 Hey, thanks so much, Derek. If any of you, after the last two really exceptional panels, are kind of scratching your head about, why are we talking about HADR? There's a fact sheet on most desks with the revised maritime strategy, the great discussion we had this morning. And I'll direct you to number two, being where it matters when it matters. And it specifically says that we will continue to see services to support humanitarian and disaster response needs for the international community. So that's the discussion we're going to have. We're extremely fortunate today to have some very serious speakers here, incredibly talented and experienced. We specifically targeted a diverse group, which if you take some time to look at their bios, you'll see just exactly how deep this group is. But the key is we went across multiple sectors that will respond to humanitarian crises. And ultimately, we were looking to get the ground truth from these fine men today on what's happening in the civ mill area of humanitarian assistance disaster relief. But more importantly, I think each of them is going to explore potential ways the US military can improve our responses. And hopefully, we'll even get into some discussions on how other international militaries can potentially respond more effectively. Before I quickly introduce them, and I do encourage you to look at their bios, I want to recognize some special visitors in the audience. First, we have a number of friends and colleagues from the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and the Humanitarian Academy at Harvard, who the college has been closely collaborating with for the past year in the HADR arena. And then, we also have some new friends, a brand new group from MIT Lincoln Lab, and their official name is the HADR Systems Group, who we're just starting to explore potential partnerships with, and with the goal of improving responses. We love Harvard, we love MIT, but most importantly, would the 17 students raise their hand number one so Dr. Mike Lappie can take roll call? But again, to recognize, thank you, thank you. This is the first HADR civil elective taught at the college here in Newport in over a decade. And so these students are, they dove in week one last week and started exploring some of the challenges and opportunities we face out there in the real world. So very quickly here, we are very fortunate to have Admiral Collin Chinn with us. He is currently the command surgeon at US Pacific Command. And the bottom line with him is he essentially leads all military, US military engagement activities across over 50% of the world's surface from a medical perspective. He's both a practitioner and a leader. And I think if you really look at what he has on his plate, there's no one that's busier from a senior medical officer position in the military. That's Admiral Chinn's right is Dr. Enzo Bolatino who is both my good friend and my teacher. Enzo surprised me. He's been serving as the director of the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, the executive director since 2008. But just to throw me for a loop, he told me last night that he is transitioning out of that role, passing it to a colleague so that he can focus on his true passions and that is teaching and research. So he now will be working with the School of Public Health as a research associate. And the bottom line with Enzo, when a disaster happens, this academic is the first guy on speed dial from US Pacific Command. He ends up flying out to the affected nation, getting on the ground and essentially assessing how the CIDMEL interaction's going. So we're very fortunate to have him here as well. To Enzo's right is Mr. Mike Marks who's the senior CIDMEL coordination advisor for the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OSHA, as he'll refer to it. He's currently working at a New York City, the UN headquarters. Prior to that, he was in Geneva, Switzerland and maybe most impressively, he spent over two decades working in the US government for USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. And before that, he was a distinguished officer in the US Army that served all over the globe. If you talk to anyone in the humanitarian space about who's leading the way in CIDMEL relations and coordination, Mike's name is first and foremost. And last, certainly not least, my dear friend and mentor, Dr. Joe DiRenzo. Joe is currently serving as the senior advisor to Coast Guard Atlantic Area, Science, Research, Technology and Innovation, but that does not tell the whole story. Joe's a retired Coast Guard officer. Obviously he's a doctor, so he holds a PhD and he spent nine lovely years in the US Navy serving as both the surface warfare and submarine officer. He's a thought leader in the US military and he specializes in crisis disaster response. So with that, each panelist has about 15 minutes and we'll take questions at the end. Sir? Dave, thank you very much for that introduction. And Derek, thank you very much for inviting me to come to the Naval War College to be part of this panel. It's really an honor and privilege to be here. So in the next 15 minutes, I'm gonna talk to you about how we approach disaster relief at US Paycom and then how we leverage our global health engagements to help our partner nations to build their capacity to be able to respond either individually to a disaster or collectively as a region to a disaster. And so that last one talks to number three on the CNO's priorities, which continue to strengthen alliances and partnerships. So if you've ever been to Paycom or if you ever have a Paycom staff provide a presentation, you have to see this slide because what it shows is the Paycom AOR and it's meant to show just the enormous size of this AOR. As Dave said, over 52% of the surface of the earth is responsibility of Admiral Locklear, covers over 50% of the world's population and three of the largest economies in the world. And so with that, time and distance is a significant challenge for us operating in the US Paycom AOR. So when there is a disaster or a contingency, even though we do have forces for deployed, whether or not it's in Japan or in South Korea or other parts of the AOR, it still takes time to get there. And then from a medical perspective, the US NS Mercy, the hospital ship, is home ported in San Diego. And that's a challenge for us, as Mr. Wesley knows, takes 27 days to get out there. So it limits how we can use that particular platform. And then 15 time zones across that AOR and then you add the other three back to DC. So when there's things happening at 9 p.m., let's say in Thailand, it's 9 a.m. in DC, 3 a.m. for us in Paycom. And the Paycom commander has to manage that because his staff in our Joint Operations Center has to find out what's happening at the site of disaster. He assigns a commander to go out there. Of course, he and his staff have to support that commander, got to talk to them. Likewise, he has to manage the valor of them in DC. And that's a significant challenge for him and all of us. So we like to say that the Paycom AOR is so large, it extends from Bollywood in India all the way to Hollywood in Southern California. So we're talking about disasters. And as I mentioned in the first paragraph of my paper, is that it's not if, it's when there is going to be a disaster in this region. If you have an assignment to Paycom or one of our components, you will respond to some form of disaster. Here's a major reason why, you know, the ring of fire. So we have all these volcanoes that circles and then the plate tectonics, which creates the scenario for us to have a volcano, an earthquake, the tsunami that results from the earthquake or, which I don't have shown here, all the storms that we have, the typhoons that occurred. You've heard mention of in the Philippines in 2013 and as early as a week ago, right? In the Solomon Islands, there was typhoon Pam that barreled a category five of typhoon that went through and devastated Vanuatu. And we were prepared and gearing up to respond to that. And the call did not come from USAID but we always see these things and we prepare. So this is just a representation of, by country, those countries that, you know, one of the odds that they may seek US assistance. So in red, you have those countries where very frequently we are asked to respond. So Oceania, the Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Nepal, frequently we are asked. In yellow, you have countries that occasionally we are asked to respond. And in green, those are the countries historically we have not been asked to respond. Although in green is Japan and as we well know, they have the great earthquake, tsunami and then nuclear disaster, which we assisted in a significant statement way. But so that's just, again, it's not a policy statement, just a representation based on history, which countries they are, we may have to respond to a disaster. So many of you may know this but there are some who don't understand the process. Some folks think, oh, if there's a disaster, the US military just gears up and sends equipment and forces over there. And that's actually not the case. There is a process and it's really based on the host nation. There has to be a disaster that is declared by the host nation or that may need international assistance. And if their head of state then comes to our US ambassador seeking that assistance, then the ambassador sends a message back to the State Department and the lead US federal agency is USA OFTA, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. And they take the lead and they very quickly will send an assessment team to the site of the disaster to see what's the situation and then what within US government or agency what can be brought. And if there's a need for DOD assistance, then they will task us and we will be in a support role. So that's sort of how it works. So we don't just go in, we have to be, there has got to be a request for assistance and we have to be invited in and a demand signal given to us by USA OFTA. So what is it that we get assigned to? What are the conditions that need to occur for USA OFTA to ask for assistance? One, there's got to be that request and likewise the response, the civilian response already present in the nation that's affected has to be overwhelmed and then we have to provide, US military has to provide some unique service function that can't be met in any other way. And so what are those functions? And here they are. Essentially it's logistics and engineering. So things that we can do very rapidly is move people, equipment and supplies. All the services have unique airlift capabilities whether or not it's rotary wing or fixed wing. We also can do surveillance, aerial surveillance. So ISR support and that was very a request that was needed in Typhoon Hyon. So we were able to send Navy P-8s. Over the area affected in Tacloban, take pictures, provide that to the affected nation so that they can then assess what areas were devastated and then make some plans or where they need to send the relief teams. Likewise, if things need to be built, if airfields need to be opened up or ports opened up, that's again a unique capability that US military can provide. What you don't see there is medical. Even though we can provide medical, but in many instances, medical support is not requested. And so even though we are prepared to provide that, many times it's not. And that again was the case in Typhoon Hyon in which the US government provided a lot of support to the Philippine government. DOD probably provided a lot of support, like you see here, but medical was not one of them. They did not require our support in that area. So let me now transition my remarks to what are we now doing to help the nations and the region to prepare for the disaster. So I wanna talk a little bit more now about what are we doing in particular in the medical area in terms of global health engagement. And those of you who have served in the past, you may recall that when it came to global health engagement, it was all about direct patient care, right? Med caps, dent caps, and bed caps. So we'd go to some remote, some nation or remote part of that country, bring a bunch of dentists and optometrists, and we'd line up thousands of people and we'd pull teeth, provide eyeglasses, and we'd take lots of photos, and then we'd leave. And we'd think, hey, we did a great thing for that country. But unfortunately there were actually some negative consequences of that action because perhaps we just put out a business with a local dentist because we pulled all the bad teeth. Now there's no patients don't have dental problems, then local dentists just went out of business. Likewise, the local optometrists just went out of business because we provided all the eyeglasses. So did we do any long lasting positive benefits? Did we improve the ability of that local health system so that our government to provide health care to their people and the answer was no. So we have changed our approach. And so now we're shifting away from this direct health care. There's still a role for med caps, dent caps, and bed caps in what we do, but we're now shifting towards capacity building efforts to working with our partners and allied and partner nations to work with their health care professionals to put them forward and providing care for their people or teaching them techniques that we can bring so that they are providing care to their people. Their health local health system is improving and the result that the whole the government has seen as providing for their people and that leads to stability for a government and for the region. And so that's sort of what we're doing. Likewise, we're trying to do this in a much more coordinated effort. Back when I was a Marine Forces specific surgeon, we just did whatever we did. Marine Corps did what they did. Pak Fleet did what they did. So a lot of times we would go to a remote area in the Philippines and do that direct health care thing and then a week later the Air Force would come in and do the exact same thing. We're trying to get away from that. Now have a coordinated effort and we're getting progress on that. Likewise, and that's why you see the logos of our interagency partners, we're also now working in a whole government effort with our interagency partners with the USAID, Health and Human Services, CDEA, all that you see there. And when I go to a new country, one of my first stop is at the US Embassy, meet with the ambassador or the deputy chief of mission as well as their health team. And the message I bring in is that I'm part of your health team. DoD is coming in to be part of your team to work the issues that you're working with the country that you're working with for part of the team. So we're trying to, again, a whole government approach to work with our allied and partner nations and we're seeing a lot of benefit from that. So here's an example, as it's been mentioned, the US Pacific Fleet has been performing a specific partnership ever since 2006 and that's because of the positive outcome from the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia. I recall that there was a public opinion poll in Indonesia, because at the time, the United States, the United States government was not held in high astute. I think our approval ratings were in the 30, 35% range. The tsunami occurred and the US government and the US military responded. I think it was the USS Ronald Reagan. Okay, Abraham Lincoln, that's right. Abraham Lincoln responded and then the USNS Mercy responded after that response. Public opinion poll was done again and the approval rating was 70%. At the time, I believe, Edmond Mullen was the CNO. He was trying to kill the hospital ship program because it's very expensive to run. Also, we really haven't used the hospital ships for their primary mission. I sort of don't count the Persian Gulf War. We only saw about 100 patients during that. But it's a very expensive program to run, really hadn't been used. But he said when he became chairman, he was so glad that he did not kill the hospital ship program. As a result of that, Pacific Fleet has now been doing every year a Pacific partnership since 2006 and again, been very successful. We go back and forth between Southeast Asia and Oceania. And so in 2015, here are the countries we're going into and a new concept. So we have the mercy coming out. You see the countries they're gonna be going to. And now the joint high speed vessel is going to be used and Admiral Harris wants to test that concept to see how that can work in both the humanitarian assistance and working with the hospital ship to try some new concepts. Other things we have done with Pacific partnership. And then again, I'm focusing on Navy efforts because this is the Naval War College. But Air Force is doing the same thing with Pacific Angel. The Army's doing similar things on the HADR world. But so it's not just US military. We're bringing in our partner military. So last year, Japan, we utilized their, one of their gray-hole ships to lead a significant portion of the effort. Australia and New Zealand in the past have participated. The NGO community is involved. So they've gone on, they've made the, from a variety of, US NGOs ride the ship, or work with us because we're gonna have to work with them during these disasters. And it's better to do it in this type of setting. Likewise, last year, 2014 in Hawaii. So every other year, Pacific Fleet does the largest naval exercise in the world. It's called RIMPAC, and they do it every other year. And last year, for the first time, there was a significant medical piece to RIMPAC. There was an HADR exercise, which really hadn't been done before, and brought out Mercy. But the other ship you see there, that's the PLA Navy Peace Arc, the Chinese hospital ship, came again for the first time working with us. And again, that was very, very successful. Both crews all worked together. We had, again, 22 nations in total, participated in RIMPAC, and there were 15 countries sent medical folks. And we had a large HADR medical symposium. We had an HADR exercise, which also incorporated the state of Hawaii for their emergency response drill. And we also had ship riders on both ships when they went out to sea. And I see this as the first step, significant first step with the Chinese, the fact that we had both Mercy and Peace Arc exercising together, because people in OSTP said that would never happen, but Admiral Harris made sure it happened, and it did. I think the future, my vision for the future is this, is we continue to work closely, because this is an area where we have common ground with the PLA Navy that we can work together. And so in the future, could we have maybe some crew swaps, maybe medical teams from PLA Navy comes aboard Mercy, and likewise, our medical teams can work on the Peace Arc, because I think there's gonna be a disaster of such as that against in the future, in which potentially both hospital ships may show up, and it's better that we're working together when that happens. I think the optic of that for the region will be very positive, because there's a lot of, as you well know, there's a lot of areas of potential conflict out there, whether or not it's the South China Sea or the East China Sea, but if we can demonstrate that we can work together with our regional partners, I think that will do a lot of good for the future. So those are my comments, I just wanna share that. Hopefully that will stimulate some thought on your part, and I look forward to any of your questions. Thank you very much. Thank you, sir. Next up is Mr. Mike Marks. Thanks, David, and thank you all for allowing me to be here. It's a pleasure and an honor to be here at the Naval War College. Even though it's a short trip from New York, it still sometimes seems like leagues away. It's always a challenge not being the first speaker on a panel, and I think that in this case, much of what Admiral Chen has mentioned, I was gonna touch on as well, which is a huge movement forward within our communities. Over the past decade, there has been less and less philosophical differences between military and humanitarians, and I'm not saying that we all need to necessarily love each other, but I think there is much more of an understanding of the value in working together and the need to work together in future crises, and it's much more of a joined up approach. A lot of the worldview is very similar. So I'm gonna take a few minutes just to talk about humanitarian civil military coordination from the international perspective, focus a bit on the United States, but also talk to you about Bocha's role in not only humanitarian coordination, but very specifically in civil military coordination. And I think this is an important subject. It's not big and sexy like deterrence and nuclear annihilation and things like that, but there are times when it is critical and it is at the top of policymakers' priorities, showing support to countries who are affected by disasters, whether it's Indonesia and Sri Lanka during the tsunami or the Philippines during Haiyan or certainly Haiti after the earthquake. It does get to the top of the priority list. And it's also an important subject because natural hazards are becoming much more frequent, much more powerful, and are having a much larger impact on human life. And part of this is climatological, not gonna get into a political debate about global warming, but much of it really is because humans choose to live in the wrong place. We live in clothes lines, we live in flood plains, or we live on the sides of hills in seismic prone areas. And that's why the larger the scope and scale of the actual disaster or the hazard, the larger the impact on human life. And with population growing, we're not making it any better and it's certainly not gonna ease off. So this is going to be a challenge for all of us in this room in the coming decades. For sea services in particular, meteorological hazards will require your engagement for the foreseeable future. And particularly, as Admiral Chinn pointed out, in Paycom's AOR, and we see disaster after disaster, I think a lot of us felt like we would be in Vanuatu, right now actually, but because of regional and to some degree national capacities, it didn't require a massive international response. It was taken care of in a more, I think appropriate and lower scale way. Because of this, there's tremendous need for engagement and coordination between humanitarian and military actors. The relationship is not necessarily a natural one. Most of my colleagues join humanitarian organizations to escape military service. And that kind of sets the relationship apart. However, there are a tremendous number of humanitarians with prior military service, especially our logisticians. The World Food Program has poached quite a few military officers and NCOs out of the ranks in order to feed the logistics piece that is the World Food Program. But the relationship is based on mutual need. I was talking to a Marine General, who's pretty much the large hulking poster child for the US Marine Corps, a few months ago. And he said something that really resonated. He said, I don't wanna do HADR missions. I don't like them, but I'm gonna have to at some point so I need to train and engage now before the event. Coincidentally, this is probably also neatly sums up the humanitarian relationship with military actors. They don't necessarily want to work with the military, but they will at some point and now see the need to train and engage prior to the disaster. One of Oach's responsibilities is to facilitate this relationship between humanitarian and military actors and to try to help fill those needs on both sides. Oach's primary responsibility is that we are responsible for coordination of the entire humanitarian community. Now, we are responsible for coordination without the authority, so we don't have the authority to dictate or direct or manage. We only have the responsibility to coordinate and get everybody moving in the same direction, which sometimes is a bit of a challenge. We also have a huge role in humanitarian information management, so many of you may be familiar with Relief Web with HumanitarianResponse.info, which are pretty much our virtual platforms for responding to disasters. And we're also very much involved in humanitarian advocacy, humanitarian policy, and humanitarian financing in the sense that it jump starts new emergencies. We don't deliver anything but coordination, so we don't deliver stuff, we just deliver as most of our colleagues say, just words. But the coordination is important to make sure that we are all moving in the same direction. One of our core mandates is that we are the focal point for humanitarian-civil-military coordination on behalf of the humanitarian community. So for the military, we are your front door into the humanitarian labyrinth. We are the ones that you can turn to and say, look, I don't know who I need to talk to on the ground in Guyane, but I need to talk to a logistician and I need to talk to him now. We're the ones that can help point you in that direction. And I think that knowing where those nodes are is really the critical point in what we're trying to do and in preparing for the next emergency. We also do training. We have a very extensive training program and actually there's some graduates here in the room from our training courses where we bring in half the humanitarian, half the military audience to really drill down into a lot of these challenges and opportunities in the relationship. We do that in each region of the world twice a year in order to really focus it on the context that they're dealing with. We have operations responsibilities. We have civil-military coordination officers in 14 countries right now and some of the usual garden spots like Somalia, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, and kind of the list goes on. And we're also the custodians for humanitarian policy and guidelines. Hopefully many of you are aware of the Oslo guidelines which are for natural disasters, the MCDA guidelines which are for complex emergencies or conflict. And we're the ones that revise these that make sure that they are relevant and contextualized. But we're also developing a whole new set of literature like the Guide for the Military which is directed specifically at military actors to try to be better able to understand the humanitarian community. We are in the last stages of a compendium document which is a guide for the humanitarian so they can better understand how military actors work and we can do this in a better way for the next one. So training, exercises like RIMPAC which we were very much engaged in the HADR piece last year and hopefully we'll continue along with that in the future because it gives us an opportunity, a rare opportunity for the humanitarians to actually do a proof of concept on different activities. Usually we just go out to the field and we operate, we don't test systems, we don't have the capability of kind of exercising and training them but military exercise actually give us that capability in a very realistic way. And we need to do this because we need to be more operationally effective and we need to be quicker to respond in the early days of an emergency. Humanitarian civil military coordination is shared responsibility for all actors both military and humanitarian. It's not just OCHA's responsibility and this has been a challenge in the past because most of our humanitarian colleagues don't have dedicated civil military liaisons or coordination officers within their structures. Most militaries don't necessarily have that capability either although many have CIMIC or civil affairs or civil military operations or whatever it is called in their own countries. Specifically for OCHA and for our engagement with the US it's our highest priority with the US military and with the combatant commands. The US has demonstrated the most willingness to deploy military assets. It has the global presence to get there quickly oftentimes before the humanitarian community can gather and has an agile political decision making process that allows for quick decisions to commit military and civilian assets into a response operation. So just briefly taking a look at the current situation and I think probably everybody's aware that coordination between humanitarian and military over the last decade has improved dramatically. We're past the point of asking should we coordinate with the military and moving much more towards how do we do it and how do we do it more effectively. Lessons from recent large-scale disasters and really 2004 is the benchmark with the Asia tsunami have led to marked improvements in the effectiveness and the efficiency of natural disaster response. Operations in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Haiti, the Philippines demonstrated military assets and in particular foreign military assets because we have to differentiate between the use of military assets domestically and overseas. They can provide timely unique and critical capabilities fill gaps in the humanitarian response especially in the early phases of response operation. There must be some level of coordination occurring between humanitarians and military. Information sharing at the very least but if we can move that forward to joint planning and task division that's even better in natural disasters that's certainly easier. But we have to have a dialogue and it has to be established in order to safeguard humanitarian principles and to allow for access to all populations affected by disasters. In conflict this is incredibly difficult because areas are controlled by one part of the conflict or the other. So from the humanitarian side we have to make sure that we not only balance that relationship but we are perceived as balancing that relationship in a neutral, impartial and operationally independent manner. We look at coordination as a range of engagement strategies so from cooperation which you would find in a natural disaster response to coexistence in a conflict or an emergency. The relationships and the coordination is going to be different in each emergency and how to adapt that to the specific context while meeting everybody's need is really what makes it more of an art than a science. There will always be need for better coordination between the humanitarian and military. I'm not saying that everything is perfect but it certainly is better. We need to do better in the areas of information sharing in gaining common situational awareness and in deploying assets that are based on identified needs on the ground. Three, primary challenges and there's quite a few more but I just wanna hit these three relating to the deployment of foreign military assets in a natural disaster response. The first would be the affected nation's ability to integrate these assets into the national response which virtually no country has prepared for, exercised or has thought through the implications of anywhere from 25 to 35 different nations deploying military assets generally to the same location whether that's the same airport or the same court. If you put on top of this the hundreds of humanitarian organizations and if you take an example like Haiti where there were 1500 different non-governmental organizations that arrived in Haiti many of whom were not NGOs the day before the earthquake it creates a whole coordination problem for that affected country. So support to potentially or potential affected states is critical in how to actually do that reception staging one word integration of these military assets. Secondly assisting nations need to deploy the right capacity to provide effective and rapid assistance to the affected people. Part of the challenge in getting the right assets there is in the assessment methodology and gaining common situational awareness quickly enough to assist decision makers in deploying the right military capacity. Unfortunately when there's most confusion on the ground which is that first 96 to 112 hours that's when decision makers in capitals are also making the decisions what assets to deploy. So it's kind of a friction that's built into the system. There is a tendency for nations to deploy foreign military assets because it's available or it's in the proximity of the disaster and to push assets from overseas rather than to pull assets forward based on assessed need. The sheer number of responders deploying staff, supplies, stuff in response to large scale natural disasters can create significant problems and massive competition on the ground especially when there are limited ports of entry into the affected area. Third challenge and that's the challenge of making the best of what arrives. We don't have much predictability on what's actually gonna show up in an emergency. So those of us who are on the ground who are trying to coordinate that usually in support of the affected government have to figure out what nations are coming, what they're coming with, are the air assets, are the helicopters, what kind of fuel is gonna be needed, what ships are at sea, all of these things. And the analogy we always make is if you go to the playground and you wanna play basketball but one group shows up in baseball kit and another one shows up in football, another in hockey gear, it's hard to play the same game if everybody kind of shows up with different expectations. There are capabilities that are commonly needed in most large scale disaster operations. These include airlift and ground transportation, the production of potable water, logistics planning and execution, engineering and the restoration of the humanitarian infrastructure. And by this I mean repairing and clearing roads, restoring bridges, ports, airports, removing rubble and other debris in order to open up lines of communications. Very specific medical surgical capability especially after collapsed structures with trauma medicine, information technology and operational planning. What arrives is often a mashup of what's available, what is nearby or what has been generically decided as a one size fits all approach to responding by some nations, not necessarily what is required on the ground. Naval services and this kills me as a former army officer to admit but often have many or all these capacities within their organizational structure. The US military sea services in particular because of its global presence, its ability to project capability and tailor its organization. And it's rapid decision making by the National Command Authority is often critically positioned to respond quickly with many of the right capabilities. Maximizing this effect requires preparation that includes dedicated training and exercising to meet the mission set, improving disaster response doctrine, establishing and maintaining networks and contacts both within the military communities and within the humanitarian response organizations as well as developing relevant standard operation operating procedures, plans and agreements both mill to mill as well as military to humanitarians. If I were in charge for a day, I would take a look at the Marine Expeditionary Units as the response platform for the United States. The combination of the muse with the naval support actually brings to bear all of the capability that is required almost universally in response operations. In addition, what we found is that the Navy, US Navy and especially Navy Medical and the US Marines are far ahead intellectually and operationally than almost any other service nation in responding to disasters. So we need to look at how to continue to refine the tactics on the ground, prepare and engage with each other in advance of disaster operations and make the next response as effective and as efficient as possible. Thank you. Mike, thanks very much. If we could get Dr. Bolatino's brief up please. Good afternoon everyone. So I'll begin even before this goes up, the slides go up and simply say that a word of thanks to Dave Pilotti who's been a fantastic collaborator and has been working on building a close relationship between the Naval War College and the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and has been just a pleasure to work with now over the past couple of years. Thank you for the invitation and to Derek as well for the kind invitation and the kind words Dave. So what I'd like to talk about today is a study that I conducted looking at humanitarian perceptions of humanitarian civil military engagement in response to Typhoon Haiyan. So this is actually perfect segue into this work and I think we'll follow naturally from the presentations that proceeded and I'm actually really excited to have had the opportunity to do this. I actually met Mike Marks in Manila in the Philippines when I had been requested by the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management to do a preliminary assessment. I was one of a team of four to look at the coordination between military, foreign militaries and the humanitarian actors on the ground. While I was there, I noticed that quite a few things were going on that were actually in, were either prescribed or in contradistinction to written policy. For example, the co-location of military actors with humanitarian actors in the same physical space which happened to have happened in Rojas with the Canadian military and humanitarian actors and to great effect. So this actually sparked quite an interest in me to better understand what was actually happening on the ground in during civil engagements. So I wanted to conduct a study to do this and proceeded to do that. So let me give you a little bit of context for what I see as some challenges in the humanitarian field. For one, the humanitarian system is enormously stretched with conflicts from the Central African Republic to Sudan to Syria and elsewhere. I don't think there, at least in my lifetime, has been a period in which the UN has been more stretched for resources and able and trained people to respond to the number of emergencies that are out there. There are also increasingly threats to the security of humanitarian aid workers, another challenge to operating in the field. This is not true everywhere, but it's certainly true in a number of different and important contexts. In addition to that, there are, and I think Michael Marx alluded to this a little bit, some challenges to humanitarian principles. And the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, independence, and humanitarianism are really the ethos of what it means to be involved in life-saving, delivering life-saving need as a humanitarian agency. These are very difficult to abide by in practice and everyone knows that, yet they are really the thing that is the coherent driving ethos of the entire humanitarian field. And it's important to keep these sorts of things in mind, I think, when we're talking about civil military engagement. Certainly, when it comes to civil military engagement in response to conflicts, less so in terms of response to natural disasters where it's less of an issue. I'll simply reiterate what I think is pretty patently obvious to everyone, and that is that the United States is committed to the Southeast Asia region for a number of strategic reasons and there are increasingly likely to be large numbers of people that are impacted by natural disasters in the region. So there are going to be ample opportunities for US military and other foreign militaries to be operating with humanitarian agencies in that region but globally as well. So it really behooves us to better understand and better know how that interaction is actually working and to get a sense of and better characterize those interactions. So when I took a look at some of the research that is out there, I noticed that unlike in the field of deterrence where there's a large amount of theory and a large amount of empirical research that's been done, that was evidenced by the previous panel. This is really not true in terms of civil military, humanitarian civil military engagement. I'm not talking about civil mill within countries which is well researched. I'm talking about humanitarian civil military engagement. There's really actually very little empirical work that's done out there. Most of it is case studies. Most of it independent case studies and very little of it comparative, very little of it quantitative. Almost all qualitative interviews. So I made an attempt to sort of expand the research and conduct a survey and we heard a little bit about the limits of that approach. But at least it was an initial foray I think into being able to collect different kinds of data on civil military engagement. Now, Typhoon Ahayyan, obviously a massive, massive event that really leveled entire cities, Taklopan being the principal one among them. But although a relatively low number of casualties when you consider it, the absolute numbers of people affected have even seen estimates as high as 16 million. You had 4 million displaced, a million, more than a million homes damaged. So this was a huge event. And as Mike was pointing out, this was a case where had military response not happened initially, many more lives certainly would have been lost. There was no way the humanitarian community could have gotten up to speed in that capacity that fast. It necessitated military involvement. So this was really a case where, and I'm sure there will be many others, where we need to really prepare for how the humanitarian agencies that then come in deal with the military actors that are on the ground delivering aid. Mike alluded to things getting better. Certainly we've gotten past the stage of wondering whether or not military should be working with humanitarian agencies, at least in terms of natural disasters. But we still really lack a lot of information about exactly what that engagement looks like. So I'm going to try to show you a little bit of stats on what it looked like in the Philippines. And incidentally here you have US troops outside. I don't remember who C-130 that is. It's not a US one at the airport in Tacloban. And below is a picture from the center that was in Rojas, where Canadian military were co-located with UN and the NGOs. There were a number of different militaries that responded. Obviously the armed forces of the Philippines is the largest one, but the largest four and one was the United States. The UK played quite a large role. The Canadians played a large role. Australians, the Japanese as well. And they were divided into different little AORs, as you can see. The humanitarian agencies that were surveyed, and I was able to basically ascertain who all of those agencies were, because it was a matter of public record for one, but also because I could see who they were from the different cities that I had traveled to, including Tacloban, Cebu, Rojas, and Manila. So I want to get into the actual results of the survey. And let me tell you a little bit about actually how it was conducted. I spent a lot of time preparing the survey instrument based on feedback that I was getting from signal experts that were actually on the ground in the Philippines, from experts that I spoke to when I came back to Hawaii at the Center for Excellence that had sponsored the initial trip, and from reading the literature. I then conducted a survey online. It was anonymous amongst all of the humanitarian agencies that had a presence in the Philippines. That was conducted between May and August of 2014. So let's take a look at some of the results, some of which I think are quite interesting and may have, I hope, policy implications for UNOSHA for often and others interested in this space. The first is that, and not surprisingly, this fits with the anecdotes as well, many of the organizations felt that, first of all, they used, in this case, many of them actually used military assets. So 67% of those that were surveyed actually employed military assets in the delivery of aid. Amongst those organizations that used military assets, most of them used them in excess of two weeks, some a fair portion for one to two weeks as well. The average age of those who responded to the surveys pretty high, 10 to 20 years of experience for a third of the people that took the survey. That's a significant amount of experience. So one of the things that I'm encouraged by that is that those who are responding actually have hopefully had some other exposure to other events and may have incorporated that into their own assessment of what happened in the Philippines. One asked about the overall effectiveness of the engagement. Overwhelmingly, they saw that SIPMEL engagement functioned well in the Philippines, and this fits well with some of the anecdotal evidence as well and some other sources of information that are out there on the effectiveness of the engagement. What's quite interesting is this. One asked about how routinely the Oslo guidelines were used to develop organizational policy. Many, the vast majority were uncertain. Many said it was not routinely used in very few. Only 20% said it is used. And this is, I think, an important piece of information. And could point to the need for further distribution, greater distribution of the guidelines, perhaps more training, but is at least a point for discussion. One asked about whether the Oslo guidelines were used in response to high end, more encouraging. 42% said they were. So again, interesting information that has potential policy implications, and you almost never actually see this in any of the documents out there, which I think is important. One asked, again, then about policy training, exercise, and resources. If you look at those who had dedicated civil military staff on board, it was quite a few, almost half. But actually, most did not either participate in joint exercises or civil military training, which is problematic when you consider that civil military training and joint exercises is one of the indicators. And I didn't put up any bivariate analysis because the sample size is too small for me to be statistically significant. But a lot of the indications are that civil military training and participation in joint exercises is highly associated with both perceptions of effectiveness and actual con, and perceptions of the conduct, positive conduct of civil military engagement on the ground. A lot of people will turn to, and I heard this anecdotally on the ground, people that they met during exercises or who they participated in training with as a resource for engagement and coordination on the ground. So that's, I think, a very important piece of information. How timely were military assets delivered and did the lead to useful outcome on the ground? In both cases, there were strong indications that assets were both useful and delivered in a timely way. So really, very, very positive. And again, this is a survey. It's a survey amongst humanitarians, and it's anonymous. So there's really no loss for one benefit of a survey as opposed to a direct interview is that you're not putting yourself basically individually on the line for saying you're not either familiar with something or haven't participated in something. So it's perhaps more accurate in that regard and at least illuminating for information that is important for policy. When looking at whether military assets were seen as a value added, again, the vast majority of respondents agreed that they were. I asked the opposite question as well. Did involvement with the military hinder operations in any way? Absolutely not. The vast majority said they did not. So really, in some sense, it's kind of a boring picture because it's all extremely positive, but it at least begins to provide some empirical evidence and some sense of what things were working and why. This is probably the most important piece. And I'll say that I only looked in this study at humanitarian perceptions of civil military engagement, but there is really no evidence or research that's being done for inquiring amongst the disaster affected community itself how well this is working. And that's a place for investigation and study as well, not to mention the military also. This study only looked at humanitarian perceptions. But the humanitarian perceptions were that the use of military assets, the coordination between civilian and military organizations had a very positive effect for disaster affected communities. So I'll stop with that and not run through additional statistics. I am going to try to make these available publicly. I submitted it for publication. I'm happy also to share the full draft report that I came up with that I did with anyone that's interested. But really what I would end with is calling for greater amounts of research and empirical analysis. It's really, I think, deeply needed in this space. It's lacking. And I think it will go a long way in highlighting exactly what things are working, where there are existing gaps, how cost effective the use of civil military assets are in the delivery of aid in both complex emergencies and in disaster relief. Thanks. Thank you, Enzo. In our last discussion today, Dr. DiRenzo is going to introduce strategic surprise. Thanks very much, David. Dr. Reverend Professor Pilotti, distinguished guest and fellow panel members, it's an honor to be back here at the War College as a graduate and someone that holds the college's mission to be critically important. I'm truly humbled to be here. During the next 15 minutes, I'm going to take a very different perspective than the leaders that are on the panel here did to our research focus. You'd expect nothing less of the Coast Guard. My purpose is to ask you to take a step outside your comfort zone and actually consider HADR perspective with a strategic surprise focus. Now, just before coming up here, I had a panic attack. It occurred to me that in my entire presentation, I don't quote Klausowitz, Sotzu, Nimitz, Rick Over, or Mohan. Does that mean they take my degree away after it's over? More to the point of this panel, think about HADR planning process and the assumptions, the restraints, and constraints that actually are considered. The process itself, using jokes, a cascade of planning from campaign plans all the way down to operations orders, are well-established. But perhaps, just perhaps based on some thinking we've done inside the Coast Guard, we can help provide you one additional factor to consider, which enhances the impressive work that has already been done in both doctrine and practice by our Navy counterparts in the Marine Corps, so that the entire HADR capability of our country and our allies is truly the best it can be before an event occurs. Next slide. To set the stage for this exploitation, what aspects of planning for the unexpected do most participants and attendees in this room immediately recognize? Well, I can thank Admiral Harley for that this morning. I'd venture a good glass. I want to emphasize a good glass of Cabernet Sauvignon that most of you have either read or heard about the book Black Swan and Black Swan Events. These are the events that author, Nason Talbot, notes are outliers when further explained like outside the realm of regular expectations because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility. Second part, it has extreme impact. Third, it can convincingly be pointed to as a possibility. And despite what mankind thinks, we try to concoct explanations as to its occurrence as a matter of fact. So one of the considerations that my command, Coast Guard Atlantic areas had, which is one of the two operational level commands in the Coast Guard, was to adapt the idea of strategic thinking and do it in a manner that springboards from Black Swan events. We captured this in an October 2014 article, Enable Institute Proceedings. And I ask that the students here from the HADR course take a look at it if you get a chance, because it gives you a little bit different spin. We take for granted that planners have done a good job thinking about the what ifs. This maybe puts a different perspective on it. In retrospect, it also fit really neatly into the 21st century cooperative sea power strategy. Next slide. So as you consider the idea of strategic surprise, the academic in me screams that I've got to provide you a lexicon so that you can see that there is a difference from Black Swans. Now researchers Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall in their essay, Ahead of the Curve, anticipating strategic surprise, noted that a strategic surprise event differs from a run of the mill surprise in that it produces significant organizational and societal impacts, challenges conventional wisdom, and is hard to imagine. Key on the words, significant organizational and societal impacts, and challenges the conventional wisdom. So in 2012, strategist and retired US Army Brigadier General, Walter Jacob, writing for the Institute for World Politics, actually added to what Schwartz and Randall wrote by saying that strategic surprise is actually based on a type of outcome that's perspective driven. Again, that's a little bit different way of looking at disaster planning. Why? Because decision makers and planners thinking are framed by their biases, their sensitivities, their political blind spots, and over time culture experience also roll into that. So can these type of factors impact the way we collectively plan for HADR operations? Schwartz and Randall say that the myth about strategic surprise is it's surprise is difficult to identify yet by its uncertainties in the world around us are recognized and explored as an important phenomenon that can be seen and sometimes even monitored. Next slide. So if you've not had a chance to review the 21st century sea power, which was released on 13 March, take a look at it and see the conductivity to this kind of thinking as a framework for HADR planning. The forward engaged and ready theme plays right in to what Schwartz and Randall were talking about. Additionally, the two primary foundational principles. The first one advocates a US forward naval presence is essential to accomplishing naval missions derived from national guidance, defend the homeland, deter conflict, respond to crisis, defeat aggression, protect the maritime commons, strengthen partnerships, and finally provide humanitarian assistance and disaster response. Next slide. So let's talk about it specifically. There are many strategic surprise events that could be used to underscore how to take this framework and apply it to HADR planners. But the one that I personally know best is the devastating 2010 7.0 magnitude Haiti earthquake. The levels of destruction were significant. 220,000 people died, 300,000 people were injured, 60% of the government buildings and 80% of all the schools and poor prints were destroyed or damaged. The Haitian Coast Guard, which is a small but very, very dedicated group, their entire base at Killick was essentially level like the green giant at Stepdott. The first three assets that actually arrived in Haiti, Coast Guard Cutters, led by Coast Guard Cutter Mohawk and Ford. The Haiti earthquake provided an opportunity as a focus point to better prepare for the next event because we could use the thinking and the response there and essentially unleash further thinking about second and third order magnitudes as part of a strategic surprise perspective. This type of innovative thinking goes beyond your classic strategic operational and tactical level planning. It's got to be more abstract than that. In a very real sense, there are three tenants that need to be used for that framework. Significant impact, challenging conventional wisdom and hard to imagine. Next slide. So take a look at what I've put, and hopefully everybody can read it, of what I've put up there about a way you can do this. Bringing together government, non-government and international partners to consider a range of disasters that identify, acknowledge and address strategic surprise that would result in significant devastation. Humanitarian operations is exceptionally difficult, but the issue is compounded if you apply this approach at all three levels of war and response. So let's get back to the cooperative sea power strategy. What does the strategic surprise lens provide us? Think about it. What does it provide us? It provides us the opportunity to step back and consider events that we haven't considered before. Let me give you three of them inside the United States alone. Next slide. Okay, show of hands. I realize I'm the last speaker and we're almost to the end. Who has heard of the New Madrid Fault? Have you stepped back and considered what happens at the New Madrid Fault actually erupts and the impact on the Western rivers and the maritime transportation system that makes up the Western rivers? You wanna talk about an HADR event that will impact our country that the military will definitely be part of the response to. It's take a look at the impacts on bridges, maritime infrastructure, the ability to move the goods and services via barge traffic and truck traffic if those bridges are taken down and there are significant disruptions in the river systems. Most people don't give a lot of thought to the Western rivers, but not only is it imperative for the economy, but we move some pretty serious chemicals through there also. So it's a very serious thing if disrupted by this. It's the second one. The second one is Atlantic Sonamis. I mean, when the event occurred in Japan, obviously the Coast Guard with all of our partners were watching the West Coast. And initially we saw the response of what happened six months later? All kinds of debris started rolling up on the shores of the West Coast. Had we planned for that fully? And was it radioactive? Was there a danger that should have been looked for? That was a strategic surprise that a lot of folks had not considered previously. The next one is the New Age of Terrorism. And by strategic surprise, I mean taking a look at every aspect of the improbable. How would artificial intelligence be used for a strategic surprise type of event by our adversaries? And finally, the combination threat. Natural versus human accident. Human deliberate matched with a natural accident. In combination, for those of you that have participated in the Joint Forces Staff, College Homeland Security Planner Course, we try to run three different events at you at the same time. This is the kind of thing we're thinking about here because a strategic surprise could also be a cascading one that we haven't anticipated. So how about some recommendations? And Dave Pilotti didn't think I could get through all these slides in 15 minutes. Next slide. Let's think about some actual recommendations because don't you love a presentation that goes all the way through and then leaves you kind of hanging? Like, well, what's next? First is, do rail group thick. And how do you do that? For the students in the room, it's those at the 04 and 05 level getting involved in the planning process early on and asking the what if question. Even if it is the most bizarre possibility you can think of, it needs to be considered. The second thing is considering a force planning construct with an HADR bent that's similar to what the Coast Guards developed called our maximum deployable force construct. We can take any event and we've got different matrixes to present and get steel on target as quickly as possible in a response. The third is dig into what academia has produced. And most recently in the last two years the Coast Guard has started to take a real hard look at what the DHS centers of excellence are producing and how we can engage with them and what the academic world and the think tank world can bring towards us. That kind of thinking really needs to be considered. And I'll give you probably the best example. How many here have heard of Hurricane Pam, the simulation? Okay, one person. Thank you, sir. One year to the date, LSU University's Dr. Ivory von Harven probably one of the best hurricane modellers in the world held an event in New Orleans. They modeled a category three event that came ashore. They had National Guard, Governor's Office, Mayor's Office, Transportation, National Guard, all in the room. And if you don't believe any of this, Google it. The results showed the ninth war would flood, the levees would be breached, and the transportation system would be significantly impacted one year before the event. That's striking when you think about it. Last couple, consider the way that adaptive force package needs to respond and if you're talking about significant human beings in danger like what we saw during Katrina, you know that you're gonna have a pretty significant air element to get in there. Well, air elements need support. That needs to be mapped out well beforehand. And that's not something we have done as well as we could have to prepare for a big event that's a strategic surprise. And finally, and it was touched on by all three of the previous speakers, you need to consider the role that NGOs and private actors play. If you take a look, for example, at the 9-11 Commission Report, it talked about all the NGOs that showed up in New York after the trade centers went down. Well-meaning folks, totally uncoordinated. You got to take that same application to plan and you can also learn from them. I mean, companies like Walmart, Target, et cetera, have extraordinary logistics capabilities. That's who you should turn to, to consider how to impact, affect, and respond to a strategic surprise event. Thank you very much for the opportunity. Well, unfortunately, I owe Joey Cocktail this evening because he finished in time. I'm proud of you, sir. I'm gonna hold my comments because I realize we've been sitting a long time today and we've been thinking about some significant issues, but I am gonna open it to the floor for about 15 minutes for questions. And if the students aren't willing to ask them, then we'll talk after.