 The Kurdish nation is the largest stateless nation in the world. There are about between 20 to 40 million Kurds who live in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria mainly. And the Kurds have always been an oppressed nation by the ruling classes of these countries. In Turkey, the Kemalist government which came to power in the 20s, banned the Kurdish language and even banned the use of the word Kurdish. Kurds were called mountain Turks essentially for the majority of the last of the past century. In Syria, the majority of the Kurds have not even been allowed to be given basic citizenship. And in Iraq and Iran, the Kurdish areas have always been kept underdeveloped and starved of any kind of investment. And the Kurds basically in one way or another have been oppressed throughout the history of these states. And while obviously the ruling classes of these countries have oppressed the Kurds, they've also used them for their own benefits to sabotage each other's political, how to say, political sphere. And when they were done doing that, they haven't ever hesitated by crushing the Kurdish movement. I mean, we can go back to the 20s where in I think it's 1928, there was a Sheikh Said uprising in Turkey supported and organized partially by the British against the nationalist government and in defense of bringing back the caliphate and in defense of the old regime essentially. And they promised the Kurds their own nation at the peace after the war and so on. But once the war was finished, the Kurds were just dropped to one side and there was no country and no state given to them. In the 70s, the Iranians and the Americans supported and armed and financed a Kurdish rebellion against the Iraqi central government for about a year from 1974 to 75. But once they reached a deal with Saddam Hussein about whatever they were disagreeing about, they didn't hesitate to pull the plug, pull the funding, close the borders and basically allow Saddam to go in and crush the Kurds. In the 80s, again, during the Iran and Iraq war, the Iranians would support the Kurds in northern Iraq against the Saddam Hussein regime. They would arm them in order to weaken the regime. But once that was finished, once they were done using the ones the war was drawing to an end, Saddam brutally crushed the Kurdish movement, killing tens of thousands of people. I think it's more than 100,000 people, in fact. And even using chemical weapons while all the while being supported by the United States. Again, in 1991, in the first Gulf War, George Bush called for an uprising of the Shias and the Kurds and they rose up and the Kurds, in fact, took power in the areas of northern Iraq where they live for a brief period. But again, once the war was finished, they pulled all support and they watched while Saddam was crushing the Kurds. Of course, then this created the big refugee crisis in Turkey and the Americans had to backtrack and come to some kind of a solution, giving some kind of self-governance and autonomy to the northern parts of Iraq. But nevertheless, it just shows the cynical attitude that the imperialists and the ruling classes of the region have always had against the Kurdish people. Over the past century, hundreds of thousands of Kurds have been killed. This place has constantly been moved from one country to another and kept in subjugation only to serve the narrow and short-sighted aims of one capitalist class or another intervening in the region. But of course, while the ruling classes have used the Kurds in their foreign policy, they've also used the Kurdish question internally in order to cut across the class struggle in order to basically dominate and exploit their own working classes as well, use the national question to dilute class differences, essentially. And Western imperialism, again, has had no small part of this. In fact, after World War I, the Western imperialist powers divided the Middle East up in these spheres of influence, completely arbitrarily, literally drawing a line in the sand and saying, this is British sphere of influence, this is French and so on. And while doing this, they always made sure to keep different nations and sects in each of these territories in order to be able to, if things ran out of control, to divide and rule basically those countries. So, yes, the question of reactionary nationalism and sectarian tension has been something which has been imposed and used by the ruling classes more than anyone, whereas in fact the peoples of the region have never had any problem living harmoniously and peacefully next to each other. But the general situation in the whole Middle East obviously changed after the Arab Revolution and after the world economic crisis of 2008, you saw the rise of class struggle, and this upended, destabilized the whole situation. And in Syria, during the Syrian Revolution, which started about seven years ago, the Assad regime was getting very pressured, it was being cornered, and it was being drowned out essentially mainly in the western parts of Syria. And therefore the Assad regime made a deal essentially, giving Kurds certain rights and sending power to some Kurdish organizations in order to be able to focus on the western part, which was seeing the most violent kind of revolutionary turmoil at that stage. Now, this vacuum of power was filled by an organization called the PYD. The PYD is a branch of the Turkish organization, the PKK, which is a left-wing guerrilla organization set up at the end of the 70s. At that time, it was a Stalinist, essentially, left-wing organization fighting for Kurdish independence, but also fighting for socialism, at least in its program. Now, the taking of power of the people, and just to clarify in this speech, I'm just going to call it the PKK because all the different names and abbreviations that we know, the YPG, the PYD, PKK, HPG, there's many, many of them. Essentially, they're all parts of the PKK organization, which is branched out into different countries, which has different wings, a women's wing, a military wing, political wings, and so on. But essentially, it's all part of the PKK movement. Now, that was the beginning of what's called the Rojava Revolution. For the first time in the history, the Kurdish masses were masters over their own lives and destinies and ruled their own homeland. And in doing so, they set up these councils or communes, they call them, which had mass participation of the masses from below, who would meet on a weekly or on a regular basis, take decisions on politics, and essentially run society by themselves. They also set up the YPG, the armed wing, which is essentially a people's army, which is drawn in hundreds of thousands of Kurdish youth, women and men, which is very revolutionary in the Middle Eastern terms. And because of this very democratic, because of the extremely democratic basis of the movement, because they were fighting for a cause, because they were fighting for their own homeland, this army became the most effective, essentially, the best army in the Middle East, in the whole region fighting in the civil war that then developed within Syria and Iraq. They were fighting for democracy against sectarianism, and this had an enormous appeal to people in the areas that they came to. And in spite of their extreme lack of funds and support and arms, they've been proven to be extremely efficient. And at the same time, this bold fight that they started, especially against ISIS, and again, the political basis on which they were based, they also gained enormous authority on the one hand, the Kurdish masses and the Kurdish youth, but amongst the masses of the whole Middle East and further throughout the Western world as well. In Iraqi Kurdistan, where at a certain stage, the Barzani, the Peshmerga forces, which is another Kurdish militia, were pulling out essentially handing power to ISIS because they wanted to use that against the Baghdad central government, it was the PKK militias who went in and saved the Yazidis who were caught, I don't know if you remember it, on Mount Sinjar and being besieged by ISIS, which was encroaching on them. And this sent a powerful shockwave throughout all of Iraqi Kurdistan, especially amongst lots of young people who could see that their own, the so-called Kurdish regional government, which was governed by the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, they could see that they were essentially allying themselves with ISIS, playing an extremely reactionary role, and all the while the PKK and the left wing of the Kurdish movement making great sacrifices to save the Yazidis. This gave enormous authority to the movement in Iraq. And essentially led to the setting up of a Yazidi organization as well. Amongst the Yazidis, of course, the PKK is now I think the biggest political force at all. In Turkey, all of this coincided with the rise of the class struggle in Turkey. If some of you might remember in 2013, in June, there was a mass movement in Turkey about the Gezi Park movement, it was called, which reflected the rising dissatisfaction with the Erdogan regime against the privatizations, the attacks, the austerity measures, but also Erdogan's Islamization of society as Erdogan's authoritarianism. And because within the Kurdish left, the Turkish left, sorry, and the Turkish working class movement, none of the parties was putting up a bold opposition to Erdogan. The Kurdish movement came to play a very important role, especially through this party that they had called the HCP. The HCP stood on a radical rhetoric for social justice against dictatorship, against Islamism, and they gained a lot of support. And in the elections in 2014, they came into parliament with 13.2% of the vote, as far as I remember. Now, this was a big blow to the Erdogan government because Erdogan was counting on the Kurds not gaining, there's a 10% threshold amongst the Turkish parliament, and he was banking on the Kurdish movement not gaining those 10%, and therefore all those votes and all those seats essentially in the Kurdish areas going to him, which would mean that he would have an overall majority in parliament. He could change the constitution and implement a presidential system and consolidate power in his hands, basically. So in that sense, the Kurdish movement became an existential threat to Erdogan's ambitions, not just that they could stop him from expanding his power, but also because they were beginning to galvanize rising class dissatisfaction in Turkey amongst themselves. Now, for the Kurdish movement, this was a great achievement. Also, well, for the Turkish working class, this was a great achievement, because for the first time since the 70s, you had Turkish and Kurdish workers and youth fighting together against the ruling class, basically. And this was the biggest threat to Erdogan, not only in Turkey, but also in Iraq. The undermining of the Barzani regime and Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish itself rule area in Iraq, is essentially a tool, is essentially a puppet of the Erdogan regime, and by the rise of the influence of the PKK, again, they also became a threat to his ambitions and to his domination of that area. At that point, you had a situation where, now I've handed out this map, so maybe you can divide it up amongst you, where the influence of the PKK was rising to such a degree that they essentially controlled a massive strip going from the Iranian border almost all the way to the Mediterranean Sea, and that's the part I've kind of tried to mark out. Going through the mountain ranges of northern Iraq, the Qantil Mountains, and then into Turkey you have the cities of Hakkari, Jezira, Shilopi, and Sirrt, I think it's called, Sirnak, and then further into Syria, where the Kurds had expanded their territories, and to almost, as I said, all the way to the Mediterranean Sea. So in that sense, the PKK movement, or the left wing of the Kurdish liberation movement, had become a physical obstacle to Erdogan's imperialist ambitions of expanding further down throughout the Middle East. In every way, the Kurds were becoming a threat to Erdogan's regime and to his ambitions. The same goes in Syria, where the Kurds were not only fighting ISIS, but also the so-called FSA, the Jihadi movement, which was supported by Turkey as a means of gaining influence within Syria. So on that basis, Erdogan started a civil war against the Kurds in the summer of 2014. He started a one-sided civil war against the Kurds of Turkey, who've never done anything to harm him. And he used this to, on the one hand, whip up extreme nationalist hysteria to cut through the rising class struggle, to divert attention from the class problems that people had, but also literally to destroy this land mass that the Kurds were gaining, which was becoming a threat to Turkey. If the Kurds consolidate this area that they control, this will be a powerful impetus, not just there, but further into the Kurdish areas, which span way into Turkish territory. However, met by this offensive of Erdogan, the leaders of the movement didn't continue the path which has been successful to begin with, the path of class struggle, revolutionary mass mobilization, but instead began vacillating and compromising basically at every single step. Every time Erdogan raised the pressure or different powers raised the pressure, the leaders of the movement thought that they could negotiate themselves or maneuver themselves out of this situation. In Iraq, for instance, where as I said the PKK had enormous authority, especially amongst the youth, the PKK refrained from building a mass movement out of this, refrained from actually building a mass organization amongst the Iraqi youth. Why? Because they didn't want to upset Iran and Iranian-supported proxies in Iraq. Instead they thought, well, if the Iranians give us support or tacit support against Turkey, which the Iranians wouldn't mind, then in return we'll get to Iraq later on. That was essentially the philosophy. That was a basic method of saying we're not going to fight the struggle here, but we're going to focus on Syria and defending ourselves against Erdogan and using all the support we can get, i.e. in this case Iranian support. For instance, in the local Kurdish elections a few years back for the local self-government of the Kurdish areas in Iraq, they didn't put up their own list, they didn't put up independent candidates in a decisive way in a serious way, but instead supported this other organization which is called Ghoran, which is a corrupt, liberal, bourgeois organization, essentially. They also developed ties with another party called the PUK, which is led by a guy called Masoud Talebani. Sorry, not Masoud, I forgot his first name, but the Talebani clan, which is essentially a tribal or clan-based, family-based organization. Again, a proxy of Iran in that area. At the same time, the PKK's Yazidi wing, which they developed, became a part of the popular mobilization units in Iraq. They received funds, even until recently, I'm not sure if they're doing it right now, but at least until six, seven months ago, receiving funds from the Iraqi central government. All of this, obviously, while in purely military terms, might have made sense, but in political terms it was completely counterproductive because it undermined the PKK's authority amongst the youth in the area who weren't interested at all in making deals with this or that power, but were interested in wiping the slate clean and overthrowing all of them. And so in that sense, they limited themselves, or they kind of sewed a divide between themselves and the radicalizing masses. In the Kurdish independence referendum, which took place last summer, again, this was a referendum, this was actually a referendum called by Barzani, who's, as I said, a reactionary, but he felt that he was losing support and he thought that whipping up nationalist sentiment would help him regain support amongst the masses. But obviously he was doing it for reactionary ends, but this was a progressive revolutionary, he was trying to tap into a progressive revolutionary mood which did exist amongst the Kurdish masses in Iraq. And instead of tapping into that, instead of saying to the Kurdish masses, yes, we also fight for independence, but we fight for independence without these clans, without these tribes, without all the capitalists who are corrupt and who you all hate. The PKK went to the other side, again, as a means to appease the Iranians and the Iranians supported proxies in Iraq and actually went against the referendum and supported a no vote essentially. In the end, the yes vote won by 90 some percent, 97 percent. And again, the PKK, and the movement then afterwards was crushed by all the forces in the region, the Americans, the Iranians, the Iraqis, the Turks, everyone united to crush this independence movement and the PKK basically stood silently or, you know, objected very, very weakly and only in words. Now, in Turkey as well, the movement has been weakened by its vacillations. When it got to power, no one thought that it would gain this amount of votes, 13, almost 14 percent. But after it did so, it became a point of reference for millions of radicalized youth and workers in Turkey. But the only thing that a lot of people said were, well, we actually agree with the HDP, we agree with this Kurdish movement on everything. The only thing is we're not sure that they won't sell out the whole movement in order to gain some kind of national independence for nationalist aims, for Kurdish aims essentially. And that's why a lot of Turkish youth and workers didn't really, didn't support it in the first instance. But instead of then appealing to these and proving itself to fighting on a class basis, the Kurdish leaders fell back in a nationalist rhetoric in the face of the attacks of Erdogan. And of course, from Erdogan's point of view, nationalism is what he wanted. Nationalism was what could keep him, which was what could strengthen him. And obviously it's not an easy thing to fight against such a hysteria being built up in every single newspaper and every single media outlet and every single school or university. But nevertheless, by playing along with it, you're only strengthening the general trend that Erdogan is achieving to aim. And at the same time, not only were they falling into the nationalist trap, but they also, at every single turn, signaled that they were willing to cooperate and collaborate with Erdogan in return for a deal on the Kurdish question and in the Kurdish areas. In fact, just a couple of weeks after he started the civil war, which was in August of 2014, the HDP joined the provisional government of Turkey. So they joined the provisional government with Erdogan, who was at the same time waging a war against the Kurds. And they did many such things, which undermined again their authority, which in return led to in the following elections them seeing a slight decrease in the number of votes they got. Now, in the Kurdish areas of Turkey, while the civil war was taking place, it was enormous radicalization. And Turkey has a lot of Kurds, between 15 and 20 million Kurds live there. And as Erdogan was attacking them, these masses were being brought out to the streets, were being brought into action. And you saw rolling general strikes in all of the areas and all of the regions that the Kurds lived in. An extremely radicalized mood. The youth were willing to fight. And at that point, again, the Kurds could have armed the masses and began at least to wage a defensive against the brutality of the Turks. And in fact, in my opinion, they could have easily taken power in many of these areas. The mood was there, the people were ready to fight back. But they didn't do so or only armed the population to a very, very low degree. On the basis with the excuse that they were too busy fighting in Syria. But the point is that not doing this was demoralizing the whole movement. And in the meantime, Erdogan was attacking the key towns controlled by the PKK in Turkey, the towns that I explained that which are kind of highlighted in the map. Basically, raise these towns to the ground. There's Jezira, Sirenak, Hakkari and a couple more. I can't remember the exact names of them. Raise these towns. These are not small towns. There are 100,000 people. There are 200,000 people living there. And they were reduced to rubbles, literally. Which, again, was a big blow to the movement as a whole. Now, of course, the real reason for not doing this was not that they were too busy fighting a war in Syria. Because here they had millions of more people ready to fight to the end, ready to die for this cause. But it was because they didn't want to alienate the Americans and the West who were supporting them and was arming them in Syria. Yes. And that's the final, that's the, in Syria is the last kind of area where they made similar mistakes. Because the YPG was so effective and because of the general weakness of U.S. imperialism, the Americans had to lean on the Kurds to retain a foothold in Syria, essentially. And they became the most important ally of U.S. imperialism in the region. And at this stage, the Americans have dozens of bases throughout Syrian Kurdish areas. But all of this, this so-called support for the Kurds have come at a certain cost. On the one hand, they forced a number of ex-FSA Free Syrian Army units to join in with the Kurds. So undermining, again, the political radicalism of the movement. They've pushed them to ally themselves with the Shamar tribe, which is a tribe which goes from Syria all the way into Saudi Arabia. Which is a group which has completely its own agenda. It has nothing to do with the fight for liberation of nations or a fight against capitalism. And all of this, again, has been undermining and hollowing out the political power of the movement. Not only have the allies been working with the Americans, they've also allowed the Syrian regime forces into some of their areas. They've allowed Russian forces into some of their areas supposedly because then Turkey wouldn't attack them in those areas. They've allowed the French, the British. And even last summer when Saudi Arabia had a conflict with Qatar, the leaders of the Syrian wing of the PKK came out saying that they were open to working with Saudi Arabia. Now this is complete, this is ridiculous because on the one hand here they are fighting ISIS, which is the spawn of the Saudi royal family itself. And on the other hand they're reaching out to the Kingdom, which is probably, well in real terms, is probably more reactionary than ISIS. And it has committed more horrible crimes than ISIS. Now the idea behind all of these alliances is that if we ally with this or that power, if we ally ourselves with the Americans, then the Kurds won't attack us. If we ally ourselves with the Iranians, then they will leave us in peace in Iran and in Turkey. But every step that they take in doing this is politically undermining them. And what they don't realize is that for the imperialists, small nations such as the Kurds are just small change. It's nothing. They serve no other purpose than to be used as they have been throughout their history and then just to be discarded whenever they're finished. Because what can the Kurds offer US imperialism? Turkey is the most industrialized, the biggest economy of the whole Middle East. It has an extremely important geopolitical position. The Americans have military bases, nuclear arms and a close collaboration through NATO with the Turks. Whereas for the Kurds, they only serve for the Americans to maintain a foothold within Syria where they've lost everything else from their interventions. Other than that, they have nothing to offer from a capitalist point of view than barren lands, essentially. And mountainous areas. And we saw this a couple of months ago when Turkey decided to attack the enclave of Afrin. In northwestern Syria. And the Americans did nothing. And it was clear that there was a deal between the Americans and the Turks. And they even said so many times that they had no intentions of defending the Kurds in those areas. And how different is that reaction to when the Islamists in Eastern Ghouta near Damascus were being attacked by the Russians and the Assad regime. And the Americans fired these missiles and made a big hooha about the so-called inhumanitarian nature of that offensive. Whereas in Afrin, hundreds of thousands of Kurds have been displaced, killed. And there is essentially ethnic cleansing going on of that whole area. And while a small Islamist caliphate or principality is being introduced, supported by Turkey itself. It just shows what the Kurds are in the eyes of the Americans. And it's clear that the next step is the city of Manbij, which the Turks also want. And which according to the Americans, even yesterday, that they're still negotiating about. Whatever that means. It's clear that once ISIS is finished, is fully defeated and once the Americans have gotten what they could out of Syria, then they won't hesitate to sell out the Kurds in order to gain some concessions from their allies and enemies. So we see step by step the Kurdish movement is being isolated. And this political isolation is only a precursor to a military isolation and a military crushing of the movement at some point in the future. The U.S. has now complete knowledge and intelligence about everything that's going on, all the military installations, the hierarchy, the key personnel throughout Kurdish areas. And in fact, I was reading a foreign policy, this magazine, Foreign Policy, if you know it, about a year ago. And they said, well, maybe it's time for us to abandon the Kurds. They've been a great help for us, but maybe it's time for us to abandon them and support our real traditional allies and do intelligence collaboration with them. What does that mean? That means giving them all these targets and all the areas that they need to hit in order to crush the Kurdish movement in northern Syria. This would be obviously a completely, this would be a disastrous event for the Kurds. And of course, on the one hand, we can't criticize the Kurds for just in principle using the fault line between different imperialist nations. That's any nation, any revolutionary movement will have to do that, but there's a limit to that tactic. And you cannot base your whole tactic on this because the strongest point that the movement has is the political authority that it has. That's been what's been strengthening it, that's been what's been giving it its advances at every single term. It hasn't been because they have arms, they don't have any arms. They've been starved of arms, they don't have funds. All of these things is not what gained the Kurdish movement its victories to begin with. The way that they advanced to begin with was in Turkey on the basis of a radical, class-based approach, not a nationalist approach, but all Turkish way of uniting all the workers and youth and all the oppressed peoples of Turkey against the regime. And in Syria, in a distorted way, they gained their position by mass revolutionary means. That was an all Syrian revolution which weakened the state and then created this power vacuum that the Kurds could then step into. These are the tactics and the strategies that the Kurds have to lean on in order to advance if they want to defend themselves and if they want to strengthen and consolidate their position. And to say that this can't be done is also wrong I would say because although the Arab revolution for now has ebbed, in every single country underneath the surface revolution is still there and revolution is still bubbling away just waiting for a focal point to come to the fore. So in January we saw the most dangerous, from a point of view of the regime at least, the strongest and most dangerous movements in the last 40 years of Iranian history. A massive movement going throughout Iran in every single town and city drawing tens of thousands of young people. Mainly not composed of middle class people who normally would lead the revolution, have been leading the revolutionary movements in Iran over the past period, but by people who working class and poor and poor middle class people who traditionally have been pillars of support for the regime. This is an extremely dangerous situation developing from the point of view of the regime, from our point of view is extremely favorable. There's a revolutionary ferment and the regime is terrified of what could happen. And that's a movement that the Kurdish movement could reach out to and help organize and unite with against the central government in Iran. And once they take power in Iran this will send shockwaves throughout the region. Even in Iraq, which surprisingly, although it has been dominated by sectarian warfare, civil war, all kinds of barbaric events over the past period, you still have a rising class contradictions and class struggle which was reflected in the parliamentary elections just a few weeks ago. I don't know if any of you followed it, but on the one hand in Iraq there was historically the lowest participation in the elections. But this wasn't because people are not political, but this is basically because people hate and are disgusted by the whole political elite. Every Iraqi you speak to would say this, that they hate all of them. They're all feeds, they're all corrupt and they're all hated. And the people who did win was a coalition of, there was an Islamic demagogic cleric and the Iraqi Communist Party, which stood, although we have to say the guy who was leading the coalition, he's a demagogue, he's a reactionary. But the program that he stood on was against corruption, against poverty, against inflation, unemployment. But more importantly, against all foreign powers meddling in Iran, i.e. both Iran and the Americans, as well as against sectarianism. And sectarianism, as you might know, has been the core basis of the Iraqi ruling class ever since the occupation that the Americans and the British carried out in 2003. So you see even in Iraq the ground is prepared for mass revolutionary movement, for the Kurdish movement to reach out to and to ally itself with against the central government. In Turkey as well, the situation is not far behind. The movement in 2013 was defeated because on the one hand it didn't gain anything, the leadership wasn't able to show a way forward. And all of the different political parties, which would traditionally reflect this pressure from below, one way or another sold out essentially, betrayed the movement. So it never gained a political expression, but nevertheless, underneath the surface there's enormous dissatisfaction with the government. And now we see that Turkey is going into a very severe economic crisis. The Turkish leader has lost 30% since in the past six months against the dollar. And this is only going to continue. The Turkish economy is in very big troubles. And all of this is going to lead to rising class struggles, it's going to lead to explosive movements in Turkey. And again, a great opportunity for the Kurdish movement to reach out and ally itself with the Turkish workers and youth against the Erdogan regime. Because on a purely military basis and on a nationalist basis, there's no way that you can defeat the Turkish state. The Turkish military is the fourth largest or fifth largest military in the world, is very well equipped. You cannot defend it militarily, but only by breaking it on class lines, by appealing to the soldiers who don't have any interest in killing Kurds. And weakening the grip that the Erdogan's nationalism gives over the masses to break his state in half and then wage a revolutionary war against him. That's the way forward, that's the way they want to begin with, and that's the methods that they have to use in order to defend their position today. Now, just to end, the past 10 years have been probably the most turbulent of the whole history of the Middle East. And that's saying a lot because of the way the situation normally is in the Middle East. You've seen the Arab revolutions, you've seen the rise of ISIS, you've seen civil wars in Iraq, in Syria, in Yemen, in Libya. And you've seen revolutions and revolutionary movements in every single country. And what this essentially reflects is the same process, is the process of the senile decay of capitalism. It is a reflection of the fact that capitalism is not capable as a system, as a regime to solve any of the problems that the masses and that societies in the region face today. And the old system of states which was artificially imposed by Western imperialism is beginning to disintegrate. And we see that the only result of imperialist and Western intervention in the whole region has been to leave a barbaric mess. And the only solution really to all of this is not to fight, to ally yourself with this or that ruling class, with this or that establishment of this or that country, but to wage a struggle against the whole system, against all of these ruling classes, none of which are able to solve the situation, overthrow capitalism and essentially establish a socialist federation of the whole Middle East. Thank you very much.