 And I'm very pleased to welcome another distinguished representative of the Office of Legal Affairs of the IA, by the name of Sylvain Fiennel. Fanielle Sylvain is a legal officer with the section. His background is very much about non-proliferation and safeguards. He has been working from Belgium, his own country, with the Belgium Federal Agency for Nuclear Control. And he was also, at the time, if I'm correct, you were attached with the University of Yesch in Belgium and already working on the same subject. So it's really a pleasure, apart from the fact that it's dear to me as a former alumni of the University of Montpellier. It's my pleasure, Sylvain, to invite you to start your presentation. Thank you very much, Patrick. Is the microphone working, is it strong enough? OK. Well, first let me know. I would like to tell you I'm delighted to be here. The landscape is beautiful. If I would have known that, I would try to arrive a bit earlier. But I also know it's 2 PM, so it's extremely challenging time frame, especially to discuss legal aspect on safeguards. So I would try to make this as interactive as possible. I will move a lot just to keep you awake in the digestion process. Please really do not hesitate to interrupt me. If you have any question, if anything is unclear, do not hesitate at all. So the objective of this presentation is to provide you with an overview of the IEA legal framework for safeguards. And it's divided into five main parts. First, or more, I would say, historical introduction. Then we will move to the legal aspect in the IEA statute related to safeguards. And then the core part of the presentation, the safeguards agreements, then the additional protocol and other protocols to the safeguards agreement. And finally, the implementation of safeguards, so how safeguards are implemented at the IEA and by the IEA. So I decided to take a more historical approach because the legal instruments we have nowadays in the field of safeguards are the results of decision from the international community to avoid any proliferation of nuclear weapons. And to avoid that this technology, this know-how would be used for destructive purposes. So we will go a bit back in time. I'm pretty sure many of you here are much more expert than me in the field of nuclear science. So I will just provide a very quick overview to give the framework. So in 1938, Otto Hahn and Lisa Meitner continued the work of Enrico Fermi and discover nuclear fission. With this increasing discovery and the follow-up to this main discovery, Albert Einstein and Leon Szilard started to be worried about the potential misuse of the nuclear technology, the nuclear know-how. So they warned the US president on these potential misuse. In 1940, in the context of the Manhattan Project, Glenn Sebo discovers plutonium, which will play a key role in the Manhattan Project itself. And as we all know, the first nuclear weapon explosion was undertaken in July 1945 by the US. It's the Trinity test and followed by the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. So very quickly, the international community tried to address the new challenges posed by this new technology, all these new discoveries in the field of nuclear science. The first one is the three-nation declaration made by the three-nation committee, which is Canada, the US, and the UK. And by that time, these were the states holding the nuclear technology. And they called for an exchange of information regarding nuclear technology for the benefit of mankind. But very importantly, they already raised the idea of having an authority, and they used the word commission to control the potential misuse of this new technology. It's then not a surprise that the first United Nations General Assembly resolution was related to nuclear disarmament and a threat posed by nuclear weapons. And this first UN resolution created the UNAEC, so the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. And the purpose of this commission was to address the challenges posed by nuclear technology. So in the next three years, discussion went on in the UN, within this UNAEC, on how to address these threats. And there are two main plans, two main ideas that came up during these three years. It's the Baruch plan from the US side, and the Baruch plan called for the establishment of an international atomic development authority. In exchange of the creation of this authority, the US would give up its nuclear weapon. But on the other side, this plan established an entire system of control on nuclear material. To avoid that, this nuclear material would be used for destructive purposes. On the other side, we have the Soviet Union plan, the Gromkyo plan. And this plan focused on a convention, a convention that would prohibit the manufacturer and the employment of nuclear weapons. So on the US side, we have the idea of control. And on the Soviet Union side, we have the idea of this convention, of a legally binding instrument. But unfortunately, all these efforts, these three years discussion, collapsed in 1949 with the first Soviet Union nuclear weapon test. By that time, the international community that considered that the proliferation was started. And therefore, this discussion in this framework, it was very difficult to move forward. So the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission stopped its work in 1949. And it was a bit of a deadlock for a few years. Until 1953, with the famous Atoms for Peace speech of President Eisenhower. And he revived the discussion started in the framework of the UN AEC. And give, I would say, a second impulse to this discussion. So he provided the idea of having an international atomic energy agency, which would be set up under the aegis of the United Nations. There would be a system of worldwide inspection and control. So this is coming from the idea from the Baruch plan. So control on nuclear activities, on nuclear material. And this international atomic energy agency would be to devise a method whereby this fission of artificial material, so the nuclear material, would be allocated to serve peaceful purposes. This led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. And the statute was negotiated between 1953 and 1956 and entered into force now a bit more than 70 years ago. We celebrated in July when everyone was on holiday the anniversary of the IAEA statute. Important is that the IAEA is not a UN organization. It is a related organization. We do have a specific relationship with the United Nations. We report annually to the General Assembly, for example, but also in the process of non-compliance to save God's agreements. And I will come back to that later. We have a specific access to the United Nations Security Council. The IAEA has two policy-making organ, the General Conference, which we'll meet in three weeks in Vienna. They meet regularly one time per year. And it gathers the representative of all member states. They approve the budget, but also they deal with any matters raised to it by the Board of Governors, second policy-making organs, by member states or by the Director General. We then have the Board of Governors. It's the executive body of the IAEA responsible to carry out the functions of the agency. The staff is headed by the Director General, which is UPA Amano from Japan. And the IAEA has currently 168 member states. So now let's move to the core of the presentation, to save God's. So first, what are save God's? I wanted to ask a question, but of course, if I put the slide, it's going to be very useless. So the save God's are a set of technical measures enabling the IAEA to verify that states are honoring their international obligations to use nuclear material and technology exclusively for peaceful purposes. These international obligations come from different instruments, the IAEA statute. I will come back to that in one or two slides. Also from bilateral or multilateral treaties and from save God's agreements and the protocol there too. What are the save God's activities of the agency? These are the numbers of 2016. So save God's are currently implemented. So we apply these set of technical measures in 181 states. Over 1,200 facilities and material and balanced area outside facilities are covered by save God's. Last year, over 2,800 verification missions from IAEA inspectors. And finally, there are over 200,000 significant quantities of nuclear material under save God's. What is a significant quantity? It's the quantity that is required to manufacture a nuclear weapon. It's a standard established by the IAEA. So it would be 54 kilos of uranium and 8 kilos of plutonium. What is the statute saying? And I will just take the statute. I forget it at the back of the room so that you can have a look. So I will circulate this orange book, which is the statute. And I guess you know already the statute. There you are. So Article 3A5 of the statute provides that the IAEA is authorized to establish and administer save God's in three situations. First, in the context of agency project and assistance. So the agency can provide equipment, provide material to states at the request of the state, but at the condition that this material or this equipment is covered by save God. Second scenario, it's at the request of parties to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement. Bilateral agreement is, for example, a supply agreement. So a supplier state will provide nuclear material to a recipient state at the condition that this material is covered by save God. So at the condition that the recipient state enters into an agreement with the IAEA to have this material covered by save God. The case of multilateral agreements is, for example, the Nuclear Non-Preferential Treaty, but I will discuss that in a few minutes. And last possibility, it's at the request of a state to any of that state's nuclear activity. So a state can decide to ask the IAEA to have certain material covered by save God. And the second article where we have provisions related to save God in the statute, it's in Article 12. It's, I would say, the more general save God's provisions. For example, we will have information on the fact that states have to keep records related to nuclear material, but also provide reports to the IAEA. And main, I would say, provisions related to inspection. And Article 12, also in its paragraph C, has the process of non-compliance to the Security Council and the General Assembly. Yeah? Yeah? This is not the IAEA, so if we go directly to the IAEA. So the supplier state will say to the recipient state, we can provide you nuclear material, but only at the condition that you enter in an agreement with the agency to have this material, the one we will provide covered by save God's, because the supplier state wants insurance that this material is not used for destructive purposes. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's in the context of bilateral agreement. We need a save God's agreement to implement save God's. No, no, but I will discuss that later. So the additional protocol is not a standalone document. So you need to have a save God's agreement if the state wants to conclude an additional protocol. So the starting point is a save God's agreement. The IAEA can't just go in a state and say, we will apply save God's. We need a legal framework. And this is given by the statute, but mainly also by the save God's agreement itself we have with the state. But if it's not clear afterwards, we can come back to that. But more information will be provided later on. A few things, general comments regarding IAEA save God's. Saved God's provision of the statute are not self-executing. It means that states need to have a save God's agreement. This is related to what I just said. States need to have a save God's agreement for the IAEA to apply save God's in that state. The IAEA membership does not require the acceptance of save God's. We do have IAEA members which do not have save God's agreement with the IAEA. So it's not because you are a member of the agency that you need to have a save God's agreement. And lastly, IAEA save God's are possible in non-member states. So we could have states which are non-member to the agency, but still they have a save God's agreement because it's an international legal instruments. You don't need to be a member of states to have such international legal instruments involved. So now it's the main part of the presentation to save God's agreements. And here I insist if anything is unclear, please do not hesitate to interact with me. So the thing to remember is there are three tabs of save God's agreement. First we have this item specific save God's agreement which are based on a document called information secular 66. So the content of these agreements are based on this document which is available online on the agency's website. In the context of these item specific save God's agreement, save God's will apply only to specific item which are provided for in the agreement itself. Nuclear equipment, nuclear material. For example, we would have this few tons of equipment is covered by save God. So the material covered by save God is very clearly identifiable in the agreement itself. And the purpose of these agreements is to verify that these items, the one subject to save God's and identified in the agreement are not diverted for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or any other explosive device. We currently have three states with item specific save God's agreement. So based on the content of the document information secular 66, it's Israel, Pakistan and India. For the comprehensive save God's agreement, this is the main type of agreement. We currently have 173 states with these tabs of agreement in force. And here the save God's will apply to all material in all peaceful activities in a state. So here it's not only specific item which are identified in the agreement itself. It's on all nuclear material in all peaceful activities in a state. And the purpose of these agreement is to verify that nuclear material subject to save God's are not diverted to nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive device. And finally, the voluntary offer agreement. In this context of these agreements, save God's will apply to nuclear material in facilities that nuclear weapon states, and I will come back to the distinction in a few minutes, that nuclear weapon states has offered for save God and have been selected by the IA. So nuclear weapon states will offer a list of facilities with nuclear material and the IA can choose facilities or just don't choose any facility in which save God's will be applied. And in the context of these save God's agreement, the objective is to verify that the nuclear material covered by save God remain in peaceful activities and it's not withdrawn from save God's unless provided on the condition in the save God's agreement itself. And we have currently five states with voluntary offer agreement in force, which are the five nuclear weapon states. Why do we have many types of agreement? Well, this is coming mainly from a distinction that I will explain in three slides on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, okay? So the process of including and implementing save God's agreement, the IA Board of Governors will approve the save God agreement. So you remember the Board of Governors, it's the executive body of the agency. And so the board will authorize the director general to conclude and implement a save God agreement. The director general will then discuss with the state, conclude the save God agreement and implement save God's in the state in accordance with the provision, of course, of the agreement. And all the agreements are available online on our website and they are published under these documents or information circular. And this agreement, so follow one of these things. Well, we only have three types of save God's agreement. So they will conclude the director general. Yeah. One of these, right? Yeah. And then the board will, sorry, the director general will report to the board on the implementation of these agreements on an annual basis in the save God's implementation report. The executive summary of this SIR, so save God's implementation report is available online, but the content is restricted. So if you remember, there are three situations in which the IEA will be authorized to establish and administer save God's in the context of agency projects and assistance at the request of states parties to any bilateral or multilateral treaties. Here we move to multilateral treaties requiring the application of save God's. The most important one of these two and the nuclear weapon free zone. So I don't know if some of you are familiar with these nuclear weapon free zones. So these are treaties establishing geographical zones without, sorry, zones in which nuclear weapons are prohibited. And these nuclear weapon free zone treaties will have provision requiring state parties to these treaties to conclude a save God's agreement with the agency. We have, for example, the treaty of Bangkok establishing a zone in Southeast Asia or the treaty of Tlatatolco establishing such a zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. Other type of multilateral treaty, it's the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons or NPT, which is maybe the most known one. And this treaty so entered into force on 5th of March, 1970. It has three main pillars, but here I have to insist that this notion of pillars are not per se provided in the treaty. It's more a practice that experts refer to it as pillars. So three main historical pillar I would say, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the obligation of disarmament, article six, and the obligation to use nuclear material, nuclear energy, nuclear know-how for peaceful purposes. And all the state's parties to the NPT will meet every five years during a review conference. And the three years preceding the review conference, there will be a preparatory committee. So all the state's party will meet three times before this review conference to discuss the implementation of the treaty and to prepare this review conference. In 1995, state's parties decided to extend undefinitely the duration of the NPT. And very, very important notion, you will see in a few minutes, is this notion of nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. So nuclear weapon states are defined in the NPT, and they are states who tested or exploded a nuclear weapon prior the 1st of January, 1967. These are China, the UK, US, Russia, and France. The non-nuclear weapon states are not defined in the treaty, but de facto, it's all the others. So all other states, which did not tested a nuclear weapon prior the 1st of January, 1967. Essential aspect, which is sometimes confusing in the media, but the IA is not a party to the NPT. It is not the role of the IA to comment on the compliance or non-compliance of a state party to the NPT. What is required under the NPT? Well, there will be different obligation, depending if you are a nuclear weapon state or a non-nuclear weapon state. So article two provides that a non-nuclear weapon states can't acquire nuclear weapons or any other explosive devices. These non-nuclear weapon states, and this is essential for the future of the lecture, they have to accept safeguards as set forth in an agreement with the agency, and in accordance with the agency statute and the agency safeguard system. So non-nuclear weapon states, party to the treaty, have the obligation to accept safeguards in a safeguard agreement with the IA. And these safeguards shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful activities within the territory of the state under its jurisdiction, sorry, or control anywhere. And article three paragraph four provides that these agreements need to be negotiated and concluded within 18 months. Now, let's compare a bit the safeguards agreement. So if you remember, I told you that the item-specific safeguards agreement cover only specific item, item which are defined and identified in the agreement itself. So with these types of agreement, this is the very simplified version of the nuclear fuel cycle. With these types of agreement, the IA will be able to implement safeguards in conversion plant, fuel fabrication plant, reactors and critical assemblies, and reprocessing plants. Initially, it was only reactors and critical assemblies, but it was extended to other types of facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle. Now, let's move to the content of the comprehensive safeguards agreement. So here, safeguards will be applied on all source or special fissionable material. Everything you need to know on comprehensive safeguards agreement are provided here in information Secular 153. Please have a look on this document, which is divided into two parts. First, part one, the general provisions. And second, it's the specific procedures on how safeguards are applied. So following the entry into force of the NPT, so the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Board of Governors established a committee within the Secretariat. And this committee, known as Committee 22, was responsible to consider the content of agreement required in connection with Article 3 of the NPT. And the Board approved that document, that blue document, in 1973. This is not a standardized document. It means that between comprehensive safeguard agreement, you can have small differences, but overall, the structure and the content are very similar, but it is not a model. And this is important to highlight because the additional protocol, I will discuss that in a few minutes, is a model. So you have to accept all the provisions. Here it's not the case. There is a small quantity protocol to this comprehensive safeguard agreement and this small quantity protocol is available only for states with very little or no nuclear material. The notion of subsidiary arrangement, so in addition to this main comprehensive safeguard agreement, the IAEA will conclude subsidiary arrangement with the state. And this subsidiary arrangement contains a general part which will describe how safeguards will be implemented in the state. An example of provisions in these subsidiary arrangements is the communication channel to whom the IAEA has to communicate regarding safeguards aspect. This is the type of information you will find in the subsidiary arrangement. What is nuclear material? Well, nuclear material is defined in Article 20 of the statute, so the orange book. And it's any source or special official material which corresponds overall to uranium, thorium and plutonium. Under comprehensive safeguard agreement, nuclear material does not include all or residues in the mines and in the mining activities. Regarding the safeguards procedures, safeguards measures will be different depending on the type of material. If the nuclear material, so uranium, thorium, or plutonium 239, is suitable for fuel fabrication or isotopic enrichment, then all safeguards measures in Part 2 of this document of information, Secular 153, will be applicable. If it's not the case, so if it's not yet suitable for fuel fabrication or isotopic enrichment, then only limited safeguards measures will be applicable. So the states will have, for example, to inform the IAEA on import and export of nuclear material unless this material is used for non-nuclear purposes such as ceramics, for example. And I repeat, under the comprehensive safeguard agreement, safeguards do not apply to material in mining or mining activities, so the beginning of the nuclear fuel cycle. In the CSA, so in the comprehensive safeguard agreement, you have different rights and obligations. And these rights and obligations are upon states but also on the agency. We also do have obligations. So the state has a general obligation to accept safeguards as provided in the Nuclear Operation Treaty. On all nuclear material in all peaceful activities within its territory, jurisdiction or control anywhere. The IAEA has the right, but also the obligation to apply safeguards. Another obligation on both, we have the obligation to cooperate to ensure that the provisions are correctly implemented. Do we have the obligation to communicate with each other in the context of the implementation of safeguards? The IAEA is required also to maintain confidentiality on the information collected in the context of the implementation of safeguards. The IAEA receive tons of information every single day on the nuclear fuel cycle of states. This information is obviously sensitive, so we have to ensure at the agency that this information remains confidential and is not going out in the public. The state has the obligation to establish and maintain a state system of our country for or control nuclear material. It means that the states need to have a system to count its nuclear material. To be able to say we have such amount of nuclear material, this is where it's located. This is the type of information that has to be provided to the IAEA. So it's referred to as SSAC or also RSAC for regional. I don't know if some people here are familiar with the URATOM system for European member states, and they have a regional accounting system. But it's also the case for ABAC, so for Argentina and Brazil. The procedures regarding safeguards, well, state have the obligation to keep records and provide reports to the IAEA. And obviously, state has the obligation also to provide access to the IAEA because the IAEA inspectors will go into the facilities and verify that the nuclear material is located as it's declared to be, but also the quantity type of nuclear material. There are several types of inspection, but I won't go into detail here. Regarding subsidiary arrangements, I already described that. And just to be complete, there are also some administrative measures related to the inspector designation, but also the visa, because obviously inspectors, when they arrive in state, they need to have a visa to contact their verification activities. And lastly, IAEA inspectors are entitled to certain privileges and immunities in the context of their duties. I think I will have to skip the small quantity protocol, but just in a nutshell to tell you, all safeguards measures in part two are pretty heavy for states. And so the IAEA decided under the decision of the board, of course, to have small quantity protocol. This protocol is available for states with very little or no nuclear material. And for these states, the safeguards measured provided in part two will not be applicable as long as they fulfill the condition that they have a certain very limited quantity of nuclear material, but also that they are no nuclear material in the facility. This is the original small quantity protocol of 1974. And there was a modified version in 2005. So the board adopted a new version on the advice of the director general. So now the conditions are the following, still minimal or no nuclear material subject to safeguards, but also not available to states with already have existing facilities or plant facilities. It means if I'm a states and I'm deciding, I'm gonna build, I'm gonna start to build in two years a nuclear facility, I am not eligible anymore to have this small quantity protocol. So regarding the safeguards coverage with under, sorry, the comprehensive safeguard agreement. Well, if you remember the previous scheme, here we have more components of the nuclear fuel cycle where safeguards are applied. In spent fuel storage, also in enrichment. So the IEA has more access, more knowledge, more information on the nuclear fuel cycle in a state in order to perform its verification activities. Let's move to the addition protocol to safeguard agreement. So this is the Tewaita Nuclear Research Center in Iraq in 91, and under the comprehensive safeguard agreement, IEA inspectors were going to decide to verify these facilities in red. But this is what were discovered later on, that on the same site, there were many other nuclear facilities which normally would have had to be declared to the agency. So following this situation, the IEA started an internal reflection on how to better detect undeclared nuclear facility because these were not declared to the agency. And the IEA had only the right to access these declared facilities. Well, there was an entire reflection within the agency on how to strengthen the safeguard system. These are the main steps. So first, the Board of Governors reaffirmed the right of the agency to conduct special inspection, to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and material in a state. This voluntary reporting scheme, the OVRS was adopted by many states, and these states decided on a voluntary basis to provide information on import and export of nuclear material, but no more comprehensive information on import and export of nuclear material. So the IEA had more a global view of the transfers of nuclear material between states. And this is the main element. The Director General decided to set up a team in the agency, and this team was tasked to think about ways to strengthen the safeguard system. This led to recommendations presented to the Board of Governors, and there were two parts in these recommendations. First, part one measures. These were measures such as environmental sampling, which were already, I would say, applicable under the existing authority by that time of the agency. And part two measures were measures which required additional legal authority for the agency to be conducted. And this led in May 1997 for the Board of Governors to approve the model additional protocol, which contains these part two measures which required additional legal authority to be conducted. And this is the additional protocol. It's a bigger document than the comprehensive safeguard agreement. To come back to one of your question, the additional protocol is not a standalone document. So to have an additional protocol, you need to have a safeguard agreement in force. A state can't have only an additional protocol in force. Yeah, yeah, because I was about to say this additional protocol is concluded on a voluntary basis. So the state will ask to conclude an additional protocol with the agency. This is a model, meaning that unlike the information circular 153, so the comprehensive safeguard agreement, the state here has to accept all provisions set out in this document in the additional protocol. No space for flexibility with regards to the provisions in the additional protocol. There are currently 128 states with an additional protocol in force. And similarly to comprehensive safeguard agreement, there are subsidiary arrangements, so how the measures contained in the additional protocol will be implemented. But unlike the comprehensive safeguard agreement, here it's not an obligation to have subsidiary arrangements. These are the new things that new instruments, new tools given to the IEA when conducting its verification activities. Broader information, broader access, a simplified process for the designation of inspectors, but also the delivery of multiple entry visa, an enhanced confidentiality regime on the IEA side, and finally the right to use communication system, including satellites for inspectors. So what do we mean by broader information? Well now the IEA will have a complete overview of all nuclear and nuclear related activities in the states. Why? Because under the additional protocol, the state has the obligation to provide information on research and development. Very concrete example, nuclear related activities undertaken in universities, these have to be declared to the agency under the additional protocol. Also, more elements provided regarding the export of nuclear material. And the model additional protocol is a bigger document because in the annex it's a list of all nuclear related equipment which have to be, I would say, notified to the IEA. Unlike the comprehensive safeguard agreement, the state have now the obligation to provide information on mines and milling activities. But also, this is the last one I will mention, the general 10 year plan relevant to the development of the nuclear fuel cycle. So under the additional protocol, the states have the obligation to say what are their 10 year plan related to the nuclear fuel cycle. Regarding complementary access, the complementary access, it's not an inspection. It's an access. So this is something to be distinguished. The complementary access can be conducted with a two hour notice to any place on a site. So if we come back to the nuclear research center in Iraq, under this complementary access, IEA inspectors could have said, okay, I wanna go there and I'm gonna be there in two hours. This was not possible by that time without the additional protocol, but now it's possible. But this two hour notice is only applicable when the inspectors are already there to conduct an inspection. Otherwise it's 24 hour notice. And very important, the IEA inspectors can't just go like that all the time on complementary access. This has to be justified. Three justification, to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material activities, to resolve question or inconsistencies. For example, we receive information from the states, something is unclear about activities in a specific facility. Then the IEA will say, well, we will conduct a complementary access specifically for the purpose to resolve an inconsistency. And last possibility is to confirm the decommissioned status. No, because here we have access to any place on a site. For inspection, it's only on specific facilities and there are strategic points on these facilities, okay? So this is really into detail, but in the state subsidiary arrangement, you will have strategic points or areas in the nuclear facility. The states and IEA will agree on these strategic points, so we'll determine these strategic points and safeguards measures will be applied only in these strategic points, so measurements, containment, and surveillance activities, et cetera. Here, it's literally everywhere. This is why I insisted, this is not an inspection. This is going far beyond what the legal authority provided in the comprehensive safeguard agreement. Here, it's under the additional protocol. But this is not conducted on a standard basis. Inspections under the comprehensive safeguard agreement are conducted on a standard basis. For this, we have to justify it. So for states with both comprehensive safeguard agreement and additional protocol enforced, if I come back again to the simplified picture of the nuclear fuel cycle, it seems that everything is covered because the IEA has now information on all the components of the nuclear fuel cycle and even on aspect taking place in research centers or laboratories without nuclear material but conducting nuclear-related research, for example. So last part of the presentation is the way safeguards are implemented now. So this is the overview as July 2017. So as I mentioned, we have voluntary or third safeguard agreement for the five nuclear weapon states. For the main part of safeguard agreement for the non-nuclear weapon states, we have comprehensive safeguard agreement in 173 states. And for 123 states, sorry, we have both comprehensive safeguard agreement and additional protocol. And as I mentioned, these item-specific safeguard agreement for Pakistan, India and Israel so non-NPT states because they have no obligation under the NPT as they are not state parties to the NPT. Every year, the DG will report on the implementation of safeguards in this safeguards implementation report and the IEA will draw different conclusion based on the type of agreement enforced. Of course, if the IEA has a comprehensive safeguard agreement and an additional protocol in a state, we can conclude that all nuclear material remain in peaceful purposes. But if we don't have all this information, this information which has to be provided under both comprehensive safeguard agreement and additional protocol, then we cannot conclude that all nuclear material are in peaceful activities, but we will conclude that declared nuclear material are in peaceful activities. So in a nutshell, safeguards verification activities are based on safeguards agreements which are legally biding instruments. Reporting and access requirements are provided for in safeguards agreements and the protocols there too. And safeguards implementation, all the activities conducted by the IEA have the objective that the states are meeting the obligation under the legal instruments. I thank you for your attention. It was very quick. I hope it was not too complicated right after lunch, but I'm very happy to take questions if there are any. Thank you.