand of someone, and some head is not said to be a certain hand of someone, but the head of someone, and in most secondary substances the like occurs, thus man is not said to be the man of someone, nor an ox the ox of someone, nor the wood the wood of someone, but they are said to be the possession of someone, in such things therefore it is evident that they are not included amongst relatives. In the case of some secondary substances, there is a doubt, as quote's head is said to be the head of someone, and quote's hand the hand of someone, and in like manner every such thing, so that these may appear amongst the number of relatives. If then the definition of relatives has been sufficiently framed, it is either a matter of difficulty or of impossibility to show that no substance is relative, but if the definition has not been sufficiently framed, but those things are relatives whose substance is the same, as consists with a relation after a certain manner to a certain thing, somewhat perhaps in reply to this may be stated. The former definition however concurs with all relatives, yet it is not the same thing that their being consists in relation, and that being what they are they are predicated of other things. Hence it is clear that he who knows any one relative definitely will also know what is referred to definitely. Wherefore also from this it is apparent that if one knows this particular thing to be among relatives, and if the substance of relatives is the same as subsisting in a certain manner, with reference to something he will also know that with reference to which this particular thing after a certain manner subsists. For if in short he were ignorant of that with reference to which this particular thing after a certain manner subsists, neither would he know whether it subsists after a certain manner with reference to something. And in singulars indeed this is evident, for if anyone knows definitely that this thing is quotes double, he will also forthwith know that definitely of which it is the double, since if he knows not that it is the double of something definite, neither will he know that it is quotes double at all. So again if a man knows this thing to be more beautiful than something else, he must straight away indefinitely know that, than which it is more beautiful. Wherefore he will not indefinitely know that this is better than that which is worse, for such is opinion and not science, since he will not accurately know that it is better than something worse, as it may so happen that there is nothing worse than it. Once it is necessarily evident that whoever definitely knows any relative also definitely knows that to which it is referred. It is possible, notwithstanding, to know definitely what the head and the hand and everything of the sort are, which are substances. But it is not necessary to know that to which they are referred, since it is not necessary definitely to know whose is the head, or whose is the hand. Thus these will not be relatives. But if these be not relatives, we may truly affirm no substance to be among relatives. It is perhaps difficult for a man to assert assuredly anything of such matters, who has not frequently considered them. Yet to have submitted each of them to inquiry is not without its use. End of Chapter 7. Recording in Memory of Mitchell Edwards. Chapter 8 of Categories. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jeffrey Edwards. Categories by Aristotle. Translated by Octavius Freer Owen. Chapter 8. Of the Quality and of Quality. By Quality, I mean that according to which certain things are said to be what they are. Quality, however, is among those things which are predicated multifariously. Hence one species of quality is called quotes habit and quotes disposition. But habit differs from disposition in that it is a thing more lasting and stable. Of this kind, too, are both the sciences and the virtues. For science appears to rank among those things which continue more stable and are hardly removed even when science is but moderately attained unless some great change should occur from disease or from something of the sort. So also virtue as justice, temperance, and so forth, does not appear capable of being moved or changed with facility. But those are termed dispositions which are easily moved and quickly changed as heat, cold, disease, health, and such things. Or a man is disposed after a manner according to these but is rapidly changed from hot becoming cold and from health passing to disease and in like manner as to other things unless some one of these qualities has from length of time become natural, immovable, or at least difficult to be moved in which case we may term it a habit. But it is evident that those ought to be called habits which are more lasting and are with greater difficulty removed. For those persons who do not very much retain the dogmas of science but are easily moved are said not to possess a scientific habit. Although they are in some manner disposed as to science either worse or better so that habit differs from disposition in the one being easily removed but the former is more lasting and less easily removed. Habits are dispositions also but dispositions not necessarily habits. For those who have habits are also after a manner disposed according to them but those who are disposed are not altogether possessed of the habit. Another kind of quality is that according to which we say that men are prone to pugilism or to the course or to health or to disease. In short whatever things are spoken of according to natural power or weakness. For each of these is not denominated from being disposed after a certain manner but from having a natural power or inability of doing something easily or of not suffering. Thus men are called pugilistic or fitted for the course not from being disposed after a certain manner but from possessing a natural power of doing something easily. Again they are said to be healthy from possessing a natural power of not suffering easily from accidents but to be diseased from possessing a natural incapacity to resist suffering easily from accidents. Similarly to these do hard and soft subsist for that is called quotes hard which possesses the power of not being easily divided but quotes soft that which has an impotence as to the same thing. The third kind of quality consists of passive qualities and passions and such are sweetness bitterness sourness and all their affinities besides warmth and coldness and whiteness and blackness. Now that these are qualities is evident from their recipients being called from them quotes qualia as honey from receiving sweetness is said to be sweet and the body white from receiving whiteness in like manner in other things they are called passive qualities not from the recipients of the quality suffering anything for neither is honey said to be sweet from suffering anything nor anything else of such a kind in like manner to these are heat and cold called passive qualities not from the recipients themselves suffering anything but because each of the above mentioned qualities produces passion in the senses they are denominated passive qualities for as sweetness produces a certain passion in the taste and warmth in the touch so also do the rest whiteness and blackness and other colors are on the contrary not called passive qualities in the same manner with the above mentioned but from themselves being produced from passion for that many changes of colors spring from passion is evident since when a man blushes he becomes red and when frightened pale and so everything of this sort whence also if a man naturally suffers a passion of this nature he will probably have a similar color since the disposition which is now produced about the body when he blushes may also be produced in the natural constitution so as that a similar color should naturally arise whatever such symptoms then originate from certain passions difficult to be removed and permanent are called passive qualities for whether in the natural constitution paleness or blackness be produced they are called qualities bracket for according to them we are called quotes qualities close bracket or whether through long disease or heat or any such thing paleness or blackness happens neither are easily removed or even remain through life these are called qualities for in like manner we are called quotes qualities in respect of them not withstanding such as are produced from things easily dissolved and quickly restored are called passions and not qualities for men are not called quotes qualities in respect of them since neither is he who blushes in consequence of being ashamed called red nor he who turns pale from fear called pale they are rather said to have suffered something so that such things are called passions but not qualities like these also are passive qualities and passions denominated in the soul for such things as supervene immediately upon birth from certain passions difficult of removal are called qualities as insanity anger and such things for men according to these are said to be quotes qualities that is wrathful and insane so also as many other mutations as are not natural but arise from certain other symptoms and are with difficulty removed or even altogether immovable such are qualities for men are called quotes qualities in respect of them those which on the other hand arise from things easily and rapidly restored are called passions as for instance where one being vexed becomes more wrathful for he is not called wrathful who is more wrathful in a passion of this kind but rather he is said to have suffered something when such things are called passions but not qualities the fourth kind of quality is figure and the form which is about everything besides rectitude and curvature and whatever is like them for according to each of these a thing is called quotes quality thus a triangle or a square is said to be a thing of a certain quality also a straight line or a curve and everything is said to be quotes quality according to form the rare and the dance the rough and the smooth may appear to signify a certain quality but probably these are foreign from the division of quality as each appears rather to denote a certain position of parts for a thing is said to be quotes dance from having its parts near each other but quotes rare from there being distant from each other and quotes smooth from its parts lying in some respect in a right line but quotes rough from this part rising and the other falling there may perhaps appear to be some other mode of quality but those we have enumerated are most commonly called so the above named therefore are qualities but quotes qualia are things denominated peronymously according to them or in some other manner from them most indeed and nearly all of them are called peronymously as quote a white man close quote from quotes whiteness quote a grammarian close quote from quotes grammar a quote just man close quote from quotes justice and similarly of the rest still in some from no names having been given to the qualities it is impossible that they should be called peronymously from them for instance a quotes racer or quotes pugilist so called from natural power is peronymously denominated from no quality since names are not given to those powers after which these men are called quotes qualities as they are given to sciences according to which men are said to be pugilists or wrestlers from disposition for they're said to be a pugilistic and science from which those disposed to them are peronymously denominated quotes qualities sometimes however the name being assigned that which is called quotes quali according to it is not denominated peronymously as from virtue a man is called worthy for he is called worthy from possessing virtue but not peronymously from virtue this however does not often happen where for those things are called quotes qualia which are peronymously denominated from the above mentioned qualities or which are in some other manner termed from them in quality there is also contrary as justice is contrary to injustice and whiteness to blackness and the like also those things which subsist according to them are termed qualia as the unjust to the just and the white to the black this however does not happen in all cases for to the yellow or the pale or such like colors though they are qualities there is no contrary besides if one contrary be a quality the other will also be a quality and this is evident to anyone considering the other categories for instance if justice be contrary to injustice injustice be a quality then injustice will also be a quality for none of the other categories accords with injustice neither quantity nor relation nor where nor in short anything of the kind except quality and the like also happens as to quality in the other countries qualia also admit the more and the less as one thing is said to be more or less quotes white than another and one more and less quotes just than another the same thing also itself admits accession for what is quotes white can become more quotes white this however does not happen with all but with most things for someone may doubt whether justice can be said to be more or less justice and so also in other dispositions since some doubt about such and assert that justice cannot altogether be called more and less than justice nor health than health but they say that one man has less health than another and one person less justice than another and so also of the grammatical and other dispositions still the things which are denominated according to these do without question admit the more and the less for one man is said to be more grammatical than another and more healthy and more just and similarly in other things triangle and square appear nevertheless incapable of the more as also every other figure since those things which receive the definition of a triangle and of a circle are all alike triangles or circles but of things which do not receive the same definition man can be said to be more such than another as a square is not more a circle than an oblong for neither of them admits the definition of the circle in a word unless both receive the definition of the thing propounded one cannot be said to be more so and so than another where for all qualities do not admit the more and the less of the above mentioned particulars then no one is peculiar to quality but things are said to be similar and dissimilar in respect of qualities alone for one thing is not like another in respect of anything else then so far as it is quality so that it will be peculiar to quality that the like and the unlike should be termed so in respect of it yet we need not be disturbed lest anyone should say that proposing to speak of quality we co-enumerate many things which are relatives for we said that habits and dispositions are among the number of relatives and nearly in all such things the genera are called relatives but not one of the singulars science for example although it is a genus is said to be what it is with respect to something else for it is said to be the science of a certain thing but of singulars not one is said to be what it is with reference to something else as neither grammar is said to be the grammar of something nor music the music of something but even perhaps these are called relatives according to genus as grammar is said to be the science of something not to the grammar of something and music the science of something not the music of something so that singulars are not of the number of relatives still we are called qualities from singulars for these we possess as we are called scientific from possessing certain singular sciences so that these may be singular qualities according to which we are sometimes denominated qualities but they are not relatives besides if the same thing should happen to be both a particular quality and a relative there is no absurdity in its enumeration under both genera chapter nine of action passion and the other categories of position when where and possession action and passion admit contrary and the more and the less for to make warm is contrary to making cold to be warm contrary to the being cold to be pleased contrary to being grieved so that they admit contrary they are also capable of the more and the less for it is possible to heat more and less to be heated more and less and to be grieved more and less where for to act and to suffer admit the more and less and so much may be said of these but we have spoken of the being situated in our treatment of relatives to the effect that it is peronymously denominated from positions as regards the other categories when where and to have nothing else is said of them then what was mentioned at first because they are evident e.g. that quote to have close quote signifies to be shod to be armed quotes where as in the lyceum in the form and the rest which are spoken of these of the proposed genera therefore sufficient has been stated chapter 10 of opposites we must now speak of opposites in how many ways opposition takes place one thing then is said to be opposed to another in four ways either as relative or as contrary or as privation and habit or as affirmation and negation thus speaking summarily each thing of this kind is opposed relatively as quote the double close quote to quote the half close quote contrary as quotes evil to quotes good privately and habitually as quotes blindness and quote sight affirmatively and negatively as quote he sits close quote quote he does not sit close quote whatever things then are relatively opposed are said to be what they are with reference to opposites or are in some manner referred to them as quote the double of the half close quote is said to be what it is with reference to something else for it is said to be the double of something and quotes knowledge is opposed relatively to the object of knowledge and is said to be what it is in reference to what may be known and what may be known is said to be what it is in reference to an opposite namely quotes knowledge for quote the object of knowledge close quote is said to be so to something namely to quotes knowledge things therefore relatively opposed are said to be what they are with reference to opposites or in whatever manner they are referable to each other but those which are opposed as contraries are by no means said to be what they are with reference to each other but are said to be contrary to each other for neither is quotes good said to be the quotes good of quotes evil but the contrary of evil nor is quotes white denominated the quotes white of quotes black but it's contrary so that these oppositions differ from each other such contraries however as are of that kind that one of them must necessarily be in those things in which it can naturally be or of which it is predicated these have nothing intermediate but in the case of those in which it is not necessary that one should be inherent there is something intermediate for instance health and disease may naturally subsist in the body of an animal and it is necessary that one should be there in either disease or health the odd and even are also predicated of number and one of the two either the odd or the even must necessarily be in number yet there is nothing intermediate between these neither between disease and health nor between the odd and the even those contraries again have something intermediate in which one of them need not be inherent as black and white are naturally in body but it is not necessary that one of these should be inherent in body for every body is not white or black vileness also and worth are predicated of man and of many others yet one of these need not be in those things of which it is predicated for not all things are either vile or worthy at least there is something intermediate as between white and black there is dark brown and pale and many other colors but between vileness and worth that is intermediate which is neither vile nor worthy in some instances the intermediates have names thus the dark brown and the pale and such colors are media between white and black but in other cases it is not easy to assign a name to the intermediate but the latter is defined by the negation of either extreme as for example whatever is neither good nor bad nor just nor unjust privation however and habit are predicated of something identical as sight and blindness of the eye and universally in whatever the habit is naturally adapted to be produced of such is either predicated we say then that each of the things capable of receiving habit is deprived of it when it is not in that wherein it might naturally be and when it is adapted naturally to possess it thus we say that a man is toothless not because he has no teeth and blind not because he has no sight but because he has them not when he might naturally have them for some persons from their birth have neither sight nor teeth yet they are neither called toothless nor blind to be deprived of and to possess habit then are not privation and habit for the sight is habit but the privation is blindness but to possess sight is not sight nor to be blind blindness for blindness is a certain privation but the being blind is to be deprived and is not privation for if blindness were the same as being blind both might be predicated of the same person but a man is said to be blind yet he is never called blindness to be deprived also and to possess habit appear to be similarly opposed as privation and habit since the mode of opposition is the same for as blindness is opposed to sight so likewise is the being blind opposed to the possession of sight neither is that which falls under affirmation and negation affirmation and negation for affirmation is an affirmative sentence and negation a negative sentence but nothing which falls under affirmation and negation is a sentence bracket but a thing close bracket still these are said to be mutually opposed as affirmation and negation since in them the mode of opposition is the same for as affirmation is sometimes opposed to negation for example quote he sits close quote to quote he does not sit close quote so that thing which is under each is opposed as quotes sitting to quote not sitting close quote but that privation and habit are not opposed as relatives is evident since what a thing is is not a certain of its opposite for sight is not the sight of blindness nor in any other way spoken in reference to it so also blindness cannot be called the blindness of sight but blindness indeed is said to be the privation of sight not the blindness of sight moreover all relatives are referred to reciprocals so that if blindness were relative it would not reciprocate with that to which it is referred but it does not reciprocate for sight is not said to be the sight of blindness from these things also it is manifest that those which are predicated according to privation and habit are not contrarially opposed for of contraries which have no intermediate one must always necessarily be inherent wherein it is naturally adapted to be inherent or of which it is predicated but between these there is no intermediate thing wherein it was necessary that the one should be in what was capable of receiving it as in the case of disease and health in odd and the even number of those however between which there is an intermediate it is never necessary that one should be inherent in everything for neither is it necessary that everything capable of receiving it should be white or black or hot or cold since there is no prevention to an intermediate being between them again of these also there was a certain medium of which it was not requisite that one should be in its recipient unless where one is naturally inherent as in fire to be hot and in snow to be white still in these one must of necessity be definitely inherent and not in whatever way it may happen for neither does it happen that fire is cold nor that snow is black where for it is not necessary that one of them should be in everything capable of receiving it but only in those wherein the one is naturally inherent and in these that which is definitely and not casually one in privation however and habit neither of the above mentioned particulars is true since it is not always necessary that one should be inherent in what is capable of receiving it as what is not yet naturally adapted to have sight is neither said to be blind nor to have sight where for these things will not be of such countries as have nothing intermediate but neither on the other hand will they be amongst those which have something intermediate since it is necessary that at some time one of them should be inherent in everything capable of receiving it thus when a man is naturally fitted to have sight then he will be said to be blind or to have sight and one of these not definitely but whichever may happen since he need not necessarily be blind nor see but either as it may happen in respect nevertheless of contraries which have an intermediate it is by no means necessary that one should be inherent in everything but in some things and in these one of them definitely and neither casually so that things which are opposed according to privation and habit are evidently not in either of these ways opposed as contraries again in contraries when the recipient exists a change into each other may happen unless one is naturally inherent in something as for instance in fire to be hot it is possible also for the healthy to be sick and the white to become black cold to become hot bracket and the hot to become cold close bracket from good it is possible to become bad and from bad good for he who is depraved being led to better pursuits and discourses advances though but a little to be better and if he once makes an advancement ever so little he will evidently become either altogether changed or have made a very great proficiency since he ever becomes more disposed of virtue even if he has obtained the smallest increase from the beginning where for he will probably acquire greater increase and this perpetually occurring he will at last be transformed entirely to a contrary habit unless he be prevented by time but in privation and habit it is impossible for a mutual change to occur since it may take place from habit to privation but from privation to habit it is impossible as neither can he who has become blind again see the bald again have hair nor has the toothless ever yet again got teeth whatever things are opposed as affirmation and negation are evidently opposed according to none of the above mentioned modes since in these alone it is always necessary that one should be true but the other false as neither is it always necessary in contraries that one should be true but the other false nor in relatives nor in habit and privation for instance health and disease are contrary yet neither of them is either true or false so also the double and the half are relatively opposed and neither of them is either true or false nor in things which are predicated as to privation and habit as sight and blindness in short nothing predicated without any conjunction is either true or false and all the above named are predicated without conjunction not but that a thing of this kind may appear to happen in contraries which are predicated conjunctively for quote socrates is well close quote is opposed to quote socrates is sick close quote yet neither in these is it always necessary that one should be true and the other false for while socrates lives one will be true and the other false but when he is not alive both will be false since neither is it true that socrates is sick nor that he is well when he is not in existence at all in privation and habit then when the subject is non-existent neither is true but when the subject exists the one is not always true nor the other false quote socrates sees close quote is opposed to quote socrates is blind close quote as privation and habit and whilst he exists one need not be true or false for when he is not naturally fitted to possess them both are false but when socrates does not exist at all both will thus be false that he sees and that he is blind in affirmation and negation always if socrates be or be not one will always be false and the other true for it is evident with respect to these two quote socrates is sick close quote and quote socrates is not sick close quote that when he exists one of them is true and the other false and in like manner when he does not exist for in the latter case that he is ill is false but that he is not ill is true so that in those things alone which are affirmatively and negatively opposed will it be the peculiarity that one of them is either true or false chapter 11 opposites continued especially as to the contrariety between the evil and the good quotes evil is of necessity opposed to good and this is evident from an induction of singulars as disease to health and cowardice to courage and similarly of the rest but to evil at one time good is contrary and at another evil for to indigence being an evil excess is contrary which is also an evil in like manner mediocrity which is a good is opposed to each of them a man may perceive this in respect of a few instances but in the majority the contrary to evil is always good again of contraries it is not required if one is that the remainder should be for when every man is well there will indeed be health and not disease and so also when all things are white there will be whiteness but not blackness besides if quote socrates is well close quote be the contrary of quote socrates is ill close quote and both cannot possibly be inherent in the same subject it follows that when one of the contraries exists the other cannot possibly exist for quote socrates is well close quote existing quote socrates is ill close quote cannot exist contraries however evidently are by their nature adapted to subsist about the same thing either in species or genus since disease and health naturally subsist in the body of an animal but whiteness and blackness simply in body and justice and injustice in the soul of man notwithstanding it is requisite that all contraries be either in the same genus or in contrary genera or be genera themselves for white and black are in the same genus as quotes color is the genus of them but justice and injustice in contrary genera for quotes virtue is the genus of one but quotes vice of the other lastly quotes good and quotes bad are not in a genus but are themselves the genera of certain things chapter 12 of priority a thing is said to be prior to another in far respects first and most properly in respect of time according to which one is said to be older and more ancient than another since it is called older and more ancient because the time is longer next when it does not reciprocate according to the consequence of existence thus one is prior to two for two existing it follows directly that one exists but when one is it is not necessary that two should be hence the consequence of the remainder's existence does not reciprocate from the existence of the one but such a thing appears to be prior from which the consequence of existence does not reciprocate thirdly the prior is that predicated according to a certain order as in the instance of sciences and discourses for in demonstrative sciences the prior and the posterior subsist in order since the elements are prior in order to the diagrams and in grammar letters are before syllables so also of discourses as the poem is prior in order to the narration moreover besides what we have mentioned the better and more excellent appear to be prior by nature the common people are accustomed to say that those whom they chiefly honor and especially regard are prior in their esteem but this is nearly the most foreign of all the modes wherefore such are bracket nearly close bracket the modes of priority which have been enumerated besides the above mentioned there may yet appear to be another mode of the prior as of things reciprocating according to the consequence of existence that which in any respect is the cause of the existence of the one may justly be said to be by nature prior and that there are certain things of this kind is manifest for that man exists reciprocates according to the consequence of existence with the true sentence respecting him since if man is the sentence is true by which we say that man is and it reciprocates since if the sentence be true by which we say that man is then man is not withstanding a true sentence is by no means the cause of a thing's existence but in some way the thing appears the cause of the sentence being true for in consequence of a thing existing or not existing is a sentence said to be true or false wherefore one thing may be called prior to another according to five modes chapter 13 of things simultaneous things are called simultaneous simply and most properly whose generation occurs at the same time for neither is prior or posterior these therefore are said to be simultaneous as to time but by nature those are simultaneous which reciprocate according to the consequence of existence although one is by no means the cause of the existence of the other as in the double and the half for these reciprocate thus the double existing the half also exists and the half existing the double exists but neither is the cause of existence to the other those also which being derived from the same genus are by division mutually opposed are said to be naturally simultaneous but they are said to have a division opposite to each other which subsists according to the same division thus the winged is opposed to pedestrian and aquatic as these being derived from the same genus are by division mutually opposed for animal is divided into these vis into the winged the pedestrian and aquatic and none of these is prior or posterior but things of this kind appear naturally simultaneous each of these again may be divided into species for instance the winged the pedestrian and the aquatic therefore those will be naturally simultaneous which derived from the same genus subsist according to the same division but genera are always prior to species since they do not reciprocate according to the consequence of existence for the aquatic existing animal exists but though animal exists it is not necessary that the aquatic should hence those are called naturally simultaneous which indeed reciprocate according to the consequence of existence but the one is by no means the cause of existence to the other which is also the case with things that derived from the same genus have by division a mutual opposition those however are simply simultaneous whose generation is at the same time chapter 14 of motion of motion there are six species generation corruption increase diminution alteration and change of place the other motions then evidently differ from each other for neither is generation corruption nor increase diminution nor alteration change of place and so of the rest in the case of alteration however there is some doubt whether it be not sometimes necessary that what is altered be so in respect of someone of the other motions but this is not true for it happens that we are altered as to nearly all the passions or at least the greater part of them without any participation of the other motions for it is not necessary that what is passively moved should be either increased or diminished where for alteration will differ from the other motions since if it were the same it would be necessary that what is altered be forth with increased or diminished or follow some of the other motions but this is not necessary similarly also what is increased or moved with any other motion ought to be altered bracket in quality close bracket but some things are increased which are not so altered as a square is increased when a nomen is placed about it but it has not become altered bracket in quality close bracket and in like manner with other things of this kind so that these motions will differ from each other nevertheless simply rest is contrary to motion the several rests to the several motions corruption to generation diminution to increase rest in place to change in place but change to a contrary place seems especially opposed as ascent to descent downwards to upwards still it is not easy to define the contrary to the remainder of the specified motions but it seems to have no contrary unless someone should oppose to this rest according to quality or change of quality into its contrary just as in change of place rest according to place or change to a contrary place for alteration is the mutation of quality so that to motion according to quality will rest according to quality or change to the contrary of the quality be opposed thus becoming white is opposed to becoming black since a change in quality occurs there being an alteration of quality into contraries chapter 15 of the verb quote to have close quote to have is predicated in many modes either as habit and disposition or some other quality for we are said to have knowledge and virtue or as to quantity as the size which anyone has thus he is said to have the size of three or four cubits or as things about the body as a garment or a tunic or as in a part as a ring in the hand or as a part as the hand or the foot or as in a vessel as a bushel has wheat or a flag and wine for the flag and is said to have the wine and the bushel the wheat all these therefore are said to have as in a vessel or as a possession for we are said to have a house or land a man is also said to have a wife and the wife a husband but the mode now mentioned of quote to have close quote seems the most foreign for we mean nothing else by having a wife then that she co-habits with a man there may perhaps appear to be some other modes of having but those usually mentioned have nearly all been enumerated end of categories by Aristotle translated by Octavius Freer Owen recording in memory of Mitchell Edwards