 Mae hwnna yn gwybod llawer o'ch gwaith yn yr asrwyllfa reisartu o'u llwyf yn ym slack. Os oedd amddwn i'r ysgol hitd o'r llwyddon, iddyn nhw'n bosb ym Maeysgol hitd o'r llwyddon o'r tîgau tygau, Snape, Tael, ac yn gallu y lleidio'n llwyffio Ch Inc. Bydd oes i'n bwysig chi'n gwybod cyllidol, ac mae dyma'r mawr yn ysgol a'n sylfa wneud. Ac nad oedd eu befnwysig rydyn ni'n ddif i gyd yn ddif i'r gael, On the Ground, dweud fel gyrfa yw gwirionedd, ac yn rhoi am rhai c zipper yn elu'r hanes i, mae cyfnodol yn fyw o hyn yn dweud yma ar y cyhoedd y bydd hon yn ymwrth gwneud dod wrth i'n defnyddio'r ysgolach ar y cyhoedd ym 15 yw iddyn nhw'n spacesoedd o'w gwirionedd yn ymdweud ar y cyhoedd yma sydd yma yna, am y gychwyn beth oesio'r hynny. Mae'n credu gan hyn ac yn hollwg unig. Mae'n hollwg cysylltu. a dyna'r cysyllt y bydd yma. Felly rydyn ni'n fynd i'w ddweud bod y gallu fan hynny'n ymgyrch yn gallu'n mynd i'r mynd i'w ddechrau. Fy hwn yn ddweud, mae'r progresau a llunio'r materio ar gyfer, ac sy'n ddynnu'r iawn, mae'n ddweud, o'r llef yn y cyfnodol yn 1978, mae'n gweithio'r blaid o'u llunio, ac mae'r gweithio'r modd yn ymddangos, yn ddechrau'r ffordd o'r problemy o bobl yn Chino, i'n ffordd i'r ffordd y ddigon i'r ffordd y rhaid dechrau i'r Ffynishrheidion i'r rhywbeth yn ymdyn nhw. Felly, yw'r perthynau i'r problemau, i'r ffordd i'r ffordd i'r rhai, oherwydd mae'n ddweud yng nghymru ei fod yn ddechrau'r bwysig, yn ddweud ddim. Rwy'n gwybod. Mae'n ddweud i'r bwysig i'r ffordd i'r bwysig, a'r Llyfrgeiadeth syysgron gyda'r blaenydd, yn gallu bod allanol amallol, lle rydyn ni wedi gael gwirionedd o cy upgraded o'r mater yng Nghymru, a ystyried o aqution gyda ddylay, ac roedden i'r gwasanaeth y的话, ac rydym yn ôl bod hyn o ddyn nhw gwneud hynny. Y wneud y wneud o gymryd hynny, maen nhw mae ei awr yn gallu'n rhaid i gael gwlad gyda mwy fydd ymunoedd fel hynny, mae hynny'n gweithio eu cynyddaeth yn llunio ac mae hynny'n gweithaf cynnwys yn llunio'n yma bydd y dychydig. Roedd y gallai ffordd hafnol yn Chino o ddod 10 reall o hyfforddiant yn y ta approximately. Ac mae'r ddifificio dyna'r penderfyniad i'w sianlŷn, ac oedd yn rhaid i'n relentau newid, sy'n chyrsodd a roedd yn mynd i ddau o… teith毫 mewn diogelwch yn Ysgrifredig Congroes o'r dysgu gennym. Mae'r ddechrau yn cyfwyngr ystafell yn ei gydag, neu'n hynny'n deallwn teithio'r gorwnaeth negatnes. Roedd yn ddod. yw'r cyffredin iawn, digwydd i'w bwyddoch yn gwybod agodd, rhywbodaeth yn gwybod yn знodg, ac yn y ddydd yn 30 o 40 yw'r ddweud, rywbeth y gallai gallwch gallai ffordd cudd yn teimlo. Rwy'n gwybod i'r lleydd o'r fwg hwn. Mae'r wrthgrifennid yw bobl yn gweithio gyni rhoi hwyddon 180- oedd yn Llyfrân yn� unrhyw gwybod i'r wneud yn ddigon gwybod i'r bwysig, oedd hynny'n nartdoedd o'r hyffredin, Mae'r ystyried yn gweithio'r cyfnod o'r ddweud yma yn ystod yn ymddangos yma, a'r ddweud yma'r cyfnod, o'r ddweud yma, ac o'r ddweud yma'r ddweud yma. Felly, yn ymgyrch, mae'n ffamiliau i'r ddweud yma, sy'n ymwneud yma, yma yma yma yma yma yma yma yma yma yma yma yma yma yma yn ymwneud yma yma. Myododd y Llywodraeth Cymru wedyn yma'r amgylcheddau gyda Llywodraeth Cymru yno'r ymrwyxer am y cyfroedd gwiriau hefyd, gyda'r hyn o'n diriedig mewn bwysigiaeth Cymru, i'ch fyddwch yn gwneud bod y cyd-rechu, i unrhyw o wyf, i unrhyw o refwm, i unrhyw o grin yn bellu rydyn ni o'n gofynol oes iawn o'r llawer o rhanau o'r rhanau cyfroedd, i eich eitemier yna, yn i ddiddordeb fynd oed yn ni, I wneud i'n gweithio y 1860. 2. 1. in the 1860s the British and there was great difficulty when the British wanted to establish an embassy with China in Beijing primarily because the emperor could not accept that there was any other sovereign in the world, Queen Victoria in this case whose eiseries he should be his agents, should deal with on an equal basis. Llywodraeth Cynryd i'r rhwng, ond ystod yn gwneud ystod yn ymgyrch yn yr unig, ond rwy'w'n eu cynnig, ond ychydig ar y llyfr, ond rwy'n credu y mynd i'w ddyn nhw'n ddyn nhw'n gweithio'n arig, ond yw'n ddyn nhw'n credu'n cwerthwn i'r rhwng, ond mae'n gwneud hynny'n gwneud hynny, ond mae'n rwy'n credu'n hwylu hwyl i'r cyfroeddau cyfroeddau i'r rhwng oedd yn gweithio cyfroeddau i'r rhwng. Onw, dyfodd y ffordd, ac yn ystod ar y ffordd, ysgrifennu yng Nghymru yn y 1806, yn ystod ar y ffordd, dwi'n ddegwynt yn cwrtwynau cexarchu, sy'n gymryd y ystod o'r opion ar hynny, ac China wedi bynnig yn dweud o'r ffordd, ond y bryddysgrunau ym Ysgrifennu yn yr ysgrifennu ym Mhwng Ysgrifennu yn y 18060, ac mae'n dweud hynny mae'n dweud hynny, ac mae'r empyrofyn yn dweud o'r dweud o'r bwysig, a'r ddysgu cyfnodol yn gwybod ar gyfer y ddod, a rydyn ni wedi'i gwybod o'r unrhyw deall yng Nghymru. Mae'n ddiddorol cyfnodol hefyd, a'r ddiddorol yn gwneud yn Gymraeg o'r Chino sy'n ddyn nhw'n mynd ychydig a ddim yn effeithio ychydig yng Nghymru yw dda i'r problemau ym 1 ystod a'u yma oedd y 20 yma, a'r ddiddorol yn unrhyw ym gwybod o'r ddysgu. yr honi, yn ymgyrch yn agonoi, byddai'n seaweedg erioeddiol. Yn ymhygoel yr erioeddiol, nid yw'n rhaid, chi yn gwirionedd iawn, ond mae'n ymhygoel ymgyrchu, byddai'n gwirionedd iawn roedd dweud yn ei gaelio. Rydw i'r ysgrifennu yna yn oed, i'i dun o'r tyfu, i'r ysgrifennu ateb, i'r cyflig ym niwn yn ei ddynustiad, yr ysgrifennu, i'r clyfu ym ddynas, i'r cyflig o'r membydau. Mae cyfnodd, dweud y ffordd, a'r ysgrifennu, a'r ysgrifennu i'r ysgrifennu, a ddiw i'r hynny, a'r byw, yn y bwysig yw ymgyrch. Mae'r ysgrifennu eich ymddorol yn ymgyrch yn 2012. Mae ydych chi'n ddweud i'r anhygu o'r lleol ar y ddefnyddio yng Nghymru, a'u ddweud i'r newid, chan Chang Khoshech. Mae'r ysgrifennu i chi'n ddiddordeb llyfrifoedd yn yng Nghymru. The regime was split. There were regional revolts every year. There were huge invasions by the Japanese. There was corruption. There was lack of any kind of real-state system for much of this period. And yet China did survive. But it was on a downward trajectory at that point. Then we had Mao, the first revolution brought about really by military victory rather than social rising, I would say, although the treasury obviously was important in that process. We then had the disasters of the Mao period, 100 flowers, anti-rightist campaign in the mid 50s, then the great leap forward, the great famine and the tenures of the cultural revolution. So by the time we get to this man, Deng Xiaoping, taking over in 1978, China had gone through a pretty awful century, century and a quarter century and a half. And I think the recovery from that terrible period is very important in really contributing to the kind of stability which China feels the need of today and also the position of the Communist Party. Deng Xiaoping, after he won the power struggle after the fall of Mao, he didn't wake up one morning and read an economics textbook and think, hmm, this is a wrong good idea. Let's have a bit of market economics here. He saw that China was in a terrible state after the Mao period and that in addition Mao had virtually destroyed the Communist Party as an effective rule of government. Deng was a great patriot who wanted to rebuild China as a great power, but he also was a lifelong Communist. He joined the party as a teenager in France and he wanted to ensure that the Communist Party was the continued to be the monopoly power in China. And what he saw, his great insight was that through pursuing economic growth and using market mechanisms for that, you could both rebuild China as a great power by drawing on abundant cheap labour, cheap capital and then external markets whose demand made up for the weakness of China's domestic consumer market. And that on top of that, by using the Communist Party as the vehicle that brought this progress to China, he could ensure continued rule of the party. So the basic equation for Deng was actually political, not economic. It was using economics for the party. And of course, this went through vicissitudes in the 1980s. He came back, then relaunched economic reform in 1992 with his southern tour, and that led us to this pattern which we've seen in this century, this is since 2007, which is a remarkable, least sustained economic growth. It looks quite up and down, from that point of view, we have the big drop at the end of 2008, brought on by a combination of domestic and external factors. But the extraordinary thing is here, growth, and this is quarterly growth, in no quarter since 2007, has growth fallen below 6.8%, which is an extraordinary, in a sense, stable and high level. And that is what China has got used to. And that is what the whole Chinese equation is based on. And that has given the Communist Party great strength, I think. One can disapprove of many, many of the things the Communist Party does in many of its policies, notably in human rights and the refusal to have any meaningful dialogue with anybody who doesn't accept its monopoly rule. But it has been able to claim credit for this great economic growth. And, as I say, looking back to the year, the century, century and a quarter, before 1978, to say implicitly, look what things were like in the past, isn't it better now? This is the best time, broadly, as a generalisation, to be Chinese, that it's probably ever been at the moment. So you've had economic growth, you've had relative stability in Communist Party terms. We still have 150, 180,000 protests every year in China. But those are localised protests. They're over police misbehagia, over corruption, over land grabs, over the environment, over bus fares going up, over all kinds of things there. But they're all disjointed. They're not anti-regime protests as such. There's no single protest movement in China today. National Unity has been preserved, I would say, and I'm sure this goes down very badly in China, but China actually runs the last major colonial empire in the world through the military conquest of Tibet and Xinjiang and holding on to that. But for the Chinese, this is National Unity and the Communist Party has brought that. Nobody that I've met in China wants to see Tibetan independence or Xinjiang breaking away and everybody welcomes the way in which Tibet, as Taiwan is gradually being brought back into the Chinese fold after Hong Kong and Macau. And there is indeed the lack of opposition in China. The Nobel Peace Prize winner is famously in jail for 11 years for having organised a petition in favour of democracy. That's what happens to you in China. But what, if you organise opposition, but what the party has done very successfully is to substitute materialism and material progress advancement for politics in China, particularly among the middle class, which is why we haven't had the kind of middle class opposition to the regime which was widely predicted. If I can drop a name, although you have many names, big names here. When I was editing the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong, I was at a small dinner party with Bill Clinton that happens to you when you're a local editor on the paper. He was just on his way back from China and he said, we have to encourage Chinese economic growth. This was just before China was going to the WTO because if it has economic growth, it will breed a middle class which will bring a much more liberal political system and the move for democracy, which we have from the middle class in Europe and the United States in the 18th and 19th century. Well, that hasn't happened because ever since the three represents doctrine was adopted by the Party Congress in 2002, the middle class has been co-opted into the system and is actually very well looked after by the regime. Class warfare was abolished in 2002 and if I was a middle class family member in Shanghai, whatever I might talk or think about, if I have a nice apartment, I have a company car, I have a second family car, my children go to private schools, I have private healthcare, I have two holidays a year abroad, et cetera, et cetera, on which we buy some luxury goods that we don't buy in China because the luxury tax is 30%. So we use duty free shopping rather. I'm living quite a nice life like that. The last thing I want from my purely selfish point of view is for 600 million peasants and poor people to have the vote. So the middle class is actually, for the moment, the conservative force in China. If it shows signs of unhappiness and we've had several demonstrations in the last year to 80 months by middle class urban residents, usually it's about the environment but it's actually about property values, more to that. The government always gives way, always cancels the petrochemical plant or whatever else because the middle class has to be kept on side and that accounts in large measure for the lack of opposition, plus the legalist system which goes back to the first emperor. People say China's run on Confucian lines but actually legalism has always been just as important, which is basically you use the force of the law to scare everybody stiff so they don't form an opposition. On the other hand, there are a whole series of weaknesses which we've had and which, when Jabal, the outgoing Prime Minister, Lika Zhang, the incoming Prime Minister and the Li Chijun Ping in his remarks at the end of the party congress acknowledged there are the wealth disparities in China which are enormous. The poor have got less poor in China over the last 30 years but the rich have got richer even faster and I'm not sure whether you're familiar with what's called the Gini coefficient which measures wealth disparities. If everybody's absolutely equal it's zero, if everybody's completely unequal it's one so it's a small range and just this week there was a report that the Chinese authorities have stopped issuing the Gini coefficient when it got to 4.5. Some academics have done work on it and the report was just published two days ago and it's 6.4 and that is far higher than in the United States, Japan or Europe. It's a very, very unequal society and those inequalities and then regional disparities, the coast of eastern China, the cities there are really developed cities in lots of ways, certainly their centres. Go back into Ganshu province, Sichuan, Yunnan and other places like that and you're back in places in the early part of the last century. We have this image of China as super efficient, these huge manufacturing plants of Foxconn in Shenzhen and other places but I was in Sichuan earlier this year visiting smaller manufacturing outfits there and it's very, very rudimentary, it's lines and lines of mainly women workers pushing sheets of metal forward a stamp comes down, knocks out a disc which will go into a motorcycle gasket. It's all Henry Ford, before Henry Ford as it were. There's the problem of corruption in China which is endemic. Sichuan thing is launching a big campaign against it at the moment. The question is will the anti-corruption investigators look into Mr Sichuan King's own family who, as Bloomberg showed earlier this year, have made very large amounts of money through their connections. There's the environment which is an enormous problem as any of you who have been to China will know from air pollution, water pollution to heavy metal, polluted rivers, many, many other areas. It's not just a green issue, this has become a sociopolitical issue which arouses great anger and if you look at the environmental legislation in China on paper it's pretty strong, it's very strong. The trouble is it's left to local authorities to implement it and those local authorities often have a share, a stake in the local polluting factory. There are many documented cases of this happening. Then there's the whole question of the social evolution of China which I think is extremely important, it's very difficult to quantify in my book, I go into this in two chapters, looking at the way society, because of economic growth, society in China has chosen, in urban areas in any way, particularly among the younger people has evolved out of all measure and these people marched to a different realm to that of the Politburo and the Communist Party and the growth of social media, there are 340 million people signed up for social media in China, there's a lot of double counting so that's 100, 200 million people who are operating outside the control of the system or of the censors and how they will be dealt with is a huge issue for the new leadership. These are the nine men who have just stepped down from running China, you'll notice they're all in their business suits and white shirts and red ties and you'll also notice they have wonderfully luxurious heads of black hair, I am very jealous of that. I'm told by a British ambassador that there is an official hair dye factory. You may be pulling my leg, I'm not quite sure about this. The thing in China is that as the political system does not evolve in the sense of competition democracy and it will not evolve there, but it has become managerially better organised now and the system is that if you're at the top in the Standing Committee of the Politburo, which did have nine members, it's now been cut down to seven, which is probably a good thing for more efficient decision making, you can only do two terms at the top or you have to retire when you do five year terms and when you pass the age of 68, you have to retire at the next party congress. As a result of that, seven of these nine people stepped down at the party congress in mid-November and Hu Juntau, who had been the party leader and state president, completed it by also stepping down as head of the military commission, which his predecessor had held on to for a couple of years. It's the first time in Chinese history that a ruler has stepped down from all his posts voluntarily, dang held on to the military commission even when he didn't have the official party post. I should say it, as I'm sure you're aware here, people often refer to Hu and now to Xi Jinping as a president, because he is state president, but that is not a very important job in China, and indeed China is done without a president, but part of its communist rule. The important job is that of communist party general secretary, because we are still in a Leninist system where the party is more important than the government. The party calls the shots, the Politburo calls the ultimate shots and the Standing Committee calls the kind of divine mandate of heaven shots at the very top and the party has its own what are called leading groups, which are more important on all kinds of policy issues, which are more powerful and more important than the relevant government ministries. So we're in this double system the whole time, which one must always remember. These are the new people, I'm sorry that I tried this slightly wrong, it should be the Inns announced, because the Inns Xi Jinping, who was taken over as party general secretary at the Congress, who will become the state president when the legislature, which appoints the president, meets next March, and Li Ke Zhang, who will become Prime Minister next March. She is head of what's called the Princelings faction, that's to say the offspring of first generation communist leaders. Li comes from Hu Jin Tau's group, the Youth League faction, as it's called, which is left and right, don't mean much in China, it's slightly more to the left. It wants to reduce wealth disparities, it wants a harmonious society. As you can see from those genie figures, it hasn't made much progress in the last few years. Wang Yi Shan, who is the most experienced economic administrator in China, was elected to the Standing Committee in number six post, number seven, but he wasn't given responsibility for economic policy. I think because had he done that, he would have overshadowed Li Ke Zhang. It's a question of balance at the top, it's rather like, if I can go to Britain, it's rather like Gordon Brown, who didn't want such a powerful man running the Treasury or the economy if you were Prime Minister. So he's been put in charge of the anti-corruption campaign, he's a tough operator, and my Chinese colleagues in Beijing think this is a very good thing, he may actually do something about corruption. The joke that immediately went round on Thursday afternoon, after he was appointed to this post, given the way family connections profit so much in China, is he got the anti-corruption job because he doesn't have any children. Yu is he's been running Shanghai, and he's been catapulted to the top because basically he's kept Shanghai, which had been getting out of control previously, under control of the centre. The people who didn't make it, Li and Wang, are both reformers who have spoken about the need for economic and social reform, but their way to the top was blocked by the other factions and by the last minute intervention of Jiangxi Min, the former party leader who was meant to have retired in 2002, but he came back and started pulling strings as over he can behind the scenes. Then we have Bo Shi Lai, who I'm sure you've read about. We'll have him go on trial in the next couple of months. It may be a big show trial, or they may be a very quiet place. He could be quite dangerous if he speaks out. He was running Chongqing, a municipality of 32 million people in western China. He was running his own thing. He was running a populist campaign to get to the top, to get to the Standing Committee. He wasn't under the control of the centre, and that is something the Communist Party does not allow. He was a kind of regional baron warlord out of control. When he became known in November of last year that if he got to the top of the Standing Committee, he wanted control of the police and internal security, and since he'd wiretapped Hu Jintao when he visited Chongqing, et cetera, et cetera, he was just too dangerous. The murdered English businessman, the corruption, all that, yes, problems there. But the real reason was they had to chop the tall poppy down and the death of the English businessman, Neil Hayward, in Chongqing, which I'm sure you've read about, provided the ideal smoking gun to do that. I mean, you can, and if we had time, I would do it, but you can make a whole scenario that the whole case against Bo Shi Lai was all set up from the beginning, and it makes just as much sense as the official case against him. But he's gone. He'll be tried, and he's kind of warning now that anybody else don't try to go and do your own thing. And the trouble with Wang down the bottom was in Guangdong, he was, again, doing his own thing, talking about the need for reform, bringing in changes in Guangdong out of control of the centre. And partly for that reason, he's been blocked on his rise to the top. So what are the challenges and why do I say that the revolution which Mao launched originally, which Deng really launched in its current form in 1978, why is that unfinished and what is needed to be done? The economy is unbalanced. It has been far too dependent on exports and fixed asset investment, in other words, property construction and big infrastructure projects. There are the huge regional disparities, the wealth gap. China needs to build up domestic consumption. It needs, and this sounds ironic but the state run by a communist party, it needs to look after the workers rather better. The wages account for about 38% to 40% in national income in China compared to 68% in the United States. This is communism and capitalism in operation. The people who've done well in the last 10 years have been the holders of capital in China. That's to say, the big state home enterprises. There's corruption and the whole legal weaknesses. You need a legal system but in China, in May of this year, judges were told that they had to swear an oath of loyalty not to the country, not to the legal system but to the communist party. In that situation, you can't have a fully functioning modern society and commercial system without a legal system. The demographics are turning against China because of fewer people being born, fewer young people coming into the workforce and older people living much longer. The question is, does China become old before it gets rich? The environmental problem which has not been dealt with seriously, as I said, the whole social evolution, this is the lack of trust in the authorities and in the whole way society works. There's a saying in China, which I'm sure many of us say in our own country, but it has a particular force in China. Only believe something when the government denies it. That is a lie with safety, food safety, to take an example in China. Everybody's worried about food safety. Recurrent food scandals over rotten meat in sausages, over milk, just about everything else. I've got two pages in my new book about this. I had five originally, but I started to feel a bit queasy when I started writing about the Chongqing pig blood curd scandal, which was pretty hurried. At the same time as society, which as I said earlier has been driven by material advancement. China isn't run by Marxism or Confucianism these days. It's run by materialism. As one of my Chinese colleagues said on returning to China after 10 years in the West, he realised that what counted was not who you were, what you did, what you said, how you lived, but what you could afford. He was being judged by what he could afford. The famous quote from a young lady on a television dating show in Jiangsu province just a couple of years ago, she was asked what would you be looking for in the young men on this programme, and she said, hmm, I'll tell you. I'd rather cry in the back of a BMW than laugh on the back of a bicycle. Now again, a lot of people might say that, but if you say that in China, everybody knows this phrase. And then that meeting with the corruption, again something that's very familiar in China, there was a southern weekly newspaper, did a survey of reporters, talked to a lot of primary school children. What do you want to be when you grow up? One said, I want to be a pop star, I want to be a sports star, I want to be a rich business man, I want to do this. And then one six-year-old girl said, I want to be an official. And the reporter when he wrote the story up said, I thought this was wonderful. At last somebody who was a child who wanted to serve the state, what kind of official young lady, a corrupt official? Because they have all the nice things. So you can see from the mouths of children, you have Tibet and Xinjiang, which are going to be unstable, elements of instability in China, for as long as the Chinese pretends that the Tibetans and the Uyghys are Chinese, which they're not for certain. There are great uncertainties over China's global role. I'm tempted to say that China doesn't really have a coherent foreign policy. It reacts to different episodes and different events. China wants to ensure continued security of raw material supplies, which it's short of. It wants other countries and the United Nations to keep out of its affairs. But in terms of playing the role of what Bob Zelig calls a global stakeholder, commensurate with its economic position as the world's second-bigest economy, China doesn't really, I don't think, play that kind of role. There's a question of one-party rule. What is the communist party for? Is it just a managerial bureaucratic outfit that has to deliver growth, in which case what happens if it can't go on delivering growth? Is it going to bring in reform? Now reform is needed in China, and I'll finish with this, to take a short laundry list, to the state-owned sector, where the state-owned enterprises are far too powerful, monopolistic and polygopolistic often, very, very privileged in terms of interest rates, finance, market access and so on, but an essential part of the system. And if you reform them, you start to chip away at the system. Land ownership needs to be privatised in China, so that you can form efficient, larger farms. All land is owned by the state. It's given out on lease basis to farmers, and it's all tiny little plots, which are inefficient to farm. And on top of that, 120, 150 million people from the country south are working in the cities at any one time in China. And those people, most of them are 20 to 40, don't know how to farm anymore. So you go to places in the countryside where they have consolidated land into larger farms, but nobody knows how to drive a tractor. They know how to use a spade, the grannies and grandpals there, but they don't know anything. So you've got this whole question of the land farming, but if you start to privatise land, take it out of the hands of the state, it means that local authorities can no longer requisition land, as they do at the moment, and auction it off to developers. And 40% of local government, local revenue, comes from that, from grabbing land and selling it off. So you've got to change the fiscal system if you do that. You've got to deal with the whole financial system, which is atrophied control, and that is happening to an extent, but it's happening in what's called shadow banking, which risks getting out of control and creating a huge bubble. You've got to increase the price of water and energy, which are vastly underpriced in China. Two things China is very short of result huge wastage of water and of electricity. You've got to change the legal system, as I said. So we can go on with these. There are huge things to be done. The new relationship knows it, I think, but if you address those problems, you first of all are going to cause economic difficulties. In the short term, we calculate, my fellow economist that trusted us, that if you did those structural reforms over a three to four year period, you knocked two to three points of growth and increased inflation by three to four percent. Is that a risk the politicians want to take? China doesn't have elections, but things are very, very politic and political. And above all, if you started on this process of reform, your danger would be that the red flag would no longer be flying quite so far. So the priority is to sustain growth, to maintain stability, to maintain power, but at the same time these huge tests which China has as it tries to evolve itself into the second stage of the unfinished revolution. If I were asked to put my finger up and say, are they going to do it? Issues you can do it, isn't he? I'm out so it would be probably not. Very slowly the economy will do well next year. That would be another reason for inaction. And the tendency will be to say, oh, we go through economic cycles, things will get better and so on. The danger is the fibres down the road. I don't know how many China will start to hit the buffers because it has not achieved the second part of the revolution. Thank you very much.