 So, we're on. Yeah, we've just waited a few minutes before that we've got a number of, yeah, we've got over 100 and then we can start, I think. Okay, so welcome everyone, and particularly welcome to Dr. Kelsey Norman from Rice University, who is going to be our speaker today. This is the Sawas Middle East Institute weekly seminars on Tuesday between lectures between 5.30 and 7pm. So it's organized by the Sawas Middle East Institute by myself as the chair of the Center for Pakistan Study and my colleague, Nakis Bazaar, who is the chair of the Center for Iranian Studies. So we are partners in crime. So please forward to hearing your, your, your discussion around a very topical issue. And, you know, sort of based on your research. And obviously it's based on your book, which came out in 2020 by Cambridge University Press, and it's called reluctant reception, refugees, migration and governance in the Middle East and Dr. Kelsey Norman is a fellow for the Middle East at Rice University, and she is the director of the women's rights, human rights and refugee program. And she, she has published widely and she has also written for media publication like the Washington Post and the Atlantic. She is advisory board of refugees solidarity network in New York. So you have a lot of experience and a lot to say. Dr. Norman will speak for about 45 minutes. And for all of you if you could put your questions in the icon that says questions and answers. And we will try and collate the questions and pose them to Kelsey as we go along. So welcome. Without further ado, we look forward to hearing you. Thank you. Thank you so much, Dina. Thank you to the Middle East Center so as for having me. I'm really excited to be able to speak today, or tonight I guess for your time. Let me just go ahead and share my screen. Hopefully everybody can hear me well. So today I'm presenting my book as you know, that in the introduction this, this is a relatively recent publication and just came out in November of 2020 so I'm excited to have these opportunities to share it virtually with you and I look forward to questions. So, a major premise of the book is that when we think about refugees when we think about migration, when we think about migratory voyages. We often think about images like this so this was one of the many iconic images that came out of that period in 2015, at the height of Europe's so called refugee crisis. We think about you know boats crossing waters, we think about people trying to cross land borders. And often we think about these images and what we usually see are are migratory journeys that are depicted from the global south to the global north, whether in this crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands or in the North American context maybe individuals trying to cross desert between Mexico and the United States Southern border. The reality though if we think about like this particular time period in 2015 was that it was really the minority of individuals who were actually ending up in Europe or who successfully ended up in Europe. So as you can see from this infographic the green dots represent the asylum applications that were filed by Syrian individuals in particular between January 2015 June 2016, and they really pale in comparison to these red dots which are Syrian individuals residing in countries that neighbor Syria so countries like Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt. And perhaps this isn't surprising to those in the audience today but you know even even those who might be more aware of the fact that there is this large Syrian refugee population residing countries of the Middle East. Sometimes easy to forget that when we're constantly bombarded by stories you know journalistic accounts or photographs of refugees and asylum seekers and migrants attempting voyages towards the global north. But if we think beyond 2015 if we think beyond that particular moment of people heading towards Europe. This is a broader phenomenon so the number of international migrants is depicted as a stock on the, the, in the graph on the left. And you can see that whilst the majority of migrants do end up living countries of the global north, it's nearly half of migrants that end up in countries of the global south. So this is generally speaking south to south migration and that's nearly half of the world's migratory patterns. And then this is of course even more pronounced for the number of refugees in the world so on the right this is a stock of the number of refugees living in either countries of the global south or global north and you can see it's the vast majority nearly 90% that live in countries of the global south, but you wouldn't necessarily know that from again the way that that's migratory stories and news articles depict depict migration or depict refugees, but also you know policy documents or even academic literature. There's a sort of discrepancy between the number of books and articles written about migrants residing countries of the global north versus those that live in the global south. So my book is I think part of this corrective and there's many other important research projects coming out as well. Trying to understand well, what what happens in the global south, how do countries in the global south receive migrants and refugees, how do migrants refugees manage in these countries. So specifically then in my book I'm looking at one particular region, how do Middle Middle East North African host states manage their migrant refugee populations. And I break this larger question down into this sort of three sub questions so how do states respond to new patterns of settlement, what causes a response to change over time. And then what are the consequences of a given policy or chosen policy for migrants and refugees themselves. So today I'll talk about the basic argue or some of the arguments of this book. I'll talk about some of the methods I use in this project. I'll present some of the case study evidence from the countries in which I was doing this research, and I'll talk briefly about some of the larger picture issues, and some of the policy implications from this book. So, in the book I talk about what are some of the reasons why we as an academic field might know less about how countries in the global south receive migrants and refugees. So what are some of the assumptions that have been implicit in this literature. One factor is this assumption about impermanence. So, whether we're talking about migrants, if we're talking about migrants we tend to think of people passing through countries, like those that I look at it in this book, specifically Egypt, Morocco and Turkey. So these, these states that get labeled as transit countries. People are seen to be just passing through them on route to other countries of the global north. And the reality is that not everyone is able to realistically complete their journey so a lot of people sort of end up getting stuck for periods of time in these countries that are thought to be countries of transit but in reality, as I talked about in the book are also host states, you know in their own rate. And then with refugees, it's often assumed that individuals will might have to leave their home country because of civil war or violence or persecution, you know, a variety of reasons, and that they might end up in a neighboring country, but once that situation in their home country resolves they'll go back home. But the reality is that we see increasingly protracted refugee situations, and that not everybody is ever comfortable returning to their home state or at least not for long periods of time. The second assumption that I discussed is that there's been much more of a focus, at least previously there's been more of a focus on camps as sites of refugee inhabitants, as opposed to urban spaces, even though the reality is that now the majority of people worldwide live in urban locations or at least not in camps, sometimes rural locations as well. So in a camp situation, the question of how a host state responds might not be as relevant because maybe in camps they aren't able to interact with host country nationals or host country authorities, but that's not the base for urban locations where they're definitely going to be interacting with host country nationals and potentially also with host country authorities. So the question of how a host state responds is much more relevant. And then the third assumption is particularly I'm drawing this really from the political science literature on on migration. The assumption that host states just don't maybe have hosts in the global south just don't have the ability or the capacity to engage with migrants or refugees. So we really shouldn't expect much from them. And they sort of are dismissed as these, you know, less important actors in this global scheme of migrant refugee protection. What I argue in the book, and this is really sort of the main thrust of the book, is that maybe it's not necessarily an issue of capacity so much as the state choosing not to directly interact with migrants or refugees at least initially, and instead looking at sort of other options. So that leads me to one of the main arguments which is this idea of indifference. So, I argue that there is this possibility that states are, even though it might look like they're not doing much like it like there might just be sort of a neglectful approach to migrants or refugees that actually if we think about this as a as a policy and as a strategic choice that the state is making that a state can utilize this type of policy this indifference to interact indirectly with migrants and refugees and this indirect engagement is mediated by international organizations as well as local domestic civil society actors, basically step in and do things on behalf of the state provide services, make sure that migrants or refugees are able to somehow get by without much direct involvement from the state itself. And I argue that if a state chooses a type of policy, it, it yield these tangential benefits for the host state so first of all they're getting this, they're getting sort of tangential again, economic benefits from these international actors that are bringing in effectively development aid that gets distributed not just to refugees are asylum seekers but also to host state nationals. These are specific examples that I draw on in the book for that. So if we consider this policy of indifference as a policy, then we can understand how things like diplomatic or economic concerns are actually driving the decision of the state to enact a different type of policy, at least as much as its capacity. Reformulates the idea of capacity and sees the hands off approach that a state might use as actually strategic as opposed to just not having the ability to do anything. And then if it chooses if a state chooses this indifference policy, then it allows for or it sort of necessitates this de facto economic and social integration for migrants and refugees themselves. So even though they might not be allowed to formally participate in the economy, for example, they're more or less allowed to or permitted by the state to participate in the informal economy. And they're often allowed to do things like form social organizations, sometimes even political organizations, and I'll talk more about that going forward. So let me just give you a sense of where this idea about indifference fits within the existing options that states might have according to the academic academic literature. So, when I talk about engagement, a host state host state engagement what I'm saying is that there's that we're counting for any interaction, whether it's direct or indirect that a state has with my guess refugees residing on its territory. So what engagement more commonly in sort of the existing literature drawn from the global north, we're thinking about a local engagement policy. So this is the idea that states are actively bringing migrants or refugees into a national system through things like education or training opportunities, or providing housing, these types of activities that we might think about as integration. Alternatively, and again this is boring from the existing literature, a state might act with a repressive policy. So this aims to really remove migrants or refugees from the host state, whether it's through policing or detention or even deportation. And some in some cases. What I'm offering is that there's this third option that's again characterized by indirect engagement so international organizations and civil society actors are stepping in to provide these types of services for the state, and it's also characterized by this de facto integration, economic and social integration for migrants and refugees. So these three policies on this on this graph, and we have on the x axis the goal of the policy whether it's more excluding or more including migrants or refugees into a national system. And then we think about the relative resource expenditure so what's what's required for the state to actually implement the policy on a scale of just low to high. You can see that both repressive and a liberal policy are relatively costly for the state so they require a lot of state resources, whether it's again, you know, training programs educational, you know bringing magnate refugees into national education systems etc. In the case of a liberal policy or policing and detaining and deporting migrants in terms of a repressive policy, but indifference is relatively cost effective it doesn't require much of the state, but it looks good internationally so states are still getting sort of that that reputational benefit by implementing a policy of indifference because they're not actively you know deporting or removing by refugees from from their states, but they're also not having to expend a ton of energy or ton of resources to implement a liberal policy. So that's what I argue is you know the benefit for the state in terms of a policy of indifference. So how do these different policies that I'm discussing how do they map on to empirical reality. So the cases that I talk about in this book, which are Morocco, Egypt and Turkey. You can see from this map they fall on these important migratory roots, leading up towards Europe. But of course, in reality, many people are not able to complete those journeys. So as I talked about in the book in the beginning in the 1990s or even earlier really but amplified in the 1990s and first decade of the 2000s, it became increasingly difficult for people to actually get to Europe because of these border externalization policies that the EU have been implementing. So we see these longer term stays of people arriving in Morocco or Egypt or Turkey, who are not able to travel onward. And so they meet this requirement, this term that I talk about in the book, which is the transit turn host country. So they are countries of transit for some people but they're also host countries for others who cannot complete those journeys. And I can talk more about the case section or about particular cases in the Q&A if you want to know more about that. So between 2012 and 2015 basically I carried out field work in each of these three countries, ultimately completing just over 130 interviews with both elite actors. So these are individuals in government positions, people working at the UNHCR or the ION, as well as international NGOs and local NGOs in each of these three countries. And then as well as individual migrants and refugees attempting to sort of include as much diversity as possible within that sample, although acknowledging it's not a statistically significant sample of migrants and refugees residing in these three states. I tried to speak with sort of as many nationalities of people as possible, different genders, people coming from or who had spent various amounts of time in the host states and people who were affiliated with organizations like NGOs or community based organizations, but also those who were not. So what I present in the book, and this is laid out in three different chapters looking at each country, and it's sort of my historic history as well as what's happened more recently, are these trajectories. So I talk about how in each of the three countries, Egypt, Morocco and Turkey, for that last decade of the last century of the 1990s, as well as the first decade of the 2000s, each country was more or less using this policy of indifference. And I talk about how it looks a bit different in each country, but there are these commonalities. And then, interestingly, in the first decade of the second decade of the 2000s, we see these different changes. So Egypt moves towards a more repressive policy, and Morocco and Turkey move towards they have these big migratory overhauls of their other policy frameworks, and at least at a jewellery level they they move towards more liberal policies. And so, this is, you know, kind of the empirical heart of the book so I don't want to, it's hard to do a justice at this point because there's kind of a lot of details involved. But I talk about how in Egypt this is very much related to the securitization of migration that happens in 2013. So domestically, probably as many of you remember that was the year when we saw this military coup that removed former President Mohammed Morsi from power and beginning with Syrian refugees, and then spreading to other nationalities as well, we see this linkage between the issue of migration and refugees, and other, what the state perceived as other threats. So migration became linked with things like terrorism or porous borders, or, you know, the possibility that migrants or refugees could be, you know, that could be affiliated with the former president and his political party. So, at this point, Egypt starts investing more and more resources in heavier policing, detaining migrants in a way that hadn't been doing before, and then even deporting, especially Syrians to two other countries sometimes, if not back to Syria then to Palestine for example to Gaza. So we see this move from Egypt, its willingness to invest more resources in this policy, this more repressive policy, because it deemed migration and the presence of refugees to be a threat at that time. In the case of Morocco and Turkey, we see a very different shift around the same time period. So in Morocco, there have been pressure on the state for years prior to 2013 from civil society, Moroccan civil society actors, as well as community-based migrant organizations kind of teaming together to put pressure on the state. But it wasn't until 2013 when sort of two factors were very important that occurred. So those civil society actors went to the international sphere to Geneva and shamed the Moroccan government about its human rights practices towards migrants. And also, there was increasing pressure from Europe that the Moroccan government saw as important about its policing, its migrant situation, and also potentially changing how it dealt with migration domestically, as well as the Moroccan government looking increasingly toward its southern neighbors in West Africa and perceiving those states as geo-strategically important for diplomatic purposes, but also economic ties, which is where a lot of the migrants coming to Morocco were originating from. So this confluence of factors then, this international shaming along with these diplomatic incentives, lead Morocco to adopt this brand new framework in 2013 that kind of rolls out in 2014 and 2015, in which it promises to have this new politics of migration and to treat migrants and refugees residing in Morocco with a sort of more human rights friendly approach. This doesn't entirely play out in practice as they talk about in the book, but it does make this very public, very, you know, sort of diplomatically salient movement towards a more liberal framework. In Turkey, this plays out very differently, but also a major change comes to fruition in 2013 and 2014. So beginning really in 2008, there's a shift in Turkey among some of the political leaders who see Turkey as being very strategically important in regards to its relationship with Europe at that time, and also a number of human rights cases that were brought against Turkey at the European Court of Human Rights by European doctors, but also domestic civil society actors in Turkey, because of Turkey's treatment of asylum seekers and Turkish detention So this is at a point when Turkey so cared a lot about its diplomatic image in regards to the European Union. So we see a major change happen, this desire to draft this new policy, this new framework for migration and asylum that ultimately comes to fruition in 2013 and then is adopted in 2014. So again, we see this confluence of international shaming as a tactic, as well as the state caring about or seeing migration is being very important to its diplomatic goals. So we see these movements. People have asked me before well what what happened you know why why are all these things occurring in 2013 2014, and I think that there are different reasons, you know whether it's domestic politics or some changes at the international level, but with these three cases that I'm looking at there is this really interesting movement that happens in this period of a couple years. So talk in the book, a bit about different alternative explanations that someone might pose. So, going back to this policy of indifference that these states are using initially to respond to migrants and refugees. Some might say well maybe it's just a matter of the state not really having the ability to do much so maybe indifference is really kind of just the state, you know, the state neglecting this issue, or not seeing this issue as important. And I think there's, you know, I think that the, the state capacity is not it's, it is an issue, but I don't think it's the only explanation of how state respond so one thing I talked about in the book to sort of push back against that alternative explanation is the fact that we see this movement that I just talked about in the previous slide towards a repressive policy in Egypt's case but also towards a liberal policy in Morocco and Turkey's case. And, you know, the fact that the state suddenly decides to implement a liberal policy is not because their state capacity suddenly changed during these two years 2013 2014 it's because you know the state perceived different incentives from implementing a more repressive policy or a more repressive policy. There's another anecdote I'd like to share from from the Egyptian case is the following so this is in the context of the robot massacre that occurred in August 2013. The supporters of former President Mohammed Morsi were sort of camped out in a particular part of Cairo, and we're demanding that, you know, Morsi be reinstated because they didn't see his removal as legitimate. Unfortunately, as probably all of you remember where you know that that ultimately led to the deaths of several hundred I think over 800 Egyptian protesters at the hands of Egyptian authorities. And so it was it was a massacre effectively, it was very violent. So the context in regards that relates to my research is that I was speaking with a refugee school director who there's many refugee schools in Cairo and this is this is one that happens to be located in sort of more central Cairo. And the director was telling me recounting this incident on the morning of the robot massacre so before any violence had taken place. He got a phone call from a woman at the Ministry of the Interior. He had not spoken with anyone from the Ministry of the Interior at any point prior to this, his school was unregistered with the Egyptian government which is not how it is supposed to be it's supposed to be registered but he had been operating without any problems. Despite it being unregistered. So he gets a phone call and he says, and the woman on the other line, the Ministry representative told him, you know, I think it would be best if you did not open your school today, because there is possibly going to be violence and we think it would be better if he told the children to just stay home. And that was it there was no other, you know, there was not accusing him of anything or being or objecting to his lack of registration. It was just, you know, sort of letting him know and advising him not to open. And he says here quote, I laughed because I'd actually been overseas, and I just changed my phone number only three days earlier, but they managed to get straight to me on my mobile. So I think this is indicative of just how closely the Egyptian state is monitoring this migrant refugee protection system, even if they are not directly interfering with them. And are generally sort of, you know, taking a more hands off approach to administering this system. You know, they do, they know all the contacts they know where these schools are operating they know where other types of services are operating, and they are closely observing and following exactly on. And if an organization were to sort of cross a red line or, you know, overstep their boundaries in terms of what they're doing, providing services to migrants and refugees, the Egyptian state would undoubtedly intervene in that situation. So I think this is helpful in rethinking some of our conceptions about, you know, capacity as being a major inhibitor, and not always assuming that a lack of action on behalf of the state indicates a lack of capacity. And this is in line with other literature that's coming out, both in political science, but in other fields, looking at things like protests, or in the case of Alicia Holland, she has a book on the state sort of not interfering with a regular street vending in Latin America. So again, states might might hesitate from reacting or might choose not to react, not as an indication of state weakness, but because they're actually strategic about one and how they interact or refrain from from interacting with, in this case migrants and refugees and the organizations working with them. Okay, I'll shift gears a bit now, and talk about the consequences of these different types of policies for individuals. And now I've talked a lot about state policy and you know the state as a, as a structure up until now, the really sort of the heart of the book is formed by these interviews I did with with migrants and refugees themselves, and how these different policies in place actually impact and structure the lives of those living within the state. So, as I said before, part of what allows a policy of indifference to work is this hands off approach from a state in regards to what individuals can and cannot do in the country in the countries in which they're living. You know, if you go to, for example, on the left, there's a photo from a neighborhood called talk to them in robot that's known, you know, to everyone to me as a researcher but I found out because everyone's kind of aware that there's a large migrant refugee population or asylum seeker population living in this neighborhood, amongst other Moroccan nationals but it is sort of a place where people who are first arriving in Morocco can go to get themselves set up. It's a place where you can find informal work to go and participate in the Moroccan economy. Similarly, Oxford neighborhood in a symbol looks and feels similar so there's a large migrant refugee population residing there. And as you can see from this photo on the right there's you know all sorts of goods out on display and people can and have the ability to participate in this informal economy that allows them to get by in the absence of a really strong state policy, or, you know, sometimes there's some help from migrant refugee organizations and geos, but oftentimes people are sort of left to fend for themselves. And so the ability that the hands off approach of the state's policy and the difference allows them to get by. And I think that I put in each of the, the empirical chapters with, you know, a story or a vignette from someone who shared their narrative with me about how they manage in these host states. And I think one of the things I talked about in the conclusion is that I'm really trying to push back against this idea that I think can also be implicit in this academic literature on global south migration that sees migrants maybe sometimes lacking a bit of agency. And I think oftentimes it's written, it's written about with, you know, the, from the viewpoint of, well, you know, people there aren't strong policies in place in global south states to protect or to enable migrants and refugees to participate much, maybe not in the same way as in global north countries. So people are sort of just left to waste away or, you know, waste their lives. And I think oftentimes maybe that's because, as I said earlier, a lot of this literature looks at camp situations where it is more difficult for people to participate in a host state community. But that's not the case for urban populations, which again is what I'm looking at in this book. So people are very much, you know, sending their children to schools, whether it's refugee schools or in some some cases, national schools of the country for certain nationalities or populations. They're finding ways to work informally, whether it's in things like restaurants or domestic work or selling goods along the street, what have you. And in some cases they're, you know, they're forming community organizations, social organizations, and also sometimes even political organizations, especially in the case of Morocco I talked quite a bit about how those political organizations were very vibrant and we're really pushing putting pressure on the state on this issue of migrant and refugee rights. So, you know, as I said I open each chapter with a story and I'll just share this story from the picture on the far right, which is, I call this and I give everyone a moniker in the book was able to speak with but will call the man on the left Madhu, who's originally from Senegal, and he comes to Morocco he comes to robot and is looking for work, ultimately wants to work as a mechanic because that's his background and his training but he has to find whatever you can and ultimately starts selling sim cards along this major thoroughfare in robot. And as I'm talking to him one day this police officer, the man on the right comes up and sort of pretends like he's going to grab Madhu's phone, which is really tense for a moment but then they both burst out laughing and they clearly have this established rapport, and they joke around for a while. So as we're sitting there, you know, I'm kind of shocked by this because I, you know, I would be worried if I were doing something in an activity like a regular street vending and a police officer came up but they have he knows this particular person he knows what he can and cannot do in front of him. So this this man walks away the officer walks away, but after a few minutes another group of police officers from a different faction come up, sort of ambling up the street, and you can quickly see all the vendors packing up their goods and making to leave and depart. And a module as well packs up his goods and makes his way. So you know he's learned that with this particular guy he can laugh and joke around, but then as soon as another set of police officers come up he needs to leave as does everybody else on the street. So these informal rules are really important in the context where formal policy might dictate one thing but what you actually can and cannot do is a very much a different question and it's something that has to sort of be learned as you acclimate to life in this kind of post date. So, whoops. I'll talk then briefly about some of the policy implications from this work. As I said earlier when I was looking at the map outlining my case selection. What part of what necessity it's this study is this you externalization that's been occurring for decades now that really at all costs, it aims to prevent onward migration of refugees towards Europe. One of that has been establishing these agreements with countries that you know are considered transit countries I'm calling them transit turned host countries in this book. But we see, especially after 2015 we see this amplification of this process of externalization and these have these partnership agreements. And I think that will continue to see that going forward as you know is evidenced by meetings even just earlier at the end of last year, which you know called for instead of trying to sort of, you know reconcile internal issues within the EU of government and, you know, responsibility sharing. We see a call for continued responsibility shifting outside beyond the EU's borders. So I think that if we continue to see that which seems like we will, that will also continue to see this indifference and informality outplay for migrants or refugees residing in these neighboring countries, like those that I look at in this book. I think we maybe will see these to jury liberal policies, like, like I discussed in Turkey and Morocco, if there are these economic and diplomatic gains to be had from shifting towards a more, you know, outwardly liberal policy. But the reality is that that doesn't always play out on the ground for migrants and refugees themselves, as we see in Turkey and Morocco in my case, in the cases discussed in this book. We might see a repressive policy if migrants and refugees are suddenly deemed a security threat. And I think that a real danger to this pathway towards a liberal policy so this pathway towards reforming policies that we saw in Morocco and Turkey is that we can see a shift a really sudden shift towards a more repressive policy because the state is not necessarily committed to, you know, truly more liberal policy for migrants and refugees themselves. And if it sees sort of different incentives from implementing a more repressive policy as we saw with Turkey in 2019, for example, we might see a really sudden shift towards that. So I think that's that's the danger towards of sort of the, you know, is trying to incentivize more liberal policies from from these countries as the EU has been pushing for and also actors like the human HDR and the IOM. So a major takeaway them from this book is that we need to stop seeing global South actors is just sort of the recipients of the policy choices of more powerful states like those in the EU or, you know, in the North American context, those of like the like the US, or international actors like the UNHCR and IOM, because they are strategic actors, even though it might appear not appear otherwise sometimes, and they have their own vested interests so we should be, we should attempt to understand what those interests are. So before I close, I'll just talk about the chapters in the book so you get a sense of how it's laid out if you're interested. So in the second chapter I talked more again about this theory of indifference as well as some of alternative explanations and how this fits in within this broader literature, both within the political science literature but sort of the broader migratory and refugee framework. The chapters three, four and five are the sort of empirical heart of the book looking at each country in turn and this trajectory that I talked about. So first things I look more at a micro level at specifically Morocco and, sorry, Morocco in Egypt, and I try to understand whether different groups of nationalities residing in these two host states whether they receive differential treatment from the state itself, and how they perceive that that differential treatment if it exists, and whether it's based on things like race or you know perceptions of race or ethnicity. This also ties into this thesis in the political science literature about host states having certain identities and whether that then translates into you know policy and then affects individuals. So I can talk more about that in Q&A if you're curious about that chapter. Chapter seven looks specifically at the role of international actors really most prominently the UNHCR and the IOM and whether those organizations and also their main funders which are global north states, how impactful they are in determining policy outcomes. Chapters eight and also partly the conclusion look quite a bit at this change that happened in 2015 so as I said before a lot of the fieldwork for this book was carried out between 2012 and 2015 so I wanted to look at everything that's in 2015, how these arguments for different types of policies fit into this paradigm within the Mediterranean, what Europe has done since then and how it's impacted countries in the region and then what of course the implications are for migrants and refugees themselves. And then lastly, in the conclusion I talked a bit about the methodology of the book but also about how maybe this argument for indifference and different types of host state responses might travel to other regions so whether we're talking about, you know, Central America and Mexico and the impact that US policies have had for those countries or you know potentially in the Pacific region with them with Australia's actions and impact for countries like Indonesia for example. So I will go ahead and just stop there. And we can open up for questions. Okay, thank you Kelsey that was very interesting and informative as well as sweeping in terms of range. We've covered a lot. Before I go on to the questions I have a small question myself which is, did you do any research of how the host populations rather than the states react to refugees in response to changes in policies. If you have done any work on that that might be interesting to answer. Yeah, I mean, I guess the short answer is no, I wish I had, you know, had one time I would, I would probably either try to look at, I know other people have done some interesting like survey work to try to get a sense of national sentiments towards the presence of migrants and refugees. I did not personally conduct any interviews with host state national so I didn't include that but I did include, you know, newspapers, sort of journalistic analysis of how host populations are feeling or you know national sentiments. But I think and I do draw on other people's work to talk especially in at least in Turkey and Morocco I know of research projects that have looked at like national surveys of host state nationals and their their perceptions towards migrants and refugees. So I include like secondary work I guess you could say. And I think, you know, especially in Turkey it was very apparent that the national population, sort of national sentiments towards the presence of Syrians was changing quite rapidly when I was doing field work. And in Morocco as well. There were certain heightened points at which the issue became quite politicized, especially racialized. And in Egypt to it's just that, you know, at least with Egypt there's there's always concerns about free the presses and how much you know state television is is being influenced by by governmental perspective so I think, you know that I don't know of like a national census or national survey looking at Egyptian populations, attitudes towards migrant and refugees but that would be interesting too. Yes, and I think media can tell us a lot about attitudes because they tend to reflect them, but I want to go into some very interesting questions the first one is, could you comment on whether the words differential treatment based on gender. And Claire is also asking another question which is so the same person. How has COVID impacted refugee policies in global South countries whether you have looked into that at all. So, in terms of gender. Well, so in the chapter that I briefly mentioned in the table of contents, gender is one of the. So what I do in this chapter is, I look at all the migrant refugee interviews I was able to do in Egypt and Morocco specifically. I'm looking at different characteristics of my my interviewees so gender is one of them as well as nationality as well as how long someone has spent in the host state, and then whether or not they have legal status. It's interesting because you know, speaking individually so looking not collectively but speak with individuals people have all sorts of feelings about how you know their race or their gender might be impacting how they are perceived and that is, I mean, I discuss some of those and I think absolutely, you know it impacts the opportunities someone might have how safe they might feel what they feel they can and cannot do in the host state. So I provide examples of that. So looking at the aggregate, it is interesting that the two most sort of influential factors are actually how long someone spent in the host state, as well as whether or not they have legal status. So that that's, you know, if I'm looking at whether they've had interactions with the police. Do they think that they are that they receive preferential treatment. Are they able to access certain services or go to a hospital all these types of things. Those are the two end up being the two most important factors for how kind of how comfortable or how maybe integrated someone feels in the host So I think that there is something to be said about like, regardless of your nationality or maybe your gender. There's a learning curve. So I look at you know whether someone has spent less than two years versus more than two years in the host state as well as whether they're able to achieve some kind of legal status whether it's whether you're a migrant or a refugee. And I think that that allows them to then know the system a bit more to know the community to know what organizations are out there that can help them, as well as you know establish relationships with, you know, co nationals or potentially with the host state population. And that helps them a lot to be able to feel a lot more comfortable in the host state. But, but again that that chapter goes into all of those factors a bit more specifically in terms of COVID I mean, unfortunately, like this book doesn't discuss it at all just given production line processes and timelines. But I, you know, I have been following at least, well I guess really in the three countries, how this has been impacting people and I mean it's, as you can imagine is just making everything that much more difficult. Some people don't necessarily have great access to health centers anyway. Some people if you have legal status in certain countries are able to at least access national hospital or national clinics, but whether that actually happens and you know into factor sense is questionable depends on like who you are who you happen to go which hospital you happen to go to how you're treated there. People are quite afraid even more than they would be normally to access to try and access national health systems. I think that I was just speaking with someone yesterday in the Egyptian context to who says that, you know, asylum seekers and refugees and migrants are all terrified of contracting COVID because they know that they probably won't receive great treatment even they won't be a priority for like a respirator or anything else if they were to have to go to a hospital. So people are just really cautious and quite scared, you know, adding to additional fears that anyone might feel on a normal basis about trying to exist in Egyptian society. And I think that whether and how these populations will end up getting vaccines once they arrive I think you know unfortunately they might also be as for the bottom of list so they're probably not super hopeful about what, when the situation will improve. And I won't say anything more about that because I'm unfortunately I'm not on the ground and I don't know enough about how, how it's playing out in terms of what people can and cannot do at the moment but yeah I think it's definitely, you know, elevated any existing difficulties or fears that people might have. Your comment about the status actually kind of seeks well into a question which is whether what is what are the long term opportunities for asylum seekers and migrants. And can they receive receive residency or citizenship, and then have there been attempts at creating semi autonomous entities for the migrant and refugee communities that you studied. Can you relate to the question of the status of such. Okay, sure I mean it's, I don't know which country to start with because there's interesting developments I think in all three of them in regards to that but so for example in Morocco, when I talked about this this big policy change in 2013 that sort of, you know, the headline part of that was that the state was offering this regularization campaign for irregular migrants that were residing in Morocco and not all of them were from Sub-Saharan Africa many from other regions but the sort of the part of the impetus was to regularize people that were coming from various especially West African countries. So, many people, I think in the end more than 20,000 individuals did receive regularization, but the reality was that, even though you might get a residency permit which means that you have you go from having being a regular to having a legal job which you could apply for formal work, or you know formal housing, all these types of things. The reality was with implementation had lots of problems so, even though you got a one year residency permit in order to renew that you had to show indications that you were integrating had to show that you had a formal job you had to show that you had housing contract it show these other types of things. So, people, one year is a pretty short timeline to expect that from people. So, many people were then going to go back into a regular status, and it wasn't sort of enough from the state to really make sure that people will not only had access to the status but that, you know, reciprocally that Moroccan nationals were being sensitized to the presence of migrants and were willing to hire someone with this this new status or were willing to offer housing contract, etc. So, there were issues around that even though the state was making, you know, a quite sort of making a lot of fanfare around this and you know, bragging about it diplomatically. But in reality on the ground, a lot of the civil society organizations and NGOs that were working with migrants refugees and migrant leaders themselves had a lot of complaints about how that was being implemented. Because citizenship is difficult. I you know I think Turkey is a really interesting example in that regard because historically it has actually offered. When there were Afghan refugees in previous decades it offered citizenship sort of a select few of these refugee of this refugee population, because you know they have gotten very good at sort of establishing relationships with the government and the government saw them as future people who were willing to offer that citizenship and then we see that repeated under air the one with with some Syrian nationals as well. So, you know, they're there I don't want to say never, but for the most part, the offer of citizenship is is generally not on the table, but you know citizenship aside that's sort of a big ask I think there are ways to offer. There are ways to do sort of what Morocco is trying to do but maybe find ways to make sure that people have access to longer term residency or making sure that there are integration measures that accompany that, not just sort of, you know, not just doing it for this show or for this diplomatic reasons but to make sure that it's really working on the ground. The second question was, can you remind me dinner. The second question is whether there have been attempts at creating semi autonomous entities. So by that do they mean like organizations run by migrants and refugees themselves, or possibly by the by the status of happy happy formed kind of would have they allowed the refugees and migrants to set up semi autonomous. Like, like, the companies, is that maybe, I'm not sure. I'm not sure if I quite understand the question but I'll just answer so, you know, like in Egypt, for example, there's been quite a lot of promotion actually recently. And I don't I don't think I talked about it as much in the book because I when I was doing research there later in 2019 I was hearing more about it. But there were, there was certainly a lot of promotion by the government and, you know, allowing for Syrian nationals to come in and form companies and business entities because it saw Syrians as being, you know, investment in that, that practice to be quite lucrative for the Syrian communities as well. So a lot so some, you know, industrial or companies or restaurants for example were allowed to sort of move their operations from Syria to to Egypt. So the state was quite, you know, promotional of that. So I think it depends on the group and I think it depends on what the state sees as sees how it sees itself benefiting from that type of that type of ability. In terms of I just want to say though, maybe this is also what you mean but maybe not I think there have been a lot of community based organizations that in all three countries that you see being formed by migrants and refugees themselves, not not commercial businesses but you know, sort of civil society actors, many of them are informal they're not registered with the state but they do, you know, provide sort of a sense of community for migrants and refugees. Co-nationals but also sometimes we see organizations that are, you know, embracing of all migrants or refugees. Certainly saw that in Morocco and Turkey, and someone in Egypt as well. And these organizations are really lifelines for a lot of a lot of migrants from refugees who don't otherwise have much of the community space. And sometimes they're overtly political but oftentimes are more sort of just focused on providing, you know, social space, a place for people to maybe get some kind of training, or just to, you know, establish relationships with other co-nationals. So those, those play quite an important role in all three of the empirical chapters that I look at are all three of the cases. Okay, thank you. So there's a question about Egypt in particular and thinking and asking what now that you have a different leadership in the country, and that it has stabilized quote unquote I think. What is the strategy that they are employing a bit opportunistic in the fact that they are welcoming, maybe entrepreneurs from Syria, Yemen, Libya, etc. to create change growth in the country. And then there's another related question which is about the relationist approach, and the fact that if we think of, can we think about the migration crisis as requiring the cooperation between Middle Eastern countries and European ones. In a sense, did you see a sense of, did you find from your, from your research that there was in terms of state policies, was there reliance on maybe or trying to draw on European policies towards migrants, etc. Let me take the first one and then I'll look back for the second. So in regards to Egypt, yeah, it's a great question that you ask it's, I think it's very interesting to see how Egypt's policy is shifting a bit now so I mean, again, just in terms of the timeline I think I didn't have, you know, I talk about this earlier in 2013, 2014, maybe even into 2015 when Egypt was still acting fairly repressively towards migrants and refugees beginning with Syrians but also other nationalities, Ethiopians, Eritreans, others in the country, Sudanese. So, I think you're right, I think more in more recent years Egypt, I think maybe from about 17 to 2017 onward and even more so when I was there in 2019, it was becoming quite clear that Egypt was sort of learning how to play this this new game of, you know, appealing to Europe for all funding to, you know, to host its migrants migrant refugee populations or to welcome or to be more receptive to other populations coming. As you said, yeah, many Libyans other other groups. So I think that Egypt is, I don't, I don't think it's actually changing entire is so much on the ground but I do think that there's a lot there's a much more different dialogue now being utilized by the CC regime. And I mean again so under 2014 when this repressive policy was happening it wasn't a different leadership at the time it was you know, because it was military leadership but then he was elected in 2014. So it's you know it's a change within the same administration but I think they're just the incentives are different now it knows that by claiming it's going to offer a more liberal policy towards migrants and refugees. And I believe that it can benefit from that in regards to its relationship with Europe so you know it's offered previously only certain nationalities that attend Egyptian public schools and now it said that all nationalities of refugees and asylum seekers can access Egyptian public schools. There's talk about possibly implementing a domestic asylum policy which Egypt hasn't had. So, you know, it's making these sort of moves that you see in other states in the Mediterranean, that I think are signaling to Europe that it's it's willing to sort of get on board with some of Europe's preferences. So, I think I think you're right there's interesting movements happening. So, can you remind me of the second question though. I'm going back up to it. So, the other one is about the application of the so called relationistic approach towards migration crisis. So, I don't know whether this is a question or whether this is a statement. But did you see in your research, a cooperation in terms of policies state policies towards refugees. I mean, all three of the countries I'm looking at and really, I mean, name any country in the Mediterranean region and they have some kind of migration agreement with Europe right. I think it's interesting in Turkey and in the Turkish and Moroccan cases that definitely that relationship was more important to those actors during the time period that I'm looking at. And, you know, Morocco had had had various agreements with Europe for years, and around 23 right around that time of that policy change it also agreed to a new migration agreement with Europe that I think was important in deciding to implement that change in 2013. Turkey, of course, also has had many agreements with Europe, you know, as part of its larger a session process beginning the 2000s its migration has been one of the most important topics in thinking about if Turkey were to join the European Union what kind of changes would have to change in Turkey in regards to migration and asylum. So that was really sort of one of the, you know, I'm an impetus for Turkey thinking about reforming its policy, although I talk in the book about how it, you know, I think people might sort of too simplistically think that the EU was requiring Turkey to change its policy so that's what Turkey did, but actually the session negotiations have fallen apart. Before Turkey decided to go ahead and adopt this new policy and I think it was more about Turkey perceiving that there would be benefits for the state from doing that as opposed to you know Europe demanding it up of Turkey. So again, it's you know comes back to the state being the Middle East, North African states as being strategic actors in their own right and not just responding only to the demands of Europe and so I think that, you know, I think I think this book is in line with other other work out there now that's you know rethinking well what is the viewpoint from the south of the Mediterranean not from from Europe in regards to how these relationships are established and what the incentives are. Okay, thank you. There's a question from Bruce Stan Stanley with your emphasis on urban spaces did you identify differences in application of indifference among different cities, either within a country or across your three cases and how does securitisation, policing and carceral mechanisms differ, for example, among cities, and that relates to an earlier question about, you know, the camps as a site for, you know, kind of refugees and migration and, you know, whether you, you know, kind of by focusing on urban spaces, you know, kind of neglect to the camps. This is an understanding of the question. Yeah, that's a great question. And I think in regards to different practices in different parts of countries or different locations I think Morocco is a great example. So even in this earlier period that I'm speaking about when I'm calling the Moroccan policy one of indifference, there were, I would say more repressive policies towards migrants and refugees residing close to the Spanish border towards the enclaves of South and the northern coast of Morocco, because Spain have put a lot of pressure on Morocco to, you know, and from the Spanish side as well there was a lot of active policing happening along those, along those very small borders with with Spain, thus with the EU. So I think that even though there was a policy of indifference towards migrants refugees residing in more urban spaces and cities like Rabar, Sri Lanka, etc. There was there was a very active police presence and you know willingness to demolish camps or deport people if they got really close to the Spanish borders. So you're right that even within, you know, one country there's of course differences in terms of where people are residing and what the preferences are there. And then a question earlier about whether I'm neglecting camps. I think well you know it's true in the Turkish case for example I, I wasn't able to go to the camps in Turkey Southeast. At the time at least I was interviewing that the sort of restricted highly restricted to researchers. But even then it's you know it's really quite a small proportion of refugees that do end up in those camps the vast majority in Turkey I mean this is I think year by year it was more and more people residing outside and when you look at it in terms of a percentage, more and more people residing in urban spaces and now it's you know less than 10% that would be in Turkish refugee camps. So I think they are important spaces, but I was I was more interested in how this policy works in urban environments because I think that is sort of a necessity for this policy of indifference. I think the Turkish policy towards individuals in the camps, which you know it wasn't, it was an arm of the Turkish government that was managing the camps and managing them quite forcefully, from what I understand, in the early days, international organizations sort of weren't even allowed into those camps, because the Turkish government was very assistant about managing them on its own and eventually relinquish that and allowed international organizations to operate there. But yeah I think that the policies that I'm most interested in are these that can operate because of the ability for migratory refugees to, you know, integrate to an extent obviously not fully integrate in the way that we talk about it in the context of the global north but to participate nonetheless and I think it's it is difficult for people to do that in camps because most of the time it's you know they're very much not allowed to leave those camps and not allowed to interact with host country nationals in the country that are already outside of the camps. Thank you, by the way, you've got so many responses saying fantastic and brilliant presentations. But there's a question about your responsibility to your interlocutors, residing in these precarious conditions. So in a sense the question is what you know, say, is the book an intervention, or do you see it as an intervention, and then a another question because that both quite short ones is the differentiations between migrants and refugees because these are different sociological categories. Is there any difference in the way the countries you started to treat them. That is another question. Yeah, that's a great question. Both great questions. So in terms of my responsibilities. I mean this is you know it's an excellent question I think that we do have a great responsibility to those who are willing to give us our time you know I wasn't offering financial incentives or any other kind of incentives that people are so willing to share their stories with me and so I'm extremely grateful and you know I want this to be, I think there's such a danger to fall into a situation where you're being extractive as a researcher and I really tried to be conscious of that and to think about any ways that I could effectively, you know, make a difference if someone if so if I was able to offer something that people that I could offer. I mean you know sometimes people, even though it's very clear about the fact that this is just a research project and I don't work for, you know the UN or I don't work for an international organization that can provide direct assistance or could help them with their legal case etc. I still see me as, you know, a white American woman who maybe could do something for them or for their case. And so that always made me feel comfortable but I tried to be as forthright as possible and also gave them my contact information tried to stay in touch with as many people as possible beyond the research project, especially and this was you know at a time when things were becoming quite tumultuous and in terms of this, this topic so actually a number of you know I talk about how people don't leave and we need to focus on people that are remaining in these countries but a number of people I spoke with did leave and ended up in countries in Europe or I know a number of people who got resettled to the US. And for those people that I that I kept in touch with you know I was able to at least connect them with other people once they arrived in a new destination, or you know was able to write reference letters for some people who I kept in close contact with. So you can at least try to, you know, maintain your integrity as researcher by offering what you can, even though, you know, we, even though I can't as a, as someone who doesn't have a lot of power authority, who can't necessarily give people the help that they would like to or you know offering resources, as I was learning about these contacts and learning about different organizations that were operating on the ground, at least you know to provide the names of those organizations if people didn't already know about them pointing them to different directions or different resources. So that's a really good question that's not a very thorough answer but something I'm happy to talk more about if you know me. And then the second question was about the difference between migrants and refugees. Yeah, no that's a great question I have a you know a section in the introduction of the book where I talk about these labels and for me it was important to include all these categories. I asked people about their legal status if they were willing to share, but it became clear that people, and you know as the literature talks about people transition between categories, they might move from, you know, they might arrive in a state and be just a migrant and then learn about the UNHCR and then a few years later become an asylum seeker and then a few years after that become a refugee, and then, you know, or they might then decide to leave that state and travel somewhere else and become a migrant against these categories are often fluid. And what became clear also was that in the context in which I was speaking with people that sometimes their legal category really didn't matter in terms of the kind of things that they were able to do or how they how they were able to get by a lot of times asylum seekers or refugees were living just like the regular migrants. For me it was important to include all the categories, but you are right that there are important distinctions, both I think in terms of how the host state considers its legal obligations, sometimes sometimes it doesn't actually matter practice I would say, but also in terms of how international organizations consider them so UNHCR such a dominant player in all of these countries, and someone who has refugee or asylum seeker status is able to offer certain service or is able to access certain services that are funded by the UNHCR usually like an intermediary organization that others without that status are not able to. But you know it was important to me to still even though someone might be, they might be, you know, a closed file so there's someone that they think they should qualify for asylum or refugee status but they didn't for whatever reason and they don't want to go back home because it's not considered safe or it's not practical. So they're continuing to exist in the country. And just because they can't offer, or they can't access these services doesn't mean that you know they aren't trying to sort of find utilize the same strategies as someone who does have that status in order to get by. So for me it was important to look at all the categories. Okay, thank you. And so there's a question about the indifference policy. If any of these states put it in place, does that, is it viable if it endangers, engenders, I think endangers human or engenders, yeah, creates human rights violation. And in really show, so maybe you could comment on that. But also there's a brilliant question here which says, regarding the three types of policy identified liberal, repressive and indifferent. How far would you say that the states that you researched blend these strategically, rather than confining themselves to one or the other. Okay, I guess so the first question, which was, does it in danger, you said, you know, right, protections, human rights violations. Yes, I mean, I would argue yes, but nonetheless, I think it's, you know, in terms of how those international how those violations might be perceived internationally it still looks I think they're they're basically they're not following, you know, these have signed on to the 1951 refugee convention and system protocol in some sense although Turkey holds geographic limitations to to that that convention. Nonetheless, they do have these commitments these normative commitments to to protect my refugees and sound seekers on their territory. And yet we see many violations right so in all three cases you can pinpoint violations of what what a state should be committed to doing. And that said I think that, you know, a policy of indifference, you know, relatively hands off and sort of characterized by a lack of direct intervention looks a lot better than a repressive policy, whereby, you know, states are actively trying to remove people from its system, often very violently through policing and detention or deportation. And so I think that whilst it, you know, it doesn't look great. And I think the international community, predominantly global north states would like to see a state implement a more liberal policy because not not because they care so much about human rights but because that in theory would mean that people would stay there longer or they wouldn't feel the need to travel onward to the global to go north. I think that, you know, in comparison to a repressive policy and in different policies still looks pretty good or is perceived positively internationally. And then the next question is what so states do they kind of blend policies. Yeah, I think that's, that's an interesting way to put it. I guess I think about more what you know what I'm talking about in the book is what's the sort of predominant policy at any given time. So, as I said, in response to an earlier question, you know, looking at Morocco. In that earlier period that I'm calling where where I'm saying it had a predominantly in different policy. That doesn't mean that there weren't sort of elements of a repressive policy occurring, you know, as I said, especially in the north of the country where people were living close to the Spanish border. I think that there, you know, there can be an element of that at the time, but predominantly I would characterize the response at that point as as one of indifference. And again I think people I think states can kind of shift between these, given the incentives in place at the time. So Egypt as we talked about is one from what I would say is a more different policy to more repressive policy, and then I would say probably back to indifference, and now is maybe showing signs that it's interested in implementing a liberal policy, although again I think it would be more of a de jure liberal policy rather than real change on the ground that would you know characterize integration. Brilliant. So in relation to the indifference policy there's a question saying whether you whether by pursuing the indifference policy and allowing migrants to pursue informal work or go to school etc. It's an attribute to keeping them in a, you know, a protracted situation that is more difficult to to manage in the long run. Yeah, so how, you know, what do you think about that question, or did you not look into it. It's interesting because because states are offering some sense of, even though it's informal integration does that allow them to sort of continue to be there for a long term as opposed to necessitating that they either go back home or move on word right. Interesting question I think it brings up, you know, in the refugee and migration studies literature and the policy world, you talk about three options that states have right to to respond to refugees specifically so they can, or sorry they did not house states but three options that refugees themselves have so they can be resettled to a third country, they can locally integrate, or they can return back home those are sort of the three ways that refugees can manage or that people can sort of enforce that refugees So I think that in the book I talk a bit about how resettlement as we know is such a such an option for so few people so less than 1% of the world's refugees actually get resettled to a third country so that's kind of it's on the table but it's kind of barely on the table especially with the past four years of policy in the United States which was the largest resettlement country for many years right. So returning home is not always an option because people can't, you know, they have no control over what the situation in their home country is like and if it's a protracted such a simple poor or generalized violence or other situations where they might not feel comfortable returning home. So the option on the table is this sort of de facto local integration that, you know it's been it's been an option for a long time, I think, historically it was actually more of an option and it wasn't so politicized or it wasn't so So off the table for states. I think now it's really difficult to talk about local integration, even with states that I think would to some extent acknowledge that that local integration is occurring you know I talked with elite doctors in Egypt for example in the Egyptian government that handles that is responsible for migrants and refugees, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and they they know that local integration is occurring they know people are participating in the informal economy, but they don't want that to become they don't want to become forthright policy or you know written policy they they acknowledge that it's happening they acknowledge that there are all these organizations like UNHCR and other society actors that are kind of managing it on the state's behalf, but whether they want to really promote integration is another matter entirely. But I don't see it as so much promoting protracted situations I think it's sort of the only option left if people can necessarily return home, and if people can't travel onward. I think it would be better if states were more forthright and and willing to acknowledge that it's happening and maybe, if not encourage it at least allow it to happen in a more formal sense as opposed to as opposed to having to be sort of this under the table matter. So there's a question related to your chapter on ethnicity and or religion, and whether whether the question is does the state privilege refugees in line with that ethnicity or religion, while services and treatment in the case of Turkey, does Turkey make a distinction between refugees, such as the Kurds and the Yazidis or the Arab. So whether you could respond to that. Yeah, I'll say that. The short answer is yes, I think there are, you know, variations to policies that do occur according to someone's ethnicity or, you know, state sort of express preference for certain groups of refugees that arrive. But briefly about it in Turkey, and how you know we saw a very different treatment from from the government towards Kurdish refugees coming from Syria, versus other like other groups that arrived at one point in 2014 the government was very reluctant to sort of allow them to come in these groups from from the Kurdistan region in Syria because of, you know, it what it perceived as that possibly igniting tensions with Kurdish groups in Turkey. So, of course, there are preferences and hesitancies on the part of the government towards different groups in the book I focus more actually on Morocco and Egypt, because that was where I did more migrant refugee interviews or sort of the same sort of migrant refugee interviews. I also, this is getting a bit into the weeds but I talk a bit about how there's this, you know, assumption, and we help created I think in academia to about this dividing line of the Sahara. People from Sub-Saharan Africa versus North Africa. And I look in the case of these two receiving countries, Egypt and Morocco, about whether those procedures coming from Sub-Saharan Africa are treated differentially from other, you know, quote unquote, migrants and refugees coming from other parts of, you know, coming from Syria, for example. Or even in the case of Morocco, although it may be considered West Africa, a preferential group would be Senegalese because of history and sort of ties and religious ties between Senegal and Morocco. So that group is given sort of preferential treatment. But I do give, but I do, I do differentiate in this chapter as well between de facto treatment and de jure treatment. So, in the case of de jure treatment, this would be, you know, again, with this example of Senegalese and Morocco. And these are able to come to Morocco and not have to apply for a cart de jure like a residency permit in order to find work in Morocco. So that's sort of a leg up that they have over other individuals coming from West Africa. And, you know, you talk with lots of people coming from Nigeria, for example, or other parts of West Africa who see Senegalese as sort of the preferred group. And it doesn't mean that Senegalese themselves see themselves as preferred grouping in contrast to maybe Syrians, for example. So it's very relational. And I try to break apart all these different, you know, assumptions about religion and race and ethnicity in this chapter. And it's a complex issue. So I'm not probably going to do it justice here, but, but I do again look at de jure versus de facto treatment of individuals, as looking at it, you know, individual responses, you know, how they feel themselves being treated versus in the aggregate picture, looking at all these responses together and whether whether that that divide with the Sahara so whether you're sent Sub-Saharan African or coming from other parts of North Africa or the Middle East, whether that then factors into how people are treated or their perceptions of how they're treated. It's a bit convoluted. I know your question is mostly about Turkey. But I would love if you do read the book and read the chapter to hear your feedback. And specifically about Marco, there's there's a question that is related to this, which is, you know, you mentioned Senegalese, but can you elaborate on the treatment of migrants based on the history, race and religion in the context of both Marco's own racial and ethnic demographic mix. Islam as a state is history as anti-black racism toward black marathons. And in the same question, what impact has Marco's 2011 Constitution had on its policies towards migrants and refugees. So I don't know whether you covered that in your work. So I do talk a little bit about like the history, as they were alluding to in terms of history of slavery and sort of lasting effects of that in Morocco and perceptions of race that are, you know, that are influenced by this history, as well as, you know, history of coloniality and the last impact that that has had. So, and in terms of the 2011 Constitution, I don't think I talk about how that might impact this migration policy reform or perceptions of migrants and refugees themselves, but I would like, I would like to hear more if it sounds like this respondent is quite knowledgeable about the topics I'd like to hear their opinions if possible to if you want to email me. But yeah I'll just say that you know I talk about sort of the broad context of migration and perceptions of migration in in Morocco and I think in regards to your first question about media I talk a bit about you know how the media has covered the race and migration and a lot of linkages that are made between, you know, and also the influence of Spanish attitudes or Spanish policy towards migrants, which I think also impacts the now Morocco also feels about its new role as a host state. And I think that for migrants and refugees themselves, certainly they feel the implications of these racial attitudes and I think especially for those from certain West African countries. They in particular feel out as outsiders in Morocco and that seems that that will be a lasting issue even if we see sort of stronger moves towards protection or you know longer residency permits or longer or more more robust ways by which people might sort of stay legally in Morocco and build a life. I think that the issue of race and the issue of xenophobia will be a major battleground and I know that there are organizations working on this trying to promote tolerance and, you know, accepting of the presence of migrants amongst Moroccans. There's, you know, a lot of NGOs I think have taken up this this cause human rights focus NGOs that didn't necessarily work on migration before but they partnered with community based organizations migrant community based organizations to try and address this issue. So I think it's, you know, it's an ongoing, ongoing battle but I think that it needs to be like a dual approach of both the government leading the way with policies that make it possible for people to stay stay legally in Morocco, combine with this sort of sensitization for the Moroccan population. I'm going to put two last questions together because we don't have time and there's a one question, another question that is left unanswered but maybe you could post the question to Kelsey the contact information is in the chat. So the question is, are there cases where liberal approach has changed, you know, regularized employment livelihood opportunities. And in relation to this. In terms of Turkey's migration policy changing from indifferent to liberal engagement after 2013 to 2014. Could you give some examples of what type of policy changes occurred in the state level that aim to bring migrants and refugees into the international system. So the two questions are very similar. So in a sense, the liberal approach doesn't. And what concrete policies does a liberal approach bring or bring forward on the table. Sure. Um, those are great questions. I think so in terms of what we could draw on from positive examples I think there's there's lots and I think it, you know it's not a one size fits all solution so I think what could work more positively in Morocco might not be applicable in Turkey and vice versa but there's really great examples of regularization campaigns working so it's not not to critique Morocco for attempting that but I think that there were ways that it could have followed through on the regularization in as I said in the regard to the previous question in conjunction with other practices that would have made it more possible for people to have an easier time remaining in Morocco and participating formally. So regularization campaigns can work. I think it's just has to be quite carefully done. I think that, you know, in terms of other when we think about sort of what is a liberal policy, you know I mentioned earlier in the talk that encompasses things like making sure that that kids are able to access schools. But you know, in addition to making sure that that that they are really able to access schools I know in Egypt for example certain nationalities are able to access schools but in reality they face all sorts of barriers whether it's language barriers or you know, even if even if they're an Arabic speaker they might not speak the addition dialect, and that's a problem so they'd rather go to like an NGO run school or some sort of community school. So finding ways to integrate models so that people can send their kids to school and have them actually make sure that they're learning as well as, you know, finding employment opportunities. And I think that, you know, I talk a bit in the book and I don't want to go too far off topic here but about, you know, the push for example in the Jordan model to have what am I trying to say the economic model whereby during companies if they're willing to hire Syrian refugees for example they would receive all sorts of benefits for that right, but the way that that was implemented was critiqued by by people who know this context because it wasn't done in consultation with refugees themselves about what what their needs were and how could they actually travel to these special zones where they would be working formally for companies. I don't know whether there was childcare provided if women were going to be working in government factories etc. So I think whatever the attempt to allow for formal employment needs to be done in consultation with those who will be most impacted and so that's, I think that's, that's key. In terms of other, you know, we can think about other, whether it's schooling, access to housing, access to formal work, access to other types of services, health care, for example. All of these things I think in a liberal model would be done like pretty efficiently by the state. And I think that we're just not quite seeing that in any of the countries that are the two countries I talked about that they tried to implement a more more liberal model in terms of the second question which, if I'm remembering now was about, oh in Turkey, what did we really see. So we saw this huge overhaul of a framework, whereby, you know, people describe it to me as Turkey finally moving away from a more security oriented approach to migration and asylum towards a more human rights based approach. And that was supposed to mean, you know, the end of all sorts of problems in these in Turkish detention centers, less policing and more, you know, allowing people as I, as we talked about with, but a liberal model is allowing and ensuring that people have access to things like access to families or education. And in Turkey, you know, even with with Syrian nationals that was supposed to also mean allowing them to access formal work but again this hasn't really panned out in the way that was promised with with all that European funding that was coming in. I don't think that there are ways to improve that in Turkey I just don't know. I don't know how much the incentive is there at the moment to really ensure that that that policy on the ground is robust for refugees and I don't think that I don't think that there were enough sort of, there was enough conditionality and enough insurance on the part of Europe which was offering a lot of funding which was supposed to make the situation better at least for Syrian nationals as part of the EU Turkey deal. I don't think there's been enough monitoring or ensuring that that's really going to to shape on the ground. That's fantastic. That's a very good end to a brilliant discussion. I had loads of people saying fantastic discussion. Thank you. And I want to thank you for, you know, just, you know, the informative very informative and interesting to look at it comparatively and thinking about state governance in terms of refugees. So thanks for that and thanks for all the good questions everyone and look forward to reading the book I haven't read it yet. But now I feel I have to So please remember that the book is in the chat so you could go and kind of order it. And we're looking forward to see you again Kelsey. That's fantastic. Thank you so much for giving us your time. Thank you for having me.