 Spinoza by Charles Bradlaw This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Reading by Greg Marguerite Spinoza by Charles Bradlaw Baruch Spinoza, or Espinoza, better known under the name of Benedict Spinoza, as rendered by himself in the Latin language, was born at Amsterdam in Holland on the 24th of November 1632. There is some uncertainty as to this date as there are several dates fixed by different authors, both for his birth and death, but we have adopted the biography by Dr. C. H. Bruder in the preface to his edition of Spinoza's Works. His parents were Jews of the middle, or perhaps somewhat humbler class. His father was originally a Spanish merchant who, to escape persecution, had emigrated to Holland. Although the life of our great philosopher is one full of interesting incidents and deserves to be treated fully, we have but room to give a very brief sketch, referring our readers who wish to learn more of Spinoza's life to Lewis's biographical history of philosophy, Westminster Review No. 77, and in Cyclopædia Britannica, Page 144. His doctrines we will let speak for themselves in his own words, trusting thereby to give the reader an opportunity of knowing who and what Spinoza really was. One man shrinks with horror from him as an atheist. Voltaire says that he was an atheist and taught atheism. Another calls him a God-intoxicated man. We present him a mighty thinker, a mastermind, a noble, fearless, otterer of free and noble thoughts. A hard-working, honest, independent man, as one who two centuries ago gave forth to the world a series of thinking which have crushed with resistless force the theological shell in the center of which the priests hide the kernel, truth. Spinoza appears in his boyhood to have been an apt scholar and to have rapidly mastered the task set him by his teachers. Full of rabbinical lore he won the admiration of the Rabbi Moses Mortira, but the pupil rose higher than his master and attempted to solve problems which the learned rabbis were content to reverence as mysteries not capable of solution. First they remonstrated, then threatened. Still Spinoza persevered in his studies and in making known the results to those around him. He was threatened with excommunication and withdrew himself from the synagogue. One more effort was made by the rabbis who offered Spinoza a pension of about a hundred pounds a year if he would attend the synagogue more frequently and consent to be silent with regard to his philosophical thinking. This offer he indignantly refused. Reason failing, threats providing futile and gold being treated with scorn, one was found sufficiently fanatic to try a further experiment which resulted in an attempt on Spinoza's life. The knife, however, luckily missed its aim and our hero escaped. At last in the year 1660 Spinoza being then 28 years of age was solemnly excommunicated from the synagogue. His friends and relations shut their doors against him. An outcast from the home of his youth he gained a humble livelihood by polishing glasses for microscopes, telescopes, etc., at which he was very expert. While thus acquiring by his own handiwork the means of subsistence he was studying hard, devoting every possible hour to philosophical research. Spinoza became master of the Dutch, Hebrew, German, Spanish, Portuguese, and Latin languages, the latter of which he acquired in the house of one Francis Van de End, who from it is more than probable he received as much instruction in atheism as in Latin. Spinoza only appears to have once fallen in love, and this was with Van de End's daughter, who was herself a good linguist and who gave Spinoza instruction in Latin. She, however, although willing to be his instructress and companion in a philological path, declined to accept his love, and thus Spinoza was left to philosophy alone. After his excommunication he retired to Rheinsburg near the city of Leiden in Holland, and there studied the works of Descartes. Three years afterwards he published an abridgment of the meditations of the great father of philosophy, which created a profound sensation. In an appendix to this abridgment were contained the germs of those thinking in which the pupil outdid the master, and the student progressed beyond the philosopher. In the month of June 1664 Spinoza removed to Werberg a small village near the Hague, where he was visited by persons from different parts, attracted by his fame as a philosopher, and at last, after many solicitations, he came to the Hague and resided there altogether. In 1670 he published his Trek to Theologico Politicus. This raised him a host of opponents. Many writers rushed eager for the fray to tilt with the poor Dutch Jew. His book was officially condemned and forbidden, and a host of refudiations were circulated against it. In spite of the condemnation it has outlived the refudiations. Spinoza died on the 21st or 22nd of February 1677 in his 45th year, and was buried on the 25th of February at the Hague. He was frugal in his habits, subsisting independently on the earnings of his own hands. Honorable in all things, he refused to accept the chair of professor of philosophy offered to him by the elector, and this because he did not wish to be circumscribed in his thinking, or in the freedom of utterance of his thoughts. He also refused a pension offered to him by Louis XIV, saying that he had no intention of dedicating anything to that monarch. The following is a list of Spinoza's works. Principaiorum Philosophis Renati Descartes, Tractatus Theologico Politicus, Ethica, Tractatus Politicus, Diamanditione Intellectis, Epistolei, Grammaticus Hebrache, etc. There are also several spurious works ascribed to Spinoza. The Tractatus Politicus has been translated into English by William McCall, who seems fully to appreciate the greatness of the philosopher, although he will not admit the usefulness of Spinoza's logic. McCall does not see the utility of that very logic which compelled him to admit Spinoza's truth. We are not aware of any other translation of Spinoza's works except that of a small portion of his Ethica by Louis. This work, which was originally published in 1677, commenced with eight definitions, which together with the following axioms and propositions were reprinted from the Westminster Review in the Library of Reason. Definitions 1. By cause of itself, I understand that the essence of which involves existence, or that the nature of which can only be considered as existent. 2. A thing finite is that which can be limited, terminari protest. By another thing of the same nature, ergo, body is said to be finite, because it can always be conceived as larger. So thought is limited by other thoughts, but body does not limit thought, nor thought limit body. 3. By substance I understand that which is in itself, and is conceived per se. That is, the conception of which does not require the conception of anything else as antecedent to it. 4. By attribute I understand that which the mind perceives as constituting the very essence of substance. 5. By modes I understand the accidents, affections of substance, or that which is in something else, through which also it is conceived. 6. By God I understand the being absolutely infinite. That is, the substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an infinite and eternal essence. Explication. I say, absolutely infinite, but not in Suo genre. For to whatever is infinite, but not in Suo genre, we can deny infinite attributes. But that which is absolutely infinite, to its essence, pertains everything which implies essence, and involves no negation. 7. That thing is said to be free which exists by the soul necessity of its nature, and by itself alone is determined to action. But that is necessary, or rather constrained, which owes its existence to another and acts according to certain and determinant causes. 8. By eternity I understand existence itself in as far as it is conceived necessarily to follow from the soul definition of an eternal thing. Axioms. 1. Everything which is, is in itself, or in some other thing. 2. That which cannot be conceived through another, per allude must be conceived, per se. 3. From a given determinant cause, the effect necessarily follows, and vice versa. If no determinant cause be given, no effect can follow. 4. The knowledge of an effect depends on the knowledge of the cause, and includes it. 5. Things that have nothing in common with each other cannot be understood by means of each other. That is, the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. 6. A true idea must agree with its original in nature. 7. Whatever can be clearly conceived as non-existent does not, in its essence, involve existence. Propositions. 1. Substance is prior in nature to its accidents, demonstration, per definitions 3 and 5. 2. Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with each other. Dem. This follows from definition 3 for each substance must be conceived in itself and through itself. In other words, the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. 3. Of things which have nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the other. Dem. If they have nothing in common, then, per axiom 5, they cannot be conceived by means of each other. Ergo, per axiom 4. 1 cannot be the cause of the other. QED. 4. Two or more distinct things are distinguished among themselves, either through the diversity of their attributes or through that of their modes. Dem. Everything which is in itself or in some other thing, per axiom 1, that is, per definitions 3 and 5, there is nothing out of ourselves. Extra intellectum, outside the intellect, but substance and its modes. There is nothing out of ourselves whereby things can be distinguished amongst one another except substances, or which is the same thing as, per definition 4, their attributes and modes. 5. It is impossible that there should be two or more substances of the same nature or of the same attributes. Dem. If there are many different substances, they must be distinguished by the diversity of their attributes or of their modes, per proposition 4. If only by the diversity of their attributes it is thereby conceded that there is nevertheless only one substance of the same attribute. But if their diversity of modes, then substance being prior in order of time to its modes, it must be considered independent of them. That is, per definitions 3 and 6 cannot be conceived as distinguished from another, that is, per proposition 4. There cannot be many substances, but only one substance. QED. 6. One substance cannot be created by another substance. Dem. There cannot be two substances with the same attributes, per proposition 5, that is, per proposition 2, that have anything in common with each other, and therefore, per proposition 3, one cannot be the cause of the other. Corollary 1. Hence it follows that substance cannot be created by anything else, for there is nothing in nature except substance and its modes, per axiom 1 and definitions 3 and 5. Now this substance not being produced by another is self-caused. Corollary 2. This proposition is more easily to be demonstrated by the absurdity of its contradiction. For if substance can be produced by anything else, the conception of it would depend on the conception of the cause, per axiom 4, and hence, per definition 3, it would not be substance. 7. It pertains to the nature of substance to exist. Dem. Substance cannot be produced by anything else, per Corollary proposition 6, and is therefore the cause of itself, that is, per definition 1, its essence necessarily involves existence, or it pertains to the nature of substance to exist. QED. 8. All substance is necessarily infinite. Dem. There exists but one substance of the same attribute, and it must either exist as infinite or finite, but not finite for, per definition 2, as the finite it must be limited by another substance of the same nature, and in that case there would be two substances of the same attributes, which, per proposition 5, is absurd. Substance, therefore, is infinite. QED. Corollary 1. I do not doubt but that to all who judge confusedly of things and are not want to inquire into first causes, it will be difficult to admit the demonstration of Proposition 7, because they do not sufficiently distinguish between the modifications of substances and substances themselves, and are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced. Hence it follows that the commencement which they see natural things have, they attribute to substances. For he who knows not the true cause of things confounds all things, and feigns that trees talk like men, that men are formed from stones, as well as from seeds, and that all forms can be changed into all other forms. So also those who confound the divine nature with the human naturally attribute human affections to God, especially as they are ignorant of how these affections are produced in the mind. If men attended to the nature of substance they would not in the least doubt Proposition 7. Nay, this proposition would be an axiom to all, and would be numbered among common notions. For by substance they would understand that which exists in itself, and is concerned through itself, i.e., the knowledge of which does not require the knowledge of anything as antecedent to it. But by modification they would understand that which is in another thing, the conception of which is formed by the conception of the thing in which it is, or to which it belongs. We can have, therefore, correct ideas of non-existent modifications, because although out of the understanding they have no reality, yet their essence is so comprehended in that of another, that they can be conceived through this other. The truth of substance, out of the understanding, lies nowhere but in itself, because it is conceived, per se. If, therefore, anyone says he has a clear idea of substance, and yet doubt whether such substance exist, this would be as much as to say that he has a true idea, and nevertheless doubts whether it be not false, as a little attention sufficiently manifests. Or if any man affirms substance to be created, he at the same time affirms that a true idea has become false, than which nothing can be more absurd. Hence it is necessarily confessed that the existence of substance, as well as its essence, is an eternal truth. And hence we must conclude that there is only one substance possessing the same attribute which requires here a fuller development. I note, therefore, that the correct definition of a thing includes and expresses nothing but the nature of the thing defined, from which follows two. That no definition includes or expresses a distinct number of individuals, because it expresses nothing but the nature of the thing defined. Ergo, the definition of a triangle expresses no more than the nature of a triangle, and not any fixed number of triangles. Three. There must necessarily be a distinct cause for the existence of every existing thing. Four. This cause, by reason of which anything exists, must either be contained in the nature and definition of the existing thing, vis that it pertains to its nature to exist, or else must be beyond it, must be something different from it. As therefore it pertains to the nature of substance to exist, so must its definition include a necessary existence, and consequently from its sole definition we must conclude its existence. But, as from its definition as already shown in notes 2 and 3, it is not possible to conclude the existence of many substances. Ergo, it necessarily follows that only one substance of the same nature can exist. It will be necessary for the reader to remember that Spinoza commenced his philosophical studies at the same point with Descartes. Both recognized existence as the primal fact, self-evident, and indisputable. But, while Descartes had in some manner fashioned a quality, God and God-created substance, Spinoza only found one substance, the definition of which included existence. By his fourth proposition of things which have nothing in common one cannot be the cause of the other, he destroyed the creation theory, because by that theory God is assumed to be a spirit having nothing in common with matter, yet acting on matter, and Lewis speaks of the fourth proposition in the following terms. This fallacy has been one of the most influential corruptors of philosophical speculation. For many years it was undisputed, and most metaphysicians still adhere to it. The assertion is that only like can act upon like, but although it is true that like produces, causes like, it is also true that like produces unlike. Thus fire produces pain when applied to our bodies, explosion when applied to gunpowder, charcoal when applied to wood. All these effects are unlike the cause. We cannot help thinking that in this instance the usually thoughtful Lewis has either confused substance with its modes, or for the sake of producing a temporary effect has descended to mere sophism. Spinoza's proposition is that substances, having nothing in common, cannot act on one another. Lewis deals with several modes of the same substance as though they were different substances. Way, more to make his argument the more plausible, he entirely ignores in it that nominal of which he speaks as underlying all phenomena, and uses each phenomenon as a separate existence. In each of the instances mentioned, however varied may be the modification, the essence is the same. They are merely examples of one portion of the whole acting upon another portion, and there is that in each mode which is common to the whole, and by means of which the action takes place. Much has been said of Spinoza's God and divine substance, and we must refer the reader to definition six, in which God is defined as being infinite substance. Now although we should be content to strike the word God out of our own tablet of philosophical nomenclature, as being a much misused misrepresented and entirely useless word, yet we must be very careful when we find another man using the word to get his precise definition, and not to use any other ourselves while in his company. Spinoza, when asked, What name do you attach to infinite substance, says God. If he had said any other word we could not have quarreled with him so long as he defined the word and adhered strictly to the terms of his definition, although we might regret that he had not either coined a word for himself or used one less maltreated by the mass. Spinoza said, I can only take cognizance of one substance, of which I am part, having infinite attributes of extension and thought. I take cognizance of substance by its modes, and in my consciousness of existence. Everything is a mode of the attribute of extension, every thought, wish, or feeling a mode of the attribute of thought. I call this substance with infinite attributes, God. Spinoza, like all other thinkers, found himself overpowered by the illimitable vastness of the infinite when attempting to grasp it by his mental powers. But unlike other men, he did not endeavor to relieve himself by separating himself from that infinite, but knowing he was part of the whole, not divisible from the remainder. He was content to aim at perfecting his knowledge of existence, rather than at dogmatizing upon an indefinable word, which, if it represented anything, professed to represent an incomprehensible existence far beyond his reach. We ought not to wonder that in many parts of Spinoza's writings we find the word God, treated in a less coherent manner than would be possible under the definition given in his ethics. And for these reasons, Spinoza, from his cradle upwards, had been surrounded with books and traditions sanctified by the past, and impressed on his willing mind by his family, his tutors, and the heads of his church. A mind like his gathered all that was given, even more quickly than it was offered, still craving for more, more light, more light. And at last light came bursting on the young thinker like a lightning flash at dark midnight, revealing his mind in chains which had been cast round him in his nursery, his school, his college, his synagogue. By a mighty effort he burst these chains and walked forth a free man, despite the entreaties of his family, the reasonings of the rabbis, the knife of the fanatic, the curse of the church, and the edict of the state. But should it be a matter of surprise to us that some of the links of those broken chains should still hang on the young philosopher, and seeming to be a part of himself, almost imperceptibly inclined to old ways of thinking and old modes of utterance of those thoughts? Wondered not that a few links bang about him, but rather that he ever succeeded in breaking those chains at all? Spinoza after his secession from his synagogue became logically an atheist. Education and early impressions enlarged this into a less clearly defined pantheism, but the logic comes to us naked, disrobed of all by which it might have been surrounded in Spinoza's mind. If that logic be correct, then all the theologies of the world are false. We have presented it to the reader to judge for himself. Many men have written against it. Of these some have misunderstood, some have misrepresented, some have failed, and few have left us a proof that they have endeavored to deal with Spinoza on his own ground. McCall says, In the glorious throng of heroic names there are few nobler than Spinozas. Apart altogether from the estimate we may form of his philosophy there is something unspeakably interesting in the life and the character of the man. In his metaphysical system there are two things exceedingly distinct. There is first the immense and prodigious but terrible mathematical skeleton which his subtle intellect binds up and throws as calmly into space as we drop a pebble into the water, and whose bones, striking against the wreck of all that is sacred in belief or bold in speculation, rattle a wild response to our wildest fantasies, and drive us almost to think in despair that thinking is madness. And there is, secondly, the divinest vision of the infinite, and the divinest incense which the intuition of the infinite ever yet poured forth at the altar of creation. The treaties on politics is not Spinoza's greatest work. It is in all respects inferior to the ethics and to the theological political treaties. But there are in politics certain eternal principles, and it is for setting forth and elucidating these that the treaties of Spinoza is so valuable. In the second chapter of that treaty, after defining what he means by nature, etc., he on the sixth section proceeds as follows. But many believe that the ignorant disturb more than follow the order of nature, and conceive of men in nature as a state within the state, for they assert that the human mind has not been produced by any natural causes but created immediately by God, and thereby rendering so independent of other things as to have absolute power of determining itself, and of using reason aright. But experience teaches us more than enough that it is no more in our power to have a sound mind than a sound body. Since moreover, everything as far as it is able strives to conserve its being, we cannot doubt that if it were equally in our power to live according to the precepts of reason as to be led by blind desire, all would seek the guidance of reason and live wisely, which is not the case. For everyone is the slave of the particular pleasure to which he is most attached, nor do theologians remove the difficulty when they assert that this inability is a vice or a sin of human nature which derives its origin from the fall of the first parent. For if it was in the power of the first man to stand rather than to fall, and if he was sound in faculty and had perfect control over his own mind, how did it happen that he, the wise and prudent, fell? But they say he was deceived and tempted by the devil. But who was it that led astray and tempted the devil himself? Who, I ask, rendered this the most excellent of intelligent creatures so mad that he wished to be greater than God? Could he render himself thus mad? He who had a sane mind and strove as much as in him lay to conserve his being? How, moreover, could it happen that the first man in possession of his entire mental faculties and master of his will should be both open to temptation and suffer himself to be robbed of his mind? For if he had the power of using his reason or right, he could not be deceived. For as far as in him lay, he necessarily sought to conserve his own being and the sanity of his mind. But it is supposed he had this in his power. Therefore he necessarily conserved his sane mind. Neither could he be deceived. Which is evidently false from his history, and consequently it must be granted that it was not in the power of the first person to use reason or right, but that he, like us, was subject to passions. Spinoza is scarcely likely to become a great favorite with the Woman's Rights Convention. In his ninth chapter of the same treaties he says, if by nature women were equal to men and excelled as much as they in strength of mind and in talent, truly amongst nations so many and so different, some would be found where both sexes ruled equally and others where the men were ruled by the women, and so educated as to be inferior to them in talent. But as this has never happened we are justified in assuming that women, by nature, have not an equal right with men, but that they are necessarily obedient to men, and thus it can never happen that both sexes can equally rule and still less that men be ruled by women. Lewis in his seventh chapter on modern philosophy thus sums up Spinoza's teachings and their result. He says, The doctrine of Spinoza was of great importance, if for nothing more than having brought about the first crisis in modern philosophy. His doctrine was so clearly stated and so rigorously deduced from admitted premises that he brought philosophy into this dilemma. Either my premises are correct and we must admit that every clear and distinct idea is absolutely true, true not only subjectively but objectively. If so, my objection is true, or my premises are false, the voice of consciousness is not the voice of truth, and if so, then is my system false, but all philosophy is impossible. Since the only ground of certitude, our consciousness, is pronounced unstable, our only means of knowing the truth is pronounced fallacious. Spinozism or skepticism, choose between them, for you have no other choice. Mankind refused, however, to make a choice. If the principles which Descartes had established could have no other result than Spinozism, it was worth while inquiring whether those principles might not themselves be modified. The ground of discussion was shifted. Psychology took the place of ontology. It was Descartes' theory of knowledge which led to Spinozism. That theory must therefore be examined. That theory becomes the great subject of discussion. Before deciding upon the merits of any system which embraced the great questions of creation, the deity, immortality, etc., men saw that it was necessary to decide upon the competency of the human mind to solve such problems. All knowledge must be obtained either through experience or independent of experience. Knowledge dependent on experience must necessarily be merely knowledge of phenomena. All are agreed that experience can only be experience of ourselves as modified by objects. All are agreed that to know things per se, namana, we must know them through some other channel than experience. Have we or have we not that other channel? This is the problem. Thus, before we can dogmatize upon onto logical subjects, we must settle this question. Can we transcend the sphere of our consciousness and know things per se? I, and of, Spinoza, by Charles Bradlaw. George Washington's 1789 Thanksgiving Proclamation by George Washington. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. George Washington's 1789 Thanksgiving Proclamation. Whereas it is the duty of all nations to acknowledge the providence of Almighty God to obey his will, to be grateful for his benefits, and humbly to implore his protection and favor. And whereas both houses of Congress have by their joint committee requested me to recommend to the people of United States a day of public thanksgiving and prayer to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty God, especially by affording them an opportunity peaceably to establish a form of government for their safety and happiness. Now therefore, I do recommend and assign Thursday the 26th day of November next to be devoted by the people of these states to the service of that great and glorious being who is the beneficent author of all the good that was, that is, or that will be, that we may then all unite in rendering unto him our sincere and humble thanks for his kind care and protection of the people of this country previous to their becoming a nation. For the signal and manifold mercies and the favorable interpositions of his providence in the course and conclusion of the late war, for the great degree of tranquility, union and plenty which we have since enjoyed, for the peaceable and rational manner in which we have been able to establish constitutions of government for our safety and happiness and particularly the national one now lately instituted for the civil and religious liberty with which we are blessed and the means we have of acquiring and diffusing useful knowledge and in general for all the great and various favors which he has been pleased to confer upon us and also that we may then unite in most humbly offering our prayers and supplications to the great Lord and ruler of nations and beseech him to pardon our national and other transgressions to enable us all whether in public or private stations to perform our several and relative duties properly and punctually to render our national government a blessing to all the people by constantly being a government of wise, just and constitutional laws, discreetly and faithfully executed and obeyed, to protect and guide all sovereigns and nations, especially such as have shown kindness to us, and to bless them with good governments, peace and concord, to promote the knowledge and practice of true religion and virtue and the increase of science among them and us and generally to grant unto all mankind such a degree of temporal prosperity as he alone knows to be best. Given under my hand at the city of New York the third day of October A.D. 1789 signed G. Washington. End of George Washington's 1789 Thanksgiving Profession Declaration. Read by Bill Moseley, Frillsburg, Texas. Thomas Paine by John Watts. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Reading by Greg Marguerite. Thomas Paine by John Watts. The Wise by some centuries before the crowd. Must, by their novel systems, though correct, of course offend the wicked, weak and proud. Must meet with hatred, calamity, neglect. Thomas Paine, the sturdy champion of political and religious liberty, was born at Thetford in the county of Norfolk, England, 29 January 1737. Born of religious parents, his father being a Quaker and his mother a member of the Church of England, Paine received a religious education at Thetford Grammar School under the Reverend William Knowles. At an early age he gave indications of his great talent and found pleasure when a boy in studying poetical authors. His parents, however, endeavored to check his taste for poetry. His father probably thinking it would unfit him for the denomination to which he belonged. But Paine did not lose much time before experimenting in poetry himself. Hence we find him when eight years of age composing the following epitaph upon a fly being caught in a spider's web. Here lies the body of John Crow, who once was high, but now is low. Ye brother crows, take warning all, for as you rise, so must you fall. At the age of thirteen, after receiving a moderate education in reading, writing, and arithmetic, Paine left school to follow his father's trade, staymaking. Although disliking the business, he pursued this avocation for nearly five years. When about twenty years of age, however, he felt as most enterprising young men do feel, a desire to visit London and enter into the competition and chances of a metropolitan life. His natural dislike to his father's business led him to abandon for a period his original occupation. And after working some time with Mr. Morris, a noted staymaker in Longacre, he resolved upon a seafaring adventure of which he thus speaks. At an early age, raw, adventurous, and heated with the false heroism of a master, Reverend Mr. Null's master of the grammar school at Fentford, who had served in a man of war, I began my fortune and entered on board the terrible Captain Death. From this adventure I was happily prevented by the affectionate and moral remonstrances of a good father, whom from the habits of his life, being of the Quaker profession, looked on me as lost. But the impression, much as it affected me at the time, wore away, and I entered afterwards in the King of Prussia Privateer, Captain Mender, and went with her to sea. Sea life did not as may be supposed long satisfy a mind like Payne's. In April 1759, after working nearly twelve months at Dover, we find him settled as master staymaker at Sandwich, marrying on September 27th Mary Lambert, daughter of an excise man of that place. But his matrimonial happiness was of short duration, his wife dying the following year. Disgusted with the toil and inconvenience of his late occupation, Payne now renounced it forever, to apply himself to the profession of excise man. After fourteen months' study, he obtained the appointment of supernumerary in the excise, which he held with intervals till 1768, when he settled as excise man at Lewis in Sussex and married 1771 Elizabeth Olive, daughter of a tobaganist, whose business he succeeded to. About this time Payne wrote several little pieces in prose and verse, among which was the celebrated song on the death of General Wolfe, and the trial of farmer Carter's dog Porter. The latter is a composition of exquisite wit and humor. In 1772, the excise officers throughout the kingdom were dissatisfied with their salaries and formed a plan to apply to parliament for an increase. Payne, being distinguished among them as a man of great talent, was solicited to draw up and state their case, which he did in a pamphlet entitled, The Case of the Salary of the Officers of Excise, and Thoughts on the Corruption Rising from the Poverty of Excise Officers. Four thousand copies of this pamphlet were printed and circulated. Sometime after this publication, Payne, being in the grocery business, was suspected of unfair practices and was dismissed the excise after being in it twelve years. This suspicion, however, was never shown to be just. But to show how very vigorous the authorities were in suppressing smuggling, we will quote the following letter from Cleo Rickman to the editor of the Independent Wig in October 1807. Sir, if there are any characters more to be abhorred than others, it is those who inflict severe punishments against offenders and yet themselves commit the same crimes. If any characters more than others deserve execration, exposure, and to be driven from among mankind, it is those governors of the people who break the laws they themselves make and punish others for breaking. Suffer me, Mr. Editor, thus to preface the following fact. Fact, I say, because I stand ready to prove it so. When Admiral Duncan rendezvoused in the Downs with his fleet on the 8th of January 1806, the spider-lugger Daniel Falara, master, was sent to Guernsey to smuggle articles for the fleet, such as wine, spirits, hair powder, playing cards, tobacco, etc., for the supply of the different ships. At her arrival in the Downs, the ships' boats flocked round her to unload her and her contraband cargo. A Custom House extra boat commanded by William Wallace, seeing the lugger, followed and took her in doing which he did his duty. On his inspecting the smuggled articles with which she was laden, he found a number of cases directed to Admiral Duncan, the right-honorable William Pitt, the heaven-born minister of England, and to the right-honorable Henry Dundas, Walmer Castle. In a few days Wallace, the master of the Customs House cutter, received orders from government to give the lugger and her smuggled cargo up on penalty of being dismissed the service, and these cases of smuggled goods were afterwards delivered at the prime ministers, Mr. Pitt, at Walmer Castle. Mr. Editor, read what follows and repress your indignation if you can. There are now, in deal jail, fourteen persons for trifling acts of smuggling, compared to the above of the right-honorable William Pitt and the now right-honorable Lord Melville. The former were poor and knew not how to live. The latter were most affluent and splendidly supported by the people, that is, they were paupers upon the generous public, towards whom they thus scandalously and infamously conducted themselves. I am, sir, your humble servant, Cleo Rickman. To those opponents of Thomas Paine, who attach any weight to his dismissal from the excise on suspicion of smuggling, we would mention the fact that during Paine's service at Lewis, Mr. Jenner, the principal clerk in the excise office London, wrote several letters from the board of excise, thanking Mr. Paine for his assiduity in his profession, and for his information and calculations forwarded to the office. Shortly after his dismissal, Mr. Paine and his wife, by mutual agreement, separated. Many tales have been put in circulation respecting the separation. Cleo Rickman, in his Life of Paine, has the following passage, that he did not cohabit with her from the moment they left the altar till the day of their separation, a space of three years, although they lived in the same house together, is an indisputable truth. It is also true that no physical defect on the part of Mr. Paine can be adduced as a reason for such conduct. Mr. Paine's answer upon my once referring to the subject was, it is nobody's business but my own. I had cause for it, but I will name it to no one. This I can assert, that Mr. Paine always spoke tenderly and respectfully of his wife, and sent her several times pecuniary aid, without her knowing even whence it came. In 1774 Paine left England and arrived at Philadelphia a few months before the Battle of Lexington. He made his appearance in the New World as editor of the Pennsylvania Magazine, and it would appear that he then had in view the coming struggle, in which he took so prominent a part, for in his introduction to the first number of the above magazine he states, thus encompassed with difficulties this first number of the Pennsylvania Magazine entreats a favorable reception, of which we shall only say that like the early snow drop it comes forth in a barren season, and contends itself with foretelling the reader that choice or flowers are preparing to appear. Upon the foreign supply of gunpowder being prohibited, he proposed a plan in the Pennsylvania Journal of a Salt Peter Association for the voluntary supply of that article of destruction. On the 10th of January 1776 Common Sense was published. Its circulation soon reaching 100,000 copies. The effect this remarkable pamphlet produced upon the minds of the American people and the share it had in bringing to a successful issue the then pending struggle, may be gathered even from pain's bitterest enemies. Mr. Chetham in his Life of Pain, while endeavoring to damage the author of Common Sense, admits the value of this pamphlet. He says, this pamphlet of forty octavo pages holding out relief by proposing independence to an oppressed and despairing people was published in January 1776. Speaking a language which the colonists had felt but not thought of. Its popularity, terrible in its consequences to the parent country, was unexampled in the history of the press. At first involving the colonists in the crime of rebellion and pointing to a road leading inevitably to ruin, it was red with indignation and alarm. But when the reader and everyone read it, recovering from the first shock, re-perused it. Its arguments nourishing his feelings and appealing to his pride reanimated his hopes and satisfied his understanding that Common Sense, backed by the resources and force of the colonies, poor and feeble as they were, could alone rescue them from the unqualified oppression with which they were threatened. The unknown author in the moments of enthusiasm which succeeded was an angel sent from heaven to save from all the horrors of slavery by his timely, powerful and unerring councils, a faithful but abused, a brave but misrepresented people. Another of Payne's enemies and slanderers, Elkhana Watson, in a volume recently published entitled Men and Times of the Revolution, after speaking in very disparaging terms of Payne's appearance, habits and disposition, which is proved false by the best of testimony, admits the service rendered to America by Common Sense. He says, Yet I could not repress the deepest emotions of gratitude toward him as the instrument of providence in accelerating the declaration of our independence. He certainly was a prominent agent in preparing the public sentiment of America for that glorious event. The idea of independence had not occupied the popular mind, and when guardedly approached on the topic, it shrunk from the conception as fraught with doubt, with peril and with suffering. In 1776 I was present at Providence, Rhode Island, in a social assembly of most of the prominent leaders of the state. I recollect that the subject of independence was cautiously introduced by an ardent wig, and the thoughts seemed to excite the abhorrence of the whole circle. A few weeks after, Payne's Common Sense appeared, and passed through the continent like an electric spark. It everywhere flashed conviction and aroused a determined spirit which resulted in the declaration of independence upon the Fourth of July ensuing. The name of Payne was precious to every wig heart, and had resounded throughout Europe. Other testimony could be given to Payne's influence in the American struggle for independence, but after the two already mentioned from his opponents, it is unnecessary to give further proof. In the same year that Common Sense appeared, Payne accompanied General Washington and his army, being with him in his retreat from Hudson River to the Delaware. Although great terror prevailed, Payne stood brave and undismayed, conscious he was advocating a just cause and determined to bring it to a successful issue. He occupied himself in inspiring hope in the Americans, showing them their strength and their weakness. This object drew from his pen the crisis, a continuation of the Common Sense which was issued at intervals till the cessation of hostilities. In 1777 Payne was unanimously and unknown to himself, appointed Secretary in the Foreign Department, where he formed a close friendship with Dr. Franklin. He did not retain his office, however long, as he refused to become a party to the fraudulent demands of a Mr. Silas Dean, one of the American commissioners, then in Europe, and he resigned the office. In 1780 he was chosen member of the American Philosophical Society, having previously received the degree of Master of Arts from the University of Philadelphia. When the independence of America was attained, and when oppression had received a severe and lasting check in that rising country, we find that Payne, so far from being satisfied with his success in the New World, began to look for a fresh field where he might render good service to the cause of right and freedom. Accordingly, in 1787 he visited Paris, his famous services to America giving him a welcome by those who knew the benefit arising from the establishment of human rights. His stay in Paris at this time was of short duration, as he returned to England after an absence of thirteen years on September 3rd. After visiting his mother and settling an allowance of nine shillings per week for her support, he resided for a short time at Rotherham in Yorkshire, where an iron bridge was cast and erected upon a model of his invention, which obtained him great reputation for his mathematical skill. The publication of Mr. Burke's Reflections on the French Revolution called from Payne his Rights of Man, a book that created great attraction and sold nearly a million and a half copies. In politics Payne was clear and decided, and from his moderation what is called sound. For the perusal of those who may not have read it, we give the following quotations to show the principles upon which it is based. Mr. Burke talks about what he calls an hereditary crown, as if it were some production of nature, or as if like time it had a power to operate, not only independently, but in spite of man, or as if it were a thing or a subject universally consented to. Alas, it has none of those properties, but is the reverse of them all. It is a thing in imagination, the property of which is more than doubted, and the legality of which in a few years will be denied. But to arrange this matter in a clearer view than what general expressions can convey, it will be necessary to state the distinct heads under which what is called an hereditary crown, or more properly speaking an hereditary succession to the government of a nation, can be considered. Which are, first, the right of a particular family to establish itself, secondly the right of a nation to establish a particular family with respect to the first of these heads, that of a family establishing itself with hereditary powers on its own authority, and independent of the consent of a nation all men will concur in calling it despotism, and it would be trespassing on their understanding to attempt to prove it. But the second head, that of a nation establishing a particular family with hereditary powers, does not present itself as despotism on the first reflection. But if men will permit a second reflection to take place, and carry that reflection forward but one remove out of their own persons to that of their offspring, they will then see that hereditary succession becomes in its consequences the same despotism to others, which they reprobated for themselves. It operates to preclude the consent of these succeeding generations, and the preclusion of consent is despotism. When the person who at any time shall be in possession of a government, or those who stand in succession to him, shall say to a nation, I hold this power in contempt of you. It signifies not on what authority he pretends to say it. It is no relief but an aggravation to a person in slavery to reflect that he was sold by his parent. And as that which heightens the criminality of an act cannot be produced to prove the legality of it, hereditary succession cannot be established as a legal thing. Nonwithstanding the taxes of England amount to almost 17 millions a year, said to be for the expenses of government, it is still evident that the sense of the nation is left to govern itself by magistrates and jurors, almost at its own charge on republican principles, exclusive of the expense of taxes. The salaries of the judges are almost the only charge that is paid out of the revenue. Considering that all the internal government is executed by the people, the taxes of England ought to be the lightest of any nation in Europe, instead of which they are the contrary. As this cannot be accounted for on the score of civil government, the subject necessarily extends itself to the monarchial part. If a law be bad, it is one thing to expose the practice of it, but it is quite a different thing to expose its errors, to reason on its defects and show cause why it should be repealed or why another ought to be substituted in its place. I have always held it an opinion, making it also my practice, that it is better to obey a bad law, making use at the same time of every argument to show its errors and procure its repeal, than forcibly to violate it, because the precedent of breaking a bad law might weaken the force and lead to a discretionary violation of those which are good. As may be supposed, such a work as the rights of man, aiming directly at all oppression regardless of party, could not be allowed to escape the attorney general's answer. Accordingly, we find a prosecution instituted against it, but instead of prosecuting the author, the publishers were selected. This drew from pain a long letter to the attorney general, suggesting the justice of his answering for the book he wrote. On the trial, Mr. afterwards Lord Erskine thus spoke of the author of the rights of man. The defendant's whole deportment previous to the publication has been wholly unexceptionable. He properly desires to be given up as the author of the book. If any inquiry should take place concerning it, and he is not affected in evidence, directly or indirectly with any legal or suspicious conduct, not even with uttering an indiscreet or taunting expression, nor with any one matter or thing inconsistent with the best subject in England. On the 12th of September, 1792, Mr. Achilles Odabear came expressly to England from the French Convention to solicit pain to attend and aid them by his advice in their deliberations. On his arrival at Calais, a public dinner was provided. A royal salute was fired from the battery, the troops were drawn out, and there was a general rejoicing throughout the town. Pain was escorted to the house of his friend, Mr. Odabear, the chief magistrate of the place, where he was visited by the commandant and all the municipal officers in forms, who afterwards gave him a sumptuous entertainment in the town hall. The same honour was also paid him on his departure for Paris. Upon his arrival in Paris, all was confusion. There were the king's friends, mortified and subdued. The Jacobians split up into cavealing factions, some wishing a federative government, some desiring the king's death and the death of all the nobility, while a portion were more discreet, wishing liberty without licentiousness and having a desire to redress wrongs without revenge. These few accepted pain as their leader and renounced all connection with the Jacobian club. Pain, on all occasions, advocated the preservation of the king's life, but his efforts were thwarted by the appointment of Robespierre of Barrere to office. So anxiously was pain sought after that both Calais and Versailles returned him as deputy. To show how the author of The Rights of Man opposed all physical force where reason may be used, it is only necessary to state that when the letter of du Maurier reached Paris with the threat of restoring the king, Pain wrote a letter to the convention stating a plan for readjustment, and was taking it personally when he was informed that a decree had just been passed offering one hundred thousand crowns for du Maurier's head, and another making it high treason to propose anything in his favor. Whilst deputy for Calais, Pain was sought and admired by all classes. He dined every Friday for a long period with the Earl of Lauderdale and Dr. Moore, and so frequent were his visitors that he set apart two mornings a week for his levee days. He soon, however, changed his residence, preferring less formality and a more select circle. His history of the French Revolution we are deprived of by his imprisonment, which Gibbon thought would prove a great loss. The historian often applied for the manuscript, believing it to be of great worth. The opinion Pain held of the Revolution may be gathered from the following. With respect to the Revolution, it was begun by good men on good principles, and I have ever believed it would have gone on so, had not the provocative interference of foreign powers distracted it into madness and sown jealousies among the leaders. The people of England have now two revolutions, the American and the French before them. Their own wisdom will direct them what to choose and what to avoid, and in everything which relates to their happiness, combined with the common good of mankind, I wish them honor and success. His speech against the death of the king shows how far he was removed from party spirit or any feeling of revenge. Whilst he protested against the king being re-enthroned, he equally protested against his death, wishing him removed from the seat of his corruption and placed in a more elevating atmosphere. In treating for the king's safety he says let then the United States be the safeguard and the asylum of Louis Capet. There, hereafter, far removed from the miseries and crimes of royalty, he may learn from the constant aspect of public prosperity that the true system of government consists in fair, equal, and honorable representation. In relating this circumstance and in submitting this proposition I consider myself as a citizen of both countries. The policy pursued by Paine was not consistent with the views of Robespierre. Consequently he was seized in the night and imprisoned in Luxembourg eleven months without any reason being assigned. The readers are doubtless aware of the many providential escapes he had from the death for which he was seized. While in prison he wrote part of his age of reason having commenced it just previous to his arrest. Not knowing one hour but he might be executed and once being on the verge of death from fever. He knew the prejudice the age of reason would create, so he left its production to the latter part of his life not wishing to make that an impediment to the good he sought to accomplish in the political world. After toiling in France to bring the revolution to a just termination and finding his efforts rendered abortive by that feeling which former oppression had created he resolved to return to America a country he saw thriving by a policy he wished to institute in France. In eighteen oh two, Jefferson then president of America, knowing his wish to return, wrote him the following letter. You express a wish in your letter to return to America by a national ship. Mr. Dawson, who brings over the treaty and who will present you with this letter, is charged with orders to the captain of the Maryland to receive and accommodate you back if you can be ready to return at such a short warning. You will in general find us return sentiments worthy of former times. In these it will be your glory to have steadily labored and with as much effect as any man living. That you may live long to continue your useful labors and reap the reward in the thankfulness of nations is my sincere prayer. Accept the assurance of my high esteem and affectionate attachment, Thomas Jefferson. But circumstances prevented pain going by the Maryland. He called, however, on the 1st of September 1802 in the London Paquette. He had often previously arranged to return to America, but luckily providence prevented him. One ship that he intended to sail by was searched by English frigates for Thomas Paine, and another sunk at sea, whilst at other times British frigates were cruising off the ports from which he was to sail, knowing him to be there. So much religious misrepresentation has been circulated about Paine's life and death, that it becomes a duty to restate the facts. The manner of life Paine pursued may be gathered from the reliable testimony of Cleo Rickman. He says, Mr. Paine's life in London was a quiet round of philosophical leisure and enjoyment. It was occupied in writing, in a small epistolary correspondence, in walking about with me to visit different friends, occasionally sitting at coffee houses and public places or being visited by a select few. Lord Edward Fitzgerald, the French and American ambassadors, Mr. Sharp the engraver, Romney the painter, Mrs. Walstoncraft, Joel Barlow, Mr. Hull, Mr. Christie, Dr. Priestley, Dr. Towers, Colonel Oswald, the walking steward, Captain Samson Perry, Mr. Tuffin, Mr. William Choppin, Captain Dysstark, Mr. Home Tooke, etc. were among the number of his friends and acquaintances. His manner of living in France and America has already been noticed. The perverted tales of Carver and Chetham may be utterly disproved by referring to Cleo Rickman's life of Paine. As his life, so was his death. When he became feeble and infirm in January 1809 he was often visited by those good people who so often intrude upon the domestic quiet of the afflicted. After the visit of an old woman, come from the Almighty whom Paine soon sent back again. He was troubled with the Reverend Mr. Millydollar and the Reverend Mr. Cunningham. The latter, Reverend, said, Mr. Paine, we visit you as friends and neighbors. You have now a full view of death. You cannot live long, and whoever does not believe in Jesus Christ will assuredly be damned. Said Paine, have none of your poppish stuff. Get away with you. Good morning. Good morning. Another visitor was the Reverend Mr. Hargrove with this statement. My name is Hargrove, sir. I am minister of the New Jerusalem Church. We, sir, explain the Scripture in its true meaning. The key has been lost these four thousand years and we have found it. Then, said Paine in an old neat way. It must have been very rusty. Shortly before his death he stated to Mr. Hicks to whom he had sent to arrange his burial, that his sentiments in reference to the Christian religion were precisely the same as when he wrote the Age of Reason. On the 8th of June, in the words of Cleo Rickman, 1809, about nine in the morning, he placidly and almost without a struggle deist, aged seventy-two years and five months. He was interred at New Rochelle upon his own farm, a handsome monument being now erected where he was buried. It has been the object in the present sketch, rather to give in a brief manner an account of Paine's life and services than an elucidation of his writings. His works are well known, and they will speak for themselves, but will not be found in the memory by the perversions and misrepresentations of the religious publications. No doubt had his views been different on religious subjects, he would have been held up as a model of genius, perseverance, courage, disinterestedness of purpose and purity of life by the men who now find him no better name than the blasphemer. We hope that there is no reason to think and speak otherwise of a man who made the world his country and the doing of good, his religion. As Euclid nears his various writings shown, his pen inspired by glorious truth alone, or all the earth diffusing light and life subduing error, ignorance and strife, raised man to just pursuits, to thinking right, and yet will free the woe and falsehood's night to this immortal man to pain was given to metamorphose earth from hell to heaven. End of Thomas Pain by John Watts Thoughts and Government by John Adams This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer on LibriVox.org. My dear sir, if I was equal to the task of forming a plan for the government of a colony, I should be flattered with your request and very happy to comply with it, because as the divine science of politics is the science of social happiness and the blessings of society depend entirely on the constitutions of government, which are generally institutions that last for many generations, there can be many. Pope flattered tyrants too much when he said, for forms of government let fools contest, that which is best administered is best. Nothing can be more fallacious than this, but poets read history to collect flowers, not fruits. They attend to fanciful images, not the effects of social institutions. Nothing is more certain, from the history of nations and nature of man, than that some forms of government are better fitted for us. We are to consider what is the end of government before we determine which is the best form. Upon this point all speculative politicians will agree that the happiness of society is the end of government, as all divines and moral philosophers will agree that the happiness of the individual is the end of man. From this principle it will follow that the form of government which communicates ease, comfort, security or in one word happiness to the citizens, and in the greatest degree is the best. All sober inquirers after truth, ancient and modern, pagan and Christian have declared that the happiness of man, as well as his dignity, consists in virtue. Confucius, Zoroastrian, Socrates, Muhammad, not to mention authority is really sacred, have agreed on this. If there is a form of government then whose principle and foundation is virtue, will not every sober man acknowledge it better calculated in general happiness than in the other form? Fear is the foundation of most governments, that is so sordid and brutal a passion and renders men whose breasts predominate so stupid and miserable that Americans will not be likely to approve of any political institution which is founded on it. Honor is truly sacred but holds a lower rank in the scale of moral excellence than virtue. Indeed the formers but a part of the latter and consequently has not equal pretensions to support a frame of government productive of human happiness. The foundation of every government is some principle of passion in the minds of the people. The noblest principles and most generous affections in our nature then have the fairest chance to support the noblest and most generous models of government. A man must be indifferent to the snares of modern English men to mention in their company the names of Sidney, Harrington, Locke, Milton, Nedham, Neville, Burnett and Holdley. No small fortitude is necessary to confess that one has read them. The wretched condition of this country however for ten or fifteen years past has frequently reminded me of their principles and reasonings. They will convince any candid mind that there is no good government but what is Republican. That the only valuable part of the British Constitution is so because the very definition of a Republic is an empire of laws and not of men. That as a Republic is the best of governments so that particular arrangement of the powers of society or in other words that form of government which is best contrived to secure an impartial and exact execution of the laws is the best of Republics. Of Republics there is an inexhaustible variety because the possible combinations of the powers of society are capable of innumerable variations. As good government is an empire of laws how shall your laws be made? In a large society inhabiting an extensive country it is impossible that the whole should assemble to make laws. The first necessary step then is to depute power from the many to a few of the most wise and good. But by what rules shall you choose your representatives? Agree upon the number and qualifications of persons who shall have the benefit of choosing or annex this privilege to the inhabitants of a certain extent of ground. The principal difficulty lies and the greatest care should be employed in constituting this representative assembly. It should be in miniature an exact portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason and act like them. That it may be the interest of this assembly to do strict justice at all times. It should be an equal representation or in other words equal interests among the people should have equal interests in it. Great care should be taken to effect this and to prevent unfair partial and corrupt elections. Such regulations however may be better made in respect of greater tranquility than the present and they will spring up themselves naturally when all the powers of government come to be in the hands of the people's friends. At present it will be safest to proceed in all established moans to which the people have been familiarized by habit. A representation of the people in one assembly being obtained a question arises whether all the powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial shall be left in this body. I think a people cannot be long free nor ever happy whose government is in one assembly. My reasons for this opinion are as follow. One. A single assembly is liable to all the vices, follies and frailties of an individual subject to a fits of humor, starts of passion, flights of enthusiasm, partialities or prejudice and consequently productive of hasty results and absurd judgments. And all these errors are to be corrected and defects applied by some controlling power. Two. A single assembly is apt to be avaricious and in time will not scruple to exempt itself from burdens which it will lay without compunction on its constituents. Three. A single assembly is apt to grow ambitious and after a time will not hesitate to vote itself perpetual. This was one fault of the long parliament. But more remarkably of Holland whose assembly first voted themselves from annual to septennial then for life after a course of years that all vacancies happening by death or otherwise should be filled by themselves without any application to constituents at all. Four. A representative assembly although extremely well qualified and absolutely necessary as a branch of the legislative is unfit to exercise the executive power for want of two essential properties secrecy and dispatch. Five. A representative assembly is still less qualified for the judicial power because it is too numerous, too slow and too little skilled in the laws. Six. Because a single assembly possessed of all the powers of government would make arbitrary laws for their own interest, execute all laws arbitrarily for their own interest and adjudge all controversies in their own favour. But shall the whole power of legislation rest in one assembly? Most of the foregoing reasons apply equally to prove that the legislative power ought to be more complex which we may add that if the legislative power is wholly in one assembly and the executive in another or in a single person these two powers will oppose and encroach upon each other until the contest shall end in war and the whole power legislative and executive be usurped by the strongest. The judicial power in such case could not mediate or hold the balance between the two contending powers because the legislative would undermine it and this shows the necessity, too of giving the executive power a negative upon the legislative otherwise this will be continually encroaching upon that. To avoid these dangers let a distinct assembly be constituted as mediated between the two extreme branches of the legislature that which represents the people and that which is vested with the executive power. Let the representative assembly then elect by ballot from among themselves or their constituents or both a distinct assembly which for the sake of call a council. They may consist of any number you please say 20 or 30 and should have a free and independent exercise of its judgment and consequently a negative voice in the legislature. These two bodies thus constituted and made integral parts of the legislature let them unite and by joint ballot choose a governor who after being stripped of most of those badges of domination called prerogatives should have a free and independent exercise of his judgment and be made also an integral part of the legislature. This I know is liable to objections and if you please you may make him only president of the council as in Connecticut. That is the governor is to be invested with the executive power with consent of council I think he ought to have a negative upon the legislative. If he is annually elective as he ought to be you will always have so much reverence and affection for the people their representatives and counselors that although you give him an independent exercise of his judgment he will sell them use it in opposition to the two houses except in cases the public utility of which would be conspicuous and some such cases would happen. In the present exigency of American affairs when by an act of parliament we are put out of the royal protection and consequently discharged from our allegiance and it has become necessary to assume government for our immediate security the governor, lieutenant governor secretary, treasurer commissary, attorney general should be chosen by joint ballot of both houses and these and all other elections especially of representatives and counselors should be annual. They're not being in the whole circle of the sciences a maxim or infallible than this where annual elections end their slavery begins. These great men in this respect should be once a year like bubbles on the sea of matter born they rise and break into that sea return. This will teach them the great political virtues of humility patience and moderation without which every man in power becomes a ravenous beast of prey. This mode of constituting the great offices of state will answer very well for the present but if by experiment it should be found inconvenient the legislature may at its leisure devise other methods of creating them by elections of the people at large as in Connecticut or it may enlarge the term for which they shall be chosen to seven years or three years or for life or make any other alterations which the society shall find productive of its ease its safety its freedom or in one word its happiness. A rotation of all offices as well as of representatives and counselors has many advocates and it's contended for with many plausible arguments. It would be attendant no doubt with many advantages and if the society has a sufficient number of suitable characters to supply the great number of vacancies which would be made by such a rotation I can see no objection to it. These persons may be allowed to serve for three years and then be excluded three years or for any longer or shorter term. Any seven or nine of the legislative council may be made a quorum for doing business as a privy council to advise the governor in the exercise of the executive branch of power and in all acts of state. The governor should have the command of the militia and all your armies. The power of pardons should be with the governor and council. Judges, justices and all other offices, civil and military should be nominated and appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of council unless you choose to have a government more popular if you do all offices civil and military may be chosen by joint ballot of both houses or in order to preserve the independence and importance of each house by ballot of one house concurred in by the other. Sheriffs should be chosen by the freeholders of counties. So should registers of deeds and clerks of counties. All officers should have commissions under the hand of the governor and seal of the colony. The dignity and stability of government in all its branches, the morals of the people and every blessing of society depends so much upon an upright and skillful administration of justice that the judicial power ought to be distinct from both the legislative and executive and independent upon both that so it may be a check upon both as both should be checks upon that. The judges therefore should be always men of learning and experience in the laws of exemplary morals, great patience, calmness, coolness and attention. Their mind should not be distracted with jarring interests. They should not be dependent upon any man or body of men. To these ends they should hold the states for life in their offices or in other words their commissions should be during good surgeries, ascertain and established by law. For misbehavior, the grand inquest of the colony, the house of representatives, should impeach them before the governor and council where they should have time and opportunity to make their defense, but if convicted should be removed from their offices and subjected to such other punishment as shall be thought proper. A militia law requiring all men or with very few exceptions besides cases of conscience to be provided with arms and ammunition, to be trained for reasons and requiring counties, towns or other small districts to be provided with public stocks of ammunition and entrenching utensils and with some subtle plans for transporting provisions after the militia, when marched to defend their country against sudden invasions and requiring certain districts to be provided with field pieces, companies of metrasses and perhaps some regiments of like-horse is always a wise institution and in the present circumstances of our country indispensable. Laws for the liberal education of youth, especially of the lower class of people are so extremely wise and useful that to a humane and generous mind no expense for this purpose will be thought extravagant. The very mention of sumptuary laws will excite a smile. Whether our countrymen of wisdom and virtue enough to submit to them I know not, but the happiness of the people might be greatly promoted by them and a revenue save sufficient to carry on this war forever. Fragality is a great revenue besides curing us of vanities, levities and properties which are real antidotes to all great manly and war-like virtues. But must not all commissions run in the name of a king? No. Why may they not as well run thus? The colony of to A. B. Greeting and be tested by the governor. Why may not Ritz instead of running in the name of the king run thus? The colony of to the sheriff etc. be tested by the chief justice. Why may not indictments conclude against the peace of the colony of and the dignity of the same? A constitution founded on these principles introduces knowledge among the people and inspires them with a conscious dignity becoming freemen. A general emulation takes place which causes good humor, sociability, good manners and good morals to be general. That elevation of sentiment inspired by such government makes the common people brave and enterprising. That ambition which is inspired by it makes them soba, industrious and frugal. You will find among them some elegance perhaps but more solidity. A little pleasure but a great deal of business, some politeness but more civility. If you compare such a country with the regions of domination, whether monarchical or aristocratical, you will fancy yourself in Arcadia or Elysium. If the colonies should assume government separately, they should be left entirely to their own choice of the forms. And if a continental constitution should be formed, it should be a Congress containing a fair and adequate representation of the colonies and its authority should secretly be confined to these cases, namely war, trade, disputes between colony and colony, the post office and the unappropriated lands of the crown as they used to be called. These colonies under such forms of government and such a union would be unconquerable by all the monarchies of Europe. You and I, my dear friend, have been sent into life at a time when the greatest law-givers of antiquity would have wished to live. How few of the human race have ever enjoyed an opportunity of making an election of government, more than of air, soil or climate for themselves or their children. When before the present epoch had three millions of people full power and a fair opportunity to form and establish the wisest and happiest government that human wisdom can contrive, I hope you will avail yourself and your country of that extensive learning and indefatigable industry which you possess to assist her in the formation of the happiest governments and the best character of a great people. For myself I must beg you to keep my name out of sight for this feeble attempt, if it should be known to be mine, would oblige me to apply to myself those lines of the immortal John Milton in one of his sonnets. I did prompt the age to quit their clogs by the known rules of ancient liberty when straight a barbarous noise environs me of owls and cuckoos, asses, apes and dogs. End of Thoughts and Government by John Adams Truth of Intercourse by Robert Louis Stevenson This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Among sayings that have a currency, in spite of being wholly false upon the face of them, for the sake of a half-truth upon another subject which is accidentally combined with error, one of the grossest and broadest conveys the monstrous proposition that it is easy to tell the truth and hard to tell a lie. I wish heartily it were, but the truth is one. It has to be discovered than justly and exactly uttered. Even with instruments specially contrived for such a purpose with a foot rule, a level, or a theodolite, it is not easy to be exact. It is easier alas to be inexact. From those who mark the divisions on a scale to those who measure the boundaries of empires, or the distance of the heavenly stars, it is by careful method and by route unwerying attention that men rise even to material exactness or to sure knowledge even of external and constant things. But it is easier to draw the outline of a mountain than the changing appearance of a face. And truth in human relations is of this more intangible and dubious order, hard to seize, harder to communicate. Veracity to be exact in a loose colloquial sense, not to say that I have been in Malabar when as a matter of fact I was never out of England, not to say that I have read Cervantes in the original when as a matter of fact I know not one syllable of Spanish. This indeed is easy and to the same degree unimportant in itself. Lies of this sword according to circumstances may not be important in a certain sense even the may or may not be false. The habitual liar may be a very honest fellow and live truly with his wife and friends, while another man who never told a formal falsehood in his life may yet be himself, one lie heart and face from top to bottom. This is the kind of lie which poisons intimacy and viceversa veracity to sentiment truth in a relation truth to your own heart and your friends, never to feign or falsify emotion. That is the truth which makes love possible and mankind happy. Lar de bien dire is but a drawing room accomplishment unless it be pressed into the service of the truth. The difficulty of literature is not but to write what you mean not to affect your reader but to affect him precisely as you wish. This is commonly understood in the case of books or set orations even in making your will or writing an explicit letter some difficulty is admitted by the world. But one thing you could never make Philistine natures understand one thing which yet lies on the surface remains as possible to their wits as a high flight of metaphysics namely that the business of life is mainly carried on by means of this difficult art of literature and according to a man's proficiency in that art shall be the freedom and the fullness of his intercourse with other men. Anybody it is supposed can say what he means and in spite of their notorious experience to the contrary I suppose. Now I simply opened the last book I have been reading Mr. LaLans captivating English Gypsies It is said, I find on page 7 that those who can converse with Irish peasants in their own native tongue form far higher opinions of their appreciation of the beautiful and of the elements of humor and pathos in their hearts then do those who know their sense of English. I know from my own observations that this is quite the case with the Indians of North America and it is unquestionably so with the gypsy. In short, or a man has not a full position of the language the most important because the most amiable qualities of his nature have to lie buried and fallow for the pleasure of comradeship and the intellect part of love rest upon these very elements of humor and pathos here is a man opulent in both and for lack of a medium he can put none of it out to interest in the mark of affection but what is thus made plain to our apprehensions is in the case of a foreign language is partially true even with the tongue we learned in childhood indeed we all speak different dialects one shall be copious and exact another loose and meagre but the speech of the ideal talker shall correspond and fit upon the truth of fact not clumsily obscuring liniments like a mantle but cleanly adhering like an athlete's skin and what is the result? that the one can open himself more clearly to his friends and can enjoy more of what makes life truly valuable intimacy with those he loves an orator makes a false step he employs some trivial some absurd some vulgar phrase in the turn of a sentence he insults by a sidewind those whom he is laboring to charm in speaking to one sentiment he unconsciously ruffles another in parentheses and you are not surprised for you know his task is to be delicate and filled with perils of man as if yourself when you seek to explain some misunderstanding or excuse some apparent fault speaking swiftly and addressing in a mind still recently incensed were not harnessing for a more perilous adventure as if yourself required less tact and eloquence as if an angry friend or a suspicious lover were not more easy to offend in different politicians nay and the orator treads in a beaten round the matters he discusses speaks out of a cut and dry vocabulary but you may not be that your defense reposes on some subtlety of feeling not so much as touched upon in Shakespeare to express which like a pioneer you must venture forth into zones of thought still unsurveyed and become yourself a literary innovator for even in love there are unlovely humours ambiguous acts unpardonable words may yet have sprung from a kind of sentiment if the injured one could read your heart you may be sure that he would understand and pardon but alas the heart cannot be shown it has to be demonstrated in words do you think it is a hard thing to write poetry why that is to write poetry and of a high if not the highest order I should even more admire the lifelong and heroic literary labours of my fellow men patiently clearing up in words their loves and their contentions and speaking their autobiography daily to their wives or not for a circumstance which lessens their difficulty and my admiration by equal parts for life though largely is not entirely carried on by literature we are subject to physical passions and contortions the voice breaks and changes and speaks by unconscious and winning inflections we have legible countenances like an open book things that cannot be said look eloquently through the eyes and the soul not locked into body as the dungeon is told with appealing signals groans and tears looks and gestures a flush or a paleness are often the most clear reporters of the heart and speak more directly to the hearts of others the message flies by these interpreters in the least space of time and the misunderstanding is averted in the moment of its birth to explain in words takes time to understand and in the critical epochs of a close relation patience and justice are not qualities on which we can rely but the look or the gesture explains things in a breath they tell their message without ambiguity unlike speech they cannot stumble by the way on a reproach or an illusion that should steal your friend against the truth and then they have a higher for they are the direct expression of the heart not yet transmitted through the unfaithful and sophisticated brain not long ago I wrote a letter to a friend which came near involving us in a quarrel but we met and in personal talk I repeated the worst of what I had written and added worse to that and with a commentary of the body it seemed not unfriendly either to hear or say indeed letters are in pain for the purposes of intimacy an absence is a dead break in the relation yet two who know each other fully and are bent on perpetuity and love may so preserve the attitude of their affections that they may meet on the same terms as they had parted pitiful is the case of the blind who cannot read the face pitiful that of the death who cannot follow the changes of the voice and there are others also to be pitied for there are some of an inert, unelequent nature who have been denied all the symbols of communication who have neither a lively play of facial expression nor speaking gestures nor a responsive voice nor yet the gift of frank explanatory speech people truly made of clay people tied for life into a bag which no one can know they are poor than the gypsy for their heart can speak no language under heaven such people we must learn slowly by the tenor of their acts or through yay and nay communications or we can take them on trust on the strength of a general air and now and again when we see the spirit breaking through in a flash correct or change our estimate will be uphill intimacies without charm or freedom to the end and freedom is the chief ingredient in confidence some minds romantically dull despite physical endowments that is a doctrine for a misanthrope to those who like their fellow creatures it must always be meaningless and for my part I can see few things more desirable after the possession of such radical qualities as honor and humor and pathos then to have a lively and not a stolid countenance to have looks to correspond with every feeling to be elegant and delightful in person so that we shall please even in the intervals of active pleasing and may never discredit speech with uncouth manners or become unconsciously our own burlesques but of all unfortunates there is one creature for I will not call him man conspicuous in misfortune this is he who has forfeited his birthright of expression who has cultivated artful intonations who has taught his face tricks like a pet monkey and on every side perverted or cut of his means of communication with his fellow men the body is a house of many windows there we all sit showing ourselves and crying on the passersby to come and love us but this fellow has filled his windows with opaque glass elegantly colored his house may be admired for its design the crowd may pause before the stained windows but meanwhile the poor proprietor must lie languishing within uncomforted unchangeably alone truth of intercourse is something more difficult to refrain from open lies it is possible to avoid falsehood and yet not tell the truth it is not enough to answer formal questions to reach the truth by yay and nay communications implies a questioner with a share of inspiration such as is found often in mutual love yay and nay mean nothing the meaning must have been related in the question many words are often necessary to convey a very simple statement for in this sort of exercise we never hit the gold the most that we can hope is by many arrows more or less far off on different sides to indicate in the course of time for what target we are aiming and after an hour's talk back and forward to convey the purport of a single principle or a single thought in yet while the Kurt Piety speaker misses the point entirely a wordy, polygymnous babbler will often add three new offenses in the process of excusing one it is really a most delicate affair the world was made before the English language and seemingly upon a different design suppose we held our converse not in words but in music those who have a bad ear would find themselves cut off from all near commerce better than foreigners in this big world but we do not consider how many have a bad ear for words nor how often the most eloquent find nothing to reply I hate questioners in questions there are so few that can be spoken to without a lie do you forgive me? Madame and sweetheart so far as I have gone in life I have never yet been able to discover what forgiveness means are you still the same between us? why? how can it be? it is eternally different and yet you are still the friend of my heart do you understand me? God knows I should think it highly improbable the cruelest lies are often told in silence a man may have sat in a room for hours and not opened his teeth and yet come out of that room a disloyal friend or a vile calumniator and how many loves have perished because of pride or spite or diffidence or that unmanly shame which withholds a man from daring to betray emotion a lover at the critical point of the relation has but hung his head and held his tongue and again a lie may be told by a truth or a truth conveyed through a lie truth to facts is not always truth to sentiment and part of the truth as often happens an answer to a question may be the foulest calumni a fact may be an exception but the feeling is the law and it is that which you much neither garble nor belie the whole tenor of a conversation is a part of the meaning of each separate statement the beginning and the end define and travesty the intermediate conversation you never speak to god you address a fellow man full of his own tempers and to tell truth rightly understood is not to state the true facts but to convey a true impression truth in spirit not truth the letter is the true veracity to reconcile averted friends a jesuitical discretion is often needful not so much to gain a kind hearing as to communicate sober truth women have an ill name in this connection yet they live in as true relations the lie of a good woman is the true index of her heart it takes as a row in the noblest and useful of passages I remember to have read in any modern author one to two to speak truth one to speak and another to hear he must be very little experience or have no great zeal for truth who does not recognize the fact a grain of anger or a grain of suspicion produces strange acoustical effects and makes the ear greedy to remark offense hence we find those who have once quarrelled carried themselves distantly and are ever ready to break the truth to speak truth there must be moral equality or else no respect and hence between parent course is apt to degenerate into a verbal fencing bout and misapprehensions to become ingrained and there is another side to this for the parent begins with an imperfect notion of the child's character formed in early years or during equonic told gales of youth to this he adheres noting only the facts which suit with his preconception and wherever a person fancies himself unjustly judged he at once and finally gives up the effort to speak truth with our chosen friends on the other hand and still more between lovers for mutual understanding is love's essence the truth is easily indicated by the one and aptly comprehended by the other a hint taken a look understood conveys the gist of long and delicate explanations and where the life is known even yay and nay become luminous in the closest of all relations that of a love well founded and equally shared speech is half discarded like a roundabout infantile process or a ceremony of formal etiquette and the two communicate directly by their presences and with few looks and fewer words contrive to share their good and evil and uphold each other's heart in joy for love rests upon the physical basis it is a familiarity of nature's making and apart from voluntary choice understanding has in some sort outrun knowledge for the affection perhaps began with the acquaintance and as it was not made like other relations so it is not like them to be perturbed or clouded each knows more than word each lives by faith and believes by a natural compulsion and between man and wife the language of the body is largely developed and grown strangely eloquent the thought that prompted and was conveyed in a caress would only lose to be set down in words aye although Shakespeare himself should be describe yet it is in these dear intimacies beyond all others that we must strive and do battle for the truth let but a doubt arise and alas all the previous intimacy and confidence is but another charge against the person doubted what a monstrous dishonesty is this if I have been deceived so long and so completely let but that thought gain entrance and you plead before a deaf tribunal appeal to the past why that is your crime make all clear convince the reason alas speciousness is but a proof against you if you can abuse me now the more likely that you have abused me from the first for a strong affection such moments are worth supporting and they will end well for your advocate is in your lover's heart and speaks her own language it is not you but she herself who can defend and clear you of the charge but in slighter intimacies and for a less stringent union indeed is it worthwhile we are all ankle free only more or less concerned for the miss chance all trying wrongly to do right all falling at each other's feet like dumb neglected lap dogs sometimes we catch an eye this is our opportunity in the ages and we wag our tail with a poor smile is that all all only if you knew but how can they know they do not love us the more fools we to squander life on the indifferent but the morality of the thing you will be glad to hear is excellent for it is only by trying to understand others that we can get our own hearts understood and in matters of human feeling the clement judge is the most successful pleader the truth of intercourse by Robert Louis Stevenson the end