 Propositions 120 to 139 of the Elements of Theology by Proclus, translated by Thomas Taylor. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by Jeffrey Edwards. Proposition 120. Every god possesses in his own hypoxies a providential inspection of the whole of things, and a providential energy is primarily in the gods. For all other things which are posterior to the gods energize providentially through the participation of them, but providence is kinescent with the gods. Furthermore, if to impart good to the subjects of providential energy is the prerogative of the providential peculiarity, but all the gods are goodnesses. Either, they do not impart themselves to anything, and thus nothing will be good in secondary natures, and whence will that be derived, which subsists according to participation, except from those natures that primarily possess peculiarities. Or if they do impart themselves, they impart good, and in consequence of this providentially attend to all things. Providence therefore subsists primarily in the gods. For where is the energy which is prior to intellect except in super-essential natures, and providence, pranoia, as the name signifies, is an energy prior to intellect, energie esti pro nu. The gods therefore, from being gods and from being goodnesses, provide for all things, and fill all things with the goodness which is prior to intellect. Proposition 121. Very divine nature has indeed, for its hypocrisies, goodness, but possesses a power which is unsubdued, and at once incomprehensible by all secondary natures. 4. If it providentially attends to the whole of things, there is in it a power which has dominion over the subjects of its providential energy, through which being unsubdued, and uncircumscribed by all things, divine natures fill all things with, and subject all things to themselves. For every thing of a ruling nature which is the cause of other things, and has dominion over them, rules through abundance of power, and predominates according to nature. 5. The first power therefore is in the gods, not indeed having dominion over some things, but not over others, but equally comprehending in itself according to cause the powers of all beings. This power neither being essential, nor much less unessential, but being cognizant with the hypoxies of the gods, and superessential. Moreover, the boundaries of all knowledge pre-subsist uniformly in the gods. For, through divine knowledge which is exempt from the whole of things, all other knowledge has a subsistence. This knowledge neither being intellectual, nor much less, being a certain knowledge posterior to intellect, but being established according to the divine peculiarity above intellect. Whether therefore there is a divine knowledge, this knowledge is occult and uniform, or has the form of the one. Or, whether there is a power uncircumscrimed by all things, this power is in a similar manner comprehensive of all things. Or, whether there is a divine goodness, this goodness defines the hypoxies of the gods. For, if all things are in the gods, knowledge, power, and goodness are also in them, but their hypoxies is characterized by that which is most excellent, and their hypostasis also is according to that which is best, but this is goodness. Everything divine provides for secondary natures and is exempt from the subjects of its providential care. Providence, neither relaxing the unmingled and unical transcendency of that which is divine, nor a separate union abolishing providence. For, divine beings abiding in their unical nature and in their own hypoxies fill all things with the power of themselves, and everything which is able to participate of them enjoys the good which it is capable of receiving according to the measures of its proper hypostasis. Divine natures in the meantime illuminating beings with good by their very essence are rather prior to essence. For, that which is divine, being nothing else than goodness, it supplies all things with an unenviying abundance of good, by its very being, not making a distribution according to a reasoning process, but other things receiving indeed according to their dessert, and divine natures according to their hypoxies. Neither, therefore, in providing for other things, do they receive a habitude or alliance with the subjects of their providential care. For, they benefit all things by being that which they are, but every thing which makes by its very essence makes without habitude, and with an unrestrained energy. For, habitude is an addition to essence. Hence also it is preternatural. Nor, being separate, do they withdraw their providential care, for thus they would subvert, which it is not lawful to say, their own hypoxies, the peculiarity of which is goodness. For, it is the province of goodness to extend itself to everything which is able to participate of it. And the greatest of all things is not that which is bona form, but that which is beneficent. Either, therefore, no being will possess this beneficent nature, or the gods will possess it prior to beings. For, it is not possible that a greater good should be present with the natures that are good by participation, but a less good with those that are primarily good. Everything divine is itself indeed, on account of its super-essential union, ineffable, and unknown to all secondary natures. But it is comprehended and known by its participants. Hence, that which is first is alone perfectly unknown as being imparticipable. For, all knowledge which subsists through reasoning and language, pertains to beings, and in beings, possesses the apprehension of truth. For, it comes into contact with conceptions, and subsists in intellectuals. But the gods are beyond all beings. Neither, therefore, is that which is divine doxastic, or the object of opinion. Nor, is it dino-etic, nor intelligible. For, every being is either sensible, and on this account doxastic, or truly existing being, and on this account intelligible. Or, it is between these, subsisting as being, and at the same time generation, and on this account is dino-etic. If, therefore, the gods are super-essential, and subsist prior to beings, there is neither any opinion of them, nor science and dino-ia, nor intellect-tion. But the nature of their peculiarities is known by the beings that are suspended from them, and this by a necessary consequence. For, the differences of participants are co-divided conformably to the peculiarities of the participated natures. And, neither does everything participate of everything, for there is no coordination of things perfectly dissimilar. Nor does any casual thing participate of that which is casual, but that which is kindred is conjoined to that which is kindred, and proceeds from that to which it is allied. Proposition 124 Every god knows partable natures impartably, temporal natures without time. Things which are not necessary necessarily, mutable natures immutably, and in short, all things in a manner more excellent than the order of the things known. For, if everything which is with the gods is with them according to their peculiarity, it is evident that the knowledge in the gods of things inferior will not subsist according to the nature of the inferior things, but according to the exempt transcendency of the gods. Hence, their knowledge of multiplied and passive natures will be uniform and impassive. If, therefore, the object of knowledge is partable, divine knowledge will be impartable. If the objects that are known are mutable, the knowledge of the gods will be immutable. If they are contingent, they will be known by the gods necessarily, and if they are indefinite, definitely. For, that which is divine, does not receive knowledge from subordinate beings, in order that thus the knowledge may be such as is the nature of the thing known. But subordinate beings become indefinite about the definite nature of the gods, are changed about their immutability, receive passively that which is impassive in them, and temporally that which in them is without time. For, it is possible for subordinate to be surpassed by more excellent natures, but it is not lawful for the gods to receive anything from beings inferior to themselves. Proposition 125 Every god, from that order from which he began to unfold himself into light, proceeds through all secondary natures, always indeed multiplying and dividing the communications of himself, but preserving the peculiarity of his own hypothesis. For, progressions being affected through diminution, first natures are everywhere after a manner multiplied into the decrements of secondary natures. But these proceeding according to a similitude to their producing causes, receive their orderly distribution, so that the hold of that which proceeds is after a manner the same with, and different from, that which abides, through its diminution indeed appearing to be different, but through continuity with its cause, not departing from sameness with it. But such as that which abides is among first, such is that which proceeds among secondary natures, and thus an indissoluble communion of the series is preserved. Each of the gods, therefore, is unfolded into light appropriately in the orders in which he makes his evolution, but he proceeds from thence as far as to the last of things through the generative power of first natures. He is always, however, multiplied according to a progression from unity into multitude, but he preserves sameness in the progression through the similitude of the things that proceed to the leader and primary cause of each series. Proposition 126 Every god who is nearer to the one is more total, but the god who is more remote from it is more partial. For the god who is the cause of a greater number of effects is nearer to that which produces all things, but he who is the cause of a less number is more remote from it, and he indeed who is the cause of a greater number of effects is more total, but he who is the cause of a less number is more partial. And each indeed is a unity, but the one is greater and the other less in power. Proposition 136 The more partial gods also are generated from the more total, the latter not being divided, for they are unities, nor changed in quality, for they are immovable, nor multiplied by habitude, for they are unmingled, but they generate secondary progressions from themselves, which are the decrements of the natures prior to them through abundance of power. Proposition 127 Everything divine is especially primarily simple, and on this account most sufficient to itself. For that it is indeed simple is evident from its union, since everything divine is most unical, but a thing of this kind is transcendently simple. That it is also most sufficient to itself may be learnt by considering that a composite nature is indigent, if not of other things to which it is external, yet of those things of which it is composed. But that, which is most simple and unical, and which establishes itself in the good, is most sufficient to itself. Such, however, is everything divine. Neither, therefore, is it indigent of other things existing as goodness itself, nor of things requisite to composition, because it is unical. Proposition 128 Every god, when participated by natures, nearer to himself, is participated without a medium, but when participated by natures more remote from himself, the participation is through a less, or greater number of media. For the former, through their alliance, being uniform, are immediately able to participate of the divine unities, but the latter, through their diminution and extension into multitude, require other things which are more united in order that they may participate of the unities themselves, and not of things united. For united multitude subsists between unity itself and divided multitude, being indeed able to coalesce with unity, but aligned in a certain respect to divided multitude through the representation of multitude. Proposition 129 Every divine body is divine through a deified soul, but every soul is divine through a divine intellect, and every intellect is divine through the participation of a divine unity, and unity indeed is of itself a god. Intellect is most divine, soul is divine, but body is deiform. For if every number of the gods is above intellect, but participations are affected through kindred and similar natures, the impartable essence will primarily participate of the supersensual unities. But the nature which comes into contact with generation will participate of them secondarily, and generation in the third place. Each of these likewise participates of them through the proximately superior natures, and the peculiarity of the gods indeed proceeds as far as to the last of things in its participants, but through media allied to itself. For unity indeed imparts the transcendent power of itself to the first intellect among divine natures, and causes this intellect to be like itself according to unical multitude. But through intellect it is also present with soul, conjoining soul with intellect and co-inflaming it with divine fire, when this intellect is participable. And through the echo of soul, imparting also to body its own peculiarity, if it is a body which participates something of soul. And thus body becomes not only animated and intellectual, but also divine, for it receives life indeed and motion from soul, but indissoluble permanency from intellect, and divine union from participated unity. For each of these imparts its own hypothesis to the subsequent natures. Proposition 130 In every divine order, such things as are first, are in a greater degree exempt from the natures proximately arranged under them. Then these latter are from things subsequent, and secondary natures in a greater degree adhere to their proximate superiors, then following natures to these. 4. By how much more unical and total anything is? By so much the more is it allotted a greater transcendency with respect to subsequent natures. And by how much the more diminished it is according to power? By so much the more is it con- asent with the natures posterior to itself? And more elevated natures indeed are more united with their more principal causes, but inferior natures are less united with them. For it is the province of a greater power to be more exempt from subordinate, and to be more united to better natures. As, on the contrary, it is the province of a diminution of power to recede in a greater degree from more excellent, and to be co-passive with subordinate natures. And this happens to secondary, but not to first natures in every order of things. Proposition 131 Every God begins his own energy from himself. 4. He first exhibits the peculiarity of his presence with secondary natures, in himself, because he imparts himself to other things also according to his own exuberant plenitude. For neither is deficiency adapted to the gods, nor fullness alone. For everything deficient is imperfect, and not being itself perfect, it is impossible it should make another thing to be perfect. But that, which is fawn, is alone sufficient to itself, and is not yet prepared to communicate. It is necessary, therefore, that the nature which fills other things, and which extends to other things the communications of itself, should be super plenary, or exuberantly fawn. Hence, if a divine nature fills all things from itself with the good which it contains in itself, it is exuberantly fawn. And, if this be the case, establishing first in itself the peculiarity which it imparts to others, it will extend to them the communications of super plenary goodness. Proposition 132 All the orders of the gods are bound in union by a medium. For all the progressions of beings are affected through similars, and much more, while the orders of the gods possess an indissoluble continuity, as subsisting uniformly, and being defined according to the One, which is the principal cause of their existence. The decrements, therefore, are produced unitedly and alone according to the similitude in beings of secondary to first natures. And this, because the hypoxies of the gods much more consists in union than the subsistence of beings. All the divine genera, therefore, are bound together by appropriate media, and first natures do not proceed into progressions perfectly different without a medium. But through the genera common to each from which they proceed, and of which they are immediately the causes. For these congregate the extremes into one union, being spread under some things knesently, but proximately exempt from others. And they preserve the well ordered generation of divine natures. Proposition 133 Every god is a beneficent unity, or an unific, inopios, goodness, and each so far as a god possesses this hypoxies. The first god, however, is simply good and simply one, but each posterior to the first is a certain goodness and a certain unity. For the divine peculiarity distinguishes the unities and goodnesses of the gods, so that each according to a certain peculiarity of goodness, such as that of perfecting, or connectedly containing, or defending, benefits all things. For each of these is a certain good, but not every good, but the first god pre-establishes a unical cause. Hence, that is the good as giving subsistence to all goodness. For all the hypoxies of the gods are not together equal to the one, so great a transcendency is the first god allotted with respect to the multitude of the gods. Proposition 134 Every divine intellect intellectually perceives indeed as intellect, but energizes providentially as a god. For it is the illustrious prerogative of intellect to know beings, and to have its perfection in intellections. But it is the province of a god to energize providentially, and to fill all things with good. This communication, however, and replenishing with good is accomplished through the union of the replenishing natures with the causes prior to themselves, which intellect, also imitating, passes into sameness with intelligibles. A divine intellect, therefore, so far as it energizes providentially, is a god, providence being established in an energy prior to intellect. Hence, as a god, it imparts itself to all things, but as intellect it is not present with all things. For a divine nature extends to things into which the intellectual peculiarity does not proceed. For beings which are without intellect desire to energize providentially, and to participate of a certain good. But this is because all things indeed do not aspire after intellect, not even all such as are able to participate of it. All things, however, aspire after good, and hasten to obtain it. Proposition 135 Every divine unity is participated by some being immediately, or without a medium, and every deified nature is extended to one divine unity. As many also, as are the participated unities. So many are the participating genera of beings. For neither two or more unities are participated by one being. For since the peculiarities in the unities are different, must not that which is cognizant with each be different also, since contact is affected through similitude. Nor is one unity participated in a divided manner by many beings. For many beings are unadapted to be conjoined with unity, and as beings they are unconjoined with the unity which is prior to beings, and as many they are separated from unity. It is necessary, however, that the thing which participates should be partly similar to that which is participated, and partly different and dissimilar. Since, therefore, that which participates is something belonging to beings, but unity is super-essential, and according to this they are dissimilar. It is necessary that the participant should be one, in order that, according to this, it may be similar to the one which is participated. Though of these, the latter is one, in such a manner as to be unity, but the former so as to be passive to the one, and to be united through the participation of unity. Proposition 136 Every God who is more total and arranged nearer to the first is participated by a more total genus of beings, but the God who is more partial and more remote from the first is participated by a more partial genus of beings, and as being is to being, so is one divine unity to another. For if unities are as many in number as beings, and vice versa, and one unity is participated by one being, it is evident that the order of beings proceeds according to the order of the unities, being assimilated to the order prior to beings. And more total beings, indeed, are cognizant with more total unities, but more partial beings with more partial unities. For if this were not the case, again similars would be conjoined with dissimilars, and there would not be a distribution according to dessert. These things, however, are impossible. Since from thence the one, and an appropriate measure are luminously imparted to all things, and from these proceed. Much more therefore will there be an order of participation in these, similars being suspended as much as possible from similars. Proposition 137 Every unity in conjunction with the one gives subsistence to the being which participates of it. For the one, as it gives subsistence to all things, so likewise it is the cause of the participated unities, and of beings suspended from these unities. But the unity belonging to every being produces the peculiarity which shines forth in that particular being. And the one, indeed, is the cause of existence simply, but unity is the cause of alliance, because it is cognizant with the one. Hence, unity is that which of itself defines the being which participates of it, and essentially exhibits in itself a super-essential peculiarity. For everywhere from that which is primary, that which is secondary is that which it is. If, therefore, there is a certain super-essential peculiarity of deity, this also belongs to the being which participates of it super-essentially. Proposition 138 Of all the deified natures which participate of the divine peculiarity, the first and highest is being itself. For if being is beyond intellect and life, as has been demonstrated, and if it is also after the one, the cause of the greatest number of effects, being will be the highest deified nature. For it is more single than life and intellect, and is on this account entirely more venerable. But there is not anything else prior to it except the one. For prior to unical multitude, what else can there be except the one? But being is unical multitude as consisting of bound and infinity, and in short the super-essential one is prior to essence. Since also in the illuminations which are imparted to secondary natures, the one alone extends beyond being. But being is immediately posterior to the one. For that which is being in capacity, but is not yet being, is nevertheless according to its own nature one, and that which follows the being that is in capacity is now being in energy. Hence in the principles of things, non-being is immediately beyond being as something more excellent, and no other than the one itself. Proposition 139 All things which participate of the divine unities originate indeed from being, but end in a corporeal nature. For being is the first of participants, but body the last, for we say that there are divine bodies, for the highest of all the genera of bodies, souls and intellects, are attributed to the gods, that in every order things analogous to the gods may connect and preserve secondary natures, and that each number may be a whole containing all things in itself according to the whole which is in a part, and possessing prior to other things the divine peculiarity. The divine genus therefore subsists corporeally, psychically and intellectually, and it is evident that all these are divine according to participation, for that which is primarily divine subsists in the unities. Hence the participants of the divine unities originate indeed from being, but end in a corporeal nature. And of Proposition 139 Propositions 140 to 159 of The Elements of Theology by Proclus translated by Thomas Taylor. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by Geoffrey Edwards. Proposition 140 All the powers of divine natures having a supernal origin and proceeding through appropriate media extend as far as to the last of things and to places about the earth. For neither does anything intercept these powers and exclude them from being present with all things, for they are not in want of places and intervals on account of their unrestrained transcendency with respect to all things, and a presence everywhere unmingled. Nor is that which is adapted to participate of them prohibited from participation, but as soon as anything is prepared for participation, they also are present, neither then approaching, nor prior to this being absent, but always possessing an invariable sameness of subsistence. If, therefore, any tearing nature is adapted to the participation of these divine powers, they are present with it and fill all things with themselves. And indeed, they are in a greater degree present with superior natures, but they are present with those of a middle nature according to the order which they possess. And, with such natures as are last, they are present in an ultimate degree. From on high, therefore, they extend themselves as far as to the last of things. Hence also, in last natures, there are representations of such as are first, and all things sympathize with all. Secondary indeed, pre-existing in first natures, but first natures, presenting themselves to the view in such as are second. For everything subsists in a threefold manner, either according to cause, or according to hypoxies, or according to participation. Proposition 141 Every providence of the gods is twofold, one indeed being exempt from the natures for which it provides, but the other being co-arranged with them. For some divine essences, indeed, according to hypoxies, and the peculiarity of their order, are entirely expanded above the illuminated natures, but others being of the same order provide for things subordinate that are of the same co-ordination. These also, imitating the providential energy of the exempt gods, and desiring to fill secondary natures with the good which they are able to impart. Proposition 142 The gods are present with all things after the same manner, but all things are not after the same manner present with the gods, but everything participates of their presence according to its own order and power. And this is accomplished by some things uniformly, but by others manifoldly, by some things eternally, but by others according to time, and by some things incorporeally, but by others corporeally. For it is necessary that the different participation of the same things should become different, either from the participant or from that which is participated, but everything divine always possesses the same order, and is without habitude too, and unmingled with all things. It remains therefore that the mutation must subsist from the participants, and that in these that which is not invariably the same must be found, and that at different times they are differently present with the gods. Hence the gods being present with all things, with invariable sameness, all things are not after the same manner present with them, but other things are present with them as far as they are able, and according to the manner in which they are present, they enjoy their illuminations. For the participation is according to the measure of the presence of the divinities. Proposition 143 All inferior natures fail before the presence of the gods, though that which participates of them may be adapted to participation. Everything foreign indeed from divine light becomes far removed from it, but all things are illuminated at once by the gods. For divine natures are always more comprehensive and more powerful than the things which proceed from them, but the inaptitude of the participants becomes the cause of the privation of divine illumination, for this inaptitude obscures it by its own imbecility. And, this being obscured, something else appears to receive dominion, not according to its own power, but according to the imbecility of the participant, which seems to rise against the divine form of the illumination. Proposition 144 All beings and all the distributions of beings extend as far in their progressions as the orders of the gods. For the gods produce beings in conjunction with themselves, nor is anything able to subsist and to receive measure and order external to the gods or beyond their influence. For all things are perfected through their power and are arranged and measured by the gods. Prior therefore to the last genera in beings, the gods pre-exist, who also adorn these genera, and impart to them life, formation and perfection, and convert them to the good. In a similar manner also, the gods are prior to the middle and first genera of beings, and all things are bound and rooted in the gods, and through this cause are preserved. But when anything apostatizes from and becomes destitute of the gods, it entirely departs into non-entity and vanishes, in consequence of being perfectly deprived of those natures by which it was contained. Proposition 145 The peculiarity of every divine order pervades through all secondary natures, and imparts itself to all the subordinate genera of beings. For if beings proceed as far as the orders of the gods extend in every genus of beings, there is a supernally illuminated peculiarity of the divine powers. For everything receives from its proximate appropriate cause the peculiarity according to which that cause is allotted its subsistence. I see, for instance, if there is a certain cathartic or purifying deity, there is also a purification in souls, in animals, in plants, and in stones, and in a similar manner if there is a guardian, a convertive, a perfective, and a vivific power. And a stone indeed participates of the divine cathartic power in a corporeal manner only, but a plant participates it still more clearly according to life. An animal possesses this form according to impulse, the rational soul rationally, intellect intellectually, and the gods superessentially and uniquely. The whole series also has the same power from one divine cause, and there is the same mode of reasoning with respect to the peculiarities of the other divine powers. For all things are suspended from the gods, and different natures are illuminated by different gods. Every divine series extending as far as to the last of things, and some things indeed are suspended from the gods immediately, but others through a greater or less number of media. But all things are full of gods, and whatever anything naturally possesses it derives from the gods. Proposition 146 The ends of all the divine progressions are assimilated to their principles, preserving a circle without a beginning and without an end, through conversion to their principles. For if everything that has proceeded is converted to the proper principle from which it proceeded, much more will total orders having proceeded from their summit be again converted to it. But the conversion of the end to the beginning renders the whole order one, definite, and converging to itself, and exhibiting, through the convergency that which has the form of the one in the multitude. Proposition 147 The summits of all the divine orders are assimilated to the ends of the natures, approximately situated above them. Proposition 148 For if it is necessary that there should be an uninterrupted connection of the divine progression, and that each order should be bound together by appropriate media, it is necessary that the summits of secondary should be conjoined with the terminations of first orders. But this contact is through similitude. Hence, there will be a similitude of the principles of an inferior to the ends of a proximately superior order. Proposition 148 Every divine order is united to itself in a threefold manner, from the summit which is in it, from its middle, and from its end. For the summit, possessing a power which is most single, transmits union to all the series, and unites the whole of it supernally abiding in itself. But the middle, extending to both the extremes, binds together the whole order about itself, transmitting indeed the gifts of primary divine natures, but extending the powers of such as are last, and inserting communion in all of them, and a conjunction with each other. For thus the whole order becomes one from natures that replenish and those that are filled, converging to the middle as to a certain center, and the end again returning to the beginning and recalling the proceeding powers in parts similitude and convergency to the whole order. And thus the whole order is one through the unific power of primary natures, through the connection existing in the middle, and through the conversion of the end to the principle of the progressions. Proposition 149 Every multitude of the divine unities is bounded according to number. For if this multitude is most near to the one, it will not be infinite. For the infinite is not cognizant with, but foreign from the one. Indeed, if multitude is of itself, or in its own nature separated from the one, it is evident that infinite multitude is perfectly destitute of it. Hence it is powerless and inefficacious. The multitude of the gods therefore is not infinite. Hence it has the form of the one and is finite, and is more finite than every other multitude. For it is nearer to the one than all other multitude. If, therefore, the principle of things was multitude, it would be necessary that what is nearer to the principle should be a greater multitude than what is more remote from it. For that which is nearer to anything is more similar to it. Since, however, that which is first is the one, the multitude which is conjoined with it is a less multitude than that which is more remote from it. But the infinite is not a less, but is the greatest possible multitude. Proposition 150 Everything which proceeds in the divine orders is not naturally adapted to receive all the powers of its producing cause. Nor, in short, are secondary natures able to receive all the powers of the natures prior to themselves. But the latter have certain powers exempt from things in an inferior order, and incomprehensible by the beings posterior to themselves. For if the peculiarities of the gods differ from each other, those of the subordinate pre-exist in the superior divinities, but those of the superior, being more total, are not in the subordinate. But more excellent natures impart indeed some things to their progeny, but antecedently assume others in themselves in an exempt manner. For it has been demonstrated that those gods who are nearer to the one are more total, and those more remote from it more partial. But if the more total have powers comprehensive of the more partial, those that have a secondary and more partial order will not comprehend the power of the more total gods. In the superior, therefore, there is something incomprehensible and uncircumscribed by the inferior orders. For each of the divine orders is truly infinite. Nor is that which is infinite, as has been demonstrated, infinite to itself, nor much less to things above itself, but to all the natures posterior to itself. But infinite in these last is in capacity. The infinite, however, is incomprehensible by those natures to which it is infinite. Subordinate natures, therefore, do not participate of all the powers which more excellent natures antecedently comprehend in themselves. For the latter are incomprehensible by the former. Hence, things of a secondary nature, from their more partial subsistence, will neither possess all the powers of more excellent beings, nor will they possess the powers which they do contain after the same manner as superior natures. On account of that infinity through which the latter transcend the former. Proposition 151 Everything paternal in the gods is of a primary nature, and is pre-established in the rank of the good, according to all the divine orders. For it produces the parxies of secondary natures and total powers and essences, according to one ineffable transcendency. Hence also, it is denominated paternal in consequence of exhibiting the united and bona-form power of the one, and the cause which gives subsistence to secondary natures. And, according to each order of the gods, the paternal genus ranks as the leader, producing all things from itself, and adorning them as being arranged analogous to the good. And of divine fathers, some are more total, but others are more partial, just as the orders themselves of the gods differ by the more total and the more partial, according to the reason of cause. As many therefore, as are the progressions of the gods, so many also are the differences of fathers. For, if there is that which is analogous to the good in every order, it is necessary that there should be the paternal in all the orders, and that each order should proceed from the paternal union. Proposition 152 Every thing which is generative in the gods proceeds according to the infinity of divine power, multiplying itself, proceeding through all things, and transcendently exhibiting the never-failing in the progressions of secondary natures. For, to multiply things which proceed, and to produce things into progeny, from the occult comprehension in causes, of what else is it the prerogative, then of the infinite power of the gods, through which all divine natures are filled with prolific good. For, everything which is full produces other things from itself according to a superplenary power. The domination of power therefore is the peculiarity of generative deity, which multiplies the powers of the things generated, and renders them prolific, and excites them to generate, and gives subsistence to other things. For, if everything imparts the appropriate peculiarity which it possesses, primarily to other things, everything which is prolific will impart progression, and will adumbrate the infinity which is the primary leader of holes, from which every generative power proceeds, and which in an exempt manner pours forth the ever-flowing progressions of divine natures. Proposition 153. Everything which is perfect in the gods is the cause of divine perfection. For, as the hypostases of beings are of one kind, but those of superessential natures of another, so likewise with respect to perfections, those of the gods themselves, according to apoxies, are different from those of beings which are secondary and posterior to them, and the former indeed are self-perfect and primary, because the good subsists primarily in them, but the latter possess perfection according to participation. Hence, the perfection of the gods is one thing, and that of deified natures is another. The perfection, however, which is primarily in the gods, is not only the cause of perfection to deified natures, but also to the gods themselves. For, if everything, so far as it is perfect, is converted to its proper principle, that which is the cause of all divine conversion is the perfective genus of the gods. Proposition 154. Everything, which is of a guardian nature in the gods, preserves everything in its proper order, and is uniformly exempt from secondary, and established in primary natures. For, if a guard immutably preserves the measure of the order of everything, and connectively contains all the natures that are guarded in their appropriate perfection, it will impart to all things a transcendency exempt from subordinate beings, and will firmly establish each thing unmingled, in itself existing as the cause of undefiled purity to the natures that are guarded, and fixing them in superior beings. For everything is perfect which adheres to primary natures, but is in itself alone, and is expanded above things subordinate. Proposition 155. Everything vivific in the gods is a generative cause, but every generative cause is not vivific. For, a generative is more total than a vivific cause, and is nearer to the principle of all things, for generation manifests a cause which produces beings into multitude. But vivification represents to us the deity who is the supplier of all life. If, therefore, the former multiplies the hypostases of beings, but the latter gives subsistence to the progressions of life. If this be the case as being is to life, so is the generative order to the vivific series. The former, therefore, will be more total, and the cause of a greater number of effects, and will on this account be nearer to the principle of all things. Proposition 156. Every cause of purity is comprehended in the guardian order, but, on the contrary, not everything of a guardian order is the same with the purifying genus. For, purity imparts to all the gods the unmingled with things inferior, and the undefiled in the providence of secondary natures. But a guardian power also affects this, and contains all things in itself, and firmly inserts them in superior natures. The guardian, therefore, is more total than the purifying genus. For, in short, the peculiarity of the guardian power is to preserve the order of everything the same with reference to itself, and to the natures prior and posterior to itself. But the peculiarity of purity is to keep more excellent natures exempt from such as are subordinate. These powers, however, primarily subsist in the gods. For it is necessary that there should be one cause preceding that which is in all things, and, in short, it is requisite, that there should be uniform measures of all good, and that these should be comprehended by the gods according to cause. For, there is no good in secondary natures which does not pre-exist in the gods. Hence, in the divinities, purity is likewise a primary good, guardianship, and everything of this kind. Proposition 157 Every paternal cause is the supplier of being to all things, and gives subsistence to the parxies of beings. But everything which is fabricative of the production of form exists prior to composite natures, and precedes their order and division according to number, and is also of the same coordination with the paternal cause in the more partial genera of things. For each of these belongs to the order of bound, since the parxies also, number, and form, have all of them the nature of bound. Hence, in this respect, they are co-ordinate with each other. But the demi- urgic, or fabricative, cause indeed produces fabrication into multitude, and the uniform, or that which has the form of the one supplies the progressions of beings. And the former indeed is the artificer of form, but the latter produces essence. So far, therefore, as these differ from each other, we daddy leeket, form and being. So far also does the paternal differ from the demi- urgic cause, but form is a certain being. Hence, the paternal cause is more total and causal, and is beyond the demi- urgic genus, in the same manner as being is beyond form. Proposition 158 Every elevating cause in the gods differs both from a purifying cause and from the convertive genera. For it is evident that this cause also has necessarily a primary subsistence in the gods, since all the causes of total good pre- exist in the divinities. But it subsists prior to the purifying cause, for the one liberates from things of a subordinate nature, but the other conjoins with more excellent natures. The elevating, however, has a more partial order than the convertive cause. For everything which converts is converted either to itself, or to that which is more excellent than itself. But the energy of the elevating cause is characterized by a conversion to that which is more excellent, as leading that which is converted to a superior and more divine cause. Proposition 159 Every order of the gods consists of the first principles, bound and infinity, but one order is in a greater degree derived from bound, and another from infinity. For every order proceeds from both these, because the communications of first causes pervade through all secondary natures. But in some things bound predominates in the mixture of bound and infinity, and in others infinity. And thus the genus which has the form of bound has its completion, in which the prerogatives of bound have dominion. This too is the case with the genus which has the form of the infinite, and in which the properties of infinity predominate. And of proposition 159 Propositions 160 to 179 of The Elements of Theology by Proclus translated by Thomas Taylor. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain, recording by Jeffrey Edwards. Proposition 160 Concerning Intellect Every divine intellect is uniform, or has the form of the one and is perfect, and the first intellect subsists from itself and produces other intellects. For if it is a god it is filled with divine unities and is uniform, but if this be the case it is also perfect, being full of divine goodness. And if this be admitted it is likewise primarily intellect as being united to the gods. But being primarily intellect it also gives an hypothesis to other intellects, for all secondary natures obtain their parxies from such as have a primary subsistence. Proposition 161 Everything which is truly being and is suspended from the gods is divine and imparticipable. For since that which is truly being is the first of the natures that participate of the divine union, it likewise fills intellect from itself. For intellect is being as replete with being and is therefore a divine intelligible. And so far indeed as it is deified it is divine. But as filling intellect and being participated by it it is intelligible. Intellect also is being on account of that which is primarily being, but that which is primarily being itself is separate from intellect, because intellect is posterior to being. But imparticipables subsist prior to things which are participated. Hence being, which subsists by itself and is imparticipable, is prior to the being which is conjoined with intellect. For it is intelligible, not as co-arranged with intellect, but as perfecting intellect in an exempt manner, because it imparts being to it, and fills it with truly existing essence. Proposition 162 Every multitude of unities which illuminates truly existing being is occult and intelligible. Occult indeed as being conjoined with unity, but intelligible as participated by being. For all the gods are denominated from the things which are suspended from them, because from these it is possible to know their different hypotheses which are of themselves unknown. For everything divine is of itself ineffable and unknown, as being cognizant with the ineffable one. From the difference, however, of the participants it happens that the peculiarities of divine natures become known. The unities, therefore, which illuminate truly existing being are intelligible, because being truly so-called is a divine intelligible and imparticipable subsisting prior to intellect. For this would not be suspended from the first gods, unless they also possessed a primary hypostasis, and a power perfective of other gods, since, as participants are to each other, so likewise are the aparxies of the things that are participated. Proposition 163. Every multitude of unities which is participated by imparticipable intellect is intellectual. For, as intellect is to truly existing being, so are these unities to the intelligible unities. Since, therefore, the latter, which illuminate being are intelligible, hence the former which illuminate a divine and imparticipable intellect are intellectual, yet they are not intellectual in such a way, as if they subsisted in intellect, but as causally existing prior to intellect and generating intellect. Proposition 164. Every multitude of unities which is participated by every imparticipable soul is supermundane. For, because imparticipable soul is primarily above the world, the gods also which are participated by it are supermundane, having the same analogy to the intellectual and intelligible gods, which soul has to intellect and intellect to truly existing being. As, therefore, every soul is suspended from intellect, and intellect is converted to the intelligible, thus also the supermundane are suspended from the intellectual, in the same manner as the intellectual from the intelligible gods. Proposition 165. Every multitude of unities which is participated by a certain sensible body is mundane. For, it illuminates the parts of the world through intellect and soul as media. For, intellect is not present with any mundane body without soul, nor our deity and soul conjoined without a medium, since participations are through similars. Intellect itself also, according to its intelligible summit, participates of unity. These unities, therefore, are mundane as giving completion to the whole world, and as deifying visible bodies. For, each of these is divine, not on account of soul, for soul is not primarily a god, nor on account of intellect, for intellect is not the same with the one. But each of these visible bodies is animated indeed on account of soul and moved of itself. But it possesses a perpetual seamness of subsistence, and is moved in the most excellent order on account of intellect. It is, however, divine on account of union, and if it possesses a providential power, it possesses it through this cause. Proposition 166. Every intellect is either imparticipable or participable, and if participable, it is either participated by super-mandine or by mandine-sons. For, imparticipable intellect, having the first order, is the leader of every multitude of intellects. But, of participable intellects, some illuminate super-mandine and imparticipable-sons, but others the mandine-sons. For, the mundane multitude is not immediately derived from the imparticipable, since progressions are through similars. But that which is separate from the world is more similar to the imparticipable, than that which is divided about it. Nor has a super-mandine multitude alone a subsistence. But there are also mundane intellects, since there is likewise a mundane multitude of gods, and the world itself is animated, and at the same time intellectual. The participation also of the super-mandine gods by mundane souls is through mundane intellects as the media. Proposition 167. Every intellect intellectually perceives itself, but the first intellect indeed perceives itself alone, and in this intellect and the intelligible are one in number. But each of the subsequent intellects perceives itself, and the nature's prior to itself, and the intelligible to each of these is partly that which it is, and partly that from which it is derived. For every intellect either intellectually perceives itself, or that which is above, or that which is posterior to itself. But if indeed it perceives that which is posterior to itself, it will, through intellect, be converted to that which is less excellent than itself. And thus will not know that to which it is converted, is not being in itself, but external to itself. But it will only know the image of this thing as being generated in itself from it. For it knows that which it possesses, and the manner in which it is affected, but not that which it does not possess, and by which it is not affected. But if it perceives that which is above itself, if indeed this is accomplished through the knowledge of itself, it will, at one and the same time both know itself, and that superior nature. But if it knows that alone, it will be ignorant of itself, though it is intellect. In short, by knowing that which is prior to itself, it will know that it is a cause, and will also know the things of which it is the cause. For if it is ignorant of these, it will likewise be ignorant of that which is the cause of them, not knowing that which produces what it produces, by its very being, and what the things are which it does produce. Hence, by knowing the things of which it is the cause, it will also know itself as deriving its subsistence from thence. By knowing therefore that which is prior to itself, it will likewise entirely know itself. Hence, if there is a certain intelligible intellect, this, by knowing itself, will also know the intelligible, being itself intelligible. But each of the intellects posterior to this will intellectually perceive the intelligible, which is in itself, and at the same time that which is prior to itself. Hence, in intellect there is the intelligible, and in the intelligible intellect. But one intellect is the same with the intelligible, and another is the same with the intelligible which is in itself, but is not the same with the intelligible prior to itself. For that which is simply intelligible is one thing, and the intelligible in that which intellectually perceives is another. Proposition 168 Every intellect knows in energy that which it intellectually perceives, and it is not the peculiarity of one part of it to perceive, and of another to perceive that it perceives. For if it is intellect in energy, and perceives itself, as not anything different from the object of intellectual perception, it will know itself and see itself. But seeing that which perceives intellectually, and knowing that which sees, it will know that it is intellect in energy. But knowing this, it will know that it perceives intellectually, and will not alone know the objects of its intellect. Hence it will at once both know the intelligible, and that it intellectually perceives it, and by intellect it will be intellectually perceived by itself. Proposition 169 Every intellect has its essence, power, and energy in eternity. For if it intellectually perceives itself, and intellect is the same with the intelligible, intelligence also is the same with intellect and the intelligible. For being the medium between that which intellectually perceives, and the object of intellectual perception, and these being the same, intelligence also will be the same with both. Moreover, that the essence of intellect is eternal is evident. For the whole of it subsists at once, and this being the case, intelligence also will be eternal, since it is the same with the essence of intellect. But if intellect is eternal, it will not be measured by time, neither according to its being, nor its energy. But these, subsisting with invariable sameness, the power also of intellect will be eternal. Proposition 170 Every intellect at once intellectually perceives all things, but imperticipable intellect indeed simply perceives all things, and each of the intellect's posterior to it perceives all things according to one. For if every intellect establishes its essence in eternity, and together with its essence, its energy, it will intellectually perceive all things at once. For to everything which is not established in eternity, the successive objects of its perception subsists according to parts. For everything which is successive is in time, the successive consisting of prior and posterior. But the whole of it not existing at once. If therefore all intellects similarly perceive all things, they will not differ from each other. For if they perceive all things similarly, they are similarly all things, since they are the very things which they intellectually perceive. But being similarly all things, one intellect will not be imperticipable, and another not. For their essences are the same things as the objects of their intellect, since the intellect of each is the same with the being of each, and each is both intellect and essence. It remains therefore either that each intellect does not similarly perceive all things, but one thing, or more than one, but not all things at once, or that it perceives all things according to one. To assert, however, that each intellect does not perceive all things is to make intellect to be ignorant of some particular being. For if it suffers transition in its energy, and intellectually perceives, not at once, but according to prior and posterior, at the same time possessing an immovable nature, it will be inferior to some, which understands all things in being moved, or in immutable energy. Because intellect, on this hypothesis, will only understand one thing by its permanent energy. It will therefore understand all things according to one. For it either intellectually perceives all things, or one thing, or all things according to the one of intellection. For, in all intellects indeed, there is always an intellectual perception of all things, yet so as to bound all things in one of all. Hence there is something predominant in intellection, and the objects of intellection, since all things are at once understood as one, through the domination of one, which characterizes all things with itself. Proposition 171 Every intellect is an impartable essence. For, if it is without magnitude, incorporeal and immovable, it is impartable. For, everything, which in any way whatever is partable, is either partable on account of magnitude, or multitude, or on account of energies which are born along with the flux of time. But intellect is eternal according to all things, and is beyond bodies, and the multitude which is in it is united. It is therefore impartable. That intellect also is incorporeal is manifest from its conversion to itself. For nobody is converted to itself. But that it is eternal the identity of its energy with its essence evinces. For this has been before demonstrated, and that the multitude in it is united is evident from the continuity of intellectual multitude with the divine unities. For these are the first multitude, but intellects are next to these. Hence, though every intellect is a multitude, yet it is an united multitude. For, prior to that which is divided, that which is collected into profound union, and is nearer to the one subsists. Proposition 172 Every intellect is proximately the producing cause of beings, perpetual, and immutable according to essence. For, everything which is produced by an immovable cause is immutable according to essence. But, immovable intellect, being all things eternally, and abiding in eternity, produces by its very being that which it produces. If, however, it always is, and is invariably the same, it always produces and after the same manner. Hence, it is not the cause of things which sometimes have existence, and at other times not, but it is the cause of things which always exist. Proposition 173 Every intellect is intellectually both the things which are prior and posterior to itself. For, it is those things which are posterior to itself according to cause, but those things which are prior to itself according to participation. Yet, it is still intellect and is allotted an intellectual essence. Hence, it defines all things according to its essence, both such as are according to cause, and such as are according to participation. For, everything participates of more excellent beings, in such a way as it is naturally adapted to participate, and not according to their subsistence. For otherwise, they would be similarly participated by all things. Participations, therefore, are according to the peculiarity and power of the participants. Hence, in intellect, the natures prior to it subsist intellectually, but intellect is likewise intellectually the things posterior to itself. For, it does not consist of its effects, nor does it contain these, but the causes of these in itself. But intellect is by its very being the cause of all things, and the very being of it is intellectual. Hence, it contains intellectually the causes of all things, so that every intellect possesses all things intellectually, both such as are prior and such as are posterior to it. As, therefore, every intellect contains intelligibles intellectually, so likewise it contains sensibles intellectually. Proposition 174 Every intellect gives subsistence to things posterior to itself by intellect, and its fabrication consists in intellect, and its intellect or intelligence in fabrication. For, if intelligible and intellect are the same, the essence also of every intellect will be the same with the intellect in itself. But it produces that which it produces by essence, and produces according to the very being which it is. By intellect, therefore, it will produce the things which are produced. For, in intellect, being and intellect are both of them one. For, intellect is the same with every being which it contains. If, therefore, it makes by its very being, but its very being is intellect, it makes by intellect. Intelligence also, which is in energy, consists in intellect, but this is the same with the essence of intellect, and the essence of intellect consists in producing. For, that which produces immovably always possesses its very being in producing. The intelligence of intellect, therefore, consists in fabrication or production. Proposition 175 Every intellect is primarily participated by those natures which are intellectual, both according to essence and according to energy. For, it is necessary that it should either be participated by these, or by other natures, which possess indeed an intellectual essence, but do not always energize intellectually. It is, however, impossible that it should be participated by the latter of these, for the energy of intellect is immovable. And, hence, the natures by which it is participated always participate of intellectual energy, which always causes the participants of it to be intellectual. For, that which possesses its energy in a certain part of time is unadapted to be conjoined with an eternal energy. But that which has perfection according to the whole of time is the medium between every eternal energy, and that which is perfect in a certain time, as well in the mutations of energy as in essences. For, progressions are never affected without a medium, but through kindred and similar natures, both according to hypotheses and the perfections of energies. After a similar manner, therefore, every intellect is primarily participated by those beings that are able to perceive intellectually, according to the whole of time, and who always energize intellectually, though their intellect is in time, and is not eternally in energy. Corollary. From this, therefore, it is evident that it is impossible for the soul, which sometimes perceives intellectually, and sometimes does not, to participate approximately of intellect. Proposition 176. All intellectual forms are in each other, and each is at the same time separate and distinct from the rest. For, if every intellect is impartable, and the multitude which is in it is united through intellectual impartability, all things in it will be in one, impartables will be united to each other, and all intellectual forms will pervade through all. But if all intellectual forms subsist immaterially and incorporeally, they are unconfused with each other and separate, and each preserving its own purity remains that which it is. The peculiar participation, however, of each participating in a separate manner manifests the unconfused nature of intellectual forms. For, unless the forms which are participated were distinguished separate from each other, the participants of each of them would not participate in a separate manner, but in the subordinate natures, he asked, in the participants there would be, in a much greater degree, an indistinct confusion, these being according to their order of an inferior condition. For, whence, would there be a separation of these, if the natures which give subsistence to, and perfect them were without distinction, and were confused together? But again, the impartable hypostasis, and uniform essence of that which contains forms evinces their united nature, for things which have their aparxes in the impartable, and the uniform, are impartably in the same thing. For, how can you divide the impartable and the one? Hence they have a simultaneous subsistence, and are in each other, each wholly pervading through the whole of each in a manner unaccompanied with interval. For that which comprehends them is not extended with interval, nor is one of them in this thing, but another elsewhere, as in that, which has interval. But everything is at once in the impartable and in one, so that all intellectual forms are in each other, and are in each other unitedly, and at the same time each is distinctly apart from each. Corollary. But if someone, in addition to these demonstrations, should require also examples, let him direct his attention to the theorems which exist in one soul. For all these are in the same essence, which is truly without magnitude, and are united to each other. For that, which is without magnitude, does not locally contain the things which are in it. But the natures which it contains are united and separated impartably and without interval. For the soul genuinely produces all things, and each apart from each, attracting nothing from the rest, which, unless they were always separated according to habit, would not be separated by the energy of the soul. Proposition 177. Every intellect, being a plenitude of forms, one indeed is comprehensive of more total, but another of more partial forms, and the superior intellects contain in a more total manner such things as those posterior to them contain more partially. But the inferior intellects contain more partially such things as those that are prior to them contain more totally. For the superior intellects employ greater powers, having more the form of the one than secondary intellects. But the inferior intellects, being more multiplied, diminish the powers which they contain. For things that are more allied to the one, being contracted in quantity surpass the natures that are posterior to them. And, on the contrary, things more remote from the one, as their increasing quantity are inferior to the natures that are nearer to the one. Hence, the superior intellects, being established according to a greater power, but being less in multitude, produce a greater number of effects according to power through fewer things according to the quantity of forms. But the intellects posterior to them produce fewer effects through a greater number of things according to a defect of power. If, therefore, the former produce a greater number of effects through fewer things, the forms in them are more total, and if the latter produce fewer effects through a greater number of things, the forms in them are more partial. Corollary Hence it happens that the natures which are generated from superior intellects according to one form are produced in a divided manner from secondary intellects according to many ideas, and again those natures which are produced by inferior intellects through many and distinct forms are produced by superior intellects through fewer but more total forms. And, that indeed which is a whole and common asseeds supernally to all its participants, but that which is divided and peculiar asseeds from secondary intellects. Hence secondary intellects by the more partial separation of peculiarities accurately and subtly distinguish the formations of primary intellects. Proposition 178 Every intellectual form gives subsistence to eternal natures. For, if every intellectual form is eternal and immovable, it is essentially the cause of immutable and eternal hypotheses, but not of such as are generated and corrupted, so that everything which subsists according to an intellectual form is an eternal intellectual nature. For, if all forms produce things posterior to themselves by their very being, but their essence possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, the things produced by them will also be invariably the same, and will be eternal. Hence neither the genera which subsists from a formal cause according to a certain time, nor corruptible natures, so far as they are corruptible, have a pre-existent intellectual form. For they would be incorruptible and unbegotten if they derived their hypothesis from intellectual forms. Proposition 179 Every intellectual number is bounded. For, if there is another multitude posterior to this, essentially inferior to it, and thus more remote from the one, but the intellectual number is nearer to the one, and if that which is nearer to the one is less according to quantity, but that which is more remote from it is more according to quantity. If this be the case, the intellectual number also will be less than every multitude posterior to it. Hence, it is not infinite. The multitude of intellects, therefore, is bounded. For that which is less, then a certain thing is not infinite, because the infinite