 Hello and welcome everyone to this webinar. I'm very pleased that so many of you can join us today. We have a diverse audience really from the US, the UK and from across the Middle East. So a warm welcome to you all, to what would be close to 90 minutes discussion on Egypt, the Middle East, with Minister Nabil Fahmi and our distinguished panel. Let me first start by introducing myself. My name is Dr. Hassan El-Bahtimi. I am lecturer in the World Studies Department at King's College London and affiliate with Sion Spoe. We're hosted here today by King's College London, the Institute of Middle East Studies and the School of Security Studies. And we're here to discuss Minister Nabil Fahmi's book, Egypt's Diplomacy in War, Peace and Transition. The book was published straight before the lockdown by Pearl Grave. It carries Minister Fahmi's recollections and analyses. And I hope he doesn't mind me doing the math of nearly 30 years of engagement with foreign policy in Egypt and the Middle East in various positions in and out of government. It's a book that is written with candor and honesty that seeks to provide a voice from the region on some of the regions, most pressing issues. It's also a book that is concerned with the future of Egypt and the region. And I found it very interesting how Minister Fahmi reflecting on why he wrote that book was a sense of personal dismay that the past two generations in the Arab world were handing over the Middle East to future leaders in a far worse state than it was when they took charge of it. Just the flavor of the candor and honesty of that book. One of the themes that cuts across this book is that Egypt has been in a long transition, not only since 2011 or 2013, but since 1952. In a sense, his written testimony is also a contribution towards the country's soul searching endeavors looking forward. This is an important contribution to our understanding of the Middle East peace process and the literature around it, Egyptian foreign policy, Mubarak years and the politics of the Arab Spring, a full wrist really of key issues. Okay, let me tell you how we're going to run the event and first introduce our panelists. I will use first the author, Minister Nabil Fahmi, who was Egypt's foreign minister from 2013 to 2014 during a turbulent point of Egypt's history. He's a career diplomat among other posts he served as Egypt's ambassador to the US for nearly nine years, seeing up close the developments related to 911, global war on terror, the Iraq war under Bush administration, was also political advisor to Amr Musa during most of the 90s, providing him with a good vantage point on the Middle East peace process. He's the founding dean of the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy in the American University in Cairo. It's a really great pleasure to have you here with us. On our panel today, and I think he has not joined us yet, but will hopefully join us very soon, is Ambassador Martin Indyk, sorry, who was currently distinguished fellow in the US Council of Foreign Relations. Ambassador Indyk held a number of positions in the US government related to the Middle East, including Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, US Ambassador to Israel, I believe twice, and the US Special Envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. And then we also have Sir Derek Plumbly, who is visiting professor at King's College London. Sir Derek served as British Ambassador to Egypt between 2003 and 2007, and Saudi Arabia before that. He was also at some point director of the Middle East and North Africa in the UK Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He also served as the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon and chaired the International Commission, which oversaw the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan. He's also a trustee and chairman of the Arab-British Center, which is having really an impressive online set of activities during lockdown, so I encourage you all to check it out. So what we're going to do today is that we will start with Minister Fahmi, who will provide us with the quick highlights of the book, some of the themes that he wants to bring to this discussion. This will be for around 10-15 minutes. We will then move to have quick intervention from each of the panelists, Ambassador Indyk, Sir Derek, and then myself. We will then go back to Minister Fahmi for some responses and then open up for the audiences to put questions. Please note that this event is recorded and will be made available on YouTube at a future date. If you have any questions at any point of the proceedings, feel free to put them down in the Q&A channel at the bottom of your screen on Zoom. Please put your name and your affiliation and your question and then we'll bring it to the discussion. All in all, I aim to include the session by 6pm London time. Thank you all for joining, and Mr Fahmi, thank you so much for joining us for this discussion, and the floor is yours. Let's see, there we are. Thank you, Dr Fahmi, thank you very much. My appreciation to King's College for the generosity of hosting this event, and of course my appreciation and thanks to the two panelists, Ambassador Lumbia and Ambassador Indyk, both of whom have long expertise in this subject we're going to talk about as well as being distinguished interlocutors I've had over the years. I say this in complete objectivity, we have remained close friends, whether we agreed or disagreed on policy issues, that's a different issue. I think we did both as time went by. To cut the long story short, this book is not autobiography. I wrote it for two basic reasons. First reason is I felt there was an absence of an Arab voice in the foreign language, literature aid market, excuse me, in terms of international relations. I wanted the Arab voice to be out there for non-Arab speakers. That's why I wrote the book originally in English. The second reason I wrote the book and that's more for the Arabic version of the book, which will be longer and more detailed is exactly what you said, Hassan, that I feel a great responsibility in providing my experience good and bad for the record for the young generation to learn from what we did, to gain from what we achieved, and to do better from what we did not achieve. It seems the most commonly quoted phrase in the book is the one you quoted, because I keep hearing it at me, but I said it honestly and I'm very candid in the book. My expressions of criticism, by the way, are not opposition as much as they are a desire to do more and expectations we should do more. Yes, I do believe that our generation is handing over the region to others at the very least at the level that I wouldn't have liked it to be. That being said, to give you context a little bit, I shied away from talking about myself. Then my first reader said the book will last much longer than you will, so you need to provide some context of why you think the way you did. And the context is quite simple. I was born at the beginning of the Cold War era, an era of transformation internationally and regionally. My professional career was throughout that, and I was born into a family of public servants on the paternal side. My grandfather was a attorney general, my father was foreign minister, and I mentioned these only to make the point that international affairs were day-to-day discussions. They weren't something you went out to study, we lived that every day. And secondly, meeting important people was, again, I don't mean to be pompous, but it was the normal state of affairs. Ironically, because of that, I decided not to be a diplomat to start off with. And I was never glamorized by meeting important people. Ultimately, I joined the foreign ministry by mere coincidence. But that's for another time, unless it's a question that comes from the floor. The book gives you four perspectives about these subjects. One perspective is a young adult in society. I was completing high school when the 1967 war started, and it was the first shock, if you want. I wanted to give you my voice, so it had to relate to some position I was in. That position at the time was not a practitioner, it was simply a member of society. The second one was when my father was foreign minister, I was very close to events. I was in the army at the time, and then I ultimately joined the foreign ministry later. But I was a witness to everything happening after the 1973 war and the negotiations. So that's, if you want, a close witness. The third perspective is a practitioner. You mentioned my different positions in the government, in the diplomacy. And then finally, as a principal, as foreign minister. And from those four perspectives, I deal with four basic books. The first part is the personal part, short. The second part is the foreign policy part. Everything from peace process to Egyptian-American relations to Africa, so on and so forth. And then I ultimately write about, before writing about the future, I wrote about transition in Egypt. Because I was the foreign minister during transition, and it was a historic responsibility to write about that as well. I don't write about it much from the domestic part, although I do, but more the implications on foreign policy or how foreign policy plays in. Now, that being said, if I, I'm going to skip the personal part, except what I said that I never intended to be a diplomat. I did it because I like international relations and I was challenged to try. And my father was completely against it, by the way. He was a tremendous personality, but a person who felt that you'll have to live your own life, not relive somebody else's. So, but again, that's a long story. In dealing with the foreign policy issues, I'm going to run through some highlights and some important lessons on the different issues as I go along. First thing is the regional context. If one looks at my regional context as a young adult onwards. I grew up in Pan-Arabism, and I would argue that the 67 war was the death knell of Pan-Arabism politically as an attractive force. It shocked everybody and people started to move away from Pan-Arabism. Even though Pan-Arabism didn't fail because of the war, it failed because it became static, wasn't forward looking and wasn't responding to the needs of its people. But again, 67 was, okay, this is not working. You better look for something else. I would jump also that the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the end of any security, any serious security cooperation between Arab countries. It changed the security paradigm in the Arab world. Very few people afterwards started to talk about the collectives of defense and so on and so forth, and it was more dependency, more not new, a dependency on foreign powers for security reasons. 2003, the American invasion of Iraq, which was baseless, even though Saddam was a bloody tyrant. 2003 created tremendous imbalance in the Middle East between Arabs and non-Arabs, or added to it, and added to it a sectarian faction element that was not there in the past. From 67 to 2003, the Arab world, the Middle East excuse me, I make the mistake that Arabs often make, Middle East was, for people like me, Arab world and others. By 2003 it started becoming Middle East and some Arabs, or the Middle East and the Arabs, with the changing political balance. Let me, with that context, and I'll come back to some issues. The Arab Israeli peace process, something I did from the very beginning of my professional career, but the irony of it is that the peace process actually started because of a war, not because of peace initiatives. Before 1973, Egypt cried several times, so that cried several times to suggest peace initiatives, and they were completely ignored because people did not take it seriously, be that the Israelis or the Americans, and for that matter, a number of Arabs and Egyptians. But the 73 war, the change in the political balance was enough to create an incentive for peace, a recognition that there were different parties there, a mutual respect for the different parties. And I will mention just one example anecdotally. I'm not sure if Martin's on the line yet, but anyway. He is. Oh, good, good, great. American presidents meet foreign dignitaries very, very carefully, and they're very careful about protocol, prestige and all that stuff. In 1973, right after the war, my father, who was the Interim Foreign Ministry with Minister of Tourism, actually, was sent to see Kissinger, excuse me, Nixon, and of course Dr. Kissinger, and President Nixon after the meeting walked him all the way out to his car. So not only did he meet a foreign minister, not his counterpart, but he actually walked him all the way out to the car. The message in the meeting and outside was after the war, especially that the Soviets have been asked to leave Cairo before that, Egypt is now a player. We want to engage you, engage with you to work on the region and the world together. So that war enabled these processes after that. Without it, it would not have been possible. First mistake after the war, I would argue, was the Syrian mistake of not going to the very first Geneva conference. When they got to the very first Geneva conference, which was under the UN umbrella, with the two superpowers, the process would have remained within the UN context, and it would have remained, if you want, regionally and multilaterally. And that, frankly, was a negative message to everyone, not only to foreigners, by the way, even to Egypt and Egyptians, because while Egypt was ready to cooperate with Syria and would thereafter, it was not going to allow anybody to have a veto one way or the other. So I think that was a strategic mistake at the time, which could have easily been avoided and would have helped, frankly, the out of position. The process then went on, disengagement agreements, ultimately the Jerusalem visit, and then the Egyptian-Israeli agreement. And that raises a question. If you look at the Egyptian-Israeli agreement, which came after the Jerusalem visit, and you look at what had been offered before that, the content is very similar. In other words, the ultimate agreement was very similar to what had been offered even before the visit. And the interesting point here is, I've always believed that Egyptian-Israeli peace was possible if Egypt agreed to do it. But we did not want to do a bilateral agreement until then. It's only then that we decided to do that. But before that, frankly, if Egypt had agreed to do a bilateral agreement, Israel, in my opinion, would have agreed, because it immediately means that there's not going to be any full-fledged Arab-Israeli war afterward if the Egyptian army is not party to that. But let me jump forward very quickly. We went back to regionalism and a comprehensive approach at the Madrid peace process, which was interesting because it had a regional context. We also had the bilateral negotiations, the face-to-face negotiations, which ultimately are necessary when you're negotiating peace agreements. And it also brought in the UN legitimacy and so on. And you all know the history of that process plus the Oslo process, the parallel negotiating trends back and forth on different things. And let me summarize again what I think were missed opportunities and mistakes. I said Janit Dejiva won was the first mistake. I would argue that the Rabin Peres team on the Israeli side was instrumental in moving things forward in the past of sense. But they could have moved more quickly, especially on settlements, and it would have helped, frankly, get things done and make them irreversible regrettably. And tragically, Rabin was assassinated, as was Sadat also. The second Camp David agreement, and that's not between, that was Palestine-Israel, was a case study in mismanagement. In terms of timing, bad timing, you brought the parties together who disliked each other, Barack didn't speak to Arafat, and likewise, they were sequestered in a closed environment. And then, amusingly enough, my American colleagues would actually ask, oh, they actually asked President Mubarak. They phoned President Mubarak and said, could you please tell Arafat to accept our Jerusalem proposal? And, sorry, they didn't phone, they sent their ambassador. And when he said, what's the proposal? Well, we can't tell you. So he phoned me. And he said, what's the proposal? I said they're not returning phone calls. So he said, OK, tell them I don't give blank checks. So even with parties that were friends with the U.S. who wanted to push peace forward, who would have been engaged, the lack of, I mean, or the diplomatic mismanagement was a real reason for why this summit failed. The third mistake was the Clinton parameters. Clinton parameters were not perfect, but I think President Arafat should have accepted them with reservations. And he actually told me that before he left Washington, but that did not become the public position afterwards. I think he should have pocketed those and negotiated some of the details because not having that ultimately meant that the Bush administration and so on and so forth was not going to be supportive. Another mistake, Arab peace initiative 2002, which provided a regional solution to the whole process in exchange for full withdrawal. The Israelis were mistaken and not immediately embracing that and then maybe negotiating some details. The Arabs were mistaken and not promoting it further. It appeared to be reactive to 911 rather than an initiative, reactive to 911 to change the subject rather than a serious peace initiative, and it would have taken us far ahead. Omar Taboumazi, Prime Minister, Omar offered Aboumazi proposals on refugees in Jerusalem that have never been offered since then, and that was a big mistake from President Aboumazi. And the last mistake I'd add here is nobody can underestimate the role of the U.S. given its influence, particularly this generation. But the big mistake we make is to overestimate the role. And I think giving the U.S. alone the responsibility of negotiating Middle East peace was wrong because they're not, they never were, and they never will be an honest broker. And secondly, their own domestic composition forces certain tendencies that make it impossible to take position that even the U.S. would want to take. If it was the U.S. plus or other countries plus the U.S., then it would give the U.S. more room for maneuver and will allow us to take advantage of U.S. influence. And I mentioned these, and again, if I take you to the Obama-carry years, the Obama-carry years, the real problem between U.S. and Martin, feel free to correct me if I'm wrong here. The ultimate disagreement was between the Israelis and the Americans, much more than between the Palestinians and the Americans. And Martin has all the details for that. But anyway, I'll just mention a couple of these. If we're going to move to peace, leaders need to be committed to peace. They need to have the courage to take risks, but they need to have the wisdom to say yes and the patience to negotiate because, as the saying is often said, the devil is in the details. And I would argue that it's important to look at developing critical mass, be that regionally or internationally, for these agreements to remain sustained. Let me run through a couple of things relating to Asian diplomacy vis-à-vis different countries around the world. I think our relations with the U.S. are indispensable, but have always been uncomfortable, except for very short periods of time, and will remain so. The reason being, if you want a bit of a contradiction or a conflict between what is known as American exceptionalism and how Egypt sees itself in light of its heritage, the fact that America sees that it has a particular kind of role internationally, well, we do the same region. And that tends to ultimately create friction between how each one of us works independently. I would argue also one of our big mistakes, and it has been mutually beneficial in the relationship to both sides. One of our biggest mistakes has been we've taken the risk to program. We allowed it to run on the basis of the Arab-Israeli peace process at the very beginning. Well, there's much more to that. So 20 years after the peace process, when you went around Congress, around the States, and we talked about Egypt-U.S., you can't talk about history in the States. You need to talk about the present and about the future. So Egyptians should have been talking more about our role in the region on a multitude of issues, because we did have that role. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, we supported the American-led coalition. Thirdly, on every topic I will talk about, and I say this to my own colleagues back home, much more to my foreign friends, over-dependence on anybody, friend or foe is a big mistake. And I think there was an over-dependence from the Egyptian side on America, and it created misunderstandings on the American side and discomfort on the Egyptian side. Russia. Again, country like Egypt, which is an important role, does not have the choice of being isolated if it wants to play its role, has to have relations with a multitude of powers, including the Soviet Union and or after that, Russia. But it's not Russia in place of America and America in place of Russia. It has to be a function of real interest on both sides. Both the Russians and the Americans look towards our region, looking for Middle Eastern players and partners. So I was the main proponent of opening up with Russia, but I said openly in Moscow and back home in Cairo, this is not to replace America by you. I'm going to promote Egyptian-American relations and Egyptian-Russian relations at the same time. I'll be very candid with you. What Russia can offer on a day-to-day basis does not compare to what America can offer on a day-to-day basis. In spite of America's shrinking role region internationally, but I would argue that ignoring Russia is a big mistake. Another point I would like to make, we had two revolutions in three years. Two revolutions in three years are basically a call for people to be partners in deciding what to do, and they wanted to express independence. So on foreign policy, you needed to also assert your decision-making posture, not that you're depending on anybody. And therefore, we opened up southwards towards Africa, eastwards towards Asia. I made more trips to Africa than any other continent during my one year in office, and it wasn't only on the Renaissance dam and the Nile issue. I'll go on for too long, but quickly in light of that, if you want to have a correct foreign policy, you need to start off with your regional foundation as your springboard and then move outwards. You have to have multiple choices. You need to draw lessons from the past, but you have to look forward. It is not enough to keep reiterating what happened in the past, unless you're a player moving forward, unless you have the vision. The vision I mean, the vision, you have a strategy to implement the vision, and then you have the assets to actually pursue the tactics necessary to get there. Anecdotally, and then I will close in two or three minutes, maximum. When I was minister, I used to say that my nightmares are better than my days. The reason being, nightmares are short. You wake up very quickly. No minister sleeps for very long, and then you wake up, and they're not true. But I used to wake up, and I would see Libya on fire, Syria on fire, no Arab Israeli peace process, looking southwards towards Sudan and Ethiopia. We have a problem there over and above the issue of terrorism in Iran and the Gulf and so on. So these were difficult times, and they required, frankly, a new outlook, a proactive forward-looking outlook. Two points I'd like to make, one point I'd like to make before a couple of minutes on the transition area. One issue of tremendous importance to us was regional security, and specifically nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the swords. And I can tell you that this, we made the mistake of joining the NPT back in 1981. Not because we don't want to join the NPT, but because our condition used to be we will join it if all of our regional players join, and we joined it unilaterally, and that was a mistake. And I remember years later talking to Richard Pearl and raising this issue, and he said, well, why in the world should your neighbors join if you join? Now, what do you do when you get that kind of answer? The second mistake we made, frankly, was after we joined in the 1995 extension conference, we overreached. I say this because there wasn't suggestion on the table to renew the agreement 25 years revolving. And then online countries insisted now we want less than that. And ultimately, the balance of power swayed, and the votes moved much more towards an indefinite extension, especially when South Africa broke ranks with an online movement. Well, again, this is a negotiating tactic where we overreached and we would have actually had a better position had we had the wisdom to accept a less ambitious target. The issue of transition. Everybody likes to say transition each started in 2011. Now it started in 1952. And I say that because we have been searching for a consensual social contract that includes us all since 1952. A contract which allows people of different opinions to participate in under one constitution, one identity of being Egyptians, not multiple identities, one identity of being Egyptians. But which you have public, private, left-leaning, right-leaning, all in the middle. If you look at our three presidents, I would have skipped President Nagyb because he spent a very short time. But if I took Nasir, Sadat, and Mubarak just quickly, each one of them came in with a very important initial message. Nasir wanted to expand regionally and he did. Sadat wanted to end war, move towards modernity, and the West and he did. Mubarak wanted to re-stabilize the country and replace it back into the middle of the Arab world and he did. And they all ended up with tragic conclusions. Their most problematic mistakes were domestic much more than foreign policy because of the absence of the social contract. It does not mean that each one of them didn't have major achievements, they did. But again, as I said, I'm always trying to get a better result. So I would argue that they all did some very good things. But we're not where we want to be now because we've continued to search for the social contract. We are doing that in the middle of regional instability. We've seen an erosion of our own soft power as that happens. And that's happened, frankly, because if you don't have efficient governance, when I say efficient governance, I mean primarily checks and balances in the system so that you have different voices out there. But second, there's also openness, which if there's a level after that politically is not after that in the sequence, but related to that is also democracy. But I would argue that we lost soft power when we started to contain people's thoughts. And regional states in the Arab and Middle East stopped looking to Egypt as the country they wanted to emulate and started to look toward Western Europe or towards the states or recently towards Asia. So we need to go back and focus on our soft power. My concluding points are the following. With all of our problems and our challenges, I think we have the depth that far exceeds anybody else in the Arab world. Nobody in the Arab world could have survived two revolutions in three years and still had an up and running state. And we did. So that is to our credit, but we can do more and we need to do more domestically and regionally by having a vision by planning strategies and by working rationally both domestically and regionally to really make the best use of our assets. Let me stop with those points because I can see my two colleagues, the panelists, scribbling, and I've written down too many things for me to answer. Thank you, Hassan. Thank you very much. Thank you very much for sharing your opening remarks. We are already getting a lot of questions. If you've joined us late, welcome. Once more, we have a very long list of participants. So there are going to be a lot of questions. If you have any question that you want to post to the panel, please feel free to do so. You can do so by using the Q&A channel at the bottom of your Zoom screen. Please identify your name and your affiliation. And then we'll put the questions to the panel. Okay, so I described earlier how we're going to run this and we want to have more of a discussion. Obviously, there are so much to cover and so many different topics that we can bring from nuclear weapons, the WMDF, the Middle East issues, Arab Spring, U.S. foreign policy in the region, Arab Israeli peace process, so many different topics and issues. So in terms of the next stage of the discussion, what we decided on doing is giving 5-10 minutes to each of the panelists, sort of like to pick on one of the themes that Minister Fahmi raised in his book, and then we'll go back to Minister Fahmi for discussion. So can I ask, please, Ambassador Indyk, to share his thoughts. This will be for 5-10 minutes. This will be followed by Sir Derek and then very quickly myself and then we'll go back to Mr Nabil. So Ambassador Indyk, the floor is yours. Thank you, Hassan. Ambassador Fahmi Nabil, it's a real honor for me to participate in this panel and to have the opportunity to discuss your fascinating book. I'm very grateful to you for writing it and I think that students of Middle Eastern history, students of the Arab Israeli conflict, and students of the geopolitics of the region will all benefit greatly from reading your book. Your candor, your self-criticism, your anecdotes, all, I think, make it a very compelling read. And so for those of you here, if you haven't read it, I hope you will. There are, unfortunately, and Nabil knows this better than most, few accounts from the Arab perspective of the history of what has happened in this tumultuous region that are based on documentation because, unfortunately, there's very little documentation available. And that's because, I gather, it really hasn't been archived effectively, which is unfortunate. And therefore we are really dependent on the biographies of the critical players. And the Egyptian critical players are the ones that have taken the lead in doing this. Nabil follows a tradition there, one that was really started by his father with his book about the negotiations back in the days of Anwar Sadat. But there are others that have also recorded their memoirs. And most recently, Ahmed Abu Ghayt, another Egyptian foreign minister, has done so. And I think that's a very important contribution. Memoirs naturally have a bias built into them. But I think that Nabil has done a great job in terms of recounting events in an analytical framework that I found not just interesting and helpful, but I discovered a whole lot of things that I didn't know about the period in which Nabil and I were negotiating together, including one incident in the book that he repeats about time when I got quite stroppy with him. And I now discovered that there was good reason for me to do so, but we can leave that for our own drinks later on. I want to focus on two things quickly that I think Nabil has highlighted in his analysis that I think are particularly important. First is what he says about the Arab-Israeli peace process and Egypt's role in it. And the second is regional geopolitics and Egypt's role there, which I think is correct in saying that is not really appreciated in Washington, except by those who still have dealt with Egypt and understand its weight in the regional system and try to work with Egypt to advance the common interests. But it's not commonly known. I think Nabil is right that more could have and should still be done to educate Washington about that. I think the most recent incident where that was driven home to me was when the Trump administration tried to organize the Middle East Strategic Alliance, the MISO, what's known as the Arab NATO, which was basically their idea, somewhat like the Baghdad pact of the 1950s, to orchestrate Arab countries against Iran. And of course, Egypt was critically important in this and since they didn't understand Egypt's relationship with Iran, which has not been an easy relationship by any means. But Egypt has a particular perspective on Iran that needs to be understood in Washington before you can go about trying to enlist Egypt in some kind of strategic alliance against Iran. And Nabil explains it in his book in a fascinating account of the relationship between Egypt and Iran that Jared Kushner and Mike Pompeo would have done well to read it before they tried to launch this. And the Middle East Strategic Alliance, for those of you who have been following this, came a cropper very quickly simply because Egypt wasn't willing to go along with it. And without Egypt, there was no chance of putting together a strategic alliance. So I think that Egypt's role in the region is something that we need to focus on. And it's because in particular now, and I'd be interested in Nabil's response to this, we have a situation in which the United States is essentially engaged in a retrenchment from the region. It started with Obama, but it is being reinforced by Trump, and it is caused by a number of factors, primarily the need to pivot to Asia where the United States faces a much bigger geopolitical challenge in the rise of China than it does in the Middle East today, especially with the reduction in America's dependence on Middle Eastern oil. So the strategic vitality of the Middle East no longer is there in the way that it used to be in the days when Nabil and I were actively involved. And that means that the United States is necessarily looking around to regional partners to play the roles that the United States once imagined that it could play, and I would say generally did it very badly, with the exception of the Egypt-Israel peace agreements. But the problem today is that we have a situation in which Egypt, in the words of one of your strategic thinkers, has gone into strategic hibernation, and at a time when Syria and Iraq are simply collapsing and out of the game and unable to play a regional role. Saudi Arabia is trying to kind of fill the vacuum, but I'm sure Nabil will be the first to explain that that doesn't work effectively, but we only have to look at the way that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman behaves to know that Saudi Arabia is a weak pillar for anybody trying to construct a stable regional order to depend upon. And so the traditional Arab regional powers are not there. And there's a vacuum that is designed for Egypt to fill, and yet Egypt is not, it appears, willing to play that role at a time when it is very much needed. So let me just shift to the peace process quickly. And say there that, again, Egypt was and is and will be a critical player in any effort to achieve a successful reconciliation between Israel and the Arab states, Israel and the Palestinians. Egypt was the leader of that effort. If Egypt had not been prepared, as Nabil described it, to move from war to peace to use the 1973 October Yom Kippur War as the means of transitioning from war to peace. And of course had Henry Kissinger and subsequently Jimmy Carter not worked with Anwas Sadat to turn this into a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. There would have been no advance in peace between Israel and the Arabs. It was the critical without Sine Khan on, without which nothing else was possible. But once that was done, it was done in a way that we can say was suboptimal because it turned out to be a separate piece. But in the end, Egypt's role was established and it maintained that role through the critical periods that Nabil has described. And when we got to dealing with the Palestinian issue, we really needed Egypt to play the role of the supporter and I would say trustee. Perhaps that's not exactly the right word. But essentially the advisor and the anchor for the Palestinians and the cover for the Palestinians to be able to make the difficult compromises for a reconciliation, a historic reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinians. And Egypt played that role in a very important way for a long time. It wasn't always convenient to us, but it was essential. There was a time, I have to say, and Nabil essentially acknowledges this critical moment with the Clinton parameters. And I agree with him completely about the way that we screwed up Camp David too. And the embarrassing way in which we tried to get Egypt to come in there was a mistake not to engage with Egypt in the way that I've described because of its importance. But afterwards, with the Clinton parameters, Egypt was not willing to lend its weight to the effort to get Arafat to agree. And I think that that was critical moment. You were fully briefed as Nabil knows. We took your concerns into account. We worked with you. And yet at the critical moment, Egypt wasn't there. And maybe Nabil can respond to that, but I think that that on the one hand shows how important Egypt was and remains, I believe. But at that critical moment, Egypt was missing in action. Now we're at a critical juncture again. And Israel is about to drive a stake through the heart of the two-state solution if it goes ahead with this annexation as proposed in the Trump plan. And where is Egypt? Egypt could put a stop to this like that. If it were to stand up and say, no way can we go along with this. Jordan would like to be able to say that is trying to come up close to it. But it's too dependent on the United States. It's too weak to be able to take a stand. And of course, Egypt is also dependent on the United States, but it is much more capable of taking an independent stand, which is critically needed now. If the Israeli-Palestinian two-state solution, which is the only solution, there will actually be a solution other than, you know, the other ones are just recipes for a continuation of the conflict. If that is to survive, then this is the moment. And I hope somehow that Egypt will find its voice. But the lack of an Egyptian voice just underscores the point that Egypt's role geopolitically and in terms of peace has always been critical and is critical today. And we need Egypt to come back to its traditional role. Thank you. Thank you very much Ambassador Indyk for your intervention. Cam David too really got appointed treatment in the memoirs. So I'm really looking forward to hear more about your views on that perhaps in the discussion. Can I also ask Mr. Fahmi if you can turn your video on since this is a discussion I perhaps think this can be more conducive to a dialogue. We are running slightly over time, but we will catch up hopefully. I'm very pleased to now give the floor to Sir Derek, who will share some thoughts on the Mubarak years since he was Ambassador of the UK in Egypt around that time. Over to you. Thanks Hassan. I'm delighted that our Middle East Institute here at Kings is hosting this event, I must say. And it's an honor to share the screen with Martin and Nabil of course Martin after a very long time I have to say, but we do go back quite a long way. And I just, I will add a caution as to my lack of tech savvy so if I go silent you'll have to submit something I didn't know. Anyway, congratulations first thing really to Nabil on the book exactly like Martin I must say it's a really stimulating read if you're reading something in lockdown I would recommend it you can include it and your benefit there from if you've got any interest in the politics of the Middle East at all, as I guess everybody who's signed in does. And I agree also with what Martin said about the shortage of sources apart actually from one or two other Egyptian diplomatic biographies but direct from the horse's mouth inside information. There are sources on Arab diplomacy over this, this period of time, particularly when there is actually no access for the scholars certainly either to public records on the Arab side, so I think it's really really valuable. The period covered is exactly that which I spent working in the Arab world either on either on either in the Arab world or outside it but on the sort of issues we're talking about today. And I agree very much with what Nabil says about the, if you look outside and survey the scene at the present moment, wherever you are in the Middle East. It's pretty disheartening, but particularly in those areas of conflict so hopefully people will draw the useful lessons from what Nabil has said because it's Frank, and it's very clear, I think. And in many cases, almost all cases actually pretty convincing frankly. I have one observation, which is slightly outside but I feel impelled to do it my first posting in Cairo was from 1977 to 80. There was a time of great hope it's already been discussed of course, and I got to know through my job which was basically liaising with the foreign ministry. So many of them who are now either retired or retiring but at that point rising stars in the ministry and of course took notes on all the great figures. Definitely one very clear impression. And I do suppose it goes to what Martin was saying too about needing to call on Egypt for help in circumstances, expressing the some of those we see today. And that is of the quality and the commitment and the professionalism of the Egyptian Foreign Service collectively. I'm not, you know, everybody but basically that was an impression with which I went away, took with me, and I have found it to be an accurate impression almost everywhere I serve and whatever I've been doing. It's a useful thing to have up your sleeve. It was confirmed I don't know in New York in the mid 90s I was the British Security Council counselor basically, and Nabil sort of mentioned at some point in the book that a French colleague said well you know they were on the Security Council when they're not on the Security Council they're effectively the 16th member. At that time Egypt certainly was very active on the sort of issues any issues which were of concern released. And it's worth remembering really and it was important actually at that time also the NPT review conference that Nabil just mentioned took place. I'm sorry because Martin commends the anecdotes in the book, the anecdotes about that are really compelling basically as to how Egypt more or less snatched an element of victory from what he's described as a defeat and walked away with a commitment which has never been on it of course to a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, despite opposition in some quarters. And I think actually you asked me to say something about Mubarak is I think they saw real successes for Egyptian diplomacy rebuilding bridges with our partners. I believe it turns to Cairo. And I think that Egypt's role in the, in the Kuwait war and the bill is a bit ambivalent about the war but it seems to me that from it did stem very good things including for Egypt and things which are the Egyptian leadership and diplomats can be proud from debt relief all the way to the none up to the Madrid conference and so on. Where else to go I won't dwell on the Middle East peace process because Martin has done so much hysteria and I will probably position myself somewhere between the two of them that they both know much more than me on the project at that time so I think this would be a waste of other's time and I know people are anxious to ask questions. I was ambassador in Cairo for part of Nabil's time in Washington and he's reflected length on relations between the United States and Egypt. Unsurprisingly, I had a much easier time than he did. I mean, a trouble free relationship essentially. But I can sympathize with what he says in the book about the way Egypt was hectic and manhandled really on issues of essentially domestic affairs the ones in which we all cared and were trying gently to encourage change and progress and pluralism and so on. And how that was taken by President Obama and so on and the impact that it had on one does sometimes whether if a different approach had been adopted, but then probably be a very big if because it would also have to include an if about the Iraq war, which certainly was going to happen. Things might have developed somewhat differently. I don't know. But the US would certainly have been in possession to give the sort of discrete advice which might have been encouragement which one feels might have helped to some extent. Other than that, what to say, I mean, I My questions, my thoughts really Stammed More prospectively, I think, rather as Martin's second Remarks did And In your time as foreign minister Nabil, you sought to promote a proactive Egyptian approach to diplomacy and you cited conversations in the book with your Saudi and Iranian opposite numbers And I can tell you that actually without knowing the view role in instituting sort of that intraragional discussion Between them I was I know from the book now a beneficiary in what I was doing as a as a UN official In the field where I was working. So it just goes to show I think rather to underline Martin's point about Egyptian heft. You know the word I mean Egyptian Egyptian diplomatic ability to make a difference, even if I mean in the big scheme of things, not the largest of them and of course that process that I'm referring to actually You referred to was overtaken by the Yemen war and nothing more came of it, but some good did come and it speaks to what good might come I think if Egypt were able to play a more active diplomatic role. I realize there are all sorts of very pressing neighborhood issues close neighborhood issues for Egypt at the present moment, but there are Many things in terms of the sort of restabilization of the region which is, I agree also something that's going to be much more multipolar and future but the absence of an effective Egyptian poll will be felt. If it if it isn't down isn't pursuing issues like conflict resolution and promoting stability on a collective sense. More than it seems minded or able perhaps because of other preoccupations to do it present. And finally I would say. I mean actually Hassan right at the beginning of all things did announced that I was the chairman of the Arab British Centre in London so this gives me a particular sort of pulpit from which to say, and I feel for the absence of a sort of collective Arab sentiment at the present moment certainly cultural linguistic ties all the rest of it, but the divisions, the political divisions are deep. And Which is not to say that one sort of advocating the absence of other players from the Middle East or even Not playing a role and it's solving these various essentially Arab problems that lay before us after all they are part of the problem and they need to be part of the solution. But I mean there is a need for, I believe for that sort of political engagement across the Arab world for people to reach out more and I don't know. And I don't know. I mean, I'd like Nabil's view really on the sort of the future of that Arab interaction And how it should be progressed in the book he does sort of firm his attachment to the idea. Maybe Things would move a little bit if there was a spark and I in conclusion agree very strongly with Martin Indig That It is important to hear an Egyptian voice which is clear and which will speak to what I take to be an almost universal Arab sentiment in one form or another in relation to what might be about to happen with regard to the West Bank and so on. And this is a place I think where that voice which is compelling and speaks for 100 million people are people is important to listen to. Thanks. Thank you very much sir Derek for your intervention. We have really a full roster of questions. So let me very quickly add on my My question and then go back to Mr. Fahmi to address this full roster of points. I I really found very interesting the and I think it's one of the sort of most incisive comments that we've got so far on the very last days of Not really very lost days but very lost years of the Mubarak time and I think you you do a great job really describing some of the Sort of difficulties that we're starting to emerge from Just too much stability if you can say if you can say that and and a sense of lack of initiative and sometimes also Lack of purpose and I think that is You know, it's a testimony that I think will also be joined as as others will start to write their perspectives on this and it's an It's an area and a period that we're now also looking looking back to and sort of like trying to come to grips with My question is a new focus a lot On the on the idea of transition and I think the the the lost years of Mubarak and the sort of the Tahrir days Where Can also be seen in in the context of how Egypt is managing that transition because it was becoming obvious that a transition is needed And I think and I found very interesting your recount in the book of the Wiseman committee Which I remember at the time where everyone was very kind of like driven by sort of Emotional ideas about radical change came across at that time as as trying to sort of Steer kind of like a middle way into into this crisis something that perhaps now with the benefit of hindsight And more evaluation we need to revisit and and actually see how some of these civil society initiatives even if by prominent Voices in in the society were actually put forward in order to manage that transition Was there any set chance something like this would have worked you think You also mentioned the mission of ambassador Frank Weisner To Cairo and how that kind of like confused and I think confused things in Egypt or at least Give mixed messages messages to some people I think my my larger question is was there any chance that this transition would have been managed in a better way Or not Or not And I leave and I have other questions, but I leave it at that and then perhaps come later with the Q&A we have a very long list of Q&A from from the audience So I'm really keen to get through them, but let's first go back to Minister Fahmi before we we go to the to the floor again Okay Thank you. Can you hear me? Yes Okay has a the mute and the and the video are not controlled by me So I couldn't turn on because of that anyway, let me answer the points because they're all excellent points I'm Passionately Egyptian, but I Be honest and I'm not objective about This is beyond being objective. I Where I'm self-critical is because I think we can do better That being said I look at Egypt as part of a region not only in our borders and part of a region that has also a international role Otherwise, we can't be the main player if it's simply based on our material assets It's actually on our intellectual contribution to our regional order and our international order Having said that with all due respect to the big powers War and peace was our game It wasn't there We decided to go to war By mistake and then intentionally and then we decided to go to peace They ran after us when we started to do it, but we couldn't conclude it without So I actually am a strong believer of regional players determining direction and That international players will react to them if you take the lead within your own region I cannot compete with the US and Latin America or with the US in Asia But I can compete with them in the Middle East believe me I can because they're busy all over the world not because I'm stronger, but because they have different priorities and so my point which I know Martin and and Sir there are also making I think we can play a very important role in our region in spite of all the challenges that we face and the challenges are Listen when I was there and even now still quite Quite strong, but unless regional players lead the region will not get better. We will be a compliment to somebody else's interest To do that we need to have a vision We cannot be reactive If we're being reactive we compare material assets If we're being proactive then we're trying to control the agenda And then you balance in the the ideas the vision the political weight the history as well as the material assets You cannot do without assets, but Frankly, if it's assets alone, we would not be a major player in our region It's much more our intellectual assets So I'm all for proactive diplomacy and by the way diplomats make mistakes. We occasionally fail Not frequently but occasionally fair So I don't consider making initiatives and then not succeeding as being a failure It's just an effort you keep as long as they're consistent with where you want to go strategically And you don't pay a price for them that is higher than not speak Secondly, I would argue very openly that There's nobody in the region that can talk about North Africa about the Gulf About Sub-Saharan Africa about what's happening in the Levant on the Mediterranean on every single topic There's nobody in the region that can do as much as we can And there's nobody can trade containing us except ourselves So we can do more point blank. No reservations. No cabinets My second point Again, you have to have vision you have to have vision and a policy by the way Vision first Strict strategy second and then the policy not the other way around Because these things take time and you pay a price for each one of them But let me add another point here. There were some specific questions and I'll run through them The issue of the tensor parameters, I think Ambassador Plumby basically answered a little bit what what Martin was asking you about By the time the parameters were stepped forward Prismobar by that time Was already annoyed with the clear administration that they seem to be taking him for granted He was because he had been in power for over 20 years by then also getting increasingly bored with the whole process and Frustrated it was not succeeding and And I say this respectfully We basically had three different presents Mubarak President Mubarak in his first ten years was one president present Mubarak in the second ten years was the next president The bucket is third ten years or the third president in terms of how he managed the state not in terms of his basic Centrist approach and by that third ten years you really need to engage him to attract his attention To play the role that he would have played naturally in the first ten years or during the second ten years and the example for that is when he was asked to Participate in the liberation of Kuwait he did He said he would not go into Iraq But he did not hesitate to fight against an Arab country to liberate an Arab country Which was unique frankly in our part of the region and the Syrians wouldn't have joined if we had said no so his readiness to Play if you want the ice-breaking roll decreased over time because of the longevity of his presence in office, but it also was a function of The two may well one main power was disintegrating Soviet Union, but the Americans were taking him for granted and This kept annoying him so it and I say this honestly and I worked with with the president closely on many occasions It was increasingly difficult To convince him to take on any American initiative Because they always seem to ask for something only when they needed it and ignored Egypt in the rest of the time And that simply did not work for again an Egyptian who looked at Egypt as being the main player in the region Ah So that's really why we didn't jump to the content parameters It was not because we were up here against and I personally Conveyed my proposals to Cairo that these put these parameters we should Ensure that Arafat reservations are respected, but that they should be taken as a plus with reservations rather than a no So we could move forward The there is I'm not going to hold back on this Annexation will destroy any possible role for a two-state solution. It's already I mean I I start off by commending and criticizing the Rabin Perez Administration because they wanted to achieve things but they hesitated on settlements, but they wanted to achieve things Now to go as far as we are now where we're actually annexing territories These guys who wanted peace then were saying it's very difficult to remove settlers settlers now There's no there's not going to be a two-state solution if we keep moving forward on this and I'm not speaking as an Egyptian official. I'm speaking as an Egyptian But what I'm telling you is what I say here back home. We should be very very vocal and It's important to preempt the crisis rather than to face it and The is BB may get angry, but he cannot afford to Ignore each and we have to understand that that we have a positive element and we have a negative element as well Now we should and continue to always pursue the more positive one But the idea that One side or the other can get angry all your respect. I'm not in this to make anybody happy I'm in it to pursue Egypt's national interest and they are strategic much more than tactical So I'm with both of you. We should be more vocal on the annexation And it's not about waiting for anybody else. We never waited for anybody else to speak out We need to speak it very quickly the Minister of Foreign Affairs Are the criticism we used to get of or if you want the commendations we used to get internationally We used to get them locally as well Even some of our colleagues would say why don't you guys ever calm down and stop making proposals? But that's why people heard us. They didn't always agree with us and Unless you start unless you play that role. Well, they're gonna go and people will go and look at where is the dollars? where dollars and cents and the dollars and cents are not Even in the West any longer. They're not in the Middle East. They're much more in Asia So I need to play the role using my intellectual assets the NPT very quickly The NPT we swallowed hard To go along with the vote going along with the resolution which went on without a vote Because the language said there was a widespread majority had it said consensus. We would vote no But we accepted it because it was well drafted diplomatically by ambassador the chair of the conference, but the interesting point is Because of the conference because we were vocal before and after She won Paris actually agreed to proposal I personally made and Then because I knew he wouldn't he wouldn't Respected I told my boss. He's not gonna come on. He's not gonna deliver on this So let's not jump out of the gun, but let's see if he does and of course he didn't That being said We're not going to have security in the region if there's an imbalance in national security capacity Whether it is a direct balance or an indirect balance there is not going to be security and One way or the other there's going to be an arms race and it's very important here to understand that This is not anti-Israel or anti-Iran When I look at our issues that are peace and war or national security They are about strategic relations not about who's in government today or who's in government tomorrow and it needs a better balance Yeah, I did gotta get a lot of bruises Frankly when I was in Washington about domestic affairs, but I gave out my share as well Particularly when they decided to go into Iraq but Let me leave that aside I Honestly believe in looking towards Egypt's role forward if I may And also well, let me do that and then I'll do the Wiseman issue The Middle East is not going to calm down in the short term and it's not going to come come down unless Arabs become more proactive the the silence of our diplomacy is bizarre In you cannot have five fires ongoing in Libya in Syrian situation the Yemeni situation lack of an after a peace process and of course the Iran Gulf area only recently Did we have to Arab initiatives on Liby? The Egyptian one and the one the day after from Algeria before that there was everything from around the world How can that be the case? It's just not logical. So Arab diplomacy has to be more engaged and I would add to that For you to be more engaged. You need to deal with two deficiencies and a Generic resistance to incremental change The world is going to change so we might as well embrace the change and deal with it rather than react to explosions rather than change and secondly There is a national security imbalance between Arabs and non Arabs because of an over dependence of Arabs on foreign parties Foreign parties will come in to help in existential situations They're not going to come in and to develop to secure your borders on Non-existential issues and that's where the regional players play in and we need to to be more active on that The wise many issue and the transition look I mentioned intentionally that our transition started in 1952 because I think our We had we've always had a pluralistic political system Actually, we had it before 52 and then we resumed it later We have about 114 parties today, but we don't have the pluralistic political culture any longer in other words There are parties in name, but they're not really engaged in an ongoing debate about different policy issues Different opinions and ultimately find a way to work together. I'm not talking working together beyond the Constitution I'm just talking about having this political debate now this eroded from 52 onwards and Because of that when 2011 happened There was nobody else there on the street who could really if you want Generate momentum to create a party or political force. The only force out there was the brother on one hand or the old institutions which Had really been the beginning of of this end So that's why I think it made it so difficult and the the new leaders of 2011 be they the young youth or Red Eye or whoever frankly Didn't also have institutional mechanisms to okay. Let's Put together and it's a committee. Let's develop the parties as the institutions so we came up with this proposal to Have a soft landing and let me quickly say here We met with members of the youth and they came to us and they said point blank You're talking tactics. We're talking strategy We're not talking about changing One law or the other. We're talking about changing the system So we respect your integrity, but you have to understand the the the the ambitions we have To move forward that was fine with us as long as it didn't mean tearing everything down We wanted to have a more open engagement more checks and balances more transparency much more accountability But we didn't want to tear down the whole system to do it If we could find a way not to do it because the options tearing it down where You want to go to a vote you're going to end up with Those who can get the vote out more quickly and it's not going to be the result people want I'm not arguing here that the ballot box in normal circumstances should not be the determining fact it should but you also should choose the right time to hold the election and I because I can see Martin Smiling at me there. I'm going to pick on him for a second. I remember frankly the push for Palestinian elections When we were screaming you want to hold the elections now you're going to get Hamas to win the parliamentary elections We weren't against elections, but it's a matter of the timing of the election anyway Transitions going to take time. I am a strong supporter of 2011. I Also think 2013 was necessary because it was in defense of our identity but 2011 and 2013 were a call for Playing a role in determining our future and we need more openness to do that I missed the Wissner question because frankly Frank has to explain that I don't know what the answer to that. I Think I think he I think he and buzzer Frank was there what might actually be on the attendees list, but hopefully that can be the the subject of another webinar perhaps I'm not sure how we can technically get him to contribute on the So let me let me collect some of the questions that we've got and apologize for those who I won't be able to Relay their questions to the panel because the questions We received too many questions actually for the time available. So I really apologize for this so So I'll group the questions in in chunks and I think one chunk refers goes back to what you discussed when it comes to the MPT and There is a question from Bob Einhorn from Brookings Asking about The so what question if if Egypt joining the MPT was a mistake What are the prospects for Egypt to be considered that decision or to withdraw from the MPT? And I think he's trying to be provocative here even through nuclear weapons There's another question about the wisdom of expanding the nuclear weapon free zone to include chemical and biological weapons as well was that How do you how do you see that now looking looking from where we were at? And then there are questions that that actually take Egypt's foreign policy Slightly beyond the Arab Israeli context obviously questions about the Ethiopian dam which is causing a lot of the beta and anxiety in Cairo and Basically, how can Egypt reformulate its relationship with with Africa? Beyond just drawing on the history of Collaboration on their Nasser and so on. So how can that be revived and be put in the service of resolving the Ethiopian dam there is there are a few questions about Libya as well and Turkey's involvement which I think fits into a larger picture about sort of Regional alliances and how they are forming and to what extent you see that Egypt might be in a position to get drawn into a Confrontation either in Libya or when it comes to Ethiopia so questions that looks into the broader Egyptian context as well So so if you can take these questions that would be that would be great and again, I apologize for those who've Who've contributed questions because of the time we won't be able to cover Sure, thank you Hassan if you send me their questions, I will send them answers After I think them carefully, but anyway on the NPT my point was It was wrong to join the NPT alone We actually signed the NPT the very first day was open for signature in 1968 But we said we would not ratify unless the Israelis did so I wasn't against Joining the NPT if the Israelis did the NPT by the way is not a very good treaty But it was the best one out there Given the alternatives so my my criticism was joining it unilaterally We actually asked the Israelis to join when we signed the peace agreement with them and they refused to do that at the time as well Let me just pick up thought for a second I Think they as I said in the book I think they gave us a tremendous opportunity to negotiate When they overreached as we did at the beginning of the NPT When they overreached to try to get a decision without a vote and then to get a decision Sorry a unanimous decision and then a decision without a vote so we decided to okay, let's get something out of this We have been criticism criticized in Egypt for not focusing all only on nuclear But also in suggesting having a zone free of weapons of chemical weapons and weapons as well Some of our purists believe that was the wrong mistake. It may have been I support the proposal nevertheless It was made in good faith to try to take into account concerns. It's really had about chemical weapons Potentially in some Arab countries and also concerns of Arabs is a big Israeli nuclear program So it was done in good faith. It did not work regrettably, but it's still there and a point that Derek that sir Derek made We got a commitment from the three depositories to take this issue seriously the NPT and they went back on their word And that's something which We will never forget and They have to remember that the next time they come knocking on the door the second issue The Ethiopian down. I just wrote an article that was published yesterday. I think this is a major crisis We have two major crisis on our hands and they're both national security crisis the Nile water issue We use 85 percent of our water consumption comes from the Nile. We don't have any substantial options besides the Nile Any irregularities there creates a problem the second issue which I will also mention is the Libyan issue Creating a regional creating a Syrian situation in Libya Is a national security problem for us? So we have two national security crisis at the same time potentially there that being said not everything means war And I would hope not I just wrote an article yesterday suggesting that Let's respect each other's historic rights, but in actual fact is more water than any of us need and Let's focus more on how do we have a better utilization of water not only as a result of the death But all all on the Nile basin area completely and Not only on the usage of water, but also how do you make agriculture more efficient? How do you generate energy more efficient? Efficiently and look at how do you take advantage of not only the Nile water, but also the rainwater and the different sources of water in that region and I Suggest having three levels of decision making the very first one which is national Then you have a tripartite Version if there's a disagreement and then if we still disagree it goes to arbitration to a quick arbitration of if you want independent individuals whose decisions are mandatory the third component to that is Let's try to develop a Marshall plan for this whole region So we create a win-win situation for the red I know with COVID-19 with economic crisis It's not the best timing to do that, but I didn't choose the timing for crisis. I just deal with them when they come But I actually think if one looks at how do we solve the how do we use the potential of the area much rather than how Do we resolve the debate about who is wrong and who is right? Because these are problems caused by the lack of strategic thinking These issues could have been dealt with by all of us much better if they were dealt with dealt with 15-20 years ago, and I would very anecdotally simply mentioned when I visited Africa frequently African president would tell me you're only the second Egyptian who doesn't tell us what you did for us and Is talking more about what happens now in the future rather than what you did for us in the past? I said well, I just like to save time, but what we did for you put that in the bank But yeah, I wanted but seriously speaking the reason I would do that is Egypt is 70% use and Africa is about 60% here. They don't want to talk about history. They want to talk about their present and their future and There's room for one for room for a role there. So I would argue Strategy vision is important even here. Maybe is a major problem major problem and At the beginning of year I wrote an article there This maybe there was a lot of talk then that the Americans would bump Iran and they might might not. I don't know That being said the last January I wrote that if Turkey expands in Libya this may be the first conflict of the year Now I would hope not But this is not an issue that we can allow to rest lightly Because it creates a tremendous security problem physical problem on the border and a potentially imbalance in the region now I saw the Egyptian initiative. I Also read the Berlin mandates. I heard what the Algerians Suggested I really hope we find a way the dialogue to move forward My last point to make here is as we look forward towards the Middle East. I focus mostly on My brothers in the Arab world But I actually think we need to have a tough love discussion as Arabs With Turkey Iran and Israel Tough love by way of let's be candid. Let's be straightforward But let's try to look towards a future together rather than only a debate about History, we're not going to be able to have a better future without resolving the historic problems but Trying to resolve them on the ground By talking to the superpowers or by talking to surrogates or by doing this or that is not going to be a solution It's important for us to respect good neighbor relations But often to find a way to dialogue. I would not start by holding conferences I will start by Choosing a small number of emissaries to develop confidence building measures to prepare for whatever dialogues Great, thank you so much. I think we've reached through the 90 minutes that we had for for today's For today's session. We could have easily had another 30 minutes, but I'm afraid we have to And now Thank you so much minister Fahmi ambassador Indak sir Derek for joining us today and for sharing your thoughts openly and for triggering this interesting discussion and also thank you everyone who joined us from From all over the world really we had like a very long list of attendees today, and we're very grateful for your interest and time And I hope you all keep well and safe. Thank you very much Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you