 CHAPTER 19 I had not been in Mexico many weeks when, reading a St. Louis paper, I found the President had asked the Illinois delegation in Congress to recommend some citizens of the state for the position of Brigadier General, and that they had unanimously recommended me as first on a list of seven. I was very much surprised because, as I have said, my acquaintance with the Congressman was very limited, and I did not know of anything I had done to inspire such confidence. The papers of the next day announced that my name, with three others, had been sent to the Senate and a few days after our confirmation was announced. When appointed Brigadier General, I at once thought it proper that one of my aides should come from the regiment I had been commanding, and so selected Lieutenant C. B. Legault. While living in St. Louis, I had had a desk in the law office of McClellan, Moody and Hillier. Difference in views between the members of the firm on the questions of the day and general hard times in the border cities had broken up this firm. Hillier was quite a young man, then in his twenties, and very brilliant. I asked him to accept a place on my staff. I also wanted to take one man from my new home, Galena. The canvas in the presidential campaign, the fall before, had brought out a young lawyer by the name of John A. Rollins, who proved himself one of the ablest speakers in the state. He was also a candidate for elector on the Douglas ticket. When Sumter was fired upon, and the integrity of the Union threatened, there was no man more ready to serve his country than he. I wrote at once asking him to accept the position of Assistant Adjutant General with the rank of Captain on my staff. He was about entering the service as major of a new regiment, then organizing in the northwestern part of the state, but he threw this up and accepted my offer. Neither Hillier nor Lago proved to have any particular taste or special qualifications for the duties of the soldier, and the former resigned during the Vicksburg campaign, the latter I relieved after the Battle of Chattanooga. Rollins remained with me as long as he lived, and rose to the rank of Brigadier General and Chief of Staff to the General of the Army, and office created for him before the war closed. He was an able man, possessed of great firmness, and could say no so emphatically to a request which he thought should not be granted, that the person he was addressing would understand at once that there was no use of pressing the matter. General Rollins was a very useful officer in other ways than this. I became very much attached to him. Shortly after my promotion I was ordered to Ironton, Missouri to command a district in that part of the state and took to 21st Illinois my old regiment with me. All other regiments were ordered to the same destination about the same time. Ironton is on the Iron Mountain Railroad about 70 miles south of St. Louis and situated among hills rising almost to the dignity of mountains. When I reached there about the 8th of August, Colonel B. Gratz Brown, afterwards Governor of Missouri and in 1872 Vice Presidential Candidate was in command. Some of his troops were 90 days men and their time had expired some time before. The men had no clothing but what they had volunteered in and much of this was so worn that it would hardly stay on. Colonel Hardy, the author of the tactics I did not study, was at Greenville some 25 miles further south, it was said, with 5,000 Confederate troops. Under these circumstances Colonel Brown's command was very much demoralized. A squadron of cavalry could have ridden into the valley and captured the entire force. Brown himself was gladder to see me on that occasion than he ever has been since. I relieved him and sent all his men home within a day or two to be mustered out of service. Within ten days after reading Ironton I was prepared to take the offensive against the enemy at Greenville. I sent a column east out of the valley we were in with orders to swing around to the south and west and come into the Greenville road ten miles south of Ironton. Another column marched on the direct road and went into camp at the point designated for the two columns to meet. I was to ride out the next morning and take personal command of the movement. My experience against Harris in northern Missouri had inspired me with confidence. But when the evening train came in it brought General B. M. Prentice with orders to take command of the district. His orders did not relieve me, but I knew that by law I was senior and at that time even the president did not have the authority to assign a junior to command a senior of the same grade. I therefore gave General Prentice the situation of the troops and the general condition of affairs and started for St. Louis the same day. The movement against the rebels at Greenville went no further. From St. Louis I was ordered to Jefferson City, the capital of the state, to take command. General Sterling Price of the Confederate Army was thought to be threatening the capital, Lexington, Chillicothe, and other comparatively large towns in the central part of Missouri. I found a good many troops in Jefferson City, but in the greatest confusion and no one person knew where they all were. Colonel Mulligan, a gallant man, was in command, but he had not been educated as yet to his new profession and did not know how to maintain discipline. I found that volunteers had obtained permission from the department commander or claimed they had to raise some of them regiments, some battalions, some companies, the officers to be commissioned according to the number of men they brought into the service. There were recruiting stations all over town with notices rudely lettered on boards over the doors announcing the arm of service and length of time for which recruits at that station would be received. The law required all volunteers to serve for three years or the war. But in Jefferson City in August 1861 they were recruited for different periods and on different conditions. Some were enlisted for six months, some for a year, some without any condition as to where they were to serve, others were not to be sent out of the state. The recruits were principally men from regiments stationed there and already in the service bound for three years if the war lasted that long. The city was filled with Union fugitives who had been driven by guerrilla bands to take refuge with the national troops. They were in a deplorable condition and must have starved but for the support the government gave them. They had generally made their escape with a team or two, sometimes a yoke of oxen with a mule or a horse in the lead. A little bedding besides their clothing and some food had been thrown into the wagon. All else of their worldly goods were abandoned and appropriated by their former neighbors for the Union man in Missouri who stayed at home during the rebellion if he was not immediately under the protection of the national troops was at perpetual war with his neighbors. I stopped the recruiting service and disposed the troops about the outskirts of the city so as to guard all approaches. Order was soon restored. I had been at Jefferson City but a few days when I was directed from department headquarters to fed out an expedition to Lexington, Booneville and Chillicothe in order to take from the banks in those cities all the funds they had and send them to St. Louis. The Western Army had not yet been supplied with transportation. It became necessary, therefore, to press into the service teams belonging to sympathizers with the rebellion or to hire those of Union men. This afforded an opportunity of giving employment to such of the refugees within our lines as had teams suitable for our purposes. They accepted the service with alacrity. As fast as troops could be got off they were moved west some twenty miles or more In seventy-eight days from my assuming command at Jefferson City I had all the troops except a small garrison at an advanced position and expected to join them myself the next day. But my campaigns had not yet begun for while seated at my office door with nothing further to do until it was time to start for the front I saw an officer of rank approaching who proved to be Colonel Jefferson C. Davis. I had never met him before but he introduced himself by handing me an order for him to proceed to Jefferson City and relieve me of the command. The orders directed that I should report at department headquarters at St. Louis without delay to receive important special instructions. It was about an hour before the only regular train of the day would start. I therefore turned over to Colonel Davis. My orders and hurriedly stated to him the progress that had been made to carry out the department instructions already described. I had at that time but one staff officer doing myself all the detail of work usually performed by an adjutant general. In an hour after being relieved from the command I was on my way to St. Louis leaving my single staff officer to follow the next day with our horses and baggage. The important special instructions which I received the next day assigned me to the command of the district of southeast Missouri embracing all the territory south of St. Louis in Missouri as well as all southern Illinois. At first I was to take personal command of a combined expedition that had been ordered for the capture of Colonel Jefferson Thompson a sort of independent or partisan commander who was disputing with us the possession of southeast Missouri. Troops had been ordered to move from Ironton to Cape Girardeau 60 or 70 miles to the southeast on the Mississippi River while the forces at Cape Girardeau had been ordered to move to Jacksonville 10 miles out towards Ironton and troops at Cairo and Birds Point at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers were to hold themselves in readiness to go down the Mississippi to Belmont 18 miles below to be moved west from there when an officer should come to command them. I was the officer who had been selected for this purpose. Cairo was to become my headquarters when the expedition terminated. In pursuance of my orders I established my temporary headquarters at Cape Girardeau and sent instructions to the commanding officer at Jackson to inform me of the approach of General Prentice from Ironton. Hired wagons were kept moving night and day to take additional rations to Jackson to supply the troops when they started from there. Neither General Prentice nor Colonel Marsh, who commanded at Jackson, knew their destination. I drew up all the instructions for the contemplated move and kept them in my pocket until I should hear of the junction of our troops at Jackson. Two or three days after my arrival at Cape Girardeau, word came that General Prentice was approaching that place, Jackson. I started at once to meet him there and to give him his orders. As I turned the first corner of a street, after starting, I saw a column of cavalry passing the next street in front of me. I turned and rode around the block the other way so as to meet the head of the column. I found there General Prentice himself with a large escort. He had halted his troops at Jackson for the night and had come on himself to Cape Girardeau, leaving orders for his command to follow him in the morning. I gave the general his orders, which stopped him at Jackson. But he was very much aggrieved at being placed under another Brigadier General, particularly as he believed himself to be the senior. He had been a Brigadier, in command at Cairo, while I was mustering officer at Springfield without any rank. But we were nominated at the same time for the United States Service and both our Commissions Board date May 17, 1861. By virtue of my former Army rank, I was, by law, the senior. General Prentice failed to get orders to his troops to remain at Jackson, and the next morning early they were reported as approaching Cape Girardeau. I then ordered the general very preemptively to counter-march his command and take it back to Jackson. He obeyed the order, but obeyed his command adieu when he got them to Jackson and went to St. Louis and reported himself. This broke up the expedition, but little harm was done as Jefferson Thompson moved light and to no fixed place for even nominal headquarters. He was as much at home in Arkansas as he was in Missouri and would keep out of the way of a superior force. Prentice was sent to another part of the state. General Prentice made a great mistake on the above occasion, one that he would not have committed later in the war. When I came to know him better, I regretted it much. In consequence of this occurrence, he was off duty in the field when the principal campaign at the West was going on and his juniors received promotion while he was where none could be obtained. He would have been next to myself in rank in the District of Southeast Missouri by virtue of his services in the Mexican War. He was a brave and very earnest soldier. No man in the service was more sincere in his devotion to the cause for which we were battling. None more ready to make sacrifices or risk life in it. On the 4th of September I removed my headquarters to Cairo and found Colonel Richard Oglesby in command of the post. We had never met, at least not to my knowledge. After my promotion I had ordered my Brigadier General's uniform from New York, but it had not yet arrived, so that I was in citizens' dress. The Colonel had his office full of people, mostly from the neighboring states of Missouri and Kentucky, making complaints or asking favors. He evidently did not catch my name when I was presented for on my taking a piece of paper from the table where he was seated and writing the order assuming command of the District of Southeast Missouri, Colonel Richard J. Oglesby to command the post at Bird's Point and handing it to him, he put on an expression of surprise that looked a little as if he would like to have someone identify me. But he surrendered the office without question. The day after I assumed command at Cairo a man came to me who said he was a scout of General Fremont. He reported that he had just come from Columbus, a point on the Mississippi twenty miles below on the Kentucky side, and that troops had started from there, or were about to start, to seize Paducah at the mouth of the Tennessee. There was no time for delay. I reported by telegraph to the department commander the information I had received and added that I was taking steps to get off that night to be in advance of the enemy in securing that important point. There was a large number of steamers lying at Cairo, and a good many boatmen were staying in the town. It was the work of only a few hours to get the boat manned with coal aboard and steamed up. Troops were also designated to go aboard. The distance from Cairo to Paducah is about forty-five miles. I did not wish to get there before daylight of the sixth and directed, therefore, that the boat should lie at anchor out in the stream until the time to start. Not having received an answer to my first dispatch, I again telegraphed two department headquarters that I should start for Paducah that night unless I received further orders. Hearing nothing, we started before midnight, and arrived early the following morning anticipating the enemy by probably not over six or eight hours. It proved very fortunate that the expedition against Jefferson Thompson had been broken up. Had it not been, the enemy would have seized Paducah and fortified it to our very great annoyance. When the national troops entered the town, the citizens were taken by surprise. I never after saw such consternation depicted on the faces of the people. Men, women and children came out of their doors looking pale and frightened at the presence of the invaders. They were expecting rebel troops that day. In fact, nearly four thousand men from Columbus were at that time within ten or fifteen miles of Paducah on their way to occupy the place. I had but two regiments, and one battery with me, but the enemy did not know this and returned to Columbus. I stationed my troops at the best points to guard the roads leading into the city, left gun boats to guard the river fronts, and by noon was ready to start on my return to Cairo. Before leaving, however, I addressed a short-printed proclamation to the citizens of Paducah, assuring them of our peaceful intentions, that we had come among them to protect them against the enemies of our country, and that all who chose could continue with their usual applications with assurance of the protection of the government. This was evidently a relief to them, but the majority would have much preferred the presence of the other army. I reinforced Paducah rapidly from the troops at Cape Gerardo, and a day or two later General C. F. Smith, a most accomplished soldier, reported at Cairo and was assigned to the command of the post at the mouth of the Tennessee. In a short time it was well fortified and a detachment was sent to occupy Smythland at the mouth of the Cumberland. The state government of Kentucky at that time was rebel in sentiment, but wanted to preserve an armed neutrality between the north and the south, and the governor really seemed to think the state had a perfect right to maintain a neutral position. The rebels already occupied two towns in the state, Columbus and Hickman on the Mississippi, and at the very moment the national troops were entering Paducah from the Ohio front, General Lloyd Tildman, a Confederate. With his staff and a small detachment of men were getting out in the other direction while, as I have already said, nearly 4,000 Confederate troops were on Kentucky soil on their way to take possession of the town. In the estimation of the governor and of those who thought with him, this did not justify the national authorities in invading the soil of Kentucky. I informed the legislature of the state of what I was doing, and my action was approved by the majority of that body. On my return to Cairo I found authority from department headquarters for me to take Paducah if I felt strong enough, but very soon after I was reprimanded from the same quarters for my correspondence with the legislature and warned against a repetition of the offense. Soon after I took command at Cairo, General Fremont entered into arrangements for the exchange of the prisoners captured at Camp Jackson in the month of May. I received orders to pass them through my lines to Columbus as they presented themselves with proper credentials. Quite a number of these prisoners I had been personally acquainted with before the war. Such of them, as I had so known, were received at my headquarters as old acquaintances, and ordinary routine business was not disturbed by their presence. On one occasion when several were present in my office my intention to visit Cape Girardeau the next day to inspect the troops at that point was mentioned. Something transpired which postponed my trip. But a steamer employed by the government was passing a point some twenty or more miles above Cairo the next day when a section of rebel artillery with proper escort brought her to. A major, one of those who had been at my headquarters the day before, came at once aboard and after some search made a direct demand for my delivery. It was hard to persuade him that I was not there. This officer was Major Barrett of St. Louis. I had been acquainted with his family before the war. End of Section 19. Recording by Jim Clevenger. Little Rock, Arkansas. Jim at joclev.com. Section 20 of Personal Memoirs of US Grant. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevenger. Personal Memoirs of US Grant by Ulysses S. Grant, Chapter 20. General Fremont in command. Movement against Belmont. Battle of Belmont. A narrow escape after the battle. From the occupation of Paducah up to the early part of November nothing important occurred with the troops under my command. I was reinforced from time to time and the men were drilled and disciplined preparatory for the service which was sure to come. By the 1st of November I had not fewer than 20,000 men, most of them under good drill and ready to meet any equal body of men who, like themselves, had not yet been in an engagement. They were growing impatient at lying idle so long, almost in hearing of the guns of the enemy they had volunteered to fight against. I ask on one or two occasions to be allowed to move against Columbus. It could have been taken soon after the occupation of Paducah, but before November it was so strongly fortified that it would have required a large force and a long siege to capture it. In the latter part of October General Fremont took the field in person and moved from Jefferson City against General Sterling Price, who was then in the State of Missouri with a considerable command. About the 1st of November I was directed from Department Headquarters to make a demonstration on both sides of the Mississippi River with the view of detaining the rebels at Columbus within their lines. Before my troops could be got off I was notified from the same quarter that there were some 3,000 of the enemy on the St. Francis River about 50 miles west or southwest from Cairo and was ordered to send another force against them. I dispatched Colonel Oglesby at once with troops sufficient to compete with the reported number of the enemy. On the 5th word came from the same source that the rebels were about to detach a large force from Columbus to be moved by boats down the Mississippi and up the White River in Arkansas in order to reinforce Price and I was directed to prevent this movement if possible. I accordingly sent a regiment from Bird's Point under Colonel W. H. L. Wallace to overtake and reinforce Oglesby with orders to march to New Madrid, a point some distance below Columbus on the Missouri side. At the same time I directed General C. F. Smith to move all the troops he could spare from Paducah directly against Columbus, halting them, however, a few miles from the town to await further orders from me. Then I gathered up all the troops at Cairo and Fort Holt, except suitable guards, and moved them down the river on steamers convoyed by two gun boats accompanying them myself. My force consisted of a little over three thousand men and embraced five regiments of infantry, two guns, and two companies of cavalry. We dropped down the river on the 6th to within about six miles of Columbus, debarked a few men on the Kentucky side, and established pickets to connect with the troops from Paducah. I had no orders which contemplated an attack by the national troops, nor did I intend anything of the kind when I started out from Cairo. But after we started I saw that the officers and men were elated at the prospect of at last having the opportunity of doing what they had volunteered to do, fight the enemies of their country. I did not see how I could maintain discipline or retain the confidence of my command if we should return to Cairo without an effort to do something. Columbus, besides being strongly fortified, contained a garrison much more numerous than the force I had with me. It would not do, therefore, to attack that point. About two o'clock on the morning of the 7th, I learned that the enemy was crossing troops from Columbus to the West Bank to be dispatched, presumably, after Oglesby. I knew there was a small camp of Confederates at Belmont, immediately opposite Columbus, and I speedily resolved to push down the river, land on the Missouri side, capture Belmont, break up the camp, and return. Accordingly, the pickets above Columbus were drawn in at once, and about daylight, the boats moved out from shore. In an hour we were debarking on the West Bank of the Mississippi just out of range of the batteries at Columbus. The ground on the West shore of the river, opposite Columbus, is low and in places marshy and cut up with slews. The soil is rich in the timber, large and heavy. There were some small clearings between Belmont and the point where we landed, but most of the country was covered with the native forests. We landed in front of a cornfield. When the debarkation commenced, I took a regiment down the river to post it as a guard against surprise. At that time I had no staff officer who could be trusted with that duty. In the woods, at a short distance below the clearing, I found a depression dry at the time, but which at high water became a slew or bio. I placed the men in the hollow, gave them their instructions, and ordered them to remain there until they were properly relieved. These troops with the gun boats were to protect our transports. Up to this time, the enemy had evidently failed to divine our intentions. From Columbus, they could of course see our gun boats and transports loaded with troops, but the force from Paduca was threatening them from the land side, and it was hardly to be expected that if Columbus was our object, we would separate our troops by a wide river. They doubtless thought we meant to draw a large force from the East Bank, then embark ourselves, land on the East Bank, and make a sudden assault on Columbus before their divided command could be united. About eight o'clock we started from the point of debarkation, marching by the flank. After moving in this way for a mile or a mile and a half, I halted where there was marshy ground covered with a heavy growth of timber in our front, and deployed a large part of my force as skirmishers. By this time, the enemy discovered that we were moving upon Belmont and sent out troops to meet us. Soon after we had started in line, his skirmishers were encountered and fighting commenced. This continued, growing fiercer and fiercer for about four hours, the enemy being forced back gradually until he was driven into his camp. Early in this engagement, my horse was shot under me, but I got another, from one of my staff, and kept well up with the advance until the river was reached. The officers and men engaged at Belmont were then under fire for the first time. This could not have behaved better than they did up to the moment of reaching the rebel camp. At this point they became demoralized from their victory and failed to reap its full reward. The enemy had been followed so closely that when he reached the clear ground on which his camp was pitched, he beat a hasty retreat over the river bank which protected him from our shots and from view. This precipitate retreat at the last moment enabled the national forces to pick their way without hindrance through the abotos the only artificial defense the enemy had. The moment the camp was reached, our men laid down their arms and commenced rummaging the tents to pick up trophies. Some of the higher officers were little better than the privates. They galloped about from one cluster of men to another and at every halt delivered a short eulogy upon the Union cause and the achievements of the command. All this time the troops we had been engaged with for four hours lay crouched under cover of the river bank, ready to come up and surrender if summoned to do so, but finding that they were not pursued, they worked their way up the river and came up on the bank between us and our transports. I saw, at the same time, two steamers coming from the Columbus side towards the west shore, above us, black or gray with soldiers, from boiler deck to roof. Some of my men were engaged in firing from captured guns at empty steamers down the river, out of range, cheering at every shot. I tried to get them to turn their guns upon the loaded steamers above and not so far away. My efforts were in vain. At last I directed my staff officers to set fire to the camps. This drew the fire of the enemy's guns located on the heights of Columbus. They had abstained from firing before, probably, because they were afraid of hitting their own men, or they may have supposed, until the camp was on fire, that it was still in the possession of their friends. About this time, too, the men we had driven over the bank were seen in line up the river between us and our transports. The alarm, surrounded, was given. The guns of the enemy and the report of being surrounded brought officers and men completely under control. At first, some of the officers seemed to think that to be surrounded was to be placed in a hopeless position, where there was nothing to do but surrender. But when I announced that we had cut our way in and could cut our way out just as well, it seemed a new revelation to officers and soldiers. They formed line rapidly, and we started back to our boats, with the men deployed as skirmishers as they had been on entering camp. The enemy was soon encountered, but his resistance this time was feeble. Again, the Confederates sought shelter under the river banks. We could not stop, however, to pick them up, because the troops we had seen crossing the river had debarked by this time, and were nearer our transports than we were. It would be prudent to get them behind us, but we were not again molested on our way to the boats. From the beginning of the fighting, our wounded had been carried to the houses at the rear, near the place of debarkation. I now set the troops to bringing their wounded to the boats. After this had gone on for some little time, I rode down the road, without even a staff officer, to visit the guard I had stationed over the approach to our transports. I knew the enemy had crossed over from Columbus in considerable numbers, and might be expected to attack us as we were embarking. This guard would be encountered first, and, as they were in a natural entrenchment, would be able to hold the enemy for a considerable time. My surprise was great to find there was not a single man in the trench. Writing back to the boat, I found the officer who had commanded the guard, and learned that he had withdrawn his force when the main body fell back. At first I ordered the guard to return, but finding that it would take some time to get the men together and march them back to their position, I countermanded the order. Then, fearing that the enemy we had seen crossing the river below might be coming upon us unawares, I rode out in the field to our front, still entirely alone, to observe whether the enemy was passing. The field was grown up with corn so tall and thick as to cut off the view of even a person on horseback except directly along the rows, even in that direction, owing to the overhanging blades of corn, the view was not extensive. I had not gone more than a few hundred yards when I saw a body of troops marching past me, not fifty yards away. I looked at them for a moment and then turned my horse towards the river and started back, first in a walk, and when I thought myself concealed from the view of the enemy, as fast as my horse could carry me, when at the river bank I still had to ride a few hundred yards to the point where the nearest transport lay. The corn field in front of our transports terminated at the edge of a dense forest. Before I got back, the enemy had entered this forest and had opened a brisk fire upon the boats. Our men, with the exception of details that had gone to the front after the wounded, were now either aboard the transports or very near them. Those who were not aboard soon got there and the boats pushed off. I was the only man of the national army between the rebels and our transports. The captain of a boat that had just pushed out but had not started recognized me and ordered the engineer not to start the engine. He then had a plank run out for me. My horse seemed to take in the situation. There was no path down the bank, and everyone acquainted with the Mississippi River knows that its banks, in a natural state, do not vary at any great angle from the perpendicular. My horse put his four feet over the bank without hesitation or urging, and with his hind feet well under him, slid down the bank and trotted aboard the boat, 12 or 15 feet away, over a single gang plank. I dismounted and went at once to the upper deck. The Mississippi River was low on the 7th of November, 1861, so that the banks were higher than the heads of men standing on the upper decks of the steamers. The rebels were some distance back from the river, so that their fire was high and did us but a little harm. Our smokestack was riddled with bullets, but there were only three men wounded on the boats, two of whom were soldiers. When I first went on deck, I entered the captain's room adjoining the pilot house and threw myself on a sofa. I did not keep that position a moment, but rose to go out on the deck to observe what was going on. I had scarcely left when a musket ball entered the room, struck the head of the sofa, passed through it, and lodged in the foot. When the enemy opened fire on the transports, our gun boats returned it with vigor. They were well out in the stream and some distance down, so that they had to give but very little elevation to their guns to clear the banks of the river. Their position very nearly inflated the line of the enemy while he was marching through the cornfield. The execution was very great, as we could see at the time and as I afterwards learned more positively. We were very soon out of range and went peacefully on our way to Cairo, every man feeling that Belmont was a great victory and that he had contributed his share to it. Our loss at Belmont was 485 and killed, wounded, and missing. About 125 of our wounded fell into the hands of the enemy. We returned with 175 prisoners and two guns and spiked four other pieces. The loss of the enemy as officially reported was 642 men killed, wounded, and missing. We had engaged about 2,500 men exclusive of the guard left with the transports. The enemy had about 7,000, but this includes the troops brought over from Columbus who were not engaged in the first defense of Belmont. The two objects for which the battle of Belmont was fought were fully accomplished. The enemy gave up all idea of detaching troops from Columbus. His losses were very heavy for that period of the war. Columbus was beset by people looking for their wounded or dead kin to take him home for medical treatment or burial. I learned later when I had moved further south that Belmont had caused more mourning than almost any other battle up to that time. The national troops acquired a confidence in themselves at Belmont that did not desert them through the war. The day after the battle I met some officers from General Polk's command, arranged for permission to bury our dead at Belmont, and also commenced negotiations for the exchange of prisoners. When our men went to bury their dead before they were allowed to land, they were conducted below the point where the enemy had engaged our transports. Some of the officers expressed a desire to see the field, but the request was refused with the statement that we had no dead there. While on the true spoke, I mentioned to an officer whom I had known both at West Point and in the Mexican War, that I was in the cornfield near their troops when they passed, that I had been on horseback and had worn a soldier's overcoat at the time. This officer was on General Polk's staff. He said both he and the general had seen me, and that Polk had said to his men, there is a Yankee. You may try your marksmanship on him if you wish, but nobody fired at me. Belmont was severely criticized in the North as a wholly unnecessary battle, barren of results, or the possibility of them from the beginning. If it had not been fought, Colonel Oglesby would probably have been captured or destroyed with his 3,000 men. Then I should have been culpable indeed. End of Section 20. Recorded by Jim Clevinger, Little Rock, Arkansas. Jim at JOCCLEV.COM. Section 21 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevinger, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant, Chapter 21, General Halligan Command. Commanding the District of Cairo, Movement on Fort Henry, Capture of Fort Henry. While at Cairo, I had frequent opportunities of meeting the rebel officers of the Columbus Garrison. They seemed to be very fond of coming up on steamers under flags of truce. On two or three occasions I went down in like manner. When one of their boats was seen coming up, carrying a white flag, a gun would be fired from the lower battery at Fort Holt, throwing a shot across the bow as a signal to come no farther. I would then take a steamer and with my staff and occasionally a few other officers go down to receive the party. There were several officers among them whom I had known before, both at West Point and in Mexico. Seeing these officers who had been educated for the profession of arms, both at school and in actual war, which is a far more efficient training, impressed me with the great advantage the South possessed over the North at the beginning of the rebellion. They had from 30 to 40% of the educated soldiers of the nation. They had no standing army and consequently, these trained soldiers had to find employment with the troops from their own states. In this way, what there was of military education and training was distributed throughout their whole army. The whole loaf was leavened. The North had a great number of educated and trained soldiers, but the bulk of them were still in the army and were retained generally with their old commands and rank until the war had lasted many months. In the army of the Potomac, there was what was known as the regular brigade in which from the commanding officer down to the Yonka Second Lieutenant, everyone was educated to his profession. So too, with many of the batteries, all the officers generally, four in number to each, were men educated for their profession. Some of these went into battle at the beginning under division commanders who were entirely without military training. This state of affairs gave me an idea which I expressed while at Cairo that the government ought to disband the regular army with the exception of the staff corps and notify the disbanded officers that they would receive no compensation while the war lasted except as volunteers. The register should be kept up, but the names of all officers who were not in the volunteer service at the close should be stricken from it. On the 9th of November, two days after the Battle of Belmont, Major General H. W. Hallick superseded General Fremont in command of the Department of the Missouri. The limits of his command took in Arkansas and West Kentucky east to the Cumberland River. From the Battle of Belmont until early in February 1862, the troops under my command did little except prepare for the long struggle which proved to be before them. The enemy at this time occupied a line running from the Mississippi River at Columbus to Bowling Green and Mill Springs, Kentucky. Each of these positions was strongly fortified as were also points on the Tennessee and Cumberland River near the Tennessee state line. The works on the Tennessee were called Fort Hyman and Fort Henry, and that on the Cumberland was Fort Donaldson. At these points, the two rivers approached within 11 miles of each other. The lines of rifle pits at each place extended back from the water at least two miles so that the garrisons were in reality only seven miles apart. These positions were of immense importance to the enemy and of course, correspondingly important for us to possess ourselves of. With Fort Henry in our hands, we had a navigable stream open to us up to Muscle Shoals in Alabama. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad strikes the Tennessee at East Fort Mississippi and follows close to the banks of the river up to the shoals. This road of vast importance to the enemy would cease to be of use to them for through traffic. The moment Fort Henry became ours. Fort Donaldson was the gate to Nashville, a place of great military and political importance, and to a rich country extending far East in Kentucky. These two points in our possession, the enemy would necessarily be thrown back to the Memphis and Charleston road or to the boundary of the cotton states and as before stated, that road would be lost to them for through communication. The designation of my command had been changed after Halick's arrival from the district of Southeast Missouri to the district of Cairo and the small district commanded by General C. F. Smith, embracing the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, had been added to my jurisdiction. Early in January, 1862, I was directed by General McClellan through my department commander to make a reconnaissance in favor of Brigadier General Don Carlos Buol who commanded the department of the Ohio with headquarters at Louisville and who was confronting General S. B. Buckner with a larger Confederate force at Bowling Green. It was supposed that Buol was about to make some move against the enemy and my demonstration was intended to prevent the sending of troops from Columbus, Fort Henry or Donaldson to Buckner. I at once ordered General Smith to send a force up the West Bank of the Tennessee to threaten Fort Hyman and Henry. McClellan, at the same time with a force of 6,000 men, was sent out into West Kentucky, threatening Columbus with one column and the Tennessee River with another. I went with McClellan's command. The weather was very bad, snow and rain fell, the roads never good in that section were intolerable. We were out more than a week, splashing through the mud, snow and rain, the men suffering very much. The object of the expedition was accomplished. The enemy did not send reinforcements to Bowling Green and General George H. Thomas fought and won the Battle of Mill Springs before we returned. As a result of this expedition, General Smith reported that he thought it practicable to capture Fort Hyman. This fort stood on high ground, completely commanding Fort Henry on the opposite side of the river and its possession by us with the aid of our gunboats would ensure the capture of Fort Henry. This report of Smith's confirmed views I had previously held that the true line of operations for us was up to Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. With us there, the enemy would be compelled to fall back on the east and west, entirely out of the state of Kentucky. On the 6th of January, before receiving orders for this expedition, I had asked permission of the general commanding the department to go to see him at St. Louis. My object was to lay this plan of campaign before him. Now that my views had been confirmed by so ably general as Smith, I renewed my request to go to St. Louis on what I deemed important military business. The leave was granted, but not graciously. I had known General Halleck, but very slightly in the old army, not having met him either at West Point or during the Mexican War, I was received with so little cordiality that I perhaps stated the object of my visit with less clearness than I might have done, and I had not uttered many sentences before I was cut short, as if my plan was preposterous. I returned to Cairo, very much crestfallen. Flag officer foot commanded the little fleet of gunboats then in the neighborhood of Cairo, and, though in another branch of the service, was subject to the command of General Halleck. He and I consulted freely upon military matters, and he agreed with me perfectly as to the feasibility of the campaign up to Tennessee. Notwithstanding the rebuff I had received from my immediate chief, I therefore, on the 28th of January, renewed the suggestion by telegraph that, if permitted, I could take and hold Fort Henry on the Tennessee. This time I was backed by flag officer foot who sent a similar dispatch. On the 29th I wrote fully in support of the proposition. On the 1st of February I received full instructions from department headquarters to move upon Fort Henry. On the 2nd, the expedition started. In February 1862, there were quite a good many steamers laid up at Cairo for want of employment, the Mississippi River being closed against navigation below that point. There were also many men in the town whose occupation had been following the river in various capacities from captain down to deckhand. But there were not enough of either boats or men to move at one time, the 17,000 men I proposed to take with me up to Tennessee. I loaded the boats with more than half the force, however, and sent General McClendon in command. I followed with one of the later boats and found McClendon had stopped very properly nine miles below Fort Henry. Seven gun boats under flag officer foot had accompanied the advance. The transports we had with us had to return to Paducah to bring up a division from there with General C.F. Smith in command. Before sending the boats back, I wanted to get the troops as near to the enemy as I could without coming within range of their guns. There was a stream emptying into the Tennessee on the east side, apparently at about long range distance below the fort. On account of the narrow watershed separating the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers at that point, the stream must be insignificant at ordinary stages, but when we were there in February, it was a torrent. It would facilitate the investment of Fort Henry materially if the troops could be landed south of that stream. To test whether this could be done, I boarded the gunboat Essex and requested Captain William Porter commanding it to approach the fort to draw its fire. After we had gone some distance past the mouth of the stream, we drew the fire of the fort, which fell much short of us. In consequence, I had made up my mind to return and bring the troops to the upper side of the creek when the enemy opened up on us with a rifled gun that sent shot far beyond us and beyond the stream. One shot passed very near where Captain Porter and I were standing, struck the deck near the stern, penetrated and passed through the cabin and so out into the river. We immediately turned back and the troops were debarked below the mouth of the creek. When the landing was completed, I returned with the transports to Paduca to hasten up the balance of the troops. I got back on the fifth with the advance, the remainder following as rapidly as the steamers could carry them. At 10 o'clock at night on the fifth, the whole command was not yet up. Being anxious to commence operations, as soon as possible before the enemy could reinforce heavily, I issued my orders for an advance at 11 a.m. on the sixth. I felt sure that all the troops would be up by that time. Fort Henry occupies a bend in the river which gave the guns in the water battery a direct fire down the stream. The camp outside the fort was entrenched with rifle pits and outworks two miles back on the road to Donaldson and Dover. The garrison of the fort and camp was about 2,800 with strong reinforcements from Donaldson halted some miles out. There were 17 heavy guns in the fort. The river was very high, the banks being overflowed except where the bluffs come to the water's edge. A portion of the ground on which Fort Henry stood was two feet deep in water. Below the water extended into the woods several hundred yards back from the bank on the east side. On the west bank Fort Hyman stood on high ground completely commanding Fort Henry. The distance from Fort Henry to Donaldson is about 11 miles. The two positions were so important to the enemy, as he saw his interest, that it was natural to suppose that reinforcements would come from every quarter from which they could be got. Prompt action on our part was in parity. The plan was for the troops and gunboats to start at the same moment. The troops were to invest the garrison and the gunboats to attack the fort at close quarters. General Smith was to land a brigade of his division on the west bank during the night of the fifth and get it in rear of Hyman. At the hour designated, the troops and gunboats started. General Smith found Fort Hyman had been evacuated before his men arrived. The gunboats soon engaged the water batteries at very close quarters, but the troops which were to invest Fort Henry were delayed for one of roads, as well as by the dense forest and the high water in what would, in dry weather, have been unimportant beds of streams. This delay made no difference in the result. On our first appearance, Tildman had sent his entire command with the exception of about 100 men left to man the guns in the fort, to the outworks on the road to Dover and Donelson so as to have them out of range of the guns of our navy and before any attack on the sixth, he had ordered them to retreat on Donelson. He stated in his subsequent report that the defense was intended solely to give his troops time to make their escape. Tildman was captured with his staff and 90 men as well as the armament of the fort, the ammunition and whatever stores were there. Our cavalry pursued the retreating column towards Donelson and picked up two guns and a few stragglers, but the enemy had so much to start that the pursuing force did not get in sight of any except the stragglers. All the gun boats engaged were hit many times. The damage, however, beyond what could be repaired by a small expenditure of money was slight, except to the Essex. A shell penetrated the boiler of that vessel and exploded it, killing and wounding 48 men, 19 of whom were soldiers who had been detailed to act with the navy. On several occasions during the war, such details were made when the compliment of men with the navy was insufficient for the duty before them. After the fall of Fort Henry, Captain Phelps, commanding the ironclad Carone Delay, at my request, ascended the Tennessee River and thoroughly destroyed the bridge of the Memphis and Ohio Railroad. End of section 21, recording by Jim Clevenger, Lillarock, Arkansas, Jim at joclev.com. Section 22 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevenger, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant, chapter 22. Investment of Fort Donaldson, the naval operations, attack of the enemy, assaulting the works, surrender of the fort. I informed the department commander of our success at Fort Henry and that on the eighth I would take Fort Donaldson. But the rain continued to fall so heavily that the roads became impassable for artillery and wagon trains. Then too, it would not have been prudent to proceed without the gunboats. At least, it would have been leaving behind a valuable part of our available force. On the seventh, the day after the fall of Fort Henry, I took my staff and the cavalry, a part of one regiment, and made a reconnaissance to within about a mile of the outer line of works at Donaldson. I had known General Pillow in Mexico and judged that with any force, no matter how small, I could march up to within gunshot of any entrenchments he was given to hold. I said this to the officers of my staff at the time. I knew that Floyd was in command, but he was no soldier. And I judged that he would yield to Pillow's pretensions. I met, as I expected, no opposition in making the reconnaissance. And besides learning the topography of the country on the way and around Fort Donaldson, found that there were two roads available for marching, one leading to the village of Dover, the other to Donaldson. Fort Donaldson is two miles north or down the river from Dover. The fort, as it stood in 1861, embraced about 100 acres of land. On the east, it fronted the Cumberland. To the north, it faced Hickman's Creek, a small stream which, at that time, was deep and wide because of the backwater from the river. On the south was another small stream, or rather a ravine, opening into the Cumberland. This also was filled with backwater from the river. The fort stood on high ground, some of it as much as 100 feet above the Cumberland. Strong protection to the heavy guns and the water batteries had been obtained by cutting away places for them in the bluff. To the west, there was a line of rifle pits, some two miles back from the river at the furthest point. This line ran generally along the crest of high ground, but in one place crossed a ravine which opens into the river between the village and the fort. The ground inside and outside of this entrenched line was very broken and generally wooded. The trees outside of the rifle pits had been cut down for a considerable way out and had been filled so that their tops lay outwards from the entrenchments. The limbs had been trimmed and pointed and thus formed an obitus in front of the greater part of the line. Outside of this entrenched line and extending about half the entire length of it is a ravine running north and south and opening into Hickman Creek at a point north of the fort. The entire side of this ravine next to the works was one long obitus. General Hallick commenced his efforts in all quarters to get reinforcements to forward to me immediately on my departure from Cairo. General Hunter sent men freely from Kansas and a large division under General Nelson from Buell's army was also dispatched. Orders went out from the War Department to consolidate fragments of companies that were being recruited in the Western States so as to make full companies and to consolidate companies into regiments. General Hallick did not approve or disapprove of my going to Fort Donaldson. He said nothing, whatever, to me on the subject. He informed Buell on the seventh that I would march against Fort Donaldson the next day. But on the 10th he directed me to fortify Fort Henry strongly, particularly to the landside, saying that he folded me entrenching tools for that purpose. I received this dispatch in front of Fort Donaldson. I was very impatient to get to Fort Donaldson because I knew the importance of the place to the enemy and supposed he would reinforce it rapidly. I felt that 15,000 men on the Eighth would be more effective than 50,000 a month later. I asked Flag Officer Foote, therefore, to order his gunboats still about Cairo to proceed up to Cumberland River and not to wait for those gone to Eastport and Florence. But the others got back in time and we started on the 12th. I had moved McClendon out a few miles the night before so as to leave the road as free as possible. Just as we were about to start, the first reinforcement reached me on transports. It was a brigade composed of six full regiments commanded by Colonel Thayer of Nebraska. As the gunboats were going around to Donaldson by the Tennessee, Ohio, and Cumberland Rivers, I directed Thayer to turn about and go under their convoy. I started from Fort Henry with 15,000 men, including eight batteries and part of a regiment of cavalry and, meeting with no obstruction to detain us, the advance arrived in front of the enemy by noon. That afternoon and the next day were spent in taking up ground to make the investment as complete as possible. General Smith had been directed to leave a portion of his division behind to guard Fort Henry and Hyman. He left General Lou Wallace with 2,500 men. With the remainder of his division, he occupied our left, extending to Hickman Creek. McClendon was on the right and covered the roads running south and southwest from Dover. Smith's right extended to the backwater up the ravine, opening into the Cumberland south of the village. The troops were not entrenched, but the nature of the ground was such that they were just as well protected from the fire of the enemy as if rifle pits had been thrown up. Our line was generally along the crest of ridges. The artillery was protected by being sunk in the ground. The men who were not serving the guns were perfectly covered from fire on taking position a little back from the crest. The greatest suffering was from want of shelter. It was midwinter, and during the siege we had rain and snow thawing and freezing alternately. It would not do to allow campfires except far down the hill out of sight of the enemy, and it would not do to allow many of the troops to remain there at the same time. In the march over from Fort Henry, numbers of the men had thrown away their blankets and overcoats. There was therefore much discomfort and absolute suffering during the 12th and 13th, and until the arrival of Wallace and Thayer on the 14th. The national forces composed of but 15,000 men without entrenchments confronted an entrenched army of 21,000 without conflict further than what was brought on by ourselves. Only one gunboat had arrived. There was a little skirmishing each day brought on by the movement of our troops in securing commanding positions, but there was no actual fighting during this time except once on the 13th in front of McClearnedon's command. That general had undertaken to capture a battery of the enemy which was annoying his men. Without orders or authority he sent three regiments to make the assault. The battery was in the main line of the enemy which was defended by his whole army present. Of course the assault was a failure, and of course the loss on our side was great for the number of men engaged. In this assault Colonel William Morrison fell badly wounded. Up to this time the surgeons with the army had no difficulty in finding room in the houses near our line for all the sick and wounded, but now hospitals were overcrowded. Owing however to the energy and skill of the surgeons, the suffering was not so great as it might have been. The hospital arrangements at Fort Donaldson were as complete as it was possible to make them considering the inclementcy of the weather and the lack of tents in a sparsely settled country where the houses were generally of but one or two rooms. On the return of Captain Walk to Fort Henry on the tent I had requested him to take the vessels that had accompanied him on his expedition up to Tennessee and get possession of the Cumberland as far up towards Donaldson as possible. He started without delay taking however only his own gunboat, the Coron Delay, towed by the steamer Alps. Captain Walk arrived a few miles below Donaldson on the 12th, a little afternoon. About the time the advance of troops reached a point within gunshot of the fort on the land side, he engaged the water batteries at long range. On the 13th I informed him of my arrival the day before and of the establishment of most of our batteries requesting him at the same time to attack again that day so that I might take advantage of any diversion. The attack was made and many shots fell within the fort creating some consternation as we now know. The investment on the land side was made as complete as the number of troops engaged would admit of. During the night of the 13th, Flag Officer Foote arrived with the ironclads St. Louis, Louisville and Pittsburgh and the wooden gunboats Tyler and Conestoga convoying Thiers Brigade. On the morning of the 14th, Thayer was landed. Wallace, whom I had ordered over from Fort Henry also arrived about the same time. Up to this time he had been commanding a brigade belonging to the division of General C.F. Smith. These troops were now restored to the division they belonged to and General Lou Wallace was assigned to the command of a division composed of the brigade of Colonel Thayer and other reinforcements that arrived the same day. This new division was assigned to the center giving the two flanking divisions an opportunity to close up and form a stronger line. The plan was for the troops to hold the enemy within his lines while the gunboats should attack the water batteries at close quarters and silence his guns if possible. Some of the gunboats were to run the batteries get above the fort and above the village of Dover. I had ordered a reconnaissance made with the view of getting troops to the river above Dover in case they should be needed there. That position attained by the gunboats it would have been but a question of time and a very short time too when the garrison would have been compelled to surrender. By three in the afternoon of the 14th Flag Officer Foote was ready and advanced upon the water batteries with his entire fleet. After coming in range of the batteries of the enemy the advance was slow but a constant fire was delivered from every gun that could be brought to bear upon the fort. I occupied a position on shore from which I could see the advancing navy. The leading boat got within a very short distance of the water battery not further off I think than 200 yards and I soon saw one and then another of them dropping down the river visibly disabled. Then the whole fleet followed and the engagement closed for the day. The gunboat which Flag Officer Foote was on besides having been hit about 60 times several of the shots passing through near the water line had a shot enter the pilot house which killed the pilot carried away the wheel and wounded the flag officer himself. The tiller ropes of another vessel were carried away and she too dropped helplessly back. Two others had their pilot houses so injured that they scarcely formed a protection to the men at the wheel. The enemy had evidently been much demoralized by the assault but they were jubilant when they saw the disabled vessels dropping down the river entirely out of the control of the men on board. Of course I only witnessed the falling back of our gunboats and felt sad enough at the time over the reports. Subsequent reports now published show that the enemy telegraphed a great victory to Richmond. The sun went down on the night of the 14th of February 1862 leaving the army confronting Fort Donaldson anything but comforted over the prospects. The weather had termed intensely cold. The men were without tents and could not keep up fires where most of them had to stay and as previously stated many had thrown away their overcoats and blankets. Two of the strongest of our gunboats had been disabled presumably beyond the possibility of rendering any present assistance. I retired this night not knowing but that I would have to entrench my position and bring up tents for the men or build huts under the cover of the hills. On the morning of the 15th before it was yet broad day a messenger from Flag Officer Foot handed me a note expressing a desire to see me on the flagship and saying that he had been injured the day before so much that he could not come himself to me. I at once made my preparations for starting. I directed my adjutant general to notify each of the division commanders of my absence and instruct them to do nothing to bring on an engagement until they received further orders but to hold their positions. From the heavy rains that had fallen for days and weeks preceding and from the constant use of the roads between the troops and the landing four to seven miles below these roads had become cut up so as to be hardly passable. The intense cold of the night of the 14th and 15th had frozen the ground solid. This made travel on horseback even slower than through the mud but I went as fast as the roads would allow. When I reached the fleet I found the flagship was anchored out in the stream. A small boat however awaited my arrival and I was soon on board with the Flag Officer. He explained to me in short the condition in which he was left by the engagement of the evening before and suggested that I should entrench while he returned to Mount City with his disabled boats expressing at the time to believe that he could have the necessary repairs made and be back in 10 days. I saw the absolute necessity of his gunboats going into hospital and did not know but I should be forced the alternative of going through a siege but the enemy relieved me from this necessity. When I left the national line to visit Flag Officer Foote I had no idea that there would be any engagement on land unless I brought it on myself. The conditions for battle were much more favorable to us than they had been for the first two days of the investment. From the 12th to the 14th we had but 15,000 men of all arms and no gunboats. Now we had been reinforced by a fleet of six naval vessels, a large division of troops under General L. Wallace and 2,500 men brought over from Fort Henry belonging to the division of C.F. Smith. The enemy however had taken the initiative. Just as I landed I met Captain Hillier of my staff, white with fear, not for his personal safety but for the safety of the national troops. He said the enemy had come out of his lines in full force and attacked and scattered McClearnand's division which was in full retreat. The roads as I have said were unfit for making fast time but I got to my command as soon as possible. The attack had been made on the national right. I was some four or five miles north of our left. The line was about three miles long. In reaching the point where the disaster had occurred I had to pass the divisions of Smith and Wallace. I saw no sign of excitement on the portion of the line held by Smith. Wallace was nearer the scene of conflict and had taken part in it. The enemy had, at an opportune time, sent Thayer's brigade to the support of McClearnand and thereby contributed to hold the enemy within his lines. I saw everything favorable for us along the line of our left and center. When I came to the right, appearances were different. The enemy had come out in full force to cut his way out and make his escape. McClearnand's division had to bear the brunt of the attack from this combined force. His men had stood up gallantly until the ammunition in their cartridge boxes gave out. There was abundance of ammunition nearby lying on the ground in boxes. But at that stage of the war it was not all of our commanders of regiments, brigades, or even divisions who had been educated up to the point of seeing that their men were constantly supplied with ammunition during an engagement. When the men found themselves without ammunition they could not stand up against troops who seemed to have plenty of it. The division broke and a portion fled but most of the men, as they were not pursued only fell back out of range of the fire of the enemy. It must have been about this time that Thayer pushed his brigade in between the enemy and those of our troops that were without ammunition. At all events the enemy fell back within his entrenchments and was there when I got on the field. I saw the men standing in knots talking in the most excited manner. No officer seemed to be giving any directions. The soldiers had their baskets but no ammunition. While there were tons of it close at hand I heard some of the men say that the enemy had come out with knapsacks and haversacks filled with rations. They seemed to think this indicated a determination on his part to stay out and fight just as long as the provisions held out. I turned to Colonel J. D. Webster of my staff who was with me and said some of our men are pretty badly demoralized but the enemy must be more so for he has attempted to force his way out but has fallen back. The one who attacks first now will be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets ahead of me. I determined to make the assault at once on our left. It was clear to my mind that the enemy had started to march out with his entire force except a few pickets and if our attack could be made on the left before the enemy could redistribute his forces along the line we would find but little opposition except from the intervening Apotos. I directed Colonel Webster to ride with me and call out to the men as we passed. Fill your cartridge boxes quick and get in the line. The enemy is trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so. This acted like a charm. The men only wanted someone to give them a command. We rode rapidly to Smith's quarters when I explained the situation to him and directed him to charge the enemy's works in his front with his whole division saying at the same time that he would find nothing but a very thin line to contend with. The general was off in an incredibly short time going in advance himself to keep his men from firing while they were working their way through the Apotos intervening between them and the enemy. The outer line of rifle pits was passed and the night of the 15th, General Smith with much of his division bivouacked within the lines of the enemy. There was now no doubt but that the Confederates must surrender or be captured the next day. There seems from subsequent accounts to have been much consternation particularly among the officers of high rank in Dover during the night of the 15th. General Floyd, the commanding officer who was a man of talent enough for any civil position was no soldier and possibly did not possess the elements of one. He was further unfitted for command for the reason that his conscience must have troubled him and made him afraid. As secretary of war he had taken a solemn oath to maintain the constitution of the United States and to uphold the same against all its enemies. He had betrayed that trust. As secretary of war he was reported through the Northern Press to have scattered the little army the country had so that the most of it could be picked up in detail when cessation occurred. About a year before leaving the cabinet he had removed arms from Northern to Southern arsenals. He continued in the cabinet of President Buchanan until about the 1st of January, 1861, while he was working vigilantly for the establishment of a confederacy made out of United States territory. Well may he have been afraid to fall into the hands of national troops. He would no doubt have been tried for misappropriating public property if not for treason had he been captured. General Pillow, next in command, was conceded and prided himself much on his services in the Mexican War. He telegraphed to General Johnston at Nashville after our men were within the rebel rifle pits and almost on the eve of his making his escape that the Southern troops had had great success all day. Johnson forwarded the dispatch to Richmond while the authorities at the capital were reading it, Floyd and Pillow were fugitives. A council of war was held by the enemy at which all agreed that it would be impossible to hold out longer. General Buckner, who was stirred in rank in the garrison but much the most capable soldier seems to have regarded it a duty to hold the fort until the general commanding the department, A.S. Johnston, should get back to his headquarters at Nashville. Buckner's report shows, however, that he considered Donaldson lost and that any attempt to hold the place longer would be at the sacrifice of the command. Being assured that Johnston was already in Nashville, Buckner, too, agreed that surrender was the proper thing. Floyd turned over the command to Pillow, who declined it. It then devolved upon Buckner who accepted the responsibility of the position. Floyd and Pillow took possession of all the river transports at Dover and before morning both were on their way to Nashville with the brigade formerly commanded by Floyd and some other troops in all about three thousand. Some marched up the east bank of the Cumberland. Others went on the steamers. During the night, Forrest also, with his cavalry and some other troops about a thousand in all, made their way out, passing between our right and the river. They had to ford or swim over the backwater in the little creek just south of Dover. Before daylight, General Smith brought to me the following letter from General Buckner. Headquarters, Fort Donaldson, February 16, 1862, sir. In consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the commanding officer of the federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and Fort under my command and in that view suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock today. I am, sir, very respectfully your obedient servant, S.B. Buckner, Brigadier General, C.S.A. to Brigadier General U.S. Grant commanding U.S. forces near Fort Donaldson. To this I responded as follows. Headquarters, Army in the Field, Camp near Donaldson, February 16, 1862. General S.B. Buckner, Confederate Army, sir. Yours of this date proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation is just received. No terms, except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works. I am, sir, very respectfully your obedient servant, U.S. Grant, Brigadier General. To this I received the following reply. Headquarters, Dover, Tennessee, February 16, 1862. To Brigadier General U.S. Grant, U.S. Army, sir. The distribution of the forces under my command incident to an unexpected change of commanders and the overwhelming force under your command compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the Confederate arm's yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unshivalrous terms which you propose. I am, sir, your very obedient servant, S.B. Buckner, Brigadier General, C.S.A. General Buckner, as soon as he had dispatched the first of the above letters, sent word to his different commanders on the line of rifle pits, notifying them that he had made a proposition looking to the surrender of the garrison and directing them to notify national troops in their front so that all fighting might be prevented. White flags were stuck at intervals along the line of rifle pits, but none over the fort. As soon as the last letter from Buckner was received, I mounted my horse and rode to Dover. General Wallace, I found, had preceded me an hour or more. I presumed that, seeing white flags exposed in his front, he rode up to see what they meant and not being fired upon or halted, he kept on until he found himself at the headquarters of General Buckner. I had been at West Point three years with Buckner and afterwards served with him in the army so that we were quite well acquainted. In the course of our conversation, which was very friendly, he said to me that if he had been in command, I would not have got up to Donaldson as easily as I did. I told him that if he had been in command, I should not have tried in the way I did. I had invested their lines with a smaller force than they had to defend him, and at the same time had sent a brigade full 5,000 strong around by water. I had relied very much upon their commander to allow me to come safely up to the outside of their works. I asked General Buckner about what force he had to surrender. He replied that he could not tell with any degree of accuracy that all the sick and weak had been sent to Nashville while we were about Fort Henry, that Floyd and Pillow had left during the night taking many men with him and that Forrest and probably others had also escaped during the preceding night. The number of casualties he could not tell but he said I would not find fewer than 12,000 nor more than 15,000. He asked permission to send parties outside of the lines to bury his dead, who had fallen on the 15th when they tried to get out. I gave directions that his permit to pass our limits should be recognized. I have no reason to believe that this privilege was abused, but it familiarized our guards so much with the sight of Confederates passing to and fro that I have no doubt many got beyond our pickets unobserved and went on. The most of the men who went in that way no doubt thought they had had war enough and left with the intention of remaining out of the army. Some came to me and asked permission to go, saying that they were tired of the war and would not be caught in the ranks again and I bade them go. The actual number of Confederates at Fort Donaldson can never be given with entire accuracy. The largest number admitted by any writer on the southern side is by Colonel Preston Johnston. He gives the number at 17,000, but this must be an underestimate. The Commissary General of Prisoners reported having issued Rations to 14,623 Fort Donaldson prisoners at Cairo. As they passed that point, General Pillow reported the killed and wounded at 2,000, but he had less opportunity of knowing the actual numbers than the officers of McLean's division for most of the killed and wounded fell outside their works in front of that division and were buried or cared for by Buckner after the surrender and when Pillow was a fugitive. It is known that Floyd and Pillow escaped during the night of the 15th, taking with them not less than 3,000 men. Forrest escaped with about 1,000 and others were leaving singly and in squads all night. It is probable that the Confederate force at Donaldson on the 15th of February, 1862, was 21,000 in-round numbers. On the day Fort Donaldson fell, I had 27,000 men to confront the Confederate lines and guard the road four or five miles to the left over which all our supplies had to be drawn on wagons. During the 16th, after the surrender, additional reinforcements arrived. During the siege, General Sherman had been sent to Smythland at the mouth of the Cumberland River to forward reinforcements and supplies to me. At that time, he was my senior in rank and there was no authority of law to assign a junior to command a senior of the same grade. But every boat that came up with supplies or reinforcements brought a note of encouragement from Sherman, asking me to call upon him for any assistance he could render and saying that if he could be of service at the front, I might send for him and he would waive rank. End of Section 22, recording by Jim Clevenger, Little Rock, Arkansas, Jim at jocclev.com.