 We have an excellent panel. I'm going to run this a little bit like a National Security Council meeting where we started thinking through options. I was senior director for Asia in the Bush administration and left before the Thai problems broke. The last time they had a series of NSC meetings, but I can imagine what they were like. Joining me on the panel are Frank Genuzzi, who is currently the president and CEO of the Mansfield Foundation. Before that, he was the deputy executive director for Amnesty in the US. And Vikram Singh, Vikram is now at the Center for American Progress where he's vice president for national security and international policy. And as many of you know, he was deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia until months ago. And of course, Dr. Ernie Bauer, our leader of the Southeast Asia programs and the man behind our program today. So I want to thank all of them for joining. We'll go through a series of questions up here, and then I'll open it up for discussion. The earlier panel talked briefly about why Thailand is important to the United States. I don't think we need to reiterate those points. Were the long and close history we have with Thailand, our oldest treaty in Asia, allies fought side by side in numerous conflicts over the years. But it's a very complicated relationship, to say the least. We've just done polling at CSIS. We surveyed foreign policy experts in 11 countries around the Pacific Rim about how they saw the future of order and international relations in Asia. We're going to be publishing this in about two weeks. Let me give you a few of the more stunning responses we got from Thailand, which indicates how complicated our relationship has become. We surveyed 11 countries. One of the question we asked was, what country will be the dominant power in Asia in 10 years? The Thai respondents, by far, had the strongest belief that China would be the dominant power, even more than the Chinese. 89% of Thai respondents said China would be the dominant power. We asked whether US leadership in Asia is in the interests of your country. Thailand had the lowest number saying that US leadership in Asia is in the interests of Thailand. Now, these are not government officials. These are think tankers, intellectuals. But only 7% of Thai respondents said that continued US leadership was in their interests, which was well below China. We did not survey North Korea, but it was well below China. It was quite stunning. And then we asked, do you support or oppose the US repivot to Asia? And Thailand was second only to China in expressing opposition to the US pivot or rebalance to Asia. To preview our results, the rest of the region was 90% favorable, was very favorable. China was most concerned, not surprisingly. But Thailand was second only to China. So again, these are not government views, and they're not public views. These are think tankers, opinion shapers in Thailand. But it indicates that as close as our relationship is, as close as particularly as our military relationship is, as long as our history together is, there are some real disquieting undertones of suspicion and divergence about what the future of Asia means. And I just mentioned that as context before we start. Now, to turn to our panelists, I'd like to present the first question so that we can advise the president on how to think about this problem. We heard earlier, as I said, about why Thailand is important to the United States. But can I ask each of you, we'll start with Frank and go down the line, why this particular chaotic situation is important. Not just in terms of Thailand's importance, but in terms of our larger foreign policy interests in Asia, in democracy, in good governance, and rule of law, in managing a rising China, and so forth. Why do the developments matter? And if you want, you can give the audience a preview of how you think this might unfold in the coming weeks and months. Frank? Thank you, Michael. Well, I think I have to offer at least a very short disclaimer, which is that what I learned about Thailand I learned by accident when I was sent there instead of China. I had been hoping to go to China. Tiananmen Square happened. I was not welcome to go to China as far as the State Department was concerned. So they sent me to Thailand. And all the way over to Thailand, on my very first visit there in 1990, I was reading the Lonely Planet Guidebook, trying to learn something about Thailand and trying to learn a little Thai. And so when I arrived at the embassy, I reported the next morning to Skip Boyce, who was the political counselor at the time. And he said, hello. Who are you? I'm Frank Chinusi. I'm here from the State Department to help you. That's very nice. How's your Thai? I said, put thai may die. So it's OK. So then he starts jabbering at me in Thai. And then I had to interrupt him a couple minutes later. No, really, put thai may die. I do not speak Thai. And so he says, well, what am I going to do with you? And so he sent me to the Cambodia border, which was the beginning of my experience of Thailand. And so I think of the Thai relationship in a special way ever since that year in 1990. And not trying to dodge your question, Michael, but I would say that it is important to understand that the Thai relationship is important in the United States not just because of the bilateral relationship, but because of what Thai represents to US interests in mainland Southeast Asia. It is the hub of so much of what the United States is attempting to accomplish in Southeast Asia. Regional economic integration, promotion of good governance and democratic values, receptivity to refugees and human rights, counterinsurgency in an effective way, hopefully, in the South. And so the reason that the outcome matters is because, as goes Thailand, so goes, in my mind, the model of democratic, tolerant constitutional governance in Southeast Asia. It's going to have a huge impact on Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and neighboring Myanmar. So it is of vital importance for the United States that the crisis in Thailand be resolved in a way that ultimately reaffirms those principles of good governance. And the problem for the president is that reflective of the polling data that Michael shared, reflective of the fact that the US consulate in Songkwa no longer exists. That is now the Chinese consulate in Songkwa, the actual building that the United States had. I mean, to me, it's a stunning physical manifestation of the diminution of the US influence in Thailand. The fact that our response to the 97 financial crisis was not what the Thai people and government would have liked. And we lost significant credibility and confidence among the Thai people and government at that time, which has never been fully restored. For all of these reasons, frankly, Mr. National Security Advisor, our leverage is not what it should be. But it's of vital importance that we not make the situation worse and that we promote an outcome that ultimately reaffirms principles of democratic governance. And I think the best way to do that right now is probably to keep a low profile and to focus on the mill to mill relationship at a low level to encourage the military to do what they've been doing, which is to remain aloof from trying to meddle directly in the political outcomes. At least that's my understanding of their role up till this point. And to look to the Thai, ultimately, I hate to sound like there's nothing to be done, but to ultimately look to the Thai to sort things out. So that's the best advice I have right now is to remember that it matters. That it matters to everything, to the Lower Mekong Initiative, to the future of Burma, to whether or not the insurgency in the South becomes inflamed as a regional one or not, but to keep a low profile. Thanks. Thanks. Thank you, Mike, Mr. National Security Advisor. Thank you, Frank. I agree with everything that Frank said. And one thing I think is important to distinguish. So on the one hand, Thailand is uniquely able to continue to function both on its own, in the region, and with the United States, despite a really unimaginable level of chaos, an unimaginable level of disruption, the kinds of disruptions that would, in many ways, grind many countries to a halt seem to sort of just be there's some element of Teflon going on in Thai society and in the Thai business community. They will take the hits, but they will bounce back. And that's happened time and time again. But this time, it feels like it might be different. And I think the nature of this really hyper politicized zero-sum politics is going to take Thailand to a new place that none of us can actually define or predict. But it is almost certainly very damaging for Thailand in the medium to long term, and I think damaging to the region and to US national security interests. It's not that Thailand faltering and having this political chaos will somehow profoundly damage the region. It seems that we will be able to maintain a lot of bilateral cooperation, a lot of regional cooperation, no matter who prevails in the internal political contest in Thailand. But if Thailand falters, I think it is going to be a powerful drag on the progress for Southeast Asia as a whole, not just mainland Southeast Asia, but actually the entire ASEAN region. I think that you see a concern now from ASEAN as a group calling for dialogue to try to resolve the political differences within Thailand. I think there is growing concern. But the fact is that Thailand is an engine for Southeast Asia. And as Thailand goes, it's not that it will become, it will drag the region down, but it will be a drag on the region. There is no doubt about that. When it comes strictly to why the chaos matters for the United States, again, on the one hand, it seems like we can manage through an awful lot of chaos. We successfully held Cobra Gold this year in the mill to mill arena. We still are able to do a lot with Thailand, both in the region and beyond. The Thai military is a constructive partner in regional institutions. We have lots of flights transiting through. We do lots of training with them and with others. So just in the mill to mill sense, that all works. Economically, I am sure that industries and businesses are already starting to think about their alternatives because this looks like it's a long-lasting political crisis. But lots of the private sector investment that's in Thailand is going to be there for the long term, as long as things continue to limp along. I mean, it's not that Thailand is well enough integrated that we can sort of get by. Were we to sort of lose that? I think it is very detrimental for the United States. And so this brings up a lot of questions for what our leverage is and how we should use that leverage. Thailand is not a place for us to use a lot of blunt tools. Thailand is a place of subtlety, and it's a place where us being thoughtful in how we respond and how we talk to our Thai counterparts about what will or won't happen depending on how they manage things is going to be very important. So I think, much like Frank said, it's a low-profile keeping engagement up in many ways. But we're going to have to start thinking about where we might have triggers that would require some sort of action. I think our recent management of the crisis has been relatively good. We have said to the Thai military, stay on the sidelines. Thai military has stayed on the sidelines. I don't think it's because we've said that. I think it's because they truly would not like to get sucked into this mess and don't see anything good coming out of something like a coup. But I think it's important that we give indicators to Thai counterparts and to Thai's on all sides of the crisis. I'm sure Ernie will talk more about where the crisis might go. But I think I find it a highly unpredictable situation. And I find Thailand's capacity to manage this kind of thing strangely better than almost any other country. Maybe in the next round we can talk a little more about the China issues that Frank brought up. But I'll end there. Mr. Senior Director, I love when Mike thinks up these scenarios where he's always like the security director, president, or something like that. It works. I like it. But Mr. I guess it's a national security advisor. I think the numbers that you shared at the outset of the meeting reflect not where the ties genuinely hold the United States right now. I detect that it reflects more that the ties are searching for their own identity. And I think they're not sure about answering these questions in that context. The ties have been extremely insular over the last, we could say since the last five or six years. And I think we also have to be, have a lot of humility about our role. I think we overstate the depth of our relationship. Well, it's very broad and very deeply engaged. I think we find ourselves, although this is our oldest treaty ally in Asia, at a point where our relationship with Thailand has become very tactical. It's not strategic. And what we're missing here is strategic depth. Those old relationships of the people like Colonel John Cole, who've been in the trenches with the ties through wars and through training and through different experiences, I think we need to reboot on that level of depth and the relationship are very, that will be very important to climbing back, but we shouldn't rush. We need to be nuanced as Vikram suggested. I think we need to be, we have to have humility as Frank suggested. There's gonna be a question point here. And I think the ties are very much quietly looking to Washington. I think there is leverage in Washington, although they do see the embassy right now as having, and I think this is wrong, but I do think that ties in Thailand have seen the embassy as being painted red. And we need to have that in mind. So Washington is gonna have to deliver messages here. I think that our leverage are several. One is we do have good relationships with the military. We do have good relationships with individual ties on all sides of this crisis. We do have incredibly good relationships with Thai business. And I think all these points are important. Thailand matters to us because we saw as in the floods a couple of years ago, when you take Thailand out of the global and regional supply chain, everybody gets not just a cold, but they get a version of the flu. I mean, Thailand is a seminal investment destination for American business and Vikram was right. We aren't pulling up stakes there. We are invested. We are with the ties through this conflict. So we have a long-term interest from a business point of view. Same is true militarily and from a security point of view. The ties have been tactically our best friends in terms of staging, not only for military reasons and intel sharing, but also on HADR. When the crisis hit in Myanmar, we were staging out of Utapau. We will continue to see that as a very important way forward. I think regionally, in the regional context, I want to mention this too. Thailand is very important. Thailand is the place where in 1967, ASEAN was founded. It is one of the original five members of ASEAN. The last Secretary of State, Clinton, called I think rightly ASEAN the fulcrum or the center of new emerging regional security and economic architecture. To the extent Thailand is weak, ASEAN is weak. And that can be exploited by people trying to weaken ASEAN for tactical reasons or strategic reasons. And I think we've seen that from China recently on the South China Sea and the pressure they've put on various ASEAN chairs at the ASEAN summit and ASEAN regional forum. So to execute our strategy of a strong ASEAN, we need to work through this with the ties. I agree with Vikram that we can't solve the problem for the ties, but we can indicate. And I think we need to indicate at a higher level than we have done that we need to be supportive. Most likely scenario is there will be conflict. This is an existential 100 year power struggle. What's important is who has power when the succession takes place and when his majesty passes from the scene. And so no matter what hopeful signs we're seeing, no matter which prime minister gets ousted in the near term, this struggle is not over until the succession takes place. We don't and should not expect resolution or stability in Thailand until that takes place. And when it takes place, Thailand is going to need friends and we need to be there. Thank you. Let me confirm for our friends watching online that this is not actually the National Security Council. I am no longer in government. Vikram is no longer in government. And the questions I ask are not designed to illustrate a policy I would recommend. I think I agree with all of you, but I do want to try to push in the way that a non-Asia or non-Tai expert looking at problems around the world would push to understand, for example, how much risk we should take, how much we should compromise our principles in order to retain influence and so forth. So let me ask some questions along those lines, but Ernie, you said in effect, you think this will lead to conflict. Let me ask Vikram and Frank to respond to that and to answer the question, Vikram, what when you said if Thailand falters, what does Thailand falters look like? Is it armed conflict or is it more and we'll do Vikram and then Frank? I think Thailand faltering is essentially armed clashes. And unfortunately, I think both sides have ensured that they have the means to go there should they need to. So there and of course that would be the kind of scenario there you may see the military feeling like it's compelled to become involved in order to, in order to preserve some sort of semblance of stability. So when you ask what does it look like, it looks like, you know, if not, you know, God forbid civil war, but it looks like something really ugly with violent clashes with blood in the streets. Now, Thailand and many other countries have gone through this kind of, you know, painful, these kind of painful periods in the past. And I do think that at some point there has to be, there has to be a sane middle in Thailand that will emerge. The hope is it emerges in time in a way that can diffuse conflict. The hope is that some sort of accommodations can happen that would diffuse that trajectory. But I believe that we're at a point now where the camps in Thailand are prepared and there are those on both sides that are sort of gearing up for, you know, putting their money where their mouth is in terms of being able to fight for their side. And that would be something you can't predict. It's a total hypothetical to try to figure out how exactly one would deal with that, but it is something we should be preparing to face should it come to that. Well, I hope you're wrong. I fear you may be right. I would say that Thailand to me is faltering now. It's faltering in that it's not able to play the leadership role within ASEAN that the United States hopes it will play. It's not able to address the crisis of confidence in its major institutions inside Thailand, including confidence in the courts right now. And so there's an element of failure that is inherent to this moment of political conflict. And that will only intensify if there's more bloodshed. My first visit to Thailand, I remember going to the movie theater and for the first time seeing the movie and having the national anthem played as it is in the beginning of Thai movies and everyone standing up and paying a homage to the king. There was a very seductive security to the notion that there was this fatherly figure who would bind the nation together against all adversity. And we're losing that sense of confidence if it's not lost completely. And the future is fraught with uncertainties surrounding succession. So I would say that the bloodshed, I think I would hope there would be minimal and that the U.S. role in this should be to look to the forces of stability in Thailand that do exist. And de facto, that means the military. But not to step in to govern the country, but to help ensure law and order. And I think that what we see right now in Thailand is a very welcome intention of the military to remain as reserved in their role as possible. But if the kind of bloodshed that Vikram is predicting breaks out, then the first duty of the state is to protect its citizens from harm. And that's the same as it is in Myanmar today, where the United States is attempting to advance civilian democratic governance. But when you see the kind of violence that you've seen in Rakhine State, there may be no alternative, but to turn to the institutions that are capable of quelling that violence to restore order. The country cannot be governed with Bangkok streets of wash and blood and protests. And so that's gonna require us, Mr. National Security Advisor, to approach the Congress with an eye towards winning greater latitude to sustain relationships with Thailand, even if the military steps in in a way that might trigger U.S. laws. It's gonna require us probably to go to our RTA friends and think strategically about how the military positions itself around the succession issue to restore stability so that you can have an orderly process to restore civilian rule if the current situation remains at an impasse. Thank you. I hear a disconnect. I hear you saying, all of you saying that bloodshed is a real possibility, if not a likelihood, that a faltering Thailand or a filling Thailand is a strategic setback for the United States because then ASEAN itself becomes ineffective and vulnerable. But then you're telling me that we should have a low profile approach, we should have a subtle approach. If I were hearing this for the first time, I would think, why? Why would we not use all the resources and all the influence we have now to forestall bloodshed, which once it happens is completely unpredictable, we don't know how this will end. We know that in other societies, Lebanon, which did not have a history, which also had a history, shall we say, of sort of living with civil war and violence, it never really recovered once they got into that spiral in the 1980s. So I would think we'd wanna use all of our instruments of power now and be unsubtle to forestall the scenarios you're talking about. Why am I wrong? You're right. In a way, you're right. But it's how we use the levers and we have to be humble. We have to have that dose of nuance and humility about how we use our levers. I think we do have, and we should use, everything in our power to forestall the bloodshed, but it may be that the United States is not in a position to do that. In fact, I think probably we're not. If the king himself, who is the guardian of the Thai people, cannot or has not been able to intervene and stop this bloodshed, then I wonder in this room, whether we should be able to convince ourselves that we think we could stop it. However, I think what we ought to do is find every, all of our best connections to the Thai military, current and retired military, we should be talking to these guys about how we can be influential with the military to keep the military on the sidelines. We should remember that the Thai military is not a monolithic body. It is now divided into groups or they're groups that guard the prince, they're groups that guard the princess. There are divisions that guys like John Cole know much better than I do about, we should call him in. John, I'm looking at you. But I think that one point here, I think is really important that in our efforts to keep Thailand peaceful and protect the peace and keep it strong, we should never sacrifice our foreign policy principles of human rights, respect for democracy. Because in the long run, even if China, which was the first country to recognize the coup in 2006, if you remember, and we took some bruises for that. But I think in the long run, if we stick with those principles, we will find ourselves on the right side of history in Thailand with the Thai people. And I think if we look at what's happening all around Southeast Asia, what we can see is the effective harvest of the last 50 years where the strong men of Asia were very effective in building their countries, moving them forward economically. The middle class is actually now empowered and wants to be empowered. And that's what we're seeing happen in Thailand, just like we saw in Malaysia, even in Singapore is surprised, the PAP is surprised by election results. But I think in Thailand, it'll be a different thing because of the monarchy and because of the unique structure of Thai society. But let's stick with those points, Mike, or Mr. National Security Advisor, and take that path. Let me push you just real quick before I turn to Vikram. So you would agree with Frank that in the near term, we're going to have to bend a bit on principles. And I assume that's with the expectation that the military may be implicated in using course of measures that are not gonna be popular in Congress. But in the near term, that we should be prioritizing our ability to engage with the Thai military, even if it means in the near term compromising somewhat on these questions of... No, I actually don't think... Or do you think we should have a very strict, consistent... I think we should have a strong message that we don't want to see the military intervene in a coup, but it may actually be, and we can imagine this possibility in a very real way, that there are battles on the streets in Thailand that include elements of the military, maybe not in uniform. And the military actually would, if that happens, we shouldn't stop, or we shouldn't criticize the Thai military from stopping, staunching that fighting, but ask them to please limit their involvement to that. Yeah, I mean the key point here is I don't expect the military to be the instigator here. I mean, I think the violence is gonna be organic between political forces and it's gonna be armed groups and thugs and irregulars. I think that if the military in fact instigates the violence, then I think that's a whole different game with respect to our ability to sustain support for them and relationships with them if we perceive them to be the ones who are setting out to instigate. Let me answer your question in sort of two parts. First, on what we have to do with the military, it's not really yet about do you compromise or not compromise principles. What it is about, what do you wanna see the military completely avoid doing and what do you wanna see the military potentially do? Completely avoid doing is get involved in politics and completely avoid doing, and this is where it gets a little trickier, is what we need to see is a commitment and I believe that Thai armed forces have been trying very hard to manage this, but there could be a point at which the Thai armed forces have to essentially disarm pieces of themselves. Those that have decided to choose sides have to be sort of told, you can't choose sides. If you do wanna choose sides, you're gonna take off your uniform, you're gonna hand in your weapons, you're gonna get in civilian clothes and go join your buddies, but you're not able to join sides inside the Thai military uniform. The military is going to protect the king, the kingdom, the nation, and then from that stand, from that vantage point, the military should be able to help with law and order as necessary, but you said should we be using all our tools? We should certainly be using all our tools. It's important to focus on the problem here and the problem is that the political game has lost any of the potential bridges, any of the potential places for compromise have been lost. It makes the gridlock on Capitol Hill look like collaborative unitary government. This is that, it is so, and so what's happened is neither, there have been multiple off-ramps from this crisis, multiple ways to find accommodations that those off-ramps have been rejected. And so one of the questions is, is it possible for the United States not alone, but the United States with Thailand's ASEAN friends, with China, with other countries that care and have deep relationship with Thailand and from the business community, is it possible for the political leadership to hear some very clear messages about hey you guys have got to find a way that does not take you off the precipice completely to get this back to something functional for your country because otherwise there are going to be consequences, not only in terms of relations, but in terms of your financial situation, your business, your investment climate, all sorts of other things. And so I think that coordinating with other friends of Thailand to essentially, have deep engagement with both sides of the Thai political spectrum and try to set some boundaries and give some friendly encouragement towards compromise is probably more important than sort of any kind of notion of using traditional tools of US power. So broaden it, get others, get the business community to send this message, but it's still an aspirational message. Are there consequences that we or other like-minded states describe? I can imagine the business community doing essentially what it did when India and Pakistan were heading towards war in 2002 which was start preparing evacuations which scared, which made it real that there would be economic consequences. Are there things that business community is or should be doing, for example, to signal, no kidding, this time this will have a profound effect on Thailand as an investment target, I mean investment environment. Are there things on the military side that General Dempsey or General Odionero or others should be saying that in terms of consequences or do you think that's not subtle, that's not low key enough? Do we put consequences on the table or do we just describe the vision that we think is necessary? I think the, I'll take the business side. I think we can use the business message. We've got a commerce secretary, Penny Pritzker going out to the region to visit four ASEAN countries in June with the, I think with the US ASEAN Business Council at least in two of those countries. I think this message has to be a private one. It cannot be a public message. The last thing we wanna do is create some sort of run on Thai business but that message privately should be delivered to the B7 which are the big, the leaders of the big business associations in Thailand. They're the ones who will understand it most clearly and they're the ones who can communicate it to the politicians on both sides. I don't think that business leaders engaging Thailand's politicians on both sides right now is, I don't think they'll be able to do that very well but I think we should work with our business interlocutors and the Thai ambassador here in Washington to tell them that there is grave concern and it could have consequences on US interests, business interests. I think one of Thailand's curses is this actual, is in some ways this resilience, this ability to always muddle through. So in a way, Thai politicians think they can push the limits and the country will manage. I mean I still think you've got something like 3% growth in Thailand through all of this, right? I mean, after the floods you had a drop to nothing and a bounce back to six or 7%. There's a sense that you can sort of play with fire because you haven't been badly enough burned. So I don't know that we're able to message that we will do things but things will happen and I'm not sure how we can best communicate how bad it could get but I think it's less a matter of us exerting specific levers or imposing some sort of punishments but just a fact of life that things will happen both in the bilateral relationship and the financial relationship in your status in the region and your ability to do things. So the out for the business community is to say it's not us, it's the markets which is true and the out for the policymakers it's to say it's not us, it's the Congress which is an age old time tested way to describe consequences from sorrow rather than anger. Still challenging and there are other cases where we've wanted to forestall this kind of violence where we've done I think of Armitage with Musharraf 2001 you're either with us or with them but you're not advocating that level of stark. There's just nowhere to put your foot. I mean you can't do that in Thailand because the country is effectively divided so if you there's no us in them it's you have to reach into a broader group who are the Thai people and the Thai institutions which eventually will need to be strengthened and eventually the people will have their say. You know that's where this is gonna come out and that's where we need to be strong but we can't afford to be where we are right now which is seen as sort of sitting back not able to engage because it's too hard. I mean it's just too divided and I think we're whether that's fair or not I think it's actually not fair from what I know of what we're doing but I think the perception is that while Thailand goes through what will be in history, a once in a century historic political reordering that we as treaty allies and Thailand's close friends those polls even if I'm right that it's about Thailand's self identity not about US policy per se even if I'm right about that I think we need to have been trying to help and I would in that area although I don't think an envoy would be particularly influential I would love to see us get on the phone with somebody like Dick Luger or another statesman who's not seen as politicized in the Thai context and maybe think about teaming him up with a friend from Japan, a friend maybe from China, a friend maybe from one of the ASEAN countries and going in just to say that we care and meet with both sides very careful talking points, a limited remit but it would show that we are at the highest level from Washington trying to urge Thailand not to walk it off the precipice as my colleague has suggested. Let me ask about China. Is China gonna be helpful or is this something we should be watching with a wary eye? China's interests are not so divergent from the United States with respect to the current situation and that they also want to see stability in Thailand and I agree very much with Vikram that having multiple voices trying to avoid us them outcomes in Thailand and to help the Thai construct we outcomes in Thailand is essential at this moment. There need to be reassurances given by the region, by the Chinese, by the Americans, by the Japanese that if the Thai can see their way forward for a we outcome that allows for something other than a take no prisoners political bloodletting that that will be supported by the international community and I never thought I would hear myself saying this but in much the same way that the international community attempted with I would argue some modest success to mitigate the political tensions in Cambodia between royalists and Cambodian people's party and other factions inside Cambodia at a time of its early political maturation post UN intervention. I think that there's a role for the international community to essentially remind the Thai of the things that they share, remind the Thai political forces of the opportunities that might exist for win-win outcomes and to then put some muscle behind that in terms of prestige, economic openings, reassurances, confidence building, if the Thai can see their way forward. So I think the Chinese here should not be viewed suspiciously by the United States. I think in fact there's an opportunity to work with China which increasingly has enormous economic muscle in the region, largest trading partner pretty much everyone in the region and they can offer resources, they can bring to bear resources that could be leveraged for political stability. I think I agree with Frank. I think that on balance China would be helpful here. I'm not sure how effectively we've engaged with them on concerns about stability in Thailand but the Chinese want stability not just in Thailand but actually internally in all the Southeast Asian nations even as they're trying to exert pressure and influence and win the day on various issues. So I actually think the time to worry about China for us is the day after the crisis. It's not necessarily during the crisis. The day after the crisis there's no doubt that I think China is essentially in competition with the United States for influence with the Thai people and leadership. I think for the most part the Thai elites believe they can have it both ways and actually I think that's probably true and I think for most of the region having it both ways is the right outcome. You want to be in great relations with the United States, great relations with China. Thailand kind of epitomizes where a lot of countries want to be. It's best military relationship is with the United States. It has strong political and other business relationships with the United States but China is its largest trading partner and that sort of seems to be the natural order of things for them. But we do have unique ties, security and political ties with Thailand that would potentially be challenged by a deepening partnership between Thailand and China particularly in the military arena. And I think that is something that we should be looking to in the future as an area where we want to essentially be the best partner and be the best partner to such a degree that we remain the partner of choice for Thailand in those areas while welcoming their deepening, economic and other ties with China and with the rest of ASEAN and quite frankly with Europe and the United States as well. I don't have much to add other than we're on the right track here already. We have agreed to and welcome Chinese participation in Cobra Gold for the first time last year. And our overall goal here, let's remind ourselves is to get the Chinese to sit at the table with all of us and help solve problems, make the rules and then follow those rules with everyone else. So this is actually a good opportunity to bring China in to a problem that does I think affect all of us together. And number two, we should also try to use ASEAN and strengthen ASEAN while we address the tie problem. So we should, whatever we do, let's remember to consult with our ASEAN colleagues on this. ASEAN made, I thought, a rather bold and forward-leaning statement out of Myanmar at the ASEAN summit this weekend calling it out directly, naming Thailand and saying that they wanna see a peaceful resolution. These are our friends and we wanna strengthen ASEAN as we help the ties avoid the brink. To summarize, we have a very pronounced national interest in avoiding bloodshed and avoiding more chaos because Thailand is an old friend, traditionally a hub of our presence in the region and across the military and DEA and a whole bunch of issues because we care about ASEAN, core of ASEAN because we care about the democratic example beyond Asia and because if it goes badly, it could turn into a location of intensified competition with China that we don't want. And the toolkit is, you're telling me, engage the military and as Frank said, we gotta have to be creative but also ask for congressional support for that. An envoy, Dick Luger has done it before, someone like that, broaden the friends who are conveying these messages. You're telling me the broader it is, in a way, the less harsh it has to be. If China, the US and others are carrying a similar message, it'll be more effective and work ASEAN both as a way to help ameliorate the situation but also because ASEAN is gonna be under stress because of this and we have broader interests in ASEAN, work the business community and be subtle. So that's it, Mr. President, you all get to be the president now and in the Q and A session, you can either challenge or revise or question or add elements, so including the previous panel, feel free. Colonel, you've been remobilized, so feel free to weigh in on what you think is right or wrong about the strategy or what you don't understand or what our panel missed. Yeah, over here with the Vietnam helmet. Oh, thank you very much. Andre Silverzo, I'm a representative for the company in Detroit, Michigan in Vietnam, interstate travel company. Anyway, wonderful panel. And now the question I have, actually the one I asked this morning was better answered by this panel, I think than the one that I put the question to about. But anyway, here's my question. The wonderfully nuanced discussion of how we handle this important relationship with Thailand, my question is why, in how we deal with China which was a subject of my question this morning, why can't we put a little more priority, prioritize in terms of dealing with China, the Philippines and Vietnam and Indonesia, to name three countries that have had a little more spine, vis-a-vis China, without deep prioritizing Thailand. Do all the wonderful things you're talking about with Thailand, there's no reason to change that, every reason to keep doing it. The business relationships, the commercial, the military, all of it's great. But your questions that you put to, that you told us about, I mean, how many ties are now leaning, but they believe Thailand is, I mean, China's the way with the future. Well, the other countries don't. And so why not work? That's my question about thread the needle. Could we do that? Can you back up the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia and Malaysia and then at the same time, ask China for help on Thailand? Yes. You can. Yeah. You absolutely can. And I think in this case, you must. And it actually helps you, I think, because you, I think at some level, part of the problem we have with China right now is that they have interpreted signals or put together a narrative in Beijing that convinces them that they have no outlet. They can't use international law. They can't use channels that we all, the community of their neighbors, their nations around them, that China somehow believes that it can't use those channels to achieve its energy security or national security. And I think the greater objective of our strategy in Asia over the next 20 years is to convince China that its security is in all of our interests because a stable and secure China is going to mean a stable and secure Asia, which is going to mean a stable and secure United States. So I would say that we can do both things and we have to thread that needle. Being very strong and decisive and clear that we cannot accept the Chinese aggressiveness on the continental shelf of Vietnam or we cannot accept the way that they have handled the Philippines is not inconsistent with going to Beijing and asking them for partnership and help on preventing Thailand from walking itself off the cliff. Dad, I mean, look, the nature of these relationships is a function of the strategic environment in which all the countries find themselves. So those countries that are having real issues with China, remind you still with China as their largest trading partner, right? We're not in a binary world where it's either or. So those countries that are having difficulties with China in some areas, certainly we are, we are the country they turn to to say, hey, help us argue for principles and norms of international law here and that this is the way these things should be dealt with. And Thailand's not facing those kinds of challenges and that is one of the reasons that you see potentially Thai attitudes looking different if they suddenly face some sort of bilateral challenge with China, public opinion would swing wildly. Public opinion makes very broad swings very quickly on these sorts of issues. But one of the frustrations that I think many have had in the region and in the United States with Thailand is a sense that Thailand isn't living up to its potential and it's not living up to its potential because of this political chaos and this long standing now we're going on. It's what seems like it will be a generational thing of that keeps Thailand from actually being what it could be. And for however well Thailand has done, Thailand would have done much better if it could find its way among the ties towards a political accommodation that works. I mean Thailand really would be the center of gravity. It really would be. Right now, everyone's hedging about, well, how do we do things well even if Thailand isn't there as a big powerhouse? And that in the mill to mill sphere has been one of the areas that's been a real challenge. We're sort of like, we want, this is an extraordinarily capable military, not only for doing things for Thailand, but for doing things in the region, for partnering, for doing things like they've done recently in terms of like peacekeeping deployments and contributions to counter piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden. Those are the kinds of things that they're not gonna be able or willing to do if they keep being just obsessed with their own politics and this internal mass. And so that's one of the reasons that I think really everyone in the region can support Thailand's sorting itself out. Thanks, I'm Steve Hirsch. I'm a journalist based here in Washington. Right at the beginning, Mike, you said something. I realize this wasn't the focus of the discussion, but I want to skip over it. Despite what Ernie said, you talked about the unpopularity of the pivot among Thais, second only to the Chinese. And I'm wondering if you or the panel have some thoughts on why that's true, what its implications are, and whether it's likely to change when the king dies. Thanks. I want to see more on this polling because I think it's fascinating data and I want to learn more about the sample. I would suspect, and it's just a guess, that the reservations about the US pivot are connected to a joke I used to hear in Thailand when I first arrived there as a young man. And one of my Thai friends asked me, he says, how come there's never been a coup d'etat in the United States? I said, I don't know. He says, because there's no US embassy there. I think US engagement is a great opportunity through the pivot engenders a certain amount of skepticism even among friends if they believe it's coming with a lot of political baggage and lecturing and admonitions from Washington. And I think part of who we are as a nation is that we are evangelical about the mission of spreading democracy and good governance. I think we have to be honest with ourselves about that. And the pivot is not devoid of those values. And so if the pivot were just the US building trade links, I think it would be universally welcomed throughout East Asia. But people understand that there's more to it. There should be more to it. And I think it engenders a certain amount of skepticism among those who fear that it's gonna come with meddling in internal politics. You know, we did the survey, a similar survey in 2009. And we basically asked the CSIS as the think tanks around the region about 500 people responded. But we got similar answers then from Thailand as well. Now the one thing I should say, we're going to present our findings here on June 5th. So look for that. And on the question of how important democracy, rule of law and human rights are, the Thai respondents were very much with the US, Japan, Indonesia, other democracies. So it wasn't a debate about values, but there was a deep, deep skepticism about the United States. And maybe that's possible because there's a US embassy. I mean, maybe there's a closeness allows a certain amount of that, it's hard to say. I think I had a question right from the speaker's table right here. Thank you. 39 points to track from Jolongon University. Two questions, regional and domestic. First, I can understand from the American policy making perspective that you would be concerned about what happens in Thailand vis-a-vis the China question, whether you know the Chinese would be more supportive. And then if something happens, there's a change of government or something like in 2006, the Chinese were the first major power to recognize the cool government. I think that you don't have to fear as much this time. The Thai crisis is fair. It dishes out equal flak to the major powers the Chinese have had some criticisms from the protesters, the yellow shirts as well for calling for the election to take place. So even if you have a right-wing government for a while that comes up that they will remember that the Chinese didn't take their side. And China also has lots of influence and lots of dominance in Myanmar. The election results in Cambodia suggests that it's lots of influence. So I think that that configuration is less of a concern to be less of a concern to foreign policymaking drivers here in Washington. The domestic, you know, if some of the remarks that have been voiced in this room, if the protesters in both sides in Bangkok hear this, they would be aghast that Washington can overestimate its resources and toolkit so much that they can think that they can do this and that in Thailand, you know, from here in the Beltway that they can do this in the world. In fact, it could boomerang. So I think that there's a risk here of trying to do too much. I know that, you know, policy makers, you sit and say, OK, what can we do? What should we do? What must we do? All our resources and forces that we can bring to bear. But you have to be careful about the boomerang effect. In fact, Ernie spoke about this. It has to be very nuanced. And there's not one magic bullet that is going to solve this high crisis, not by the Thais and certainly not by the foreigners. So in Thailand, being an independent country, we're lucky in that sense. There's not a lot of foreign meddling. You know, you don't have imperialist masters from the past trying to vie for the future of Thailand. But this also means that the domestic sphere, they have to solve this problem themselves. So I would say that I would reiterate and second Ernie's remarks about, you know, you have to stick to principle. So I think that those parameters are very important. No coup, democratic process, constitutional rule, human rights and so on. And that makes a big difference already. And beyond that, in the private sphere, the Thais are not talking enough. So if you want to make a difference, you get the Thais talking in whatever way you can. And then that would be helpful. And then, you know, you have the notion of tough love. So I think once in a while, you need to be a tough ally. 1997 in Boomerangt, a tough allied kind of abandoned Thailand. But this time, a tough ally could say, look, you know, President Obama goes to Asia, goes right by Thailand, but not to Thailand. And the Thais, they take notice from this. They don't want to be an outcast. They want to be respected and so on. So that's a little bit of a leverage that, hey, Thailand's missing out is dysfunctional, malfunctioning. And if it continues to be so, then it'll be chunt and disregarded. And that is a kind of a wake-up call that the Thais, it will set another parameter for the Thais when they fight. Those are excellent points. And in defense of my panelists, I think they all were clear that our leverages and our influence is limited and that we have to be very cautious about drawing red lines or threatening consequences. I was pushing them and I'm satisfied with their answers. I think they address your concerns. But you make an excellent point about dialogue and no one raised that. Is there a role for the US or the international community to foster dialogue? Can you think of specific ways or do we risk looking too heavy-handed? Dialogue among the parties. Yeah, I would just say that I was discussing this with outstanding Thai experts yesterday and I slept on it too. And I don't have the answer yet. But I think the answer is we need to find a way. How do you bring two existentially opposed forces within a national context together in some way that doesn't boomerang right in your, or blow up in your face, to be honest with you. And I was trying to think about a way to do that whether you could invite everybody to a football game or something like that. I mean soccer, not that kind of football. But I don't know, I don't know the answer. But I think it is a good idea. But we need someone smarter than I am to have an idea about how to do that. Mansfield Center. Yes, Frank. Yes ma'am, can we take a few more? Hi, my name is Meredith Sandler. Appreciate being called on. Also I've been listening, thanks Ernie for your email earlier this morning that this was gonna be online because I've been listening to it and finally scurried over here at a little bit late, 1.15 or something like that. So thank you. And thank you to the panel, especially the last intervention. For full disclosure, I have a small firm and we are the International Trade Advisor to the Office of Commercial Affairs at the Royal Thai Embassy. And I also work with the Embassy of Indonesia and really about 25 other embassies here. So I wanna be clear that I'm probably biased. But in a way, and I was just in Thailand in February and March. And when I was there, I expected, I was scared. In fact, I got my will done and I hadn't done that before until last time before I went to Algeria. So you can tell the, you know, because I'd been listening. But anyway, it's not like that. I mean, there were places I couldn't go. It was the first of the popcorn bombs that occurred when I was there. But I was amazed both by the continuing work of the Thai government ministry officials as well as the economic vitality and building and production and union workers and, you know, of the rest of the country. So the Mr. National Security Advisor. The thing I would ask is the US has, is right now sitting with real decisions. They're small, but they're important. One is the decision on trafficking in persons, whether Thailand will go to tier three versus go up to tier two. Now I'm not advocating one way or another. But, and the reason I was in Thailand was to do a fact finding trip, which personally as a typical American, I was like, yeah, how could have anything have happened positively? But a lot of people are working very hard. And the government and the private sector are working very hard to deal with a number of issues of importance to the US, like trafficking in persons. So I would pay attention to that decision. I'm not saying don't give Thailand a pass like Ukraine was given a pass on IPR, but look at the details of what's been done. Not the press, because the Thai, at least in my opinion, aren't big press people. But at the details of that, there's a worker rights petition in the GSP sphere. Look at what the Thais specifically have been doing in that. Make the decision whether or not to accept that as a case under review. In IPR, there was a very small thing that happened that somebody announced that they were gonna do a training session on IPR in Thailand. That went a lot, it was a US decision of some, I don't know, USPTO or someone. But it made a big deal, it made a big impact that the US government was recognizing that there are many officials and many companies trying to do it right in the US way, which is not always agreed to by the Thais. But the US has its sticks, not too many carrots, but and that's, so those nuanced are, those decisions mean a whole lot, and especially, I'm sorry to say so much, but Ernie, you know, there's some high percentage of Thai GDP is supported by exports. So anything that we can do to keep those exports going, as was said, the flood hit it, but in the last eight months, it's not been the case. Thailand is a leader in this effort to get this GSP renewed, $19 billion of duty free imports that basically help US companies and also suppliers in 123 developing countries. But Thailand is a leader in that. In the midst of everything else, it is organized 22 countries to try to go to the Hill and get Congress to move it at least this. And if the administration has not been strong on that, has not really, with all due respect, because I was one of them once. So those kinds of things can make a difference. Thank you. Thank you. My wife was in Bangkok around the same time as you, and she brought back, she was in Lupia Square and she brought back the whistles and the clangers as gifts for my kids, which was a big mistake because the next morning at 7 a.m., there they were in our bedroom, clang, whistle, I'll say something real quick about TIP and also religious freedom, which is less of an issue for Thailand, but the Trafficking Persons Office. All too often, the State Department and the NSC regional offices approach the TIP office like it's an antibody within the department or within the government to be contained and destroyed. And that never ends well. And we're much more successful and I know this from experience when the NSC, I'm not gonna look at anybody in particular, but when the NSC and the East Asia Bureau sit down with the chamber, with the TIP office, with NGOs and start coming up with a plan because at the end of the day, the way that office works is it wants to see intent, wants to see progress and you can do that. That's what diplomacy is all about. So these to me are not game stoppers and shouldn't be problems. These should be areas where this crisis really forces us to think strategically and gets people in senior positions to start pulling together our stakeholders to get a win-win solution. I don't think that should be, you gave a couple of examples, but I don't think any of them should be, let me rephrase that, all of them should be looked at as opportunities, not threats to the US-Tai relationship. But that takes strategic intent and the kind of attitude I think our panelists talked about. I don't know if you, oh no, okay. Just the only thing I would add is that, look, I honestly think that the, our ambassador has consistently made sure that, I think in this case that we continue to work on all the things we can work on constructively with Thailand. I've actually seen that has been my sense from the folks in the field has been that we're continuing to do just about everything. This gets back to the ability of Thailand to what I called muddle through, which is that you actually see a country that can go through a great deal of crisis and continue to be very functional. So I don't, you know, our operations in Thailand are tremendously broad and deep. We have an awful lot of people working in Thailand every day and they're all, for the most part, I think doing their jobs with mostly traffic inconvenience, that's the largest disruption. But that doesn't mean that this is not a profound crisis that Thailand faces. That means that above that we've got to, we have to really think about how we help them, how we help Thailand get to a good place. I'm gonna, with Ernie's forbearance, call on the Colonel and one other speaker, Sunai, from the speaker's table. Both ask your questions and we'll end with that. So I think Colonel, you're first and then Sunai. Sir, can you hear me? John Cole, retired officer. I represent myself. I'm opening up a surfing equipment shop on the North Shore in Hawaii. And haven't incorporated yet, but just in case, I do come up with a name before this conference ends, we'll put it on email. What I would like to say is just real quick, number one is our mill to mill exercise program is much larger and deeper and more ongoing and all this is in the open press, it's just not covered by the Washington Post and the Bangkok Post that everybody gets all their information from. Cobra Gold's not the only exercise. Our special ops, people love to go down there. Our airpiles, our airwings up in Okinawa and Korea in Japan that can't fly because of crowded airspace, they can open it up out of karate air base and these coped under type exercises. What I would like to ask is Paycom has done an excellent job of cleaning up the exercise, particularly Cobra Gold, it's no longer the last cocktail party in Asia, it's a more professional exercise now as it should be but the area I think that we need some to increase emphasis is in ASEAN, going on beneath the behind the curtain so to speak, ASEAN defense ministers, ASEAN regional forum, ASEAN are all putting on numerous exercises, they're all in HADR, involve a lot of European Union participation, South Korea and the ASEAN member states but we sent a group and many of these people, these young men and women, particularly the Thai civilians from the DDP and the Thai equivalent of FEMA, they've never done an exercise before and our people were just told to stand in the corner and wait for the little people when they have a question to come over and ask for some expertise. That's where leading from behind doesn't play any role here. Our guys could do an exercise in their sleep, they don't have to take over, they just have to act as a teacher but for some reason that's left out, it's a small point but I think the ASEAN exercise program building an HADR capacity, Afghanistan, I learned the big word capacity building so you have to throw that into every sentence, capacity building is for sure, for sure the way to go including military people which we do but it's the idea we've got the expertise, why not share it? We don't want to take it over, we just want to show them how to do it. Sunay from Humor I Wash, the conference now is already in the news of Thai Rath which is one of the largest newspaper in Thailand, in Thailand which is already reported that the US call on Thai military not to intervene through military coup and that, and that, and that, it's not that because I ran to the back room, no. And that the tourist self-conflict it ought to be peaceful, democratic and based on inclusiveness and this is the essence of the report already and I think that given this, the gravity of difficult time in Thailand, this is perhaps the most serious test to the nature of bilateral between Thailand and US being very long-term treaty allies and everything so I think that provides unique opportunity in fact to be honest, to be direct, to be candid and consistent. So if it is about principles of democracy, it's about the principle of human rights and half of faith in people's decision is a message on political matters and security matters, the same consistency need to be applied on issues on human rights such as human trafficking which we don't see any progress but in fact, the opposite, that the Thai Navy to name it that is now suing local journalists, suing the Reuters for exposing Navy officer involvement in trafficking. We have seen several cover-ups of these serious crimes. There's no other reason to say Thailand should get a pass on TIP report but to ensure that the message from the US has always been consistent on every single matter and that is about principle. I think this is a major test that we are not looking to just, how the US can support Thailand to get through political crisis but how the US can also maintain the core value of human rights including on the trafficking with human. Thank you. Excellent points. Let's start with Frank and we'll go down and then you can give the benediction. Well, I think especially the last speaker and putting my former Amnesty International head on, I will say that it never profits the United States to downplay disregard or walk away from not US values but the universal values that are represented by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the covenants that the Thai government has sworn to uphold on civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights and I think that the United States needs to stand firmly behind those principles. I wish I could say as a former congressional staffer that the TIP Report is a non-political document. The reality is it's politically tainted, has been since its inception. It's not applied fairly or equally across the board and the United States makes exceptions for its friends and penalizes its enemies and that's also part of the reality that we're dealing with. But I'm glad if the message coming out of Washington at least in some Thai media sources is a message of hope for peaceful resolution of political differences, military remaining out of politics and safeguarding law and order only to the extent that it's necessary to preserve peace and prevent bloodshed but not to intervene actively in an attempt to choose sides in the political tussle and ultimately a message of confidence that as our friend who is engaged economically with the Thai people reminded us that this is a country with a lot happening on the positive ledger in terms of economic productivity and activity and engagement and that we should not neglect that even as we focus on the political turmoil. So today's Wednesday, right? Oh, it's Tuesday, rats. That's too bad, that's too bad. Wednesday in Thailand, Wednesday in Thailand, that's good, thank you. Because my old mentor Bob Scalapino used to say that on Monday, Wednesday and Friday he's an optimist and on Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday he's a pessimist and on Sunday he rests. So in Wednesday today in Bangkok, it's a time hopefully for some optimism that there can be a peaceful way forward. Even if Tuesday here in Washington, we are still mired a bit in the pessimistic outlook about limited U.S. leverage and limited options for the United States in this polarized political struggle. Thanks for both the questions. I totally agree with Frank on the importance of the United States being consistent. And I would go so far as to say I think Sunayu referenced potential abuses within the Royal Thai armed forces and I would assume, I hope, and if it's not the case it should be the case that where such events are happening that that's something that the United States takes up with the Thai military in very clear terms and help them understand what's happening and hopefully help them deal with it. I think the Thai armed forces again have proven to be at what they are, which is a professional military force that is capable of policing and of improving when it needs to make improvements and just like any other organization, military or otherwise, that's the essence of remaining good and strong is that you can take a hard look at yourself and do things. So if that's not happening, it's certainly something that we should be discussing. On the exercises front, I would just say this is a bright spot. This is not something where I would feel at all concerned and it's certainly not something where I would be at all critical of the way that the Pacific Command has handled what we've been doing in terms of the development of multilateral exercises and engagement in the military sphere in Southeast Asia. The ADMM plus has achieved vastly more than any of us thought it would achieve three years ago, three, four years ago. And I believe the US role has been in many ways exemplary, we've helped by offering planners and where the planners are wanted, the planners have gone, where the planners are not wanted and the countries are saying, we think we can do this ourselves, we've stayed out of the way, we've been extraordinarily committed to finding even as these exercises picked up and there weren't sort of things that were on the plan and we were facing difficult choices of how to find assets and stuff. We've tried to make sure the US is there and present and a good participant in these exercises. And these exercises have offered some of the unique opportunities that point to where the region could go if things go well. For example, the deployment of China's hospital ship, the Peace Arc in the HADR Mil-Med exercise that was hosted by Brunei, which was five ASEAN countries together hosting this exercise. When the Chinese deployed the Peace Arc, we were able to put the incoming commander of the mercy on the Chinese hospital ship every day of that exercise to work together with the Chinese in the context of an HADR exercise. These are the winning stories of what's happening in ASEAN. This is the stuff we're trying to make the investments in. This is where we're trying to see ASEAN build those capabilities and other countries around the region and beyond, including China and us and India, Japan, Australia really invest in what will develop into an architecture that helps provide stability for the region. So hopefully we're doing that and we'll continue to do that in a good way. Like Frank, I fell in love with Southeast Asia in Thailand first, you know, I really, but I did it with intent. I wasn't, I was going to Thailand with a Thai friend and he showed me, I think what he showed me was how important people are. And you know, that's one reason why a kid like me who's, you know, from Northeastern Pennsylvania could really relate to Southeast Asia without any prior training in context. And I think that's where we are today. You know, at the bottom of the day, I think it's the people that are important. And I look at this room and I see a lot of faces and a lot of capability. And I noticed that, although my team told me that there's going to be 190 people today and that, but people will come and go and that some panels will be thin and they'll flow in and out. Actually, Elka, you know, no one left, you know. This room is packed and it was packed all day and I think that's because people really care about Thailand. And I also think it's because this discussion was well overdue. We really need to spend more time on calories physically and in our brains on how to help Thailand. And I think for me, this is just the beginning of an effort. I think we will do more here at CSIS and we'd like to cooperate and collaborate with other institutions in government and outside of government. And when I'm talking about people, I want to just take one moment to thank someone who helped fund this effort and someone who loved Thailand and really cared about it. And that's Laura Hudson who worked for Chevron Corporation and she passed away earlier this week. And she will be sorely missed by all of us. So thanks to Laura and thanks to Chevron for the support. Also thanks to the Luce Foundation for their support. For me, at the base here, I think what we need to do is, and we will write up a report on this conference and share recommendations with our colleagues in Thailand and the US government and anywhere. Anyone will be willing to read it. But I think what we're seeing is that we need to approach Thailand with seriousness of intent, with consistency, as Vikram said, with humility, but with a belief that this place will, Thailand will make it through this crisis and that we need to stick to who we are. And I think if we do that, I think we'll all be around in a day not too far away where Thailand's numbers, in terms of how they perceive the United States will be much better than they are in the CSIS study right now. I remember like it was yesterday, after the Asian financial crisis, a couple of years after the Asian financial crisis, Prime Minister Chewin was still Prime Minister and he was coming to the United States and Stu Eisenstadt was then Undersecretary for I think Business and Economic Affairs at State. And Stu Eisenstadt asked the question, what he did is he actually called an interagency meeting of all the government agencies and the business community. I was then President of the U.S. ASEAN Business Council and he called us all in together and he said, I want every single one of you to tell me every single thing you've done in Thailand and I wanna know what the totals are, what have we invested, how many people are working on it, how many people are involved. And when we put all that together, it was U.S. investment in Thailand was enormous. If you count energy investment, we were by far and I think we still are, by far the largest investor there. The U.S. government engagement in Thailand was incredible. The numbers were in I think 20 or 30 billion dollars back then and the ongoing programs, there was a list, it looked like literally, it was almost a book of things that we're doing together. And I think, to be honest, if we really count up what we're doing, it is, there's a lot but we don't stay consistently, I think, together focused. And I think Thailand is focused on itself right now and we have let it drift a little bit and so we need to pull that back together. So a new paradigm, I believe that leadership in the United States on this issue is about building a political foundation for engagement in Thailand and ASEAN and then Asia in general. So I would love to see leaders who continue to talk to Americans about why Thailand is important to us, to our jobs, to our future, to our safety. And finally, I'd like to end by thanking Mike Green, my colleague for chairing this panel, to Vikram and Frank, to our speakers and experts who came a long way for this discussion. Many of you came from Thailand, from Europe, other places. Our team here at CSIS, Murray Hebert, really deserves an enormous amount of credit because he stayed up all night, dogging people and making sure that they were coming to this conference and really used his, there's the Hebert soft power, is, you can't be refused. So please join me in thanking everyone and thank you all. Thank you.