 Hello. Good morning from New York. My name is Adam Tooze. I am the Director of the European Institute at Columbia University. And it's my great pleasure to welcome you to this session on behalf of the World Economic Forum on Building Future Preparedness. We've all been living through, we indeed still are living through, one of the great biological shocks, pandemic shocks that have struck our civilization, our societies in many centuries. And it has, I think, raised awareness, if it wasn't there already, for the challenges that we face in facing the risks, assessing the risks that surround us in the modern world, in preparing to fight mount responses to those risks, and in the event of us failing to be able to do so to build the resilience that we need to cope with the fallout from the crisis. There is a range of issues facing us. COVID is the most urgent and one that we are still struggling with. Climate, of course, hovers ahead of us no longer in the distant future, but really as a challenge of the coming decades. And beyond the edge of our horizon of awareness, what COVID has, after all, taught us most of all, is the fact that out there in the wider world, beyond risk, there is radical uncertainty that we have to come to terms with as well. This is a set of questions. These are a set of questions that have been preoccupying a series of panels at the online World Economic Forum this year. And it's my pleasure today to present to you a really extraordinary group of contributors to this discussion. We have, from the side of government, His Excellency Mohammed El-Jadan, the Finance Minister of Saudi Arabia, one of the key states, obviously, in the struggle to think through the issues of decarbonisation. From the side of science and expertise, we have Jeremy Farah, the Director of the Wellcome Trust. From the side of finance, from the side of the industry, which most sits at the heart of the management of risk, we have Christian Muntala, CEO of Swissry, one of the key insurance groups that we'll have to do with these risks. And then finally, from the side of policy banking, we have the President of the ERBD, Odile Francoise Renaud Basso. So an extraordinary line-up of speakers who can give us access to these problems from a remarkably diverse set of perspectives. I am sure the audience is going to follow the comments with great interest. But at the WEF, even in our online format, we're very interested in mobilising audience response and audience questions. To do this, we're going to be using a technology called Slido. This screen here is the key. What you have to do, if you want to ask a question, is to point your smartphone at the QR code in the bottom right-hand corner here. And this will, by a series of electronic magical steps, take you to a series of links from which you will then be able to ask questions. You go to Davos Agenda Slido, then you select Future Preparedness, which is our session. And then you will be able to enter your question. Then this will be passed to the WEF team behind the scenes, and it will come back to me in the chat. Please keep these questions flowing as we go along, because it would allow me to direct our conversation before, in the final 10 minutes or so, we go explicitly to answering your questions. But without further ado, can I call on His Excellency Mohammed El-Jadam to give us one or two minutes on his take on these issues that face us in the current moment. Thank you. Thank you very much. And let me start by thanking the World Economic Forum for organizing session and obviously thanking the banalists for their time and attendees. The past two years have provided many lessons to build social and economic resilience and better build future preparedness. Among these lessons is the need for a bold, decisive and data-driven action and risk mitigation. Also, it is key that we balance public health, social and economic needs, simultaneously. The G20 have agreed to establish the joint task force between the Ministers of Health and the Ministers of Finance to ensure that the world is better prepared for the future. It is very critical that we all support these efforts. We learned the clear lesson. It is not possible for one country to fight the pandemic alone. We will only be safe if everyone is safe. Let us be clear also. The next virus may not be a pandemic. It could be something else. It could be, you know, cyber security issue. It's just like the pandemic needs a greater international collaboration to prevent it and deal with it when it happens. And the energy transition, which we will talk about throughout the session, sustainable development is a key to build a resilient global economy. However, risks that often overlooked is the need to ensure that energy security is not negatively impacted through the energy transition. Thank you very much, Adam. Thank you so much, Minister, for that important set of remarks to get us started. Could I ask Jeremy Farrar at this point to give us his view from the side of the Welcome Trust and really the forefront of the scientific endeavor on where we stand at this moment? Thanks, Adam, and it's a pleasure to join and thank you, my thanks to that other minister and the pleasure to join this panel. A few opening comments. The importance of taking warning seriously. This pandemic didn't come out of the blue. We've had a series of warnings over the last 20 years. That would be the first thing I'd say. The second is I've heard so often that it's coming from an emerging disease background that will take this one more seriously. Tragically, over the last 20 years, we've said that a number of times. And yet within a year or two, actually, interest has waned. If we don't act after this one, we will never act. The second point is that this requires a real assessment of the risks we face. And your comment about climate not being something for decades away, but happening now is absolutely spot on. These are challenges that we face today. They're all transnational. They are all requiring some degree of science, but science is part of a society that operates in and they will affect all of society. This pandemic hasn't just been a health issue. It's been a geopolitical issue. It's been a trade issue. It's been an educational issue. It's been a all of society issue. And we're not used to dealing with those sorts of things in fragmented governments and international agencies. And the last thing which I think is a real struggle is how do we combine a domestic political agenda where your domestic drivers may pull you in one direction, but your international responsibilities and actually international common sense would take you in another direction. Do you provide vaccines to your own citizens? Or do you also provide them to the world? And I don't think we've answered those questions and they will be the great challenges in the 21st century. Yes, it does seem to me that though we are briefed and tasked on this panel with talking about the future, it would simply be remiss not to note, as you say Jeremy, just the glaring fact of our failure to roll out a comprehensive vaccine response at this point, because that sort of just to the certainly to the non scientific, especially somebody interested primarily in economic stability is just the staggering fact about our current situation because it impacts everything. Christian, can you give us the perspective from the side of the of the insurance industry, which after all is going to be in the crosshairs of this, if we if we if we fail. Thank you, Adam, and to all the other panelists, it's a great pleasure to be here today with all of you. Maybe something that links very much to what we heard from the two other panelists is I looked at the web global risk reports 2007, which is a report I was involved in personally as the chief risk officer of Swiss three at the time. And what is interesting that was a few months before the financial crisis is that the biggest economic risk was correctly identified as the housing bubble. But also in terms of the biggest risk in terms of human lives, pandemics was mentioned in 2007. And in the risk report, there is a little scenario which we worked on at the time which said that in January of the following year, there will be a virus coming in Asia through animals, countries will close the borders immediately, but aviation would transport it everywhere. There will be no effect on just in time inventories. There will be asset devaluation. Central banks would inject liquidity at Hawke creating inflationary risk conspiracy theories would be calm and be abundant. There will be a backlash against globalization. And a year later by January of the year later, there will be a partially effective vaccine. So why am I telling that? I think it's highly relevant. I'm telling that because experts, that's my experience experts generally know the risks. I've never seen anything materialized that no expert in the world had ever conceived. The issue is this doesn't get transformed into actions. So certainly in Western democracies, most of the funds available to states are steered not according to risk, they're steered according to perceived risks. And that's a huge difference. Risk perception changes massively over time. It is influenced by events that have happened. So before the pandemic, the risk perception amongst the public would have been minimal around pandemic. And there would be no funds available. We had, we all had plans around pandemic, but they were useless because there was no real means behind them. After the event, typically risk perception is huge. So there's unlimited funds going into the issue. And then as no new pandemic comes up, it will wane step by step. That's just human nature. So my I have no worries around what we're going to do on pandemic specifically in the next five years. I think if there should be concern is what's going to be in 30 years, when the next pandemic hits, and will we have the attention span to have the right means until then? And also, will we start to look at risks in advance? Will we start to be steered by effective risk and not by risk perceptions? Because there's many other risks out there, like cyber or so that are, it might be undervalued and where we have no thought out response as a global system. So I'm hopeful, I hope it's a general wake up call for a lot of other things. But history, of course, it makes me not super optimistic around that. Thank you so much, Christian. I can see a great conversation between you and Germany unfolding just a second. But before we go there, I'd like to bring in a deal because you're on the side if you like of investment, you are the side presumably of building preparedness and building resilience through investment. How do you approach this from the side of the EBRD? First of all, I'm very happy to be in the panel and very interesting and I share a lot of things that have been said already. But my first comment would be really to say and that we are in this all together and that this is a global issue calling for global response. Part of it, part of the response has been global, but part of it has been very national and the trade-off and the challenging I mean, how to square the circle is very difficult for political leaders and so forth. The second thing I wanted to say is that we all learn from previous crises. And of course, I mean, we probably underestimate the next risk and we as Christian just said, we focus very much on just the risk we've just been through, but we learn and I think on the economic ground, part of the economic response draw very much on the lessons of the past crisis, much more rapid, much stronger at the European level, extremely quick compared with the euro area crisis and so forth. So I think that to be on the positive side, lessons learned, I mean, is a very important thing to prepare the next crisis. And of course, the next crisis will probably not come from a virus, it will come from somewhere else. But what we will have learned and to do will be very important for to deal with this one. The third comment I wanted to make is listen to scientists. I think that's something which we should learn from this. I mean, it was already said, this was anticipated and so forth, the politician international organization should listen more. And if I look from my I mean, bank, policy bank perspective being quick to react, innovate, so speed is of the essence. And Ibiadi was extremely quick in March 2020 to put in place new instruments, specific response to support our clients and countries of operation. Scale of the answer was also very important and build on existing partnership and so forth. We were able to react quickly and because we were relying on our clients, existing financial relationship and so forth that allowed us really to provide support at a time where the economy was completely in a standstill. And so help them to survive these very difficult times. Thank you, Adil. That was great. What is what a super range of comment early on? Can I come back to the question that Jeremy and Christian first raised? And I throw this open to the entire panel. But I mean, there was, I think there was a consensus in fact, because all of the speakers, we should listen to scientists. And I think there was also a consensus that we don't listen enough or that we don't listen to the right ones or we only listen to a certain period of time. So how do we do this better in future? I mean, why do we not listen? Christian offered us some basic, I think, intelligible kind of logics in terms of short attention, time spans, focus and so on. How do we push back against that? I mean, we have, after all, in the zone of economic policy, various types of institutional solution which secure a diversity of different time horizons, different structures to build credibility, for instance in monetary policy. Jeremy, perhaps if I can just come straight back to you, do you have one or two core suggestions that might help us address that fundamental problem that you analysed? Listen to the experts. How do we ensure that that happens? Like many things in this, I think it's the structures and systems and frankly relationships, culture, language that you have before a crisis that facilitates your ability to respond to it. If you depend on reacting to the crisis, you will always be too slow, always, and therefore I think we shouldn't think of how do we listen to a scientist or whatever, social scientist, biomedical scientist, economic scientist in a crisis. We need to somehow build that in, in to embed it all of the time so that you have that infrastructure, you have those relationships, you understand the weaknesses of science as well as what it can offer and you understand something of the way science works. I think the lesson I would have across health systems, across governments, across science, build it in all of the time and then when you need it, it will be there for you in a way that you can use rather than reacting and trying to establishment in a crisis. So perhaps the analogy is something closer to the financial stability board or in which we moved from understanding the financial system is inherently stable to believing it's inherently unstable and therefore basically constantly a macro potential management essentially mode. Christian, you were, you were bold in some of your hypotheses about the limits of our policies in responding. Do you have from your vantage point, suggestions that, that might improve this? Yeah, maybe somewhat naively at the time we put in the report and the recommendation to create the chief risk officers for governments. And it's not just government offices, other companies, but the idea that you would have and you don't need many people that you had some people in the government who are there to do the links to all the scientists on all the risks and on a yearly basis collects all the risk, reassesses all the risks that the country faces and then communicates that to the parliament, but also to the people potentially, right? It should be an open resource. And then once this gets established, the difficult part will be to reallocate step by step resources towards the risks and not just have all the resources on the last risk that has happened. But I think this is much harder and will take time. So that was a proposal we did at the time and we work with many countries since then. And some of these practices have been created since 2007, to be honest. So I see some improvement. It's true. I think I share some of the optimism of Odile that there is there is some learning happening. But if you don't have people whose job it is to look at these risks, I think the risk is just that you get driven by risk perception. And I think there was a lot of scientific progress on behavioral science the last few years and we know how irrational human beings are. And so I think to a certain extent is about creating systems and processes that find a way around that irrationality. Minister Al-Jaddan, you in your comments from the very beginning highlighted the role of the G20. And the G20 has been one of the driving agencies with regard to global financial stability. That's really in fact when much of the action is located and much of the direction comes for the IMF and the World Bank from that forum. Could you envision the G20 acting as the sort of group that would enable us to as it were push this agenda of risk awareness in a more general sense? Is it the right form? Is it large enough? Does it include some of the countries most at risk? How do you how do you how might you envision that? Well, thank you. And they agree with with the comments earlier and they think the G20 represent about 80 percent of the world and actually represent also those who are not represented by having actually representatives from various regions around the world. And therefore it works with the World Bank, the IMF and other multilateral institutions when we needed a wider participants buying in terms of policy positions. I think obviously G20 plays a very important role. I think multilateral institutions and they would name the World Bank and possibly even the IMF in particular with a wider outreach, wider stakeholders who could play a very important role in this supporting the G20 in sitting the policy and then monitoring the execution of that policy. We have seen this in various aspects, including the financial crisis and the establishment of the ecosystem that is now monitoring the financial system and actually proven that it works. I think the second point which is also important is we should find the way and possibly this is more relevant to democracies to find the way where policies like this are not actually election driven, are not short term because if you are looking for short term, the likelihood if you are locating the necessary resources and funds will be very limited. So we need to find a mechanism to support, I would really say just to give an example, if you look at the U.N. Donors list of who is actually giving to other countries, particularly low income countries, emerging markets who are in need, particularly in need, not only for immediate support like food, et cetera, but also research and development, developing resource, it is this promotion. If you look at just the top five, they are different than the top five GDBs around the world. And therefore we will really need to find a way to, as we are focusing, for example, over the last 20, 30 years on allocating a percentage of our GDB on the search and development and actually finding a way to impose it almost on governments to allocate for risk management and preparedness. That's very interesting. Yes, for me, I have to say that one of the really shocking discoveries of doing this research for the book I wrote about 2020 on the funding of the WHO, where the Rotary Club makes a larger contribution than the vast majority of sovereign states. I mean, this is an extraordinary mismatch between the sovereign resources of states. I mean, O'Deal, I'd like to come back to your very interesting remarks about the need for cooperation. I mean, this was a theme that also ran through Minister Al-Jadam's comments that this is this praise, which is far more than a cliche, no one's safe until we're all safe. And I guess the question is, do you see the financial linkages that, as you say, were rather rapidly mobilized in 2020 as a model for work in other areas? Or do you see them as, as it were, directly feeding into other areas? So should we think of policy banks like yours as models for action in other spheres of global risk management? Or do you actually see a role for policy banks as assisting in this process of risk management directly in other domains, in the health domain, in the climate domain, in the realm of cyber that's been invoked several times? And I want in a minute to come on to discuss that wider range of risks. I think in a way, the financial, the coordination and the financial system response on monetary side, fiscal side, and to force was a coordination of national response. So it was everybody, each constituency doing the same thing in a relatively coordinated manner very quickly, but dealing with its own issues with the same, I think, what was very useful is to have the same way of thinking, same tools and so forth. On, for example, on vaccine or on climate, the issue is how to ensure it's not. I don't think that we can work only on the basis of each constituency working with its own stake. I think there is a need of cooperation and assistance because, I mean, of different responsibilities, different capacities. So I think that that were solidarity and needs to interfere. And I think that happened a bit also on the financial side, which not underestimate, for example, SDR allocations. This was a bit, I mean, emergency assistance from the AMF. This was also quick and large and important delivery. But I think on vaccine on climate, we have to do. I mean, the answer what is not really yet there. Just one comment I wanted to make on the risk and how to better address the risk, I think one important issue and it's the same issue with pandemic and with climate and probably cyber is the same is to really bring in the discussion very early, the question of cost exposed versus cost ex ante. And when you take into account the gap, I mean, and I think on the climate, the discussion changed a bit when you realize the cost of no action rather than the cost of action. And I think if we had that on the pandemic, we would have probably had we'd be better prepared. One last element I wanted additional comment I wanted to make is also I mean, we need to prepare for specific risk, but also I mean, all the work to have better institution, strong, legitimate institution with the confidence of the citizen well functioning institution, policy space and fiscal monitoring and so forth. All this is also very important because you will never know where the crisis will come from. And then if you are if you have this positive element, yeah, then you can much better react. Thank you. Thank you, Adeel. I mean, I guess for me listening to you for the this first half hour of our conversation and I hope that we will get some questions from our audience in a minute. The one line that really echoes in my head was Jeremy's, which was if we don't react to this, we're not going to react to anything. And the fact of the matter is, as we all know, that as you just pointed out the deal with regard to vaccines, it just somehow hasn't happened. Quote unquote, right? Well, words to that effect. I'm sorry to paraphrase you, but I think that is how many of us feel like it just has not happened. So even if as it were, the mission of our panel here is to look forward and it must be don't we simply have to face the failure so far to address this issue? It's not a complete failure by any means and it's not as it were just a default, but there is surely and we see it with Omicron after all as it were the nightmare scenario of an uncontrolled epidemic, journey-rating variants to which we have yet really to produce an adequate response. And for me, the question that Jeremy's comment poses is the fundamental one. If not now, when? Like, you know, if not in response to this, acute risk now, which threatens the viability of the global financial system going forward. So I wonder whether, whether, you know, maybe from a minister, Jadam, you could give us a sense at the level of the G20, I mean, you're represented at the highest level in this body. Where is that urgency that you would expect in relation to this problem? And how without that urgency can we look in an optimistic way about dealing with the other risks to come in future? Well, two things. One is I would say that I'm not as pessimistic. I think even if we failed, human nature is adaptive and they were able to respond and they were able to respond very quickly to something that most of us did not think that we will be able to. If you remember in previous pandemics, took years, seven years, ten years to produce vaccine. Some of them we don't have vaccines for, but we managed when we put our efforts together, both the private and the government to move and to move successfully. We also managed to provide support very quickly to low income countries who are in need. And some of the efforts that have been very difficult over the past ten years were able to be agreed through the G20 and Barris Club to provide relief. We have seen also IMF is showing 650 billion dollars equivalent of SDRs to support liquidity. So what I'm saying is, yes, I think if we look at, as mentioned earlier by Odi, if we look at the cost of most problems, compared to what would it take just to prevent it, it's just like insurance premium. It's very cheap, actually, very cheap. And we need to make that message very clear to everybody. And to me, still, I think the G20 is taking a lead. They are taking this actually very seriously. They are planning, as I said, a task force have been now established between the ministers of health and ministers of finance. But to me, that is just covering one bar of the risk. But we didn't know what the next risk is going to come from. And therefore, the call by the G20 for the IMF and the World Bank to actually improve their reporting mechanism for future risk is critical. Second is, I think people underestimate why we as stakeholders and shareholders in the World Bank and the IMF support the management in actually imposing sometimes difficult conditions on recipients of support to do structural reform. It is not about money. It's not about just having discipline on money. It's actually having structural reforms will help you face this kind of risk when it heads. And I think we just need to make sure that this institution continue with that path. Thank you so much, Minister. We have several good questions coming up in the chat, which I think pose really basic dilemmas. And I think I'd like to go there because I think they pose hard choices. Because it's very easy, I think. Obviously, we would all choose safety over risk. And in retrospect, it's very clear, as the minister pointed out, that the trade-off here is simple. It's a small insurance premium against the very last potential Ross. But how exactly do we balance these issues? And this is the burden of the two questions. One is, how do we balance the trade-off between safety on the one hand and the need in certain areas to take risks and accept risk? I mean, how do we actually collectively manage that? Say we establish Christians risk officers for governments. They provide the information, but that in a sense is the easy bits, the difficult choices as it were, how do I trade-off? And the second question is, similarly, really, and it's as it were, spells that out in a political economy dimension because the benefits and the risks are not equally distributed. The benefits and the costs of adjusting to risk are not equally distributed either. When they are absolutely massively collective, it's relatively simple, but often they're not. So how would the panelists think about these kind of trade-offs? Maybe I can come back to you Christian on this. Say we get your country risk officers. How are they gonna strike these two types of balance for us? What would be the next step in the algorithm that you'd be proposing? So there's only no algorithm. This must be a choice of the country, of the body that is ruling and will be very dependent on the risk appetite, the costs it costs to reduce the risk, et cetera. I think the problem today is not really this dilemma. The problem today is that people don't know about the risk period and therefore there's no choice. I think once you talk about the risks, you can think about how much would it cost to reduce it, how much and are you okay with that? That's called risk tolerance. That's what we do in companies and you would probably have something very similar. You would say that's all the risks we have. That's the kind of means we allocate to these risks. That's the risk that is remaining and we live with that risk. And I think the answer to that equilibrium will be different from country to country, from society to society, et cetera, et cetera. So to me this is a difficult choice, but it's a choice that must be made by the people who meet effects. With better information. Odile, how might you approach this issue of as it were, the trade-offs? Or do you, like Christian, think this can essentially be resolved by better information and then leaving it up to people to make choices on that basis? No, I was thinking listening to Lucretial that there is an additional complexity that if we say we are all in this together and there are so many incorrect connection that if somebody choose to take mode, if a country choose to take more risk, not to get prepared, but then something happens, then, I mean, the cost will have to be shown by everybody because it's not like, I mean, this would be sort of moral, I don't know whether it's moralism, but you could have some free riding there. And so that I think had an additional layer of complexity that, I mean, if we are all concerned, then it should be a common response. I think that, I mean, in the balance, and it's something all financial institutions are always balancing risk and risk appetite and safety. And so this is indeed something, a choice that has to be made in a way collectively. What I was thinking about and also listening and looking at one question coming on, it is the fact that, you know, to be sure that we really assess the risk and measure them, I mean, having people responsible for doing that is very efficient. And I've participated to a number of financial stability board meeting. And the fact that this body now is in charge of assessing the risk and so forth, it puts a burden on the people participating and they really need to think hard. If they will publish a report saying, this is the way we assess the situation and they are all accountable for that. And therefore this, I mean, involves and implies some discipline, transparency, accountability that is, in my view, very important in preparing and understanding what may come and really providing this kind of transparent assessment that we have that will help making some decisions. Thank you so much Adil. That's really fascinating to hear your experience of those financial stability discussions. Jeremy, I think in a sense, one of these questions goes right back to your early intervention, right? So the question is, can scientific messages alone drastically change the existing economic and political vested interests? I mean, it goes back to your basic intervention of why don't we listen to the experts? Is it simply a matter of behavioral issues? In other words, our inability to sustain long-term time horizons, the screening out of bad news or is in your experience the issue of vested interests really the fundamental one that people don't want to hear news that threatens their jobs? No, I think it's because we unfortunately exist too much in a fragmented siloed sort of approach. Within governments, we have ministries that look after themselves. They rarely think cross-government. I'm delighted that G20, and I was involved in the high-level panel report that Tham and from Singapore together for the minister, he will know that. And I'm delighted that Health and Finance are now talking for the first time, not as a charitable activity, but actually as a long-term investment. That is crucial. I'm delighted by the minister's optimism about G20. I do worry that geopolitics is getting in the way of G20 being able to act in a cohesive way with the interests of the world at stake. And when I think about risk and whether it be economic, scientific, social, whatever it is, I would plead that we don't see that in the abstract, but that doesn't become a tick-box exercise of a risk assessment every year. But when we think about it, we put in place things that, whether that risk happened or not, would bring us value and utility all the time, and that is the way to make it sustain. In terms of surveillance, talking about at the moment for pandemics, there's a lot of talk about focusing on pandemics in surveillance or vaccines for future pandemic illnesses. What I would much rather we talked about is how can we build in a system that is sustained all the time and providing utility all the time? And then I think that's the best way of sustaining it. So we taught less in the abstract and more about how actually what we would invest in would bring value and utility all of the time, because that's the only way of sustaining it. So in terms of this question of vested interests, in a sense, your argument is more vested interest, but let's vest them in preparedness. Let's, as it were, build coalitions of interested groups who are committed to this project. Does that, is that what? Yeah, that's a very nice way of putting it. The only thing I would add to it is the vested interest. Vest in the interest that makes a difference to people's lives today and tomorrow, and if something happens, rather than just in the abstract if something happens, because I don't believe that if something happens, we'll be sustained. That goes back to what Odeo was talking about, good governance, good investment in systems, good investments in mitigating and preventing actions rather than responding to crises when they happen. Yes, it does seem to me, doesn't it? I mean, to that sense, one could spin the current crisis and this might be going very far in the direction of the minister's optimism as an opportunity to build a kind of global. Absolutely, absolutely. I mean, this should be the moment to build a rudimentary but basic comprehensive health service for every human on the planet. We need to get a jab in as many people's arms as we can. That, in a sense, could be this vested project, which is very powerful. In the back of our minds, and I know this was also part of the mission of the panel from WEF, and it's come up in several different forms and it's posed acutely in question four that we can see, is the question of how we deal with the limits of our own perception? If the problem here is not simply risk, which is, in a sense, the easy bit, the things we can gauge and measure in advance, how do we deal with what's beyond that boundary? Not in this, not radically, because there's always going to be an expert somewhere who's probably scammed this, but in a sense of salience and presence. And the question we have from the audience is how do we avoid global group think in a globally connected and interdependent world? Now, that points back at us. That's obviously us, you know? I mean, here we all are. We're in the bubble, almost the definition of the bubble. There's nothing more bubbly than Davos. We're inside this. How do we, what do we see outside? We're focused on climate and the COVID, the two Cs, top of stack. Christian, you were saying that you were thinking to one beyond. I'm going to go around. So maybe if everyone prepares, like the obvious extra one and maybe something that's more left field. Christian, do you want to give us an idea of how you would go about trying to break group think? Presumably your organization has to do this. Is that you must be severely concerned that Swiss read? Yeah, you know, Jeremy's a scientist. I was a scientist two before. And I don't think there's a huge risk of grouping a scientific community. Everybody wants to prove the other wrong. That's the whole point. That's your hero if you can find something new. So I would start there. I would look at just in a very interconnected way. You just ask all fields of science what kind of risks there are seen potentially. And you will discover things beyond that have not been discussed a lot so far. And as I said before, of course there's a risk that we missed something. But so far all the big risks we have been talking about, they were on the screen. I cannot name you one example of a true black swan in a sense of everybody's totally surprised. So I think if we make that step and I'm very encouraged by, you know, Minister Al-Jaddan's optimism around G20, maybe there's an opportunity here to get into the, you know, into the new phase of institutions that will be much stronger in the broader sense, not just for the pandemic. So I think it's feasible. It's just that people haven't done it. Minister Al-Jaddan, can I come back to you? You have become here the representative of optimism on our panel. Can you give us a sense of how the G20 is, as it were challenging itself to see the boundaries of what it can and what it can't see? I mean, by design, actually, the G20 is designed actually to avoid that because it has no head office. It is not hosted by one country. It moves from one continent to another. It brings about experiences from emerging markets to developed nations, et cetera. So that by itself actually helps. It also engage in multiple ways with different stakeholders and multilateral institutions, including actually totally non-governmental. And that helps through the various engagement groups. I mean, there is more than 12 engagement groups in various sectors that actually feeds into that discussion, which includes academia and others, including even youth, women. So that also enriches the discussion. I think just to bring about one example, which we have not really covered and possibly there's no time, energy transition and how actually it's happened sometimes, the process by which we make decision to avoid actually alarms that are, is there. While obviously climate change is a very serious risk and I think we haven't done what we promised to do. For example, developed nations, the promise to 100 billion every year to support low-income countries. We still have about 800 million people without electricity and it will take us at least 100 million connections every year between now and 2030 to reach. We haven't done that. But at the same time, we have not also looked at the unintended consequences of rushing transition. And we are seeing only the top of the iceberg as we speak now in Europe on energy prices. Because of the overwhelming also global as the question buttered thinking, we are not prepared actually to stop and say actually 2030 and 2040 and 2050 is not today. Today we need energy and then we need to make sure that that energy is becoming cleaner and cleaner until we reach to the targets. I think the world's still ignoring that. Thank you. Thank you so much, minister. Odile and Jeremy, perhaps if I could ask you to wrap up. Odile, does the EBRD have a mechanism for breaking this kind of group thing? We have a chief fiscal officer who is really very, I mean, focused on that, focusing on that. So that helps a lot. I think, I mean, in my view, there are two very important elements, which I mean, country level or global level, very important. I fully agree with what has been said on multidisciplinarity. And I think that bringing science, I mean, hard science, social science and so forth is very important, I mean, when looking at the risk. And the second element is scenario planning. I think in a way we've been shifting, I mean, in the handling of public issues and so forth more to your market-driven solution and so forth. And this crisis recalled us. I think that scenario planning, first of all, I mean, strong institutions, public services, capacity of state to intervene are very important in crisis. And then looking at scenarios and thinking about how reaction can be organized, I think it's very important. And probably this is something we've been, I mean, lagging behind globally, I would say. Thank you so much, Odile. Jeremy, I want to give you the final word. Is there something out there in your extraordinary overview of the scientific community right now that's as Christian says, we ultimately rely on to alert us that we are undervaluing at this moment? Is the one area that really gives you sleepless nights above and beyond the everyday nightmares that we're living? I think it's addressing the root causes. COVID is the symptom of something wider happening. And that is, as we all know, ecological change, urbanization, trade, travel, connectivity, and the rest of it. If we only think, let's make a vaccine for COVID and we don't address the underlying changes that are going to drive the 21st century, then it won't just be COVID. It'll be more pandemics. It'll be more disruption, more migration, more inequality. So it's addressing the underpinnings, I think, that's most important. And I'm much, much less worried about group think than others are. I'm much more worried about fragmentation and geopolitics and the inability actually of the G20, which is why I'm so pleased with the optimism, the inability of the G20 to actually come together and act cohesively in an equitable way between them and for the rest of the world. That's my much bigger risk to me, worry, sorry, than is group think. As Christian said, all of the major threats we face, frankly, you could write down on a reasonable piece of paper and there would be great agreement on that. It's the willingness to act on them in a concrete way that I think we're lacking at the moment. Thank you, Jeremy. That's really an absolutely excellent final statement on which to wrap things up. I really feel as a chair I have very little to add to that. I think this has been an extraordinarily rich panel, thought-provoting, stimulating, a nice balance of sort of a bleep pessimism and an optimism on the other hand, a wonderful range of perspectives. Thank you all so much for contributing. And I'm sure we all hope and look forward to encounters in person at some point in the future. May the force of science be with us. And politics and international cooperation. Thank you all for me and on behalf of the web, thank you all and to the audience as well for taking part and for such great questions. Thank you. Thank you.