 Question 78 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triaties on the Cardinal of Virtues, The Virtue of Justice. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triaties on the Cardinal of Virtues, The Virtue of Justice. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 78 of The Sin of Usury in four articles. We must now consider The Sin of Usury, which is committed in loans. And under this head, there are four points of inquiry. First, whether it is a sin to take money as a price for money lent, which is to receive usury. Second, whether it is lawful to lend money for any other kind of consideration by way of payment for the loan. Third, whether a man is bound to restore just gains derived from money taken in usury. Fourth, whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury. First article, whether it is a sin to take usury for money lent. Objection 1. It would seem that it is not a sin to take usury for money lent. For no man sins through following the example of Christ. But our Lord said of himself in Luke 1923, At my coming I might have exacted it. That is, the money lent with usury. Therefore it is not a sin to take usury for lending money. Objection 2 further. According to Psalm 18 verse 8, The law of the Lord is unspotted, because to which it forbids sin. Now usury of a kind is allowed in the divine law according to Deuteronomy 23, 19, and 20. Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother money, nor corn, nor any other thing, but to the stranger. Nay more, it is even promised as a reward for the observance of the law according to Deuteronomy 28, 12. Thou shalt lend upon usury to many nations and shalt not borrow of any one. Therefore it is not a sin to take usury. Objection 3 further. In human affairs justice is determined by civil laws. Now civil law allows usury to be taken. Therefore it seems to be lawful. Objection 4 further. The councils are not binding under sin. But among other councils we find, Luke 6 verse 35. Lend hoping for nothing thereby. Therefore it is not a sin to take usury. Objection 5 further. It does not seem to be in itself sinful to accept a price for doing what one is not bound to do. But one who has money is not bound in every case to lend it to his neighbor. Therefore it is lawful for him sometimes to accept a price for lending it. Objection 6 further. Silver made into coins does not differ specifically from silver made into a vessel. But it is lawful to accept a price for the loan of a silver vessel. Therefore it is also lawful to accept a price for the loan of a silver coin. Therefore usury is not in itself a sin. Objection 7 further. Anyone may lawfully accept a thing which its owner freely gives him. Now he who accepts the loan freely gives the usury. Therefore he who lends may lawfully take the usury. On the contrary it is written in Exodus 20 to 25. If thou lend money to any of thy people that is poor that dwelleth with thee thou shalt not be hard upon them as an extortioner nor oppress them with usuries. I answer that to take usury for money lent is unjust in itself because this is to sell what does not exist and this evidently leads to inequality which is contrary to justice. In order to make this evident we must observe that there are certain things the use of which consists in their consumption. Thus we consume wine when we use it for drink and we consume wheat when we use it for food. Therefore in such like things the use of the thing must not be reckoned apart from the thing itself and whoever is granted the use of the thing is granted the thing itself and for this reason to lend things of this kind is to transfer the ownership. Accordingly if a man wanted to sell wine separately from the use of the wine he would be selling the same thing twice or he would be selling what does not exist therefore he would evidently commit a sin of injustice. In like manner he commits an injustice who lends wine or wheat and asks for double payment notably one the return of the thing in equal measure the other the price of the use which is called usury. On the other hand there are things the use of which does not consist in their consumption thus to use a house is to dwell in it not to destroy it. Therefore in such things both may be granted for instance one man may hand over to another the ownership of his house while reserving to himself the use of it for a time or vice versa he may grant the use of the house while retaining the ownership. For this reason a man may lawfully charge a price for the use of his house and because of this revindicate the house from the person to whom he has granted its use as happens in renting and letting a house. Now money according to the philosopher in ethics 55 and politics 13 was invented chiefly for the purpose of exchange and consequently the proper and principal use of money is its consumption or alienation whereby it is sunk in exchange. Hence it is by its very nature unlawful to make payment for the use of money lent which payment is known as usury and just as a man is bound to restore other ill-gotten goods so is he bound to restore the money which he has taken in usury. Reply to Objection 1. In this passage usury must be taken figuratively for the increase of spiritual goods which God exacts from us for he wishes us ever to advance in the goods which we receive from him and this is for our own profit not for his. Reply to Objection 2. The Jews were forbidden to take usury from their brethren that is from other Jews. By this we are given to understand that to take usury from any man is evil simply because we ought to treat every man as our neighbor and brother especially in the state of the gospel where to all are called. Hence it is said without any distinction in Psalm 14.5 he that hath not put out his money to usury and in Ezekiel 18.8 who hath not taken usury. They were permitted however to take usury from foreigners not as though it were lawful but in order to avoid a greater evil lest to it through avarice to which they were prone according to Isaiah 56.11 they should take usury from the Jews who were worshipers of God where we find it promised to them as a reward thou shalt fenerate to many nations etc. Fenerating is to be taken in a broad sense for lending as in Ecclesiasticus 29.10 where we read many have refused to fenerate not out of wickedness that is they would not lend. Accordingly the Jews are promised in reward an abundance of wealth so that they would be able to lend to others. Reply to Objection 3. Human laws leave certain things unpunished on account of the condition of those who are imperfect and who would be deprived of many advantages if all sins were strictly forbidden and punishments appointed for them. Wherefore human law has permitted usury not that it looks upon usury as harmonizing with justice but lest the advantage of many should be hindered. Hence it is that in civil law it is stated that those things according to natural reason and civil law which are consumed by being used do not admit of usufruct and that the senate did not or could it appoint a usufruct to such things but established a kazi usufruct namely by permitting usury. Moreover the philosopher led by natural reason says in politics 1.3 that to make money by usury is exceedingly unnatural. Reply to Objection 4. A man is not always bound to lend and for this reason it is placed among the councils. Yet it is a matter of precept not to seek profit by lending although it may be called a matter of council in comparison with the maxims of the Pharisees who deemed some kinds of usury to be lawful just as love of one's enemies is a matter of council. Or again he speaks here not of the hope of usurious gain but of the hope which is put in man. For we ought not to lend or do any good deed through hope in man but only through hope in God. Reply to Objection 5. He that is not bound to lend may accept repayment for what he has done but he must not exact more. Nor is he repaid according to equality of justice if he is repaid as much as he lent. Wherefore if he exacts more for the usufruct of a thing which has no other use but the consummation of its substance he exacts a price of something non-existent and so his exaction is unjust. Reply to Objection 6. The principal use of a silver vessel is not its consumption and so one may lawfully sell its use while retaining one's ownership of it. On the other hand the principal use of silver money is sinking it in exchange so that it is not lawful to sell its use and at the same time expect the restitution of the amount lent. It must be observed however that the secondary use of silver vessels may be an exchange and such use may not be lawfully sold. In like manner there may be some secondary use of silver money for instance a man might lend coins for show or to be used as security. Reply to Objection 7. He who gives usury does not give it voluntarily simply but under a certain necessity insofar as he needs to borrow money which the owner is unwilling to lend without usury. Second article whether it is lawful to ask for any other kind of consideration for money lent. Objection 1. It would seem that one may ask for some other kind of consideration for money lent. For every one may lawfully seek to indemnify himself. No sometimes a man suffers loss through lending money. Therefore he may lawfully ask for or even exact something else besides the money lent. Objection 2 further. As stated in Ethics 5.5, one is in duty bound by a point of honor to repay any one who has done us a favor. Now to lend money to one who is in straits is to do him a favor for which he should be grateful. Therefore the recipient of a loan is bound by a natural debt to repay something. Now it does not seem unlawful to bind oneself to an obligation of the natural law. Therefore it is not unlawful in lending money to anyone to demand some sort of compensation as condition of the loan. Objection 3 further. Just as there is real renumeration, so is there verbal renumeration and renumeration by service as Iglas says on Isaiah 3315, blessed is he that shaketh his hands from all bribes. Now it is lawful to accept service or praise from one to whom one has lent money. Therefore in like manner it is lawful to accept any other kind of renumeration. Objection 4 further. Seemingly the relation of gift to gift is the same of loan to loan. But it is lawful to accept money for money given. Therefore it is lawful to accept repayment by loan in return for a loan granted. Objection 5 further the lender by transferring his ownership of a sum of money removes the money further from himself than he who entrusts it to a merchant or craftsman. Now it is lawful to receive interest for money entrusted to a merchant or a craftsman. Therefore it is also lawful to receive interest for money lent. Objection 6 further. A man may accept a pledge for money lent, the use of which pledge he might sell for a price, is when a man mortgages his land or the house wherein he dwells. Therefore it is lawful to receive interest for money lent. Objection 7 further. It sometimes happens that a man raises the price of his goods under guise of loan or buys in others goods at a low figure or raises his price through delay in being paid and lowers his price that he may be paid the sooner. Now in all these cases there seems to be payment for a loan of money nor does it appear to be manifestly illicit. Therefore it seems to be lawful to expect or exact some consideration for money lent. On the contrary among other conditions requisite in a just man it is stated in Ezekiel 1817 that he hath not taken usury an increase. I answer that according to the philosopher in Ethics 4.1 a thing is reckoned as money. If its value can be measured by money consequently just as it is a sin against justice to take money by tacit or express agreement in return for lending money or anything else that is consumed by being used. So also it is a like sin by tacit or express agreement to receive anything whose price can be measured by money. Yet there would be no sin in receiving something of the kind not as exacting it nor yet as though it were due on account of some agreement tacit or expressed but as gratuity. Since even before lending the money one could accept a gratuity nor is one in a worse condition through lending. On the other hand it is lawful to exact compensation for a loan in respect of such things as are not appreciated by a measure of money for instance benevolence and love for the lender and so forth. Reply to Objection 1. A lender may without sin enter an agreement with the borrower for compensation for the loss he incurs of something he ought to have for this is not to sell the use of money but to avoid a loss. You may also happen that the borrower avoids a greater loss than the lender incurs where for the borrower may repay the lender with what he has gained but the lender cannot enter an agreement for compensation through the fact that he makes no profit out of his money because he must not sell that which he has not yet and may be prevented in many ways from having. Reply to Objection 2. Repayment for a favor may be made in two ways. In one way as a debt of justice and to such a debt a man may be bound by a fixed contract and its amount is measured according to the favor received where for the borrower of money or any such thing the use of which is its consummation is not bound to repay more than he received in loan and consequently it is against justice that he be obliged to pay back more. In another way a man's obligation to repayment for favor received is based on a debt of friendship and the nature of this debt depends more on the feeling with which the favor was conferred than on the greatness of the favor itself. This debt does not carry with it a civil obligation involving a kind of necessity that would exclude the spontaneous nature of such a repayment. Reply to Objection 3. If a man were in return for money lent as though there had been an agreement tacit or expressed to expect or exact repayment in the shape of some renumeration of service or words it would be the same as if he expected or exacted some real renumeration because both can be priced at a money value as may be seen in the case of those who offer for hire the labor which they exercise by work or by tongue. If on the other hand the renumeration by service or words be given not as an obligation but as a favor which is not to be appreciated at a money value it is lawful to take exact and expect it. Reply to Objection 4. Money cannot be sold for a greater sum than the amount lent which has to be paid back nor should the loan be made with the demand or expectation of what else but of a feeling of benevolence which cannot be priced at a pecuniary value and which can be the basis of a spontaneous loan. Now the obligation to lend in return at some future time is repugnant to such a feeling because again an obligation of this kind has its pecuniary value. Consequently it is lawful for the lender to borrow something else at the same time but it is unlawful for him to bind the borrower to grant him a loan at some future time. Reply to Objection 5. He who lends money transfers the ownership of the money to the borrower. Hence the borrower holds the money at his own risk and is bound to pay it all back, wherefore the lender must not exact more. On the other hand he that entrusts his money to a merchant or craftsman so as to form a kind of society does not transfer the ownership of his money to them for it remains his so that at his risk the merchant speculates with it or the craftsman uses it for his craft and consequently he may lawfully demand as something belonging to him part of the profits derived from his money. Reply to Objection 6. If a man in return for money lent to him pledges something that can be valued at a price the lender must allow for the use of that thing towards the repayment of the loan. Else if he wishes the gratuitous use of that thing in addition to repayment it is the same as if he took the money for lending and that is usually unless perhaps it were such a thing as friends or want to lend to one another gratis as in the case of the loan of a book. Reply to Objection 7. If a man wished to sell his goods at a higher price than that which is just so that he may wait for the buyer to pay it is manifestly a case of usury because this waiting for the repayment of the price has the character of a loan so that whatever he demands beyond the just price in consideration of this delay is like a price for the loan which pertains to usury. In like manner if a buyer wishes to buy goods at a lower price than what is just for the reason that he pays for the goods before they can be delivered it is a sin of usury because again this anticipated payment of money has the character of a loan the price of which is the rebate on the just price of the goods sold. On the other hand if a man wishes to allow a rebate on the just price in order that he may have his money sooner he is not guilty of the sin of usury. Third article whether a man is bound to restore whatever profits he has made out of money gotten by usury. Objection one you would seem that a man is bound to restore whatever profits he has made out of money gotten by usury for the apostle says in Romans 11 16 if the root be holy so are the branches therefore likewise if the root be rotten so are the branches but the root was infected with usury therefore whatever profit is made therefrom is infected with usury therefore he is bound to restore it. Objection two further it is laid down in a decretal property accruing from usury must be sold and the price were paid to the persons from which the usury was extorted therefore likewise whatever else is acquired from usurious money must be restored. Objection three further that which a man buys with the proceeds of usury is due to him by reason of the money he paid for it therefore he has no more right to the thing purchased than to the money he paid but he was bound to restore the money gained through usury therefore he is also bound to restore what he acquired with it on the contrary a man must lawfully hold what he has lawfully acquired now that which is acquired by the proceeds of usury is sometimes lawfully acquired therefore it may be lawfully retained I answer that as stated above in article one there are certain things whose use is their consumption and which do not emit of usufruct according to the law. Therefore if such like things be exhorted by means of usury for instance money wheat wine and so forth the lender is not bound to restore more than he received since what is acquired by such things is the fruit not of the thing but of human industry unless indeed the other party by losing some of his goods be injured through the lender retaining them for then is he bound to make good the loss. On the other hand there are certain things whose use is not their consumption such things admit of usufruct for instance house or land property and so forth wherefore if a man as by usury extorted from another his house or land he is bound to restore not only the house or land but also the fruits accruing to him therefrom since they are the fruits of things owned by another man and consequently are due to him. Reply to objection one the root has not only the character of matter as money made by usury has but has also somewhat the character of an active cause in so far as it administers nourishment hence the comparison fails. Reply to objection two further property acquired from usury does not belong to the person who paid usury but to the person who bought it yet he that paid usury has a certain claim on that property just as he has on the other goods of the usurer hence it is not prescribed that such property should be assigned to the persons who paid usury since the property is perhaps worth more than what they paid in usury but it is commanded that the property be sold and the price be restored of course according to the amount taken in usury. Reply to objection three the proceeds of money taken in usury are due to the person who acquired them not by reason of the usurious money as instrumental cause but on account of his own industry as principal cause therefore he has more right to the goods acquired with usurious money than to the usurious money itself. Fourth article whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury. Objection one it would seem that it is not lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury for the apostle says in Romans 132 that they are worthy of death not only that they do these sins but they also they consent to them that do them. Now he that borrows money under a condition of usury consents in the sin of the usurer and gives him an occasion of sin therefore he sins also. Objection two further for no temporal advantage ought one to give another an occasion of committing a sin for this pertains to active scandal which is always sinful as stated above in question 43 article 2. Now he that seeks to borrow from a usurer gives him an occasion of sin therefore he is not to be excused on account of any temporal advantage. Objection three further it seems no less necessary sometimes to deposit one's money with a usurer than to borrow from him. Now it seems altogether unlawful to deposit one's money with a usurer even as it would be unlawful to deposit one's sword with a madman a maiden with a libertine or food with a glutton neither therefore is it lawful to borrow from a usurer on the contrary he that suffers injury does not sin according to the philosopher in ethics 511 where for justice is not a mean between two vices as stated in the same book in chapter 5. Now a usurer sins by doing an injury to the person who borrows from him under a condition of usury therefore he that accepts a loan under a condition of usury does not sin. I answer that it is by no means lawful to induce a man to sin yet it is lawful to make use of another sin for a good end since even god uses all sin for some good since he draws some good from every evil as stated in the N. Caridian 11. Hence when Publicola asked whether it were lawful to make use of an oath taken by a man swearing by false gods which is a manifest sin for he gives divine honor to them. Augustine in his letter 47 answered that he who uses not for a bad but for a good purpose the oath of a man that swears by false gods is partly not to his sin of swearing by demons but to his good compact whereby he kept his word. If however he were to induce him to swear by false gods he would sin. Accordingly we must also answer to the question in point that it is by no means lawful to induce a man to lend under a condition of usury yet it is lawful to borrow for usury from a man who is ready to do so and is a usurer by profession provided the borrower have a good end in view such as the relief of his own or another's need. Thus too it is lawful for a man who is fallen among thieves to point out his property to them which they sin in taking in order to save his life after the example of the ten men who said to Ishmael in Jeremiah 41.8 kill us not for we have stores in the field reply to objection one he who borrows for usury does not consent to the usurer's sin but makes use of it nor is it the usurer's acceptance of usury that pleases him but his lending which is good reply to objection two he who borrows for usury gives the usurer an occasion not for taking usury but for lending it is the usurer who finds an occasion of sin in the malice of his heart hence there is passive scandal on his part when there is no active scandal on the part of the person who seeks to borrow nor is this passive scandal a reason why the other person should assist from borrowing if he is in need since this passive scandal arises not from weakness or ignorance but from malice reply to objection three if one were to entrust one's money to a usurer lacking other means of practicing usury or with the intention of making a greater profit from his money by reason of the usury one would be giving a sinner matter for sin so that one would be a participator in his guilt if on the other hand the usurer to whom one entrusts one money has other means of practicing usury there is no sin in entrusting it to him that it may be in safer keeping since this is to use a sinner for a good purpose end of question 78 read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert LC question 79 of summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice by st. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 79 of the quasi integral parts of justice in four articles we must now consider the quasi integral parts of justice which are to do good and to decline from evil and the opposite vices under this head there are four points of inquiry first whether these two are parts of justice second whether transgression is a special sin third whether omission is a special sin fourth of the comparison between omission and transgression first article whether to decline from evil and to do good are parts of justice objection one it would seem that to decline from evil and to do good are not parts of justice for it belongs to every virtue to perform a good deed and to avoid an evil one but parts do not exceed the whole therefore to decline from evil and to do good should not be reckoned parts of justice which is a special kind of virtue objection to further a gloss on Psalm 33 verse 15 turn away from evil and do good says the former that is to turn away from evil avoid sin the latter that is to do good deserves the life and the palm but any part of a virtue deserves the life and the palm therefore to decline from evil is not a part of justice objection three further things that are so related that one implies the other are not mutually distinct as parts of a whole now declining from evil is implied in doing good since no one does evil and good at the same time therefore declining from evil and doing good are not parts of justice on the contrary Augustine in on admonition and grace one declares that declining from evil and doing good belong to the justice of the law i answer that if we speak of good and evil in general it belongs to every virtue to do good and to avoid evil and in this sense they cannot be reckoned parts of justice except justice be taken in the sense of all virtue confer question 58 article 5 and yet even if justice is taken in this sense it regards a certain special aspect of good namely the good as do in respect of divine or human law on the other hand justice considered as a special virtue regards good as due to one's neighbor and in this sense it belongs to special justice to do good considered as due to one's neighbor and to avoid the opposite evil that namely which is hurtful to one's neighbor while it belongs to general justice to do good in relation to the community or in relation to god and to avoid the opposite evil now these two are said to be quasi integral parts of general or of special justice because each is required for the perfect act of justice for it belongs to justice to establish equality in our relations with others as shown above in question 58 article 2 and it pertains to the same cause to establish and to preserve that which it has established now a person establishes the equality of justice by doing good that is by rendering to another his due and he preserves the already established equality of justice by declining from evil that is by inflicting no injury on his neighbor reply to objection one good and evil are here considered under a special aspect by which they are appropriated to justice the reason why these two are reckoned parts of justice under a special aspect of good and evil while they are not reckoned parts of any other moral virtue is that the other moral virtues are concerned with the passions wherein to do good is to observe the mean which is the same as to avoid the extremes as evils so that doing good and avoiding evil comes to the same with regard to the other virtues on the other hand justice is concerned with operations and external things whereas to establish equality is one thing and not to disturb the equality established is another reply to objection two to decline from evil considered as a part of justice does not denote a pure negation notably not to do evil for this does not deserve the palm but only avoids the punishment but it implies a movement of the will in repudiating evil as the very term decline shows this is meritorious especially when a person resists against an instigation to do evil reply to objection three doing good is the competitive act of justice and the principal part so to speak thereof declining from evil is a more imperfect act and a secondary part of that virtue hence it is a material part so to speak thereof and a necessary condition of the formal and competitive part second article whether transgression is a special sin objection one it would seem that transgression is not a special sin for no species is included in the definition of its genus now transgression is included in the definition of sin because ambrose says in on paradise eight that sin is a transgression of the divine law therefore transgression is not a species of sin objection to further no species is more comprehensive than its genus but transgression is more comprehensive than sin because sin is a word deed or desire against the law of god according to august in in against faustus twenty two twenty seven while transgression is also against nature or custom therefore transgression is not a species of sin objection three further no species contains all the parts into which its genus is divided now the sin of transgression extends to all the capital vices as well as to sins of thought word and deed therefore transgression is not a special sin on the contrary it is opposed to a special virtue namely justice i answer that the term transgression is derived from bodily movement and applied to moral actions now a person is said to transgress in bodily movement when he steps gradi tour beyond trans a fixed boundary and it is a negative precept that fixes the boundary that man must not exceed in his moral actions where for to transgress properly speaking is to act against a negative precept now materially considered this may be common to all the species of sin because man transgresses a divine precept by any species of mortal sin but if we consider it formally namely under its special aspect of an act against a negative precept it is a special sin in two ways first in so far as it is opposed to those kinds of sin that are opposed to the other virtues for just as it belongs properly to legal justice to consider a precept as binding so it belongs properly to a transgression to consider a precept as an object of contempt secondly in so far as it is distinct from a mission which is opposed to an affirmative precept reply to objection one even as legal justice is all virtue confer question 58 article 5 as regards its subject and matter so legal injustice is materially all sin it is in this way that ambrose defined a sin considering it from the point of view of legal injustice reply to objection two the natural inclination concerns the precepts of the natural law again a laudable custom has the force of a precept since as augustin says in an epistle on the fast of the Sabbath a custom of God's people should be looked upon as a law hence both sin and transgression may be against a laudable custom and against a natural inclination reply to objection three all these species of sin may include transgression if we consider them not under their proper aspects but under a special aspect as stated above the sin of omission however is altogether distinct from the sin of transgression third article whether omission is a special sin objection one you would seem that omission is not a special sin for every sin is either original or actual now omission is not original sin for it is not contracted through origin nor is it actual sin for it may be all together without act as we stated above in the past prema secunde question 71 article 5 when we were treating of sins in general therefore omission is not a special sin objection to further every sin is voluntary now omission sometimes is not voluntary but necessary is when a woman is violated after taking a vow of virginity or when one lose that which is under an obligation to restore or when a priest is bound to say mass and is prevented from doing so therefore omission is not always a sin objection three further it is possible to fix the time when any special sin begins but this is not possible in the case of omission since one is not altered by not doing a thing no matter when the omission occurs and yet the omission is not always sinful therefore omission is not a special sin objection for further every special sin is opposed to a special virtue but it is not possible to assign any special virtue to which omission is opposed both because the good of any virtue can be omitted and because justice to which it would seem more particularly opposed always requires an act even in declining from evil as stated above in article one the second reply while omission may be altogether without act therefore omission is not a special sin on the contrary it is written in James 4 verse 17 to him who knoweth to do good and doth it not to him it is sin i answer that omission signifies the non-fulfillment of a good not indeed of any good but of a good that is due now good under the aspect of due belongs properly to justice to legal justice if the thing do depends on divine or human law to special justice if the do is something in relation to one's neighbor therefore in the same way as justice is a special virtue as stated above in question 58 articles 6 and 7 omission is a special sin distinct from the sins which are opposed to the other virtues and justice doing good which is the opposition of omitting it is a special part of justice distinct from avoiding evil to which transgression is opposed so too is omission distinct from transgression reply to objection one omission is not original but actual sin not as though it had some act essential to it but for as much as the negation of an act is reduced to the genus of act and in this sense non-action is a kind of action as stated above in the paris prima secunde question 71 article 6 first reply reply to objection 2 omission as stated above is only of such good as is due and to which one is bound now no man is bound to the impossible therefore no man sins by omission if he does not do what he cannot accordingly she who is violated after vowing virginity is guilty of an omission not through having virginity but through not repenting of her past sin or through not doing what she can to fulfill her vow by observing continents again a priest is not bound to say mass except he have a suitable opportunity and if this be lacking there is no omission and unlike manor a person is bound to restitution supposing he has the wherewithal if he has not and cannot have it he is not guilty of an omission provided he does what he can the same applies to other similar cases reply to objection 3 just as the sin of transgression is opposed to negative precepts which regard the avoidance of evil so the sin of omission is opposed to affirmative precepts which regard the doing of good now affirmative precepts bind not for always but for a fixed time and at the time the sin of omission begins but it may happen that then one is unable to do what one ought and if this inability is without any fault on his part he does not omit his duty as stated above on the other hand if this inability is due to some previous fault of his for instance if a man gets drunk at night and cannot get up for matins as he ought to some say that the sin of omission begins when he engages in an action that is illicit and incompatible with the act to which he is bound but this does not seem to be true for supposing one were to rouse him by violence and that he went to matins he would not omit to go so that evidently the previous drunkenness was not an omission but the cause of an omission consequently we must say that the omission begins to be imputed to him as a sin when the time comes for the action and yet this is on account of a preceding cause by reason of which the subsequent omission becomes voluntary reply to objection 4 omission is directly opposed to justice as stated above because it is a non-fulfillment of a good virtue but only under the aspect of due which pertains to justice now more is required for an act to be virtuous and meritorious than for it to be sinful and demaritorious because good results from an entire cause whereas evil arises from each single defect from Dionysius on the divine names four wherefore the merit of justice requires an act whereas omission does not fourth article whether a sin of omission is more grievous than a sin of transgression objection one you would seem that a sin of omission is more grievous than a sin of transgression for delictum would seem to signify the same as derelictum and therefore this is seemingly the same as an omission but delictum denotes a more grievous offense than transgression because it deserves more expiation as appears from levitic is five therefore the sin of omission is more grievous than the sin of transgression objection two further the greater evil is opposed to the greater good as the philosopher declares in ethics eight ten now to do good is a more excellent part of justice than to decline from evil to which transgression is opposed as stated above in article one third reply therefore omission is a graver sin than transgression objection three further sins of transgression may be either venial or mortal but sins of omission seem to be always mortal since they are opposed to an affirmative precept therefore omission would seem to be a graver sin than transgression objection four further the pain of loss which consists in being deprived of seeing god and is inflicted for the sin of omission is a greater punishment than the pain of sense which is inflicted for the sin of transgression as christostom says in his homily 23 on the gospel of matthew now punishment is proportionate to fault therefore the sin of omission is graver than the sin of transgression on the contrary it is easier to refrain from evil deeds than to accomplish good deeds therefore it is a graver sin not to refrain from an evil deed that is to transgress then not to accomplish a good deed which is to admit i answer that the gravity of a sin depends on its remoteness from virtue now contrariety is the greatest remoteness according to metaphysics 10 wherefore a thing is further removed from its contrary than from its simple negation thus black is further removed from white than non-white is since every black is not white but not conversely now it is evident that transgression is contrary to an act of virtue while omission denotes the negative thereof for instance it is a sin of omission if one fail to give one's parents due reverence while it is a sin of transgression to revile them or injure them in any way hence it is evident that simply and absolutely speaking transgression is a graver sin than omission although a particular omission may be graver than a particular transgression reply to objection one delictum in its widest sense denotes any kind of omission but sometimes it is taken strictly for the omission of something concerning God or for a man's intentional and as it were contemptuous dereliction of duty and then it has a certain gravity for which reason it demands a greater expiation reply to objection two the opposite of doing good is both not doing good which is an omission and doing evil which is a transgression but the first is opposed by contradiction the second by contrariety which implies greater remoteness therefore transgression is the more grievous sin reply to objection three just as omission is opposed to affirmative precepts so is transgression opposed to negative precepts where for both strictly speaking have the character of mortal sin transgression and omission however may be taken broadly for any infringement of an affirmative or negative precept disposing to the opposite of such precept and so taking both in a broad sense they may be venial sins reply to objection four to the sin of transgression there correspond both the pain of loss on account of the aversion from God and the pain of sense on account of the inordinate conversion to a mutable good in like manner omission deserves not only the pain of loss but also the pain of sense according to matthew seven nineteen every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit shall be cut down and shall be cast into the fire and this on account of the root from which it grows although it does not necessarily imply conversion to any mutable good end of question 79 read by michael shane craig lambert lc question 80 of summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice this is a liber vox recording all liber vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit liber vox.org summa theologica secunde secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice by saint thomas equinas translated by the fathers of the english dominican province question 80 of the potential parts of justice in one article we must now consider the potential parts of justice namely the virtues annexed there too under which head there are two points of consideration first what virtues are annexed to justice second the individual virtues annexed to justice the article whether the virtues annexed to justice are suitably enumerated objection one you would seem that the virtues annexed to justice are unsuitably enumerated tully reckoned six notably religion piety gratitude revenge observance truth now revenge is seemingly a species of commutative justice whereby revenge is taken for injuries inflicted as stated above in question 61 article four therefore it should not be reckoned among the virtues annexed to justice objection to further macrobius reckoned seven notably innocence friendship concord piety religion affection humanity several of which are omitted by tully therefore the virtues annexed to justice would seem to be insufficiently enumerated objection three further others reckon five parts of justice notably obedience in respect of one superiors discipline with regard to inferiors equity as regards equals fidelity and truthfulness towards all and of these truthfulness alone is mentioned by tully therefore he would seem to have enumerated insufficiently the virtues annexed to justice objection four further the peripatetic andronicus reckons nine parts annexed to justice notably liberality kindliness revenge common sense piety gratitude holiness just exchange and just law giving and of all these it is evident that tully mentions none but revenge therefore he would appear to have made an incomplete enumeration objection five further Aristotle in ethics five ten mentions epikeya as being annexed to justice and yet seemingly it is not included in any of the foregoing enumerations therefore the virtues annexed to justice are insufficiently enumerated i answer that two points may be observed about the virtues annexed to a principal virtue the first is that these virtues have something in common with the principal virtue and the second is that in some respect they fall short of the perfection of that virtue accordingly since justice is of one man to another as stated above in question 58 article two all the virtues that are directed to another person may by reason of this common aspect be annexed to justice now the essential character of justice consists in rendering to another his due according to equality as stated above in question 58 article 11 therefore in two ways may a virtue directed to another person fall short of the perfection of justice first by falling short of the aspect of equality secondly by falling short of the aspect of due for certain virtues there are which render another his due but are unable to render the equal due in the first place whatever man renders to god is due yet it cannot be equal as though man rendered to god as much as he owes him according to psalm 115 verse 12 what shall i render to the lord for all the things that he hath rendered to me in this respect religion is annexed to justice since according to telly it consists in offering service and ceremonial rights or worships to some superior nature that men call divine secondly it is not possible to make to one's parents an equal return of what one owes to them as the philosopher declares in ethics 814 and thus piety is annexed to justice for thereby as telly says a man render service and constant deference to his kindred and the well-wishers of his country thirdly according to the philosopher in ethics 4 3 man is unable to offer an equal mead for the virtue and thus observance is annexed to justice consisting according to telly in the deference and honor rendered to those who excel in worth a falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a two-fold due moral or legal where for the philosopher in ethics 813 assigns a corresponding two-fold just the legal due is that which one is bound to render by reason of a legal obligation and this due is chiefly the concern of justice which is the principle virtue on the other hand the moral due is that to which one is bound in respect of the rectitude of virtue and since a due implies necessity this kind of due has two degrees for one due is so necessary that without it moral rectitude cannot be ensured and this has more of the character of due moreover this due may be considered from the point of view of the deader and in this way it pertains to this kind of due that a man represent himself to others just as he is both in word and deed where for to justice is a next truth whereby as tully says present past and future things are told without perversion it may also be considered from the point of view of the person to whom it is due by comparing the reward he receives with what he has done sometimes in good things and then the next to justice we have gratitude which consists in recollecting the friendship and kindliness shown by others and in desiring to pay them back as tully states and sometimes in evil things and then to justice is a next revenge whereby as tully states in on invention 253 we resist force injury or anything obscure by taking vengeance or by self-defense translators note saint thomas red obscure room and explains it as meaning derogatory cicero however wrote ob futurum that is hurtful there is another due that is necessary in the sense that it conduces to greater rectitude although without it rectitude may be ensured this due is the concern of liberality affability or friendship or the like all of which tully omits in the aforesaid enumeration because there is little of the nature of anything due in them reply to objection one the revenge taken by authority of a public power in accordance with the judge's sentence belongs to commutative justice whereas the revenge which a man takes on his own initiative though not against the law or which a man seeks to obtain from a judge belongs to the virtue annexed to justice reply to objection two macrobius appears to have considered the two integral parts of justice namely declining from evil to which innocence belongs and doing good to which the six others belong of these two would seem to regard relations between equals namely friendship in the external conduct and concord internally two regard our relations towards superiors namely piety to parents and religion to god while to regard our relations towards inferiors namely condescension insofar as their good pleases us and humanity whereby we help them in their needs for isidore says in his etymologies ten that a man is said to be humane through having a feeling of love and pity towards men this gives its name to humanity whereby we uphold one another in this sense friendship is understood as directing our external conduct towards others from which point of view the philosopher treats of it in ethics four six friendship may also be taken as regarding properly the affections and as the philosopher describes it in ethics eight and nine in this sense three things pertain to friendship namely benevolence which is here are called affection concord and beneficence which is here called humanity these three however are omitted by tally because as stated above they have little of the nature of a do reply to objection three obedience is included in observance which tally mentions because both reverential honor and obedience are due to persons who excel faithfulness whereby a man's acts agree with his words is contained in truthfulness as to the observance of one's promises yet truthfulness covers a wider ground as we shall state further on in question 109 articles one and three discipline is not due as a necessary duty because one is under no obligation to an inferior as such although a superior may be under an obligation to watch over his inferiors according to mathieu 2445 a faithful and wise servant whom his lord hath appointed over his family and for this reason it is omitted by tally it may however be included in humanity mentioned by macrobius and equity under epikea or under friendship reply to objection four this enumeration contains some belonging to true justice to particular justice belongs justice of exchange which he describes as the habit of observing equality in commutations to legal justice as regards things to be observed by all he describes legislative justice which he describes as the science of political commutations relating to the community as regards things which have to be done in particular cases beside the general laws he mentions common sense or good judgment which is our guide in like matters as stated above in question 51 article four in the triities on prudence wherefore he says that it is a voluntary justification because by his own free will man observes what is just according to his judgment and not according to the written law these two are ascribed to prudence as their director and to justice as their executor eusebia piety means good worship and consequently is the same as religion wherefore he says that it is the science of the service of god he speaks after the manner of socrates who said that all the virtues are sciences and holiness comes to the same as we shall state further on in question 81 article 8 eukarestia gratitude means good thanksgiving and is mentioned by macrobius wherefore isador says in etymologies 10 that a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord to do good and is of gentle speech and andronicus two says that kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence liberality would seem to pertain to humanity reply to objection five epikeya is a next not to particular but to legal justice and apparently is the same as that which goes by the name of eugenomo sine common sense end of question 80 read by michael shane greg lambert lc