 Good afternoon, everyone. Those were the students replying they're well-trained after a year. So welcome back, everybody. This is the second panel this afternoon, and my job is, I would say, probably the easiest job that I've had in the entire 12 months of our academic year, which is to introduce three very esteemed and very well-known scholars. What we're looking at this afternoon is something that is near and dear to my heart, and I think probably near and dear to your heart as well, which is the current challenges, the future trends, the things that we need to be aware of that specialists can really draw us in and provide insight into. So what I'm going to do this afternoon is introduce each of the panelists and then allow them to do their presentations so their background, their context is fresh in your mind as they're giving their presentations. Immediately to my right here I have Dr. Matthew Burrows, who serves as the director of the Atlantic Council's Strategic Foresight Initiative. You probably know him best for something that he authored for the National Intelligence Council, the NIC, which is the Global Trends 2030 Alternative Worlds document. And I know that this is very well read, very well thought of, and both in academic circles and think tanks, but also amongst operators and practitioners. This is a document that has really served to spur discussion and debate about what's coming next and what our future issues are. So Dr. Burrows, I'll hand it over to you, and we have about 15 minutes or so, and then I'll start waving. Thank you very much, and it's a real honor to be here. I wanted to begin actually with a quote that I often use, which is from Charles Dickens' Tale of Two Cities, it's a famous one, it's the best of times, it's the worst of times. I want you to keep that in mind, because I think what we're facing in the future in terms of challenges is actually the result of a lot of success. And Charles Dickens' Tale of Two Cities, the French Revolution, but it's also a time of the Industrial Revolution in England, a revolutionary period. And in many ways we're in the same revolutionary period facing, I would say, even more challenges. So these are five key questions, and I'll answer these as I go through the briefing. But if you were to ask me what were the five key things to watch out for about the future, these would be the five. Beginning with basically middle class aspirations, we're living in a middle class world first time in human history that has huge pressures on governments, both democracies and authoritarian governments. The third is technology. We came from a period I think when back in the 90s, probably this decade when we saw technology is very beneficial. It's really, there are downsides that are occurring, particularly this morning about cyber security a little bit, but there are other security questions, and then there are bigger issues on the economics than on the social. So technology is there, obviously, huge benefits, but also some negatives we have to worry about. The fourth is what we thought. We are seeing a downward trend. Technology is that we may be seeing an uptick on conflict. And the final is how do you put together an international system with so many new rising powers? Previously, the way that question was answered was a world war, and we want to avoid it. So the first big issue, and you'll note I'm not beginning to talk about states, because I actually think this is the age of the individual. You really have this growth of a global middle class, huge. When you're thinking about this is happening over a 20, 30, 40 year period, and you're going to get to a majority of the world are going to be middle class. That means that you're looking, actually, we can begin to see the light at the end of the tunnel on poverty. There still will be poverty in 2030, but not at all like we have known before. This world, though, a middle class is going to be now not Western the way it was 19th, 20th century, but increasingly global. Because population, the biggest populations are in the east and south, that middle class is going to be located in the east and south, and the U.S., Western European, those middle classes actually will form a minority of the world's global middle class. When I talk, and I get lots of invitations to go out and talk, broadly to lots of groups, and there's always a puzzled look that gets on people's faces about this point. We have a campaign, Hillary Clinton's campaign, talking about the decline of the middle class, how you bolster it. You have other campaigns also trying to grapple with this question. It is true that we have seen stagnant incomes for the middle class. This graph basically explains that. This is if you line up all the households in the world and you compare their incomes and you compare this over the last, well, it's between 88 to 2008, so this is a period of huge globalization and historically high levels of global growth. What you're seeing is on that first big hump there, that's the global middle class. The rate of increase in their income over the past couple of decades, as that rate is actually higher than the rate of income growth for the very rich, which are the very end. But in that valley is really the western middle class. This is a case of not all boats rising. The U.S. as a country has done very well, but that western middle class has stagnated in some cases decline. This has huge implications when you're thinking about, I'll just go on. This shows you in the U.S. case exactly what has happened to our medium income. It also, when you're looking at democracies, my thesis on why we are seeing weakness, I would say in western democracies, is based on the economic. Middle classes felt that governments had that responsibility to provide economic opportunities. Those opportunities have been coming in the way that they were in the immediate post-World War II period. You're seeing then something that was not assumed decade or two ago. Assumption was with the growing middle class worldwide, western values would also follow and these new middle classes would actually gravitate to democracy. We've seen, if you follow Freedom House, we've seen basically in the last decade a decline in some of the, and that's what part of the graph indicates, a decline, kind of retrenchment in some of those values. It's not going back to pre the end of the Cold War when you had a huge spurt of democracies, but it is a plateauing of that democracy in a way that we expected that it would actually increase and that you would see pressures grow in China and other places for democracy. Good news is, I want to stress, best of time, worst of time, best of time, education, we've seen a lot more progress than we would have expected. The rates of enrollment, of attainment of secondary or tertiary, going at a much faster rate than they did when the western middle class was expanding in the late 19th and 20th century. We're getting to the point, and this is also very critical, that the gender gap is closing in terms of educational opportunities for young boys and girls. This is happening worldwide. There are some regions that lag a little bit, but nevertheless we're seeing this progress all over. Here's what you wouldn't think you would be seeing in terms of really formal education in the Middle East. You are really seeing real improvements, real growth. The only problem, and it's not shown on this graph, is that PhDs in the Middle East actually have a much harder time of getting jobs than the less skilled. We have a middle class, that's one huge tectonic shift, a middle class world. The other shift that we're looking at, and we don't quite know how this is going to work out, is aging. Aging is happening worldwide, developing states. Some of the developed states, parts of Europe, southern Europe, Germany, Japan, these are aging quite quickly, but more or less everybody is aging except for about 28 countries. Most of them are Sub-Saharan Africa, a few in South Asia. Even the Middle East, the core Middle East, will be aging and it's already starting that process. It's going to be a very slow process there, but you're seeing in this graph basically that there's a crossover point in 2050 when there will be more population over 65 than population under 15. The Sub-Saharan Africa, that is really where you're going to see continued explosive population growth. So the point of Nigeria is going to be 30 to 40% bigger in terms of population over the next 20, 30 years. And in 2050, one out of five people in the world is going to be African. And of the Africans, one out of four will be Nigerian. So the question is, can you keep up economic growth? When you have huge numbers now of your formerly working population actually in retirement. Mackenzie has done a study looking at this, where are you going to get basically what formerly was the labor growth? How are you going to compensate for actually that growth being 40% lower? So 40% lower in terms of worker participation. And the only way is through productivity. Now developing states, productivity is very low. So you can see about how you can boost that up. Some of it has to do with bringing an internet into business operations. But it is a concern in developed states like the U.S. And one of the things, I'm sure you picked up by economists real worry in the U.S. about the fact that productivity has not been picking up in recent years. Now we're at a much higher level than the rest of the world, but nevertheless we will be an aging society. If this, if you wouldn't solve the productivity problem, then you would be looking at global growth 30% lower. And you would be going back to a period before really the last three, four decades when you've had historically high global growth. Other big thing happening, and we've talked a little bit about it, are the technological revolutions. So the internet has really broken open a whole series of other technologies. And these are the robotics, artificial intelligence, biotech, a whole slew. And they are actually, some of them going at a faster speed than Moore's law. So largely again, I would say very beneficial, but real worries about on robotics is it going to come so fast that you're going to displace more workers than you can get new ones trained up and that you can develop new jobs. Are you also biotech concerned that we've been working on in the Atlantic Council looking at the security implications? Because basically now a high schooler can put together an organism. You can send it through a 3D processing all around the world. It's not too, you don't have to be a PhD to really do this, because they're all packaged various ways that you can put together an organism. Still there for putting a lethal one, for developing a virus. It is a really, really live potential and one that in 10, 15 years we could see bioterrorists. Now I remember when we did this briefing in the National Intelligence Council, the question was, well, 10, 15 years ago we should have been thinking about cybersecurity, because all we saw are the good possibilities. What are the things that now we should be thinking about to prevent the negative excesses of these technologies? And that I don't think we're anywhere near of having a conversation on that, particularly as with genetic engineering, parents can determine makeup of their children. China is going ahead looking at what genes correlate with high intelligence. We have the ability or we soon will have the ability as a species to be responsible, able to determine our own evolution. It is a huge revolution, it turns Darwin on his head. One of the big issues looking forward, and there was some comment on this, on the resource issues, and we do have, particularly in the areas of high population growth, they face a perfect storm in many ways, because that's the parts of the world that are going to be impacted by climate change. They're also growing, as I said before, and they also are areas that are already, we know governments are flailing about, have not been able to really tackle the big challenges. So on top of this you add basically water stress, you add also conflict, which makes it harder to invest in terms of increasing your agricultural productivity, and in Africa the productivity has been flat for several decades, despite the increasing demand. In future you could have, like we did in 2008, but on a bigger scale of food crisis, particularly if we have one of the big red basket, producers, US, Canada, Russia, Ukraine, Australia fail simultaneously. Many of the countries in Northern Africa actually depend heavily on imports. Where we have our own drought and really going on in Southwest part of the country, equally again it's many of the parts that are impacted by climate change, so precipitation patterns are changing rapidly and for agriculture in India and other places that depend on rain, they face an uncertain future. Now India, China have much better resources to cope with these issues, Africa doesn't. Finally looking at conflict, and as I said last couple of decades have been the most peaceful in human history, and certainly way down in terms of interstate conflict. Place we worry increasingly interstate, and that is because of the Middle East, Ukraine, Georgia, other places we're seeing this growth in interstate conflict. The idea was that basically we were going to see this continued downward slope because of globalization, because of growing economic interdependence, but if you look back in history you notice that the pattern is an up and down one, and we've had previous episodes of globalization, ones that have been actually quite large episodes during the 1890s before the first World War. The worry here is that we're going to see this pattern reassert itself. Finally looking at this question of the international order. We have seen a rapid, and I put the emphasis particularly on how rapid it has been. China has tripled its GDP per capita, and it took it about 30 years. Even with a half or a third of it, even probably less population took 105 years to triple its GDP per capita. As a result you're seeing where the center of gravity for the world economy shift back to where it started, which is in Asia. This is happening again, very rapid rate, whereas it took thousands of years for the shift to go westward. It's now going back at a very fast clip. As a result you are seeing countries rise, and in a relative sense other countries begin to decline. We and the National Intelligence Council put this together. We used different measures, and it all came out the same, except for you could move the crossover point one way or the other. The important point here is that you are seeing the rise of these first couple giants, the Chinese and the Indians. You are seeing the relative decline of the US and Europe, and also to an extent Japan. Those are the US partners. This new world is not one that isn't made of the western world. It's a G20 world in many ways, not a G7. That makes it I think harder to think about how you put together an order. It also makes it harder, as we were talking about this morning when our own resources, particularly for defense, are going to go down unless we begin to really tackle our financial issues. Now that shows you, if you're looking at entitlements, this is the result of, as I said before, the aging of society, of the US. It does mean that you're moving into a world where you do have major new forces and major new challenges. You're not going to have those same resources that we traditionally have had. The final thing, and this is really the message, and I think others have talked about it. I still see the US as the center of the international system, but I don't think the status quo can actually be maintained. We have to think imaginatively about how to redesign it, and we have a small window in order to do that. As what we have, and I don't have time to go enjoy it, there are all sorts of different scenarios that you can imagine, a lot of them not very good. All the good ones actually involve US thinking about how to redesign it, so you are inclusive at the same time that we have a hope of maintaining Western values. With that, I'll finish. Thank you so much for that fabulous overview. The best of times and the worst of times, I would say keep this in our head as we move forward. Three provocative questions and then a very scary conversation about resilience and how much of our GDP we're losing as we're sitting here thinking about cyber issues. Which actually brings us round to then our third presenter today, Professor Joel Trackman, who is a professor of international law at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University in Boston. And as a graduate of that institution, I will tell you that Professor Trackman's courses are considered to be the gold standard. You're very lucky if you manage to get into one of his courses and you're even lucky if you manage to graduate and get out the other side. His research interests include international economic law, including international trade, finance, migration, investment and business law. In addition to consulting for the United Nations, OECD, APEC and the World Bank, Professor Trackman is also the author of many books and articles, including two of my favorites. One is the tool of argument how the best lawyers think, argue and win. And the last one, ruling the world, constitutionalism, international law and global governance. So with that, I will hand it over to Professor Trackman. Thank you very much, Andrea. It's really an honor and it's a great learning experience for me to be here. I wanted to really reflect on some of General Gluck's comments and other comments today about the increasing complexity of warfare and maybe just to broaden that of contention. By looking at the expanded non-kinetic toolbox that I think is available to enemies and to allies alike and to recognize, as Dr. Pinovich said, that we're seeking advantage. We're seeking asymmetric advantage and our opponents are too. And what I want to look at is lawfare, the use of legal argumentation and legal fora to one's advantage or to undermine an opponent's ability to seek advantage. And I think the traditional approach to law in every area, including in military affairs, is to comply with law. But I think in business as well as in military affairs, it's important to know that you can use law to seek advantage versus an opponent and perhaps to achieve your goals. So first I should define lawfare and the traditional definition, one coined by General Charles Dunlap of the Air Force now at Duke University, is that it's a strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective. And when you hear him say it's possibly for misuse, you can see the kind of pejorative context. It's something that the bad guys do to restrict the good guys in their ability to carry out operations. But I think it's possible that good guys can use lawfare also and that lawfare can be good. In fact, to the extent that lawfare can be a substitute for kinetic warfare and can be used to achieve your goals, then it can be something that's quite attractive. So when we use it to achieve our objectives at low cost, lawfare is good. Even I would say when we and others are appropriately, appropriately held to account for our actions, there it's good too. And it's something that we fight for in connection with the rule of law. And so it's something that if it's used properly and structured appropriately, it should not be something that strikes fear or anger in our hearts. So in 1999, a couple of scholars, a couple of officers, I should say, of the People's Liberation Army authored a paper called Unrestricted Warfare. One of the things I mentioned in an almost offhand way was the possibility of changing legal rules to one's advantage. And we can see that playing out in the exquisite strategy in the South China Sea and in other areas, the attempt to change rules, but also perhaps to change facts in a way that change the effects of the rules and give an advantage in the legal and perhaps in the propaganda context. So of course, as you know, Von Klausowitz said that war is the continuation of politics by other means. I teach my business law students that litigation is the continuation of business negotiations by other means. And so law is somewhere in between politics and kinetic warfare. And in fact, to say it's in between is not really accurate because I think we can look at it as a kind of integrated aspect of contention. And that's really what I'm trying to suggest is that that's the proper way to understand law, not just as something that we must comply with, but as something that is a component of strategic decision making. And I'd like to conjecture with you about what that would mean. So first, think of lawfare in context, where it's part of contestation in a multi-dimensional board. And lawfare is different from kinetic warfare. It's a kind of symbolic contention like morality or history or religion, where we say this is the way it should be. But law has a kind of difference where sometimes it can have a broader universal appeal. And actually one of the interesting questions in dealing with others and trying to assess the extent to which they might comply with law is to try to look at them individually and understand to what extent are they likely to comply with the rules. What is it about them that might allow us to predict their behavior in response to law? So it's different from geographic arenas. It's even different from some of the other functional arenas like cyber or bio. And of course, once you think about it that way, it's important to recognize that a move that might look good on the kinetic board might look terrible on the lawfare board. And so that's the reason for integrated decision making. So there are a number of different types of things that we could call lawfare. I want to focus on three of them. The first is what you might think of as conventional lawfare, where law is used as a constraint on operational capabilities of an opponent. And here we actually, the Israelis, as you know, launched a preemptive strike against Hamas and even against the United Nations on Sunday. And that preemptive strike was led by a German general. What I'm talking about is the preparation and publication of a report on Israel's compliance. And I don't want to litigate that here today, but I want to say they did this report that purports to show that they did comply quite well with the laws of war just in advance of their expectation of a United Nations Council report and in anticipation of eventual attempts to prosecute Israeli military personnel and government officials at the International Criminal Court. So a preemptive strike. And so that's one type of lawfare. A second type of lawfare is where law is used as a form of conflict where it ends with the use of law. And the hope of the international community for a while since the United Nations Charter, at least maybe since Nuremberg, was that we could outlaw the use of aggressive force. And indeed, there is a law against the use of aggressive force. As you know, that's not working out all that well. But the interesting question is the counterfactual, which is hard to assess. Which wars might have happened if that law had not been in place? And the really interesting question is how could international institutions be designed? How could we work with others generally and opponents in particular to make that lawfare more effective in avoiding warfare? So law as a defense against aggression, of course that didn't work out so well for Ukraine and the Crimea. The development of facts on the ground or sort of facts in the water in the South China Sea. Law as a substitute for conflict. And one area, it's a modest area of success. But it looks like an area of success is general territorial conflicts addressed in the world court. Where states, of course, agree to present those conflicts to the world court. And it seems to result in a resolution of many of those conflicts where one can guess that some subset of those conflicts might have resulted in warfare. So three types of lawfare. I'm sorry, I forgot to mention the third. And that is where law is used to gain access to an enemy. In a way that can allow an easier attack on the enemy. So in the area of cyber security, it's the possibility that network gear or software might contain Trojan horses. And under the law of trade, law of the world trade organization, a state might find itself compelled to accept that network gear and not have the ability to avoid dangers. Similarly with bio weapons that might be subject to that kind of legal right of entry. Where in all of the treaties involved in the world trade organization treaty and the investment treaties, because sometimes this comes up with investment, there are security exceptions. But those security exceptions are written in a way that is not always useful. And so one question is can we write those better? Can we work better to ensure that we're not required to accept those kinds of attacks? So let me just say a word about Article 24 of the United Nations Charter. It's easy to see where that prohibition on the aggressive use of force fails. One problem is the indeterminacy of exceptions. And the lack of a definitive authoritative forum for determination of the availability of those exceptions. So of course, there's an exception for self-defense. Well, I don't have to say to this audience that there are all sorts of ways that self-defense might be characterized. There's the idea supported by the United States, but not necessarily clearly in international law, that you can protect your nationals abroad. And the Russians in the Crimea said those people are our nationals. They weren't Russian citizens, so it's a different definition of nationality than most of us would think of. There's the emergent idea which many people who are interested in human rights and solving serious problems, serious humanitarian problems like of humanitarian intervention. And the fear is that the bad guys use humanitarian intervention, use that pretext. So those things are easy to manipulate and we don't have the ability to determine them definitively. And even the United States has established some inconvenient precedents. And one of the aspects of law in this context is that when you violate it or you decline to accept it at time one, you might regret that decision at time two because it can be turned against you. This is what all international lawyers say. This is why you should comply with international law because you'll wish that the rule was there later on. And so as the United States and other countries make decisions in this area, they need to recognize that they may find that they've created inconvenient precedents. And despite all of this uncertainty, I think it's true that Russia has paid a heavy price for its separation of Crimea from the Ukraine. Let me just mention one other thing along those lines in connection with the South China Sea. Earlier today in a question and answer, there was this question about the Philippines' claim against China under the Law of the Sea Convention and its arbitration capability. China, interestingly, has withdrawn from most of that arbitration capability. There will be a decision next month as to whether that withdrawal really covered exactly what the Philippines is claiming. But here, China's withdrawal will at least provide a chance and maybe a significant chance for China to avoid that jurisdiction. Interestingly, the United States, of course, cannot use the Law of the Sea Convention because the United States is not a party to that convention. So let me just say a word about Israel and Hamas. So I think it's clear that Hamas did a very careful job of planning for asymmetric warfare, inciting its missiles and its fighters so as to deprive its enemy of some of its less discriminant weapons. And by really making it tough for its enemy to avoid attacking to delegitimate that enemy's position in the international public arena. There's even been a media campaign, and this is along the lines of that PLA paper about changing international law, seeking to redefine proportionality in the law of armed conflict as proportionality of casualties among civilians instead of proportionality between a mission and the means used for that mission. So Israel has learned about this and is engaging in planning and response, including the response that I mentioned, but also including innovation in protection of civilians. Avoiding the International Criminal Court, avoiding countries like the Netherlands and Spain that have had universal jurisdiction over people who commit these types of crimes. Declining, and this is a judgment that may or may not be a good one, declining to cooperate with the Human Rights Commission investigation, the Shabas report, even though Shabas is no longer on that group. So I think as you think about this idea of lawfare, it's important to recognize that it can be used in strategic planning, but it has to be done in a very particular way, opponent by opponent and conflict by conflict, looking at the relevant legal rules that might affect the strategic decision making, your strategic decision making, and your opponent's strategic decision making. And part of that question, as I've said, is the question of how important is international law to your opponent. And there's some survey evidence where people ask citizens how important is international law to you. And there's other things that you can look at, like the number of international agreements that a particular country has. But we need better ways of measuring and maybe even finding out about particular legal rules to what extent those will affect our enemy's behavior. Is there a formal process? Are there penalties? What would we want in terms of design, in terms of specific contexts to have legal rules that will impose costs on our opponents, and hopefully not impose costs on us, not require us to be constrained in what we think are valuable operations? So what would it mean to have an integrated legal strategic analysis? We have questions like when will law prevent aggression? How can we redesign law to prevent aggression? How can we identify disputes that might be amenable to non-kinetic resolution? What's the value of this to our opponent? Are they really going to go to war? Is there a legal rule that we can establish or that we can refer to that will constrain them? And that could allow you to determine how to deploy your kinetic forces given the ability of your legal forces to resolve certain problems. It's also important to identify potentially legally salient facts that your opponent, China and the South China Sea, or other opponents might be working to change. And to identify that and respond with freedom of the seas operations or other operations that respond and deprive your opponent of those facts that will support their propaganda legal argument. I think it's also important, as the Israelis have shown, to develop and sometimes to stock appropriate weapons systems so as to maximize effectiveness under legal constraint. Do you need to have a knock on the roof munition in order to carry out your operations? Where should you put those things? Another point, and I think this relates to the broader changing context, is that in a sense every asymmetric civilian oriented and even non-civilian oriented warfare is like Ferguson, where there's going to be videotape, there's going to be lots of evidence. And combatants have to be trained to expect that and to act accordingly in terms of their compliance with rule. So there needs to be training, there needs to be record keeping, maybe body cameras for certain types of forces to make sure that you're above reproach. We need to resist opponents' attempts to change international law to their advantage. And I think here I'll sound an optimistic note. I think there's a great deal of shared interest in a number of areas so that it's possible to agree together to change international law to the general advantage in a way that would benefit this country and other countries. And finally, before taking action, I think it's important to anticipate the reversal of positions and to factor in the possibility of establishing an adverse precedent that will work to your disadvantage in the future. So I think lawfare is a kind of innovation and contention. There's been a dramatic rise in law in the world since the Second World War. And with this rise in the amount of law comes a greater capability to frame different issues in different ways. Is this a human rights issue or is it a law of armed conflict issue? Is it a trade issue? And so there's lots of potentially applicable law. And one of the creative things that one can do, that your lawyers can do for you, is to identify legal rules that might be applicable that nobody thought of before. And that's a source of advantage. So I think this strategic approach anticipates bringing to bear the power of law, of international law specifically. I think it would be ignorant. We sometimes think, well, we can't prevent war so international law is irrelevant. I think that's an ignorant position because I can point to lots of circumstances where this country and other countries change their behavior in response to legal rules. And so it's also ignorant, as many traditional international lawyers have assumed, that law is always effective. And so the better analytical position is to try to identify the circumstances where lawfare can be effective and to craft a fully integrated kinetic and lawfare based strategy. Thank you. Thank you very much, Professor Trackman. So my job for the next five minutes or so is to take your questions, answer questions, direct them to our panelists. I would say one of the ways to look at this is all three of our panelists have given us perspectives on cooperation and conflict. The extent to which competition is systemic, the extent to which the international system needs to flex, needs to change to absorb some of these challenges. And from all three of our presenters, I think they gave us the challenge of creativity. If this is what the world is looking at, this is what the future trends are, we need to be creative to figure out how we're going to incorporate that in our thoughts going forward. So we have about 10 minutes or so to ask the panelists questions. If you have a particular panelist you wish to single out, by all means do so. If not, then please say it's for the entire panel. And then just two thoughts. For those of you who have questions, please try to ask the question rather than tell us what the world is shaped like and lots of background. And there is absolutely no requirement to stand up to ask your questions. One of the foundation members pointed out to me last year, Andrea, we have very sharp minds, but we have very creaky knees. Please don't make us bob up and down. If you do ask a question, please try and use the microphone. And if you're sitting next to somebody who's fumbling with a microphone, please try to help them with the microphone. The acoustics in this building go front and back, but they don't go sideways. So the microphones really help us to be able to hear each other. So with that, I will open it up to, we have time for three or four profound and deep questions. A gentleman at the back and then the lady here at the front. Yes, please. Hello, I'd like to, my name is Austin Schofield. I'm a Naval War College Foundation member. I want to ask a question about cyber warfare. I know you had various other definitions for it. My question is the casualties in cyber warfare and cyber cyber attacks. So often our citizens or businesses, what responsibility does the military have to protect these businesses? If they're being attacked by a state actor or a non-state actor that's funded by a state. So the lady at the front who had her hand up, please. Thank you. Anyone in the panel can answer this one because it kind of crosses, I think, a couple different boundaries. What I haven't heard, but I do think is relevant to everything you've discussed, is the point about privacy and about U.S. persons. I work for DIA and U.S. persons. I've interpreted the Executive Order 12.3.5248.1-R. And how you use strategy and how you look at rules and engagement and what you can and can't do. Given the context of that, if we are trending east and south, they don't follow those same rules. They don't look at privacy and or persons in the same way. From a legal perspective and how we look at how we work with cyber and how we store data or the big data issues. Everyone's wranging themselves around about, oh, with big data, we've got to worry about the U.S. persons. Well, the definition of U.S. persons seems to be changing a bit, too. And the enemy also knows that areas that we restrict ourselves. So from a strategy perspective, from trends and all that, how do we solve those issues? Let me just say, in addition to those thoughts, which I think are really very interesting. I think our data is going to become either voluntarily on our part or because of governmental or business activity somewhere recorded electronically. And the cat is out of the bag. And I think the only recourse after that is a legal recourse to say to a business, you've abused my data or to a government, you've abused my data. And here I think the problem is with globalization and the fact that the data moves around quite a bit. And globalization of these kinds of technologies and the commerce that they allow is very, very valuable. And so in order to have that globalization, the United States had a very tough negotiation with the European Union over its data privacy efforts. In order to have that globalization, we kind of have to agree about who's in control of which data or agree about what the standards will be. And I think you're going to see more of that over time to respond to the important questions that you've raised. I don't have a solution for this problem, but I think when you're talking about U.S. persons, I think we're comfortable with the idea of immigration and people coming to live here. But what you're increasingly seeing is really movement or mobility, where people actually may not have any real residence for an extended period of time. This is particularly at the highly skilled level where they're really living in several different countries throughout a year in high demand. And we're going to see this particularly as we see labor shortages in aging states where there really will be a demand. It won't necessarily be that they come and settle. So how to define what a U.S. person is in that sort of environment, and it's already, as you indicated, difficult to do that, I think is going to become even more difficult. When I was listening to Matthew Barrows, I was hearing some of the old conflict, have and have nots. And in this world, of course, HABS has something to do with innovation, software creativity, entrepreneurship, ever more so than in past eras. And then you get into the protection laws. Historical studies show that economic might has been much stronger in countries with these strongest property laws than countries that didn't. And this goes back, these studies go back a very long way. So if we're to provide opportunity, don't we need to provide a combination of military and legal protection for that opportunity? And of course, the laws need to be backed up, so you do need guns. How do you see the combination, Professor, of protecting our economic properties, our properties, the combination of law and military? Well, it's an interesting question, and I don't claim expertise on intellectual property rights. But what I'll say is, you know, in the current negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, the United States is seeking actively to enhance intellectual property protections in those partner states, especially in the Pacific. And the United States did a lot in that regard in connection with the formation of the World Trade Organization in 1995. And so intellectual property rights have been advanced. So the last time I studied this, and I think it's still true, economists really don't know. They profess ignorance as to how strong intellectual property rights protection should be. Right now, if you invent something, you get a patent that lasts 20 years. Why 20 years? It seems rather arbitrary. If you invent something, perhaps you should get that forever. Also, those laws are used sometimes to stifle innovation, to attack new innovators. So as I say, it's not an area I know well, but I know there's ambivalence about their quality. I think in the end, for commercial law, I would be against having a military used to enforce those laws. And the reason is that as a liberal in the classical sense, I believe that other countries should have a right to their systems of laws and that we shouldn't use military force to change them, except in the most extreme circumstances. Intellectual property rights would not qualify along those lines. So I think that's an area where politics and legal contestation and things short of kinetic warfare seem most appropriate. Good afternoon. All three of you touched on the cyberspace, the internet for good and for bad. But one thing that I look at is how strong it is at influencing public opinion. I know during the Algerian war, the FLN influenced public opinion with Le Mans, with the French newspaper, and they got what they wanted. Ultimately, the freedom flotilla, the views from that were on the YouTube instantaneously. What's your opinion on how that's changed, how the public opinion has been influenced by the internet? Well, I think Brzezinski mentions this in his last strategy book, which is basically that you have a public opinion out there that is worldwide that sees everything instantaneously. And I think what where I just came back from a conference in Poland and what everybody is trying to grapple with is why an authoritarian leader who in many ways has suppressed a lot of his media, brought it under state control has nevertheless been very good at crafting a narrative that appeals not only to populate his public in Russia, but also in countries and surrounding areas, including obviously in parts of Ukraine. And I think the cyber obviously is a big part in increasing that connectivity, getting the pictures sent around the world instantaneously. But what we have to think about as well as what sort of messages, how you craft them into a narrative and what that narrative is. And at least the opinion of the people in Poland and other places is that the West, including the US, has really been behind the curve in developing its own narrative. And that that is the critical part, even though we have a lot more assets on the cyber society, on the media and so on, that we really haven't learned that lesson. Okay, so the rules of engagement here are that when Captain Mike Sherlock stands, I'm getting the hook. So regrettably we've run out of time for further questions, but I know that our panelists have provided us with many interesting things to think about for tomorrow's discussion. So thank you all to our panelists.