 Good morning. My name is Steve Heggy. On behalf of USIP, I would like to cordially welcome all of you to this event titled Columbia at a Critical Juncture for Peace, a conversation with the Peace Commission of Columbia's House of Representatives. The space is co-sponsored by our partners too from the Inter-American Dialogue and the Woodrow Wilson Center. We would like to thank them for their contributions to the organization of this event. The US Institute of Peace, known as USIP, is an independent NGO supported by public resources that promote peace-building and peaceful conflict resolution throughout the world. It was founded by Congress in 1984 and it works independently in coordination with other government agencies. There are 12 countries in the world that we are working on, but also for more than 15 years we've been working with and for Columbia, supporting efforts led by civil society, communities, victim's association and direct collaboration with the Colombian government and the public force in order to strengthen their legitimacy in areas that were hardly hit by armed conflict. The Institute has supported several formal and informal processes to look for a peaceful conflict resolution with armed groups such as the FARC and the National Liberation Army, ELM. Our current programs include supporting the two peace commissions of the Colombian Congress at the Senate level and the Lower Chamber level. These are unique spaces in order to build political consensus on very delicate issues related to peace and security. The peace accord was implemented in 2016. There is a great of uncertainty around it and the dialogue with the ELM was suspended after their very tragic terrorist attack. The UN Security Council recently recognized that peace in Colombia was undergoing a very critical moment. The Kroc Institute, officially in charge of measuring the implementation of the accords with the FARC, just published its latest findings. They summarize very important issues under Duque's administration and what is going to happen in the 16 municipalities that they've been working on out of all the ones that they will be working on. They identify very serious challenges. The shutdown of the ex-combatant camps, the killings of social leaders and also limited progress with regard to Kroc substitution. The Special Jurisdiction for Peace, the HEB, has achieved substantial progress regarding flagship cases such as the kidnapping by the FARC and extrajudicial killings by the Army. The HEB has had to also face criticism and questioning because of its neutrality. And there is a current discussion around its legal framework. With regard to the extradition of the FARC's negotiation is also an issue right now. Promoted by its commitment to those that led the no vote to the plebiscite in 2016 and more than 10 million people that have demanded changes and corrections to the implementation process of the accords with the FARC Duque's position to the statutory law has reflected the gaps that exist in the Colombian society. And it's also very important to look for political consensus regarding peace in Colombia. In spite of a small ceasefire, very short ceasefire during Easter, the ELN has not accepted the unilateral concessions demanded by the Colombian government in order to consider a peace process in the future. The rebel leaders of the ELN are still waiting to see what possibilities there are regarding an armed conflict in the neighboring country, Venezuela. Within this current context, the two peace commissions in Congress represent, as I just said, unique forum in order to promote consensus around the implementation of the agreement with the FARC and potential measures to put an end to the exact nation that we have with the ELN process. After a visit to USIP by three senators of the peace committee last December, we've decided to also bring three, no, rather six congressmen and women to Washington in order to have a series of events and discussions such as this one. We would like to express our gratitude to this delegation. They reflect current political tendencies in the country from the government perspective all the way to the opposition. We would like to thank once again the six representatives, Carlos Alvila from the Partido Liberal, Juanita Gwebertus from Alianza Verde, John Jairo Hoyos from Partido del Lago, David Cullido from Cambio Radical, David Racero from Colise, Colombia-Humana, Gabriel Santos from Centro Democrático. Today we have an excellent moderator and she needs no introduction. Dr. Cynthia Arson is the director of the Latin American program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for scholars and she's led many think tanks in Washington around issues regarding peace governance and security in the region. She's also published several books about peace processes. Cynthia, it's actually a pleasure to have you here. The floor is yours. Thank you, Steve. Is the microphone on? Perfecto. Bueno, muchísimas gracias. Thank you, Steve, for such a great introduction. You all have the values of the participants, so I will not repeat all the names. For me, it's a pleasure and an honor to be here again with USIP, with Steve, Tonyz Montes, who have worked in Colombia for so many years in favor of peace. It's again also a pleasure to collaborate with the Latin American Dialogue and organize in this event. I would also like to recognize Catalina Casas, Colombian from Bogota, who follows this topic with a great deal of interest. In order for you to know how this forum will take place, let me explain it to you. Each congressperson is going to speak for several minutes, around six minutes. Juanita will be the first speaker. She's the vice chair of this commission, and she will talk a little bit about the work of the committee and what type of issues they're working on, and what's her position regarding peace law and the Senate committee in order to understand a little bit more how the Colombian Congress works. I would also like to highlight the fact that all the congress representatives that are here today are very young, and for me it's a pleasure to see younger generations undertaking these leadership roles, showing a dialogue and also search for consensus. We have here the Democratic Center, the Partido Verde, basically all the different political tendencies, traditional political parties and more new political parties that are sitting here with us today, and this basically reflects our hope for Colombia to overcome the divisions that have always existed, and hopefully we'll find a path towards consensus. Without further ado, I would like to offer the floor to Juanita. Thank you very much for being here with us today, and for being willing to participate in this discussion with people that know a lot about Colombia and that are very interested in this subject matter. Good morning everyone, to everyone following us online as well. Thanks of course to Steve, Cynthia, USIP, the Inter-American Dialogue, the Wilson Center. Thank you for organizing this event. The Peace Committee of the House of Representatives is a committee that specifically focuses on follow-up of the peace process in the country. It's not a legislative committee. So the rules that the Peace Committee is not bound by the usual rules, they do follow-up and policy studies. We are the ones who have made the decision to have a bipartisan approach to all the differences that the different parties have around this issue. We refer to this as being from the capital to the territory. We want to reach out to the areas most affected by war, and to include people who have both supported the peace accords and been critical of them, because the only way we can move forward in the process of reconciliation in Colombia is to acknowledge our differences, but try to find a common ground in terms of information, ensure security, reintegration, rural development, restitution, or crop substitution rather, and reparations, victims. There are many different positions on these different issues, but at the same time there's a deep conviction that we must work hand in hand if we are going to change the dynamics on the ground. So that's a general introduction as to this peace commission, and then each one of us can talk about how we see the progress on the issues. Alright, so let's go in alphabetical order then, and start with Carlos Ardila from the Liberal Party, a congressman from Putumayo, which, as we know, was a department that was very hard to hit by armed conflict and is affected by coca cultivation as well. Thank you, Cynthia, warm hello to everyone who is in the auditorium with us and following us online. Thank you for that welcome, and I want to focus on the illegal economy and coca cultivation in my remarks, because this is a major obstacle and challenge for us to be able to implement the peace accord. If we want that to be a reality then we need to shift away from these illegal economies that are hindering the peace accords. We're talking about 200,000 hectares approximately. Some people think it's significantly more, some think it's 136,000, but regardless of the exact number it's an enormous challenge. And the national government has told us that they're going to resume glyphosate spraying. That is a strategy that has been used in the past. It's nothing new in Colombia. It began in the 1980s, and the results are there for all to see. What we've been saying in the Congress and in our commission is that we need to combat illicit crops in an evidence-based way. The struggle against drugs needs to be evidence-based and not be based on politics. And for that to work we need to analyze what has actually happened. The strategy has failed. It has been demonstrated that the use of glyphosate is not very effective. The best data indicate that in order to definitively eradicate a hectare of cocaine you have to spray 32 hectares. So 1 to 32 ratio, 200,000 hectares times 32, you can see how much we would have to spray. Now the re-sewing rate is above 60%. So if we eradicate one hectare, then 60% of that is going to be replanted. Why? Because what we see is that the peasants, who themselves end up being sprayed with glyphosate, end up traveling to a different area to do the same thing because there's no alternative for them. And Plan Colombia shows us this. It's a clear example. We began with seven departments when Plan Colombia started and in the end there were 23 when it ended. The departments that weren't major coca growers before the plan later became major growers. And in Putomayo, the people that had to leave in the lower areas ended up moving to other areas. And so we ended up having the Narinio, Pacific Narinio area becoming a major coca growing area. About $450 million were invested just in spraying. And between 2004 and 2014, according to the federal government, the whole anti-drug effort going beyond just glyphosate spring ended up costing $88 billion pesos, billion with a B, and a country with serious fiscal constraints. So that's something that must be addressed. And the risks and hazards are well documented, health risks, environmental risks. In the U.S. right now it's invoked to sue glyphosate producers. There have been studies, one by the World Health Organization, that ruled glyphosate to be highly carcinogenic. This was based on lab tests with mice, of course, but as a precautionary measure, Colombia had suspended the use of glyphosate. So that's a major challenge to overcome. And I believe that if we do it in a coordinated way between the U.S. and the Colombian governments, we will see good results. And we would like that fight against drugs to be science-based. The studies are out there. There's a lot of material from U.S. universities, Colombian universities that have been monitoring the strategy since the 90s. And what we need to do now is sit down once again and think of a new way to combat illicit crops. And any approach absolutely must have a social component. Rural areas affected by COCA don't need more glyphosate and more state coercion. What they need is development. And no matter what the strategy is going to have to include public services and goods, tertiary roads, healthcare, education, and electricity. If those four public goods aren't in place in rural Colombia, then regardless of the strategy we implement, it will fail. Very well. So now let's turn the floor back to Juanita. I have something to add to what Carlos said. There are many benefits to the signature of the peace accords, and that should be highlighted. If we looked at all the variables to decline in the homicide rate, decline of victimization, if you look at those data, you see that Colombia is on a good path. It's bringing down all those indicators. And we have to say that in this country, that that goes hand in hand with the bilateral relationship we have. If you look at statistics from 2002 to today, if you look at capacity building and security, if you look at the Havana peace process, all the numbers have been coming down between 2002 and 2006. When we had the lowest homicide rate of the last 30 years, this shows us the immense potential of the peace building process and what the country could develop into in terms of its economic potential, the atourism, etc. But in 2008, we did see that the process is very fragile. What we began to see in the areas most affected by conflict is that the national homicide rate went up by one point in 2008, turning around the downward trend. And if we analyze the 107D municipalities most affected by war, you'll see that they account for 42% of the increase in the homicide rate, the rate of displacement between 2016 and 2018, which had been declining, tripled. Mine incidents doubled in 2018 over the previous year. So 2018 revealed just how fragile this process is. So I believe we have three major challenges that require a stronger bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and Columbia. And above all, the political will to really transform the areas most affected by war if we want to ensure stability in our country and successful peace building. First, we have the challenge of territorial security. We need to change the way the state approaches these territories. Historically, the approach has been a military and law enforcement approach. And these scenarios where judicial capacity is low, if we compare the 170 municipalities with the rest of the country, those 170 have just six judges per 100,000 inhabitants while the national average is 11. So about half the judicial capacity, 76% of these municipalities do not have technical investigators on their police forces, 30% don't have prosecutors. So that's the next link in the chain to be able to administer justice. And the challenge there is to have capacity building. That is essential to enhancing security. And then there's the enormous challenge of reincorporation. 13,000 former combatants gave up over 9,000 weapons, which was a major milestone in the country. We have 2,000 dissidents that are involved in organized crime, particularly in these areas, however. And what we have is a very weak reintegration process, almost all 13,000 ex combatants do get their basic income. And this was very controversial because the development plan extends that basic income for an additional period of time. And now we have just 20% though economically active. So most ex combatants are receiving their guaranteed basic income, but they are not fully reintegrated in a sustainable way that would enable them to engage in the peace process. So what this, this has been signaled by the international crisis group as a risk factor that is likely to lead to recurrence because there is no clear economic future for them. So we need territorial security based mainly on capacity building in administration of justice and economic reintegration. And then we need rural development. Both the Santos policy and the Oribe policies were based on strengthening development. Both major documents of these administrations said so while the Oribe policy focused on enhancing security and the Santos administration was focused more on the peace accords. But there, neither plan has succeeded in achieving economic development in those areas as Carlos explained the sustainability of this process is at risk more than 200,000 people participated in the first participatory participatory process and these development plans when as he said we need schools electrification, tertiary roads, etc. And they are waiting for those commitments because it's been 10 or 15 years and they want those promises kept they want their areas to change. And this requires an integrated fight against drugs. If we want legal economies, then we need effective crops, substitution strategies that are linked with rural development strategies. We can get into this more in the Q&A. But right now, if a proposal focuses just on forced eradication, it is destined to fail if it is not accompanied by these rural development approaches that give families other successful strategies and economic terms. And the third major challenge lies in the sustainability of transitional justice. There have been different discussions mainly in Bogota about the polarization between the yes and the no camps, what is the transitional justice system, what sentences are appropriate, when can there be extradition, who is eligible for transitional justice. So this has a very important impact in terms of legal certainty and there is the risk that people will take up arms again if there is not sufficiently legal certainty around their cases. So we need to address all three challenges at this time so that we can take advantage of this enormous potential to definitively put an end to the conflict between the government and the FARC. That needs to be the focus and that is where I'll leave it for now. Thank you so much Juanita. Now we're going to move on to John Jairo Hoyos Partido de la U, which is the party of former President Santos. Congressman Hoyos is from the Calca Valley, which is well known among other things for the kidnapping and killing of 11 members of Congress by the FARC back during the time, during wartime. John, thank you so much. Thank you, Sylvia, Steve, Andres and the entire USIP team for all the work they've done over the years in striving for peace, their commitment, present and future. And thank you for the opportunity to be here now. I thank each one of you for your generosity, your interest in Colombia, your commitment to the country and to peace. Thank you for that generosity. I am a child of the 11 congressmen assassinated by the FARC in 2007. My father was shot 12 times after being kidnapped for over five years and I'd like to take the opportunity given me now to reflect on the future of Colombia and what's at stake now for current and future generations. I'll provide three examples. One, an armed man enters disco in Orlando and kills over 50 people. An armed man shoots from a hotel room in Las Vegas and kills a great many people who were just enjoying a show. A group of armed men attack multiple sites in Sri Lanka, killing over 300 people. One of the wealthiest men in Holland, father of four, lost his life. One single person can cause immense damage and nobody, no matter how much money they have, can be protected from violence. In Colombia, the peace accord process enabled 9,000 armed men to give up their weapons. That is harm avoided in Colombia with this peace accord. But there's something more. Many of these violent acts are motivated not just for economic reasons, but also ideological ones. And as much as we'd like to believe that it is enough to physically remove violent actors to do away with violence, it's not enough because there will always be new people willing to take up the weapons put down by others. So the battle is not just to eliminate your opponent. We need to be capable of influencing the mindset of those who are causing violence. And I'd like to share an anecdote in that regard. My father was a state congressman. He went to work with his suit and tie, went to his office after we had breakfast together. And an armed commando of the FARC went downtown, fresh as a member of the army. And with a bomb, got 12 people to get on a bus, which took them away to a remote place where they were kidnapped and held captive for over five years. That was when Uribe was in power. Gabriela Santos, ambassador, was vice president at the time. And we, the citizens, begged the FARC and the government to hold a dialogue to free my father and many other people held captive. We begged them for their survival, but the policy of that administration was that they would not negotiate with terrorists. And that ended up being fatal for my father. My heart, my soul was filled with hatred for more than 10 years. I applauded all the military actions that led to the killing of any of the members of the FARC. When the peace process arrived, I received an invitation from the Colombian government to go to Havana to speak with the combatants. I was accompanied by eight three to four year old children, people who were three or four when their children were killed. They were in their 20s by this time. They never really knew their parents and we yelled at them. We called them names. We cried for hours shouting at those people who had killed our parents. And that dialogue, in that dialogue, those combatants asked for our forgiveness and promised to do no more harm to Colombia. And we came out of there determined to build peace and to put the past aside. I am a congressman now because people put me in this position and I am fighting for peace. The big question for me is when we approached this accord, the guerrillas were very concerned as to what would happen to them in the future if they gave up that weapon that was insuring their own safety. That was their security and if they gave up that weapon, they had to put their trust in this accord for their future and the future of their families. Knowing that the Colombian society doesn't believe in them because of the harm they did and knowing that they would use the political and legal systems. Both parties were mistrustful of one another and still we managed to get so many weapons turned in. So many people turned themselves in and I apologize for going over but I promise I'll finish in 60 seconds. What we ask the government now, what we are asking the President of the Victims Commission is that we not stoke the mistrust because a single match caused the fire at the Cathedral of Notre Dame. A single match put to the cause of peace in Colombia could set everything ablaze. We have Venezuela next door. We have Mexico stoking the drug trade. There are so many risks. There is so much at stake in Colombia. Thank you. Thank you so much for those very personal and powerful remarks and for talking about your own evolution over these years. We give the floor now to David Pulido from the party Cambio Radical. He's also from a department that was hard hit by the conflict. David is an attorney and also very committed to human rights. David, you have the floor. Thank you so much. Good morning to everyone accompanying us today for this panel discussion of the topic that is vital importance to us. But I believe to those of you that are here today in the auditorium and for the entire hemisphere strengthening peace in Colombia. This process has been supported by the international community, the European Union and the United Nations for a reason and supported by the U.S. for a reason. We are here because every one of us is aware of how vitally important it is to maintain and strengthen the peace process and find a way to address those factors that are jeopardizing it. Of course, we all have different perspectives. We have a different vision as to how the peace process should be implemented and strengthened. I'd say none of the political schools of thought represented here are considered themselves an enemy of peace. I believe that we all want peace and the way to focus on this and ensure that the process doesn't fail is to come together and avoid that polarization that would seem insurmountable. There are several areas of conflict around these five main points of the accord. Juanita mentioned some of them as did Carlos. There's the issue of demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and the increasing number of dissidents within those groups which poses a threat. In my department that's where we're starting to see this focus of dissidents. Even a person who was in Havana, a former FARC member, is re-arming a group of people who are looking at a group of 2,500 that have taken up arms again. And why? There is the issue of the eradication of illicit crops and so there's a connection there to the re-arming which is fueling conflict. And we have to address why and look at the illegal economies which in turn are connected to regional development in these specific areas which historically have had these illegal economies that held up or financed war. And so those are the connections and the five points of the accord are also are all interconnected, re-arming of ex combatants, lack of regional development and investment as had been promised as part of the peace negotiations and the resurgence of illegal economies, not just illegal crops. There's also illegal mining. There's other things that are happening in parallel and are also jeopardizing the whole peace process. And then we have what's happening to Venezuela which is also impacting everything and there are those who would take advantage of this situation. There are dissident groups who would be happy to take in people from Venezuela who in turn are fleeing a terrible situation themselves. So it's good to be here. It's good to have different forum. We had international support to the process and we need to continue to do so. One of the greatest challenges to the process is lack of time. We don't have a lot of time in order to overcome all the different challenges that are actually threatening the pillars of peace process. There is very short time and that's key because in order to implement a peace process we need a long time. But because of the current situation in Colombia and the situation that we're actually experiencing, we cannot really talk in the long term but in the short term. We need immediate action. Regional and rural development is important and in order to do so we need good planning. We need also willingness to implement those development plans but we also need resources. So we need to see how we're going to find those resources so that we don't use the excuse that there's no money to do so. Peace has also to become a state policy and not a government or temporary policy because its administration is going to have a different perspective. We talk about security democracy, democratic security under Uribe, different phrase during Santos. We just need to make sure that this is not something of a specific demonstration. It has to be state policy and the international community has to provide continued support regardless of who's in power in Colombia. If we don't reach that point we will not be able to implement the peace process in the short term in a successful manner. We might really reach no return point where the accord might be broken and there might be lack of trust by all the parties and lack of trust and what was signed. I believe in the peace process with some reservations of course but I hope we can work on it here in the United States and also to the international community as a whole. We need to make sure that we maintain credibility and trust. It's possible to consolidate peace with the guarantees that every single sector has demanded. Thank you very much. I would like now to offer the floor to David Bracero from Coalición de Santos. He has a great deal of experience working with social leaders especially in Bogota. Thank you. Good morning ladies and gentlemen. Greetings to USIP and everyone who worked and organized this event. I would also like to greet my fellow Colombians who are always following what's happening in our country. They're always focused on the country and also greetings to all those who are not Colombians but that do pay a great deal of attention to what happens in that country through the research, through their studies. Thank you for dedicating your lives to this issue that we are all working on. I'm going to basically present two conclusions and then I'll see how much I can explain each one of them. The first conclusion. And this one goes for those that have worked on Colombia for more than 20 years. The country has changed. Yes, it has changed indeed. And that's great news. Those 20 years have not been in vain. All that research, all those studies, all the fora, all the money, all the efforts, they've worked. And this is actually a great moment to thank all of you. I know that many people have been working on Colombia for 20 years and they've really dedicated their lives to this. It was worth it. It worked. Thank you. Juanita provided you with some indicators and we could even provide many more. I'm going to focus on coca crops. We have internal processes within the peace process. There's been a delay and I will talk about this, but there are also other external factors. Drug trafficking is not only an issue regarding campesinos in Colombia that have nothing else to do but grow coca. Poor farmers, poor campesinos are the weakest link in the chain and that's why I share what Ardila said. He knows the situation very well because he lives in Putumayo. This is not only about flying over with a plane and having aerial fumigation with glyphosate. There are deeper issues. It has to do with demand, international demand. As long as there are people that are willing to buy coke, there will always be production. This is international logic. So in the Havana process, we always talked about a different approach. We had to distinguish between the producer, the trafficker, the grower. So we are not the only ones to be blamed for the problem and we will say this everywhere we go. This is not only about Colombia, Mexico or Bolivia. This is an international issue and all of us have failed in the war against drugs. We've always done things the same way over the last 20 years. Using very punitive measures, attacking the growing of coca hasn't worked. We have to be much more creative. All presidents have said that we've really failed in terms of our war on drugs. The policy on drugs has been promoted from the U.S. and I'm saying this with all due respect, but I really do believe that this is not only a matter of the producers. That's the first conclusion that the country has really changed and we can use many indicators. Violence, murders, life is more protected. And that's a great thing. Now, life living in Colombia is safer. Another conclusion. This is a critical moment in Colombia for two reasons. The first one is because the two, three years after a peace accord, there are some residues. There is an aftermath of the war. 10, 15% of former combatants go back to illegal activities and this is kind of normal. Quote-in-quote of the post-negotiation peace process. And it's also because the state, the government takes a little bit in order to reach certain areas in terms of bringing justice, in terms of bringing electrification to certain areas. It doesn't happen overnight and we have to stay cool and understand that this is a difficult process and it is all part of the process. And there's a second reason and this is what my colleague was mentioning. And it's that trust is being hindered in a way and this sometimes happens after a peace accord. When trust fades away and there's no political will, this is when we start shaking because we start realizing that we could take certain steps backward. Some people focus on the past and they saw the Havana process always as a threat and not an opportunity. I was not part of Santos's government. I was in the opposition but that's what Santos defended. There is tension, tension because many people saw the peace process as a threat against them and I'm not talking about those that were pulling the trigger. I'm talking about those that always benefited from having a war in terms of land, in terms of justice and also in terms of certain political issues that were the three different issues that were addressed in Havana. We still need to do much more work. We will reach agreement in certain things but not in others and I'm very realistic. There are many different interests that we need to overcome. Those that are here have always been linked to the war one way or another. Maybe we're sons of those that were killed, sons of military, sons of someone that was kidnapped and now we're in Congress fighting for peace and that's part of normality. And it's good if we go from killing each other to discussing, to have an ideological discussion but there is tension and hence the polarization that we're seeing in Colombia. I'm not stigmatizing polarization as such. I think it's part of a process. We're learning to talk to each other. We're learning to discuss but this is a political matter and there are different interests. We're talking about justice but there are people that do not want that justice. They don't want to know the truth. They want silence. There are issues with land. There are people that don't want their lands to be taken away. They actually took those lands from those 8 million displaced people. We're talking about this in third conclusion. There are certain challenges ahead and one is the same one. What are we going to do if we're experts on demobilizing armed groups but conflict is being recycled? Some people think that the issue with the FARC is to see what we're going to do with those rebels so that they don't have those weapons anymore but there are some root causes in plural that need to be addressed and the political dispute is the following. Who understand those root causes that need to be addressed? Social, political, economic root causes because other people think that these are just rebels that need to be put in prison or extradited. Those are my thoughts, my conclusions, foot for thought but let me reiterate once again that the country has changed. That right in front of you you have a generation that is going to work really hard to make sure that the country moves forward. Thank you very much. I would like now to offer the floor to Gabriel Santos. He started working for the civil service through his father's campaign for mayor of Bogotá. I would like to especially thank him because when we were talking about organizing this forum we didn't have any representatives from the Democratic center and the big question was how could we have a plural panel really reflecting the different perspectives and opinions regarding peace without a representative from the Central Democratic Center. So really and truly thank you very much Gabriel Santos for joining us. Thank you for your invitation and thank you all the attendants for taking the time to get to know different standpoints regarding the current situation in Colombia. Regarding the implementation of the peace accords as you have just heard and the dissident voice regarding most of the issues even though we agree in many other things. My presence here is to basically strengthen the possibility to reach agreements and consensus without really giving in certain points where you are not fully convinced about. I just want to show that in spite of our differences of our different opinions we are capable of reaching consensus and I will explain why I just said so during my presentation. I have a very different idea about how peace can be implemented in Colombia and basically what I think is that we cannot put an end to conflict if we don't have a solid agreement within society as a whole. And we have to go through all the different sectors in society those that were in agreement with the peace accords those that voted yes those that in international community supported the process. Why do I think we cannot reach an agreement right now and it's because a third party is being ignored. It's a legitimate party we won the elections we won the elections again and we are legitimate third party because we have a very legitimate position towards what was agreed. And I would like to highlight here something what do I represent here two years ago I had many more reservations compared to the reservations I had right now regard regarding what was agreed. I've overcome certain fears because I've actually talked to certain people I've talked to the CTR I visited the CTR I've known I've met those that put down their weapons but I still have reservations and why do I say that we cannot really close or bridge that gap. Because we we there are different those differences are interpreted by other people as our attempts to put an end to the peace process and that's not the case. And that's really stopping us from having some sort of political rapprochement to overcome those differences that are keeping us in the situation where we are for example. Objections to the head the special peace jurisdiction. I thought that was the golden opportunity to sit at the same table those that had very different political views starting with the 2014 political process. There was a polarization with enemies of peace versus friends of peace and that lack of friendship was never overcome there are three elect there were three electoral process after that processes after that and we couldn't find agreement. Once you put a label on someone that comes from a specific sector then is therefore stigmatized and that person's ideas are completely invalidated not because of their content but because of where those ideas are coming from. So basically I thought we needed to sit down at the table again. We needed this type of forum we needed to sit down and reach consensus in my opinion. The reason why we're not reaching consensus is because of what I was talking about yesterday and I said it had to do with the architect. I sat with Bernie Hansen and I talked about our differences and I understood that there were all we also had many things in common much more than we believed. But again it's that impossibility of finding that common ground to change the current situation in Colombia. The reality is that yes I do have a different vision but maybe not as different as the people in front of me think I have. And we need to solve the situation. And sometimes those that build the PISA courts those that build that house are not willing to change anything within that house. In the country with so many different opinions political differences in the country that is so diverse as John Haydoyez was shared a very moving testimony. Well we have an imminent political war and we need to sit down with all the different stakeholders. Political civil military stakeholders so we can reach a consensus and decide what the government needs to do. Taking into account all the political differences that might exist of course. And a final comment regarding public policy in Colombia we have been kind of monolithical. We've been unable to recognize that the Colombian society has changed in a very rapid fashion. And policy has to keep up with those changes. When we two year norm from two years ago it might not be valid right now. Tipper feel faster feel better. Tipper feel faster feel better. We need to take this into account because we need to alter the law and we need to adjust to the current situation. That's what we are suggesting to review what was done basically. I'm not an intransigent person. I do think that a certain sector believes that justice is more important than other things. Other victims believe that reparation is more important. Other victims believe more in truth. Those three opinions are equally valid and from a political standpoint we cannot privilege one over the other. Yesterday Bernie was saying that maybe you have to give in a little bit in terms of justice in order to have access to truth. And that's one of the things that are taking into account. Santos did something. Duque wants to do something else. We want a different standard. Maybe where we have a little bit less of something and we have a little bit more justice for certain victims that supported us. And that's basically my comment. Thank you very much. Before I offer the floor to our audience I would like to ask a very quick question to each one of our speakers. Please stick to the time. Please try to give me an answer within a minute. Once again thank you very much for being with us here today. I guess you're not in Washington to have a discussion like this but rather to talk to decision makers from the Department of State, from Congress and so on and so forth. So in a minute please what is the main message that you would like to convey here to the United States in general as a whole for the decision makers on the U.S. policy with Colombia. Maybe we can start with John Jairo and then we'll go one by one. John Jairo? Oh my God. I would like to give you an example of the challenge that we have ahead. Carlos Sardilla lives in Putumayo. It's a department that is on the border with Ecuador. Juanita invited me to this department and I visited him. We went to one of the most important municipalities within this department. He was born in the Guamés Valley on the other side of the Putumayo River. That is on the border with Puerto Aces basically. We visited that area. In order to cross the Putumayo River we took a barge. The barge crossed the river. I think the river is a little less wide than the Potomac River. It took us I think 30 minutes. We had to pay $10, $15 per vehicle. And on the other side you could see many coca crops. So here the question is how do we put an end? How do we eradicate those coca crops? Some people think that the solution is to build a bridge over the Putumayo River so that if on the other side of the river you harvest tomato or soy the farmer on his bike, on his car can actually cross the river to sell his tomatoes, avocados and so on and so forth. This campesino with a hectare or two hectares can produce a box of tomatoes but it has to pay $10 to cross the river and then sell those products in Puerto Aces. Those will be the most expensive tomatoes in the world. The solution that we found to solve the problem with coca on the other side of the river is to spray the crops so that they cannot harvest tomato or soy either. We just passed the national development plan. Electric carib is going to be saved. All Colombians are going to put money to save the utilities company because we're going to build a port known as Trivuga. We're going to do a thousand things but we're not going to build the bridge over the Putumayo River. I just want you to think what would happen if there weren't a bridge over the Potomac River, a bridge that you cross on a daily basis. That's why we're asking the United States to help us address the root causes of the conflict to worsen them. Thank you very much. John Haido, thank you very much for your message about my department. Thank you for your support along the same lines of what John Haido said. I have something to say. The armed conflict was a great excuse not to do things. Because of the armed conflict we failed to do many things. No education, no roads, no electrification, no healthcare, or very precarious healthcare. It was and it continues to be very insufficient in the areas affected by the armed conflict. I'm saying that the conflict was an excuse because we prioritized, and I'm saying this in between quotes, those urgent manners and we neglected other things. The urgent matter was to wage the war against the rebels and to wait on other things. For example, the bridge over the Potomac River, the bridge could wait. But in my department, in less than 10 years, eight battalions were established. In that same department, within those 10 years, several police stations were built. And that's fantastic. We celebrate it. We welcome it. We have more police stations and two or three battalions more over the next 10 years. However, in more than 60 years, we haven't built a single second tier hospital. It's also not acceptable to see that in 60 years, we haven't finished paving the main road within the department that connects Colombia with to South America. And it is not acceptable either that the Putumayo department, with 300,000 people, do not have a single university. There is no university in Putumayo. That's unacceptable. And just one sentence more. Peace is not just courts understanding a piece of paper, X number of pages. Peace are not doves and apologies to the beautiful building where we are, which is clearly a symbol, a very beautiful building indeed. But peace is not just doves. Peace is precisely that. It is building hospitals where there are no hospitals. Peace is building bridges. The bridge, bridges such as the one that my colleague just mentioned. Peace has to do with transforming the lives of millions of Colombians that hope that the situation will change for them, that the state will have a presence where they live. Juanita, the floor is yours. Thank you, Cynthia. I want to say something. The best way of moving forward in terms of bringing peace to Colombia, and here I include democratic transition in Venezuela, coca or rather reduction in the demand of coca by the United States. We need to move forward in terms of our bilateral relationship between Colombia and the United States. In the United States it has to apply to both political parties and in Colombia it has to apply to all political parties. We have to focus on a successful replacement with a comprehensive approach. A forced eradication that has proven to be the one that has the highest re-harvesting rates. 63% if it's with aerial spraying and 43% if it's manual eradication is way less effective in terms of making the process sustainable. The other approaches are much more effective, but we need to focus therefore on role development. Number two, security in Colombia depends on other things, not only military and police capacity, but above all capacity to strengthen the rule of law and socio-economic reintegration of those that put down their arms. Number three, in Colombia extradition of those that have trafficked in drugs after the first of December 2016 continues to be alive. This is a mechanism that we will continue to honor. Colombia amended its constitution to guarantee that those that committed a crime before the first of December 2016 within the framework of the armed conflict have the guarantee of non-extradition. That was a decision that was made by Colombians. If we start from that start point, I think the relationship between Colombia and the United States will continue to bear the fruit that we saw in the past with the security policy, peace policy that we had, and now I hope with a policy to consolidate the rule of law within the whole territory. David, thank you. I do not want to repeat what my colleagues said. I agree with what my colleagues said, with what Juanita said, but I want to add something. First of all, to those decision makers, I want to urge them to be patient, very patient. As we have said here, precisely what we're trying to do requires a great deal of patience in terms of obtaining immediate results. Results are not always immediate. Also a great deal of patience so that Colombians have a chance to develop our own dynamic. Peace is full of content. The word peace is full of content. Juan Manuel Santos said it in his book, The Battle for Peace, it's easier to wage war than to build peace. And I think it's a personal quote. He borrowed it from someone. So we're trying to give meaning to peace. And I would say to the United States and any government supporting us over time, please be patient and enable us to develop and mature at our own pace. Secondly, you may rest assured that what is good for Colombia will be good for the United States. Any good that comes of what is happening right now economically and elsewhere, for instance, ecotourism. It's a major line of development. And as Juanita was saying about extradition, U.S. security and interests will never be harmed by what's happening. I think anything that happens in terms of the peace process in Colombia will be good for the U.S. You can be sure of that. And third, cooperation should happen with equality, having the two governments on an equal footing, sitting down as equals, not just between the U.S. and a country that's in its backyard. Thank you. Okay, thank you. So as I said earlier when I spoke, all stakeholders and not just on the government side and then the FARC, of course, the other party, but all stakeholders, everyone that was part of the peace process, I would stress that what we need to do is build trust and do nothing to harm it and focus on this quickly because the enemy of that trust is time. If we don't move quickly, we need to tackle those little dark spots that are casting doubt and causing mistrust among all the different parties. I think that's what could undermine the peace process. Trust is built on the belief that the role played by each of the actors in the negotiation and the initial peace process will continue to be played. There may be some that are not playing their role as they should are stepping outside of that role. And when that happens, that is placing all of this in jeopardy. When they were part of coming up with the accord, they made promises that they need to keep now and this is important in terms of the justice system and in honoring the rules of the game. I'd like to clarify something since this is an international context and I don't want there to be doubts. The Colombian government waged a senseless war for a great deal of time and it's important to provide that context. I don't want there to be misunderstandings. You all are well, aren't very familiar with Colombia but there was an intransigence on the part of the Colombian government that was fighting an enemy and it was hard. Can you imagine a situation where if you were to cross the Potomac you were likely to get kidnapped? So it was a necessity to establish security in an area to be able to travel through an area. It was impossible to have a school outing without a military escort. So that's what the reality looked like across the country. There was little access to public services unless security was insured by the state, little could be done. So what would I ask the U.S. for at this difficult time of transition? I think that politics are going to evolve and look differently. I'm not ashamed to say that we were elected. We were elected to make legitimate amendments to the peace accord through democratic means, absolutely, but some of those changes are not minor and what is needed is patience. We need to figure out a solution and it's going to be a solution to the illegal crops, for instance, and it's going to be different. I would say it may be a last resort, but it may be a component of an overall strategy. We consider forced eradication to be much more important than did the previous administration. There were 26 mobile eradication units when in 2002 there had been over 100. So we do think that it is part of the solution of the conflict and there can be some intransigence sometimes on the part of the U.S. government, but pressures might end up creating a situation that might hinder a cross-cutting approach to illicit crops. So I would ask for understanding there also assistance in terms of justice because we tend to have weaknesses and it tends to be the U.S. that helps us with that and we need investment in voluntary restitution programs that cannot be financed wholly by the government. So just patience on all fronts is what I would urge. Okay, so with those comments and remarks, we give the floor to you. Please raise your hands and we ask that you wait for the microphone to come to you. We need you to speak on the microphone because this is being webcast. I see somebody in the back. Shall we take three questions at once? Here in the middle, this lady. Okay, so these three will kick off our Q&A. Good morning. I'm Aurelio Diaz. Thank you to USIP and the honorable members of the Colombian Congress and of the Duque Administration and everyone here. I'm sorry, what is your name again? Could you repeat your name, please? Alfredo Diaz. So first question. Why so much mistrust? The nation wanted a peace treaty. This was initiated by President Santos. Former President Uribe was not in agreement with some aspects of that peace treaty. When it was reached in Cuba, the FARC kept something hidden. They kept a card up their sleeve. What is that? The weapons. They never turned in all their weapons. They turned in 9,000 weapons and 13,000 former combatants. 13,000 weapons hidden across the country. Right now the FARC is operating in Venezuela intimidating rural estates and they operate there freely because it is so permitted first by the Chavez and now by the Maduro Administration. So my question is how could the Congress have permitted the FARC to keep that abbreviation and let their political arm use FARC because FARC is not a political entity. It's a terrorist criminal organization that is still engaging in contraband, supporting drug trafficking and it's preventing the country from progressing. Why haven't you insisted on eliminating the term FARC from the political scene? And here I am, Ana Maria Gonzalez. I work at the World Bank on a program called Sustainable Landscapes of the Amazon. I wanted to say that one of the themes that you've all brought up is rural development and unfortunately there is a factor that's been a problem in Putomayo and elsewhere and that's deforestation. Going back to the tomato example it's hard to give the tomato grower something and help him when basically everything is being raised and it's all just cows grazing. There are land holding issues, ploys being made, people are going into the countryside and cutting down forests to graze their cows and all because there's a lack of a comprehensive rural development policy so I wanted to call attention to that and suggest to you that when you speak of rural development you understand that it should be sustainable rural development that it's not just about bringing roads. Because if you put a road cutting through a forest reserve that's not a good road and the negatives might outweigh the positives. So if the gentleman's going to grow tomatoes they also shouldn't be doing so in a way that's going to pollute the Putomayo River. So that is my reflection. If you truly want rural development you'll yield benefits for all and respect the wealth, natural resources of our country. And here our third question. Thank you so much for your excellent presentations. I'm Adam Isaacson from WOLA. I have a very basic question. Almost all of you spoke of the need for rural transformation, having the state presence into rural areas and 110% in agreement with that but I'd like to hear your reflections on how an 80% urban country where most of the population hasn't really felt the impact of the conflicts for more than 50 years. How are you going to convince those people to assume the costs and make the sacrifices necessary in order to develop the rural areas of the country? Thank you. So now let's give the floor to our panel and you don't need to feel that each one of you needs to answer each question. Maybe you just respond to the question that most resonates with you. David, would you like to start? As to the first question with regard to trust. You're talking about that polarization phenomenon. How can we have trust when actors in the process aren't holding up their end of the bargain whether that's turning in all your weapons or demobilizing and that's where I would make a call and say, yes, what everyone's signed on to, they have to do it. They have to speak truth. They have to implement justice. They need to prevent confusion. We have a group of dissidents using the same name, FARC, and in my department we've seen photos of armed people with the same kind of uniforms, the same armbands that say FARC and billboards that say FARC is still alive. So that, of course, is going to lead to confusion and it's going to diminish trust internally amongst groups that were critical of the process and it'll be confusing to the international community as well. And so I would say those who are trying to play their role because I don't want to generalize many people, many stakeholders are trying to fulfill their promises. Many former FARC members are doing that and are setting a good example and they are calling upon their formal colleagues to join them in the hip hearings. You hear this in discussions around traditional justice. Yes, they need to take the first step. The judges of the transitional justice systems are saying, come, come, don't be afraid. This is for you. But every stakeholder needs to set that good example and that is what's going to build trust so that we don't create this mistrust. Alfredo, as to your question, I would say that we have to be very careful with evidence and data. 30,000 ex-combatants turned in 9,000 weapons. Now, if you look at the data, about 4,000 were militiamen. I was working on this in a delegation and we verified this in conjunction with the United Nations and compared it with other processes in other countries. There was a very rigorous process of cataloging the weapons. So to say that 4,000 weapons are out there just because we subtract 9,000 from 13,000, that's not a truth. It's irresponsible to allege that because there are no data that support that. The most accurate data suggests that there are 2,000 to 2,500 dissident FARC members. There is no clarity as to how many weapons they might have now. This is a challenge. It's been a challenge in other peace processes and we have to be very careful with the data. Yes, this is a major threat to territorial security. Why was it allowed to keep FARC? That was what FARC decided. I don't agree with that. I would have preferred that they kept a different acronym but it would have been anti-democratic for Columbia to prohibit a democratic party from calling it whatever it wants to call it. It's a different word. Each party makes its own decisions as to what they want to call themselves. We need to help them. There's a difference between a committed political party and there is no indication that the former FARC members that are in Senate are committing any kind of crime in any way. You need to separate very clearly the people who are legally participating in the transition and those who are dissidents who do pose major danger. Now, on to the deforestation question that is a major concern we have. In the national development plan identified as a major risk and the government acknowledges that the deforestation rate if it stays up at the current rates will lead to 900,000 hectares of lost forests by 2021. That was a 30% loss of the forest cover we have so we have to deforest less and we can't accept losing 900,000 hectares of forest because it's part of our natural resources and the wealth of the country. As to how we get urban Colombians to buy into this I think that urban Colombians know that wealth is in the forest and in the countryside. I think we need like an urban peace corps to get people from the cities to go out there and really take ownership and understand what our country offers us. On the first point I don't think that it was a political misstep. You have to take into account that the name was part of the victimization. There are millions of victims of the FARC and FARC is not a normal political party. It's not a group of citizens that gathered signatures on a petition to apply for party status. It is a party that came out of a specific scenario. It gets public funding and it's very different from what led to parties like Alianza Verde Partido de la U, etc. So it's a unique kind of party never before seen in Colombia. And I think the Colombian government was being a little too lenient and led to a re-rictimization because the word FARC hurts many people. Anyone who is a victim in their family and really that's the majority, it's very painful to hear FARC. And I think that the Colombian government certainly would have been in a position to argue against keeping FARC. It was part of it was a radical move and I think that it was out of pride that and it shouldn't have happened. Now as for deforestation, I agree with Juanita the numbers are terrifying. I've expressed this concern and we need to be more responsible with the data and how we present them. I mean, yes nine, the initial figures that we heard were 1.2 million. Now the figure is 900,000 but the point is we need to focus on cutting down on deforestation where trying to get the military to actually deploy forces to protect the environment. And there's a really interesting issue. How do we prevent this over-centralization from continuing to push this rural urban flow? Anyone who wants to study to say be a veterinarian you have to go to the capital you can't learn that out in rural areas. So we need to take advantage of the fourth industrial revolution and what technology offers us in terms of opportunity to have the market move out to outlying rural areas. And so the infrastructure is there and the interconnectivity is there so that a Colombian peasant can offer his products through digital platforms and not having to carry his wares all the way to the center of the country. So this is where you can have virtual education and courses as we see in the great democracies that connectivity will I think make the rural areas more attractive again and might make working in the fields more attractive to young Colombians in the future. Thank you. Very briefly, Adam. We just arrived in Congress eight months ago meeting I attended. The message I first message I got in this meeting was that there would no longer be marmalade for Colombian congressmen basically saying there would no longer be perks that we couldn't be lazy that we needed to work hard. And the new generation is up to the task. The Colombian people have committed to the country's development goals and putting an end to violence based on a political consensus which requires leadership from the president who needs to be a president for all Colombians. We need to get over it in terms of who voted yes and who voted no. And we see these tweets Santos this, Santos that, Santos the other thing and it keeps being a return to the past. We need to be willing to look forward to get together and set common goals and targets together and I'm certain that the Colombian people will support us in doing so. The challenge is enormous yes because we're deforesting one of the last natural areas of our region which are really lungs for the world. The development model in Colombia right now is based on intensive agriculture. We have bananas and plantains that are consumed in the United States and Europe. We sell coffee sold across the world sugar cane biofuels that we export palm oil that's where our income comes from hand livestock and we continue investing in that while using up our land and our water and that economic drive that's what's driving deforestation and it's jeopardizing our survival. There also this investment in mining so much of our income depends on mining and oil and gas and that's where the incentives keep going. If we can generate an alternative model of development then we are going to be constantly and fruitlessly battling deforestation and on the topic of the FARC there is where there is great mistrust on both sides. FARC and society in the US it is citizens who decide not to use them to cause harm. If we had sufficient trust in these former combatants we wouldn't necessarily have to see an increase in violence or use of weapons again in the future that's why I ask that we trust one another and that former combatants won't feel driven to go back to their weapons. Thank you. In the interest of time I'm going to answer Alfredo's question only dear Alfredo why do the FARC get to keep their acronym first because we exchanged bullets for votes for elections instead of weapons? We'd rather hear the cacophony of their rhetoric than the sound of bombing and they really were the worst political strategists in the world. There's no rival no one is as terrible in political strategy I mean that was their crazy decision to keep an acronym that embodies 50 years of violence and horror and if they want to make this terrible decision well more power to them. Now as to how to convince urban Colombians to support rural development well Colombians suffered from arm thicklet as well even though it happened in areas of the country and they were areas that received millions of displaced Colombians and no city could absorb them the way Bogota had to so that would be my message that if things are going well in the country things will go better for the cities I do feel like I have to say something about the Amazon region I was born in Putomayo I'm a child of the Amazon and we do have an enormous challenge which is to convince everyone that our landscapes and our products in the Amazon region give us a great advantage our landscapes and in parallel they can give us an advantage over other regions but we need to learn first how to have tourism and how to yield the benefits of the Amazon region our fruits like the acai and acainti and other fruits but what we need to make that happen is that we have public goods if we don't have those public goods and services out there then we're not going to develop and we'll just see more deforestation well I still haven't answered well we do have a time limit here so we could take one or two additional questions and we'll ask you to be very disciplined in answering them so very quickly please Steve do you want to answer or should we take more questions wow there are many Steve well you tell me you're the host two questions two questions and then we wrap up but not everyone will be able to answer thank you I'm Steven Danehu from McLaren Associates I'm from Washington DC and thank you very much for your presentations especially for being so civil here seated with other people from other political parties several of you asked the United States to be patient I'm sure you've heard this from other people in the US that is not very patient there is a new environment in Washington DC you're competing for funding versus other humanitarian tragedies in other situations I have to do with natural disasters for example the issue of extradition especially of Mr. Sandrich is a priority for US politicians then also the hectares of coca crops is also a priority for the US government regardless of the explanations if those three things do not change it will be very hard to find patients in US politicians today good morning Natalia Ruiz I have a question for the peace committee and I would like to know also what the government's position would be for the war on coke what happens with gold illegal mining when you attack coca then those people start doing gold mining what strategy do you have in place in order to protect the environment as well as the victims human rights two people in the panel who would like to take these two questions I'm going to answer to a previous question and then to this one first the last question well in terms of deforestation I think this has to be addressed from a much broader issue which is a issue with land in Colombia land tenure is the greatest issue here in terms of land index which analyzes inequality especially in terms of tenure the genie index in terms of land in the country is ridiculous 0.7% out of 32% one is very high inequality and then it goes we are a country with a lot of inequalities I've read that we're among the five most unequal countries in the world but in terms of land tenure it's ridiculous inequality in terms of land tenure is at its highest when we talk about deforestation about illegal mining we need to understand both sides first there is illegal economies such as illegal gold mining but there are also people that are trying to find a way of surviving or finding an economic activity here we need to understand something as society point number one of the Havana meetings we're talking about an agrarian reform it had to do about how to modernize agriculture in our country the discussion that we're having around land is pre-modern pre-capitalist if you want to call it that way it's really hard for us to talk about this there is a lot of mistrust by the people in Colombia regarding this issue they see everything that they did threatened that's why I wanted to address that issue from a much broader perspective the issue of deforestation from the land tenure perspective I just wanted to mention it because we cannot address it in depth and number two I wanted to answer to that question about urban areas how can we convince those in urban areas that are disconnected from the rural situation for us it was very hard that only 33% of the Colombians were in the plebiscite it means that only 33% were interested in peace well that's actually a very serious issue I don't know if it has to do with certain psychological issues such as neglect or forgetfulness or who knows oblivion the only thing that we can do as Colombians is to make sure that everyone gets involved we don't have people disconnected from peace disconnected from the country itself some people say politics is for politicians and I'm not interested in it that could be a vestige of the war and we cannot let that happen everyone needs to be involved in politics collective problems affect individuals too therefore we need to get everyone involved in the peace process get involved in politics because everyone should participate some final words yes I wanted to talk about the issue of extradition we have problems in Colombia as well as in the US let me provide you with an example the only survivor of the kidnapping of the 11 congressmen was Freda Lopez there was a video of an intelligence and there were images of the planning of that kidnapping the person led the kidnapping was in the video but you could only see his nose the prosecutor's office in Colombia based on that video decided that the nose was the same one as Ciggy Freda's nose so he was going to be arrested so this person that was kidnapped for 11 years was accused of being the mastermind of the kidnapping he was detained for more than 6 months he was seen as one of the greatest monsters in Colombia and in the end the prosecutor's office said that they didn't have enough evidence and in a private event they acknowledged their mistake and his innocence and I'm giving you this example to understand the level of mistrust of people around justice in Colombia when a combatant demobilizes they're worried because after negotiating they might be extradited and such extradition could be based on inaccurate legal information that is why they are so concerned with the issue of extradition in the past Colombians have never asked whether the accusation by the prosecutor is correct or not in Colombia even contractors have been extradited just because of drug related issues therefore combatants say if I'm going to be extradited don't wait for me to be in the United States to defend me from some potential complot justice in Colombia please make sure that justice in Colombia please make sure that at least the US government has solid evidence against me and that's when you need to review international cooperation in order to make sure that when the prosecutor makes an accusation when the peace accord is at stake just with a single extradition what are we asking for here to send a copy of all the evidence so that the HEB can review the evidence and say there is substantial evidence to say that this man should be sent to the United States and stand before justice and in the last call on everyone to help us extradition in Colombia led to many deaths today thousands of Colombians extradited to Colombia have returned to Colombia the most important criminals they served six, seven years in prison they were sent to the US because the US said that they guaranteed high sentences and very serious prison conditions so that they would not go back to their criminal activities and now six years later they are being sent back to Colombia so we would like to ask the US government to review the sentences that are being applied they are making legal agreements with those criminals therefore they get to go back to Colombia for a very long time thank you everyone we've had a very deep and fruitful conversation here today very informative for us in Washington DC thank you for your interventions but also the discussion model that has been very candid very open in spite of all those differences regarding the search a warm round of applause for our speakers and guests