 Welcome to the Asian Review. I'm your host Bill Sharp. My guest today is an old friend of Asian Review, Ambassador Ray Burkhart. Ambassador Burkhart served for 10 years as a chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, which manages the U.S.'s relationship with Taiwan. As such, he was clearly an insider who played a unique role in all U.S. government policy decisions regarding Taiwan. Earlier in his career, he served as Director of the American Institute in Taiwan, U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, U.S. Council General in Shanghai, and many other important diplomatic posts. Welcome back to Asian Review. Nice, Bill. Thanks for having me back here. Glad to be here. That's great. Well, our show today, what 92 consensus? So, for the benefit of our audience, could you just explain what the 92 consensus is supposed to be? Well, the 92 consensus, which is a device that Taiwan and mainland China have used in order to conduct negotiations with each other. Essentially, it means that they both agree that there is one China, but they have different views about how to define that. So the mainland thinks one China is the People's Republic of China, and Taiwan, under the KMT government, said that one China was the Republic of China. So it was a way of, you know, a clever Chinese solution to be able to talk to each other. Well, you had a very interesting interview with Voice of America, which was also reported in the Taipei Times. And were you really debunked the existence of the 92 consensus? No, I wasn't really debunking the existence. I was talking about the history of it. The key point is that, first of all, it's not for the U.S. to say how Taiwan and mainland China should figure out how to talk with each other. That's for them to figure out. Americans aren't too good at that kind of thing, you know, and it would be inappropriate. But what I was saying, frankly, what I was reflecting was we thought that Beijing, I mean, I thought, I think the U.S. government thought that Beijing was being a bit inflexible, was being a little too nitpicky with the new government in Taiwan, and that the term 92 consensus actually had not always been used. At the beginning, they didn't sort of give it any name at all. They just said, we've agreed to talk. We've exchanged documents, one side sent one text, the other side sent the other text, and they said, all right, let's talk. Later, somebody, you know, one of the negotiators called the 92 understanding, and then later somebody decided it should be called the 92 consensus. But I mean, my point was, you know, if you look back at the history, none of that seemed to really be all that important. I mean, so I thought that Beijing was being somewhat inflexible. They were being tough on the new president in Taiwan, and they had stopped negotiations because she wouldn't say the right language. And we felt that that was a mistake, that stopping talks over, you know, for that reason was being overly, overly hard, and that it was also not good to stop talks. The fact that they, we had been very happy to have mainland China and Taiwan in dialogue with each other, with the United States government, because obviously that made it harder for there to be misunderstanding or miscalculation, but with the talks stopped, you get, again, the danger of miscalculation or misunderstanding. Did you become an instant hero or the Democratic Progressive Party? Yeah, the government in Taiwan was very happy. They said, when I met Tsai Ing-wen, she said, so I think you've joined our team. So that was, you know, I wasn't sure that was exactly what I wanted to hear, but that was nice. And the Beijing was quite unhappy with me for what I said. You know, what you were talking about, it's not up to the US government to determine how Taiwan and China should deal with themselves or what kind of forum they should meet in. It sort of reminded me of General Marshall's comments at the end of World War II when they were trying to affect the coalition government. And he sort of threw his hands up and said, well, you guys are just left to your own and march out. Well, we're not saying you're left to your own. You know, I mean, General Marshall was the classic bad experience. And it showed that the Americans can be pretty, you know, and General Marshall is a pretty smart guy and very capable of a lot of things, but he went over there at the end of World War II to try to negotiate peace during the China's Chinese Civil War. And he, it was impossible. So let's talk about the congratulatory call that was such a hot topic. Tsai Ing-wen's congratulatory call to President Trump. What's your take on that? Well, clearly it was something arranged. First of all, I left the post of AIT chairman on October 1st, so I was not involved in that. You dismissed it. But, you know, I think it was, I know it was carefully arranged ahead of time. I think it was a good thing in some ways. I think it showed that he was his own man. It also showed his respect for Taiwan. And frankly, he'd done a few things which kind of worried some of us in terms of conveying his interest in Asia and his toughness on things that mattered to us. I thought withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership was a big present with a big bowtie on it given to China, which made the Chinese very happy. Talking about pulling out of the, talking about, you know, the need for sort of belittling the alliance with Japan, the alliance with South Korea, that wasn't too good either. So I thought that showing respect for Taiwan at least maybe, I think the time, Beijing was feeling pretty smug at that point. So I thought showing some respect for Taiwan at least gave them something to worry about for a change. But unfortunately, some of the comments he made afterwards did cause some trouble, I thought, because in fact they actually managed to make both Beijing and Taipei kind of upset, which is kind of a difficult accomplishment. So I mean, talking about using Taiwan and the One China principle as a negotiating chip was... A bargaining chip. A bargaining chip, yeah. That was viewed with some alarm even in Taipei. So that's what I'd say about the phone call. Now afterwards, of course, there was the follow-up call with Xi Jinping, which was putting, after Trump became president, that call kind of got relations going between our new administration and the Chinese government. And the wording was very carefully worked out in that call. Even though I'd left government, I actually joined some of the discussion in Washington about how to do that. And a lot of the One China principle that China uses and that they talk about is a little different than the One China policy we talk about. Not to get too far down on the weeds on this or into the theology of it, but... Theology. Basically, what China is saying is that there is One China and Taiwan is a renegade province, and someday it's going to be unified. And we're going to bring Taiwan into the People's Republic of China. What we're saying is, look, our One China policy is kind of like the 92 Consensus. We're saying, look, we know that you both talk about there being One China. We only recognize Beijing as a member of the UN and as a country called China. But as far as the future of Taiwan and what the fate of Taiwan is going to be and how you're going to reconcile that, we don't take any position on that. And so, therefore, we have never said exactly the same thing as what China says, and even though they've tried for 30-something years to get us to say that unification and bringing Taiwan into part of your country under Beijing's control is the ultimate outcome. We have never said that and we won't say it. And so, if you listen to what Trump said during the Xi conversation, if you look at the White House statement that was issued afterwards, it was very carefully worded. It said that President Trump, at the request of China, had agreed to honor our One China policy. And then One China policy was in quotation marks. Was Trump a loser on this or is he going to get something big in return? From whom? From Xi. From China? From China. Look, I don't think he gave anything up. I mean, I think he, Clara, I don't think when he originally, you know, made some of his comments about One China, I think, you know, he and his, he hadn't really, you know, that was before he was elected, before he became president and he hadn't, he and his team had not really studied that and what it meant. Once Tillerson had been briefed and others briefly understood it, they realized that, you know, since what we mean by One China, what Beijing means by One China are so different, there's no need to, you know, saying that we have a One China policy is not a concession, you know. So it kind of, it got things patched up. I feel like I came away from on this, this call was, to me, kind of showed that the U.S. relationship with Taiwan is best handled out of public sight. Although I don't like to say that as a, you know, part-time journalist but I don't like to say that but I just can't help but to think that. There's a lot to that. Too many sort of public statements, remarks, public speculation about things doesn't necessarily help. A lot of it is best done quietly. Behind the curtain. Or just not talked about so much, you know. I mean, so. So this idea about using Taiwan as a bargaining chip, has Taiwan ever been used as a bargaining chip to get a trade concession from China to get some help with North Korea? I don't think so. No. I mean, I think China has tried that. China has tried that. But they have said, well, you know, if you sell arms to Taiwan, we're not going to help you on North Korea, you know, stuff like that. But we generally haven't fallen for that, you know. So I, you know, one of the points I like to make to your audience is we don't, particularly in the last ten years, I'd say, and to the Bush administration through the Obama administration, I'm sure it's going to be true with this administration. We've gotten away from what was true in the early days after we D-recognized Taiwan as China in 1979. We tended to just sort of treat Taiwan as part of our China policy. And frankly, China and Taiwan wasn't as important then. Taiwan in the intervening 30-something years has developed a very strong economy. It's part of the world's supply chain. We have one minute to break. We have a big economic and trade player in the world, a big economic and trade player in the world. And so we treat it as an important relationship in its own right. I think people in Taiwan would be very glad to hear that, especially from the... Well, we say that. We say a lot. And they can see it. And we have, we show them more respect. We have visa waiver for Taiwan now, so that, which gave a big boost to a number of visitors from Taiwan, both tourists and business people. And so we break at this point. You're watching Asian Review. I'm your host, Bill Sharp. Our guest today is Ambassador Ray Burkhart, who served for 10 years as chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan. So we have a real insider here with us. And don't go away. We'll be back in one minute. Aloha, kakou. I'm Marcia Joyner, and I'm inviting you to navigate the journey. We are discussing the end-of-life options, and we would really love to have you every Wednesday morning at 11 a.m. right here. Aloha, my name is Mark Shklav. I am the host of Law Across the Sea. Please join me every other Monday to hear lawyers from Hawaii discussing ways to reach across the sea and help people and bring people together. Aloha. Hi, I'm Cheryl Crozier Garcia, the host of Working Together on Think Tech Hawaii. Join us every other Tuesday from 4 p.m. to 4.30 when we discuss the impact of change on employees, employers, and the economy. Welcome back to Asian Review. I'm your host, Bill Sharp. Our show today, What 92 Consensus. And joining us right here in our studio is Ambassador Ray Burkhart, who served for 10 years as the chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan. I don't know if you happen to have seen the March 11th edition of The Economist. I did. I did see it. They had one little line in there which I thought was really interesting. I'll quote it to. The one China policy is a preposterous fit, but America must stick to it. Yeah, and then earlier in the article, they called it something a convenient fiction or a useful fiction or something. Well, I mean, you know, it's true. And that's right. And it works. Okay, well, it was interesting to see what your take on that was. Now, you know, there seems to be some... You worked on the National Security Council, so you have a good idea of how things work in the White House. Maybe not so much under this administration or at least under previous ones. They differ from one administration to another. But what I'm reading is that when it comes to Taiwan policy, there are about four different centers of interest. One is the, we'll call it the Steve Bannon group. And the other is the Reese Preba's group. And then there's the HR McMaster group and the Jared Kushner crowd and the President himself. And do you see any of these centers as being more influential than the other? Well, I mean, look, I'm not sure I'd buy that precisely would divide the White House up in those centers. And I'm not sitting in the White House, so I don't know. Okay. And I think Taiwan is not a major issue that these people are worrying about right now. They're giving more attention, it's a little more attention to the issue now because we just had Secretary Tillerson in Beijing. They will be preparing for Xi Jinping's wonderful experience in Florida at Mardulago. So Taiwan will be an issue. It always comes up. Right, right. If we don't, I mean, usually China, China raises it, you know, tell us what to do. That's a given. Yeah, don't do this, don't do that, you know, and so forth. So there will be a necessity to focus on the issue in preparing for the Mardulago meeting with Xi Jinping. But I can't really comment on whether there are these different factions. I find that a little bit, maybe on other issues, but on Taiwan, I think that would be a little far-fetched. It does seem that this administration is going to pay more attention to Taiwan, though, doesn't it? I don't know. I actually think the Obama administration paid pretty good attention to Taiwan. The Obama administration sold 12, and I've worked on Taiwan for the Bush administration and a lot of administrations, but I thought the Obama administration did do more than $12 billion in arms sales to Taiwan. That's not bad. I think this administration, there are people in the administration who are or who look like they might go in the administration. I mean, that's part of the reason it's kind of hard to comment because we have no assistant secretaries named yet for either the State Department or the Defense Department. So, you know, we're kind of guessing who these personalities are going to be. Randy Shriver. Was that been announced? No, but there seems to be a lot of conjecture. Sure. There's a lot of conjecture about a lot of names, but no one's been named yet. There's nothing official yet. Well, Randy would be very friendly to Taiwan. There are a lot of people out there who are possible people for these jobs who are friendly to Taiwan, even very friendly. So, I think Taiwan is hopeful that the Trump administration will be well inclined toward it and that some real friends will be in the administration. And I would say that that hope is probably well founded. Right. Oh, that sounds good. Arms Package has talked that after the sea, Trump meeting in Florida that the US will announce another arms package to Taiwan, which is said to be very robust and continue to have a lot of more modern weapons. I've seen those stories. I saw also Bill Gertz's story about, which was basically valid. There was a package that almost was announced to Congress at the end of... I mean, this is what happens. The process is that we notify Congress of an arms package to sell to Taiwan, and that's when it becomes public information. There was a serious discussion about a notifying Congress of an arms package of a billion plus at the very end of the Obama administration. And as Bill Gertz correctly reported, it was something that actually was supported by the Defense Department and the State Department, but it was lost somewhere in the corridors of the White House. And so... Does that mean Obama himself couldn't be... I would doubt it went up to him, but it was somebody who got cold feet, probably in the NSC staff, so at a high level. So certainly those are all items that made a lot of sense. They were various kinds of missiles. They were parts related to the upgrade of the F-16A's and B's. There were other items and things that they really need, and that we had encouraged them to have in some cases. So I'm sure that'll happen at some point. And it looks like the new administration is going to want to put its own stamp on it. And there are people who are in the administration or who look like they will be in the administration who are very well inclined toward helping Taiwan's defense. So I would be surprised not to see some additional items. It's been said that at the meeting in Florida between Xi and Trump that China will push hard for a fourth communique. I don't put a lot of stock in that. Every couple of years there are stories about China pushing for a fourth communique. Some of us think there was one communique to many already. I mean the 82 communique in which we agreed to phase out arms sales was an unfortunate agreement. And I think a lot of people, I wouldn't be surprised if a lot of people in the Trump administration feel the same way. So I would be really surprised to see that happen. Well, China always pushes for another communique. Sure, they always push for more. Oh, okay. So let us just touch very lightly on this indictment of Ma Ying-jeou that came out last week. What's your take on that? Is it substance? Is it political payback? What's your feeling about it? I don't know. I think, you know, and there may have been, I haven't studied it in great detail, you know, and you'd have to be a Taiwanese lawyer to really understand all the whole thing. I mean, I think, but I would just say this about it. I think this custom that you see developing in Taiwan and you've seen it for years in Korea, of going after former presidents for legal, over legal issues, I think it's a bad, really bad practice. I think in a polarized, in countries where you already have rather polarized political environments, I think it just further bitters the environment and it's not a good thing. I mean, I'll just tell you, I remember talking to President Ma about that with reference to the indictment of Chun Shui-ban, the president who preceded him who ended up being thrown in jail for a long time. And I said to President Ma, and I was actually authorized by the U.S. government to say this to him, I said, you know, I spent years in Korea and I saw what happened in Korea where each president locked up his predecessor. And I said, you know, that really created a bitter political atmosphere. I said, you know, you may, maybe you need to really sort of think through whether you want to follow that model here in Taiwan. I would say, oh, Ali, he said, I'll let the law follow its course. So I was unhappy about that action against Chun Shui-ban and I kind of feel the same way about this one against Ma Ying-chou. No, I can see that. And one hand it seems to be, do you let the rule of law and democracy prevail in order to prevent political or not to avoid political polarization? I agree with you that Taiwan, after what I studied the whole last year, is politically polarized and it really doesn't need any more of it. Right, I mean, and I'm not saying that, you know, and I don't know whether this was some crime committed by Ma or not. I really just don't know. In the case of Chun Shui-ban, there clearly does seem to have been crimes committed by Hammond, certainly by his wife. But how vehemently and for how long and how, you know, it needs to be given careful consideration because of the political environment there. I think I agree with you in the sense I also thought reluctantly came to the conclusion Chun Shui-ban is guilty, but I don't know if he deserves the prison term that he got. We're coming up on the third anniversary of the Sunflower Movement. Ah, yes. So just this month. So what's your reflection on that, looking back? Well, I think the Sunflower Movement, which in turn, what it was, was a student demonstration, a student takeover of the legislative building, protesting a potential further trade agreements, an agreement on trade and services with China, which they saw as just Taiwan giving up too much to China and getting too close, becoming too dependent on China. And I think it showed that, you know, it showed pushback, particularly by a younger generation. And that kind of anxiety about becoming absorbed by China or the anxiety about becoming too dependent on and too beholden to China. That anxiety also had a lot to do with Tsai Ing-wen's victory in the presidential election. It was fundamental to it, obviously. So I think... One minute to go. That was a lesson for all parties. I get one last question. I know this is a little unfair to hit you with this, but 45 seconds left. But, you know, you devoted so much of your life to Taiwan. So what does Taiwan represent to you? Taiwan represents an island of 23 million people who, against all odds, and the odds were all against them, they managed to create a vibrant democracy and a very vibrant economy. Great, great, great. Well, I guess we'll have to end it here because the clock has caught up with us again, the devilish clock. And we want to thank you for joining us today. There's a lot of things to think about, as always. And we want to thank you out there for joining us today. And next week, be sure to join us again. My guest will be Miss Andrea Wu, the President and the American Chamber of Commerce of Taiwan, who will be joining us via Skype. We'll see you then.