 But we're going to go ahead and dive right in. I'm going to try to keep the biographies to a minimum so we can get into the substance. So I'll just introduce people quickly. To my left is Stephen Goldstein. He's been the Sophia Smith Professor of Government at Smith College since 1998. His current research focuses on the relations between mainland China and Taiwan, as well as the evolution of US-Taiwan relations. He has served as Director of the Taiwan Studies Workshop at Harvard University and has been a visiting faculty member at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Columbia University. And he has written, co-authored, or edited nine books, as well as many scholarly articles and book reviews, and received his PhD from Columbia University. To my immediate right is David Huang, who is an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of European and American Studies of Academic Acinica in Taiwan. His focus is on comparative politics, election studies, and the European Union. Mr. Huang served as Secretary General at the Taiwanese Political Science Association from 2000 to 2003. And from 2004 to 2005, he served as the Vice Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council in Taiwan. And he has also served as a Deputy Representative at Tech Row here in the United States. And to his right is Li Peng, the Deputy Director and Professor of Political Science at Shaman University's Taiwan Research Institute, the Deputy Director of Shaman University's Taiwan Research Center, and an adjunct research fellow at the Research Center for Cross-Strait Relations under the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. He's currently a Fulbright Visiting Fellow at the University of Maryland, College Park. And his research focuses on Taiwan politics and cross-strait relations. Just before we kick off the discussion, I just would like to, since it came up in our last panel, to note for our Chinese friends studying international relations that Professor Mirsheimer also predicts the inevitability of a nuclear exchange between the United States and China. So they might want to think about that one. Stephen, why don't you kick off? Well, my charge is to talk about the TRA in the 21st century. And I guess I would begin by saying that the 21st century ends 85 years from now. So I think I have to scale back what I'm going to do or what I'm going to hope to do. What I thought might be a fun exercise is if I tried to imagine what the next anniversary of the passage of the TRA would look like. That is the kinds of things that we'll talk about the next time we have to observe the anniversary of the TRA in 2019. I'm not going to predict the future. I can predict the future, obviously. But what I want to do is try to raise some questions about what some of the trends will be in Asia that will touch on the application of the TRA and will certainly challenge American policy in the area. So if we look five years hence, I think there are two areas where there will probably be very few challenges and very little change in the application of the TRA. One of those areas is obviously the representation area via AIT. That has developed very creatively and very constructively since the passage of the TRA. And the representation function has really been firmly established. And that is a fact that's symbolized by the new embassy or the new AIT office which is being built in Taipei. There will be issues probably. There will be issues of staffing. There will be issues of particularly visits by Taiwan officials to the United States. I'm sure there'll be pressure for some changes in both those regards, visits to both sides. I think also the sections of the TRA regarding Taiwan's status in American law will probably not change very much and that the trajectory will remain what it's been again for the past 35 years. There's a very rich, if you read law journals, very boring discussions of the various aspects of Taiwan's status in American courts. Obviously, the two areas where there will be challenged will be in the area of security and also in the area of congressional legislative relations. Now, despite the ambiguous nature of the TRA and despite the fact that my friend Richard Bush argues that there's generally less than meets the eye in the TRA, it has become a well-established, well-anchored part of both American domestic politics and American foreign policy. It's cited along with the three communiques and now recently the six assurances as part of American policy. Congress, there's no question, takes the TRA very seriously and they consider it to be a very well-established and firmly founded instrument of congressional prerogative in foreign policy. So the brief answer is that the security sections will not go away. The focus will continue to be on the security sections and then the question becomes where will the challenges come or where will the possible applications of the TRA have to be considered. I think that obviously the one that stands out is the recent, depending on the term that you use, the recent more assertive or more provocative nature of Beijing's foreign policy in Asia. Clearly the TRA and particularly that part of the TRA, which talks about the maintenance of an American presence in Asia, particularly that part of the TRA, one would think, will become an increasingly broad or an increasingly important area of discussion in regard to the TRA. And that will probably touch on, which I'll talk about a little bit more in a minute, on the question of the rebalancing and on the question of American interests in the Western Pacific area. Secondly, I think one would expect that the development of mainland military capabilities will also touch on the question of arms sales. If the present trends continue, I think there are going to have to be increasingly more serious considerations of the nature but also the efficacy of arms sales to Taiwan and about the possibility of American assistance in the defense of Taiwan, given the growing anti-access capabilities of China. And this is going to bring not only American-Taiwan security cooperation to the forefront, which is a neurologic issue, obviously, as far as the mainland is concerned, but it will also, again, bring to the forefront the issue of rebalancing to Asia and the place of Taiwan, which even the discussion of which might also be neurologic as far as the mainland is concerned. Turning to economic achievements, again, looking five years hence, when we talk about the TRA and we talked about it this morning, the issue of how the United States plays a major role in the economy of Taiwan and how Taiwan plays a major role in the economy of the mainland. I think bilateral economic relationships, again, in the next five years will become much less important. The emphasis now, or the major issue now, is on multilateral, is on the ability of Taiwan to become a part of not only the growing production chains in Asia, they're already a part of those, but also play a part of the multinational, regional, economic forms that are being created in Asia. And, of course, the question of TPP, and that will touch on the United States and American policy. So I think we're going to be, and I think Taiwan is going to be thinking much more in terms of multinational, multilateral kinds of economic relations, and I think we will as well. Now, these are secondary questions that I've just raised, I think, compared to the issue of the temperature in the Taiwan Straits and where things might look five years from now. If you look at the uses that the TRA has been put to, it's been implicitly, never explicitly, but it's been implicitly used in the 1996 confrontation in the Taiwan Straits to try to restrain what was perceived as dangerous actions by the mainland. But I think it was also implicitly used during the administration of Chen Shui-bin to restrain him as well. So the TRA can restrain one side or the other. The TRA can also, if the two sides get to talking about serious issues, of course, the TRA and arm sales can be used to promote some kind of reconciliation between the two sides. That is, I'm not talking about consultation. I'm talking about a situation where negotiations between the two sides begin to move things into a less confrontational posture. It's determined that the danger of cross-strait conflict has been reduced, that danger to Taiwan has been reduced, and the United States can play an indirect role by modulating arm sales in relation to those changes. What might change the status quo, though, in a more dangerous direction rather than talking about peace are the domestic politics on Taiwan. I think that after a very encouraging start with the early years of the MA administration, MA's mainland policy has not resulted, as some people here in Washington feared, that Taiwan would somehow inadvertently drift into the grasp of Taiwan, of the mainland. It's actually developed in somewhat of an opposite direction. That is, in the last two or three years, MA's mainland policy has hit some very rough domestic political waters. Things at the moment are at a juncture where it is not clear to me, at least, how much further he'll be able to go. If you add to that the fact that there are going to be elections in the fall, and then there are going to be elections in 2016, and the mainland will be watching those elections very closely, and that I think it's very likely that at least before the elections this fall, Taiwan will be able to do nothing on the services pact. It begins to strain, and if the DPP begins to show strength, it begins to strain the patience of the mainland. It begins to look like peaceful separation, clipping fungi at it. In fact, if the DPP, as the campaign develops, and as the competition between the KMT and the DPP grows, the mainland is going to be faced with what's really basically a Hobson's choice. They can either back an uncertain KMT that is opposed by 40% of the population, assuming they do well, or it can back a DPP or deal with the DPP, but the only choice there will be somehow to accept a compromise with the DPP that at the moment the mainland isn't willing to accept it. So there is no good candidate for the mainland as the Taiwan political situation unwinds in the next two years. So those are some of the trends that I would look at. And then the final question becomes what's the American response going to be? And there I think domestic politics are key again. We heard this morning that the TRA was the result of a bi-ideological, if there's any such word, a bi-ideological and bipartisan agreement or effort in the Congress to somehow balance the new and dramatic relationship with China, with the old and what was considered to be very important relationship with Taiwan. And I think balance is the operative word there. It was to be a balancing effort. I think what's happened really since the late 1980s, clearly through the Clinton administration, has been the increasing politicization of the TRA. The TRA has evolved into not only an expression of the prerogative of Congress in the area of foreign policy, but also become the rallying point for anti-Chinese supporters of Taiwan from both parties. And what was intended to balance the United States cross-strait policy has in the legislative branch become an instrument of those who would undermine that balance. Now, it's not fair because Randy's not here and Randy was my co-author of a piece on the TRA, but when he says that Taiwan relations are a subset of relations with the mainland, that's not quite right. The two relationships are interconnected and policy in one area always has to be considered in regards to policy in the other area. But I think what he expresses is a sense, perhaps, of some in Washington that Taiwan is in a secondary position and that somehow you have to pass congressional resolutions that clearly are not constructive, that clearly are unbalanced, and that further polarizes the question within the United States government. So what we don't need, if I'm right, and I rarely am, if the next five years are going to be difficult years with serious challenges, what we don't need is a divided government. Now, this has always been, you know, this has always been the case with the TRA, but the division between the executive and the legislature, I think, is fundamentally dysfunctional and it sends the wrong signals. It sends the wrong signals both to the mainland, but most of all, since we're talking about Taiwan today, it sends the wrong signals to Taiwan. Because Taiwan has a very selective vision when it looks at what's being said in Washington, and I say that as someone who met with Chun Shui, four times or five times in the early part of the century, they see and hear what they want to hear or at least they did during that period. And Congress gives them a lot of things to see and hear, even more things than John Mirsheimer gives them to see and hear and worry about. So I would just end. I will go back to my liberal northeast institution and leave Washington, but I would end with sort of a need to get the act together on Taiwan and try to pursue what the TRA intended to do, and that is create a balanced, rather than an unbalanced, cross-strait policy. Thanks. Thank you, Steve. That's good. David, please. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to first express my gratitude to Dr. Bush and Dr. Von Glasser to invite me to participate in this very important event and share some of my ideas about the TRA. I was asked specifically to talk about the implementation of the TRA in the future. Let me recapitulate what the panelists said in the morning and also Ambassador Rae Berhart just said. I think the essence of the TRA expects that the future of Taiwan will be determined by the peaceful means. And the TRA specifies that it is a policy to consider any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan's future a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of great concern of the United States. And TIA also authorizes the US government to provide Taiwan with arms of defense characters. And TIA establish a congressional role in determining security assistance necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capabilities. And TIA also insists to maintain the capacity of the United States to use any result of the force or other form of coercion in dangerous security or social or economic system of Taiwan's people. And TIA set up the ART to carry out the daily matters of the relationship between the people of the US and Taiwan, which according to Ambassador Rae Berhart just said that it set up example for the foreign country to set up the representative office in Taiwan to function that way. For the US domestic application, the TIA requires that Taiwan continue to be treated as a US law as a state or as if it is a state, will be a state. It further provides the continual applications of treaties and international agreements to which the US and ROC were parties or any US law that covered Taiwan. The TIA, the law as such does not prejudice against the status of Taiwan's memberships in international organizations. And finally, the TIA reaffirms that the preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all of the Taiwan's people are US top objectives. The TIA, as far as I know, I consult some legal scholar at the TIA and join unique status as a federal status. In contrast, the three communiques with China from the US views are not treaties or executive agreements, hence are not equal in status or dignity of the US domestic laws. Although the three communiques and TIA together with the six assurances are the core elements of US-China policies, the US president is not free to disregard the TIA, whereas he would be free to terminate the communiques if he see fit, even if they were binding the treaties. The US, one China policy, US normalizations of the relations with China is premised on the understanding of China's commitment to the peaceful means resolve the dispute between China and Taiwan. Based on that understanding, the US acknowledged China's sovereign positions over Taiwan but not recognized it. Because from the US perspective, Taiwan's sovereign status is yet to be determined and the US does not accept the PRC claim that Taiwan belongs to the PRC at this moment. Now, to China and Taiwan, US policy is a process oriented which does not prejudice either on unification or independence. Cross-strait disputes must be resolved peacefully by peoples across Taiwan Strait. The US opposed the unilateral change of the status quo by either side of Taiwan Strait, especially US opposed the unilateral change by use of force or non-peaceful means which is deemed as a great threat to the peace of the Western Pacific by the TIA. In other words, US, one China policy is open-ended policies relying on uncourse consents of the people in both China and Taiwan. Now, defining the status quo through the PRC's constitution, now I want to talk about China's anti-successional role which states that Taiwan and mainland are an inevitable part of China. The status quo is such that, legally speaking, Taiwan and mainland have never been separated, only that they have not yet been re-unified. So, any attempts defined by the Beijing's to separate China and Taiwan will invoke the legitimacy of China to use the non-peaceful means against Taiwan. So, China's policy to Taiwan enshrined in the anti-successional role is close-ended and inclined to use the non-peaceful means if Beijing sees it fit. So, comparing China's anti-successional role and the US-Taiwan Relations Act, the latter one fulfilled the democratic sentiments. When the future of Taiwan is open-ended and subject to Taiwan's people's consent. Now, being a democracy, what about the Taiwan policy toward China? Being a democracy, Taiwan's policy toward China is always try to preserve all the options open for Taiwanese people to decide when times come. For instance, we have an implication guideline. The time is that when China becomes a genuine democracy. Now, Taiwan governments, whoever empowered, does want to have a good relations with China. And in fact, Taiwan cannot afford not to have a good relations with China. But a good relations with China cannot come at the expense of Taiwan's democracy, a democratic way of life which respect people's right to choose among multiple options. Which is against Taiwan independence. But it does specify clearly that it respect the articulations where Taiwan independence belong to the freedom of speech. And Ma declared that the potential peace agreements between China and Taiwan will be subject to a referendum of Taiwanese people. So I think the Ma's government also more or less fulfill this kind of democratic sentiments. Here, the DPP does not differ from Ma's government too much. The DPP always insists that any change should be agreed by Taiwan's people through referendums. And unlike Ma who proclaimed no unifications. A DPP government probably would have to concede unifications if the majority of people of Taiwan agreed through the referendums. Both DPP and KMT want Taiwan to be better represented in international organizations and participate meaningfully in international affairs. Both parties want to integrate Taiwan into regional economic structures. The difference between KMT and DPP is how to bring Taiwan into the regional integration structures. For KMT, China is the key to unlock Taiwan's economy to regional integrations because China can block all Taiwan's attempts. For DPP, regional integration, the multiple liberalizations go first. Then the bilateral agreements with China come second. Now, given there already is 21 agreements exist between Taiwan and China, it would be irrational for any DPP government or any future DPP government to scrap them. But I think a review and revisions of their implementations are very likely. In fact, Ma's governments also do the same things through their self and our artists on a regular basis to review the implementation of the cross-strait agreements. Both KMT and DPP want to strengthen the national defense. But I think both suffer from the budget constraints and also public inclinations toward butters rather than guns. Transfer of the defense article I think there are some opportunity and challenge of implementing the TIA in the coming 5 years or 10 years. I think first, we have to think about transfer the defense article and service prescribed in the TIA. First, we need to upgrade the qualities of the defense articles. Secondly, build up the credible deterrence capacities to avoid Jomi Sharma's way to say goodbye to Taiwan. Secondly, consolidation of Taiwan democracy. As I said that the TIA said it clearly, the preservation of the and promoting the human rights is a US objective. So I think consolidation of Taiwan democracy is very important for the TIA to focus on in the coming features. Especially in support of Taiwan's institutional reforms to encourage more transparency, more meaningful participation of the people. And try to defend the democracy not a State Christian. Defend the legitimacy, not legalities. Defend a strong democracy, not thin electoral democracies. Defend the rule of law, not rule by laws. I think these are all very, very important issues that maybe in the future the TIA can help Taiwan to consolidate the institutions. And also I think it's very important most of people in Taiwan, I think the great majority of Taiwanese people has an aspiration to become meaningful participate in international organizations and NGOs. And we really appreciate that US government reiterates several times that the US supports Taiwan's participation in even recently the UN community. So I think we are really grateful that US make that kind of articulations and support in the public. And I think further things that need to be done by Taiwan. And of course from Beijing's perspective that any kind of participation of Taiwan in international organizations must have prior consultations between Beijing and Taiwan. That probably would be a very, very difficult for Taiwanese government to do so. Maybe some kind of exchange of opinion may be possible. But it's a prior consultation or prior agreement with Beijing to allow Taiwan to participate in international organizations. That would not be a feasible option for Taiwan. I think additional issues that in the coming years is that assist Taiwan accession to the regional integration schemes. Taiwan's government has reiterated several times that Taiwan would like to participate in the DPP RCEP and FTAAP in the APEC schemes. Taiwan of course should do it in a very transparent way. I think recent student movements in Taiwan according to master Ray Berhard said it's more or less against China. But I would say that it's more against the black box in a transparent way of doing the DPP. It's not about whether Taiwan would like to have a further trade liberalization. I think Taiwan, most of people in Taiwan would probably for support a trade liberalization. But the real problem is how do you do it in the proper way? The more transparency is very important. Even this is a trend where I learned from the European countries even in the EU. They started two or three years of consultation of the sectors after sectors that really get started in negotiation. Whereas this service agreement that the students is against the black box where the problem here is that one of the L.Y. members in the committees proclaimed that the law is already being passed within 30 seconds. So I think in this way the government disregard the democratic procedures that would really hurt the Taiwan democracies. So I think for Taiwan to have some of the very good strategies to integrate Taiwan into the regional economic schemes I would say that the best way right now under the current situations is to have some unilateral and multilateral liberalizations combined these two approaches is more cost effectively. Now signed bilateral agreements of course is more or less for psychological consultation. Most economists would not agree to have more and more bilateral free trade agreements because it will create spaghetti balls effect that we complicate the trade. Finally I think we have to consider in the coming future as Taiwan and China integrate each other on economic, social terms so extensively would it be possible for China at some point to use economic coercions rather than foreign origins against Taiwan? That could be the possibilities. You know you can witness the problem is that some southern part of the cities try to host the Uyghurs leaders and that China immediately stop the tourist to the southern part of the cities in Taiwan. So that kind of a thing that could happen. You cannot assume that economic integration will not have any cost of the future strategic considerations and that's the best way for Taiwan as mask government trying to do is try to diversify our economic activities from China to elsewhere and I think this is critical important and also DPP government probably would do the same things. For the US I think it's very difficult to managing the operating signals of the US rebalance strategy. I think Professor Gosling just said that there's the difficulty in the Congress and the executive branch of the way that they present the TIA and passing the TIA resolution may be looking good to Taiwan but then that send out some different signals to other signal receivers perhaps in Beijing's. So that would be a very very daunting task for the US to managing the balancing the signals. It's not that easy to have always have sent consistent signals to signal receivers and I would say that adhering to the original spirit of the TIA is the best way to do so and because it will reassure the US Asia partners. Finally, I think in response to the Joe Mishomer's argument I don't say goodbye to Taiwan. I think Taiwan would never say goodbye to the US because you have a TIA, it's your law. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon everybody. It's my great pleasure to be here to attend such a conference about the TIA and cross-re relations and many asked me two months ago whether I'm interested in participating in such a conference. I hesitated for a while because she told me I was the only scholar from mainland China and even I was a scholar at the University of Maryland and she told me I will face a lot of pressure I told her, huge pressure at this meeting maybe and she had already predicted that I will say maybe something different with some other scholars so I've been under this pressure for almost two months so maybe today is a good opportunity for me to relieve this pressure I'm going to start with mainland China's position over TIA as all of us know that China opposes TIA from the very beginning so every time when U.S. officials reiterate that the United States will stick to one China policy three U.S.-China Communicates and the Taiwan Relations Act so the spokesperson and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China will just mention the first part to mention TIA China regarded TIA as the violation of U.S.-China three Communicates and the interference of China's internal affairs so in the future we cannot see any possibility that China will say yes to TIA also we cannot see any possibility that the United States will revise or abolish TIA or give up one China policy or something like that so that's the basic reality we have to when we are trying to analyze the future development of cross-strait relations and U.S.-China and Taiwan relations so when talking about TIA U.S. scholars always mention I think it's two keywords some scholars just mentioned in the morning a lot of times the two keywords are balance and confidence so let's talk about these two keywords the United States has been trying to balance its relations with Taiwan and with the many China in the last 35 years or even maybe even longer maybe we can regard the making of the TIA itself as the balance to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States and China maybe we can regard the arms sales to Taiwan as a balance to the so-called growing China's military threat to Taiwan and maybe the enhancing and the deepening of U.S.-Taiwan relations as a balance to cross-strait relations etc so maybe from the United States perspective TIA successfully maintained peace and stability in that region and protected Taiwan very well from China's so-called potential threat something like that but from the Chinese perspective you can see many remarks from the scholars Chinese scholars TIA only played the role of hindering China's ratification course so because in this kind of balance some scholars regard the United States balance was kind of hard balance so it's time to use this kind of strategy or tactics to and maybe to contain China's intention to influence Taiwan or something like that it's kind of hard balance also China also do some kind of balancing over Taiwan issue but our strategy is maybe pay more attention on the soft balance we want to create some harmonious atmosphere in that region we want to convince almost every party and different groups in one party PPP or KMT we just want to create such a harmonious environment so you can see this kind of hard balance can create some atmosphere that both sides are not happy when many China of course many China are not happy to see any breakthroughs of US-Taiwan relations and also are not happy to see the US arms sales to Taiwan also Taiwan was also was nervous every time when China's leader and the United States leader to be together and they are worried about whether they are going to a new statement there are some wars and not so good to Taiwan so every time when the US scholars say something like abandoning Taiwan are still in nervous so everybody was in nervous so that's not a good balance so maybe we prefer the soft balance let everybody happy not let everybody unhappy so of course the other key words is so-called confidence yeah I know many US scholars believe that TRA can give the people in Taiwan confidence to facing many China maybe the logic is clear that Taiwan is weaker side and maybe China is not should not be trusted and many China intends to threaten Taiwan's security or trying to rule Taiwan something like that so many people believe that without the United States port Taiwan will be not so confident to face many China and cannot get what they want from many China so when government officials once told me a few months ago that the United States just want to create a fair environment for the two sides to handle their disputes or handle their problems but this logic was also doubted in China so the US definition of fair was regarded as unfair by China the United States believe it's fair but some Chinese scholars say it's not fair it's unfair so of course a few weeks ago there is this sunflower movement happening in Taiwan so some scholars regarded as and that movement just shows that some people in Taiwan are not so confident enough while facing the mainland so from China's perspective the United States only give the Taiwanese people the confidence to say no to mainland not giving them confidence to face the reality and to handle the problems let's just tell the people in Taiwan if you don't want to talk with the mainland you can have the confidence to say no but do not give them confidence to say yes so that's a problem if the United States really believe Taiwan people can get confidence from them so then they should tell the people in Taiwan you should be brave and to talk with the mainland if the mainland do something not good for you or use coercion to threaten you so the United States will stand behind you that should be the normal logic but now the reality is not that so the people in Taiwan are a little bit worried about talking with the mainland are worried about the economic integration political talks so that's why many scholars in mainland China are doubted about the so-called confidence theory so on the contrary the United States want to give Taiwan confidence and the people in Taiwan are not so confident enough maybe the mainland is already confident but the people in Taiwan are not so confident they do not want to give the confidence to the mainland but mainland China is more confident than before it's more confident than before from the remark of Xi Jinping to Lianzhai in February and his remarks to Jameson maybe just last week we can see the confidence of mainland China and these kinds of confidence I believe will have some kind of influence over the future development of cross-strait relations I'd like to mention four points the first point is mainland China are confident enough to focus on the peaceful development process so though we will never give up the ultimate goal of re-invocation so every time when Chinese leaders and some influential scholars or officials mention the term of re-invocation or mention the term the issue cannot be delayed forever the problem should not be passed from generation from generation and some people in Taiwan or in the United States are deeply concerned about these kinds of remarks they just worry about whether the China will change its peaceful development policy or not my understanding is mentioning re-invocation or mention the issue cannot be delayed forever does not mean re-invocation re-invocation will be achieved in a short time or the issue should be resolved tomorrow or the day after tomorrow that only means we need to sleep down to create some conditions and environment to handle this problem just like Xi Jinping mentioned last week to Jameson He Ping Fa Zhan Ren Zhong Dao Yuan peaceful re-invocation is a heavy task it has a long way to go so but in that long way we cannot just wait and see we have to stand up and do something that's what we want we not just want to settle this problem in maybe tomorrow or the day after tomorrow so we know it's complicated we know it's a very long task to achieve so our second point is many China especially Xi Jinping regard the two sides feminine we are confident to win the heart of Taiwanese people eventually not maybe it's still it's a long task it's a long way to go but we are confident to win the heart of Taiwanese people eventually Xi Jinping used the new term Liang An Yi Jia Qin we used to use the term Liang An Gong Tong Ti and also maybe before somebody used Liang An Yi Jia Ren but this time Xi Jinping used the term Liang An Yi Jia Qin he just want to focus on the relative relations close relative relations across the two sides so maybe some people in Taiwan do not admit that their family do not admit that they are Chinese but the key problem is whether mainland really treats the people in Taiwan as family members so that's the most important thing I'll give you an example every time when I forced my daughter to study Chinese Xi Xi was the first graduate student in American elementary school she just found English much easier than Chinese so every time I forced her to write Chinese capital and forced her to study she was mad and said you are not my father I don't want you to be my father so but I never say you are not my daughter so that's the most important thing whether we treat the people in Taiwan as a family or as a family member or not that's the most important thing so that's why when Xi Jinping met Liang Zhan he showed the deep understanding over Taiwan's special history and the special feelings of Taiwanese people so that's what just now ambassador said that's very important maybe that's a new change in many Chinese policy toward Taiwan and third point is maybe confidence give many China encouraged to correct the mistakes during the cross-strait exchanges I know the Taiwan issue is very complicated Taiwan's domestic and political situation is very complicated in the last few years China just issued a lot of policies just want to benefit the people of Taiwan we admitted that during the implementation of these policies there could be some mistakes or false I just want to be clear false or mistakes if the reporter wants to translate into Chinese false or false not false or false so from Xi Jinping's remarks with Jamsong and China realize that we are we have some mistakes we have some false or false during the policy implementation we are trying to correct that maybe so in the future maybe many China will hear or ready to hear the voice of the young people in Taiwan and the grass-rooted people in Taiwan just like our director of TAO said when he he paid a visit to Taiwan is willing to meet the young people in Taiwan so the confidence give many China the courage the courage to correct these kinds of mistakes so the first point is many China is confident to face the US factor and maybe to discuss some issues with the United States such as arm sales issue many China refuse to discuss Taiwan issue with the United States because we believe Taiwan issue is China's internal affairs so the issue should be resolved between the two people across the Taiwan Strait there are no need to discuss with the United States but last year when our Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a speech at Brookings he just said Taiwan could be the access of US relations also our PLA leader just mentioned we can discuss arm sales issue so I think these kinds of confidence is very important these kinds of confidence will help reduce the sensitivity of Taiwan issue in China US relations because China always mentioned that Taiwan issue is the most important and the most sensitive issue in China US relations in conclusion I will say that many China is confident enough to handle the disputes with Taiwan and with the United States it's time for Taiwan to be more self-confident and it may be it's time for the United States to give Taiwan more confidence to face the disputes not to run away from this disputes so the continuous delay of these disputes will increase the anxieties of Taiwanese people and benefit nobody in the last so I stop here thank you for listening great thank you for your candor I think you've met the pressure test well with humor and linguistic precision so that was a good thing okay well in the interest of time I think we're going to jump straight out to the audience I have a question that I'd like to ask the panel myself we'll see what the audience has to say first per our other two panels please do identify yourself confine yourself to a question and we'll take it from there who's up first hi Nadia just one question for Professor Li this morning our representative Shan mentioned the process between the two sides of Taiwan is integration neither unification nor independence I wonder do you share this analysis and is this widely accepted in China thank you maybe integration is yes we are on the road of integration you know many Chinese scholars mentioned economic integration, social integration something like that so also I know some scholars in Taiwan just like Zhang Yazong also mentioned so-called integration Chinese translation is Ronghe or Tonghe so maybe but I don't think China say no to these kinds of concepts so I think the officials at the TAO often mention that all these are discussable we can discuss this so I believe maybe I don't think there are some conflicts between so-called unification or integration so that depends on how you interpret these terms these terms also I know some people in Taiwan just preferred European model EU model so I think Chinese men and I think these models are discussable but maybe it's not the final one that we will accept so if this if these kinds of integration will be good for the peaceful development it will help for the two for two people to understand each other for the two sides to settle their disputes especially the political disputes that way will be helpful so I think during the process of peaceful development integration is very important re-indication is our ultimate goal the gentleman over here I'm a Garrett van der Wies editor of Taiwan communique I have a question for Steve Goldstein and I actually want to go back to something that Chris Delsen said this morning Chris I really want to let you know that I listened to what you were saying okay one of the things that he said is if Taiwan was a functioning democracy in 1979 but we have broken relations Taiwan is a democracy now do we still stick with a policy that was based on the situation in the 1970s or could you somehow envision a different policy to take better account of the fact that Taiwan is now a democracy and the more equal role it does want to play internationally thank you one of the things that practitioners of American policy towards Taiwan always say or always talk about is the impact of democracy on Taiwan-American relations and what's interesting for me is that you'll hear a certain amount of grousing that it's a much more difficult kind of relationship because of democracy but then in the end they'll say you know it's easier to deal with a democracy because you can impact different parts of the population on different kinds of issues I'm not sure that policy towards Taiwan would be any different or would have been any different if it were a democracy then and I'm frankly democracy and American foreign policy are very tricky items democracy doesn't give you de facto legitimation not being a democracy doesn't delegitimize you as a friend to the United States I still think that the major American interest in Taiwan is the American interest in Asia and that's it all the other stuff helps there are little fringe benefits but we cannot remain an Asian hope to be influential in Asia if we walk away from Taiwan this couldn't happen again I don't think I think meaningful participation I think the kind of policy that we've been pursuing is a legitimate kind of policy you know it's hard for me to look at Taiwan as an isolated little island particularly when you go abroad and go to Europe Europe has much different has much different hang-ups about dealing with Taiwan their virtual embassies TECRO in Europe they're treated as embassies they're given the dignity of them they call themselves ambassadors by that in the United States you have to reprint your cards but the the other point that I'd make about participation and I was hoping to provoke something about rebalancing because I think one thing to keep in mind is that twice in American history since the Second World War that we've had a major influence towards Asia and that was the Vietnam War and the Korean War American efforts were to keep Taiwan out of it and the efforts were to keep Taiwan out of it because of the fear of provoking the main one and I think that was a good policy and I think that in spite of all the hopes that Taiwan might have about its role in rebalancing my guess is that it's going to remain like that do you still want to interject just wait me for the microphone just a quick and thank you Garrett it's always nice to be taken seriously even if you don't deserve it necessarily when I asked obviously a rhetorical question about Taiwan democracy I was asking it to focus on where it is now today as we go forward but we could have had a long discussion about the tragedy of history that if Taiwan had been a democracy for many years prior to 78-79 you have to wonder what the relationship with the mainland might have been would the government in Taipei have still been claiming to rule all of the mainland how could you do that if you're a democracy you know so we could have a wonderful almost Star Trek sci-fi alternative history discussion here but that was part of what was in my mind that there were so many lost opportunities leading up to 78-79 that the authorities in Taipei had lost the battle really by then and it was too bad but that's really what I was getting at question in the back corner David Brown from CIS I thought we got three excellent presentation my question is for Dr. Huang those of us who were not in Taiwan at the time of the Sunflower student movement are still trying to understand it and I would appreciate it if you could explain what you think its implications are for future cross-strait relations how will it impact on President Ma's ability to pursue his policies how will it impact on the DPP which has been considering whether or not to revise its own policy and any other implications you think it might have thank you well thank you Professor Brown's questions I think the first the Sunflower student movements come with as a result of the protest of the student against the so-called black box decision-making of the service agreements that's the original I think the first casualty right now is not from the KMT it's from DPP the premier student said that he won't stand against to reelect as the chairman of the DPP I think the student movements itself slow down the cross-strait interaction I think especially service agreements seems to be now grounded in the L.Y. until the new law that would monitor or control the cross-strait agreements enacted so after that then there will be a review of service agreements right now I think it seems that the situation is that you need to enact the law that review cross-strait agreements first and then review the service agreement itself and I think it will slow down the play-hole dialogues I think the initially in February the director of Taiwan Affairs and then Wang Yiqi met in the mainland China presumably there are a lot of discussion but the media focus on whether there will be some discussion about Ma and Xi meeting in the coming October-November and there was a schedule that Zhang Xijin will return visit to Taiwan in April but then with March 18th student movements it seems that the arrangement is slowed down so to think that maybe Zhang Xijin would not be able to come to Taiwan before June because right now there's no way for the service agreement to be passed by the end of June so and then we'll come into the 2014 elections that we have a midterm elections and then with the elections in May that would be a very difficult time to have a Marchi Hui so I think I would say that the student movements actually slowed down the cross-strait integrations in this way but I think there are other things still undergoing the cross-strait negotiation setting up the representative office of the self and the editors still continue to discuss and if I would be recently concluded because China already granted the humanitarian visit of our office in Beijing so there will be some progress in this way so if you ask me whether Zhang Xijin can visit Taiwan maybe next year but next year is another elections we have already a presidential elections in view so Zhang Xijin maybe come to Taiwan to open up the office of the editors but that would be an occasion that only my guess okay so undoubtedly it will slow down the whole process of cross-strait integrations and I would say that the student movements will have a great impact on the way that we review the cross-strait agreements I think there will be a mechanism set up in the L.O.Y and that would be help Taiwan to be more transparent and Zhang Xijin in the Jam Song meeting said that he already noticed that these service agreements or any cross-strait agreement must trickle down to the average Taiwanese people so I think to have a more transparent way to do the cross-strait agreement or cross-strait negotiations would be a benefit not only for Taiwan democracy but also for the benefit for the people across the Taiwan Strait thank you in the middle here yes my name is Bill Sharp and I teach at Hawaii Pacific University and University of Hawaii in Manoa a follow-up on David Brown's question so how is this going to impact the 7-1 elections that are slated for next November Professor Goldstein talked briefly made a comment about the 7-1 earlier and you just alluded to it so I'm really curious about that and then the other thing if I could let me see well I'll let that one go but I'd be interested in hearing your comments on the 7-1 election what's the outcome of that going to be as you see it today I think you have to ask the fortune tellers if you're looking into the opinion poll right now especially with regard to the Metropolitan Mayor's elections you have six Metropolitan Mayor's elections right now if you look into the Taipei cities the current candidate from the KMT is Lian Shengwen that's Lian Zhan's son and I don't know whether the DPP will promote its own candidate in Taipei Mayor's elections but right now there will be one candidate of the DPP and stand in comparison with the independent candidates Dr. Covinger medical Dr. Covinger and they will compare the opinion poll but I think in the Taipei cities it seems to be if you want to count the voters there are a lot more voters to support the KMT than to support DPP unless there's a sprit in the blue camp it would stand a good chance to win but right now even the Lian Shengwen and Dr. Covinger independent candidates is running in the neck-to-neck opinion poll in opinion polls so it's difficult to determine whether Taipei city will go for one way or the others I think if you look into the Taichong right now Jason who is already three terms Mayor four terms and his opinion poll is really lower and compare with the challenger from the DPP by 20% of differences so the DPP probably would gain of the Taichong cities and in my hometown the Zhanghua counties and the opinion poll is also favorite of the DPP so I think in general the DPP stand a good chance to win in local elections are always considered as second-order elections which means that the elections will not have a great impact or will not have a major impact in the national regime change of national regimes so people are more or less favored to cast a sincere vote in the second-order elections that would vote against the government so seven-in-one elections most people will say that the DPP probably can retain the Kaohsiung and Tainan and then increase win the Taichong and also the maybe Zhanghua that's the central part of Taiwan and the northern part of Taiwan it all depends there are some speculations with the Prime Minister's step-down as candidate of the DPP whether that he will stand as candidate of the new Taipei cities I don't know but new Taipei cities now currently the DPP is going to have the Yoshihiko former premier to stand as candidates and Eric Zhu think that the current Taipei mayor new Taipei mayor Eric Zhu probably would wrong for the 2016 presidential elections so if the current DPP candidate stand then he will ask his deputy mayor to run for the new Taipei cities and he was going to run for the 2016 presidential elections so in that case the new Taipei city is still difficult to judge because they can't themselves that's not yet determined so the DPP already proclaimed that if they can win the Taichong mayor then the DPP will have the power for DPP but most of the DPP supporters probably would not agree with that because given that the lower opinion power of the mayor demonstrations that DPP should win more than just three out of the six metropolitan mayors so in this sense I think I wouldn't I don't know what will happen but you will probably expect the next presidential elections right here and I know I have a question for Professor Li we talk about democracy here so 25 years ago they have democracy in Tiananmen and so this is Tiananmen Mexico is 25 years so I wonder the Xi Jinping where we do anything I don't know what your comment about this Tiananmen Mexico thank you I'm an expert of Taiwan issue so I don't know anything about China's domestic politics yeah that's an off topic how about back here in the coin you can ask your uncle thank you, my name is Yu Dachou I'm a first year school here currently studying agent studies my question will be my question will go to Professor Li because it seems like China has a lot of confidence in dealing with Taiwan problems as you've mentioned four of the Chinese confidence one of them is the one of them is that China has the confidence to win Taiwan people's heart eventually I would like to first of all with Professor Huang had mentioned that Taiwan is now facing the turning point especially institutional reform which is really important because as we have known right now the constitution of ROC doesn't really match the reality in Taiwan right now and also the student movement currently in Taiwan one of their main asks to the government is to set such kind of dialogue between the government and the people on this kind of constitutional reform or institutional reform issues which President Ma didn't really focus on this I mean during his talks in the period of student movement so and also Professor Huang has mentioned that if DPP really won the future elections presidential elections or the mayoral elections this year they would tend to decide the future of Taiwan through the referendum process which is also not acceptable by PRC regime so can Professor Li would you mind to extend a little bit on your confidence where did your confidence come from to win the Taiwanese people's heart eventually thank you thank you for your question I believe many in China are trying to build this kind of confidence to convince the people of Taiwan to make the people of Taiwan and to get to know more about the mainland I know since the two sides opened communications for over 20 years or over 20 years but I believe most of the ordinary people do not understand each other I believe most of the people in Taiwan do not really know what happened in mainland China and maybe 95% of the people in mainland don't really know what's happening in Taiwan so that's the source of some misunderstandings and problems we receive students from Taiwan our institute receives students from Taiwan each year always these students ask some very strange questions they are very strange for our some of our students do not even believe that questions just come from the students of Taiwan so they ask maybe can you eat some maybe do you have car okay in Xiamen something like that so that's why we believe that's a very big issue our institute is trying to play the role to make the two sides to understand each other what we are trying to do is to make our teachers our researchers and our students to know Taiwan better than the other people when they come to their positions in the government or in other places they can tell the other people what Taiwan really looks like we established three offices in Taipei in Taichung and in Kaohsiung we sent our teachers and students every month to Taiwan we asked them to not just talk to the scholars and officials we forced them to talk with the ordinary people talk with the farmers the fishermen some of our students and researchers can speak Minnan dialect Taiwan is very different from what the television tells them that's what we are trying to do of course our institute the role is limited but I believe through the frequent communication more and more people will get to know China maybe they do not accept the political system in China maybe they do not understand our belief our value, our mind but if they learn how to respect it that's enough we are just trying to make the people in Minnan China to respect the lifestyle of Taiwanese people respect the political system of the Taiwanese people to understand why the two sides cannot come into war to understand why to keep the peace and stability in the region so I think that's enough for two sides so why Xi Jinping mentioned He Ping Fadang that means we are ready to do this in the next several years maybe several decades of years we are maybe another idea is all this problem all this trouble the sunflower movements yes there are problems but in our perspective it's the problem of development during China's rise we have to face a lot of trouble a lot of problems maybe some people in Taiwan some people in Hong Kong do not understand they do not accept our policy they do not accept what we are doing that's all right maybe after 20 years after 30 years even 50 years when we come back we say what we are doing today is worthwhile that's enough great just want to point of clarification you're not suggesting better relations through karaoke just want to all right I think we have time for one more question how about over here in the back hi I recently graduated from a university focusing on human rights and I think I totally agree that professor Li you contribute yourself to mutual understanding between Taiwan and China and the people in Taiwan we think that's really good because it helps the mutual understanding and peace but regarding since you gave our really interesting story about you and your daughter you force your daughter to study Chinese and then your daughter say back to you that you are not her father then I will give you my story my side since RLC was founded earlier than PRC then I would say RLC is the older part of PRC then RLC can say you are not my water then that's acceptable too the question will be based on your opinion that you say China whether China treated Taiwan is the most important issue how China treat Taiwan the people in Taiwan is critical is the most critical point in my opinion I think the critical point is when and how China democratize when China democratize that's when the people in Taiwan will start to think maybe unification is not bad but until then I don't think Taiwanese people will accept the fact that China tries to force Taiwan to be unified or to be part of them so that's my personal opinion did you have a question? regarding the democratization of China when or how China will carry on democratization you have two and a half minutes okay don't bother okay well I just want to thank everyone for their participation you've been a very patient audience and I especially want to thank both this panel and also my colleagues Richard Bush and Bonnie Glazer for helping us put together what I thought was a fantastic program so thank you very much for your participation thanks